VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 947: Goquiolay, Et Al. vs. Sycip, Et Al

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 108 05/12/2020, 11(56 AM
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 947

Goquiolay, et al. vs. Sycip, et al.
[No. L-11840. July 26, 1960]

[With resolution of December 10, 1963]
ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY and THE PARTNERSHIP

"TAN SIN AN and ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY", plaintiffs
and appellants vs. WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, ET AL.,
defendants and appellees.
1. PARTNERSHIP; MANAGEMENT, RIGHT OF

EXCLUSIVE; PERSONAL RIGHT; TERMINATION UPON
MANAGER-PARTNER'S DEATH.·The right of exclusive
management conferred upon Tan Sin An, being premised
upon trust and confidence, was a mere personal right that
terminated upon Tan's demise.
2. ID.; ARTICLES OF CO-PARTNERSHIP; RIGHT OF HEIRS

TO REPRESENT DECEASED PARTNER; MANAGERIAL
RIGHT; PROPRIETARY INTEREST.·The provision in the
Articles of Co-partnership stating that "in the event of
death of any one of the partners within the 10-year term of
the partnership, the deceased partner shall be represented
by his heirs", could not have referred to the managerial
right given to Tan Sin An; more appropriately, it relates to
the succession in the proprietary interest of each partner.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF HEIRS' FAILURE TO REPUDIATE;

HEIRS BECOME INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS; MINORITY
OF HEIRS.·Consonant with the articles of co-partnership
providing for the continuation of the firm notwithstanding
the death of one of the partners, the heirs of the deceased,
by never repudiating or refusing to be bound under said
provision, became individual partners with Antonio
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Goquiolay upon Tan's demise. Minority of the heirs is not a

bar to the application of that clause in the articles of co-
partnership. Heirs liability in the partnership being limited
to the value of their importance, they become no more than
limited partners, when they manifest their intent to be
bound as general partners.
948
948 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
4. ID.; SALE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES; CONSENT

OF ALL PARTNERS UNNECESSARY; STRANGERS
DEALING WITH PARTNERSHIPS; POWER TO BIND
PARTNERSHIP.·As to whether or not the consent of the
other partners was necessary to perfect the sale of the
partnership properties, the Court believes that it is not.
Strangers dealing with a partnership have the right to
assume, in the absence of restrictive clauses in the
copartnership agreement, that every general partner has
power to bind the partnership.
5. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL.·By allowing defendant Kong Chai

Pin to retain control of the partnership properties from 1942
to 1949, plaintiff Goquiolay estopped himself from denying
her (Kong Chai Pin's) legal representation of the
partnership, with the power to bind it by proper contracts.
6. PARTNERSHIP; GENERAL PARTNER BY ESTOPPEL;

WIDOW OF MANAGING PARTNER AUTHORIZED BY
OTHER PARTNER TO MANAGE PARTNERSHIP.·By
authorizing the widow of the managing partner to manage
partnership property (which a limited partner could not be
authorized to do), the other general partner recognized her
as a general partner, and is now in estoppel to deny her
position as a general partner, with authority to administer
and alienate partnership property.
7. ID.; HEIR OF PARTNER; STATUS ORDINARILY AS

LIMITED PARTNER BUT MAY WAIVE IT AND BECOME
A GENERAL PARTNER.·Although the heir of a partner

ordinarily becomes a limited partner for his own protection,
yet the heir may disregard it and instead elect to become a
collective or general partner, with all the rights and
obligations of one. This choice pertains exclusively to the
heir, and does not require the assent of the surviving
partner.
8. ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; AUTHORITY OF PARTNER TO

DEAL WITH PROPERTY.·A third person has the right to
presume that a general partner dealing with partnership
property has the requisite authority from his co-partners.
9. ID.; PROPERTY OF PARTNERSHIP; SALE OF

IMMOVABLES, WHEN CONSIDERED WlTHIN THE
ORDINARY POWERS OF A GENERAL PARTNER.
·Where the express and avowed purpose of the partnership
is to buy and sell real estate (as in the present case), the
immovables thus acquired by the firm form part of its stock-
in-trade, and the sale thereof is in pursuance of partnership
purposes, hence within the ordinary powers of the partner.
10. ID.; SALE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; ACTION FOR

RESCISSION ON GROUND OF FRAUD; NO
INADEQUACY OF PRICE; CASE AT
949
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 949
BAR.·Appellant's claim that the price was inadequate,

relies on the testimony of a realtor, who in 1955, six years
after the sale in question, asserted that the land was by
then worth double the price for which it was sold. But
taking into account the continued rise of real estate values
since liberation, and the f act that the sale in question was
practically a forced sale because the partnership had no
other means to pay its legitimate debts, this evidence
certainly does not show such "gross inadequacy" as to justify
the rescission of the sale.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP ALONE IS NO BADGE OF

FRAUD.·The Supreme Court has ruled that relationship
alone is not a badge of fraud (Oria Hnos. vs. McMicking, 21
Phil., 243; Hermandad del Smo, Nombre de Jesus vs.
Sanchez, 40 Official Gazette 1685).
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; FRAUD OF CREDITORS DISTINGUISHED

FROM FRAUD TO OBTAIN CONSENT.·Fraud used to
obtain a party's consent to a contract (deceit or dolus in
contrahendo) is different from fraud of creditors that gives
rise to a rescission of contract.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSIDIARY NATURE; ALLEGATION OF

NO OTHER MEANS TO OBTAIN REPARATION,
NECESSARY.·The action for rescission is subsidiary; it
can not be instituted except when the party suffering
damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for
the same. Hence, if there is no allegation or evidence that
the plaintiff can not obtain reparation 'from the widow and
heirs of the deceased partner, the suit to rescind the sale in
question is not maintainable, even if the fraud charged
actually did exist.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Davao. Fernandez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose C. Colayco, Manuel O. Chan and Padilla Law
Offices for appellants.
Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar & Associates for appellees.
REYES, J. B. L. J.:
Direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao (the amount involved being more than
P200,000) dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants' complaint.
From the stipulation of facts of the parties and the
evidence on record, it would appear that on May 29, 1940,
950

Tan Sin An and Antonio C. Goquiolay entered into a

general commercial partnership under the partnership
name "Tan Sin An and Antonio C. Goquiolay", for the
purpose of dealing in real estate. The partnership had a
capital of P30,000.00, P18,000.00 of which was contributed
by Goquiolay and P12,000.00 by Tan Sin An. The
agreement lodged upon Tan Sin An the sole management of
the partnership affairs, stipulating that·
"III. The co-partnership 'shall be composed of said Tan

Sin An as sole managing and partner (sic), and
Antonio C. Goquiolay as co-partner.
"VIII. The affairs of the co-partnership shall be managed
exclusively by the managing and partner (sic) or by
his authorized agent, and it is expressly stipulated
that the managing and partner (sic) may delegate
the entire management of the affairs of the co-
partnership by irrevocable power of attorney to any
person, firm or corporation he may select upon such
terms as regards compensation as he may deem
proper, and vest in such person, firm or corporation
full power and authority, as the agent of the co-
partnership and in his name, place and stead to do
anything for it or on his behalf which he as such
managing and partner (sic) might do or cause to be
done.
"IX. The co-partner shall have no voice or participation
in the management of the affairs of the co-
partnership; but he may examine its accounts once
every six (6) months at any time during ordinary
business hours, and in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Commerce." (Articles of
Co-Partnership).
The lifetime of the partnership was fixed at ten (10) years

and also that·
"In the event of the death of any of the partners at any time before
the expiration of said term, the co-partnership shall not be
dissolved but will have to be continued and the deceased partner
shall be represented by his heirs or assigns in said co-partnership"
(Art. XII, Articles of Co-Partnership).
However, the partnership could be dissolved and its affairs

liquidated at any time upon mutual agreement in writing
of the partners (Art. XIII, articles of Co-Partnership).
On May 31, 1940, Antonio Goquiolay executed a general
power of attorney to this effect:
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VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 951

"That besides the powers and duties granted the said Tan Sin An by
the articles of co-partnership of said co-partnership "Tan Sin An
and Antonio Goquiolay", the said Tan Sin An should act as my
Manager for said co-partnership for the full period of the term for
which said co-partnership was organized or until the whole period
that the said capital of P30,000.00 of the copartnership should last,
to carry on to the best advantage and interest of the said co-
partnership, to make and execute, sign, seal and deliver for the co-
partnership, and in its name, all bills, bonds, notes, specialties, and
trust receipts or other instruments or documents in writing
whatsoever kind or nature which shall be necessary to the proper
conduction of the said businesses, including the power to mortgage
and pledge real and personal properties, to secure the obligation of
the co-partnership, to buy real or personal properties for cash or
upon such terms as he may deem advisable, to sell personal or real
properties, such as land's and buildings of the co-partnership in any
manner he may deem advisable for the best interest of said co-
partnership, to borrow money on behalf of the co-partnership and to
issue promissory notes for the repayment thereof, to deposit the
funds of the co-partnership in any local bank or elsewhere and to
draw checks against funds so deposited * * *.
On May 29, 1940, the plaintiff partnership "Tan Sin An and

Goquiolay" purchased the three (3) parcels of land, known
as Lots Nos. 526, 441 and 521 of the Cadastral Survey of
Davao, subject-matter of the instant litigation, assuming
the payment of a mortgage obligation of P25,000.00,
payable to "La Urbana Sociedad Mutua de Construcción y
Prestamos" for a period of ten (10) years, with 10% interest
per annum. Another 46 parcels were purchased by Tan Sin
An in his individual capacity, and he assumed payment of a
mortgage debt thereon for P35,000.00, with interest. The

down payment and the amortization were advanced by
Yutivo and Co., for the account of the purchasers.
On September 25, 1940, the two separate obligations
were consolidated in an instrument executed by the
partnership and Tan Sin An, whereby the entire 49 lots
were mortgaged in f avor of the "Banco Hipotecario de
Filipinas" (as successor to "La Urbana") and the
covenantors bound
952

themselves to pay, jointly and severally, the remaining

balance of their unpaid accounts amounting to P52,282.80
within eight 8 years, with 8% annual interest, payable in
96 equal monthly installments.
On June 26, 1942, Tan Sin An died, leaving as surviving
heirs his widow, Kong Chai Pin, and four minor children,
namely: Tan L. Cheng, Tan L. Hua, Tan C. Chiu and Tan K.
Chuan. Defendant Kong Chai Pin was appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased
husband.
In the meantime, repeated demands for payment were
made by the Banco Hipotecario on the partnership and on
Tan Sin An. In March, 1944, the defendant Sing Yee and
Cuan, Co., Inc., upon request of defendant Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co., paid the remaining balance of the mortgage
debt, and the mortgage was cancelled.
Then in 1946, Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. and Sing Yee
and Cuan Co., Inc. filed their claims in the intestate
proceedings of Tan Sin An for P62,415.91 and P54,310.13,
respectively, as alleged obligations of the partnership "Tan
Sin An and Antonio C. Goquiolay" and Tan Sin An, for
advances, interests and taxes paid in amortizing and
discharging their obligations to "La Urbana" and the
"Banco Hipotecario". Disclaiming knowledge of said claims
at first, Kong Chai Pin later admitted the claims in her
amended answer and they were accordingly approved by
the Court.
On March 29, 1949, Kong Chai Pin filed a petition with

the probate court for authority to sell all the 49 parcels of
land to Washington Z, Sycip and Betty Y. Lee, for the
purpose primarily of settling the aforesaid debts of Tan Sin
An and the partnership. Pursuant to a court order of April
2, 1949,1 the administratrix executed on April 4 1949 a deed
of sale of the 49 parcels of land to the defendants
Washington Sycip and Betty Lee in consideration of
_______________
1 In her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate and as a

managing partner of the plaintiff partnership (Exh. "AA-6").
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VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 953

P37,000.00 and of vendees' assuming payment of the claims

filed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. and Sing Yee and Cuan
Co., Inc'. Later, in July, 1949, defendants Sycip and Betty
Lee executed in f avor of the Insular Development Co., Inc.
a deed of transfer covering the said 49 parcels of land.
Learning about the sale to Sycip and Lee, the surviving
partner Antonio Goquiolay filed, on or about July 25, 1949,
a petition in the intestate proceedings seeking to set aside
the order of the probate court approving the sale in so far
as his interest over the parcels of land sold was concerned.
In its order of December 29, 1949, the probate court
annulled the sale executed by the administratrix with
respect to the 60% interest of Antonio Goquiolay over the
properties sold. Kong Chai Pin appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which court later certified the case to us (93 Phil.,
413; 49 Off. Gaz. [7] 2307). On June 30, 1953, we rendered
decision setting aside the orders of the probate court
complained of and remanding the case for new trial, due to
the non-inclusion of indispensable parties. Thereafter, new
pleadings were filed.
The second amended complaint in the case at bar prays,
among other things, f or the annulment of the sale in f avor
of Washington Sycip and Betty Lee, and their subsequent
conveyance in favor of the Insular Development Co., Inc., in

so far as the three (3) lots owned by the plaintiff
partnership are concerned. The answer averred the validity
of the sale by Kong Chai Pin as successor partner, in lieu of
the late Tan Sin An. After hearing, the complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in its decision dated October
30, 1956; hence, this appeal taken directly to us by the
plaintiffs, as the amount involved is more than
P200,000.00. Plaintiffs-appellants assign as errors that·
"I. ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai

Pin became the managing partner of the
partnership upon the death of her husband, Tan Sin
An, by virtue of the articles of Partnership executed
between Tan Sin An and Antonio Goquiolay, and
the general power of attorney granted by Antonio
Goquiolay.
954

II ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai

Pin could act alone as sole managing partner in
view of the minority of the other heirs.
III ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai
Pin was the only heir qualified to act as managing
partner.
IV ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai
Pin had authority to sell the partnership properties
by virtue of the articles of partnership and the
general power of attorney granted to Tan Sin An in
order to pay the partnership indebtedness.
V ·The lower court erred in finding that the
partnership did not pay its obligation to the Banco
Hipotecario.
VI ·The lower court erred in holding that the consent
of Antonio Goquiolay was not necessary to
consummate the sale of the partnership properties.
VII ·The lower court erred in finding that Kong Chai

Pin managed the business of the partnership after
the death of her husband, and that Antonio
Goquiolay knew it.
VIII ·The lower court erred in holding that the failure
of Antonio Goquiolay to oppose the management of
the partnership by Kong Chai Pin estops him now
from attacking the validity of the sale of the
partnership properties.
IX ·The lower court erred in holding that the buyers
of the partnership properties acted in good faith.
X ·The lower court erred in holding that the sale
was not fraudulent against the partnership and
Antonio Goquiolay.
XI ·The lower court erred in holding that the sale
was not only necessary but beneficial to the
partnership.
XII ·The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint
and in ordering Antonio Goquiolay to pay the costs
of suit,"
There is merit in the contention that the lower court erred

in holding that the widow, Kong Chai Pin, succeeded her
husband, Tan Sin An, in the sole management of the
partnership, upon the latter's death. While, as we
previously stated in our narration of facts, the Articles of
Co-Partnership and the power of attorney executed by
Antonio Goquiolay conf erred upon Tan Sin An the
exclusive management of the business, such power,
premised as it is upon trust and confidence, was a mere
personal right that terminated upon Tan's demise. The
provision in the articles stating that "in the event of death
of any one of the partners within the 10-year term of the
partnership,
955
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 955

the deceased partner shall be represented by his heirs",
could not have referred to the managerial right given to

Tan Sin An; more appropriately, it related to the succession
in the proprietary interest of each partner. The covenant
that Antonio Goquiolay shall have no voice or participation
in the management of the partnership, being a limitation
upon his right as a general partner, must be held
coextensive only with Tan's right to manage the affairs, the
contrary not being clearly apparent.
Upon the other hand, consonant with the articles of co-
partnership providing for the continuation of the firm
notwithstanding the death of one of the partners, the heirs
of the deceased, by never repudiating or refusing to be
bound under the said provision in the articles, became
individual partners with Antonio Goquiolay upon Tan's
demise. The validity of like clauses in partnership
agreements is expressly
1
sanctioned under Article 222 of the
Code of Commerce.
Minority of the heirs is not a bar to the application of
that clause in the articles of co-partnership (2 Vivante,
Tratado de Derecho Mercantil, 493; Planiol, Traité
Elementaire de Droit Civil, English translation by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 177).
Appellants argue, however, that since the "new"
members' liability in the partnership was limited merely to
the value of the share or estate left by the deceased Tan Sin
An, they became no more than limited partners and, as
such,
_______________
1 "General and limited partnership shall furthermore be dissolved by

reason of the following cases: (1) The death of one of the general
partners, if the partnership contract does not contain an express
provision for the continuation of the heirs of the deceased partner in the
partnership or for the continuation of the partnership among the
surviving partners". (See also Codigo Civil, Manresa, Vol XI, pp. 423-424,
1950 ed.)
956

were disqualified from the management of the business

under Article 148 of the Code of Commerce. Although
ordinarily, this effect follows
2
from the continuance of the
heirs in the partnership, it was not so with respect to the
widow Kong Chai Pin, who, by her affirmative actions,
manifested her intent to be bound by the partnership
agreement not only as a limited but as a general partner.
Thus, she managed and retained possession of the
partnership properties and was admittedly deriving income
therefrom up to and until the same were sold to
Washington Sycip and Betty Lee. In fact, by executing the
deed of sale of the parcels of land in dispute in the name of
the partnership, she was acting no less than as a managing
partner. Having thus preferred to act as such, she could be
held liable for the partnership debts and liabilities as a
general partner, beyond what she might have derived only
from the estate of her deceased husband. By allowing her
to retain control of the firm's property from 1942 to 1949,
plaintiff estopped himself to deny her legal representation
of the partnership, with the power to bind it by proper
contracts.
The question now arises as to whether or not the
consent of the other partners was necessary to perfect the
sale of the partnership properties to Washington Sycip and
Betty Lee. The answer is, we believe, in the negative.
Strangers dealing with a partnership have the right to
assume, in the absence of restrictive clauses in the co-
partnership agreement, that every general partner has
power to bind the partnership, specially those partners
acting with ostensible authority. And so, we held in one
case:
"* * * Third persons, like the plaintiff, are not bound in entering
into a contract with any of the two partners, to ascertain whether or
not this partner with whom the transaction is made has the consent
of the other partner. The public need not make
_______________
2 Gay de Montella, Tratado Practico de Sociedades Mercantiles, Vol. II, p.

289; Tratado de Derecho Mercantil, Vivante, Vol. II, pp. 493-494.
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VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 957

inquiries as to the agreements had between the partners. Its

knowledge is enough that it is contracting with the partnership
which is represented by one of the managing partners.
'There is a general presumption that each individual partner is
an agent for the firm and that he has authority to bind the firm in
carrying on the partnership transactions.' [Mills vs. Riggle, 112
Pac., 617]
'The presumption is sufficient to permit third persons to hold the
firm liable on transactions entered into by one of the members of
the firm acting apparently in its behalf and within the scope of his
authority.' [Le Roy vs. Johnson, 7 U.S. Law, Ed., 391] (George Litton
vs. Hill & Ceron, et al., 67 Phil. 513-514)."
We are not unaware of the provision of Article 129 of the

Code of Commerce to the effect that·
"If the management of the general partnership has not been limited
by special agreement to any of the members, all shall have the
power to take part in the direction and management of the common
business, and the members present shall come to an agreement for
all contracts or obligations which may concern the association."
(Emphasis supplied)
but this obligation is one imposed by law on the partners

among themselves, that does not necessarily affect the
validity of the acts of a partner, while acting within the
scope of the ordinary course of business of the partnership,
as regards third persons without notice. The latter may
rightfully assume that the contracting partner was duly
authorized to contract for and in behalf of the firm and
that, furthermore, he would not ordinarily act to the
prejudice of his co-partners. The regular course of business
procedure does not require that each time a third person
contracts with one of the managing partners, he should
inquire as to the latter's authority to do so, or that he
should first ascertain whether or not the other partners
had given their consent thereto. In f act, Article 130 of the
same Code of Commerce provides that even if a new
obligation was contracted against the express will of one of
the managing partners, "it shall not be annulled for such
reason, and it shall produce its effects without prejudice to

the responsibility of the member or members who
contracted it, for the damages they may have caused to the
common fund."
958

César Vivante (2 Tratado de Derecho Mercantil, pp.

114115) points out:
"367. Primera hipotesis.·A falta de pactos especiales, la facultad de

administrar corresponde a cada socio personalmente. No hay que
esperar ciertamente concordia con tantas cabezas, y para cuando no
vayan de acuerdo, la disciplina del Código no ofrece un sistema
eficaz que evite los inconvenientes. Pero, ante el silencio del
contrato, debia quizá el legislador privar de la administración a uno
de los socios en beneficio del otro? Seria una arbitrariedad. Deberá
quizá declarar nula la Sociedad que no haya elegido Administrador?
El remedio seria peor que el mal. Deberá, tal vez, pretender que
todos los socios concurran en todo acto de la Sociedad? Pero este
concurso de todos habria reducido a la impotencia la
administración, que es asunto de todos los dias y de todas horas.
Hubieran sido disposiciones menos oportunas que lo adoptado por el
Código, el cual se confia al espiritu de reciproca confianza que
deberia animar la colaboración de los socios, y en la ley inflexible de
responsabilidad que implica comunidad en los intereses de los
mismos.
En esta hipótesis, cada socio puede ejercer todos los negocios
comprendidos en el contrato social sin dar de ello noticia a los otros,
porque cada uno de ellos ejerce la administración en la totalidad de
sus relaciones, salvo su responsabilidad en el caso de una
administración culpable. Si debiera dar noticia, el beneficio de su
simultánia actividad, frecuentemente distribuida en lugares y en
tiempos diferentes, se echaria a perder. Se objetará el que de esta
forma, el derecho de oposición de cada uno de los socios puede
quedar frustrado. Pero se puede contestar que este derecho de
oposición concedido por la ley como un remedio excepcional, debe
subordinarse al derecho de ejercer el oficio de Administrador, que el
Código con-cede sin limite: 'se presume que los socios se han
concedido reciprocamente la facultad de administrar uno para otro.'

Se haria precipitar esta hipótesis en la otra de una administración
colectiva (art. 1.721, Código Civil) y se acabaria con pedir el
consentimiento, a lo menos tácito, de todos los socios·lo que el
Código excluye ..........., si se obligase al socio Administrador a dar
noticia previa del negocio a los otros, a fin de que pudieran oponerse
si no consintieran."
Commenting on the same subject, Gay de Montellá (Código

de Comercio, Tomo II, 147-148) opines:
"Para obligar a las Compañias enfrente de terceros (art. 128 del

Código), no es bastante que los actos y contratos hayan sido
ejecutados por un socio o varios en nombre colectivo, sino que es
959
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 959

preciso el concurso de estos dos elementos, uno, que el socio o socios

tengan reconocida la facultad de administrar la Compañia, y otro,
que el acto o contrato haya 'sido ejecutado en nombre de la Sociedad
y usando de su firma social. Asi es que toda obligación contraida
bajo la razon social, se presume contraida por la Compañia. Esta
presuncion es impuesta por motivos de necesidad practica. El
tercero no puede cada vez que trata con la Compañia, inquirir si
realmente el negocio concierne a la Sociedad. La presuncion es juris
tantum y no juris et de jure, de modo que si el gerente suscribe bajo
la razón social una obligación que no interesa a la Sociedad, éste
podrá rechazar la acción del tercero probando que el acreedor
conocia que la obligación no tenia ninguna relación con ella. Si tales
actos y contratos no comportasen la concurrencia de ambos
elementos, serian nulos y podria decretarse la responsabilidad civil
o penal contra sus autores.
En el caso que tales actos o contratos hayan sido tácitamente
aprobados por la Compañia, o contabilizados en sus libros, si el acto
o contrato ha sido convalidado sin protesta y se trata de acto o
contrato que ha producido beneficio social, tendria plena validez,
aun cuando le faltase algunos o ambos de aquellos requisitos antes
señalados.
Cuando los Estatutos o la escritura social no contienen ninguna
cláusula relativa al nombramiento o designación de uno o mas de

un socio para administrar la Compañia (art. 129 del Código) todos
tienen por un igual el derecho de concurir a la decision y manejo de
los negocios comunes. * * *"
Although the partnership under consideration is a

commercial partnership and, therefore, to be governed by
the Code of Commerce, the provisions of the old Civil Code
may give us some light on the right of one partner to bind
the partnership. States Art. 1695 thereof:
"Should no agreement have been made with respect to the form of

management, the following rules shall be observed:
1. All the partners shall be considered agents, and whatever any
one of them may do individually shall bind the partnership; but
each one may oppose any act of the others before it has become
legally binding."
The records fail to disclose that appellant Goquiolay made

any opposition to the sale of the partnership realty to
Washington Z. Sycip and Betty Lee; on the contrary, it
appears that he (Goquiolay) only interposed his objections
960

after the deed of conveyance was executed and approved by

the probate court, and, consequently, his opposition came
too late to be effective.
Appellants assail the correctness of the amounts paid for
the account of the partnership as found by the trial court.
This question, however, need not be resolved here, as in the
deed of conveyance executed by Kong Chai Pin, the
purchasers Washington Sycip and Betty Lee assumed, as
part consideration of the purchase, the full claims of the
two creditors, Sing Yee and Cuan Co., Inc. and Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co.
Appellants also question the validity of the sale covering
the entire firm realty, on the ground that it, in effect, threw
the partnership into dissolution, which requires consent of
all the partners. This view is untenable. That the

partnership was left without the real property it originally
had will not work its dissolution, since the firm was not
organized to exploit these precise lots but to engage in
buying and selling real estate, and "in general real estate
agency and brokerage business". Incidentally, it is to be
noted that the payment of the solidary obligation of both
the partnership and the late Tan Sin An, leaves open the
question of accounting and contribution between the co-
debtors, that should be ventilated separately.
Lastly, appellants point out that the sale of the
partnership properties was only a fraudulent device by the
appellees, with the connivance of Kong Chai Pin, to ease
out Antonio Goquiolay from the partnership. The "devise",
according to the appellants, started way back sometime in
1945, when one Yu Khe Thai sounded out Antonio
Goquiolay on the possibility of selling his share in the
partnership; and upon his refusal to sell, was followed by
the filing of the claims of Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. and
Sing Yee and Cuan Co., Inc. in the intestate estate
proceedings of Tan Sin An. As creditors of Tan Sin An and
the plaintiff partnership (whose liability was alleged to be
joint and several), Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. and Sing
961
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 961

Yee and Cuan Co., Inc. had every right to file their claims
in the intestate proceedings. The denial of the claims at
first by Kong Chai Pin (for lack of sufficient knowledge)
negatives any conspiracy on her part in the alleged f
raudulent scheme, even if she subsequently decided to
admit their validity after studying the claims and finding it
best to admit the same. It may not be amiss to remark that
the probate court approved the questioned claims.
There is complete failure of proof, moreover, that the
price for which the properties were sold was unreasonably
low, or in any way unfair, since appellants presented no
evidence of the market value of the lots as of the time of
their sale to appellees Sycip and Lee. The alleged value of
P31,056.58 in May of 1955 is no proof of the market value

in 1949, specially because in the interval, the new owners
appear to have converted the land into a subdivision, which
they could not do without opening roads and otherwise
improving the property at their own expense. Upon the
other hand, Kong Chai Pin hardly had any choice but to
execute the questioned sale, as it appears that the
partnership had neither cash nor other properties with
which to pay its obligations. Anyway, we cannot consider
seriously the inferences freely indulged in by the
appellants as allegedly indicating fraud in the questioned
transactions, leading to the conveyance of the lots in
dispute to the appellee Insular Development Co., Inc.
Wherefore, finding no reversible error in the appealed
judgment, we affirm the same, with costs against appellant
Antonio Goquiolay.
Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepción, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutiérrez David, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed.
962

RESOLUTION
December 10, 1968

REYES, J. B. L., J.:
The matter now pending is the appellant's motion for
reconsideration of our main decision, wherein we have
upheld the validity of the sale of the lands owned by the
partnership Goquiolay & Tan Sin An, made in 1949 by the
widow of the managing partner, Tan Sin An (executed in
her dual capacity of Administratrix of her husband's estate
and as partner, in lieu of the husband), in favor of buyers
Washington Sycip and Betty Lee for the following
consideration:
Cash paid P37,000.00

................................................................
Debts assumed by purchaser:
To Yutivo 62,416.91
................................................................
To Sing Yee Cuan & Co. 54,310.13
.........................................
TOTAL P153,726.04
...................................................................
Appellant Goquiolay, in his motion for reconsideration,

insists that, contrary to our holding, Kong Chai Pin, widow
of the deceased partner Tan Sin An, never became more
than a limited partner, incapacitated by law to manage the
affairs of the partnership; that the testimony of her
witnesses Young and Lim belies that she took over
administration of the partnership property; and that, in
any event, the sale should be set aside because it was
executed with the intent to defraud appellant of his share
in the properties sold.
Three things must be always held in mind in the
discussion of this motion to reconsider, being basic and
beyond controversy:
(a) That we are dealing here with the transfer of

partnership property by one partner, acting in
behalf of the firm, to a stranger. There is no
question between partners inter se, and this aspect
of the case was expressly reserved in the main
decision of 26 July 1960;
963
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 963

(b) That the partnership was expressly organized "to

engage in real estate business, either by buying and
selling real estate". The Articles of co-partnership,
in fact, expressly provided that:
"IV. The object and purpose of the co-partnership are as follows:

1. To engage in real estate business, either by buying and selling
real estates; to subdivide real estates into lots for the purpose of
leasing and selling them.";
(c) That the properties sold were not part of the

contributed capital (which was in cash) but land
precisely acquired to be sold, although subject to a
mortgage in favor of the original owners, from
whom the partnership had acquired them.
With these points firmly in mind, let us turn to the points

insisted upon by appellant.
It is first averred that there is "not one iota of evidence"
that Kong Chai Pin managed and retained possession of
the partnership properties. Suffice it to point out that
appellant Goquiolay himself admitted that·
"* * * Mr. Yu Eng Lai asked me if I can just let Mrs. Kong Chai Pin
continue to manage the properties (as) she had no other means of
income. Then I said, because I wanted to help Mrs. Kong Chai Pin,
she could just do it and besides / am not interested in agricultural
lands. I allowed her to take care of the properties in order to help her
and because I believe in God and I wanted to help her."
Q. ·So the answer to my question is you did not take any steps?
A. ·I did not.
Q. ·And this conversation which you had with Mrs. Yu Eng Lai
was few months after 1945?
A. ·In the year 1945." (Emphasis supplied)
The appellant subsequently ratified this testimony in his

deposition of 30 June 1956, page 8-9, wherein he stated:
"that plantation was being occupied at that time by the widow, Mrs.
Tan Sin An, and of course they are receiving quite a lot of benefit
from that plantation."
Discarding the self-serving expressions, these admissions

of Goquiolay are certainly entitled to greater weight
964

Goquiolay, et al vs. Sycip, et al.
than those of Hernando Young and Rufino Lim, having

been made against the party's own interest.
Moreover, the appellant's reference to the testimony of
Hernando Young, that the witness found the properties
"abandoned and undeveloped", omits to mention that said
part of the testimony started with the question:
"Now, you said that about 1942 or 1943 you returned to Davao. Did
you meet Mrs. Kong Chai Pin there in Davao at that time?
Similarly, the testimony of Rufino Lim, to the effect that

the properties of the partnership were undeveloped, and
the family of the widow (Kong Chai Pin) did not receive any
income from the partnership properties, was given in
answer to the question:
"According to Mr. Goquiolay, during the Japanese occupation Tan

Sin An and his family lived on the plantation of the partnership and
derived their subsistence from that plantation. What can you say to
that?" (Dep. 19 July 1956, p. 8)
And also·
"What can you say as to the development of these other properties

of the partnership which you saw during the occupation?" (Dep., p.
13, Emphasis supplied)
to which witness gave the following answer:
I saw the properties in Mamay still undeveloped. The third property

which is in Tigatto is about eleven (11) hectares and planted with
abaca seedlings planted by Mr. Sin An. When I went there with
Hernando Young we saw all the abaca destroyed. The place was
occupied by the Japanese Army. They planted camotes and
vegetables to feed the Japanese Army. Of course they never paid
any money to Tan Sin An or his family." (Dep., Lim, pp. 13-14.
(Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, Both Young and Lim's testimonies do not belie, or

contradict, Goquiolay's admission that he told Mr. Yu Eng
Lai that the widow "could just do it" (i. e., continue to
manage the properties). Witnesses Lim and Young referred

to the period of Japanese occupation; but Goquio-
965
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 965

lay's authority was, in fact, given to the widow in 1945,

after the occupation.
Again, the disputed sale by the widow took place in
1949. That Kong Chai Pin carried out no acts of
management during the Japanese occupation (1942-1944)
does not mean that she did not do so from 1945 to 1949.
We thus find that Goquiolay did not merely rely on
reports from Lim and Young; he actually manifested his
willingness that the widow should manage the partnership
properties. Whether or not she complied with this authority
is a question between her and the appellant, and is not
here involved. But the authority was given, and she did
have it when she made the questioned sale, because it was
never revoked.
It is argued that the authority given by Goquiolay to the
widow Kong Chai Pin was only to manage the property, and
that it did not include the power to alienate, citing Article
1713 of the Civil Code of 1889. What this argument
overlooks is that the widow was not a mere agent, because
she had become a partner upon her husband's death, as
expressly provided by the articles of co-partnership. Even
more, granting that by succession to her husband, Tan Sin
An, the widow only became a limited partner, Goquiolay's
authorization to manage the partnership property was
proof that he considered and recognized her as general
partner, at least since 1945. The reason is plain: Under the
law (Article 148, last paragraph, Code of Commerce),
appellant could not empower the widow, if she were only a
limited partner, to administer the properties of the firm,
even as a mere agent:
"Limited partners may not perform any act of administration with

respect to the interests of the co-partnership, not even in the
capacity of agents of the managing partners." (Emphasis supplied)
By seeking authority to manage partnership property, Tan

Sin An's widow showed that she desired to be considered a
general partner. By authorizing the widow to
966

manage partnership property (which a limited partner

could not be authorized to do), Goquiolay recognized her as
such partner, and is now in estoppel to deny her position as
a general partner, with authority to administer and
alienate partnership property.
Besides, as we pointed out in our main decision, the heir
ordinarily (and we did not say "necessarily") becomes a
limited partner for his own protection, because he would
normally prefer to avoid any liability in excess of the value
of the estate inherited so as not to jeopardize his personal
assets. But this statutory limitation of responsibility being
designed to protect the heir, the latter may disregard it and
instead elect to become a collective or general partner, with
all the rights and privileges of one, and answering for the
debts of the firm not only with the inheritance but also
with the heir's personal fortune. This choice pertains
exclusively to the heir, and does not require the assent of
the surviving partner.
It must be remembered that the articles of co-
partnership here involved expressly stipulated that:
"In the event of the death of any of the partners at any time before
the expiration of said term, the co-partnership shall not be
dissolved but will have to be continued and the deceased partner
shall be represented by his heirs or assigns in said co-partnership"
(Art. XII, Articles of Co-Partnership).
The Articles did not provide that the heirs of the deceased
would be merely limited partner; on the contrary, they
expressly stipulated that in case of death of either partner
"the co-partnership * * * will have to be continued" with the
heirs or assigns. It certainly could not be continued if it
were to be converted from a general partnership into a
limited partnership, since the diff erence between the two

kinds of associations is f undamental; and specially because
the conversion into a limited association would leave the
heirs of the deceased partner without a share in the
management. Hence, the contractual stipulation does
967
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 967

actually contemplate that the heirs would become general

partners rather than limited ones.
Of course, the stipulation would not bind the heirs of the
deceased partner should they refuse to assume personal
and unlimited responsibility for the obligations of the firm.
The heirs, in other words, can not be compelled to become
general partners against their wishes. But because they
are not so compellable, it does not legitimately follow that
they may not voluntarily choose to become general
partners, waiving the protective mantle of the general laws
of succession. And in the latter event, it is pointless to
discuss the legality of any conversion of a limited partner
into a general one. The heir never was a limited partner,
but chose to be, and became, a general partner right at the
start.
It is immaterial that the heir's name was not included in
the firm name, since no conversion of status is involved,
and the articles of co-partnership expressly contemplated
the admission of the partner's heirs into the partnership.
It must never be overlooked that this case involves the
rights acquired by strangers, and does not deal with the
rights arising between partners Goquiolay and the widow
of Tan Sin An. The issues between the partners inter se
were expressly reserved in our main decision. Now, in
determining what kind of partner the widow of partner Tan
Sin An had elected to become, strangers had to be guided
by her conduct and actuations and those of appellant
Goquiolay. Knowing that by law a limited partner is barred
from managing the partnership business or property, third
parties (like the purchasers) who found the widow
possessing and managing the firm property with the
acquiescence (or at least without apparent opposition) of

the surviving partners were perfectly justified in assuming
that she had become a general partner, and, therefore, in
negotiating with her as such a partner, having authority to
act for, and in behalf of, the firm. This belief, be it noted,
was shared even by the probate court that approved the
sale by the widow of the real property standing
968

Goquiolay et al vs. Sycip, et al.
in the partnership name. That belief was f ostered by the

very inaction of appellant Goquiolay. Note that for seven
long years, from partner Tan Sin An's death in 1942 to the
sale in 1949, there was more than ample time for
Goquiolay to take up the management of these properties,
or at least ascertain how its affairs stood. For seven years
Goquiolay could have asserted his alleged rights, and by
suitable notice in the commercial registry could have
warned strangers that they must deal with him alone, as
sole general partner. But he did nothing of the sort, because
he was not interested (supra), and he did not even take
steps to pay, or settle, the firm debts that were overdue
since before the outbreak of the last war. He did not even
take steps, after Tan Sin An died, to cancel, or modify, the
provisions of the partnership articles that he (Goquiolay)
would have no intervention in the management of the
partnership. This laches certainly contributed to confirm
the view that-the widow of Tan Sin An had, or was given,
authority to manage and deal with the firm's properties,
apart from the presumption that a general partner dealing
with partnership property has the requisite authority from
his copartners (Litton vs. Hill and Cerón, et al., 67 Phil.,
513; quoted in our main decision, p. 11).
"The stipulation in the articles of partnership that any of the two

managing partners may contract and sign in the name of the
partnership. with the consent of the other, undoubtedly creates an
obligation between the two partners, which consists in asking the
other's consent before contracting for the partnership. This
obligation of course is not imposed upon a third person who

contracts with the partnership. Neither is it necessary for the third
person to ascertain if the managing partner with whom he contracts
has previously obtained the consent of the other. A third person may
and has a right to presume that the partner with whom he contracts
has, in the ordinary and natural course of business, the consent of
his co-partner; for otherwise he would not enter into the contract.
The third person would naturally not presume that the partner
with whom he enters into the transaction is violating the articles of
partnership, but on the contrary, is acting in accordance therewith.
And this finds support in the legal presump-
969
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 969

tion that the ordinary course of business has been followed (No. 18,
section 334, Code of Civil Procedure), and that the law has been
obeyed (No. 31, section 334). This last presumption is equally
applicable to contracts which have the force of law between the
parties." (Litton vs. Hill & Cerón, et al., 67 Phil., 509, 516)
(Emphasis supplied)
It is next urged that the widow, even as a partner, had no

authority to sell the real estate of the firm. This argument
is lamentably superficial because it fails to differentiate
between real estate acquired and held as stock-in-trade and
real state held merely as business site (Vivante's "taller ó
banco social") for the partnership. Where the partnership
business is to deal in merchandise and goods, i.e., movable
property, the sale of its real property (immovables) is not
within the ordinary powers of a partner, because it is not in
line with the normal business of the firm. But where the
express and avowed purpose of the partnership is to buy
and sell real estate (as in the present case), the immovables
thus acquired by the firm form part of its stock-in-trade,
and the the sale thereof is in pursuance of partnership
purposes, hence within the ordinary powers of the partner.
This distinction
1
is supported by the opinion of Gay de
Montella , in the very passage quoted in the appellant's
motion for reconsideration:
"La enajenación puede entrar en las facultades del gerente: cuando

es conforme a los fines sociáles. Pero esta facultad de enajenar
limitada a las ventas conforme a los fines sociáles, viene limitada a
los objetos de comecio ó a los productos de la fabrica para
explotación de los cuales se ha constituido la Sociedad. Ocurrira
una cosa parecida cuando el objeto de la Sociedad fuese la compra y
venta de inmuebles, en cuyo caso el gerente estaria facultado para
otorgar las ventas que fuere necesario." (Montella) (Emphasis
supplied)
The same rule obtains in American law.

In Rosen vs. Rosen, 212 N. Y. Supp. 405, 406, it was
held:
_______________
1 Tratado Practico de Sociedades Mercantiles, Tomo I, p. 223. (Italics

supplied)
970

"a partnership to deal in real estate may be created and either

partner has the legal right to sell the firm real estate"
In Chester vs. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550:
"And hence, when the partnership business is to deal in real estate,

one partner has ample power, as a general agent of the firm, to
enter into an executory contract for the sale of real estate."
And in Rovelsky vs. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 9 South 182, 25

Am. St., Rep. 83:
"If the several partners engaged in the business of buying and

selling real estate can not bind the firm by purchases or sales of
such property made in the regular course of business, then they are
incapable of exercising the essential rights and powers of general
partners and their association is not really a partnership at all, but
a several agency."
Since the sale by the widow was in conformity with the

express objective of the partnership, "to engage * * * in
buying and selling real estate" (Art. IV, No. 1, Articles of
Copartnership), it can not be maintained that the sale was
made in excess of her powers as general partner.
Considerable stress is laid by appellant in the ruling of
the Supreme Court of Ohio in McGrath, et al., vs. Cowen, et
al., 49 N. E., 338. But the facts of that case are vastly
different from the one before us. In the McGrath case, the
Court expressly found that:
"The firm was then, and for some time had been, insolvent, in the
sense that its property was insufficient to pay its debts, though it
still had good credit, and was actively engaged in the prosecution of
its business. On that day, which was Saturday, the plaintiff caused
to be prepared, ready for execution, the four chattel mortgages in
question, which cover all the tangible property then belonging to
the firm, including the counters, shelving, and other furnishings
and fixtures necessary for, and used in carrying on, its business, and
signed the same in this form: "In witness whereof, the said Cowen
& McGrath, a firm, and Owen McGrath, surviving partner of said
firm, and Owen McGrath, individually, have hereunto set their
hands, this 20th day of May, A. D. 1893. Cowen & McGrath, by
Owen McGrath. Owen McGrath, Surviving partner of Cowen &
McGrath. Owen McGrath" At the same time, the
971
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 971

plaintiff had prepared, ready for filing, the petition for the
dissolution of the partnership and appointment of a receiver, which
he subsequently filed, as hereinafter stated. On the day the
mortgages were signed, they were placed in the hands of the
mortgagees, which was the first intimation to them that there was
any intention to make then. At that time none of the claims secured
by the mortgages were due, except, it may he, a small part of one of
them, and none of the creditors to whom the mortgages were made
had requested security, or were pressing for the payment of their
debts. * * * The mortgages appear to be without a sufficient
condition of defeasance, and contain a stipulation authorizing the
mortgagees to take immediate possession of the property, which

they did as soon as the mortgages were filed, through the attorney
who then represented them, as well as the plaintiff; and the stores
were at once closed, and possession delivered by them to the receiver
appointed upon the filing of the petition. The avowed purpose of the
plaintiff in the course pursued by him, was to terminate the
partnership, place its property beyond the control of the firm, and
insure the preference of the mortgages, all of which was known to
them at the time; * * * ." (Cas cit., p. 343, Italics supplied)
It is natural that from these facts the Supreme Court of

Ohio should draw the conclusion that conveyances were
made with intent to terminate the partnership, and that
they were not within the powers of McGrath as partner.
But there is no similarity between those acts and the sale
by the widow of Tan Sin An. In the McGrath case, the sale
included even the fixtures used in the business, in our case,
the lands sold were those acquired to be sold. In the
McGrath case, none of the creditors were pressing for
payment; in our case, the creditors had been unpaid for
more than seven years, and their claims had been approved
by the probate court for payment. In the McGrath case, the
partnership received nothing beyond the discharge of its
debts; in the present case, not only were its debts assumed
by the buyers, but the latter paid, in addition, P37,000.00
in cash to the widow, to the profit of the partnership.
Clearly, the McGrath ruling is not applicable.
We will now turn to the question of fraud. No direct
evidence of it exists; but appellant points out, as indicia
972

thereof, the allegedly low price paid for the property, and
the relationship between the buyers, the creditors of the
partnership, and the widow of Tan Sin An.
First, as to the price: As already noted, this property
was actually sold for a total of P153,726.04, of which
P37,000.00 was in cash, and the rest in partnership debts
assumed by the purchaser. These debts (P62,415.91 to
Yutivo, and P54,310.13 to Sing Yee Cuan & Co.) are not
questioned; they were approved by the Court, and its
approval is now final. The claims were, in fact, for the
balance on the original purchase price of the land sold (due
first to La Urbana, later to the Banco Hipotecario) plus
accrued interests and taxes, redeemed by the two creditors-
claimants. To show that the price was inadequate.
appellant relies on the testimony of the realtor Mata, who
in 1955, six years after the sale in question, asserted that
the land was worth P312,000.00. Taking into account the
continued rise of real estate values since liberation, and the
fact that the sale in question was practically a forced sale
because the partnership had no other means to pay its
legitimate debts, this evidence certainly does not show such
"gross inadequacy" as to justify rescission of the sale. If at
the time of the sale (1949) the price of P153,726.04 was
really low, how is it that appellant was not able to raise the
amount, even if the creditor's representative, Yu Khe Thai,
had already warned him four years before (1945) that the
creditors wanted their money back, as they were justly
entitled to?
It is argued that the land could have been mortgaged to
raise the sum needed to discharge the debts. But the lands
were already mortgaged, and had been mortgaged since
1940, first to La Urbana, and then to the Banco
Hipotecario. Was it reasonable to expect that other persons
would loan money to the partnership when it was unable
even to pay the taxes on the property, and the interest on
the principal since 1940? If it had been possible to find
lenders willing to take a chance on such a bad financial
973
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 973

record, would not Goquiolay have taken advantage of it?

But the fact is clear on the record that since liberation until
1949 Goquiolay never lifted a finger to discharge the debts
of the partnership. Is he entitled now to cry fraud after the
debts were discharged with no help from him?
With regard to the relationship between the parties,
suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has ruled that

relationship alone is not a badge of fraud (Oria Hnos. vs.
McMicking, 21 Phil., 243; also Hermandad de Smo. Nombre
de Jesus vs. Sanchez, 40 Off. Gaz., 1685). There is no
evidence that the original buyers, Washington Sycip and
Betty Lee, were without independent means to purchase
the property. That the Yutivos should be willing to extend
credit to them, and not to appellant, is neither illegal nor
immoral; at the very least, these buyers did not have a
record of inveterate defaults like the partnership "Tan Sin
An & Goquiolay".
Appellant seeks to create the impression that he was the
victim of a conspiracy between the Yutivo firm and their
component members. But no proof is adduced. If he was
such a victim, he could have easily defeated the
conspirators by raising money and paying off the firm's
debts between 1945 and 1949; but he did not; he did not
even care to look for a purchaser of the partnership assets.
Were it true that the conspiracy to defraud him arose (as
he claims) because of his refusal to sell the lands when in
1945 Yu Khe Thai asked him to do so, it is certainly strange
that the conspirators should wait 4 years, until 1949, to
have the sale effected by the widow of Tan Sin An, and that
the sale should have been routed through the probate court
taking cognizance of Tan Sin An's estate, all of which
increased the risk that the supposed fraud should be
detected.
Neither was there any anomaly in the filing of the
claims of Yutivo and Sing Yee Cuan & Co., (as subrogees of
the Banco Hipotecario) in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of Tan Sin An. This for two reasons: First,
974

Tan Sin An and the partnership "Tan Sin An & Goquiolay"

were solidary (joint and several) debtors (Exhibit "N"
mortgage to the Banco Hipotecario), and Rule 87, section 6,
is to the effect that:
"Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with

another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he
were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of .the estate to
recover contribution from the other debtor." (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the solidary obligation was guaranteed by a

mortgage on the properties of the partnership and those of
Tan Sin An personally, and a mortgage in indivisible, in the
sense that each and every parcel under mortgage answers
for the totality of the debt (Civ. Code of 1889, Article 1860;
New Civil Code, Art. 2089).
A final and conclusive consideration. The fraud charged
not being one used to obtain a party's consent to a contract
(i.e., not being deceit or dolus in contrahendo), if there is
fraud at all, it can only be a fraud of creditors that gives
rise to a rescission of the offending contract. But by express
provision of law (Article 1294, Civil Code of 1889; Article
1383, New Civil Code), "the action for rescission is
subsidiary; it can not be instituted except when the party
suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain
reparation for the same". Since there is no allegation, or
evidence, that Goquiolay can not obtain reparation from
the widow and heirs of Tan Sin An, the present suit to
rescind the sale in question is not maintenable, even if the
fraud charged actually did exist.
Premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepción, Barrera, and

Dizon, JJ., concur.
975
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 975

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., dissenting:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First

Instance of Davao dismissing the complaint filed by
Antonio C. Goquiolay, et al., seeking to annul the sale made
by Kong Chai Pin of three parcels of land to Washington Z.
Sycip and Betty Y. Lee on the ground that it was executed

without proper authority and under fraudulent
circumstances. In a decision rendered on July 26, 1960, we
affirmed this decision although on grounds different from
those on which the latter is predicated. The case is once
more before us on a motion for reconsideration filed by
appellants raising both questions of fact and of law.
On May 29, 1940, Tan Sin An and Antonio C. Goquiolay
executed in Davao City a commercial partnership for a
period of ten years with a capital of P30,000.00 of which
Goquiolay contributed P18,000.00 representing 60% while
Tan Sin An P12,000.00 representing 40%. The business of
the partnership was to engage in buying real estate
properties for subdivision, resale and lease. The
partnership was duly registered, and among the conditions
agreed upon in the partnership agreement which are
material to this case are: (1) that Tan Sin An would be the
exclusive managing partner, and (2) in the event of the
death of any of the partners the partnership would
continue, the deceased to be represented by his heirs. On
May 31, 1940, Goquiolay executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Tan Sin An appointing the latter
manager of the partnership and conferring upon him the
usual powers of management.
On May 29, 1940, the partnership acquired three parcels
of land known as Lots Nos. 526, 441 and 521 of the
cadastral survey of Davao, the only assets of the
partnership, with the capital originally invested, financing
the balance of the purchase price with a mortgage in favor
of "La Urbana Sociedad Mutua de Construcción Prestamos"
in the amount of P25,000.00 payable in ten years. On
976

the same date, Tan Sin An, in his individual capacity,

acquired 46 parcels of land executing a mortgage thereon
in favor of the same company for the sum of P35,000.00. On
September 25, 1940, these two mortgage obligations were
consolidated and transferred to the Banco Hipotecario de
Filipinas and as a result Tan Sin An, in his individual

capacity, and the partnership bound themselves to pay
jointly and severally the total amount of P52,282.80, with
8% annual interest thereon within the period of eight years
mortgaging in favor of said entity the 3 parcels of land
belonging to the partnership to Tan Sin An.
Tan Sin An died on June 26, 1942 and was survived by
his widow, defendant Kong Chai Pin, and four children, all
of whom are minors of tender age. On March 18, 1944,
Kong Chai Pin was appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Tan Sin An. And on the same date, Sing,
Yee and Cuan Co., Inc. paid to the Banco Hipotecario the
remaining unpaid balance of the mortgage obligation of the
partnership amounting to P46,116.75 in Japanese currency.
Sometime in 1945, after the liberation of Manila, Yu Khe
Thai, president and general manager of Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co. and Sing, Yee and Cuan Co., Inc., called for
Goquiolay and the two had a conference in the office of the
former 'during which he offered to buy the interest of
Goquiolay in the partnership. In 1948, Kong Chai Pin, the
widow, sent her counsel, Atty. Dominador Zuño, to ask
Goquiolay to execute in her favor a power of attorney.
Goquiolay refused both to sell his interest in the
partnership as well as to execute the power of attorney.
Having failed to get Goquiolay to sell his share in the
partnership, Yutivo Sons Hardware Co., and Sing, Yee and
Cuan Co., Inc. filed in November, 1946 a claim each in the
intestate proceedings of Tan Sin An for the sum of
P84,705.48 and P66,529.91, respectively, alleging that they
represent obligations of both Tan Sin An and the partner-
977
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 977

Goquiolay, et al., vs. Sycip, et al.
ship. After first denying any knowledge of the claims, Kong

Chai Pin, as administratrix, admitted later without
qualification the two claims in an amended answer she
filed on February 28, 1947. The admission was predicated
on the ground that she and the creditors were closely
related by blood, affinity and business ties. In due course,
these two claims were approved by the court.

On March 29, 1949, more than two years after the
approval of the claims, Kong Chai Pin filed a petition in the
probate court to sell all the properties of the partnership as
well as some of the conjugal properties left by Tan Sin An
for the purpose of paying the claims. Following approval by
the court of the petition for authority to sell, Kong Chai
Pin, in her capacity as administratrix, and presuming to
act as managing partner of the partnership, executed on
April 4, 1949 a deed of sale of the properties owned by Tan
Sin An and by the partnership in favor of Betty Y. Lee and
Washington Z. Sycip in consideration of the payment to
Kong Chai Pin of the sum of P37,000.00, and the
assumption by the buyers of the claims filed by Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co. and Sing, Yee and Cuan Co., Inc. in whose
favor the buyers executed a mortgage on the properties
purchased. Betty Y. Lee and Washington Z. Sycip
subsequently executed a deed of sale of the same properties
in favor of their co-defendant Insular Development
Company, Inc. It should be noted that these transactions
took place without the knowledge of Goquiolay and it is
admitted that Betty Y. Lee and Washington Z. Sycip bought
the properties on behalf of the ultimate buyer, the Insular
Development Company, Inc., with money given by the
latter.
Upon learning of the sale of the partnership properties,
Goquiolay filed on July 25, 1949 in the intestate
proceedings a petition to set aside the order of the court
approving the sale. The court granted the petition. While
the order was pending appeal in the Supreme Court,
Goquiolay filed the present case on January 15, 1953
seeking to nullify
978

the sale as stated in the early part of this decision. In the

meantime, the Supreme Court remanded the original case
to the probate court for rehearing due to lack of necessary
parties.
The plaintiffs in their complaint challenged the

authority of Kong Chai Pin to sell the partnership
properties on the ground that she had no authority to sell
because even granting that she became a partner upon the
death of Tan Sin An the power of attorney granted in favor
of the latter expired after his death.
Defendants, on the other hand, defended the validity of
the sale on the theory that she succeeded to all the rights
and prerogatives of Tan Sin An as managing partner.
The trial court sustained the validity of the sale on the
ground that under the provisions of the articles of
partnership allowing the heirs of the deceased partner to
represent him in the partnership after his death Kong Chai
Pin became a managing partner, this being the capacity
held by Tan Sin An when he died.
In the decision rendered by this Court on July 26, 1960,
we affirmed this decision but on different grounds, among
which the salient points are: (1) the power of attorney given
by Goquiolay to Tan Sin An as manager of the partnership
expired after his death; (2) his widow Kong Chai Pin did
not inherit the management of the partnership, it being a
personal right; (3) as a general rule, the heirs of a deceased
general partner come into the partnership in the capacity
only of limited partners; (4) Kong Chai Pin, however,
became a general partner because she exercised certain
alleged acts of management; and (5) the sale being
necessary to pay the obligations of the partnership, she was
therefore authorized to sell the partnership properties
without the consent of Goquiolay under the principle of
estoppel, the buyers having the right to rely on her acts of
management and to believe her to be in fact the managing
partner.
979
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 979

Considering that some of the above findings of fact and

conclusions of law are without legal or factual basis,
appellants have in due course filed a motion for
reconsideration which because of the importance of the
issues therein raised has been the subject of mature

deliberation.
In support of said motion, appellants advanced the
following arguments:
1. If the conclusion of the Court is that heirs as a

general rule enter the partnership as limited
partners only, therefore Kong Chai Pin, who must
necessarily have entered the partnership as a
limited partner originally, could have not chosen to
be a general partner by exercising the alleged acts
of management, because under Article 148 of the
Code of Commerce a limited partner cannot
intervene in the management of the partnership,
even if given a power of attorney by the general
partners. An Act prohibited by law cannot give rise
to any right and is void under the express
provisions of the Civil Code.
2. The buyers were not strangers to Kong Chai Pin, all
of them being members of the Yu (Yutivo) family,
the rest, members of the law firm which handles
the Yutivo interests and handled the papers of sale.
They did not rely on the alleged acts of
management·they believed (this was the opinion
of their lawyers) that Kong Chai Pin succeeded her
husband as a managing partner and it was on this
theory alone that they submitted the case in the
lower court.
3. The alleged acts of management were denied and
repudiated by the very witnesses presented by the
defendants themselves.
The arguments advanced by appellants are in our opinion

well-taken and furnish sufficient basis to reconsider our
decision if we want to do justice to Antonio C. Goquiolay.
And to justify this conclusion, it is enough that we lay
stress on the following points: (1) there is no sufficient
factual basis to conclude that Kong Chai Pin executed acts
of management to give her the character of general
manager of the partnership, or to serve as basis for
estoppel that may benefit the purchasers of the partnership
properties; (2) the alleged acts of management, even if
proven, could not give Kong Chai Pin the character of

general manager for the same is contrary to law and well-
980

known authorities; (3) even if Kong Chai Pin acted as

general manager she had no authority to sell the
partnership properties as to make it legal and valid; and (4)
Kong Chai Pin had no necessity to sell the properties to pay
the obligation of the partnership and if she did so it was
merely to f avor the purchasers who were close relatives to
the prejudice of Goquiolay.
1. This point is pivotal for if Kong Chai Pin did not
execute the acts of management imputed to her our ruling
cannot be sustained. In making our aforesaid ruling we
apparently gave particular importance to the fact that it
was Goquiolay himself who tried to prove the acts of
management. Appellants, however, have emphasized the
fact, and with reason, that the appellees themselves are the
ones who denied and refuted the so-called acts of
management imputed to Kong Chai Pin. To have a clear
view of this factual situation, it becomes necessary that we
analyze the evidence of record.
Plaintiff Goquiolay, it is intimated, testified on
crossexamination that he had a conversation with one
Hernando Young in Manila in the year 1945 who informed
him that Kong Chai Pin "was attending to the properties
and deriving some income therefrom and she had no other
means of livelihood except those properties and some
rentals derived from the properties." He went on to say by
way of remark that she could continue doing this because
he wanted to help her. On point that he emphasized was
that he was "not interested in agricultural lands."
On the other hand, defendants presented Hernando
Young, the same person referred to by Goquiolay, who was
a close friend of the family of Kong Chai Pin, for the
purpose of denying the testimony of Goquiolay. Young
testified that in 1945 he was still in Davao, and insisted no
less than six times during his testimony that he was not in
Manila in 1945, the year when he allegedly gave the

information to Goquiolay, stating that he arrived in Manila
for the first time in 1947. He testified further
981
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 981

that he had visited the partnership properties during the

period covered by the alleged information given by him to
Goquiolay and that he found them "abandoned and
underdeveloped," and that Kong Chai Pin was not deriving
any income from them.
The other witness for the defendants, Rufino Lim, also
testified that he had seen the partnership properties and
corroborated the testimony of Hernando Young in all
respects: "the properties in Mamay were underdeveloped,
the shacks were destroyed in Tigato, and the family of
Kong Chai Pin did not receive any income from the
partnership properties." He specifically rebutted the
testimony of Goquiolay in his deposition given on June 30,
1956 that Kong Chai Pin and her family were living in the
partnership properties and stated that the 'family never
actually lived in the properties of the partnership even
before the war or after the war."
It is unquestionable that Goquiolay was merely
repeating an information given to him by a third person,
Hernando Young·he stressed this point twice. A careful
analysis of the substance of Goquiolay's testimony will
show that he merely had no objection to allowing Kong
Chai Pin to continue attending to the properties in order to
give her some means of livelihood, because, according to
the information given him by Hernando Young, which he
assumed to be true, Kong Chai Pin had no other means of
livelihood. But certainly he made it very clear that he did
not allow her to manage the partnership when he explained
his reason for refusing to sign a general power of attorney
for Kong Chai Pin which her counsel, Atty. Zuño, brought
with him to his house in, 1948. He said:
"* * * Then Mr. Yu Eng Lai told me that he brought with him Atty.
Zuño and he asked me if I could execute a general power of attorney

for Mrs. Kong Chai Pin. Then I told Atty. Zuño what is the use of
executing a general power of attorney for Mrs. Kong Chai Pin when
Mrs. Kong Chai Pin had already got that plantation for agricultural
purposes, I said for agricultural purposes she
982

can use that plantation * * *" (T.s.n., p. 9, Hearing on May 5, 1955)
It must be noted that in his testimony Goquiolay was

categorically stating his opposition to the management of
the partnership by Kong Chai Pin and carefully made the
distinction that his conformity was for her to attend to the
partnership properties in order to give her merely a means
of livelihood. It should be stated that the period covered by
the testimony refers to the period of occupation when living
condition was difficult and precarious. And Atty. Zuño, it
should also be stated, did not deny the statement of
Goquiolay.
It can therefore be seen that the question as to whether
Kong Chai Pin exercised certain acts of management of the
partnership properties is highly controverted. The most
that we can say is that the alleged acts are doubtful more
so when they are disputed by the defendants themselves
who later became the purchasers of the properties, and yet
these alleged acts, if at all, only refer to management of the
properties and not to management of the partnership,
which are two different things.
In resumé, we may conclude that the sale of the
partnership properties by Kong Chai Pin cannot be upheld
on the ground of estoppel, first, because the alleged acts of
management have not been clearly proven; second, because
the record clearly shows that the defendants, or the buyers,
were not misled nor did they rely on the acts of
management, but instead they acted solely on the opinion
of their counsel, Atty. Quisumbing, to the effect that she
succeeded her husband in the partnership as managing
partner by operation of law; and third, because the
defendants are themselves estopped to invoke a defense

which they tried to dispute and repudiate.
2. Assuming arguendo that the acts of management
imputed to Kong Chai Pin are true, could such acts give her
the character of general manager of the partnership as we
have concluded in our decision?
983
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 983

Our answer is in the negative because it is contrary to law

and precedents. Garrigues, a well-known commentator, is
clearly of the opinion that mere acceptance of the
inheritance does not make the heir of a general partner a
general partner himself. He emphasized that the heir must
declare that he is entering the partnership as a general
partner unless the deceased partner has made it an express
condition in his will that the heir accepts the condition of
entering the partnership as a prerequisite of inheritance,
1
in which case acceptance of the inheritance is enough. But
here Tan Sin An died intestate.
Now, could Kong Chai Pin be deemed to have declared
her intention to become general partner by exercising acts
of management? We believe not, for, in consonance with our
ruling that as a general rule the heirs of a deceased partner
succeed as limited partners only by operation of law, it is
obvious that the heir, upon entering the partnership, must
make a declaration of his character, otherwise he should be
deemed as having succeeded as limited partner by the mere
acceptance of inheritance. And here Kong Chai Pin did not
make such declaration. Being then a limited partner upon
the death of Tan Sin An by operation of law, 2
the
peremptory prohibition contained in Article 148 of the
Code of Commerce became binding upon her and as a
result she could not change her status by violating its
provisions not only under the general principle that
prohibited acts cannot produce any legal 3effect, but also
because under the provisions of Article 147 of the
_______________
1 "Tratado de Derecho Mercantil, Tomo I, Vol. 30 pp. 1211-1212.

2 "* * * The limited partner may not perform any act in the
administration of the interests of the company, even in the capacity of
attorney-in-fact of the managing partners."
3 "Should any limited partner include his name or allow its inclusion
in the firm name, he shall be subject, with respect to persons not
members of the company, to the same responsibilities as the managers,
without acquiring more rights than those corresponding to his character
as limited partner." (Italics supplied)
984

same Code she was precluded from acquiring more rights

than those pertaining to her as a limited partner. The
alleged acts of management, therefore, did not give Kong
Chai Pin the character of general manager to authorize her
to bind the partnership.
Assuming also arguendo that the alleged acts of
management imputed to Kong Chai Pin gave her the
character of a general partner, could she sell the
partnership properties without authority from the other
partners?
Our answer is also in the negative in the light of the
provisions of the articles of partnership and the pertinent
provisions of the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code.
Thus, Article 129 of the Code of Commerce says:
"If the management of the general partnership has not been limited
by special agreement to any of the members, all shall have the
power to take part in the direction and management of the common
business, and the members present shall come to an agreement for
all contracts or obligations which may concern the association."
And the pertinent portions of the Articles of partnership

provides:
"VII. The affairs of the co-partnership shall be managed exclusively

by the managing partner or by his authorized agent, and it is
expressly stipulated that the managing partner may delegate the

entire management of the affairs of the co-partnership by
irrevocable power of attorney to any person, firm or corporation he
may select, upon such terms as regards compensation as he may
deem proper, and vest in such person, firm or corporation full power
and authority, as the agent of the co-partnership and in his name,
place and stead to do anything for it or on his behalf which he as
such managing partner might do or cause to be done." (Page 23,
Record on Appeal)
It would thus be seen that the powers of the managing

partner are not defined either under the provisions of the
Code of Commerce or in the articles of partnership, a
situation which, under Article 2 of the same Code, renders
applicable herein the provisions of the Civil Code. And
since, according to well-known authorities, the relation-
985
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 985

ship between a managing partner and the partnership is

substantially
4
the same as that of the agent and his
principal, the extent of the power of Kong Chai Pin must,
therefore, be determined under the general principles
governing agency. And, on this point, the law says that an
agency created in general terms includes only acts of
administration, but with regard to the power to
compromise, sell, mortgage, and other acts of 5 strict
ownership, an express power of attorney is required. Here
Kong Chai Pin did not have such power when she sold the
properties of the partnership.
Of course, there is authority to the effect that a
managing partner, even without express power of attorney,
may perform acts affecting ownership if the same are
necessary to promote or accomplish a declared object of the
partnership, but here the transaction is not for this
purpose. It was effected
6
not to promote any avowed object
of the partnership. Rather, the sale was effected to pay an
obligation of the partnership by selling its real properties
which Kong Chai Pin could not do without express
authority. The authorities supporting this view are

overwhelming.
"La enajenación puede entrar en las facultades del gerente, cuando

es conforme a los fines sociáles. Pero esta facultad de enajenar
limitada a las ventas conforme a los fines sociales, viene limitada a
los objetos de comercio, o los productos de la fábrica para
explotación de los cuales se ha constituido la Sociedad. Ocurrira una
cosa parecida cuando el objeto de la Sociedad fuese la compra y
venta de inmuebles, en cuyo caso el gerente estaria facultado para
otorgar las ventas que fuere necesario. Por el contrario, el gerente no
tiene atribuciones para vender las instalaciones del comercio ni
_______________
4 Derecho Mercantil, David Supino, 4a ed., p. 179; Cesar Vivante, Tratado de

Derecho Mercantil, pp. 124-125, Vol. II, la. ed., R. Gay de Montella, Tratado
Practico de Sociedades Mercantiles, pp. 223224. Tomo I, 3a. ed.
5 Article 1713, Spanish Civil Code.
6 The main business of the partnership is to engage in the real estate
business in general, particularly in buying and selling real estate. (Page 23,
Record on Appeal)
986

la fábrica, ni las maquinarias, vehiculos de transporte, etc., que

forman parte de la explotación social. En todos estas casos,
igualmente que si tratase de la venta de una marca o procedimiento
mecánico o quimico, etc., siendo actos de disposición seria necesario
contar con la conformidad expresa de todos los socios." (R. Gay de
Montella, id., pp. 223-224, Italics supplied)
"Los poderes de los Administradores no tienen ante el silencio del
contrato otros limites que los señalados por el objeto de la Sociedad
y, por consiguiente, pueden llevar a cabo todas las operaciones que
sirven para aquel ejercicio, incluso cambiando repetidas veces los
propios acuerdos según el interés convenido de la Sociedad. Pueden
contratar y despedir a los empleados, tomar en arriendo almacenes
y tiendas, expedir cambiales, girarlas, avalarlas, dar en prenda o en
hipoteca los bienes de la sociedad y adquirir inmuebles destinados a
su explotación o al empleo estable de sus capitales. Pero no podrán

ejecutar los actos que estan en contradicción con la explotación que
les fue confiada no podran cambiar el objeto, el domicilio la razón
social; fundir a la Sociedad en otra; ceder la acción, y por tanto, el
uso de la firma social a otro renunciar definitivamente el ejercicio
de uno de otro ramo comercio que se les haya confiado y enajenar o
piqnorar el taller o el banco social excepto que la venta o piqnoracion
tengan por el objeto procurar los medios necesarios para la
continuación de la empresa social." (Cesar Vivante, Tratado de
Derecho Mercantil, pp. 124125, Vol. II, la. ed.; Italics supplied)
"The act of one partner to bind the firm, must be necessary for
the carrying on of its business. If all that can be said of it was that
it was convenient, or that it facilitated the transaction of the
business of the firm, that is not sufficient, in the absence of
evidence of sanction by other partners. Nor, it seems, will necessity
itself be sufficient if it .be an extraordinary necessity. What is
necessary for carrying on the business of the firm under ordinary
circumstances and in the usual way, is the test. Lindl. Partn. Sec.
126. While, within this rule, one member of a partnership may, in
the usual and ordinary course of its business, make a valid sale or
pledge, by way of mortgage or otherwise, of all or part of its effects
intended for sale, to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, without
the consent of the other members of the firm, it is not within the
scope of his implied authority to make a final disposition of all of its
effects, including those employed as the means of carrying on its
business, the object and effect of which is to immediately terminate
the partnership, and place its property beyond its control. Such a
disposition, instead of being within the scope of the partnership
business, or in the
987
VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 987

usual and ordinary way of carrying it on, is necessarily subversive

of the object of the partnership, and contrary to the presumed
intention of the partnership in its formation." (McGrath, et al. vs.
Cowen, et al., 49 N.F. 338, 343; Italics supplied)
Since Kong Chai Pin sold the partnership properties not in

line with the business of the partnership but to pay its
obligation without first obtaining the consent of the other

partners, the sale is invalid being in excess of her
authority.
4. Finally, the sale under consideration was effected in a
suspicious manner as may be gleaned from the following
circumstances:
(a) The properties subject of the instant sale which

consist of three parcels of land situated in the City
of Davao have an area of 200 hectares more or less,
or 2,000,000 square meters. These properties were
purchased by the partnership for purposes of
subdivision. According to realtor Mata, who
testified in court, these properties could command
at the time he testified a value of not less than
P312,000.00, and according to Dalton Chen,
manager of the firm which took over the
administration, since the date of sale no
improvement was ever made thereon precisely
because of this litigation. And yet, for said
properties, aside from the sum of P37,000.00 which
was paid for the properties of the deceased and the
partnership, only the paltry sum of P66,529.91 was
paid as a consideration therefor, of which the sum
of P46,116.75 was even paid in Japanese currency.
(b) Considering the area of the properties Kong Chai
Pin had no valid reason to sell them if her purpose
was only to pay the partnership's obligation. She
could have negotiated a loan if she wanted to pay it
by placing the properties as security, but preferred
to sell them even at such low prices because of her
close relationship with the purchasers and creditors
who conveniently organized a partnership to exploit
them, as may be seen from the following
relationship of their pedigree:
988

KONG CHAI PIN, the administratrix, was a granddaughter of Jose

P. Yutivo, founder of the defendant Yutivo Sons Hardware Co.
YUTIVO SONS HARDWARE Co, and SIN YEE CUAN Co, INC.,
alleged creditors, are owned by the heirs of Jose P. Yutivo (Sing, Yee
& Cuan are the three children of Jose). Yu KHE THAI is a grandson
of the same Jose P. Yutivo, and president of the two alleged
creditors. He is the acknowledged head of the Yu families.
WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, one of the original buyers, 'is married to
Ana Yu, a daughter of Yu Khe Thai, BETTY Y. LEE, the other
original buyer is also a daughter of Yu Khe Thai. The INSULAR
DEVELOPMENT Co., the ultimate buyer, was organized for the
specific purpose of buying the partnership properties. Its
incorporators were: Ana Yu and Betty V. Lee, Atty. Quisumbing and
Salazar the lawyers who studied the papers of sale and have been
counsel for the Yutivo interests; Dalton Chen a brother-in-law of Yu
Khe Thai and an executive of Sing Yee & Cuan Co; Lillian Yu,
daughter of Yu Eng Poh, an executive of Yutivo Sons Hardware, and
Simeon Daguiwag, a trusted employee of the Yutivos.
(c) Lastly, even since Tan Sin An died in 1942 the

creditors, who were close relatives of Kong Chai
Pin, have already conceived the idea of possessing
the lands for purposes of subdivision, excluding
Goquiolay from their plan, and this is evident from
the following sequence of events:
Tan Sin An died in 1942 and intestate proceedings were opened in

1944. In 1946, the creditors of the partnership filed their claim
against the partnership in the intestate proceedings. The creditors
studied ways and means of liquidating the obligation of the
partnership, leading to the formation of the defendant Insular
Development Co., composed of members of the Yutivo family and
the counsel of record of the defendants, which subsequently bought
the properties of the partnership and assumed the obligation of the
latter in favor of the creditors of the partnership, Yutivo Sons
Hardware and Sing, Yee & Cuan, also of the Yutivo family. The
buyers took time to study the commercial potentialities of the
partnership properties and their lawyers carefully studied the
document and other papers involved in the transaction. All these
steps led finally to the sale of the three partnership properties.
Upon the strength of the foregoing considerations, I vote to grant
motion for reconsideration.
Labrador, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
989
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 108 05/12/2020, 11(56 AM

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 947

[No. L-11840. July 26, 1960]

ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY and THE PARTNERSHIP

1. PARTNERSHIP; MANAGEMENT, RIGHT OF

2. ID.; ARTICLES OF CO-PARTNERSHIP; RIGHT OF HEIRS

3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF HEIRS' FAILURE TO REPUDIATE;

Goquiolay upon Tan's demise. Minority of the heirs is not a

948 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Goquiolay, et al. vs. Sycip, et al.

4. ID.; SALE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES; CONSENT

5. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL.·By allowing defendant Kong Chai

6. PARTNERSHIP; GENERAL PARTNER BY ESTOPPEL;

7. ID.; HEIR OF PARTNER; STATUS ORDINARILY AS

A GENERAL PARTNER.·Although the heir of a partner

8. ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; AUTHORITY OF PARTNER TO

9. ID.; PROPERTY OF PARTNERSHIP; SALE OF

10. ID.; SALE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; ACTION FOR

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 949

Goquiolay, et al. vs. Sycip, et al.

BAR.·Appellant's claim that the price was inadequate,

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP ALONE IS NO BADGE OF

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; FRAUD OF CREDITORS DISTINGUISHED

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSIDIARY NATURE; ALLEGATION OF

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

950 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tan Sin An and Antonio C. Goquiolay entered into a

"III. The co-partnership 'shall be composed of said Tan

The lifetime of the partnership was fixed at ten (10) years

However, the partnership could be dissolved and its affairs

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 951

On May 29, 1940, the plaintiff partnership "Tan Sin An and

mortgage debt thereon for P35,000.00, with interest. The

952 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

themselves to pay, jointly and severally, the remaining

On March 29, 1949, Kong Chai Pin filed a petition with

1 In her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate and as a

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 953

P37,000.00 and of vendees' assuming payment of the claims

conveyance in favor of the Insular Development Co., Inc., in

"I. ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai

954 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

II ·The lower court erred in holding that Kong Chai

VII ·The lower court erred in finding that Kong Chai

There is merit in the contention that the lower court erred

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 955

the deceased partner shall be represented by his heirs",

could not have referred to the managerial right given to

1 "General and limited partnership shall furthermore be dissolved by

956 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

were disqualified from the management of the business

2 Gay de Montella, Tratado Practico de Sociedades Mercantiles, Vol. II, p.

VOL. 108, JULY 26, 1960 957

inquiries as to the agreements had between the partners. Its

We are not unaware of the provision of Article 129 of the

but this obligation is one imposed by law on the partners

reason, and it shall produce its effects without prejudice to

958 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

César Vivante (2 Tratado de Derecho Mercantil, pp.