Bennett v. Stanley Facts:: Trespassing
Bennett v. Stanley Facts:: Trespassing
Bennett v. Stanley Facts:: Trespassing
Stanley
Facts: When Bennett, plaintiff-appellant, arrived home in the late afternoon, he found his two
young daughters crying. The three-year-old daughter told him that Mommy and her five-year-old
half-brother, were drowning in the water. Bennett ran next door to his neighbors' house to find
mother and son unconscious in the swimming pool. Both died. Stanleys' property included a
swimming pool that had gone unused for three years. At that time, the pool was enclosed with
fencing and a brick wall. After moving in, the Stanleys drained the pool once but they allowed
rainwater to accumulate in the pool to a depth of over six feet. They removed a tarp that had been
on the pool and also removed the fencing that had been around two sides of the pool. The pool
became pond-like: it contained tadpoles and frogs, and Mr. Stanley had seen a snake swimming
on the surface. The pool contained no ladders, and its sides were slimy with algae. The houses
were about one hundred feet apart. There was some fencing with an eight-foot gap between the
two properties. The Stanleys were aware that the Bennetts had moved next door and that they
had young children. They did not post any warning or no trespassing signs on their property.
Procedural history: Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. The trial court found that decedents were trespassers on defendants property and that
defendants therefore owed them only a duty to refrain from wanton and willful misconduct. The
trial court rejected plaintiffs argument that defendants maintenance of the swimming pool
amounted to a dangerous active operation that would create for them a duty of ordinary care. As
the complaint alleged that defendants had violated a duty of ordinary care, the court found for the
Stanleys. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment.
It held that defendants owed the decedents only a duty to refrain from wanton and willful
misconduct, and added that there was no evidence of such misconduct. This court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to the trial court.
Issues: whether child trespassers should become a class of users who are owed a different duty of
care?
Rules: Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 339: A possessor of land is subject to
liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon
land if: (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has
reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the
possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children because
of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it
or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of
maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with
the risk to children involved, and (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate
the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
Holdings: Yes, child trespassers should become a class of users who are owed a different duty of
care.
Children of tender years, and youthful persons generally, are entitled to a degree of care
proportioned to their inability to foresee and avoid the perils that they may encounter. The same
discernment and foresight in discovering defects and dangers cannot be reasonably expected of
them, that older and experienced persons habitually employ; and therefore the greater precaution
should be taken, where children are exposed to them.
The dangerous instrumentality exception to nonliability to trespassers imposes upon the owner or
occupier of a premises a higher duty of care to a child trespasser when such owner or occupier
actively and negligently operates hazardous machinery or other apparatus, the dangerousness of
which is not readily apparent to children.
The Restatement's version of the attractive nuisance doctrine balances society's interest in
protecting children with the rights of landowners to enjoy their property. Even when a landowner
is found to have an attractive nuisance on his or her land, the landowner is left merely with the
burden of acting with ordinary care. A landowner does not automatically become liable for any
injury a child trespasser may suffer on that land.