ROXAS & CO. VS.

CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas: Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas.

The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C.
Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a
Provisional Constitution. President Aquino signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131
instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229
providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.

On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over
legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President
on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.

Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in
accordance with the CARL.

HACIENDA PALICO:
- Assessed by Municipal Agrarian Officer (MARO), subjected to acquisition and
distribution according to CARL.
- Petitioner applied with DAR for conversion of said hacienda from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
- Application denied.
- Original TCT was replaced with CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership Award,
registered with DAR) and compensated with appropriate value thru LBP Trust
Accounts.

HACIENDA BANILAD:
- Same with Hacienda Palico.

HACIENDA CAYLAWAY
- Voluntarily offered to the government.

On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent
DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu,
where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not
suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to non-agricultural.

In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the
prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this
question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for
determination.
Petitioners questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of
due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.

MARO – denied
CA – denied; MR = denied

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in
accordance with law; and
2. W/N SC has the power to rule on whether the lots were reclassified from
agricultural to non-agricultural.

HELD:

1. YES. Acquisition proceedings was against petitioner’s right to due process.

First, there was an improper service of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to

corporations should be served through their president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors or partners. Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was
served, was neither of those.

Second, there was no notice of coverage, meaning, the parcels of land were not
properly identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the law, the land
owner has the right to choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving
the Notice of Acquisition, the petitioner had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition.

Third, The CLOAs were issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The
law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. DAR’s
opening of a trust account in petitioner’s name does not constitute payment. Even if
later, DAR substituted the trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure
the lack of notice, which still amounts to a violation of the petitioner’s right to due
process.

2. NO. Despite all this, the court has no jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of
land from agricultural to non-agricultural.

DAR’s failure to observe due process does not give the court the power to adjudicate
over petitioner’s application for land conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of
approving applications for land conversion. They have the tools and experience
needed to evaluate such applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which
applications for land use conversion are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to
correct their defects with regard to petitioner’s right to due process.

Petition dismissed.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118712
October 6, 1995 (2D)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745
October 6, 1995

Facts: Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) (G.R. No. 118712)
following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals, granting private respondents' Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the
petitions were ordered consolidated. Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the
Resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,
private respondents filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private
respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the LBP merely "earmarked", "deposited
in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear
mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or in bonds. The respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor
of private respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court
denied the same, hence, the instant petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP bonds

Held: In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules
and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing
the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property
because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed.

The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It
did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

Issue: Whether or not there should be a distinction the deposit of compensation and
determination of just compensation

Held: To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected
the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is
unnecessary to distinguish between deposit of compensation (provisional) under Section
16(e) and determination of just compensation (final) under Section 18 for purposes of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property
for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.

Land Bank vs CA, Yap, et al

G.R. No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995,
249 SCRA 149 (1995)

Facts:
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the CARL.
Petitioners assail decision of CA which ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;

b) Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not merely "earmark", "reserve" or

"deposit in trust" — with an accessible bank designated by DAR in the names of the
following [private respondents] the following amounts in cash and in government financial
instruments — within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the [private respondents] to withdraw the
above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation
by the proper authorities;

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust
in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their
properties

Held:
YES. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section
16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable.
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in
 their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's
valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and
use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.

Paris v Alfeche
 Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., Case Digest
G.R. No. 171101 November 22, 2011
By ResIpsaLoquitor - July 06, 2013
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al.,

Facts:

The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with modifications the
resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC for brevity) revoking Hacienda
Luisita Inc. (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject land in
HL under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government.

Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts that occurred in the
premises. The SC thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by application of
the operative fact principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for
brevity) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land
distribution. Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the
effects of their choice and therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice.

The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration regarding the SC’s
decision.

Issue:

1) Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the said case.

2) Whether or not Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 unconstitutional.

3) Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under
RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage
through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, and thus the qualified FWBs should now be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have
fully paid for the lands or not?

4) Whether or not qualified FWBs shall be entitled to the option of remaining as

stockholder be reconsidered.

Ruling:

1) Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the instant case. The court ruled that the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but also to decisions made by
the president or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws,
especially if the said decisions produced acts and consequences that must be respected.
That the implementation of PARC resolution approving SDP of HLI manifested such right and
benefits favorable to the FWBs;

2) The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 is not the lis mota of the
case and it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and did not rule on the
constitutionality of the law;

3) The SC ruled that it has not yet lapsed on May 10, 1999, and qualified FWBs are not
allowed to sell their land interest in HL to third parties; That the start of the counting of the
prohibitive period shall be ten years from the issuance and registration of the Emancipation
Patent (EP for brevity) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA for brevity), and
considering that the EPs and CLOAs have not yet been issued, the prohibitive period has not
started yet.

4) The SC ruled in the affirmative, giving qualified FWBs the option to remain as
stockholder

YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The
Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus,
even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders,
which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting
shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided
by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by
PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire
control over HLI.]

The SC PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al.,
The 6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and relinquish their rights over the HLI shares of stock
issued to them in favor of HLI. The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares issued
to the said FWBs and transfer them to HLI in the stocks and transfer book. The 4,206 non-
qualified FWBs shall remain as stockholders of HLI.

HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC (G.R. NO. 17110; JULY 5, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK
CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-
Intervention, vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and
JULIO SUNIGA and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and
WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

FACTS: Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in the above-captioned case on
July 5, 2011, the petitioners present for resolution several issues concerning the said
Decision. To recall, in the 2011 Decision, the Court ordered, among others, that the lands
subject of Hacienda Luisita Incorporated's (HLI) stock distribution plan (SDP) be placed
under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP and declared
that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries (FWBs) shall have the option to
remain as stockholders of HLI.

ISSUES: I. Is the operative fact doctrine applicable to the present case?

II. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 constitutional?
III. Did the Court properly determine the coverage of compulsory acquisition?
IV. Has the matter on just compensation been correctly passed upon by the Court?
V. May the subject agricultural lands be sold to third parties though they have not been fully
paid?
VI. Did HLI violate any of the provisions under the SDP?
VII. Is the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI valid?

HELD: [1] The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited to invalid or unconstitutional laws.
Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to
laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts
subsequently declared as invalid. The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani
v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with. Evidently,
the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by
the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those
which are quasi-legislative in nature.

[2] As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, it took the Farmworkers
Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989
before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of
constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and
presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in
belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement
that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is
clearly wanting. The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must
be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present,
the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The
unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is
favored. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, We maintain that this Court is NOT compelled
to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.

[3] FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum
area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be
covered is 6,443 hectares, which is the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and
previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco). We cannot subscribe to this
view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.

[4] In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just compensation for
the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the
FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.

We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved
HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the
FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus,
such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
[5] There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita were placed under
CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, then the 10-year period
prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, and,
consequently, the qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with respect
to their land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they have fully
paid for the lands or not. The proposition is erroneous. Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the
awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after ten (10) years from the issuance
and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award
(CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs
in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the
reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural
lands under CARP coverage.

[6] AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of the FWBs is among
the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP and is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and
DAO 10. FARM further asserts that "[i]f that minimum threshold is not met, why allow
[stock distribution option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a political
accommodation to the powerful."

Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10
can it be inferred that improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal
obligations of HLI under the SDP or is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a
violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution option.
[7] Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have
control over these agricultural lands for as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In
line with Our finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the
farmers, We reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.

Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no
longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation;
the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and
will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.

In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and
homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return
them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011 Decision, "the benefits x x x were
received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other fringe
benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining agreement with
Tadeco."
 Daez v CA

Facts:

Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad,
Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as
amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by
the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez
applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy
as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of
the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the
same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to
retain the subject land but the DAR Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the
Office of the President which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision of the Office of the President.

Issue
:
Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application
for retention under RA 6657

Held:
The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those
for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are
different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application
for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in
one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the
subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was
denied in a decision that became final and executory.
 G.R. No. 93045 June 29, 1992

THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO

CAYABYAB, petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL
SISON, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding
an order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of
his predecessors who had issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn
lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership
of their shares if they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.

Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No.
27, certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners,
tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering
that certificates of land transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested
to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land
transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."

Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation report dated November 17,
1980, revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were
subdivided among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966.
Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the
cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had been issued to the petitioners-tenants.

However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be
included in the Operation Land Transfer. This was affirmed in a second Reinvestigation Report
dated February 9, 1982. Still another (third) Reinvestigation Report, dated September 29, 1986,
affirmed the previous recommendation that the landholdings of the Heirs be covered by the
Operation Land Transfer.

On February 17, 1987, then Minister Heherson Alvarez dismissed the petition filed by Manuel Sison,
as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage
of Operation Land Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order was denied on July
6, 1987.

On December 8, 1987, the heirs reiterated their request for reconsideration when Secretary Philip
Ella Juico succeeded Secretary Alvarez. They stressed the fact that their individual landholdings
were too small, not exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer.
After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was issued on
September 7, 1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the
ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer
and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are
entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners of
more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not
entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer because they
each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.

The tenants filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration which the Heirs of Dr. Sison
opposed. On February 20, 1989, an order was issued by Secretary Juico denying the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on March 29, 1990,
dismissing their petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition for review, alleging:

1. that the order dated September 7, 1988, of respondent Secretary Philip Ella Juico, reconsidering
and reversing the orders of his predecessors dated February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987, violates the
rule on estoppel, which prohibits the resurrection of a case after it has become final and executory;

2. that the respondents Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison having failed to file any application for retention
within the period required by law, and having filed their intentions to apply for retention and/or
exemption only on March 13, 1987, which was beyond the period required by law, are estopped and
totally barred from claiming such retentions or exemptions;

3. that even assuming that the said Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison are still entitled to file such applications
for retention and/or exemption, still they are disqualified by law to be granted the same under the
provisions of P.D. 27, in relation to LOI 474, which grant such retentions or exemptions only "if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it" (p. 6, Rollo); and

4. that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to cancel the
Certificates of Land Transfer after they have been issued to the tenants beneficiaries.

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners herein question the propriety and legality of the order of former Secretary Philip Ella Juico
of the Department of Agrarian Reform dated September 7, 1988, reversing and modifying the orders
of his predecessors which allegedly had attained finality after the lapse of more than five (5) months
since the order sought to be reconsidered therein contained a proviso that "so far as this Office is
concerned, this case is considered already closed" (p. 26, Rollo). Respondent Secretary allegedly
violated the rule on estoppel, which prohibits the resurrection of a case after the decision has
become final and executory.

The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The orders for the issuance
of Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become final and executory because the
certificates had been marked "under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the technical rules of court practice and procedure do
not apply to administrative proceedings in the Department (formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:
. . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it reconsidered the previous
ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the law. As the
order of September 7, 1986, stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to
a retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the office had no
discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded by law to the landowners. No one,
not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice can deprive or deny the land owners of the
retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has reserved for them. Otherwise, the law would be set
to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there is no administrative rule or
regulation, and Our attention has not been called to it, which would preclude the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, to change the decision of his predecessor if the ruling is patently against the law;
on the contrary justice and equity demand, that the wrong should be righted and the error should not
be made to prevail over what is correct and legal. . . . " (p. 22, Rollo.)

The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of their
agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective right of retention.
The omission was cured by their timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land
transfer to the petitioners. In the 1st Indorsement by Gregorio Sapera, Legal Office, of the
Kagawarang Pangsakahan, it was noted that as early as December 20, 1973, the Heirs of Dr. Jose
Sison had been seeking exemption of their landholdings from the Operation Land Transfer.

Whether or not each of their Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison owns more than seven (7) hectares of riceland
and other agricultural lands, is a factual issue which we generally do not review. We are bound by
Secretary Juico's finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that their respective landholdings are as
follows:

Riceland Other Agricultural

Lands

1. Elisa S. Reyes 9.3370 Has. 5.3135 Has.

2. Consuelo S. Nazareno 2.4972 Has. 6.1460 Has.
3. Alfredo Sison 5.4584 Has. 9.1935 Has.
4. Renato Sison 9.4091 Has. 5.2435 Has.
5. Peter Sison 4.6663 Has. 5.3135 Has.
6. Jose Sison 9.4069 Has. 5.2435 Has.
7. Josefina S. Zulueta 9.4066 Has. 5.2435 Has.
8. Manuel Sison 2.4972 Has. 12.1529 Has.
9. Jaime Sison 9.1496 Has. 5.2435 Has.
(p. 19, Rollo.)

Secretary Juico and the Court of . Appeals correctly ruled that:

Consequently, the landholdings of Consuelo and Peter, are exempted from the OLT Coverage, and
Elisa, Renato, Jose, Josefina and Jaime are entitled to a retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares of their ricelands since they are not the owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other
agricultural lands. However, the excess areas of the retained portion are covered by Operation Land
Transfer. With respect to Alfredo and Manuel, they are not entitled to the exemption and/or retention
of their ricelands because they are owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural
lands.

Anchored on the rule of law, the applicability of LOI No. 474 (Oct. 21, 1976) as the Implementing
measure of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972) on the foregoing facts and circumstances is mandatory. This
office does not even have the discretion to alter the above disposition on retention limits accorded
the landowners as the law is clear and explicit on this point.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the orders dated February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987 of this
Office are hereby modified in the following manner as it is declared and ordered that:

1. The ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno situated at Labrador, Pangasinan, and the ricelands of
Peter Sison situated at Labrador and Bayambang, Pangasinan, are exempted from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer;

2. Petitioners Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison are to
retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their respective ricelands situated in Bayambang,
Pangasinan, but the excess areas thereof situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, which are covered by
the OLT and the CLTs already issued, if any, to the tenants are hereby affirmed;

3. Petitioners Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to this exemption and/or retention of
their ricelands as they are owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land, and the
tenant-tillers thereon, if they have not yet been issued the Certificates of Land Transfer, shall be
issued such Certificates by the Regional Director of Region I, DAR, San Fernando, La Union;

4. The tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the petitioners shall remain as
agricultural lessees thereon and the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to them, if any, shall be as
they are hereby recalled/cancelled; and

5. The tenant-farmers within the exempted and retained riceland areas are hereby ordered to pay to
the landowners the lease rentals due them; or if such lease rentals were deposited with the Land
Bank, the landowners are therefore, authorized to withdraw the said deposits. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain
their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that
"such landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo), The Secretary
interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of
the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein. Which means, that while
ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain to the concerned Heirs of Sison,
the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The
concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas,
unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and
vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs" (p. 23, Rollo; Emphasis ours).

Respect should be accorded to the Secretary's construction of the law which his department
administers and implements (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Com. of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166; Sierra Madre
Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to be
entitled to their retention right.
Secretary Juico's interpretation of the owner's right of retention conforms with our own construction
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, G.R.
No. 78742, August 23, 1990, where we ruled that:

. . . in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area,
he shall be considered as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In
case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a
leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the land owner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
(En Banc, Minute Resolution.)

Petitioners' contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction to
cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is
not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the
Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of
Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had
been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates
of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS it in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DARAB, et.al., respondents
G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992
FACTS:

The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in
the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910,
in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was
converted into a college until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an
agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which
would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was
surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural
communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the
tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner
school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and
employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. The faculty and staff combine
themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical
training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the
lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was
expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty
and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural
technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU
reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor
Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants (respondents). Obrique was a Physics
Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project.
In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business
Management and Training Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project
was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement
Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance,
provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the
income of the faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts
were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of
jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities,
all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of
Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
affirming the decision of DARAB.

RULING:

DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP. — Under

Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only
to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases
and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not
include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among
such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot
production centers, etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be
necessary for its purposes.

SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE TENANTS:
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners
are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that
quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order
segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled
as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted
under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the
complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL. — As to the
determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in
the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation
to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the
Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the
evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of
Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private
respondents.
 Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR

GR No 103302 August 12, 1993

Facts:

Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares
and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia
properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private landowners
were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation,
petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location
clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of
Coverage on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately
registered its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of
Coverage.

Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then
contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply with t he
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657.

Ruling:

No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted
to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus,
the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands
for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural land by virtue of the
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.

REPUBLIC V. CA - NOT FOUND