This document discusses the role of feelings in making moral decisions. It argues that feelings play an important role and should not be dismissed from ethical reasoning. Recent research in neuroscience shows that emotion and reasoning circuits in the brain are interconnected, and damage to emotional areas impairs decision making. Feelings prioritize what is important, help encode memories, and direct reason toward important factors in a situation. Allowing feelings to influence decisions does not necessarily distort reasoning, and feelings are important for caring about relationships and others' perspectives in ethics.
This document discusses the role of feelings in making moral decisions. It argues that feelings play an important role and should not be dismissed from ethical reasoning. Recent research in neuroscience shows that emotion and reasoning circuits in the brain are interconnected, and damage to emotional areas impairs decision making. Feelings prioritize what is important, help encode memories, and direct reason toward important factors in a situation. Allowing feelings to influence decisions does not necessarily distort reasoning, and feelings are important for caring about relationships and others' perspectives in ethics.
This document discusses the role of feelings in making moral decisions. It argues that feelings play an important role and should not be dismissed from ethical reasoning. Recent research in neuroscience shows that emotion and reasoning circuits in the brain are interconnected, and damage to emotional areas impairs decision making. Feelings prioritize what is important, help encode memories, and direct reason toward important factors in a situation. Allowing feelings to influence decisions does not necessarily distort reasoning, and feelings are important for caring about relationships and others' perspectives in ethics.
This document discusses the role of feelings in making moral decisions. It argues that feelings play an important role and should not be dismissed from ethical reasoning. Recent research in neuroscience shows that emotion and reasoning circuits in the brain are interconnected, and damage to emotional areas impairs decision making. Feelings prioritize what is important, help encode memories, and direct reason toward important factors in a situation. Allowing feelings to influence decisions does not necessarily distort reasoning, and feelings are important for caring about relationships and others' perspectives in ethics.
the field of ethics has witnessed a great deal of interest in the role of emotions and feelings in making moral decisions. There are a number of reasons for this, perhaps beginning with the appearance of feminist, or “care,” approaches to ethics in the 1980s. This model emerged largely a neurological impossibility. As we consciously (and mostly unconscious- ly) process our thoughts, beliefs, percep- tions, imaginings, memories, anticipa- tions, and action plans, the brain’s feel- ing and reasoning circuits are working together to arrive at a plan that “feels right” to the organism.
Immensely impressive about Damasio’s
Now, it is certainly true that feelings can occasionally distort reasoning, especially when we argue backwards, that is, when we already know the conclusion we want—usually because that conclusion is infused with a passionate commitment, whereas its contrary strikes us as disgust- ing—and we select and adapt our evi- dence to suit the very conclusion we want to adopt. As I will discuss, these as a counterpoint to 2500 years of West- work is the way in which he and his cases are all too familiar. ern moral philosophy, whose major fig- colleagues have shown that when the ures, such as Plato and Immanuel Kant, brain’s feeling circuits have been dam- On the other hand, especially as we go were very concerned about feelings aged by trauma or disease, decisional about the mundane activities of daily influencing moral decisions. They ability becomes severely impaired. In life, the brain’s feeling circuits are utterly argued that allowing feelings to sway contrast to the Kantian or Platonic indispensable in making decisions that ethical reflection would distort moral repudiation of feelings in making deci- manifest our “values,” what we believe is reasoning and that if anything is impor- sions, Damasio and his ken have shown important. So I want to spend this article tant about making moral decisions, it is that damage to the brain’s feeling cir- reclaiming the significance of feelings in that moral reasoning be pristinely logical cuitry often disposes the individual to making moral decisions. Because I don’t and not “contaminated” by emotions, extremely poor or maladaptive deci- want to get too neurologically technical, passions, and sentiments. sion-making, especially in important I consistently use the word “feeling” in life matters involving relationships, the following, although “emotion” might In response, scholars such as Carol Gilli- finances, and job performance. As I will occasionally be more accurate, whereas gan and Nel Noddings have argued discuss below, feelings are increasingly the safest, all-purpose technical word to that a wholesale distrust of feelings being understood as a kind of “com- use is probably “affect.” Even so, I think neglects the importance of relationships pass” for the brain’s reasoning. the points will come across intelligibly in our moral life and that purely logical and fairly accurately. Also, although the or rational approaches to ethical situa- Feelings direct reason or the intellect following material can apply to any pro- tions ignore the degree to which empa- toward what is and isn’t important; they fession, I offer examples familiar to case thy, emotional attachments, communal prioritize the factors or elements in a managers so that my readers’ feeling cir- ties, and respecting another ’s feelings moral situation such that our decision cuitry will be positively disposed. inform the moral dimensions of those making is efficient and not haphazard; relationships. they appraise an object or situation as Feelings and Attention desirable, undesirable, dangerous, or An interesting distinction between feel- Perhaps the primary reason a great deal neutral; and they help to encode memo- ings and moods is that feelings (and of ethical attention has recently turned ries (eg, “That was awful” or “That was emotions) are about things, situations, or toward feelings and emotions in our marvelous”). Consequently, behaviors objects, whereas moods are largely dif- moral life is the continuing contributions that end with satisfying results are rein- fuse, generalized sensations that aren’t of neuroscientists who demonstrate that forced, and those that don’t become about anything in particular. Thus, all thinking and reasoning, not just “learning experiences” that shouldn’t be moods tend to be cognitively trouble- moral contemplation, is laced with feel- repeated. (Thus, sociopaths, who cannot some, as they often shape whatever we ing (or affect). Neurologist Antonio seem to learn from trial and error or are thinking about into the mold of the Damasio, one of the leading figures in from the consequences of their actions, mood. So when I am gloomy, everything this research, has offered convincing have been consistently found to have I think about is colored with negativity, findings that whenever reasoning and serious malfunctioning in the circuitry but when I am upbeat, everything in my decision making are occurring, the that connects the feeling with the think- world is marvelous or hopeful. brain’s feeling circuits are coactive with ing parts of the brain, primarily in the its reasoning or thinking circuits. In fact, amygdala-anterior cingulate-frontal and Feelings and especially emotions, how- dissociating feeling from thinking is prefrontal cortical loops.) ever, tend to be object oriented, or about