13 - Santos v. Lumbao

9/12/21, 8:47 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 519
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Lumbao
*
G.R. No. 169129. March 28, 2007.
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.

VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F.
SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE
LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, respondents.
Appeals; In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of

review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
the Court; Exceptions.—It is well-settled that in the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the Court. But, the rule is not without
exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions in which factual
issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is
when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court. This exception is present in the case at bar.
Actions; Jurisdictions; Katarungang Pambarangay Law;

Barangay Conciliation; While non-compliance with the condition that
there must first be proper recourse to barangay conciliation before
filing of complaint in court or any government offices could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity, the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction.—Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative
Circular No. 14-93 provide that all disputes between parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay
conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a
complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with
the said condi-
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https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017bda1075898c0c27c1000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/23
* THIRD DIVISION.
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Santos vs. Lumbao
tion precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of

action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction. While it is true that the
present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the
same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real
property, hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the
city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is
located, which happens to be the same city where the contending
parties reside. In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed
to comply with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case,
however, respondents Spouses Lumbao’s non-compliance with the
aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although
petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao
should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the condition
precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely
instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the
case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Non-referral of a case for barangay

conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably
in a motion to dismiss.—Emphasis must be given to the fact that the
petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss.
However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it.
Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by
presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses
presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that
the active participation of a party in a case pending against him
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar
said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. It is also
well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation
when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and

may
410
Santos vs. Lumbao
therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to

dismiss. Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek
the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses
Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they
failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; An answer is a mere statement of

fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence;
In spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading,
the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented.—Facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed
admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an
absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact
which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And
in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading,
the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented. However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals
mentioned in its Decision, “[herein petitioners] had not adduced any
other evidence to override the admission made in their [A]nswer that
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa
dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the
purpose of the document, x x x.” Virgilio’s answers were unsure and
quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a
party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in
this case.
Sales; Notarial Law; A document acknowledged before a notary

public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity
—it is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein
and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution;
One who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature
appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the
jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act.—Both “Bilihan ng
Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a
document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document
that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence
of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption
of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption,
there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing.

Absent such evidence, the pre-
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Santos vs. Lumbao
sumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due

execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the burden
of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be
a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials
without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud
and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned
presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of
the facts stated in the aforesaid “Bilihan ng Lupa” are upheld.
Same; Co-Ownership; Even while an estate remains undivided,

co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
them, and, in any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to
transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void.—It
is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents
denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” the entire property owned by
Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her
co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the “Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981” because the exact metes and
bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao
could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that
does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence
have categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided,
co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
them. The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the
deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render
the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot
share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the
results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Same; Actions; Reconveyance; Prescription; Land Titles; When

the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed,
prescription cannot set in.—The defense of prescription of action and
laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the

decree of
412
Santos vs. Lumbao
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead

is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its rightful or
legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is, indeed, true that
the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute
because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription
cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that
registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for
enriching a person at the expense of another.
Same; Land Titles; Registration is not a requirement for validity

of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration
serves chiefly to bind third persons.—This Court holds that the
“Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance. The failure
of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents
registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It must be
remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of the
contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves
chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a
transaction involving the property had been entered into. Where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered
at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. Hence, the “Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners
are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents
are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Succession; Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their

predecessors-in-interest—whatever rights and obligations of the
decedent have over a property are transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations
of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the
heirs.—The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case.
Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the
said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent
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VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 413
Santos vs. Lumbao
have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of

succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations
of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the
heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because
they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between
them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights
their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right
and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Porfirio Gabiola, Jr. for petitioners.
Domingo E. Chiu, Sr. for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of1 Civil Procedure 2seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses
Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F.
Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and
Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos,
dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which
granted the appeal filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate

Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring, Rollo, pp. 47-
62.
2 Id., at p. 64.
414
Santos vs. Lumbao
Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and

ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F.
Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay
the latter attorney’s 3 fees and litigation expenses, thus,
reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint
for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao for lack of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all
surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the
late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985.
The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are
the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot
(subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita
during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a
part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria
Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On
the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate
share in her mother’s estate through a document4
denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the
aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the
second occasion, an additional seven square meters was
added to the
_______________
3 Penned by Judge Ma. Cristina C. Estrada, Rollo, pp. 103-114.

4 Id., at pp. 73-74.
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VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 415

Santos vs. Lumbao
land as evidenced by a document also 5

denominated as
“Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 9 January 1981.
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses
Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a
house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners
up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject
property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal

demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon
herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary
documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property
is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior
to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao
she could not deliver the title to the subject property because
the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from
Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that
petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one6
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other
heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject
property already sold to respondents
7
Spouses Lumbao and
now covered by TCT No. 81729 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses 8
Lumbao, through
counsel, sent a formal demand letter to petitioners but
despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed
and refused to reconvey the subject property to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a
Complaint
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 77-78.

6 Id., at pp. 80-82.
7 Id., at p. 83.
8 Id., at pp. 84-86.
416

Santos vs. Lumbao
9
for Reconveyance with Damages before the RTC of Pasig
City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that
the subject property had been sold to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed
because the same was duly published as required by law. On
the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint
for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses
Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code 10
of 1991, which
repealed Presidential Decree No. 1508 requiring first resort
to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court,

amended their Complaint because they discovered that on 16
February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana
for the sum of P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on
26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of the
petitioners that they failed to comply with the mandate of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents
Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was filed directly in
court in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations
may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented
Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses,
while the petitioners presented only the testimony of
petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 66-72.

10 A decree, “Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the
Barangay Level.”
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VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 417

Santos vs. Lumbao
“Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack

of merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to
protect their interest, [respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby
directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of P30,000.00 as
11
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit.”
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the

Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court
rendered a Decision, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the
subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents
spouses Lumbao] the sum of P30,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
12
No pronouncement as to costs.”
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the Resolution of
the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the
following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO
RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE
RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES
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11 Rollo, p. 114.
12 Id., at p. 61.
418

Santos vs. Lumbao
LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE

GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER
THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO
BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE “DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT” DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE
SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST
1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE
SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH
UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE
BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9
JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
[SPOUSES LUMBAO’S] COMPLAINT FOR
RECONVEYANCE IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON
COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508,

AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160. VII. THE
APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR
PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY[’]S FEES.
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented

in this case, because they claim that the factual findings of
the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They
allege that the findings of fact by the trial court revealed that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of
the documents known as “Bilihan ng Lupa”; hence, this
finding runs counter to the conclusion made by the appellate
court. And even assuming that they were witnesses to the
aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were
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Santos vs. Lumbao
not entitled to the reconveyance of the subject property

because they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert
their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since
respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a
period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of
execution of the second “Bilihan ng Lupa,” it would be unjust
and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be allowed
to recover the subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even respondents
Spouses Lumbao’s witness, Carolina Morales, testified that
neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present
during the execution of the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a
newspaper of general circulation to give notice to all creditors
of the estate subject of partition to contest the same within
the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant appeared to
interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to
the subject property was then issued in favor of the
petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good
faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering into any
subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the
documents denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa” because the
same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for
being falsified documents because one of those documents
made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were
witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally

before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did
not; 2) the identities of the properties in the “Bilihan ng
Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation
to the subject property in litigation were not established by
the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao;
3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their
claim over the subject property had already been barred
through estoppel by
420

Santos vs. Lumbao
laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s claim over

the subject property had already prescribed.
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with
the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic
Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the
petitioners may be restated as follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with

Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is
dismissible for their failure to comply with the
mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as “Bilihan ng
Lupa” are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the
bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for
reconveyance with damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to
comply with the “Bilihan ng Lupa” dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey
the subject property to herein respondents spouses
Lumbao.
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s

power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case considering that the findings of fact of the13 Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. But, the
rule is not14without exceptions. There are several recognized
exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this
_______________
13 Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA

311, 322.
14 Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judg-
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Santos vs. Lumbao
Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings of the

appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This
exception is present in the case at bar.
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the
argument of the petitioners that the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act
No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of15 the aforesaid law and Administrative
Circular No. 14-93 provide that all disputes between parties
actu-
_______________
ment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts

are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion [Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243; 336 SCRA 97,
110 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments
Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547; 305 SCRA 70, 74-75 (1999);
Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283; 285 SCRA 351, 357-
358 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471
SCRA 311, 322.
15 Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to
Prevent Circumvention of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
[Sections 399-442, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991] issued by the Supreme Court
on 15 July 1993.
422

Santos vs. Lumbao
ally residing in the same city or municipality are subject to

barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a
precondition before filing a complaint in court or any
government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause
of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same
would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it,
where the 16defendants failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction.
While it is true that the present case should first be
referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the
parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig
City) and the dispute between them involves a real property,
hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city
in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy,
is located, which happens to be the same city where the
contending parties reside. In the event that respondents
Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition
precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages
can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s non-compliance with the aforesaid condition
precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners
alleged in their answer that the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should
be dismissed for their failure to comply with the condition
precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely
instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear
the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said
complaint.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners
could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss.
However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same
jurisdic-
_______________
16 Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65072, 31 January

1984, 127 SCRA 470, 473-474.
423
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 423

Santos vs. Lumbao
tion by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it.

Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case
by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the
witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It
is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case
pending against him before a court is tantamount to
recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case which will bar17 said party
from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. It is also
well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed 18
waived
if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. Hence,
herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-
compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek
the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents
Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said
defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the
“Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to
appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the
execution of the said documents and that the identities of the
properties in those documents in relation to the subject
property has not been established by the evidence of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the
enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of
action and laches.
It is the petitioners’ incessant barking that the “Bilihan ng
Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and
_______________
17 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. No. 112526,

16 March 2005, 453 SCRA 432, 477.
18 Bañares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36,
50-51.
424

Santos vs. Lumbao
their allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbao’s

witness Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not
present during the execution of the aforementioned

documents. This is specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court
finds that in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979, the
signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon.
Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they
acted as witnesses in the 19
execution of the “Bilihan ng Lupa,”
dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their
obligations in the said “Bilihan ng Lupa,” petitioner Virgilio, in
his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale
transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same
as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the
length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio
did not categorically deny having signed the “Bilihan ng
Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof, his
testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the
counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted
hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. Witness . . . Virgilio Santos, that you
don’t know about this document which was marked as
Exhibit “A” for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised
the question that he does not have any knowledge but
not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being. . . you are one of the witnesses of this document?
[I]s it not?
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 87, 97.
425
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 425

Santos vs. Lumbao
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature
at the left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos,
will you please go over the same and tell the court whose
signature is this?
A. I don’t remember, sir, because of the length of time that
had passed.
Q. But that is your signature?
A. I don’t have eyeglasses . . . My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario
Mangahas?
20
A. I don’t remember.
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are

deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him,
but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a
mere statement of fact which 21
the party filing it expects to
prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of
judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still
22
given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals
mentioned in its Decision, “[herein petitioners] had not
adduced any other evidence to override the admission made
in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually
signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except
that they
23
were just misled as to the purpose of the document,
x x x.” Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence,
the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a
pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this
case.
_______________
20 TSN, 12 September 1996. Records, pp. 13-14.

21 Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053, 23 January 1997, 266
SCRA 596, 604.
22 Id., at p. 605.
23 Rollo, p. 55.
426

Santos vs. Lumbao
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness

Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings made by the
appellate court. Thus—
“[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question

during cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were
not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be
pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she
confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the
lot from [Rita] (“nagkabilihan”). Said witness positively identified and
confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of
[respondents spouses Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement
that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with them during
the transaction does not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of
sale attesting to their mother’s voluntary act of selling a portion of
her share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that
testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its
entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages
24
therein.”
Furthermore, both “Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated 17

August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a
notary public. It is well-settled that a document
25
acknowledged
before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive
26
presumption
of its existence and due execution. To overcome this
presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear
and convincing.
27
Absent such evidence, the presumption must
be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due execution of
a
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 55-56.

25 Rule 132, Section 19(b) of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
26 Id., Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; Medina v. Greenfield
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA
150, 160; Agasen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508, 15 February 2000,
325 SCRA 504, 511.
27 Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, Id.
427
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 427

Santos vs. Lumbao
deed where one’s signature appears has the burden of

proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the
deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case
petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing evidence to
support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to
overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the
authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in
the aforesaid “Bilihan ng Lupa” are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the
properties described in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property
were not established by respondents Spouses Lumbao’s
evidence is likewise not acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the

documents denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” the entire
property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet
divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of
the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in
the “Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981” because the exact metes and bounds of the subject
property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be
possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not
make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and
jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an
estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership
of their respective aliquots or undivided shares
28
and may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal
portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere
fact that the deed
_______________
28 Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 593,
610-611.
428

Santos vs. Lumbao
purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render

the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the
aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is
subject to the results
29
of the partition upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been
partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, the 107-square meter lot sold by the mother of
the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be
deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in
representation of their deceased mother, which in this case
measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer
be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no
longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during
the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two
“Bilihan ng Lupa” documents was described as “a portion of a
parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674,”
while the subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate

of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment
because in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by
Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the
petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration
No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT No.
3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is,
thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax
Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one
and the same.
_______________
29 Heirs of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, G.R. No.
152168, 10 December 2004, 446 SCRA 56, 71.
429
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 429

Santos vs. Lumbao
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise

unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better
right. It is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of
registered property is not absolute because it is subject to
extinctive prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot
set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that
registration proceedings could not be used as a shield30 for
fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because the
latter have been and are still in actual possession and
occupation as owners of the property sought to be
reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by
the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao
cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start
that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of
the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of
the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her
lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to
do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot had not been
partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire
estate of Maria, petitioners still included the 107-square meter
lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves

despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their
mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the
“Bilihan ng Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the
basis
_______________
30 Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, 16

January 2004, 420 SCRA 51, 56-58.
430

Santos vs. Lumbao
of the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s action for

reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to
have the said documents registered does not affect its validity
and enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is
not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the
parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind
third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely
to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a
transaction involving the property had been entered into.
Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest
which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the
same land, his knowledge of that prior 31unregistered interest
has the effect of registration as to him. Hence, the “Bilihan
ng Lupa” documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are
bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such
documents are absolutely valid between and among the
parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts
entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
32
applies in the
present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule.
It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of
acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent33
to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.
Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a
transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they
_______________
31 Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125585, 8 June

2005, 459 SCRA 412, 426.
32 Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent.
33 Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, G.R. No.
140182, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 436, 446
431
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 431

Santos vs. Lumbao
have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting

their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest
between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed
to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding
against her is also valid and binding as against them. The
death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of
the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by
the death of the party when the other party 34
has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother,
they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the
“Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981.
Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents
Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought
from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as correctly ruled by the
appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses
Lumbao attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for having
been compelled
35
to litigate and incur expenses to protect their
interest. On this matter, we do not find reasons to reverse
the said findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively,
are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to
_______________
34 DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118248, 5 April

2000, 329 SCRA 666, 674-675.
35Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs cannot be recovered, except:
(1) x x x
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) x x x
432

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject

property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Failure of a party to specifically allege the fact

that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. (Diu vs. Court
of Appeals, 251 SCRA 472 [1995])
An allegation in the complaint that the petitioners had
initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful
detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with
P.D. No. 1508, as well as the certification to file action by the
barangay chairman, is sufficient compliance with Article 151
of the Family Code. (Martinez vs. Martinez, 461 SCRA 562
[2005])
——o0o——
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9/12/21, 8:47 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 519

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.

Appeals; In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of

Actions; Jurisdictions; Katarungang Pambarangay Law;

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 409

Santos vs. Lumbao

tion precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of

Same; Same; Same; Non-referral of a case for barangay

when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Lumbao

therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to

Same; Pleadings and Practice; An answer is a mere statement of

Sales; Notarial Law; A document acknowledged before a notary

there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing.

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 411

Santos vs. Lumbao

sumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due

Same; Co-Ownership; Even while an estate remains undivided,

Same; Actions; Reconveyance; Prescription; Land Titles; When

laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Lumbao

registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead

Same; Land Titles; Registration is not a requirement for validity

Succession; Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 413

Santos vs. Lumbao

have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Lumbao

Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and

3 Penned by Judge Ma. Cristina C. Estrada, Rollo, pp. 103-114.

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 415

land as evidenced by a document also 5

property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal

5 Id., at pp. 77-78.

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court,

9 Id., at pp. 66-72.

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 417

“Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack

Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE

COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508,

Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 419

not entitled to the reconveyance of the subject property

witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s claim over