The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics
The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics
The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics
Republics
Between 1787 and 1791 the Framers of the U.S. Constitution established a system of
government upon principles that had been discussed and partially implemented in
many countries over the course of several centuries, but never before in such a pure
and complete design, which we call a constitutional republic.
The social contract is very simple. It has only two basic terms: (1) mutual defense of
rights; and (2) mutual decision by deliberative assembly. There are no agents, no
officials, that persist from one deliberative assembly to another. The duties of the
social contract are militia. There may be customs that persist from assembly to
assembly, such as customs for due notice, parliamentary procedure, judicial due
process, and enforcement of court orders by militia. This second term could be called
the constitution of society, but it precedes a constitution of government and should not
be confused with it.
There is also a constitution of nature that precedes both the constitution of society and
the constitution of government. It is also convenient to speak of a constitution of the
state that follows the constitution of society and precedes the constitution of
government. It arises after a society is created (by adopting the social contract), and
after it acquires exclusive dominion over a well-defined territory. That is when we get
things like a right to remain at and to return to one's birthplace, which makes no sense
for a society with no territory (such as nomads).
A constitution of government, such as the Constitution of 1787, is the next step in the
development. It is to establish institutions, offices, procedures, duties, and structures
that persist from one assembly to another that are not just customs. It is at that point
that we begin to get things like laws, and paid agents and officials, whose jobs
continue beyond transient assemblies. We also get taxes, standing armies, and
professional law enforcers.
Such pooled powers are generally exercised by delegating them to some members of
the society to act as agents for the members of the society as a whole, and to do so
within a framework of structure and procedures that is a government. No such
government may exercise any powers not thus delegated to it, or do so in a way that is
not consistent with established structures or procedures defined by a basic law which
is called the constitution.
Although in principle the procedures may allow for the direct adoption of legislation
by vote of the people, this is both impractical and potentially dangerous, especially to
the rights of minorities, so that it is generally best that most legislation require
approval at some point in the legislative process by a deliberative assembly, a body
of elected representatives rather than by direct popular vote, and that any such
legislation be subject to judicial review, whereby legislation not consistent with the
constitution can be voided.
It is important that the deliberative assembly fairly represent all the competing
interests of the people, so that the concerns of minorities can be weighed and not
ignored. But fair representation is insufficient if deliberation is not effective in
analyzing and anticipating all the consequences of any decisions that might be made.
The consent of the majority should be necessary for action, but that consent should
never be sufficient for action.
Origins of the Social Contract
Critics of social contract theory argue that almost all persons grow up within an
existing society, and therefore never have the choice of whether to enter into a social
contract. Not having a choice, they say, makes any such contract void.
The original proponents of the social contract theory, John Locke, David Hume, and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, answered these critics, but not in a way that is entirely
satisfactory. To understand how the social contract comes about, we need to look at
the kinds of contract that prevail during each stage in the development of a human
being in society.
Each of us begins life under the terms of a special kind of social contract called a filial
contract, between a child and his parents, and by extension to his siblings. That
contract is established at the moment of bonding between parents and child following
birth, and the terms of the contract are that the child will provide the parents certain
pleasures that come with parenthood, particularly the satisfaction of helping to form a
happy and admirable adult, and support for the parents in their later years, and in turn
receives their love, support, guidance, and protection during childhood.
Although a filial contract can exist in a family that is isolated from any larger society,
when the parents join a society, they pool their rights and duties as parents with other
members of that society, and thereby become agents of the larger society in the raising
of their own children, and accountable to that larger society for doing so properly.
As a child grows, it encounters other members of the larger society, usually beginning
with other children. Whenever any two or more individuals meet with the
understanding and expectation that they will live together in harmony and not fight
with one another using any available means, they are establishing a social contract
among themselves.
In most cases they will be contracting with persons who have already established such
a contract with still other persons, so that the terms of the contract are not only to live
in harmony with those in direct contact, but also with all those with whom each of the
parties is already engaged in a social contract, and by extension, to all others that
those are in a social contract with, and so on.
In other words, the social contract is transitive: if a is in a social contract with b,
and b with c, then a is in a social contract with c. In this way each of us is bound
under a social contract with all the other members of the society, most of whom we
have never met.
As a person makes the transition from childhood to adulthood, his obligations change
to match his abilities, and the filial contract gives way to the larger social contract and
obligations to larger communities at the local, provincial, national, and global levels.
Of course, the social contracts of several societies may not extend to one another,
giving rise to tribes or nations, whose members are bound by social contract within
their membership, but are in a state of nature with respect to one another. If that state
of nature involves active conflict, whether at the individual, tribal, or national level, it
is said to be a state of war.
Around the end of the 19th century, however, it became increasingly apparent that
excessive and unbalanced concentrations of power in the private sector could subvert
the system of checks and balances in government, and the first anti-trust laws were
passed to try to provide a check on those undue influences.
Unfortunately, such legislation has not been entirely effective, and we now face a
situation in which to an intolerable degree the real powers of government are being
exercised not by constitutional bodies but by secret cabals based in the private sector
but extending throughout government, cabals which are increasingly coherent and
increasingly abusive of the rights of the people, including the right to have
government be accountable to them and not to a power elite.
The continued constitutional development of this society will therefore require the
development of a new, more sophisticated system of checks and balances that extends
throughout the private sector as well as the public and does not entirely rely on market
forces.
The fundamental natural rights are life, liberty, and property. However, it is necessary
to be somewhat more specific as to what these rights include. Therefore, constitution
framers usually expand them into such rights as the right of speech and publication,
the right to assemble peaceably, the right to keep and bear arms, the right to travel
over public roadways, and so forth.
The exercise of such natural rights may be restricted to the extent that they come into
conflict with the exercise of the natural rights of other members of society, but only to
the minimum degree needed to resolve such conflict.
Such natural rights are inalienable, meaning that a person cannot delegate them or
give them away, even if he wants to do so. That means that no constitutional provision
which delegated to government at any level the power to take away such rights would
be valid, even if adopted as an amendment through a proper amendment process. Such
rights apply to all levels of government, federal, state, or local. Their enumeration in
the constitution does not establish them, it only recognizes them.
Although they are restrictions on the power of government, the repeal of the
provisions recognizing them would not remove the restrictions or allow the delegation
of any power to deny them. The people do not have that power, and therefore cannot
delegate it to government.
Yet constitutions recognize the power to deprive persons of their rights under due
process of law. Strictly speaking, a person may not be deprived of such rights in the
sense of taking them away. Natural rights are never lost. Their exercise can, however,
be restricted or, to use the proper legal term, disabled.
While some might question the practical distinction between losing a right and having
it disabled, that distinction is important. A right which is disabled under due process
may also be re- enabled by the removal of that disability, and the disability is removed
if the social contract is broken and persons return to the state of nature.
Due process is not defined in the written U.S. Constitution, which points out the fact
that the constitution consists not only of the written document itself, but the body of
court precedents, legal definitions and traditions, and prevailing civic processes as of
the date the written document was ratified, which is called pre-ratification Common
Law.
It also includes the commentaries and records of the debates of the framers and
ratifiers insofar as they provide guidance on how to interpret the provisions of the
written document. The constitution is further expanded to include the body of court
precedents since ratification which interpret its provisions, called post-ratification
common law, but only insofar as those court precedents are consistent with the written
document, pre-ratification Common Law, and the original intent of its framers and
ratifiers.
Certain rights, therefore, such as the rights of due process and the right to vote, are
contractual. They have no meaning in a state of nature, only within the context of a
civil society. And they are defined within Common Law rather than in the written
Constitution.
Due process requires, among other things, that any disablement of a right be done
only by a court of competent jurisdiction in response to a petition to do so, and after
arguments and evidence are heard from all sides to support or refute the granting of
such petition. The only rights which may be disabled by statute and without a specific
court proceeding are the rights of majority, or adulthood.
This duty implies not only individual action to defend the community, but the duty to
do so in concert with others as an organized and trained militia. Since public officials
may themselves pose a threat to the community, such militias may be subject to call-
up by officials, but may not be subject to their control except insofar as they are acting
in accordance with the constitution and laws pursuant thereto, and in defense of the
community.
Another important duty is jury duty. Since officials may be corrupt or abusive or their
power, grand jurors have the duty not only to bring an indictment upon evidence
presented to it by a prosecutor, but to conduct their own investigations and if
necessary, to appoint their own prosecutors to conduct a trial on the evidence.
No matter how despicable an accused defendant might be or how heinous his acts,
they have the duty to find that accused not guilty if the court lacks jurisdiction, if the
rights of the accused were seriously violated in the course of the investigation or trial,
or if the law under which the accused is charged is misapplied to the case or is
unconstitutional; and to find the law unconstitutional if it is in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused, if it is not based on any power delegated to the
government, if it is unequally enforced, or if it is so vague that honest persons could
disagree on how to obey or enforce it.
Most written constitutions prescribe the powers delegated to government, but are not
always explicit about the duties. It is implied that the government has the duty to
exercise its powers wisely and pursuant to the purposes of the social contract.
But some persons argue that the power to act is also the power not to act. Could the
government choose not to exercise its power to conduct elections, or to defend the
country, or to maintain a sound currency, or to organize and train the militias of each
state? No. Except in case of emergency, and only for the duration of the emergency,
government must exercise the powers delegated to it according to their purposes to the
best of its ability. That is its duty. Just as it is the duty of every member of society to
exercise his or her powers in service of the community.
References:
[] Ernest Barker, ed., Social Contract, Oxford U. Press, London, 1960. Contains the
essays: John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government; David Hume, Of the Original Contract; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The
Social Contract.
[] Bernard Schwartz, The Roots of the Bill of Rights, Chelsea House, New York, 1980.
[] Clarence Streit, Atlantic Union Now, 1962, Freedom & Union Press, Washington,
DC.
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