The Nibbāna Sermons 1 to 11 by Bhikkhu K Ñāṇananda

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Sermon 07
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa
Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Etaṃ santaṃ, etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho

sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.
"This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all preparations, the
relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation,
extinction".
With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and the assembly
of the venerable meditative monks. Towards the end of the last sermon we
happened to quote a certain verse from the Kevaḍḍhasutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.
The verse runs as follows:
Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ,
anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ,
ettha āpo ca paṭhavī,
tejo vāyo na gādhati,
ettha dīghañca rassañca,
aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,
ettha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhati,
viññāṇassa nirodhena,
etth'etaṃ uparujjhati.
-------------------------------
Translation Walshe (1987: 179)
“Where consciousness is signless, boundless, all-luminous
That’s where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul,
There ‘name-and-form’ are wholly destroyed.
With the cessation of consciousness this is all destroyed.”
 Ceylonese and PTS ed. second line have pahaṃ instead of pabhaṃ.
PED: 448 s.v. paha has “flight of steps from which to step down into the
water” … “accessible”, followed by adding that “it is not at all improbable to
take pahaṃ as ppr. of pajahati (as contracted fr. pajahaṅ like pahatvāna for
pajahitvāna at Sn 639), thus meaning ‘giving up entirely’.”
(See also Monier-Williams 1899/1999: 700 s.v. pra-hā, prajahāti, “to leave …
to desert, quit, abandon, give up, renounce”)
Rhys Davids 1899: 283 adopts pahaṃ and translates it as “accessible from
every side”
Neuman 1906/2004: 157 adopts pahaṃ and takes it to be a shortening of
pajahaṃ; he then translates the first two lines as „Bewußtsein wo
entschwunden ist, vollkommen restlos abgetan”, “consciousness that has
vanished and completely been dropped off”.
Franke 1913: 166 adopts pahaṃ and translates the first part as „Die Wahr-
nehmung selbst niemand sieht, doch endlos rings ist ihr Gebiet”; “Perception
itself is not seen by anyone, yet its range is endless all round.”
Norman 1987 in an article entirely dedicated to this passage concludes: “I
would suggest that an earlier version, perhaps the earliest version, of the
epithet had the form sabbato-paha … it is clear from the complete absence of
any reference to the verb pabhā- that the Dīgha-nikāya commentarial
tradition which Buddhaghosa was following did not know about the possibility
of explaining sabbato-pa(b)ha as coming from that verb … This makes it clear
that the commentarial tradition came into being at a time when the spelling –
pabha had not yet replaced –paha, or the explanation ‘shining’ would certainly
have been included.”
“It is likely that when the canonical texts were translated or transformed
into the language of the Theravādin canon, which we call Pāli, the redactors
thought that –paha was inappropriate to the dialect and they wished to
translate it.”
Regarding the variant pahaṃ still found in the PTS edition, however,
Norman reasons: “I do not think that this is a trace of the original pre-Pāli
reading. It seems rather to be an error in the Sinhalese scribal tradition, where
ha and bha are very similar and easily confused.”
Sanskrit fragment parallel in Zhou 2008: 9, 389v7f (with corrections)
tatredaṃ vyākaraṇaṃ bhavati jñātvā dharmān yathātathaṃ:
vijñānyānidarśanam anantaṃ sarvataḥ pṛthuṃ taṃ pṛthivīpṛthatvena
anabhibhūtaṃ atha pṛthivī āpaś ca tejo vāyur na gāhate, atra dīrghaṃ ca
hrasvaṃ cāpy aṇu sthūlaṃ śubhāśubham atra nāma ca rūpaṃ cāpy aśeṣaṃm
uparudhyate
Here the reading pṛthuṃ supports Pāli pahaṃ
Tibetan parallel Peking 5595 tu 72a7
de la ji ltar ji ltar chos rnam par shes nas lung bstan par ’gyur ba ’gog pa ste /
rnam par shes pa bstan du med pa mtha’ yas pa thams cad du khyab cing
khyab pa de ’byung bar mi ’gyur gyi / ’on kyang sa dang chu dang me dang
rlung yang ’jug par mi 'gyur la / ring ba dang thung ngu dang / phra ba dang
sbom pa dang / dge ba dang mi dge ba dang / ming dang gzugs ma lus par yang
’di ’gag par ’gyur ro /
Here the reading khyab supports Pāli pahaṃ
The significance of a reference to cessation found in the introductory
statement of the Tibetan version is not entirely clear. It could be intending a
predication (lung bstan par) according to which what is conscious of dharmas
(chos rnam par shes nas) should be made to cease (’gyur ba ’gog pa).

Chinese parallel DĀ
應答識無形，無量自有光。
此滅四大滅，麤細好醜滅，
於此名色滅，識滅餘亦滅」(CBETA, T01, no. 1, p. 102, c17-19)
Translation Meisig (1995: 195): “This must be answered: consciousness ―
shapeless, extraordinary, radiating by its own ― if this vanishes, then the four
elements vanish, and coarse and subtle, nice and ugly vanish. Into this name
and form vanish to (sic). If consciousness vanishes, the rest vanishes, too.”
Here the reading 有光 supports pabhaṃ. However, the next line starts with
a reference to cessation, 此滅四大滅, “this ceasing, the four element cease”
(the reformulated question by the Buddha also speaks of their cessation, not of
the four elements not finding a footing). Here already the cessation of the four
elements clearly takes place with the cessation (此滅) of the anidassana
viññāṇa (識無形).

Chinese parallel as quoted in the *Mahāvibhāṣā

「識不見無邊 周遍廣大性
更無餘廣大 能映奪此者
四大與短長 細麁淨不淨
於是處永棄 名色滅無餘」(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 671, a17-20)
Here the reading 廣 supports pahaṃ.

Quotations in the Ratnāvalī (I 93-95)

如識處無形 無邊遍一切
此中地等大 一切皆滅盡
於此無相智 短長善惡業
名色及諸陰 如此滅無餘」(CBETA, T32, no. 1656, p. 495, b15-18)

P 5658 nge 133a8: rnam shes bstan med mtha’ yas pa || kun du bdag po de la ni
|| sa dang chu dang me dang ni || rlung gis gnas thod ’gyur ma yin ||
’dir ni ring dang thung ba dang || phra sbom dge dang mi dge dang || ’dir ni
ming dang gzugs dag kyang || ma lus par ni ’gag par ’gyur
Both Ratnāvalī quotations have no equivalent to the notion of luminosity.

Summary: The sense of luminosity (pabhaṃ) is probably due to a later

change. A presumably more original reading of pahaṃ (at times understood to
convey nuances of accessibility or being spread out) could also be a reference
to the cessation of consciousness. In fact the only version (DĀ Chinese) that
supports the sense of luminosity follows this right away with a reference to
the cessation of such a luminous consciousness as the condition for the
cessation of the four elements. The Tibetan also has a reference to cessation in
the part immediately preceding the line in question.
--------------------------------
The other day, we could give only a general idea of the meaning of this verse
in brief, because of the question of time. Today, we propose to attempt a
detailed explanation of it. To start with, we purposely avoid rendering the first
two lines, which appear as the crux of the whole verse. Taking those two lines as
they are, we could paraphrase the verse as follows:
It is in a consciousness, that is anidassana, ananta, and sabbato pabha, that
earth, water, fire, and air do not find a footing. It is in this consciousness that
long and short, fine and coarse, and pleasant and unpleasant, as well as name-
and-form, are kept in check. It is by the cessation of consciousness that all these
are held in check.
Let us now try to sort out the meaning of the difficult words in the first two
lines. First of all, in the expression viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, there is the term
anidassana. The meaning of the word nidassana is fairly well known. It means
'illustration'. Something that 'throws light on' or 'makes clear' is called
nidassana. This is the basic sense.
We find an instance of the use of this word, even in this basic sense, in the
first Kosalasutta among the Tens of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. It is in connection
with the description of abhibhāyatanā, bases of mastery, where there is a
reference to contemplation devices known as kasiṇa. It is said that even the flax
flower can be used initially as a sign for kasiṇa meditation. A flax flower is
described in the following words: Umāpupphaṃ nīlaṃ nīlavaṇṇaṃ
nīlanidassanaṃ nīlanibhāsaṃ, which may be rendered as: "The flax flower,
blue, blue-coloured, manifesting blue, shining blue". Nīlanidassanaṃ suggests
that the flax flower is an illustration of blue colour, or that it is a manifestation
of blue. Anidassana could therefore be said to refer to whatever does not
manifest anything.
In fact, we have a very good example in support of this suggested sense in the
Kakacūpamasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. There we find the Buddha putting a
certain question to the monks in order to bring out a simile: "Monks, suppose a
man comes with crimson, turmeric, indigo or carmine and says: 'I shall draw
pictures and make pictures appear on the sky!' What do you think, monks, could
that man draw pictures and make pictures appear there?" Then the monks reply:
Ayañhi, bhante, ākāso arūpī anidassano. Tattha na sukaraṃ rūpaṃ likhituṃ,
rūpapātubhāvaṃ kātuṃ. "This sky, Lord, is immaterial and non-illustrative. It is
not easy to draw a picture there or make manifest pictures there."
-------------------------------
Translation Ñāṇamoli (1995: 221):
“Suppose a man came with crimson, turmeric, indigo or carmine and said: ‘I
shall draw pictures and make pictures appear on empty space.’ What do you
think, bhikkhus? Could that man draw pictures and make pictures appear on
empty space?”
“No, venerable sir. Why is that? Because empty space is formless and non-
manifestative; it is not easy to draw pictures there or make pictures appear
there.”
MĀ 193 parallel T I 745c11
“It is just as if a painter or a painter’s apprentice were to come along carrying
various colors and say: “I will trace forms and images in empty space and
adorn them with these colored paints.” What do you think? Will that painter
or that painter’s apprentice be able, by this means, to trace forms and images
in empty space and adorn them with colored paints?”
The monks replied: “No, Blessed One. Why is that? Blessed One, empty space is
non-material, invisible, and without resistance. Therefore that painter or that
painter’s apprentice is not able, by this means, to trace forms and images in
empty space and adorn them with colored paints.”
As pointed out by Harvey (1995: 200), anidassana features as one of the
epithets of Nibbāna in the Asaṅkhata-saṃyutta, SN 43.22 at SN IV 370. The
counterpart SĀ 890 at T II 224b7, however, does not refer to anidassana.
「如無為，如是難見、不動、不屈、不死、無漏、覆蔭、洲渚、濟度、依
止、擁護、不流轉、離熾焰、離燒燃、流通、清涼、微妙、安隱、無病、
無所有、涅槃」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 224, b7-10; adopting two variants)
-------------------------------
Here we have the words in support of the above suggested meaning. The sky
is said to be arūpī anidassano, immaterial and non-illustrative. That is why one
cannot draw pictures there or make pictures appear there. There is nothing
material in the sky to make manifest pictures. That is, the sense in which it is
called anidassano in this context.
Let us now see how meaningful that word is, when used with reference to
consciousness as viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ. Why the sky is said to be non-
manifestative we could easily understand by the simile. But how can
consciousness become non-manifestative? First and foremost we can remind
ourselves of the fact that our consciousness has in it the ability to reflect. That
ability is called paccavekkhana, 'looking back'. Sometimes the Buddha has
given the simile of the mirror with reference to this ability, as for instance in the
AmbalatthikāRāhulovādasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya. In the Ānandasutta of
the Khandhasaṃyutta, also, he has used the simile of the mirror. In the former
sutta preached to Venerable Rāhula the Buddha uses the simile of the mirror to
stress the importance of reflection in regard to bodily, verbal, and mental action.
In our last sermon, we gave a simile of a dog crossing a plank over a stream
and looking at its own reflection in the water. That, too, is a kind of reflection.
But from that we can deduce a certain principle with regard to the question of
reflection, namely, that the word stands for a mode of becoming deluded as well
as a mode of getting rid of the delusion. What creates a delusion is the way that
dog is repeatedly looking down from his own point of view on the plank to see a
dog in the water. That is unwise reflection born of non-radical attention, ayoniso
manasikāra. Under the influence of the personality view, sakkāyadiṭṭhi, it goes
on looking at its own image, wagging its tail and growling. But wise reflection
born of radical attention, yoniso manasikāra, is what is recommended in the
AmbalatthikāRāhulovādasutta with its thematic repetitive phrase
paccavekkhitvā, paccavekkhitvā, "reflecting again and again".
Wise reflection inculcates the Dhamma point of view. Reflection based on
right view, sammā diṭṭhi, leads to deliverance. So this is the twin aspect of
reflection. But this we mention by the way. The point we wish to stress is that
consciousness has in it the nature of reflecting something, like a mirror.
Now viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ is a reference to the nature of the released
consciousness of an arahant. It does not reflect anything. To be more precise, it
does not reflect a nāma-rūpa, or name-and-form. An ordinary individual sees a
nāma-rūpa, when he reflects, which he calls 'I' and 'mine'. It is like the reflection
of that dog, which sees its own delusive reflection in the water. A non-arahant,
upon reflection, sees name-and-form, which however he mistakes to be his self.
With the notion of 'I' and 'mine' he falls into delusion with regard to it. But the
arahant's consciousness is an unestablished consciousness.
We have already mentioned in previous sermons about the established
consciousness and the unestablished consciousness. A non-arahant's
consciousness is established on name-and-form. The unestablished
consciousness is that which is free from name-and-form and is unestablished on
name-and-form. The established consciousness, upon reflection, reflects name-
and-form, on which it is established, whereas the unestablished consciousness
does not find a name-and-form as a reality. The arahant has no attachments or
entanglements in regard to name-and-form. In short, it is a sort of penetration of
name-and-form, without getting entangled in it. This is how we have to unravel
the meaning of the expression anidassana viññāṇa.
By way of further clarification of this sense of anidassana, we may remind
ourselves of the fact that manifestation requires something material. That is
obvious even from that simile picked up at random from the Kakacūpamasutta.
As for the consciousness of the arahant, the verse in question makes it clear that
earth, water, fire, and air do not find a footing there.
 It is because of these four great primaries that one gets a perception of form.
They are said to be the cause and condition for the designation of the aggregate
of form: Cattāro kho, bhikkhu, mahābhūtā hetu, cattāro mahābhūtā paccayo
rūpakkhandhassa paññāpanāya. "The four great primaries, monk, are the cause
and condition for the designation of the form group".
Now the arahant has freed his mind from these four elements. As it is said in
the Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta: Paṭhavīdhātuyā cittaṃ virājeti, "he makes his mind
dispassionate with regard to the earth-element". Āpodhātuyā cittaṃ virājeti, "he
makes his mind dispassionate with regard to the water-element". As he has freed
his mind from the four elements through disenchantment, which makes them
fade away, the arahant's reflection does not engender a perception of form. As
the verse in question puts it rather rhetorically, ettha āpo ca paṭhavī, tejo vāyo
na gādhati, "herein water and earth, fire and air find no footing".
Here the word gādhati is particularly significant. When, for instance, we want
to plumb the depth of a deep well, we lower something material as a plumb into
the well. Where it comes to stay, we take as the bottom. In the consciousness of
the arahant, the material elements cannot find such a footing. They cannot
manifest themselves in that unplumbed depth of the arahant's consciousness.
Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ,
anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ,
ettha āpo ca paṭhavī,
tejo vāyo na gādhati.
"Consciousness, which is non-manifestative,
Endless and lustrous on all sides,
It is here that water, earth,
Fire, and air no footing find."
It is precisely because the material elements cannot make themselves manifest
in it, that this consciousness is called 'non-manifestative'. In the same connection
we may add that such distinctions as long and short, fine and coarse, and
pleasant and unpleasant are not registered in that consciousness, because they
pertain to things material. When the consciousness is freed from the four
elements, it is also free from the relative distinctions, which are but the
standards of measurements proper to those elements.
Let us now consider the implications of the term anantaṃ - 'endless', 'infinite'.
We have already said something about the plumbing of the depth of waters.
Since the material elements have faded away in that consciousness, they are
unable to plumb its depth. They no longer serve as an 'index' to that
consciousness. Therefore, that consciousness is endless or infinite.
It is endless also in another sense. With regard to such distinctions as 'long'
and 'short' we used the word 'relative'. These are relative concepts. We even
refer to them as conjoined pairs of terms. In worldly usage they are found
conjoined as 'long and short', 'fine and coarse', 'pleasant and unpleasant'. There is
a dichotomy about these concepts, there is a bifurcation. It is as if they are put
within a rigid framework.
 When, for instance, we go searching for a piece of wood for some purpose or
other, we may say: "This piece of wood is too long". Why do we say so?
Because we are in need of a shorter one. Instead of saying that it is not
'sufficiently' short, we say it is too long. When we say it is too short, what we
mean is that it is not sufficiently long. So then, long and short are relevant
within one framework. As a matter of fact, all measurements are relative to
some scale or other. They are meaningful within some framework of a scale.
In this sense, too, the worldling's way of thinking has a tendency to go to
extremes. It goes to one extreme or the other. When it was said that the world,
for the most part, rests on a dichotomy, such as that between the two views 'Is'
and 'Is not', this idea of a framework is already implicit. The worldling's ways of
thought 'end-up' in one extreme or the other within this framework. The arahant
transcends it, his consciousness is, therefore, endless, ananta.
There is a verse in the Pāṭaligāmiyavagga of the Udāna, which clearly brings
out this fact. Most of the discourses in that section of the Udāna deal with
Nibbāna - Nibbānapaṭisaṃyutta - and the following verse, too, is found in such
a discourse.
Duddasaṃ anantaṃ nāma,
na hi saccaṃ sudassanaṃ,
paṭividdhā taṇhā jānato,
passato natthi kiñcanaṃ.
-------------------------------
Translation Ireland (1990: 109):
“The unaffected is hard to see,
The truth is not easy to see:
Craving is penetrated by one who knows,
There is no obstruction for one who sees.”
The Burmese, Ceylonese, and Siamese editions read anataṃ, the PTS edition
reads anattaṃ. Thus the reading anantaṃ is only attested as a variant.

Chinese Parallel :
「難見諦不動， 善觀而分別，
當察愛盡原， 是謂名苦際」(CBETA, T04, no. 212, p. 733, c27-28)
“Difficult to see is the truth, which is immovable,
Well contemplating and discerning it,
One will observe the destruction of craving at its source.
This is reckoned to be the end of dukkha.”
The Chinese parallel has no counterpart to ananta et al., the corresponding
term seems to be rather aneñja or perhaps a misunderstanding of anata (PED
345 s.v. nata “bent”).
In sum, the main editions of the present passage and its Chinese parallel do not
offer support for considering ananta, “endless”, to be an epithet of Nibbāna.
-------------------------------
This verse, like many other deep ones, seems to have puzzled the
commentators. Let alone the meaning, even the variant readings had posed them
a problem, so much so that they end up giving the reader a choice between
alternate interpretations. But let us try to get at the general trend of its meaning.
Duddasaṃ anantaṃ nāma, "hard to see is the endless" - whatever that
'endless' be. Na hi saccaṃ sudassanaṃ, "the truth is not easily seen", which in
effect is an emphatic assertion of the same idea. One could easily guess that this
'endless' is the truth and that it refers to Nibbāna. Paṭividdhā taṇhā means that
"craving has been penetrated through". This penetration is through knowledge
and wisdom, the outcome of which is stated in the last line. Janato passato
natthi kiñcanaṃ, "to one who know and sees there is NOTHING". The idea is
that when craving is penetrated through with knowledge and wisdom, one
realizes the voidness of the world. Obviously, the reference here is to Nibbāna.
The entire verse may now be rendered as follows:
"Hard to see is the Endless,
Not easy 'tis to see the truth,
Pierced through is craving,
And naught for him who knows and sees."
The commentator, however, is at a loss to determine whether the correct
reading is anataṃ or anantaṃ and leaves the question open. He gives one
interpretation in favour of the reading anataṃ. To show its justifiability he says
that natā is a synonym for taṇhā, or craving, and that anataṃ is a term for
Nibbāna, in the sense that there is no craving in it. It must be pointed out that it
is nati and not natā that is used as a synonym for taṇhā.
Anyway, after adducing reasons for the acceptability of the reading anataṃ,
he goes on to say that there is a variant reading, anantaṃ, and gives an
interpretation in support of it too. In fact, he interprets the word anantaṃ in
more than one sense. Firstly, because Nibbāna is permanent, it has no end. And
secondly it is endless because it is immeasurable, or appamāṇa.
In our interpretation of the word anantaṃ we have not taken it in the sense of
permanence or everlastingness. The word appamāṇa, or immeasurable, can have
various nuances. But the one we have stressed is the transcendence of relative
concepts, limited by their dichotomous nature. We have also alluded to the
unplumbed depth of the arahant's consciousness, in which the four elements do
not find a footing.
In the Buddhavagga of the Dhammapada we come across another verse
which highlights the extraordinary significance of the word anantaṃ.
Yassa jālinī visattikā,
taṇhā natthi kuhiñci netave,
taṃ Buddham anantagocaraṃ,
apadaṃ kena padena nessatha?
-------------------------------
Translation Norman (2004: 28):
“Of whom there is no attachment with a net [or] craving to lead him
anywhere, him awakened, with endless realm, leaving no track, by what track
will you lead him?”
-------------------------------
Before attempting a translation of this verse, some of the words in it have to
be commented upon. Yassa jālinī visattikā. Jālinī is a synonym for craving. It
means one who has a net or one who goes netting. Visattikā refers to the
agglutinative character of craving. It keeps worldlings glued to objects of sense.
The verse may be rendered as follows:
"He who has no craving, with nets in and agglutinates to lead him somewhere
- by what track could that Awakened One of infinite range be led - trackless as
he is?"
Because the Buddha is of infinite range, he is trackless. His path cannot be
traced. Craving wields the net of name-and-form with its glue when it goes
ranging. But since the Awakened One has the 'endless' as his range, there is no
track to trace him by.
The term anantagocaraṃ means one whose range has no end or limit. If, for
instance, one chases a deer, to catch it, one might succeed at least at the end of
the pasture. But the Buddha's range is endless and his 'ranging' leaves no track.
The commentators seem to interpret this term as a reference to the Buddha's
omniscience - to his ability to attend to an infinite number of objects. But this is
not the sense in which we interpret the term here. The very fact that there is 'no
object' makes the Buddha's range endless and untraceable. Had there been an
object, craving could have netted him in. In support of this interpretation, we
may allude to the following couple of verses in the Arahantavagga of the
Dhammapada.
Yesaṃ sannicayo natthi,
ye pariññāta bhojanā,
suññato animitto ca,
vimokkho yesa gocaro,
ākāse va sakuntānaṃ,
gati tesaṃ durannayā.
Yassāsavā parikkhīṇā,
āhāre ca anissito,
suññato animitto ca,
vimokkho yassa gocaro,
ākāse va sakuntānaṃ,
padaṃ tassa durannayaṃ.
-------------------------------
Translation Norman (2004: 14):
“Of whom there is no accumulation, who have knowledge of [and have
renounced] food, whose realm is empty and unconditioned release, their going
is hard to follow, like that of birds in the sky.
Whose āsavas are destroyed, and who is not dependent upon food, whose
realm is empty and unconditioned release, his track is hard to follow, like that
of birds in the sky.”
-------------------------------
Both verses express more or less the same idea. Let us examine the meaning
of the first verse. The first two lines are: Yesaṃ sannicayo natthi, ye pariññāta
bhojanā. "Those who have no accumulation and who have comprehended their
food". The words used here are charged with deep meanings. Verses in the
Dhammapada are very often rich in imagery. The Buddha has on many
occasions presented the Dhamma through deep similes and metaphors. If the
metaphorical sense of a term is ignored, one can easily miss the point.
For instance, the word sannicaya, in this context, which we have rendered as
'accumulation', is suggestive of the heaping up of the five aggregates. The word
upacaya is sometimes used with reference to this process of heaping up that
goes on in the minds of the worldlings. Now this heaping up, as well as the
accumulation of kamma, is not there in the case of an arahant. Also, they have
comprehended their food. The comprehension of food does not mean simply the
usual reflection on food in terms of elements. Nor does it imply just one kind of
food, but all the four nutriments mentioned in the Dhamma, namely
kabaḷiṅkārāhāra, material food, phassa, contact, manosañcetanā, volition, and
viññāṇa, consciousness.
The next two lines tell us what the true range or pasture of the arahants is. It
is an echo of the idea of comprehension of food as well as the absence of
accumulation. Suññato animitto ca, vimokkho yesa gocaro, "whose range is the
deliverance of the void and the signless". When the arahants are in their
attainment to the fruit of arahant-hood, their minds turn towards the void and
the signless. When they are on this feeding-ground, neither Māra nor craving
can catch them with their nets. They are trackless - hence the last two lines
ākāse va sakuntānaṃ, gati tesa durannayā, "their track is hard to trace, like that
of birds in the sky".
The word gati in this last line is interpreted by the commentators as a
reference to the 'whereabouts' of the arahants after their parinibbāna. It has
dubious associations of some place as a destination. But in this context, gati
does not lend itself to such an interpretation. It only refers to their mental
compass, which is untraceable, because of their deliverance trough the void and
the signless.
The next verse also bring out this idea. Yassāsavā parikkhīṇā, āhāre ca
anissito, "whose influxes are extinct and who is unattached in regard to
nutriment". Suññato animitto ca, vimokkho yassa gocaro, "whose range is the
void and the signless". Ākāse va sakuntānaṃ, padaṃ tassa durannayaṃ, "his
path is hard to trace, like that of birds in the sky". This reminds us of the last line
of the verse quoted earlier, apadaṃ kena padena nessatha, "by what track could
one lead him, who is trackless"? These two verses, then, throw more light on the
meaning of the expression anantagocara - of infinite range - used as an epithet
for the Awakened One.
 Let us now get at the meaning of the term sabbato pabham, in the context
viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ. In our discussion of the
significance of the drama and the cinema we mentioned that it is the darkness in
the background which keeps the audience entranced in a way that they identify
themselves with the characters and react accordingly. The darkness in the
background throws a spell of delusion. That is what makes for 'enjoyment'.
Of course, there is some sort of light in the cinema hall. But that is very
limited. Some times it is only a beam of light, directed on the screen. In a
previous sermon we happened to mention that even in the case of a matinee
show, dark curtains and closed doors and windows ensure the necessary dark
background. Here, in this simile, we have a clue to the meaning sabbato
pabhaṃ, luminous or lustrous on all sides. Suppose a matinee show is going on
and one is enjoying it, entranced and deluded by it. Suddenly doors and
windows are flung open and the dark curtains are removed. Then immediately
one slips out of the cinema world. The film may go on, but because of the light
coming from all sides, the limited illumination on the screen fades away, before
the total illumination. The film thereby loses its enjoyable quality.
As far as consciousness, or viññāṇa, is concerned, it is not something
completely different from wisdom, paññā, as it is defined in the
Mahāvedallasutta. However, there is also a difference between them, paññā
bhāvetabbā, viññāṇaṃ pariññeyyaṃ, "wisdom is to be developed, consciousness
is to be comprehended". Here it is said that one has to comprehend the nature of
consciousness.
-------------------------------
Chinese and Tibetan parallels do not have such a statement; Anālayo 2011: 270.
-------------------------------
Then one may ask: 'We are understanding everything with consciousness, so
how can one understand consciousness?' But the Buddha has shown us the way
of doing it. Wisdom, when it is developed, enables one to comprehend
consciousness. In short, consciousness is as narrow as that beam of light falling
on the cinema screen. That is to say, the specifically prepared consciousness, or
the consciousness crammed up in name-and-form, as in the case of the non-
arahant. It is as narrow as the perspective of the audience glued to the screen.
The consciousness of the ordinary worldling is likewise limited and committed.
Now what happens when it is fully illuminated on all sides with wisdom? It
becomes sabbato pabhaṃ, lustrous an all sides. In that lustre, which comes from
all sides, the framework of ignorance fades away. It is that released
consciousness, free from the dark framework of ignorance, that is called the
consciousness which is lustrous on all sides, in that cryptic verse in question.
This lustre, associated with wisdom, has a special significance according to the
discourses. In the Catukkanipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya we come across the
following sutta:
Catasso imā, bhikkhave, pabhā. Katamā catasso? Candappabhā,
suriyappabhā, aggippabhā, paññāpabhā. Imā kho, bhikkhave, catasso pabhā.
Etad aggaṃ, bhikkhave, imāsaṃ catunnaṃ pabhānaṃ yadidaṃ paññāpabhā.
"Monks, there are these four lustres. Which four? The lustre of the moon, the
lustre of the sun, the lustre of fire, and the lustre of wisdom. These, monks, are
the four lustres. This, monks, is the highest among these four lustres, namely the
lustre of wisdom."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2012: 519):
“Bhikkhus, there are these four splendors. What four? The splendor of the
moon, the splendor of the sun, the splendor of fire, and the splendor of
wisdom. These are the four splendors. Of these four splendors, the splendor of
wisdom is foremost.”
No parallel is known.
-------------------------------
Another important discourse, quoted quite often, though not always correctly
interpreted, is the following:
Pabhassaram idaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi
upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. Taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti. Tasmā
assutavato puthujjanassa cittabhāvanā natthī'ti vadāmi.
Pabhassaram idaṃ, bhikkhave, cittaṃ. Tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi
vippamuttaṃ. Taṃ sutavā ariyasāvako yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Tasmā sutavato
ariyasāvakassa cittabhāvanā atthī'ti vadāmi.
"This mind, monks, is luminous, but it is defiled by extraneous defilements.
That, the uninstructed ordinary man does not understand as it is. Therefore, there
is no mind development for the ordinary man, I declare.
This mind, monks, is luminous, but it is released from extraneous defilements.
That, the instructed noble disciple understands as it is. Therefore, there is mind
development for the instructed noble disciple, I declare."
-------------------------------
Translation Bodhi (2012: 97):
“Luminous, bhikkhus, is this mind, but it is defiled by adventitious
defilements. The uninstructed worldling does not understand this as it really
is; therefore I say that for the uninstructed worldling there is no development
of the mind.”
“Luminous, bhikkhus, is this mind, but it is freed from adventitious
defilements. The instructed noble disciple understand this as it really is;
therefore I say that for the instructed noble disciple there is development of
the mind.”
Karunaratne (1999: 219), explains: “what is meant by lustrous and pure mind
(pabhassara) is not a state of mind which is absolutely pure, nor the pure mind
which is synonymous with emancipation … pure only in the sense, and to the
extent, that it is not disturbed or influenced by external stimuli.”
Shih Ru-nien (2009: 168) explains that “unlike the Mahāyāna theory of
tathāgatagarbha, which claims that the innately pure mind possesses all the
virtues of the Buddha and that the revelation of this mind is the attainment of
the Buddhahood, statements in the Pali texts only emphasize the knowledge of
the innate purity of the mind as a prerequisite step in the cultivation of the
mind and the restoration of the purity of the mind is not the end of religious
practices. As a matter of fact, after the removal of the defilements, the mind is
not only pure, tranquil, and luminous but also soft, pliant, and adaptable. It
then becomes suitable for the destruction of all the āsavas or the cultivation of
the seven limbs of wisdom, and the like. This means that the tranquil,
luminous, and pliable mind is just the basis for further religious practice.”
-------------------------------
It is sufficiently clear, then, that the allusion is to the luminous mind, the
consciousness of the arahant, which is non-manifestative, infinite, and all
lustrous. To revert to the analogy of the cinema which, at least in a limited
sense, helps us to form an idea about it, we have spoken about the stilling of all
preparations. Now in the case of the film, too, there is a stilling of preparations.
That is to say, the preparations which go to make it a 'movie' film are 'stilled'.
The multicoloured dresses of actors and actresses become colourless before that
illumination, even in the case of a technicolour film. The scenes on the screen
get blurred before the light that suddenly envelops them.
And what is the outcome of it? The preparations going on in the minds of the
audience, whether induced by the film producers or aroused from within, are
calmed down at least temporarily. This symbolizes, in a limited sense, the
significance of the phrase sabbasaṅkhārasamatha, the stilling of all
preparations.
Then what about the relinquishment of all assets, sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga? In
the context of the film show, it is the bundle of experiences coming out of one's
'vested-interests' in the marvellous cinema world. These assets are relinquished
at least for the moment. Destruction of craving, taṇhakkhayo, is momentarily
experienced with regard to the blurred scenes on the screen.
As to the term virāga, we have already shown that it can be understood in two
senses, that is, dispassion as well as the fading away which brings about the
dispassion. Now in this case, too, the fading away occurred, not by any other
means, but by the very fact that the limited narrow beam of consciousness got
superseded by the unlimited light of wisdom.
Nirodha means cessation, and the film has now ceased to be a film, though
the machines are still active. We have already mentioned that in the last analysis
a film is produced by the audience. So its cessation, too, is a matter for the
audience. This, then, is the cessation of the film.
Now comes Nibbāna, extinction or extinguishment. Whatever heated
emotions and delirious excitements that arose out of the film show cooled down,
at least momentarily, when the illumination takes over. This way we can form
some idea, somewhat inferentially, about the meaning and significance of the
term sabbato pabhaṃ, with the help of this illustration based on the film show.
 So now we have tackled most of the difficulties to the interpretation of this
verse. In fact, it is the few words occurring in the first two lines that has posed
an insoluble problem to scholars both eastern and western. We have not yet
given the commentarial interpretation, and that, not out of disrespect for the
venerable commentators. It is because their interpretation is rather hazy and
inconclusive. However, we shall be presenting that interpretation at the end of
this discussion, so as to give the reader an opportunity to compare it with ours.
But for the present, let us proceed to say something about the last two lines as
well. Viññāṇassa nirodhena, etth'etaṃ uparujjhati. As we saw above, for all
practical purposes, name-and-form seem to cease, even like the fading away of
the scenes on the cinema screen. Then what is meant by this phrase viññāṇassa
nirodhena, with the cessation of consciousness? The reference here is to that
abhisaṅkhata viññāṇa, or the specifically prepared consciousness. It is the
cessation of that concocted type of consciousness which was formerly there, like
the one directed on the cinema screen by the audience. With the cessation of that
specifically prepared consciousness, all constituents of name-and-form are said
to be held in check, uparujjhati.
Here, too, we have a little problem. Generally, nirujjhati and uparujjhati are
regarded as synonymous. The way these two verbs are used in some suttas
would even suggest that they mean the same thing. As a matter of fact, even the
CūḷaNiddesa, which is a very old commentary, paraphrases uparujjhati by
nirujjhati: uparujjhatī'ti nirujjhati.
Nevertheless, in the context of this particular verse, there seems to be
something deep involved in the distinction between these two verbs. Even at a
glance, the two lines in question are suggestive of some distinction between
them.
-------------------------------
Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, 8 syllables
anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ, 8 syllables
ettha āpo ca paṭhavī, 8 syllables
tejo vāyo na gādhati, 8 syllables
ettha dīghañca rassañca, 8 syllables
aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ, 8 syllables
ettha nāmañca rūpañca, 8 syllables
asesaṃ uparujjhati, 8 syllables
viññāṇassa nirodhena, 8 syllables
etth'etaṃ uparujjhati 8 syllables
uparujjhati has 5 syllables, nirujjhati has 4 syllables
Bhikhu Ānandajoti (personal communication) comments: “The commentary
doesn't seem to have any doubt: uparujjhatī ti nirujjhati, kiṃ āgamma asesam-
etaṃ nappavattatī ti. Of course nirujjhati is passive, and uparujjhati is active so
there is a slight change of tone. But it does seem to me it is probably just a
matter of meeting the śloka requirements.”
-------------------------------
Viññāṇassa nirodhena, etth'etaṃ uparujjhati, the nirodha of consciousness is
said to result in the uparodha of whatever constitutes name-and-form. This is
intriguing enough.
But that is not all. By way of preparing the background for the discussion, we
have already made a brief allusion to the circumstances in which the Buddha
uttered this verse. What provided the context for its utterance was a riddle that
occurred to a certain monk in a moment of fancy. The riddle was: 'Where do
these four great primaries cease altogether?' There the verb used is nirujjhanti.
So in order to find where they cease, he whimsically went from heaven to
heaven and from Brahma-world to Brahma-world. As we mentioned earlier, too,
it was when the Mahā Brahma directed that monk to the Buddha, saying: 'Why
'on earth' did you come all this way when the Buddha is there to ask?', that the
Buddha reworded the question. He pointed out that the question was incorrectly
worded and revised it as follows, before venturing to answer it:
Kattha āpo ca paṭhavī,
tejo vāyo na gādhati,
kattha dīghañca rassañca,
aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,
kattha nāmañca rūpañca,
asesaṃ uparujjhati?
The word used by the Buddha in this revised version is uparujjhati and not
nirujjhati. Yet another innovation is the use of the term na gādhati. Where do
water, earth, fire, and air find no footing? Or where do they not get established?
In short, here is a word suggestive of plumbing the depth of a reservoir. We may
hark back to the simile given earlier, concerning the plumbing of the
consciousness with the perception of form. Where do the four elements not find
a footing? Also, where are such relative distinctions as long and short, subtle
and gross, pleasant and unpleasant, as well as name-and-form, completely held
in check?
In this restatement of the riddle, the Buddha has purposely avoided the use of
the verb nirujjhati. Instead, he had recourse to such terms as na gādhati, 'does
not find a footing', 'does not plumb', and uparujjhati, 'is held in check', or 'is cut
off'. This is evidence enough to infer that there is a subtle distinction between
the nuances associated with the two verbs nirujjhati and uparujjhati.
What is the secret behind this peculiar usage? The problem that occurred to
this monk is actually of the type that the materialists of today conceive of. It is,
in itself, a fallacy. To say that the four elements cease somewhere in the world,
or in the universe, is a contradiction in terms. Why? Because the very question:
'Where do they cease?', presupposes an answer in terms of those elements, by
way of defining that place. This is the kind of uncouth question an ordinary
materially inclined person would ask.
That is why the Buddha reformulated the question, saying: 'Monk, that is not
the way to put the question. You should not ask 'where' the four great primaries
cease, but rather where they, as well as the concepts of long and short, subtle
and gross, pleasant and unpleasant, and name-and-form, are held in check.' The
question proper is not where the four great primaries cease, but where they do
not get established and where all their accompaniments are held in check.
Here, then, we see the Buddha relating the concept of matter, which the world
takes for granted, to the perception of form arising in the mind. The four great
primaries haunt the minds of the worldlings like ghosts, so they have to be
exorcised from their minds. It is not a question of expelling them from this
world, or from any heavenly realm, or the entire world-system. That exorcism
should take place in this very consciousness, so as to put an end to this haunting.
Before the light of wisdom those ghosts, namely the four great primaries,
become ineffective. It is in the darkness of ignorance that these ghosts haunt the
worldlings with the perception of form. They keep the minds of the worldlings
bound, glued, committed and limited. What happens now is that the specifically
prepared consciousness, which was bound, glued, committed and limited,
becomes fully released, due to the light of wisdom, to become non-
manifestative, endless, and lustrous on all sides. So, to sum up, we may render
the verse in question as follows:
"Consciousness, which is non-manifestative,
Endless, lustrous on all sides,
Here it is that earth and water,
Fire and air no footing find,
Here it is that long and short,
Fine and coarse, pleasant, unpleasant,
And name-and-form,
Are cut off without exception,
When consciousness has surceased,
These are held in check herein."
Though we ventured to translate the verse, we have not yet given the
commentarial interpretation of it. Since this might seem a shortcoming, we shall
now present what the commentator has to say on this verse.
Venerable Buddhaghosa, before coming to this verse in his commentary to
the Kevaḍḍhasutta, gives an explanation as to why the Buddha reformulated the
original question of that monk. According to him, the question: 'Where do the
four great primaries cease?', implied both the organic and the inorganic aspects
of matter, and in revising it, the Buddha limited its scope to the organic. In other
words, Venerable Buddhaghosa presumes that the revised version has to be
interpreted with reference to this human body. Hence he explains such words as
'long' and 'short', occurring in the verse, in a limited sense as referring to the
body's stature. How facile this interpretation turns out to be, one can easily
discern as we go on.
Venerable Buddhaghosa keeps on reminding the reader that the questions are
relevant only to the organic realm, upādinnaṃ yeva sandhāya pucchati. So he
interprets the terms dīghañca rassañca, long and short, as relative distinctions of
a person's height, that is tallness and shortness. Similarly, the words aṇuṃ
thūlaṃ, subtle and gross, are said to mean the small and big in the size of the
body. Likewise subha and asubhaṃ are taken to refer to the comely and the ugly
in terms of body's appearance.
The explanation given to the phrase nāmañca rūpañca is the most astounding
of all. Nāma is said to be the name of the person and rūpa is his form or shape.
All this goes to show that the commentator has gone off at a tangent, even in the
interpretation of this verse, which is more or less the prologue to such an
intricate verse as the one in question. He has blundered at the very outset in
limiting the scope of those relative terms to the organic, thereby obscuring the
meaning of that deep verse.
The significance of these relative terms, from the linguistic point of view, has
been overlooked. Words like dīghaṃ/rassaṃ and aṇuṃ/thūlaṃ do not refer to
the stature and size of some person. What they convey is the dichotomous nature
of concepts in the world. All those deeper implications are obscured by the
reference to a person's outward appearance. The confusion becomes worse
confounded, when nāmañca rūpañca is interpreted as the name and the shape of
a person. So the stage is already set for a shallow interpretation, even before
presenting the verse beginning with viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ.
It is on such an unsound premise that the commentator bases his interpretation
of the verse in question. We shall try to do justice to that exposition, too. It
might necessitate a fair amount of quotations, though it is difficult to be
comprehensive in this respect.
The commentator begins his exposition with the word viññāṇaṃ itself. He
comes out with a peculiar etymology: Viññāṇan'ti tattha viññātabbanti
viññāṇaṃ nibbānassa nāmaṃ, which means that the word viññāṇa, or
consciousness, is in this context a synonym for Nibbāna, in the sense that it is 'to
be known', viññātabbaṃ. This forced etymology is far from convincing, since
such a usage is not attested elsewhere. Moreover, we come across a long list of
epithets for Nibbāna, as many as thirty-three, in the Asaṅkhatasaṃyutta of the
Saṃyutta Nikāya, but viññāṇa is not counted as one. In fact, nowhere in the
discourses is viññāṇa used as a synonym for Nibbāna.
Next, he takes up the word anidassana, and makes the following comment:
Tad etaṃ nidassanābhāvato anidassanaṃ, that Nibbāna is called anidassana
because no illustration for it could be given. The idea is that it has nothing to
compare with. Then comes the explanation of the word anantaṃ. According to
the commentator Nibbāna is called ananta, endless, because it has neither the
arising-end, uppādanto, nor the falling-end, vayanto, nor the otherwiseness of
the persisting-end, ṭhitassa aññathatta. Strangely enough, even the last
mentioned middle-state is counted as an 'end' in the commentators concept of
three ends. So this is the substance of his commentary to the first three words
viññāṇaṃ, anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ.
The commentarial interpretation of the term sabbato pabhaṃ is even more
confusing. The word pabhā is explained as a synonym for papa, meaning 'ford'.
The bha element in the word, he explains, is a result of consonantal interchange
with the original pa in papa. Pakārassa pana bhakāro kato. The idea is that the
original form of this particular term for Nibbāna is sabbato papaṃ. The
meaning attributed to it is 'with fords on all sides'. Nibbāna is supposed to be
metaphorically conceived as the ocean, to get down into which there are fords
on all sides, namely the thirty-eight topics of meditation. This interpretation
seems rather farfetched. It is as if the commentator has resorted to this simile of
a ford, because he is already 'in deep waters'! The word pabhā, as it is, clearly
means light, or radiance, and its association with wisdom is also well attested in
the canon.
Though in his commentary to the Dīgha Nikāya Venerable Buddhaghosa
advances the above interpretation, in his commentary to the Majjhima Nikāya he
seems to have had second thoughts on the problem. In the
Brahmanimantanikasutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, also, the first two lines of the
verse, viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ, occur . But here the
commentator follows a different line of interpretation. Whereas in his
commentary to the Kevaḍḍhasutta he explains anidassanaṃ as an epithet of
Nibbāna, in the sense of having nothing to compare with, here he takes it in the
sense of not being visible to the eye. Cakkhuviññāṇassa āpāthaṃ
anupagamanato anidassanaṃ nāma, "it is called anidassana because it does not
come within the range of eye-consciousness".
In explaining the term sabbato pabhaṃ, he suggests several alternative
interpretations. In the first interpretation, he takes pabhā to mean light, or lustre.
Sabbato pabhan'ti sabbato pabhāsampannaṃ. Nibbānato hi añño dhammo
sappabhataro vā jotivantataro vā parisuddhataro vā paṇḍarataro vā natthi.
"Sabbato pabhaṃ means more lustrous than anything else. For there is nothing
more lustrous or luminous or purer or whiter than Nibbāna". In this
interpretation Nibbāna is even regarded as something white in colour!
The etymology of the term sabbato pabhaṃ has been given a twist, for the
word sabbato is taken in a comparative sense, 'more lustrous than anything'. As
we have pointed out, the term actually means 'lustrous on all sides'. Then a
second interpretation is given, bringing in the word pabhū, 'lord' or 'chief'.
Sabbato vā pabhū, that is to say more prominent than anything else. In support
of it he says: Asukadisāya nāma nibbānaṃ natthī'ti na vattabbaṃ, "it should not
be said that in such and such a direction Nibbāna is not to be found". He says
that it is called pabhū, or lord, because it is to be found in all directions. Only as
the third interpretation he cites his simile of the ford already given in his
commentary to the Kevaḍḍhasutta.
What is the reason for giving so many figurative interpretations as alternatives
to such a significant verse? Surely the Buddha would not have intended the
verse to convey so many conflicting meanings, when he preached it.
No doubt the commentators have made a great effort to preserve the
Dhamma, but due to some unfortunate historical circumstances, most of the
deep discourses dealing with the subject of Nibbāna have been handed down
without even a clue to the correct version among variant readings. This has left
the commentators nonplussed, so much so that they had to give us several vague
and alternative interpretations to choose from. It is up to us to decide, whether
we should accept this position as it is, or try to improve on it by exploring any
other possible means of explanation.
We had occasion to mention in our very first sermon that the Buddha himself
has prophesied that those discourse which deal with voidness would, in time to
come, go into disuse, with their deeper meanings obscured. The interpretations
just quoted go to show that already the prediction has come true to a great
extent.
The phrase we quoted from the Brahmanimantanikasutta with its reference to
anidassana viññāṇa occurs in a context which has a significance of its own. The
relevant paragraph, therefore, deserves some attention. It runs as follows:
Viññānaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ, taṃ paṭhaviyā
paṭhavittena ananubhūtaṃ, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtaṃ, tejassa tejattena
ananubhūtaṃ, vāyassa vāyattena ananubhūtaṃ, bhūtānaṃ bhūtattena
ananubhūtaṃ, devānaṃ devattena ananubhūtaṃ, pajāpatissa pajāpatittena
ananubhūtaṃ, brahmānaṃ brahmattena ananubhūtaṃ, ābhassarānaṃ
ābhassarattena ananubhūtaṃ, subhakiṇhānaṃ subhakiṇhattena ananubhūtaṃ,
vehapphalānaṃ vehapphalatte ananubhūtaṃ, abhibhussa abhibhuttena
ananubhūtaṃ, sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ.
"Consciousness which makes nothing manifest, infinite and all lustrous, it
does not partake of the earthiness of earth, the wateriness of water, the fieriness
of fire, the airiness of air, the creature-hood of creatures, the deva-hood of
devas, the Pajāpati-hood of Pajāpati, the Brahma-hood of Brahma, the radiance
of the Radiant Ones, the Subhakiṇha-hood of the Subhakiṇha Brahmas, the
Vehapphala-hood of the Vehapphala Brahmas, the overlord-ship of the
overlord, and the all-ness of the all."
-------------------------------
Translation Ñāṇamoli (1995: 428):
“Consciousness non-manifesting, boundless, luminous all-round: that is not
partaken of by the earthness of earth, that is not partaken of by the waterness
of water … that is not partaken of by the allness of all.”
Ñāṇamoli 1972: 353 note 7 comments on MN 49: “we could take sabbato
pabhaṃ to be made up of sabbato and a contracted form of the present
participle of pahoti (=pabhavati), i.e. pahaṃ (= pabhaṃ). This ties up with the
preceding sabbato abhiññāya … sabbaṃ nāpahosiṃ; however, the sense then
requires a suppressed negative, i.e. sabbatopahaṃ = sabbato apahaṃ (‘claiming
not being apart from all’). The letters h and bh are easily mistaken for each
other in Sinhalese.”
In the Ceylonese, PTS, and Siamese editions the part that precedes the
reference to viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ is spoken by
Brahmā and does not end with the quotative iti, nor does the quotative iti
occur at the end of the present statement. Strictly speaking it would have to be
attributed to Brahmā. Horner (1967: 392) in fact translates the passage as
something spoken by Brahmā.
The Burmese edition precedes the same reference with iti (mā heva te
rittakam eva ahosi, tucchakam eva ahosī ti. viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ …), but has
no iti at its end to provide a transition to Brahmā’s claim that he will now
disappear (viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ … sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ. Handa carahi
te, mārisa, passa antaradhāyāmī ti).

In the parallel MĀ 78 the corresponding part is spoken by Brahmā, who

proclaims:
「以識無量境界故，無量知、無量見、無量種別，我各各知別，是地知
地，水、火、風、神、天」(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 548, b11-12)
“Because I am conscious of immeasurable worlds, have immeasurable
knowledge, immeasurable vision, immeasurable discrimination, I know each
and every thing distinctly. This earth I know to be earth … water … fire … wind
…”
The passage uses counterparts to ananta repeatedly, but has no equivalent to
anidassana or to pabha. This leaves open two possibilities: a) these were lost in
MĀ 78, b) these were added in MN 49.
MĀ 78 then continues with the following:
At this the Blessed One said: “Brahmā, if there is a renunciant or brahmin who
in regard to earth has a perception of earth as ‘earth is me,’ ‘earth is mine,’ ‘I
belong to earth,’ then, since he reckons earth as self, he does not [truly] know
earth. In the same way for … water … fire … air …”
The implication appears to be that Brahmā’s claim to infinite consciousness
and infinite knowledge still comes with the notion of a self and for this reason
is not true knowledge.
The same sense could also be applied to the Pāli version, on following the
three editions which do not have iti either before or after the passage in
question, thereby conveying the impression it should be attributed to the
same speaker, namely Brahmā. Understood in this sense, Brahmā would claim
to have an anidassana viññāṇa that is so aloof that it does not partake of the
earth (etc.)–ness of various things listed. These had just before been
mentioned by the Buddha as something he had direct knowledge of, yet did
not take any stance in relation to earth (etc.). In reply Brahmā then takes up
this point saying sace kho te mārisa sabbassa sabbattena ananubhūtaṃ, mā
h’eva te rittakam eva ahosi tucchakam eva ahosi, “if you do not partake of the
all-ness of all, may it not be vacuous and empty for you.” This would then
presumably lead over to Brahmā’s claim regarding what indeed does not
partake of the earth-ness … all-ness, namely the anidassana viññāṇa. In order
to prove the superiority of his claim, Brahmā would next try to vanish from
the Buddha’s vision.
On this alternative reading of the passage, a sense clearly supported by the
Chinese, the type of consciousness described would be part of a claim by
Brahmā and therefore could not be related to Nibbāna.
Some degree of influence by or relationship between versions of the
Brahmanimantaṇika-sutta and the Kevaḍḍha-sutta suggests itself from the
Kaivartisūtra , the Sanskrit parallel to the Kevaḍḍha-sutta, which has the
reading pṛthivīpṛthatvena anabhibhūtaṃ, which reminds one of paṭhaviyā
paṭhavittena ananubhūtaṃ in the Brahmanimantaṇika-sutta.
Be that as it may, in a discussion of the passage from the Kevaḍḍha-sutta,
Brahmāli (2009: 44 and 45n45) argues that “due to the qualifiers ananta and
pabhā, anidassana viññāṇa is described in a way that resembles the descrip-
tion of certain states of samādhi.” “It seems that ananta is never used with
mind or consciousness apart from describing states of samādhi. It never seems
to be used to describe the ‘normal’ consciousness of the arahant, for example.”
-------------------------------
This peculiar paragraph, listing thirteen concepts, seems to convey something
deep about the nature of the non-manifestative consciousness. That
consciousness does not partake of the earthiness of earth, the wateriness of
water, the fieriness of fire, and the airiness of air. That is to say, the nature of the
four elements does not inhere in this consciousness, they do not manifest
themselves in it. Similarly, the other concepts, like deva-hood, Brahma-hood,
etc., which the worldlings take seriously as real, have no applicability or validity
here.
The special significance of this assertion lies in the context in which the
Buddha declared it. It is to dispel a wrong view that Baka the Brahma
conceived, in regarding his Brahma status as permanent, ever lasting and
eternal, that the Buddha made this declaration before that Brahma himself in the
Brahma world. The whole point of the discourse, then, is to challenge the wrong
view of the Brahma, by asserting that the non-manifestative consciousness of
the arahant is above the worldly concepts of elements and divinity and the
questionable reality attributed to them. In other words, they do not manifest
themselves in it. They are transcended.
--------------------------------
Salient point:
 anidassana viññāṇa

Suggested starting points for further discussion:

a) anidassana as an epithet of Nibbāna in the Asaṅkhata-saṃyutta is not found
in the Chinese parallel; it could result from a later expansion of the Pāli list.
b) the anidassana viññāṇa in the Brahmanimantaṇika-sutta appears to be a
claim made by Brahmā and in that case could not be a reference to Nibbāna or
a level of realization. This is definitely the case in the Chinese parallel.
c) the qualification of the anidassana viññāṇa in the Kevaḍḍha-sutta as
luminous, pabhaṃ, is less probably an original reading as evident from a
survey of parallels and quotations in later texts. In fact a consciousness that is
“non-manifestative” in the sense of no vision or seeing, dassana, manifesting,
does not fit naturally with the presence of luminosity (at least as long as this is
something visible and not just metaphorical).
Judging from the occurrence of anidassana to illustrate the immaterial nature
of space, an example for a state of consciousness that could be qualified as
anidassana and ananta would even be, for example, the attainment of
boundless space. The same attainment would also fit the notion of sabbato
pahaṃ, which could refer to leaving behind all perceptions of form and of
diversity, in line with what is stipulated in the standard description of the
attainment of boundless space, sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā,
paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā, nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā, ‘ananto
ākāso’ti ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. This would indeed be an
experience where the four elements find no footing, but it would not be one in
which name-and-form cease.
As already suggested by bhikkhu Brahmāli, the verse in the Kevaḍḍha-sutta
could be understood as providing two answers to two questions: a) where do
the four elements not get a footings?, and b) where do name-and-form cease?
A problem here is that the Pāli formulation with is recurrent ettha reads a bit
awkward with this interpretation and it would be more natural to read it as a
single answer. This is the case for the Dīrgha-āgama parallel, the only version
to refer to luminosity. Here it is precisely the cessation of the luminous
consciousness that results in the cessation of the four elements etc.
d) the qualification pabhassara elsewhere in the early discourses seems to
refer to experiences of concentration through absence of the hindrances, not
necessarily involving insight or levels of awakening. The same holds for the
other qualification as ananta, “endless”. Thus a condition of inner luminosity
could be attained through, for example, the light kasiṇa, which would also be
an “endless” experience.
e) Whatever may be the final word on the exact implications of the
introductory line viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ/ pabhaṃ,
the main import of the Kevaḍḍha-sutta seems to be that the monk was
mistaken in searching in the heavens for a location where the four elements
cease. The Buddha clarified that the enquiry should rather be where the four
elements do not find a footing and where dualistic concepts usually applied to
matter (long/short, etc.) cease. This takes place when, with the cessation of
consciousness, name-and-form cease. The journey of the monk through
heavenly realms, presumably representative of meditative cultivation leading
up to deep concentration, did not lead him to the final goal. The Buddha
clarifies that this requires the experience of the cessation aspect of dependent
arising, in particular the cessation of consciousness and of name-and-form.
--------------------------------
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