1.

Abella Jr V CSC, 442 SCRA 207

2. Victorias Milling Company Inc. V SSS 4S
3. Rizal Empire Insurance Group V NLRC 150 SCRA 565
4. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A Tolentino Jr V Comelec GR#: 189698 (2/28/2010)
5. Leah M. NAzareno V City of Dumaguete GR# 181559, 10/02/2009
6. De La Rama v CA GR# 131136
7. Quirog V Aumentado
8. Municipal Board of Canvasser of Glen V Comelec GR# 150946
9. Cerafica V Comelec GR# 205136 12/2/2014
10. BPI Leasing Corp. V CA 416 S4
11. RCPI V NTC 184 SCRA 517
12. PPA Employees Hired After V COA 469 SCRA 397
13. De Jesus V COA 294 SCRA 152
14. NEA V Gonzaga GR# 158 SCRA 761
15. Lokin V Comelec GR# 180443
16. Taxi Cab Operators of MMLA V Board of Transportation 114 SCRA 597
17. Macario Katipon Jr V Jerome Kapson
18. Bellica V Executive Secretary
19. Ynot V IAC

1. Abella Jr vs CSC
Date: November 17, 2004
Petitioner: Francisco Abella Jr
Respondent: CSC

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts:
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as Department
Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department
Manager, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under
the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850, which was then the required eligibility
for said position.
 The CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 (Pertinent provision: Positions
covered by the CES: (a) the position is a career position, (b) above division chief level (c) duties and
responsibilities require performance of executive or managerial functions. Upon promotion or transfer to
other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said
other CES positions until they qualify.’)

“Two years after retirement, petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a contractual basis. He was
issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center.
However, when said appointment was submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the
ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval
of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment. The CSC affirmed the
disapproval of his permanent appointment. The CA shunned the issue of constitutionality of the Memo
Circular. It ruled that petitioner has no standing as only the appointing officer may request reconsideration
of the action taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner was not the real party in interest as his appointment was
dependent on the CSC’s approval.

Issue:
Who may file reconsideration or appeal?

Ratio: A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements
of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and
the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee. The law
requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed
appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment
were observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively,
make an appointment complete In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the appointee does, the
appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved. According to the CA, only the appointing
authority had the right to challenge the CSC’s disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides: “Section 2. Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal
from, the disapproval of an appointment may be made by the appointing authority and submitted to the
Commission within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the disapproved appointment.”

Appointing Authority’s Right to Challenge CSC Disapproval

The power of appointment necessarily entails the exercise of judgment and discretion.
Significantly, “the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing
authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored
person.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing
authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus,
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the
appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
Appointee’s Legal Standing to Challenge the CSC Disapproval
While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none
to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved parties, including the CSC,
should be given the right to file MRs or to appeal.
Although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
“legal standing” and “real party in interest” are different concepts. “The question in standing is whether
such parties have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. On the other hand, the question as to ‘real party-in-
interest’ is whether he is ‘the party who would be [benefited] or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party
entitled to the avails of the suit.’”
If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so should petitioner be allowed
to contest the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced by the disapproval,
since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his
eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove
his eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC
act that denied his permanent appointment.

The Appointee a Real Party in Interest

The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or
from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The appointee is rightly a real party in
interest too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office
in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an
approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.

Appointee Allowed Procedural Relief

The view that only the appointing authority may request reconsideration or appeal is too
narrow. The appointee should have the same right. , CSC Resolution 99-1936 recognizes the right of the
adversely affected party to appeal to the CSC Regional Offices prior to elevating a matter to the CSC
Central Office. The adversely affected party necessarily includes the appointee. This judicial
pronouncement does not override Mathay v. CSC, which the CA relied on. The Court merely noted in
passing -- by way of obiter -- that based on a similar provision, only the appointing officer could request
reconsideration of actions taken by the CSC on appointments.
In that case, QC Mayor Mathay Jr. sought the nullification of CSC Resolutions that recalled his
appointment. He filed a Petition assailing the CA Decision, which had previously denied his Petition for
Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for being filed out of time. The CSC Resolutions then were
already final and could no longer be elevated to the CA. Mathay’s Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
was improper, because there was an available remedy of appeal. And the CSC could not have acted without
jurisdiction, considering that it was empowered to recall an appointment initially approved.
The right of the appointee to seek MR or appeal was not the issue in Mathay. At any rate, the present case
is being decided en banc, and the ruling may reverse previous doctrines laid down by this Court.

Issue:
WON the Section 4 of the CSC Memo Circular is unconstitutional

Held:

Ratio: In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions
covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective,
specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
Career Service Classified by Levels
Positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are grouped into three major
levels:
“(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-
professional or sub[-]professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than
four years of collegiate studies;
“(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
“(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.”
Entrance to the different levels requires the corresponding civil service eligibility. Those in the third level
(CES positions) require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was appointed to a CES position;
however, his eligibility was inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of the
position, which in petitioner’s case was a CSEE.

Rights Protected
The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the positions to
which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity,
notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of prospectivity of regulations;
hence, there is no basis to argue that it is an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder. These terms, which have
settled meanings in criminal jurisprudence, are clearly inapplicable here.
The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain in a CES
position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years later as
department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed
at the time for that position.

Security of Tenure Not Impaired

First, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service -- except in the case of first and second
level employees in the civil service -- pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the employee may
be appointed Second, petitioner had neither rank nor position prior to his reemployment. One cannot claim
security of tenure if one held no tenure prior to appointment.

Due Process Not Violated

The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial,
issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary.
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons
before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the
applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the
performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as
enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation
of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of
certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and
hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination
of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus
and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative
body’s power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties.

Disapproval of Appointment
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The
appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the
imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification.

2. Victoria’s Milling Company, Inc v. Social Security Commission

FACTS:

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all employers to
include in the Employee's remuneration (salary) all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration (service).

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions.

Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act.”

RULING:

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body.

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated may be enforced by a penal sanction provided
therein.

In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new
or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.

Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in
the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation
of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such
circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity.

The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

In favor with Social Security Commission. Costs against Victoria’s Milling Company.
3. RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and
ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.

G.R. No. 73140

May 29, 1987

Facts:

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation,
he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he
was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost
of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was
made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the
National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-
32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.

Held:

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter
on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985
and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the
National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution
dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations
and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case
has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank
and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be
retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

4. Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC GR No. 189698

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution.
HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation by an appointing authority.

5. Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete (2009)

Doctrine: The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees
already assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once. There is
no need to wait for the approval of the appointments by the CSC. The appointments shall be effective until
disapproved by the CSC.

Facts:
1. The 52 petitioners in this case were all bona fide employees of the City of Dumaguete appointed
to various positions by City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. sometime in June 2001,
shortly before the end of his term.
2. On July 2001, the newly elected Mayor Perdices announced that he was not recognizing the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. Thereafter, the Treasurer was directed not to
make any disbursements pertaining to petitioners and petitioners’ names were deleted from the
list of employees.
3. The petitioners filed a petition for Mandamus with injunction and damages before the RTC of
Dumaguete against the Mayor and 4 other City Officers (Civil Case). On the same day, Director
II Fabio Abucejo (Abucejo) of the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC-FO), pursuant to
CSC Memorandum No.001374, invalidated and revoked the appointments made by former
 Mayor Remollo in June 2001 because the appointments were in violation of Items No. 3(d) and 4
of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001, which prohibit the outgoing chief executive
from making mass appointments after elections.
4. A copy of the CSC-FO’s findings were given to the petitioners and upon receipt, they filed a
motion for reconsideration before the CSC Regional Office VII. The CSC RO dismissed this
reasoning that the motion should be filed before the CSC FO. The petitioners filed another motion
to treat their first motion as an appeal. The CSC RO dismissed appeal and affirmed the CSC FO’s
decision.
5. Petitioners elevated the case to the CSC Proper. The CSC Proper noted that generally, it is the
appointing officer who appeals invalidated appointments but relaxed the rule in this case as the
appointing authority was no longer in power. However, the appeal was still dismissed.
6. The petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed this and affirmed
the CSC decision. The petitioners filed a petition for the review of this decision before the SC.
7. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the injunction prayed for in the Civil Case. But upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents, the RTC lifted the injunction. The CA affrimed. This
Court also affirmed on the ground that the petitioners had already availed the remedies of law
when they appealed the decision of the CSC FO to the CSC RO and then to the CSC Proper.
Hence, the injunction was lifted.
8. The petitioners filed a motion to declare the respondents in default in the Civil Case. This was
denied by the RTC but the CA declared the respondents in default.
9. The RTC dismissed the case. Hence this petition.

Petitioner’s argument:
1. They should receive their salaries for the meantime because their appointments are valid until
declared invalid (citing an unnumbered CSC Memorandum Circular, issued on 6 December 2001,
with the subject matter: “Reiteration of the Strict Implementation of Section 1, Rule IV and
Section 3, Rules VI, both of Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, otherwise known as the
Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.”)

Respondent’s argument:
1. The right of the petitioners to their positions and salaries is unclear thus, mandamus will not lie.
The RTC took note that the invalidation of petitioners’ appointments by the CSC Proper was then
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals and unless it was reversed, petitioners’ right to the
salaries, salary adjustments, and other emoluments claimed, were doubtful.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to
pay petitioners’ salaries, salary adjustments, and other emoluments, from 28 September 2001
until this Court finally resolves the issue of the validity of petitioners’ appointments NO
2. Whether petitioners are entitled to an award for damages resulting from the invalidation of their
appointments NO

Held/Ratio: Petition is denied.

A. On their right to compel the City Government to pay their salaries
1. The Court noted the following pertinent rules:
Rule IV of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions, Section 1. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules
shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the
appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his
salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
 Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. x x x

Section 3. When an appointment is disapproved, the services of the appointee shall

be immediately terminated, unless a motion for reconsideration or appeal is
seasonably filed.

Services rendered by a person for the duration of his disapproved

appointment shall not be credited as government service for whatever purpose.

If the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a

violation of civil service law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the Qualification
Standards (QS) prescribed for the position, the same is considered effective until
disapproved by the Commission or any of its regional or field offices. The appointee
is meanwhile entitled to payment of salaries from the government.

If a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the disapproval is seasonably filed

with the proper office, the appointment is still considered to be effective. The
disapproval becomes final only after the same is affirmed by the Commission.

2. The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees
already assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once.
There is no need to wait for the approval of the appointments by the CSC. The appointments shall
be effective until disapproved by the CSC.
3. The CSC has a three-tiered organizational structure, i.e., the CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the CSC
Proper acting as a collegial body. The disapproval of the appointments by the CSC FO and CSC
RO is not final and executory until affirmed by the CSC Proper.
4. Nevertheless, the aforementioned general rules cannot be simply applied to the case at bar given
its peculiar circumstances.
5. Section 3 above only applies if there was no violation of civil service laws but if there was,
Section 4 states that: “The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of
appointees whose appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as the
publication requirement pursuant to RA 7041.”
a. This consistent with Sec 65, Chapter 10, Book V of the Administrative Code which states
that: “No person employed in the Civil Service in violation of Civil Service law and rules
shall be entitled to receive pay from the government, but the appointing authority
responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that
would have accrued had the employment been lawful, and the disbursing officials shall
make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.”
6. The rules laid down by the CSC in CSC Resolution No. 010988, dated 4 June 2001, are deemed
included in what is the “civil service law,” it having the force and effect of law.
7. Since petitioners’ right to the payment of their salaries by the City Government of Dumaguete is
still unsettled at this point, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against respondents to
make such payment. Mandamus applies only where the petitioner’s right is founded clearly in
law and not when it is doubtful. Until the SC finally resolves the pending petition for review of
the CA’s affirmation of the CSC Proper’s disapproval of the petitioners’ appointments, the issue
of who will pay their salaries cannot be settled.
B. On damages
1. Mayor Perdices’ refusal to re-appoint petitioners is merely in exercise of the former’s discretion
and does not constitute bad faith.
6. Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service
Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy Porta,
Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce, Elsa Marino,
Bernardita Mendoza, Jane Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino Ramos, respondents.
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote
a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s
request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld
the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the
CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Issue:
Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law
and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b)
Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective
agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing
civil service law, rules and regulations.

7. QUIROG vs.AUMENTADO
Facts:
Liza M. Quirog was permanently appointed as Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial
Agriculture by then Bohol Governor Rene L. Relampagos. The appointment was confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Quirog was likewise certified by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) as one
of the two candidates qualified for the position.
However, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog’s appointment upon the finding that the same was
part of the bulk appointments issued by Gov Relampagos after May 14, 2001 elections in violation of a
CSC Resolution prohibiting the issuance of midnight appointments. In a motion for reconsideration, it was
contended by the Relampagos and Quirog that the appointment cannot be considered a midnight
appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampago’s term and that Quirog was
already the acting Provincial Agriculturists a year prior to said appointment. The CSCROVII however ruled
that Quirog and Relampagos had no legal personality to file the pleadings. That under Section 2, Rule VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998 only the appointing officer may request
reconsideration of the disapproval of an appointment by the Civil Service Commission. Even if Relampagos
was the one who appointed Quirog, he could not file a motion for reconsideration because his term as
governor had already expired. On appeal with the CSC, the latter ruled in favor of the petitioners. It ruled
that the appointee Quirog be allowed to question the decision and that the latter was not a midnight
appointment. On appeal with the CA, it was however contended by then incumbent Bohol Governor Erico
B. Aumentado that Quirog and Relampagos had no legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration of
the disapproved appointment or to appeal the same and insisted that Quirog's appointment was a midnight
appointment. The CA ruled against the petitioners.
Issues
: (1) WON petitioners Relampagos and Quirog have the legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of, or appeal from the disapproval of the latter's appointment by theCSC 2) WON the subject appointment
was a midnight appointment.
Held
: 1.) Yes.In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court declared that both the
appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal
standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. Clearly, pursuant to Abella,
Jr., Quirog had the right to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In
contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as governor, had lost the legal personality to
contest the disapproval of the appointment. 2.) No. It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a
midnight appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically,
those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight
appointment. For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties
concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the
fact that she was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the
Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted
from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the
more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently filled up.

8. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GLAN, ENRIQUE B. YAP, JR., VENANCIO S.

WATA, JR., GILDO VILLORENTE, SR., JING MUSA, BENEDICTO L. RUIZ, ANANIAS S.
EMNACE, VANNEVAR B. ALEGADO, ALITO ARNOLD CARIO, SATURNINO BAG, JR., and
FEDERICO J. TANGAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (En Banc) and
FLORA L. BENZONAN, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, originated from SPC No. 01-032,
a pre-proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora L. Benzonan with the Commission on
Election (COMELEC) en banc. Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan,
Sarangani during the May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Glan, Sarangani and to recall the proclamation of
petitioners Enrique B. Yap, Jr., Venancio S. Wata, Jr., Gildo Villorente, Sr., Ting Musa, Benedicto L.
Ruiz, Ananias S. Emnace, Vannevar B. Alegado, Alito Arnold Carino, Saturnino Bag, Jr. and Federico J.
Tangan, as duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, Sarangani,
respectively.

Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case on the grounds that: a) after the original and second MBC
had resigned, the third MBC was illegally constituted as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary are
not qualified under the Omnibus Election Code;[1] b) the canvassing proceedings, which were initially
held in the Session Hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial
Capitol of Danao Province, contrary to COMELEC Resolution No. 3848;[2] c) the Secretary of the MBC
failed to record the minutes of the canvassing proceedings since the start of the canvass; d) neither
Benzonan nor her representatives were notified of the last three days of the canvassing proceedings and,
consequently, they were not able to participate therein; e) a substantial number of the election returns had
been tampered with or falsified; and f) the MBC had falsified the certificate of canvass votes.[3]

On December 4, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution[4] finding that, based on the evidence
presented, the canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the previous venue at the
inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus, the proclamations of the winning
candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered.

To reverse the COMELEC en bancs resolution, petitioners filed the present petition with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction.[5] On December 21, 2001, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing its
December 4, 2001 resolution.

Although not raised as an issue, the Court is compelled to resolve whether the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over this case.

Section 3 (c) of Article IX-C of the Constitution reads:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC[6] and reiterated in subsequent cases,[7] the most recent being
Balindong v. COMELEC,[8] the Court has upheld this constitutional mandate and consistently ruled that
the COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in
the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission and any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction.

It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC
are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling
within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that
the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration,
en banc.[9]

It is clear that SPC No. 01-032 is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires the
exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of
the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and certificate of canvass, were alleged to be in
issue.[10] Furthermore, in her comment to the petition dated January 9, 2000,[11] Benzonan categorically
stated that it is not disputed that what is involved here is a pre-proclamation controversy.

Also undisputed is the fact that Benzonan filed her pre-proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en
banc and that the case was subsequently decided by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. As aforestated, the
COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving these types of controversies in the
first instance. Thus, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor that the Court
must declare null and void and set aside.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the COMELEC en
banc dated December 4, 2001 in SPC No. 01-032 is hereby declared null and void and set aside, and the
COMELEC is directed to assign SPC No. 01-032 to a division.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

9. OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205136, 02

December 2014,EN BANC , (Perez, J.)
Doctrine:
COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
Facts:
On October 2012, Kimberly filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Councilor, City of Taguig for the
2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20)
years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a
sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of
Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and the
denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. COMELEC argued that Olivia cannot substitute
Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post by reason
of her age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material
misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to. Olivia countered that
although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that
she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Olivia also
claimed that there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of
qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth date to qualify for
the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is
precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid substitution?
RULING:
Yes, in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and,
thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond
the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution;
we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a va lid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day
for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which
Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.

10. BPI LEASING CORP. vs. CA, et al.

GR No. 127624, 18 Nov. 2003
FACTS:
BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. For the calendar year 1986, it paid
Commissioner of Internal Revenue a total of P1, 139,041.49 representing 4% contractor’s percentage tax
as imposed by the National Internal Revenue Code. However, in November 1986, CIR issued a Revenue
Regulation which provides that companies registered under RA 5980, likeBLC, are no longer liable for
contractor’s percentage tax, instead, subject only to gross receipts tax. Thereafter, BLC filed a claim for
refund before the CIR and simultaneously filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeal in
order to stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds. Both cases were denied, despite motion
for reconsideration by BLC, hence, they appealed before the Court of Appeals, which the latter affirmed
the decision of CTA and CIR. Aggrieved by the decision, BLC instituted a petition before the SC.
However, the certification against non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed by the counsel
on record of the BLC, who was not specifically authorized to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer is authorized to validly sign, for and in behalf of itsclient, the certification of
non-forum shopping.
HELD:
It was held that while the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed,for an on behalf of a
corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who haspersonal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document, it doesnot mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of the corporation he is
representing,may routinely sign a certification of non-forum shopping – the lawyer must be“specifically
authorized” in order to validly sign the certification.Since powers of corporations are exercised through
their board of directorsand/or duly authorized officers and agents, physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for thepurpose by corporate by
laws or by specific acts of the board of directors. Beingcounsel of record does not vest upon a lawyer the
authority to execute thecertification on behalf of his client.PETITION DENIED.

11. RCPI vs NTC Case Digest

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

Facts:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through
petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and
brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.
Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-
complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a
request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of
the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing.

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a)
of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate
amount of one thousand pesos.
Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines.

HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. NTC
has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to
comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the
Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of
any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation
from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or
disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor
General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed
to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and
regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or
beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).

12. PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA

469 SCRA 397

Facts: PPA has been paying its officials and employees COLA and amelioration allowance equivalent to
40% and 10%, respectively, of their basic salary pursuant to various legislative and administrative
issuances. During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA discontinued the payment thereof in view of Corporate
Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 prescribing the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 6758
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law which integrated said allowances into the basic salary
effective July 1, 1989. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R.
No. 109023 dated August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to non-
publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856 directing the payment
of COLA and amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service during the period July 1, 1989 to March
16, 1999, the date of publication of CCC No. 10. “Doubting the validity of said Resolution, the PPA Auditor
requested the opinion of the General Counsel on the propriety of the payment of the backpay. In fully
concurring with the recommendation of the then Director, CAO II, the General Counsel ruled that ‘in order
for a PPA employee to be entitled to backpay representing COLA and amelioration pay equivalent to 40%
and 10% respectively, of their basic salary, the following conditions must concur: (1) he has to be an
incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1,
1989.’ Aggrieved, PPA sought reconsideration of the said advisory opinion which was denied by the
General Counsel in a 1st Endorsement dated September 13, 2001, since she found no cogent reason to set
aside the earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor accordingly ruled against the grant of the subject backpay. The
COA ruled that “in the absence of effective integration of the COLA and amelioration allowance into the
basic salary in 1989, the inevitable conclusion is that they are deemed not integrated from the time RA 6758
was promulgated until DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March 1999.” During that period, it thus
disallowed the disputed allowances on the ground that these fell under the second sentence of Section 12
of RA 6758. It held that only officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was entitled to receive back pay
equivalent to the additional compensation (COLA and amelioration allowance) mentioned.

Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on various dates
after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living allowance (COLA) and
amelioration allowance?
Held: Court held that the COLA of government employees from 1989 to 1999 was not “deemed integrated
into their salaries.” This means that the COLA during that period is a legally demandable and enforceable
right. Employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, whether incumbent or not, are entitled
to the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter of right. Hence, in consonance with the equal-protection clause
of the Constitution, and considering that the employees were all similarly situated as to the matter of the
COLA and the amelioration allowance, they should all be treated similarly. All -- not only incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back pay corresponding to the said benefits, from July 1,
1989 to the new effectivity date of DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The principle of equal protection
is not a barren concept that may be casually swept aside. While it does not demand absolute equality, it
requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Verily, equal protection and security shall be accorded every person under identical or analogous
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Commission on
Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

13. PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA

469 SCRA 397

Facts:
PPA has been paying its officials and employees COLA and amelioration allowance equivalent to 40% and
10%, respectively, of their basic salary pursuant to various legislative and administrative issuances. During
the last quarter of 1989, the PPA discontinued the payment thereof in view of Corporate Compensation
Circular (CCC) No. 10 prescribing the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 6758 otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law which integrated said allowances into the basic salary effective
July 1, 1989. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023
dated August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to non-publication.
Consequently, the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856 directing the payment of COLA
and amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service during the period July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999,
the date of publication of CCC No. 10. “Doubting the validity of said Resolution, the PPA Auditor requested
the opinion of the General Counsel on the propriety of the payment of the backpay. In fully concurring with
the recommendation of the then Director, CAO II, the General Counsel ruled that ‘in order for a PPA
employee to be entitled to backpay representing COLA and amelioration pay equivalent to 40% and 10%
respectively, of their basic salary, the following conditions must concur: (1) he has to be an incumbent as
of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1, 1989.’ Aggrieved,
PPA sought reconsideration of the said advisory opinion which was denied by the General Counsel in a 1st
Endorsement dated September 13, 2001, since she found no cogent reason to set aside the earlier opinion.
The PPA Auditor accordingly ruled against the grant of the subject backpay. The COA ruled that “in the
absence of effective integration of the COLA and amelioration allowance into the basic salary in 1989, the
inevitable conclusion is that they are deemed not integrated from the time RA 6758 was promulgated until
DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March 1999.” During that period, it thus disallowed the disputed
allowances on the ground that these fell under the second sentence of Section 12 of RA 6758. It held that
only officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the additional
compensation (COLA and amelioration allowance) mentioned.

Issue:
Whether or not herein petitioners who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on various dates after
July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living allowance (COLA) and amelioration
allowance?

Held:
Court held that the COLA of government employees from 1989 to 1999 was not “deemed integrated into
their salaries.” This means that the COLA during that period is a legally demandable and enforceable right.
Employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, whether incumbent or not, are entitled to
the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter of right. Hence, in consonance with the equal-protection clause
of the Constitution, and considering that the employees were all similarly situated as to the matter of the
COLA and the amelioration allowance, they should all be treated similarly. All -- not only incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back pay corresponding to the said benefits, from July 1,
1989 to the new effectivity date of DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The principle of equal protection
is not a barren concept that may be casually swept aside. While it does not demand absolute equality, it
requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Verily, equal protection and security shall be accorded every person under identical or analogous
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Commission on
Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

14. Rodolfo S. De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit

294 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003
Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice
allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by
Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered
the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act
of 1973.

Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even
if authorized by the LWUA.

Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is
vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District
is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can
disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA. Considering that the
disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that payment had no legal basis,
the allowances need not to be refunded.

15. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. VICTORIANO B.

GONZAGA, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., , J.:

For review under Rule 45 are the March 6, 2003 Decision1 and June 10, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal of the July 23, 2001
Order3 of the Pagadian City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 4282-2K, and
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II
(ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent because his
spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on
the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification
Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective government position higher than
Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO’s by-laws,
however, do not provide for such ground for disqualification.4

On November 21, 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition and Damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4282-2K with the Pagadian City RTC.

ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer on November 24, 2000, which the RTC denied.
However, it issued a temporary restraining order, ordering ZAMSURECO’s officials to refrain from
conducting the election for directorship set on December 2, 2000.

The RTC said that the petition was dismissible because of the failure of respondent to exhaust all
administrative remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of District
Elections for Electric Cooperative. The section required that "a protest arising from disqualification shall
be filed with the screening committee in not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The screening
committee shall decide the protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from receipt thereof. Failure of the
applicant to file his/her protest within the above-cited period shall be deemed a waiver of his right to
protest."5

As observed by the RTC, respondent had urgently filed the petition on November 21, 2000 because the
election sought to be restrained was going to be held on December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a
holiday. Under the circumstances, respondent had little time to exhaust the remedy in Sec. 2 of the
Guidelines, such that an exception could be made. More importantly, according to the RTC, the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in the instant case since the guidelines
prescribing the administrative remedy is a subject matter of the ECEC, which is at issue, and is exactly
what is being sought to be invalidated.6

On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the amended petition, and to admit a
second amended petition that impleaded NEA as indispensable party. Respondent also averred that the
ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted
the second amended petition, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the conduct of election for
directorship, issued summons to NEA, and required NEA to comment if the ECEC was published in any
newspaper of general circulation.7

On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer, and subsequently on
April 10, 2001, a Motion for Leave to Admit Pleading to which a Motion to Dismiss was attached. NEA
questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC and alleged that respondent failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.8

In its July 23, 2001 Order,9 the RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for being filed out of time.
More importantly, it noted NEA’s failure to state whether the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper
of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. The RTC
said the failure rendered the ECEC null and void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that NEA erroneously relied on Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 269 and misapplied the cases it cited.
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to "order, ruling or decision of the NEA" in the exercise
of NEA’s quasi-judicial functions. And the RTC noted that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings,
investigations, and procedures. On the other hand, the validity of the ECEC, subject of the instant
petition, was an exercise of NEA’s quasi-legislative function or rule-making authority.

Further, according to the RTC, NEA took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context when it said Sec. 58 dealt with
the administrative remedy available to petitioner. It said that Sec. 58 presupposed a ruling or decision of
the NEA and there was none in the case before it. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and ordered
ZAMSURECO to accept Gonzaga’s certificate of candidacy for director.10 The RTC denied NEA’s
motion for reconsideration.

The CA Ruled that the Courts Have Jurisdiction Over

Issues on Legality of Codes

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA denied due course and dismissed the petition. It said
that NEA was not exercising its quasi-judicial powers but its rule-making authority. In the case before the
trial court, the CA stressed that the issue involved the interpretation of the ECEC, and to this extent, NEA
had no jurisdiction because the issue is within the province of the courts.

The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its June 10, 2003 Resolution. Hence, we have
this petition.

The Issues

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 59

OF P.D. 269

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL

COURT’S NULLIFICATION OF THE ECEC

Issues Involving NEA’s Rule-Making Authority

Are Cognizable by Regular Courts

The petition has no merit.

Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:

SEC. 59. Court Review.—The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review any order,
ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such order, ruling or decision when it
clearly appears that there is no evidence before the NEA to support reasonably such order, ruling
or decision, or that the same is contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA.
The evidence presented to the NEA, together with the record of the proceedings before the NEA,
shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or decision of the NEA
may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari in proper case. The
procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be presented by rules of the Supreme
Court. Any order or decision of the NEA may be reviewed on the application of any person or
public service entity aggrieved thereby and who was a party in the subject proceeding, by
certiorari in appropriate cases or by a petition for review, which shall be filed within thirty (30)
days from the notification of the NEA order, decision or ruling on reconsideration. Said petition
 shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme Court who shall furnish copies
thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.

Petitioner argues that based on the foregoing provision, only the Supreme Court has the authority to
review the "acts" of NEA as an administrative body with adjudicative and rule-making power. It
cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Court’s pronouncement that:

[T]he power of judicial review of NEA’s order or decision pertains to the Supreme Court as
decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests specifically on the Supreme Court the jurisdiction
to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such orders, rulings
or decisions.11

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to "order, ruling or decision" of NEA. What is being
challenged in this case is the decision of the screening committee of ZAMSURECO to disqualify
respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement of
publication was complied with. The ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not
its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondent’s disqualification
and the question on the ECEC’s validity are within the inherent jurisdiction of regular courts to review.
Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is misplaced. The subject in that case was the electricity rates charged by a
cooperative, a matter which is clearly within NEA’s jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition,
however, centers on the validity of NEA’s rules in light of the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code and New Civil Code. The present issue is cognizable by regular courts.

With regard to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial courts’ nullification of the
ECEC. The CA correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the
code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in the Official
Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of
publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented.

Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, reinforced the
requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as follows:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three
(3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.

Sec. 4. Effectivity – In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in this rule.
 Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect – Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.

We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in this Court’s Resolution
in Tañada v. Tuvera:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity which shall begin fifteen (15) days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on Audit,13 De Jesus v. Commission on
Audit,14 andPhilippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit.15

In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by petitioner pursuant to its rule-making authority provided in PD
269, as amended, particularly Sec. 24:

Section 24. Board of Directors. — (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its
Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented
and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and
resolutions.

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures
for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the By-laws of the
Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations x x x.

The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum,
interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. In previous cases involving the
election of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was not put in issue. The ECEC
then enjoyed the presumption of validity. In this case, however, respondent directly questioned the
validity of the ECEC in his second amended petition. The trial court thus required petitioner to show
proof of publication of the ECEC. Petitioner could have easily provided such proof had the ECEC
actually been published in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the country. This
simple proof could have immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioner’s failure to do so only implies that
the ECEC was not published accordingly, a fact supported by the certification from the National Printing
Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition for mandamus and prohibition should not have been resorted to by
respondent. The proper recourse, according to petitioner, is a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner
miserably errs on this point. Rule 63 on declaratory relief states:

Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

As stated above, a requirement under Rule 63 is that the petition for declaratory relief must be filed
"before any breach or violation" the questioned document may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that a breach has not yet occurred since an actual dispute has already arisen between
ZAMSURECO and respondent––the screening committee of the cooperative on the erroneous
implementation of a code whose legality and implementation is being questioned.

On the other hand, it is familiar and fundamental doctrine that a writ of prohibition or mandamus may
issue when "x x x a board unlawfully excludes another from x x x enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled x x x."16

Considering that the screening committee of the board has excluded respondent from being elected as
board member of ZAMSURECO because of the latter’s improper implementation of the code, a petition
for mandamus and prohibition is the proper recourse.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March 6, 2003 Decision and June
10, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs against petitioner.

16. Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportation

GR L-59234, 30 September 1982 En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
FACTS:
To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the
commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular,
respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed andaccepted for registration as public
conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation
filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
TemporaryRestraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and
Memorandum Circular of the BLT.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3)
Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived
of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of
other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of
choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is
not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to
subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public especially considering that
they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours every day in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met. On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was
directed solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the
equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed
Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be
accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and
was dismissed.

17. MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005 Decision3 of the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17,
2010 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio
Colleges Foundation. When applying for graduation, he was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies
despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with
deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction came
after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a graduate.

In 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra.
Sometime in September 1993, the personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that
the Civil Service Commission was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in
October of the same year. Petitioner filed an application to take the examination, believing that the CSC
still allowed CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic
deficiency which they may have. However, the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been
discontinued since January 1993 pursuant to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42,
Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992.

Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of 80.52%.
Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at
Bangued, Abra. In October 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.

On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS
Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging
that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his
college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5
units in Military Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993
since he was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application
form.

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-
CAR.6

Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary Administrative

Case No. BB-03-006.

In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He
maintained that at the time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the policy
of the CSC – that any deficiency in the applicant’s educational requirement may be substituted by his
length of service – was still subsisting.

On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a
Decision9 containing the following pronouncements:

Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing circumstances. The only issue
now left is with respect to the particular offense for which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent
Catipon is charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of respondent Catipon for
the purpose of taking the CS Professional Examination scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful
perusal of the said application form reveals that most of the entries filled up by respondent are
typewritten. The only entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to "Year Graduated" and
"School Where Graduated" which were answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF" respectively.
Another handwritten entry is with respect to "Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC" entry, however,
was just superimposed on the typewritten "Commerce".

The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten suggests that the said
application form was consciously drafted and meticulously prepared before its actual submission to the
CSC for processing. They are relevant and material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth
emphasizing however that the pre-drafted application form, considering the typewritten entries, shows
respondent’s confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent answered both the IF YES column
and IF NO column corresponding to the question "Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x

xxxx

The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate intent to defraud the
government. He manifested in his application his uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only lacks 1.5
units Military Science to be conferred a graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on educational
requirement. Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee who processed the application
would have doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the Application
Form, and thus the educational status of Macario. x x x

xxxx

Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational attainment as can be
deduced from the manner he answered Item No. 8 in the application form. This may be taken as good
faith, which will serve to mitigate any liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent to
deceive or willfully distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon do not even show
blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if at all, there was attempt to
reveal the truth to the examination division processing the application.

xxxx

With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing the October 17, 1993
Career Service Professional Examination, the same needs to be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6, Rule II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 states:

Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have x x x intentionally made any false
statement of any material fact in his application, x x x the Commission shall invalidate such examination
x x x.

With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head, Social
Security System, Bangued, Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct. However, respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is suspension of six months and one day
to one year.

Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating circumstance. Thus,
respondent Macario Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six months and one day suspension, without
pay, which is the minimum period of the penalty attached to the offense committed. The Career Service
Professional eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without prejudice however to retaking of
the said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein provided should not be allowed to go
back to his current position without CS Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case respondent Catipon
fails to retake or pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any available position
that fits his subprofessional eligibility.10

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a March 23, 2006
Decision,12which contained the following pronouncement:

Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents
and Grave Misconduct, there is no longer any basis to hold respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. This contention is without legal basis. In the case of Philippine
Retirement Authority vs. Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:

Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts constitute the grave
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault under the
circumstances. To completely exonerate respondent would be inequitable and iniquitous considering the
totality of events surrounding this case. Though there was no deliberate intent to falsify or to make
dishonest entry in the Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was
accomplished, the fact that there was indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application Form
is undisputedly established. In view of such an established fact, the integrity of the Civil Service
Examination, particularly the CSPE has been blemished which is sufficient to constitute Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner prayed for injunctive
relief and the reversal of the above CSC-CAR decision. He argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found
him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he has been declared innocent of
the charges of dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct; that while the
Supreme Court has held that making false entries in public documents may be considered as conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, such act must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a
willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service;14 and that with the finding that
he merely committed an innocent mistake in filling up the application form for the CSPE, he may not be
found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
[sic] of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region dated July 6, 2005 and March
23, 2006 is [sic] AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner should have interposed
an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases;16 that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner’s case is not exceptional as would
exempt it from the application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v. Judge Ramos,17 the absence
of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service does not
preclude a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner did
not act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE application form
and in failing to verify beforehand the requirements for the examination.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant recourse. Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

(A)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO REALIZE THAT GIVEN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION IMPOSED
BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING JUDICIAL RECOURSE BEFORE (THE
COURT OF APPEALS);

(B)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
MISAPPLIEDIN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

(C)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES
GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.18

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, consequently,
exoneration from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, petitioner argues that
he was constrained to file the petition for review with the CA as his decreed six-month suspension was
imminent as a consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that immediate judicial
intervention was necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him, which is why his CA petition
included a prayer for injunctive relief; that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should
not have been applied strictly in his case, given the special circumstance that his suspension would mean
loss of his only source of income;20 that he should be completely exonerated from the charges against
him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be accompanied by deliberate intent
or a willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service – which is absent in his
case; and that his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked in the interest of justice and
in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.

Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment21 seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that completion of all the academic
requirements – and not merely attendance at graduation rites – confers the necessary degree which
qualifies a student to take the CSPE; that petitioner’s claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is belied by
his Transcript of Records22 and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect the date of his
graduation as October 1995 – or after completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in Military Science; that
petitioner cannot claim to suffer irreparable injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision,
which is valid and binding; that the revocation of petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he was then
not qualified when he took the CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in finding that petitioner’s act
compromised the image and integrity of the civil service, which justified the imposition of a
corresponding penalty; that this Court in the Rupa case made it clear that the act of making false entries in
public documents constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a grave offense
punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal for
the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies when he proceeded directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal
with the CSC.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service." 23

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of
government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.
As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper,
or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought
before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days
suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper
within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof."24 "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service
Commission-Central Office.25

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review,
under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the
Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court.26

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the
CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders
petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case."27 Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this case the
Commission Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum."28

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence."29 When
petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.

We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination.
Petitioner’s claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the
rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.30 Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional
service through the CSPE – cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is
required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by
the appellate court:
In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the
said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has been a
practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would simply sign the prepared
order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the
will is necessary for deliberate intent to exist; such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He
simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in
Military Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of
the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and
careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on
prospective examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy
disallowing substitution of one’s length of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should
petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was not shown that the
latter was authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was
competent and capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements
which a reasonably prudent and careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his
failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in Bacaya,
negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.32

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon
an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the
office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Under
our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such:
misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior
notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents;
falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a
traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular
Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of
receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network problems within his office
and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state
of security;33 a public prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by
a judge;34 and a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics
for Professional Teachers.35 In petitioner’s case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE application
undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a willful or
deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules."36

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the
policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility
should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not
only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the
government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public
service.37 "Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the
highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor,
and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected."38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH
ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE
LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.

19. Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:
In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.
 On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He
issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not police power is properly enforced
HELD:
NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the
State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper
but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O. 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order
(E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.