Ma. Nikka Andrea F.

Oquias
Social Legislation
Atty. Empaces
July 26, 2016

Agrarian Law and

M5

Case Digests

Case Title:
Cabral vs CA
July 12, 2001

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of

the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in
favor of private respondents. Allegedly said patents
and titles covered portions of the property owned and
registered in the name of petitioner.
The Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, however, dismissed her petition. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the DAR Regional Director. She maintains
that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is exclusive of the
DAR Regional Director
Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case?
Held: The cancellation of emancipation patents is
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. When petitioner
filed her petition in the BARC in 1990, the function of
the Regional Office
concerns "implementation" of agrarian reform law; that
of the DARAB is the "adjudication" of agrarian reform
cases.
Thus, the Regional Director is primarily tasked with
"[i]mplement[ing] laws, policies, rules and regulations
within the responsibility of the agency," as well as the
"agency program in the region." The second is judicial
in nature, involving as it does the determination of
rights and obligations of the parties. To aid the DARAB
in the exercise of this function, the Rules grant the
Board and Adjudicators the powers to issue subpoenas
and injunctions, to cite and punish for contempt, and to
order the execution of its orders and decision, among
other powers.
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Case Title:
Calvo vs Vergara
December 19,2001

Facts:
Milagros Lebumfacil was the owner of several lots
which were placed under the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) program of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). DAR reallocated and awarded the lots
to the herein respondents after the original land tillers
waived their rights therein due to poor health and
senility. Being reallocatees, the respondents were also
awarded
homelots.
Despite the
above-cited
developments, Lebumfacil still sold the parcels of land
to the petitioners. Subsequently, petitioners filed an
illegal detainer case against respondents. Being
agrarian in nature, the Municipal Trial Court forwarded
the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board which, after trial, declared the coverage of
the subject lots under OLT was valid and legal.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the
said decision. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court denied due course to the appeal
and sustained the findings of the DARAB that the
subject area is agricultural and well within the coverage
of the agrarian reform law. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied,
hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether private respondents are tenant-farmers
and are thus qualified as reallocatees of OLT areas and
are entitled to a homelot under Letter of Instruction No.
705
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. According to the Court, the essential
issue raised by the petitioners was whether the
respondents were tenant-farmers who were qualified as
reallocatees of OLT and were entitled to a homelot. The
Court found this issue to be a question of the DARAB,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Being a question of fact, this case is beyond the
office of the Supreme Court since petitioners were
not able to show that the circumstances herein fall
under the recognized exceptions. The Court denied the
petition.

Case Title:
Celendro vs CA
July 20, 1999

Facts: The disputed land in the present case is

registered in the name of Florencio Guevarra, husband
of private respondent. The land was tilled by petitioner
through the owner's tolerance. When petitioner refused
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to vacate the lot after Florencio's death, a case of

unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent
against him with the MCTC. Petitioner moved for the
referral of the case to the DAR. The same was denied
due to the absence of landlord-tenant relationship.
Thereafter, judgment was rendered by the trial court in
favor
of private respondent, ordering petitioner to vacate the
lot and restore possession thereof to the former. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the assailed decision. After
the issuance of a writ of execution, petitioner filed a
Petition to Quiet Title before the Provincial Adjudicatory
Board (PACB). This administrative body rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner ordering private
respondent to desist permanently from disturbing the
peaceful ownership by petitioner over the land. The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), on
appeal, affirmed the holding of the PACB. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the civil courts (Municipal Court
and
Regional Trial Court) or the Court of Agrarian Relations
or the DAR Adjudication Board ha[ve] jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Held:
Petitioner
cannot
question
before
an
administrative body a final decision of the MTC and
RTC. A final judgment of a trial court which has
become conclusive on the parties under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment can no longer be reviewed
or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher
court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by
any other official, branch or department of the
government like the PACB and DARAB on the principle
of separation of powers which presupposes mutual
respect by and between the three departments of the
government. Having actively participated in the
proceeding in the MCTC and even appealed to the RTC,
A party cannot be permitted to turn around and
question it. It is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure affirmative
relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction.

Case Title:
Centeno vs Centeno

Facts: Respondent Ignacia Centeno filed with the

DARAB for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession"
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October 13, 2000

praying for restraining order, ejectment and damages

against the petitioners. Respondent alleged that
despite the decision of the DAR recognizing her
ownership over Lot Nos. 111
and 122, and affirmed by the Office of the President,
petitioners have been
molesting respondent's
possession over the landholdings adjudicated to her. As
defense, petitioners insisted that they are better
entitled to the possession of the lots and that DARAB
has no jurisdiction over the case. DARAB decided the
case in favor of
respondent, adverting to the earlier decision of the DAR
which was determinative of the rights of the parties
under the principle of res judicata. The Court of Appeals
affirmed
DARAB's decision. Hence, this petition for review,
petitioners claiming: that the case is one for recovery
of possession which falls under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts; that the complaint states no cause of
action; that res judicata does not apply because the
two actions have two distinct causes of action.
Issue: Whether DARAB has jurisdiction over the case;
Whether res judicata applies in the case
Held: The appellate court was correct in holding that
the present case is an incident Growing from the earlier
decision of the administrative agency involving the
same parties and relating to the same lands. (T)he
instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the
said previous case for cancellation of CLTs which was
decided in favor of
herein respondent, we believe and so hold that the DAR
continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As aptly
stated by the Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A.
6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR
is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program.
The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and
decide any agrarian dispute or any
incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Res judicata applies in the instant case because the
issue of
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possession is a settled matter in the earlier case for

cancellation of CLTs, which has already been decided by
the DAR.

Case Title:
DARAB VS CA
January 21, 1997

Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint with the

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) at
Teresa, Rizal, praying that they be maintained in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of a portion,
consisting of 12 hectares, of the land in question. They
alleged that they are farmworkers and occupant-tillers
of the land in question; that the land is an [sic]
agricultural land; that they had invested efforts and
money in cultivating and planting it with various fruit
trees and root crops; that on March 4, 1993 the portion
of the land they were cultivating had been bulldozed at
the instance of Federico Balanon and other individuals
acting in behalf of the petitioner BSB Construction, as a
result of which the improvements made by them on the
land were destroyed. For this reason private
respondents asked the PARAD for an order restraining
the herein petitioners from further bulldozing the
property and maintain them in the peaceful possession
of the land. The Provincial Adjudicator issued an order
enjoining the BSB Construction and all persons
representing it "to cease and desist from undertaking
any further bulldozing and development activities on
the property under litigation or from
committing such other acts tending to disturb the
status quo.
Petitioners filed a complaint with the Department of
Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at Diliman, Quezon
City, in which they sought the nullification of the
restraining order issued by the PARAD. They alleged
that the land in question is not an agricultural, but
residential, land and that the petitioners before the
PARAD, who are the herein respondents are not tenantfarmers but mere squatters. Without waiting for the
action of their complaint before DARAB, they filed the
present action for certiorari substantially alleging the
same matters and praying for the annulment of the
restraining order issued by the PARAD, on the ground
that the order was issued capriciously, whimsically, and
in excess of the jurisdiction of the PARAD.
nother group, claiming the same right to the cultivation
of the land in question, filed a complaint with theDARAB
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against the petitioner BSB Construction, represented by

its president, Federico Balanon. Thecomplainants
alleged that they too are farmworkers and occupanttillers of the same portion being cultivated bythe
private. In substantially the same way, they alleged
that they had invested money and effort to develop
theportion of the land into a "compact agricultural
undertaking," planting it with various fruit trees and
root crops;that on March 4, 1993 petitioner BSB
Construction bulldozed the portion of the landOn the
same day, the DARAB issued a "status quo order,"
ordering BSB Construction not to bulldoze and
scrapethe fruit-bearing trees and root crops thereon,
harass and disturb the peaceful possession of
PetitionersBefore the Court of Appeals, private
respondents BSB Construction and Agricultural
Development Corporationand Carol Baucan sought to
annul the temporary restraining order issued by PARAD
and the Status Quo orderissued by DARAB.The CA
upheld the validity of the PARAD TRO, On other hand, it
set aside the DARAB SQO and the warrant of arrest
issued as the DARAB had no jurisdiction over said the
case and violated its Rules of Procedure.The petitioners
herein, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The Court of Appeals denied it hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has the authority
to initially take cognizance of the case.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of
Appeals correctly set aside the DARAB SQO and
annulled all proceedings in DARAB Case No. 010093).
Under the DARAB Revised Rules, the DARAB was
without authority to initially take cognizance of the
case.
It is the DAR which is vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters,
andexclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except thosefalling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department
of Environment
and
Natural
Resources.Thereunder, the DAR's exclusive original
jurisdiction is exercised through hierarchically arranged
agencies,namely, the DARAB, RARAD and PARAD. The
latter two exercise "delegated authority," while the first
exercisesappellate jurisdiction over resolutions, orders,
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decisions and other dispositions of the RARAD and the

PARAD,and "functional supervision" over the RARAD
and the PARADIt indisputably follows that all actions
pursued under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DAR, inaccordance with Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657,
must be commenced in the PARAD of the province
where theproperty is located and that the DARAB only
has appellate jurisdiction to review the PARAD's orders,
decisionsand other dispositions.The DARAB was without
authority to issue the SQO, much less the warrant of
arrest. Its action was a clearviolation of its DARAB
Revised Rules.The instant petition is denied.
Case Title:
Gonzales vs. CA
May 9, 2001

Facts: The Regional Office of the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued two orders to petitioner
pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the
government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. In
response, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the
Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to
annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director
on the ground of lack or excess of
jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a
land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in
the execution of the final survey plans and the
valuation of her land. However, CA dismissed the
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not DAR Director acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction.
Whether or not petitioner
administrative remedies;

failed

to

exhaust

Held: A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional

Office which, under the Administrative Code of 1987, is
responsible for "supporting the field units and
supervising
program
implementation
of
the
Department within the region". The function of the DAR
Regional Office includes "[implementing] laws, policies,
plans, rules and regulations of the Department in the
regional area". A similar function is delegated to the
DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order. With such
a broad function and responsibility, it may be
reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assailed
orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and
tenant emancipation program of the government is
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within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR

Regional Director. However, questions as to the
propriety of the issuance could have still been raised
before the proper administrative forum. Instead of
going directly to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the
petitioner should have sought redress in the DARAB,
and the latter's officials should have been given an
opportunity to review the matter and resolve the
controversy.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
was created under Executive Order No. 129-A to
assume specific powers and functions with respect to
the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The Revised
Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, was already in effect
at the time the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
was field. Hence, the proper procedure which the
petitioner should have taken is to move for a
reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director,
or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive
adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD).

Case Title:
Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. CA
December 29, 1999

Facts: Pursuant to a final decision of the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the financing arm in
the operation of the
Land Reform Program of the government was ordered
to pay private respondent. Petitioner, however,
adamantly refused to do so, thus prompting private
respondent to file an action for mandamus. The Court
of Appeals granted the writ. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted
to this action, arguing that the CA cannot issue the writ
of mandamus because it cannot be compelled to
perform an act which is beyond its legal duty.
Issue: Whether or not LBP can be compelled through
mandamus to pay the respondent.
Held: Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, which bears the
approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to
finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner
participated in the valuation proceedings held in the
office of the PARAD through its counsel. It did not
appeal the decision of the PARAD which became final
and executory. The only thing that hindered it from
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paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the

farmer-beneficiary. A perusal of Sec. 18 of RA 6657,
however, showed that the consent of the farmerbeneficiary is not required in establishing the vinculum
juris for the proper compensation of the landowner.
Without such obstacle, petitioner can now be
compelled to perform its legal duty through the
issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Case Title:
Luz Farms vs
Secretary of the
Department of
Agrarian Reform
December 4, 1990

Facts:
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement
of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of
said law arguing that Congress in
enacting the said law has transcended the mandate
of the Constitution, in including land
devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage. Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming
Issue: Whether or not the assailed provisions are
constitutional.
Held:No.
the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands
are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands
and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands . It is evident from the discussion
of
the
Committee that
Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition
of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agroindustrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Case Title:
Machete vs. CA
November 20,1995

Facts: Private respondent filed before the RTC a

complaint for collection of back rentals and damages.
The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a
leasehold agreement with respect to private
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respondent's landholdings under which petitioners were

to pay private respondent a certain amount or
percentage of their harvests. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter.
They contended that the case arose out of or was
connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject
matter of the complaint fell
squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasijudicial powers. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss but the CA reversed the decision and directed
the trial court to assume jurisdiction. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction
over the case.
Held: The DARAB was created to assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases. In the case at bench, there
exists an agrarian dispute which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to
pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract
with private respondent is an issue which is clearly
beyond the legal competence of the trial court to
resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

Case Title:
Nuesa vs. CA
March 6, 2002

Facts: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an

Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo, herein
respondent over two (2) parcels of agricultural land
under certain conditions. After twenty-one years,
private respondent filed an application with the
Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had
complied with the conditions set forth in the order.
Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of
protest against private respondent claiming that
contrary to the manifestation of private respondent, it
is petitioner who had been in possession of the land
and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner filed his
own application for said parcels in opposition to that of
private respondent. After investigation, petitioner,
Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, ordered
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the cancellation of the Order of Award in favor of

private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition
with the Provincial Adjudication Board for annulment of
said order. Herein petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was
an appeal to the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform from
the order of the Regional Director. The DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
and reversed the order of the Regional Director. The
said decision was affirmed by the DAR Appellate
Adjudication Board and later on by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the DARAB and its Provincial
Adjudicator exceeded in its jurisdiction.
Held: The Court ruled that the revocation by the
Regional
Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the
Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative
functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial
adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously
and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR
Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits
without affording the petitioner opportunity to present
his case. As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno,
"the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving, the implementation of the agrarian reform
program." The DARAB has primary, original and
appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as
amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Case Title:
Ocho vs. Calos
November 22, 2000

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint before the

Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudicator docketed as
DARAB Case No. (X)-014, seeking a nullification of the
Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title
issued to third persons, including herein petitioner,
involving the landholdings of their deceased parents.
After all the parties had been heard, the Provincial
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Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of

respondents. Petitioners, together with others, elevated
the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication
Board (DARAB). The DARAB reversed the decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
substantially affirmed the decision of the DARAB as it
upheld the titles over the subject lands of some of the
respondents therein except that of petitioner and of
Vicente Polinar. The Court of Appeals found that
petitioner and Vicente Polinar are not qualified to be
farmer-beneficiaries as they are already owners of
other agricultural lands. Accordingly, it ordered them to
restore and return to the government their
landholdings under TCT No. ET-5223 in the case of
petitioner Ramon Ocho and TCT Nos. T-28281 to 84 and
T-28288 to 91 in the case of Vicente Polinar. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner claimed that the second action instituted by
respondents in Adm. Case No. (X)-014 (Annulment of
Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation Patents and
Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery Of
Possession and Ownership) is barred by the Final
Resolution rendered in their first action docketed as
DAR Adm. Case No. 006-90 (Anomalies/Irregularities in
OLT Transfer Action and Other Related Activities) also
involving the same parties and subject lands. Petitioner
contended that the resolution of the Hearing Officer in
Adm. Case No. 006-90 fording untrue the respondents'
claim that petitioner owns other lands in his name
before acquiring the subject land constituted res
judicata, as the said resolution already became final
and executory and the issue of his ownership of other
agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
Issue: Whether or not the second action filed by
respondents before the DARAB was already barred by
the first action before the DAR.
Held: Although the action instituted by the Caloses in
Adm. Case No. 006-90 (Anomalies/Irregularities in OLT
Transfer Action and Other Related Activities) is different
from the action in Adm. Case No. (X)-014 (Annulment of
Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation Patents and
Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery of
Possession
and
Ownership),
the
concept
of
conclusiveness of judgment still applies because under
this principle "the identity of causes of action is not
13

required but merely identity of issues." Simple put,

conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between
the same parties on a different claim cause of action.
There was no question that the issue of whether
petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands had
already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial
authority in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision
became final and executory when the respondents
failed to file an appeal thereof after their motion for
reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether
petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands may
no longer be relitigated. The findings of the Hearing
Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long
attained finality, that petitioner is not the owner of
other agricultural lands foreclosed any inquiry on the
same issue involving the same parties and property.
Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in so far as it directed petitioner to
restore and return to the government his subject land.
The Court declared valid petitioner's TCT No. ET-5223.

Case Title:
Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. CA
January 18, 2000

Facts: Petitioner bank owns the four parcels of land

which were placed under the comprehensive agrarian
reform program by the Department of Agrarian Reform
pursuant to RA No. 6657. Petitioner rejected the
valuation made by the Land Bank and the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
questioned the same with the Regional Trial Court in a
petition for determination of the just compensation.
The same was dismissed for being filed beyond the 15day reglementary period. The dismissal was affirmed
on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied petitioner resorted
to this recourse claiming that DAR adjudicators have no
jurisdiction to determine the amount of just
compensation the same being lodged with the Regional
Trial Courts and as such the petition can be filed even
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Issue: Whether or not the DAR has jurisdiction to
determine the amount of just compensation.
Held: The Department of Agrarian Reform, under
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, has the jurisdiction to
14

preliminary determine the value of the lands placed

under land reform and the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the taking, and that
appeal, under Section 57 of the same law, may be
taken to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within 15 days from receipt of the
notice thereof. The first refers to administrative
proceedings, while the second refers to judicial actions.
Thus, the power to decide just compensation cases is
vested in the courts provided that the same is filed
within the reglementary period. The Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Case Title:
Quismondo vs. CA
September 31, 1991

Facts: Private respondent, as tenants of petitioner,

filed a complaint with the trial court praying that their
relationship with petitioner be changed from share
tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to RA 3844.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action since the law that shoud govern is Act Noo. 4115
and not RA 3884. The court denied the petition.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration now
invoking as an additional ground for lack of jurisdiction
is EO 229 and RA 6657. But the Court still denied the
petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no jurisdiction
to try the case at bar considering that the exclusive
original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has
already been vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) by Executive Order No. 229, as amended
by Republic Act No. 6657.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.
Held: Yes. With the enactment of Executive Order No.
229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15)
days after its release for publication in the Official
Gazette, the regional trial courts were divested of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Thus, is the case at bar, the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private
respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft of
authority to act on the same. The allegation of private
respondents that their complaint was filed on
November 3, 1987, and not on February 13, 1988 as
found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of
either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in
effect.
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The foregoing holding is further sustained by the

passage of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988. The
said law contains provisions which evince and support
the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian
Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
matters. Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates
Section 17 of Executive Order No . 229 vesting in the
Department
of Agrarian Reform exclusive and original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof
provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of at
least one (1) branch of the regional trial court within
each province to act as a special agrarian court. The
said special court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners and the prosecution
of criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions thus
delimit the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in
agrarian cases only to these two instances

Case Title:
Roxas & Co. vs. CA
December 17, 1999

Facts: Petitioner corporation is the registered owner of

Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway in Nasugbu,
Batangas. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered
for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the
effectivity of the CARL. Hacienda Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by the
DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992,
petitioner informed DAR that it was withdrawing its VOS
of Hacienda Caylaway and applying for conversion of
the hacienda from agricultural to other uses. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway
from agricultural to non-agricultural. DAR denied
petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS. Meanwhile on May
4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion
of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to
non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL.
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, DAR
proceeded with the acquisition of the two haciendas.
On July 14, 1993, petitioner reiterated its request to
withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of
the following: (1) Certification of the Department of
Agriculture that the subject lands are not feasible and
16

economically
sound
for
further
agricultural
development, (2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu approving the zoning ordinance
reclassifying the lands after consultation with the DAR
and other agencies and after public hearings, (3)
Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Batangas approving said zoning ordinance; and, (4)
Letter dated December 15, 1992 of the Municipal
Planning & Development to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta
advising that the municipality had no objection to the
conversion of the lands to non-agricultural purposes.
On October 30, 1993, Certificates of Land Ownership
Awards were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
Petitioner then instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA)
with the DAR Adjudication Board for the cancellation of
the CLOA's issued to several persons.
The DARAB, in its Resolution, held that the case
involved the prejudicial question whether the property
was subject to agrarian reform, hence, the question
should be submitted to the DAR Secretary for
determination. Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition questioning the expropriation of the
properties under the CARL and the denial of the due
process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
Meanwhile, petitioner's request for conversion of the
three haciendas was denied by respondent Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas. The
Court of Appeals also dismissed petitioner's petition. Its
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,
petitioner filed the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings
violated due process.
Held: Yes, the Supreme Court found that in the entire
acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded
the basic requirements of administrative due process.
Hence, petitioner
rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There
was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust
administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. However,
respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the
acquisition of petitioners' landholdings does not ipso
facto give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate
over petitioner's application for conversion of its
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The
power to determine whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad
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and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempts

from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not
with the Supreme Court.
The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the
requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings
does not give the Supreme Court the power to nullify
the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To
assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative
process, which has yet to run its regular course.
Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct
its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
The Court, therefore, nullified the acquisition
proceedings on account of DAR's failure to observe due
process but remanded the case to the DAR for proper
acquisition
proceedings
and
determination
of
petitioner's application for conversion.

Case Title:
Santos vs.
Landbank

Facts: Petitioner questions in this petition for Review

on Certiorari the propriety of the Order of the Regional
Trial Court requiring payment of compensation for
petitioner's land taken under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, to be made in cash and
bonds. According to petitioner Edgardo Santos, owner
of the land so taken, said order illegally amended the
judgment rendered August 12, 1997 which directs
payment of compensation to be made "in the manner
provided in RA 6657."
Issue: Whether or not the judge erred in requiring the
compensation to be paid in cash and bonds.
Held: The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated
compensation to the petitioner "in the manner provided
by RA 6657." There is certitude with regards to this
assertion. Pursuant to section 18 of the same law,
payment was to be in cash and bonds. The confusion in
the present case, which required the issuance of the
assailed order, arose from petitioner's belief that the
Land Bank had obligated itself to pay in cash the
compensation due him.
This fact can allegedly be gleaned from its compliance
with the December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and
December 19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment. However,
the Land Bank's compliance with the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment should be construed as
an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth
in RA No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking
18

to pay in cash because such act would have been a

deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to
which execution must conform.

Case Title:
Sarne vs. Makiling
May 9, 2002

Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for

redemption and damages against petitioners before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator,
Dumaguete City. They alleged therein that during his
lifetime, Jose Rafal, together with his wife, Romana,
were tenants of a parcel of land owned by petitioner
Laura Sarne. Prior to January 29, 1997, petitioner Laura
Sarne mortgaged the said land to Jose and Romana
Rafal. On January 29, 1997, Laura Sarne sold it to
Romana Rafal by installments. However, when Romana
was about to tender thebalance of the purchase price,
petitioner Laura Sarne declined to accept it. Later,
respondents came to know that Laura Sarne had
already sold the land to petitioners Jaugans. In their
respective answers, petitioners alleged that another
case involving the same nature and subject of the
action was previously dismissed by the Provincial
Adjudicator for lack of jurisdiction and that private
respondents Jose and Romana Rafal ceased to be
tenants and became creditors when the subject lot was
mortgaged to them. Subsequently, the Provincial
Adjudicator issued an order declaring that it had
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the DARAB New
Rules of Procedure. In a petition for certiorari, the Court
of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence,
this appeal.
Petitioners contend in the main that the complaint for
redemption is not an agrarian case but is one for
specific performance as it seeks to compel petitioners
to accept the alleged balance of the purchase price and
therefore it should be filed with the regular courts. Even
assuming arguendo that it is an agrarian case,
petitioners aver that the issue involves the
determination of just compensation and is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court acting
as a Special Agrarian Court, under Section 57 of
Republic Act 6657 (CARP). They insist that since the
landholding is not under the administration and
disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, then the case does
not fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

19

Held: The Court ruled that to strengthen the security of

tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provided
that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. Consequently, the
sale of the subject landholding to petitioners Jaugans
did not adversely affect the security of tenure of the
private respondents as tenants of the subject lot.

Case Title:
Sigre vs CA
August 8, 2002

It was clear then that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in

this case is anchored on Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule
II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure covering
disputes involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,
foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural
lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian
laws. There was nothing in the provision from which it
can be inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB was
limited only to agricultural lands under the
administration and disposition of DAR and LBP. We
should not distinguish where the law does not
distinguish. The DARAB was, therefore, correct in taking
cognizance of the instant complaint for redemption, it
being a case concerning the rights of respondents as
tenants on agricultural land.
Facts: Private respondent in this case filed with the CA
a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to
prohibit LBP form accepting the leasehold rentals from
Ernesto Sigre, the predecessor of petitioner and who
was also a tenant in an irrigated rice land owned by
private respondent. The latter also prayed for LBP to
turn over to private respondent the rentals previously
remitted to it by Sigre. Sigre stopped paying his rentals
to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the
LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform's
Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set
the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial
payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land
transfer program of P.D. No. 27.
The appellate court gave due course to the petition and
declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void. LBP
was directed to return the lease rentals to private
respondent while Sigre was directed to pay directly to
private respondent. It further declared that the
Memorandum was void as there is nothing in PD 27
which sanctions the contested provision.
Issue: Whether or not PD 27 and other related laws are
20

constitutional.
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The power of
subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in" the details. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law.

Case Title:
Tirona vs Alejo
October 10, 2011

The goal of PD No. 27 is the emancipation of tenants

from the bondage of soil, transferring to them the
ownership of the land they till. Pursuant thereto, the
DAR issued Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978
to make certain that the lease rental payment made by
the tenant-farmer is applied to the amortizations on the
purchase price of the land. PD No. 816, on the other
hand, provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural
lessee) shall pay lease rental to the landowner until the
value of the property has been determined or agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR. This is not in
conflict with Circular No. 6, which mandates that the
tenant-farmer shall pay the LBP the lease rental after
the value of the land has been determined. The validity
of PD No. 27 has also been repeatedly emphasized by
the Court in a number of cases; It does not set
limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining
just compensation and neither does RA 6657 repeal or
supersede PD 27.
Facts: Petitioners claimed to be owners of various
fishpond lots located at Caloong, Valenzuela. On March
25, 1996, they filed ejectment complaints against Luis
Nuez docketed as Civil Case No. 6633 and Juanito
Ignacio docketed as Civil Case No. 6632 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Valenzuela. Civil Case
No. 6633 was raffled to Branch 81, while Civil Case No.
6632 was raffled to Branch 82. In Civil Case
No. 6633, Nuez raised the following affirmative
defenses: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case for petitioners' failure to allege prior physical
possession in their complaint; (2) petitioners' action
was premature in view of the pendency of a complaint
he filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as Case No. IVMM-0099-95R, where the issue of possession in the
concept of tenancy is the same as that raised by
petitioners in Civil Case No. 6633; and (3) petitioners
are guilty of forum-shopping since they were fully
aware of the said DARAB case. Thereafter, MeTCBranch 81 rendered judgment in favor of herein
21

petitioners. Nuez appealed the said decision to the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela docketed as
Civil Case No. 5093-V-97. On the other hand, in Civil
Case No. 6632, Ignacio raised similar defenses as
those made by Nuez. MeTC-Branch 82 issued an
order of dismissal of the complaint against Ignacio.
Thus, petitioners appealed the order of dismissal to the
RTC of Valenzuela docketed as Civil Case No. 5169-V97. Since Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97
involved essentially the same parties, the same subject
matter and the same issues, the cases were jointly
heard before Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela. In its
judgment, the RTC affirmed the appealed order of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 6632 and reversed the
appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 6633. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not failure to allege prior physical
possession and; Whether or not the filing of a suit
before DAR proscribe the filing of the ejectment case.
Held: The court held in the affirmative. A reading of the
allegations in the complaints showed that petitioners'
action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
Hence, in actions for forcible entry, the plaintiff must
allege his prior physical possession of the property. The
complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed
to allege prior physical possession of the property
on the part of petitioners. All that was alleged was the
unlawful deprivation of their possession by private
respondents.
The
deficiency
was
fatal
to
petitioners' actions before the MTC of Valenzuela. Such
bare allegation was insufficient for the MeTC to acquire
jurisdiction.
Moreover, under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, litis pendentia or pendency of another action is
a ground for the dismissal of the second action. The
requisites, are present in this case. For one, the parties
in the DARAB case and in the forcible entry cases 9led
with the MeTC are the same. Also, there was identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. The evident and
logical conclusion then is that any decision that may be
rendered in the DARAB case regarding the question of
possession will also resolve the question of possession
in the forcible entry cases. Thus, the Court concluded
that under the concept of litis pendentia, the pendency
of the DARAB Case served as a bar to the filing of Civil
Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633. Further, to determine
22

whether a party violated the rule against forum

shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
Based thereon, the Regional Trial Court correctly
dismissed the forcible entry cases on the additional
ground of forum shopping. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela was AFFIRMED.

Case Title:
Vda. De Tangub s.
CA
December 3, 1990

Facts: Petitioner filed with the RTC an agrarian case for

damages by reason of the unlawful dispossession as
tenants from the landholding" of private respondent
spouses. But the respondent judge dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the jurisdiction of the RTC
over agrarian cases has already been transferred to the
DAR by virtue of the enactment of Executive Order No.
229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and EO
129-A. She filed a certiorari but the CA dismissed the
petition holding that the trial court correctly resolved
the jurisdictional issue. Petitioner now contends that
the decisions are patently illegal and unconstitutional"
because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts
and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang
129.".
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming
the decision of the RTC.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct
in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case
concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on
agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction"
of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it
clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Department of
Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to
wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department,
23

supra. The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate

her contention that she has been denied access to the
courts, which is just as well. The contention is on its
face utterly without merit. It may profit her and her
counsel to realize that apart from granting all
concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform), the law strives to make resolution of
controversies
therein
more
expeditious
and
inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board "shall
not be bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence," but also, farmers are allowed to represent
themselves.

24