Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136806, 22 August 2000

8/28/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 338
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 485

Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. No. 136806. August 22, 2000.
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; The resolution of

a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion, and a lower court’s order of denial shall not be
disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the
prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether or not such
evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such
judicial discretion has been gravely abused.—The resolution of a
demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be
disturbed, that is, the appellate courts
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide

whether or not such evidence has established the guilt of the
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b8ccdbc3b3e008264000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/17
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has

established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused,
thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere
allegations of such abuse will not suffice. For the special civil
action of certiorari to lie, it is crucial that . . . there must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of
both civil law and common law traditions. To warrant the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of
jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross
or grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or
the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all, in contemplation of law. x x x
Same; Same; The appropriate recourse from an order denying
a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial,
after which the accused may file an appeal from the judgment of
the lower court rendered after such trial.—When there is no
showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order denying a
demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial,
after which the accused may file an appeal from the judgment of
the lower court rendered after such trial. In the present case, we
are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely
abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s demurrer to
evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution’s evidence
satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged.
Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in
the pleadings of petitioner that would show otherwise.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Where
retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the
jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending
prior to their enactment.—It is well established that the
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the
court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to
exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of the case
and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction
over such proceedings in another tribunal. A recognized exception
to this rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending
before its enactment. However, where such retroactive effect is

not provided for, statutes altering the
487
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 487
jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending

prior to their enactment.
Criminal Law; Public Officers; Words and Phrases; An offense
is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused’s office when
such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense
charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official
functions of accused.—Thus, to fall within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged
must be either one of those mentioned in paragraph (a)
abovementioned or one committed by a public officer in relation to
his office. The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be
committed in relation to the accused’s office when such office is an
element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is
intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of
accused. This was our ruling in Cunanan v. Arceo wherein the
Court explained several decisions dealing with the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Court held—In Sanchez v.
Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the
scope and reach of the term “offense committed in relation to [an
accused’s] office” by referring to the principle laid down in
Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil. 49 (1951)], and to an exception to
that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil. 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is
that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
accused’s office if “the offense cannot exist without the office” such
that “the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.” In
People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion,
said that “although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in [the] abstract,” the facts in a particular case may show
that “x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected
with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it
had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x”
Same; Same; Grave Threats; Where the information charged a
municipal mayor with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill a
councilor during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a
privilege speech critical of the former’s administration, clearly the
crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of his
official functions.—The jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar,
the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the
crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code
488
against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with
aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public
hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations,
the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that
the accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor
when he attended said public hearing” and that “accused’s violent
act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the
municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was
not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by
whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech.” Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

De Borja, Medialdea, Bello, Guevarra, Serapio and
Gerodias for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the1 Rules of

Court, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it issued its Resolution dated
July 28, 1998 denying his demurrer to evidence and the
subsequent Resolution dated December 17, 1998 denying2
his motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 23069.
The factual background of this case is set out herein:
_______________
1 The assailed resolutions were issued by the First Division composed of

Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Justices Catalino R.
Castaneda, Jr. and German G. Lee, Jr. However, by the time the
December 17, 1998 Resolution was issued, Justice Lee, Jr. was replaced by
Justice Gregory S. Ong.
2 Rollo, 8.
489
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 489

On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting

through the3 Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an
information with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave threats as
defined in Article 282 of the Revised 4
Penal Code. On the
same day, a second information was filed charging
petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. These informations were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively.
Criminal Case No. 23070 was raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Acting upon a motion for
reinvestigation filed by petitioner, the Office of the Special
5
5
Prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information,
which motion was eventually 6
granted by the
Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1996.
Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. 23069 was assigned to
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also
filed a motion for reinvestigation with the court on May 8,
1996, to which the prosecution objected. On June 18, 1996,
the court issued a resolution deferring action on
petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation until compliance by
the prosecution with the court’s resolution of March 20 and
28, 1996, requiring the amendment of the information so as
to indicate the “office-related” character of the crime
charged. On November 8, 1996, the 7
Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed an ex-parte motion for the admission of an
amended information which reads—
That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime herein charged in
relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45
caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi,
during a public hearing about the pollution from the operations of
the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said
com-
_______________
3 Records, vol. II, 2-A - 2-B.

4 Rollo, 73.
5 Ibid., 100-101.
6 Ibid., 87-90.
7 Records, vol. 1, 100-101.
490

plainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and

excesses of the administration of said accused.
8
8
In its resolution of January 30, 1997, the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information. 9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, praying
that the court reconsider its admission of the amended
information. He claimed that the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070 arose out of the same
incident; that considering that the latter case had already
been dismissed by the court on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the same since the crime charged was not
“office-related,” the same ruling should apply to the former
10
case. After the prosecution had filed 11
its comment, the
First Division issued a resolution on April 25, 1997,
denying petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. 23069 and his motion for reconsideration. With
regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan held
that—
In criminal cases, the court’s jurisdiction in the first instance is

determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information.
The complaint or information must be examined for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the
punishment provided for by law for such acts fall within the
jurisdiction of the court in which the complaint or information is
presented. If the facts set out in the complaint or information are
sufficient to show the court in which the complaint or information
is presented has jurisdiction, then the court has jurisdiction (U.S.
vs. Mallari, 24 Phil 366; Magay vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456;
Enerio vs. Alampay, 64 SCRA 142).
A perusal of the Amended Information in the instant case
readily shows that the felony allegedly committed was
“officerelated,” hence, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is
alleged therein that accused mayor committed the crime of grave
threats when he levelled and aimed his gun at and threatened to
kill private complainant Simeon Legazpi during a public hearing
about the pollution which resulted from the operation of Giant
Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after said com-
_______________
8 Rollo, 118.
9 Ibid., 119-122.
10 Ibid., 123-124.
11 Ibid., 126-132.
491
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 491

plainant rendered a privileged speech critical of the abuses and

excesses of the administration of the accused. As the local chief
executive, the health and sanitation problem of the community
was one of the accused’s main concern[s]. Thus, accused was
performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended
said public hearing. It is apparent from the allegations, that,
although public office is not an element of the crime of grave
threat[s] in abstract, as committed by the accused, there is an
intimate connection/relation between the commission of the
offense and accused’s performance of his public office.
Moreover, accused’s violent act was precipitated by
complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech.
It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If
he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during
said privilege speech.
x x x x x x x x x
The ruling in Criminal Case No. 23070 relied upon by the
accused will not apply in this case, because the offense involved
there was [a] [v]iolation of Section 3 (e) of RA. 3019. It is an
essential element of said offense that the act of the accused in
causing undue injury to any party including the Government or
the giving to any party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or
perference was done in the course of the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial function. The ponente, the Hon. Jose S.
Balajadia, however, found the said circumstance not obtaining in
the said case (Crim. Case No. 23070) because the incident
complained of took place after the public hearing when the
accused was not anymore performing any of his official
administrative functions. The difference lies in the fact that in the
case at bar (grave threats), said condition is not a component
element. All that the law requires for the crime to be within the
jurisdiction of this court is the fact that the felony was committed
“in relation to his office” (not during the discharge of his official
function).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and on the further ground that
accused’s primary intent in pleading a reinvestigation is the
determination of the “office-related” character of the crime, which
is now passed upon, his Motion for Reinvestigation is hereby
DENIED due course. His Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s Resolution dated January 30, 1997 is likewise DENIED

for lack of merit.
492

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

cited ruling,
12
but the Sandiganbayan denied the same in its
resolution dated June 18, 1997. Thus, 13
petitioner was
prompted to file a petition for certiorari with this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s April 25, 1997 and June
18, 1997 resolutions, which case was 14
docketed as G.R. No.
130231. However, in our resolution dated September 22,
1997, we dismissed the petition “for failure to sufficiently
show that the questioned [resolutions were] tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.”
Thus, the trial of Criminal Case No. 23069 proceeded.
On May 19, 1998, after the prosecution had completed the
presentation
15
of its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence on the ground that the prosecution had failed to
prove that he had committed the crime charged in the
information and that the act complained of took place while
he was performing 16
his official functions.
In a resolution dated July 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. The resolution
states that—
x x x x x x x x x
The accused herein is charged with having threatened to kill
Simeon Legaspi by pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. There is
evidence on record that the acts were indeed committed.
Regardless of whether or not the pistol was cocked, the pointing of
a firearm at a person in a hostile manner is an act demonstrating
an intent to inflict harm to that person. Whether or not the
accused Mayor was in the performance of his proper duties when
he pointed the .45 caliber pistol is not a proper issue of
jurisdiction for this Court since all illegal acts are never proper
acts of one’s public office. What is at evidence is that an ordinary
citizen was not in a position to convoke the Sanggunian Bayan
nor to preside over the same, much less to interfere with the
legislative proceedings of the Municipal Council which, because

he as mayor, the accused could and did, even if unlawfully.
x x x x x x x x x
_______________
12 Ibid., 134-136.
13 Records, vol. I, 307-424.
14 Ibid., 476.
15 Ibid., vol. II,6-18.
16 Rollo, 49.
493
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 493

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was similarly

denied by17 the Sandiganbayan in its December 17, 1998
resolution explaining that—
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, an illegal act is not an official act; rather the question
boils down to whether or not the acts attributed to the accused
herein were performed by him in the occasion of either the
performance of his duties or of his assertion of his authority to do
so. Were the rule to be otherwise, the Sandiganbayan would never
have jurisdiction of criminal acts of public officers since these acts
would never be the performance of official duties or be official acts,
although they might be in the occasion thereof.
x x x x x x x x x
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner asks this

Court to set aside the July 28, 1998 and December 17, 1998
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan and to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 23069. In addition, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin public respondent from
further proceeding
18
with said case until this petition has
been resolved. 19
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Comment
on April 22, 1999. 20On May 18, 1999, petitioner filed a
motion to resolve his application for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in
order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding

with the21
case, which prayer he reiterated in a subsequent
motion filed with this Court on July 22, 1999. On
September 6, 1999, the Court22 denied petitioner’s July23 22,
1999 motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Reply on
December 6, 1999. The prosecution and the defense then
filed their respective
_______________
17 Ibid., 50.
18 Ibid., 44.
19 Ibid., 182-193.
20 Ibid., 194-200.
21 Ibid., 203-208.
22 Ibid., 209.
23 Ibid., 220-225.
494

24
Memorandums
25
on March 16, 2000 and on March 30,
2000, respectively, after which the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
Petitioner sets forth the following issues for the Court’s
resolution—
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 23069 FALLS WITHIN ITS
JURISDICTION.
III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER 26
SHOULD BE
GRANTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
With regard to the first issue, petitioner claims that the

elements constituting the crime of grave threats have not
been proven. He insists that the prosecution had not
established that his act of pointing a gun at complainant
Simeon Legaspi, assuming 27
that it had actually occurred,
constituted grave threats. However, quite to the contrary,
the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution’s evidence,
standing unrebutted by any opposing
28
evidence, sufficiently
established the crime charged.
The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left
to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s
order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate
courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and
precipitately decide whether or not such evidence has
established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial
discretion has been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a
lack or
_______________
24 Ibid., 228-238.
25 Ibid., 241-280.
26 Ibid., 256.
27 Ibid., 256-259.
28 Ibid., 49.
495
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 495

29
excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will
not suffice. For the special civil action of certiorari to lie, it
is crucial that
. . . there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise

of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance
with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. To
warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion
must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to

an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty
30
enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law. x x
x
When there is no showing31

of such grave abuse, certiorari is
not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate recourse
from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the
court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may
file an appeal from the32 judgment of the lower court
rendered after such trial. In the present case, we are not
prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely
abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s demurrer
to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution’s
evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the
crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the
records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that
would show otherwise.
Coming now to the second issue, petitioner assails the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the case on the ground
that the crime was not committed in relation to his office.
He contends that it has not been established that the crime
charged was committed by him while in the discharge of or
as a consequence of his official functions as municipal
mayor. Additionally, he claims that public office
_______________
29 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 18 (1997). See also Antonio v.

Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 328 (1998); People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA
453, 459 (1988).
30 Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).
31 Morales v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 211 (1997).
32 Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677 (1986), citing People v. Court of
Appeals, 119 SCRA 162 (1982); Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324 (1979);
People v. Romero, 22 Phil. 565.
496

is not an essential ingredient of the crime of grave threats,

which may be committed by a public officer and a private
individual alike, with the same facility. Therefore, the

Sandiganbayan 33
erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the
present case.
It is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. Once the court
acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to
exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of
the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation
vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
it is intended to operate upon actions pending before its
enactment. However, where such retroactive effect is not
provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court
cannot be applied
34
to cases already pending prior to their
enactment.
The original information in Criminal Case No. 23069
was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 1, 1995,
whereas the amended information was filed with the same
court on November 8, 1996 and admitted by the
Sandiganbayan on January 30, 1997. The applicable law at
this time would be Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 35
1606),
as amended by Republic Act No. 36
7975 (RA 7975), which
took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 4 of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 7975, provides that—
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases

involving:
_______________
33 Rollo, 260-272.
34 People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998); Azarcon v. Sandigan-bayan, 268
SCRA 747 (1997); People v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996), citing People v.
Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976) and People v. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968).
35 Entitled “TO AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED.
Approved on March 30, 1995.
36 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
497
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 497

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, x x x
x x x x x x x x x
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials

and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.
x x x x x x x x x
Thus, to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged must be either
one of those mentioned in paragraph (a) abovementioned or
one committed by a public officer in relation to his office.
The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be
committed in relation to the accused’s office37
when such
office is an element of the crime charged or when the
offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of the official functions
38
of accused. This was our ruling in
Cunanan v. Arceo wherein the Court explained several
decisions dealing with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
The Court held—
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court

elaborated on the scope and reach of the term “offense committed
in relation to [an accused’s] office” by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil. 49 (1951)], and to an
exception to that principle which was recognized in People v.
Montejo [108 Phil. 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in
relation to the accused’s office if “the offense cannot exist without
the office” such that “the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x.” In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief
Justice Concepcion said that “although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,” the facts in a
particular case may show that “x x x the offense therein charged
is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the
accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they

would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices, x x x”
_______________
37 People v. Cawaling, supra.

38 242 SCRA 88 (1995).
498

The jurisdiction of a court is determined

39
by the allegations
in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the
amended information contained allegations that the
accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official
functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan
when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant
Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at
and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with
the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was
elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997
resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing
his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing” and that “accused’s violent act was
precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of the
municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he
was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said
during said privilege speech.” Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima,

JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The purpose for obtaining leave of court prior

to filing a demurrer to evidence is to determine whether or
not the defendant
_______________
39 People v. Cawaling, supra., citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA

408 (1995); Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998); Chico v. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 (1998); Cunanan v. Arceo, supra.
499
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 499

Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
in a criminal case has filed the demurrer merely to stall the

proceedings. (People vs. Mahinay, 246 SCRA 451 [1995])
Whoever avails of a demurrer to evidence gambles his
right to adduce evidence. (Quebral vs. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 353 [1996]) The jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. (National
Irrigation Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA
255 [1999])
——o0o——
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Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136806, 22 August 2000

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8/28/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 338

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 485

EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, petitioner, vs. THE

Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; The resolution of

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan

will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide

accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has

before its enactment. However, where such retroactive effect is

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 487

Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan

jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan

against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the1 Rules of

1 The assailed resolutions were issued by the First Division composed of

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 489

On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting

That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and

3 Records, vol. II, 2-A - 2-B.

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

plainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and

In criminal cases, the court’s jurisdiction in the first instance is

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 491

plainant rendered a privileged speech critical of the abuses and

Court’s Resolution dated January 30, 1997 is likewise DENIED

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

legislative proceedings of the Municipal Council which, because

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 493

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was similarly

Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner asks this

order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF

With regard to the first issue, petitioner claims that the

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 495

. . . there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise

personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to

When there is no showing31

29 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 18 (1997). See also Antonio v.

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is not an essential ingredient of the crime of grave threats,

individual alike, with the same facility. Therefore, the

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases

VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 497

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials

Thus, to fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court

accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they

37 People v. Cawaling, supra.

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The jurisdiction of a court is determined

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima,

Notes.—The purpose for obtaining leave of court prior