T R F M M D: HE Ole of Eelings in Aking Oral Ecisions

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THE ROLE OF FEELINGS IN MAKING


CM ETHICS

MORAL DECISIONS

John D. Banja, PhD

D uring the past decade,


the field of ethics has
witnessed a great deal
of interest in the role of
emotions and feelings in
making moral decisions.
There are a number of reasons for this,
perhaps beginning with the appearance
of feminist, or “care,” approaches to
ethics in the 1980s. This model emerged
largely a neurological impossibility. As
we consciously (and mostly unconscious-
ly) process our thoughts, beliefs, percep-
tions, imaginings, memories, anticipa-
tions, and action plans, the brain’s feel-
ing and reasoning circuits are working
together to arrive at a plan that “feels
right” to the organism.

Immensely impressive about Damasio’s


Now, it is certainly true that feelings can
occasionally distort reasoning, especially
when we argue backwards, that is, when
we already know the conclusion we
want—usually because that conclusion is
infused with a passionate commitment,
whereas its contrary strikes us as disgust-
ing—and we select and adapt our evi-
dence to suit the very conclusion we
want to adopt. As I will discuss, these
as a counterpoint to 2500 years of West- work is the way in which he and his cases are all too familiar.
ern moral philosophy, whose major fig- colleagues have shown that when the
ures, such as Plato and Immanuel Kant, brain’s feeling circuits have been dam- On the other hand, especially as we go
were very concerned about feelings aged by trauma or disease, decisional about the mundane activities of daily
influencing moral decisions. They ability becomes severely impaired. In life, the brain’s feeling circuits are utterly
argued that allowing feelings to sway contrast to the Kantian or Platonic indispensable in making decisions that
ethical reflection would distort moral repudiation of feelings in making deci- manifest our “values,” what we believe is
reasoning and that if anything is impor- sions, Damasio and his ken have shown important. So I want to spend this article
tant about making moral decisions, it is that damage to the brain’s feeling cir- reclaiming the significance of feelings in
that moral reasoning be pristinely logical cuitry often disposes the individual to making moral decisions. Because I don’t
and not “contaminated” by emotions, extremely poor or maladaptive deci- want to get too neurologically technical,
passions, and sentiments. sion-making, especially in important I consistently use the word “feeling” in
life matters involving relationships, the following, although “emotion” might
In response, scholars such as Carol Gilli- finances, and job performance. As I will occasionally be more accurate, whereas
gan and Nel Noddings have argued discuss below, feelings are increasingly the safest, all-purpose technical word to
that a wholesale distrust of feelings being understood as a kind of “com- use is probably “affect.” Even so, I think
neglects the importance of relationships pass” for the brain’s reasoning. the points will come across intelligibly
in our moral life and that purely logical and fairly accurately. Also, although the
or rational approaches to ethical situa- Feelings direct reason or the intellect following material can apply to any pro-
tions ignore the degree to which empa- toward what is and isn’t important; they fession, I offer examples familiar to case
thy, emotional attachments, communal prioritize the factors or elements in a managers so that my readers’ feeling cir-
ties, and respecting another ’s feelings moral situation such that our decision cuitry will be positively disposed.
inform the moral dimensions of those making is efficient and not haphazard;
relationships. they appraise an object or situation as Feelings and Attention
desirable, undesirable, dangerous, or An interesting distinction between feel-
Perhaps the primary reason a great deal neutral; and they help to encode memo- ings and moods is that feelings (and
of ethical attention has recently turned ries (eg, “That was awful” or “That was emotions) are about things, situations, or
toward feelings and emotions in our marvelous”). Consequently, behaviors objects, whereas moods are largely dif-
moral life is the continuing contributions that end with satisfying results are rein- fuse, generalized sensations that aren’t
of neuroscientists who demonstrate that forced, and those that don’t become about anything in particular. Thus,
all thinking and reasoning, not just “learning experiences” that shouldn’t be moods tend to be cognitively trouble-
moral contemplation, is laced with feel- repeated. (Thus, sociopaths, who cannot some, as they often shape whatever we
ing (or affect). Neurologist Antonio seem to learn from trial and error or are thinking about into the mold of the
Damasio, one of the leading figures in from the consequences of their actions, mood. So when I am gloomy, everything
this research, has offered convincing have been consistently found to have I think about is colored with negativity,
findings that whenever reasoning and serious malfunctioning in the circuitry but when I am upbeat, everything in my
decision making are occurring, the that connects the feeling with the think- world is marvelous or hopeful.
brain’s feeling circuits are coactive with ing parts of the brain, primarily in the
its reasoning or thinking circuits. In fact, amygdala-anterior cingulate-frontal and Feelings and especially emotions, how-
dissociating feeling from thinking is prefrontal cortical loops.) ever, tend to be object oriented, or about

September/October 2006 TCM 17

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