1. GR NO.

166833

FELIXBERTO CUBERO, NERISSA C. NATIVIDAD, JUDY U. LIM, MANUEL R. LAHOZ, SOTERO DIOLA and
BELLE CORPORATION, vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

ISSUE:

The present petition raises the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Individual petitioners Felixberto Cubero, Nerrisa1 C. Natividad, Judy U. Lim, Manuel R. Lahoz and Sotero
Diola are the registered owners of various parcels of land covered by twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs).2 The properties cover a total land area of about 78,178 square meters located in Barangay
Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas.

In August 2003, each of the individual petitioners entered into a Joint Venture Development Agreement
with co-petitioner Belle Corporation to develop the properties as part of an agricultural farm lot
subdivision project known as "Plantation Hills at Tagaytay Greenlands Phase I" (the Project) for eventual
sale to the public.

With the development of the Project in full swing in mid-2004, respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (Laguna West Cooperative) filed 9 ex-parte petitions4 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tanauan City, for inscription of an adverse claim, the annotation of which the Registrar of Deeds
allegedly failed to carry over to the TCTs of individual petitioners under the Property Registration
Decree5. Laguna West Cooperative added that the petitions were filed to rectify the omission or error
and to protect its vested, subsisting and valid rights under the JVAs.

Getting wind of the petitions filed by Laguna West Cooperative, petitioners also filed a Complaint10 with
the RTC of Tanauan, for "Annulment of Joint Venture Agreements with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writs of Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages" against
herein respondents Laguna West Cooperative and Atty. Abraham Bermudez11 in the latter's capacity as
Registrar of Deeds of Tanauan.

In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the April 1996 JVAs between Laguna West Cooperative and
individual petitioners' predecessors-in-interest are void ab initio since they were executed within the 10-
year prohibitory period under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988),12
the titles covering the properties having emanated from emancipation patents granted in November
1988 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

ISSUE: W/N THE RTC OF BATANGAS OBTAINED JURISDICTION AS OPPOSED TO CLAIM BY CUBEROS THAT
DARAB HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION

HELD:

YES, the RTC of Batangas has juridsiction over the subject matter.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over
it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In the determination of
jurisdiction, the status or relationship of the parties, as well as the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy, is also considered.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Original
jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment
upon the law and facts, while exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of co-existence and refers to
jurisdiction possessed to the exclusion of others.

There is no question that the instant case does not involve agrarian dispute and that the parties have no
tenurial relationship. The Court dismissed the complaint not because the subject of the questioned JVAs
is an agricultural land as erroneously assumed by the plaintiffs. The complaint was dismissed because it
involves controversy or issue in the implementation of R.A. 6657 – that is – whether or not the
agricultural land beneficiaries has reneged its (sic) obligation by entering in the joint venture
agreements and whether the terms thereof are violative of Sections 27 and 73 of the said Act including
the restrictions annotated on the emancipation patents certificates.

The JVAs subject of the petition for annulment of petitioners precisely involve the development and
utilization of the subject agricultural lands. As successors-in-interest of the beneficiaries of the
agricultural lands, individual petitioners seek to nullify the JVAs. Since the controversy involves the rights
and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of an agricultural land
covered by CARP, the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the DAR.

2. G.R. Nos. 197592 November 27, 2013

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.

Doctrines: The COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.

Facts:

The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent)
entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I)
and Passenger Terminal Building (PhaseII) in Malay, Aklan. In the course of construction, petitioner
issued variation/change orders for additional works. Jody King demanded for the payment of Aklan’s
balance, but to no avail. Jody King filed a case in the RTC of Marikina City to collect the said balance. The
Province of Aklan denied any unpaid balance and interest. The RTC favored Jody King, and issued a writ
of execution against petitioner. Sheriff Gamboa

served notices of garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and
Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the
judgment debt from the funds deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused
to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and
jurisprudence on the determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and
satisfaction.

Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution. It was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
111754, which was dismissed as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's issuance of
the writ of execution. The trial court denied petitioner's notice of appeal and motion for
reconsideration. Thus, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid
orders denying due course to its notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073, which was also
dismissed because petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely
motion for reconsideration

Issues: W/N the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the
matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not
be unfairly disadvantaged,dismiss the case without prejudice.The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide the court indetermining whether it should refrain from exercising
its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. As can be gleaned, respondent
seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local government unit. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.

3. OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, vs.

Facts:
Castillo was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT 19972. The Philippine Tourism Authority
allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land based on TCT 18493. Castillo and Olivarez Realty
Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo Olivarez, entered into a contract of conditional sale over the
property.  The details were as follows:

1. Under the deed of conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty; with Olivarez
Realty delivering the downpayment and the rest to be paid in 30 equal monthly installments every 8th
of the month beginning in the month that the parties would receive a decision voiding the PTA’s title to
the property.

2. Under the same deed, Olivarez Realty will file the action against PTA with full assistance of Castillo;
and that should the petition be denied, Castillo shall reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez Realty.

3. Under the same contract, Olivarez Realty undertook to pay the legitimate tenants of the land
disturbance compensation, while Castillo undertook to clear the land of the tenants within 6 months
from the signing of the deed; that should Castillo fail to clear the land within 6 months, Olivarez Realty
may suspend its monthly downpayment until the tenants vacate the property.

4. The parties agreed that Olivarez Realty Corporation may immediately occupy the property upon
signing of the deed. Should the contract be cancelled, Olivarez Realty Corporation agreed to return the
property’s possession to Castillo and forfeit all the improvements it may have introduced on the
property.

Olivarez Realty failed to comply with the conditions, to wit: a) pay the full purchase price; b) failed to file
any action against PTA; c) failed to clear the land of the tenants nor paying them disturbance
compensation. For breaching the contract, Castillo prayed for rescission of contract under Art. 1191 of
Civil Code, plus damages.

In their defense, Olivarez Realty alleged that Castillo failed to fully assist in filing the action against PTA;
that Castillo failed to clear the property of the tenants within 6 months from the signing of the deed.
Thus, they had all the legal right to withhold the subsequent payments to fully pay the purchase price.

Both RTC and CA ruled that Olivarez Realty breached the contract and ordered the rescission of the sale
plus damages.

Issue #1:
What is the nature of obligations undertaken by both parties?

Held #1:
Olivarez Realty’s obligation to pay the disturbance compensation is a pure obligation, and hence,
demandable at once. With respect to Castillo’s obligation to clear the land of the tenants within six
months from the signing of the contract, his obligation was an obligation with a resolutory period. The
obligation to clear the land of the tenants took effect at once, specifically, upon the parties’ signing of
the deed of conditional sale. Castillo had until October 2, 2000, six months from April 5, 2000 when the
parties signed the deed of conditional sale, to clear the land of the tenants. Olivarez Realty Corporation,
therefore, had no right to withhold payments of the purchase price. As the trial court ruled, Olivarez
Realty Corporation “can only claim non-compliance of the obligation to clear the land of the tenants in
October 2000.

Issue #2:
Whether or not rescission of the contract is proper.

Held #2: NO.
SC characterized the contract as a contract to sell, not a contract of conditional sale. In a contract of
conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the property upon full payment of the
purchase price. This transfer of title is “by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.” In a contract to sell, transfer of title to the prospective buyer is not automatic.
“The prospective seller must convey title to the property through a deed of conditional sale.” The
distinction is important to determine the applicable laws and remedies in case a party does not fulfill his
or her obligations under the contract. In contracts of conditional sale, our laws on sales under the Civil
Code of the Philippines apply. On the other hand, contracts to sell are not governed by our law on sales
but by the Civil Code provisions on conditional obligations.

Specifically, Article 1191 of the Civil Code on the right to rescind reciprocal obligations does not apply to
contracts to sell. Failure to fully pay the purchase price in contracts to sell is not the breach of contract
under Art. 1191. Failure to fully pay the purchase price is merely an event which prevents the seller’s
obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. This is because there can be no rescission of an
obligation that is still nonexistent, the suspensive condition (the condition of having the buyer pay the
full purchase price) having not happened.

In this case, Castillo reserved his title to the property and undertook to execute a deed of absolute sale
upon Olivarez Realty Corporation’s full payment of the purchase price. Since Castillo still has to execute
a deed of absolute sale to Olivarez Realty Corporation upon full payment of the purchase price, the
transfer of title is not automatic. As this case involves a contract to sell, Article 1191 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines does not apply. The contract to sell is instead cancelled, and the parties shall stand as if
the obligation to sell never existed.

SC cancelled the deed of conditional sale. Olivarez Realty was ordered to return to Castillo the
possession of property, together with all improvements that it introduced. Olivarez Realty was also
ordered to pay moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees to Castillo.

4. Alfredo Balquidra, petitioner vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz

G.R. No. L-40490 October 28, 1977

FACTS:

On June 17, 1961, petitioner Alfredo Balquidra was appointed watchman in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Capiz. On August 31, 1962, without advance notice, nor any formal charge, either
administrative, criminal or civil, respondent Provincial Governor and respondent Provincial Treasurer
terminated the services of the petitioner as such watchman, respondents alleging that the termination
was "for the convenience of the government.' On August 28, 1963 petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with damages with the CFI. He alleged that since his dismissal from the government service,
he had not received nor collected any terminal leave pay nor did he obtain any clearance of any
accountability. The CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that he be reinstated and that the
Provincial Government of Capiz is liable because respondent Governor and Provincial Treasurer were
charged in their official capacity. Respondents filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. They
claimed that the respondent Provincial Governor cannot be compelled to reinstate the petitioner due to
a memorandum circular of the Civil Service Commission and that the decision ordering the Province of
Capiz and/or respondents Provincial Governor and Provincial Treasurer to pay the back salaries of the
petitioner is contrary to law and applicable jurisprudence. When CFI denied this first motion for
reconsideration, the respondents filed a second motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the respondent
Court modified its decision and absolved the Province of Capiz from the payment of petitioner's back
salaries and damages on the ground that the Province of Capiz was not expressly impleaded as a party
respondent in said case. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied, hence this present
petition.

Issues/Held/Ratio

1. Whether or not petitioner Alfredo Balquidra is entitled to payment, jointly and solidarily by the
Provincial Governor, Provincial Treasurer, and the Province of Capiz, of back salaries, damages,
and attorney's fees as a result of his arbitrary dismissal from service as watchman in the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer Capiz
- Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner is not a civil service eligible, but this is no legal ground to
dismiss him at anytime without prior notice or formal charge. The lack of civil service
eligibility of an appointee to an unclassified position does not remove him from the
operation and protection of the Civil Service Law. In Barbero v. Paraguya, the Supreme
Court declared: o Employees in the civil service, regardless of their status are entitled to
security of tenure of office.
2. Whether or not the Province of Capiz should be held liable for the payment of petitioner's back
salaries
- Yes. Firstly, petitioner's dismissal was admittedly "for the convenience of the Government."
In other words, it was the Province of Capiz which benefited in the termination of
petitioner's services That the Provincial Government can act only through its officials, either
through its Provincial Executive alone, or through the Provincial Board, or through other
officials exercising discretion, cannot be disputed. The record of the case shows that the
complaint was directed against the respondent officials not in their personal but official
capacities, the illegal act complained of being done in the course of official function.
Respondents submit that since the Province of Capiz was not directly impleaded in the case,
it was not afforded its day in court and had no opportunity to be heard. The SC says that the
respondents were represented by the Provincial Attorney whose arguments against the
liability of the said respondents as well as that of the Province of Capiz are well researched
and ably presented. These facts alone belie the contention that the Province of Capiz was
not afforded its day in court.

5. G.R. No. 175574, February 14, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent Jose C. Go (Go) obtained two loans from PBCom, evidenced by two promissory notes.
PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go. It contended that the Spouses’ Answer interposed no
specific denials on the material averments and moved for summary judgment.

The RTC granted PBCom’s motion in its Judgment. The CA reversed this, reasoning that the fact of
default, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and the existence of a prior demand, which were all
material to PBCom’s claim, were “hardly admitted.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit.

REMEDIAL LAW: Admission

The Court agrees with the CA that “[t]he supposed admission of defendants-appellants on the x x x
allegations in the complaint is clearly not sufficient to justify the rendition of summary judgment in the
case for sum of money, considering that there are other allegations embodied and defenses raised by
the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a genuine issue as to the material facts in the
action.”

Taken within the context of the entirety of the pleading, it becomes apparent that there was no implied
admission and that there were indeed genuine issues to be addressed.

Petition is DENIED.

6. REPUBLIC v. FE ROA GIMENEZ, GR No. 174673, 2016-01-11

Facts:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint[6] for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.[7] "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez
Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos[.]"
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business
interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.[9] The Republic presented the
testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG.[10] Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned
or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel's testimony.[12]
The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence."[13] Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the
Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006,
within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."[15] This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in
a Resolution of the same date.
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence.[17] This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated May 8, 2006.[18] Following... this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the
date it terminated its presentation of evidence.[19] Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing
of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.[22] He argued
that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.[23]
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion... to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute.
[24] Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez's demurrer to evidence.[25]
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's
Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses' Motion to Dismiss.
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this court.
Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Formal Offer
of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Ruling:
Testimonial evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify."[84] Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered "after the presentation of a... party's testimonial evidence."[85]
Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless permission is given by the trial
court for a written offer of evidence.[86]
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case.[87] "Failure
to make a formal offer within a considerable period of... time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it."
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the
necessary actions to secure their case.[89] Hence, any... document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."... this court
is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be... relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its
written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan's Resolutions should be reversed.
Principles:
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

7. ANGEL L. BOLEYLEY v. CLARENCE J. VILLANUEVA, GR No. 128734, 1999-09-14

Facts:
1996, petitioner Angel L. Boleyley filed with the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City,... complaint... for
collection of a sum of money,... 1996, private respondent Albert S. Surla filed with the trial court a
motion to dismiss... on the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised Katarungan
Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for the filing of a complaint in court... referral of the matter
to the barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for conciliation or settlement.
1997, petitioner filed an opposition to motion to dismiss... private respondent was not a resident of
Baguio City... the parties was not within the authority of the lupon... the trial court issued an order
dismissing... premature, for not having been referred to the barangay lupon
Issues:
whether or not petitioner was bound to refer the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for
conciliation or settlement before he could file an action for collection with the regional trial court
Ruling:
It is a basic rule of procedure that "jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The... jurisdiction of the court can not be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant... the complaint clearly
implies that the parties do not reside in the same city or municipality.
The venue of the action is not affected by the filing of defendant's (respondent's) motion to dismiss
stating that he also resided in Baguio City. That is not decisive to determine the proper venue.
there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of
showing in the complaint itself that the parties reside in the same city or municipality
Court orders... the trial court to... proceed to the disposition of the case with all deliberate dispatch.