Lahom v. Sibulo

ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989, 2003-07-14, VITUG, J.
KEY DOTRINE: The action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, a childless couple, took into their care Isabelita’s
nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and brought him up as his own. In 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. Thereafter, an order granting the petition was issued and as an effect, the Civil
Registrar changed Jose’s surname from Sibulo to Lahom.
In December of 1999, Isabellita commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
RTC. She averred that Jose refused to change his surname to Lahom to the utter disregard of the
feelings of the petitioner. Further, it was said that Jose remained indifferent to her and would only
visit her once a year and that Jose was just after his alleged rights over the properties of the petitioner
and her late husband clearly shown by his filing of an action for partition against Isabelita, thereby
totally eroding her love and affection towards Jose, rendering the decree of adoption for negated for
which reason there is no more basis for its existence.
Prior to the institution of the case, R.A. No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The
adopters may only disinherit the adoptee for valid causes provided by the law. Banking on the new
law, Jose moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action
against him in view of the enactment of RA 8552.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action because of the deletion of the right
to rescind an adoption by the new law. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner’s right to rescind
under the FC should be respected, the action still had already prescribed for being filed more than 5
years from the time the legal ground had been discovered and known (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules
of Court). Hence, this petition. Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her
right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
ISSUE: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
RULING: NO.
In Republic vs. CA, a petition to adopt Jason was filed by Zenaida in Febtuary 1988 when the Child
and Youth Welfare Code allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After
the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the
FC, mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that
the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Zenaida alone. The Court concluded that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No.
603 was still in effect, the right of Zenaida to file the petition alone, according to the Court had
become vested. In Republic vs. Miller, spouses Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael. In July
1988, the couple filed a petition to adopt Michael having theretofore been taken into their care. At
that time, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal
before the CA, the FC was enacted into law disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The
Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. The SC found it untenable and
ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come
into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself
not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by
statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that
an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Lahom v. Sibulo

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lahom v. Sibulo

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lahom v. Sibulo

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs.

JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

You might also like