ROBLEZA vs. Court of Appeals

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3
At a glance
Powered by AI
The dispute was about ownership of two lots that were sold by the petitioners to the Tans but were never paid for and were eventually mortgaged and foreclosed by the respondent corporation. The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale was void due to lack of consideration and that the petitioners were the true owners. The Supreme Court also ruled that the petitioners were entitled to moral damages and compensation for the impairment of their right to dispose of the lots.

The dispute was about two lots that were sold by the petitioners to the Tans but were never paid for. The Tans then mortgaged the lots to the respondent corporation, which eventually foreclosed on the property when the Tans did not pay their loan.

The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale between the petitioners and the Tans was void due to lack of consideration since the purchase price was never paid. It declared the petitioners as the true owners of the lots.

JULITA ROBLEZA and JESUS ROBLEZA vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and INTER-ISLAND FISHING GEAR & EQUIPMENT,
INC.
G.R. No. L-80364 June 28, 1989

DOCTRINE:

MORAL DAMAGES – Awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusement that
will alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendants culpable action. 

FACTS:

It appears that on June 24, 1979, in General Santos City, petitioner Julita A. Robleza, with the consent of her
husband, petitioner Jesus Robleza, sold to spouses Elpedio and Marianne Tan Lot No. 4735 (497 square meters) and
Lot No. 4736 (495 square meter).

For said purpose, petitioners executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Tan spouses supposedly for and in
consideration of the sum of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) which was therein acknowledged to have been
allegedly paid. Incidentaly, says the respondent court, Elpedio Tan is the baptismal godson of petitioners and his
mother was a schoolmate of petitioner Julita Robleza. In fine, the parents of Elpedio Tan and petitioners have known
each other for more than forty years and are close to each other.

In July 1979, Elpedio Tan executed in favor of respondent corporation (Inter-Island) a promissory note in the sum of
P228,362.10. He also executed a deed of mortgage over the two lots to secure payment of said promissory note. The
mortgage was registered in the Register Deeds of General Santos City. 

Petitioners, claiming that they did not receive a single centavo from the Tans and maintaining that the purchase price
of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) appearing on the face of the deed of sale was not the true purchase price,
presented in evidence two checks issued by Elpedio Tan which represented the actual stipulated price. The first
check (RCBC) is in the amount of P50,000 and the second check is for P44,000. Both checks were dishonored
(accounts closed).

Thereafter, petitioners saw Elpedio Tan who assured them that he would pay the amount of the checks upon the
release of his loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines. However, Elpedio Tan failed to make good his
promise. 

When it became clear to petitioners that the Tan spouses did not really intend to pay the agreed price of the subject
lots, they demanded the return of their certificates of title. It was at this juncture that Elpedio Tan admitted to
petitioners that he had transferred the titles to the lots in his name and that he had mortgaged the lots and turned over
his certificates of title to respondent corporation. 

As confirmed by Romeo Uy, the general manager of respondent corporation, petitioner found out that the two lots
were used as collaterals and that the certificates of title were in the possession of the private respondent. Apprised of
the true facts on the status of the said two lots and the non-payment of the purchase price by the Tan spouses, said
general manager of respondent corporation refused to return the certificates of title but signified his willingness to
accept other collaterals provided a partial payment of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) would first be made by
Elpedio Tan.

Petitioner Jesus Robleza and Elpidio Tan attempted to sell the said lots to a certain Jong See but the transaction
failed because Jong See wanted the certificates be given to him first.
For failure of the Tans to pay their outstanding obligation to private respondent, the mortgage on the two lots was
foreclosed and the same were sold in favor of respondent corporation in a public corporation.

Petitioners filed a civil case for the nullification of the aforesaid deed of sale for want of consideration and for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title issued to private respondent. Petitioners claim that they have always
been in possession of the subject property, that neither the Tan spouses nor private respondent ever took possession
thereof, and that respondent corporation acted in bad faith.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners declaring them as absolute owners of the lots and the Deed of Sale
null and void ab initio.

CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Petitioners are the true owners of the subject lots.

2. WON the Petitioners are entitled to damages.

HELD:

CA ruling reversed.

Basic is the rule that if the contract has no cause, it shall not produce any effect whatsoever  16and, therefore, it is
inexistent or void from the beginning. 17 It is the total absence of cause or consideration that renders such contract
absolutely void and inexistent. Where the parties agreed upon a price but the vendee did not in fact pay or failed to
pay in full the purchase price, the contract may still be supported by some other consideration. The fact of payment
or non-payment is not the controlling criterion in declaring the contract null and void for want of consideration.
Non-payment of the contract price results in a breach of contract for non-performance and warrants an action for
rescission or specific performance under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.

There are several indicia which lead Us to the conclusion that respondent corporation acted in bad faith in
foreclosing the subject properties, to the prejudice of herein petitioners.

x x x as early as the time when respondent corporation's lawyer went to see the property, bad faith had set in since,
in that posture, it was incumbent upon respondent corporation to initiate the proper legal remedies for the protection
of its supposed alleged rights. Its failure to do so is strongly indicative of bad faith for, if it really believed that it had
every right to the possession of the land as a mortgagee, it would not have treated the matter so lightly and with
indifference. Its unexplained silence may be deemed a recognition and an admission on its part that petitioners are
the true owners of the subject lots. The categorical refusal of petitioners to surrender possession of the land and their
unequivocal declaration that they are the true owners thereof, made in the presence and within the observation of
private respondent's agents who did or said nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action
or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against respondent corporation 30 and, in this case, should be
considered as evidence adverse to it.

x x x there are insuperable features in this case which compel Us to decree the resolution of the deed of sale between
the parties. It was preponderantly established that there was non-payment of the purchase price. Also, petitioners
were never disturbed in their possession even when the titles to the lots were transferred to the Tan spouses up to the
time the same were mortgaged to respondent corporation and were eventually subjected to foreclosure proceedings.
In fact, Jong See who had tried but failed to purchase one of the lots and had constructed a building thereon, was
paying rentals on the premises to herein petitioners. For these reasons, there is no other legal or equitable recourse
but to declare, as We hereby declare, the aforesaid deed of sale rescinded and of on legal effect.
We agree with the trial court that based on the evidence of record the petitioners are entitled to damages. It is said,
however, that the law on damages is merely intended to repair the damage done by putting the plaintiff in the same
position, as far as pecuniary compensation can do, that he would be had the damage not been inflicted and the wrong
not committed. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff; they are designed to compensate for the
actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 

Considering, further, that petitioners were never dispossessed of the subject lots, although their right of disposition
and alienation thereover was impaired, an award of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) as moral damages, in addition
to the compensatory and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, is deemed sufficient and reasonable

You might also like