5. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs.

ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVT BANK

EMPLOYEES, 249 SCRA 162 [1995]

Digest (Administrative Law):

FACTS:
From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following
issue: Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on
promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position
Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position
Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from
the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper
had been filed by LDB.
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to
the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE:
WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC

RULING: 
The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES.
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and
the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders
of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
…” Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter,
Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is,
more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this
is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that
the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies  must become final
at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine
the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a
court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that “a
voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.”
Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a
panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart
from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that
the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
 Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary
arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a
“quasi-judicial instrumentality.”

An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency.  Thus, the terms

governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function. An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent
appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court,  and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a

governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code
and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in the
aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for
in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a
quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also
provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability
of its decisions to the CA under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted
by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or
award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to
the CA, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated
therein.
 In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No.
876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of
which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the
RTC for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or
in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of
the RTC. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA
must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition.

Full Text:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, 

vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA
in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on
December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received
ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position
Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no
Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on
promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound
themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either
compulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the
government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third party.  The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a
1

dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the
parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant
to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final
and binding resolution.  Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties
2

without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done
by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen
arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen
a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually
agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision.

In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to
include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies.  For this purpose, parties
3

to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include
a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over
other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the
following enumerated cases:
 . . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in
the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement.

xxx xxx xxx

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.  The state of our
4

present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties,"  while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
5

final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."  Hence, while there is an express
6

mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to
an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not,
elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari,  in effect equating the voluntary
7

arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and
imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,  on the settled premise that the judgments of courts
8

and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that
the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the
same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et
al.,  this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
9

capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a
panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the
NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
Appeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly
be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it
was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators
here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission,  that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in the
11

above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency.  Thus, the terms governmental

12

"agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed.  The word
13

"instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function.  An individual person, like an
14

administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate,  in the same
15

manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a
16

trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.

17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that,
although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular
No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down
the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing
rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated
therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to
provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities  not
18

expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another
statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the
voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known
as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the
contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in
which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have
jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made,
apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such
order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. 19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial
court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals
must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J. are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Seide, A Dictionary of Arbitration (1970).

2 Ibid.

3 Art. 260, Labor Code.

4 Art. 217, Labor Code.

5 Art. 262-A, par. 4, Labor Code.

6 Art. 223, Labor Code.

7 Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 130 SCRA 392 (1984);
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 180 SCRA 177 (1989).

8 98 SCRA 314 (1980).

9 Supra.

10 Art. 262-A, in relation to Art. 217 (b) and (c), Labor Code, as amended by
Sec. 9, R.A. 6715.

11 Executive Order No. 1008.

12 Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
112 S.E. 2d 716, 719, 236 S.C. 2.

13 Govt. of P.I. v. Springer, et al., 50 Phil. 259, 334 (1927).

14 Ciulla v. State, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 545, 550, 191 Misc. 528.

15 In re Turncock's Estate, 300 N.W. 155, 156, 238 Wis. 438.

16 In re Brown Co., D.C. Me., 36 F. Supp. 275, 277.

17 Gagne v. Brush, D.C.N.H., 30 F. Supp. 714, 716.

18 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, et al., 231 SCRA 30 (1994).

19 Section 23, R.A. No. 876.