ARTICLE VIII

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1. THE JUDICIAL POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN ONE SUPREME COURT AND IN SUCH LOWER COURTS AS MAY BE
ESTABLISHED BY LAW. JUDICIAL POWER INCLUDES THE DUTY OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE TO SETTLE ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING RIGHTS WHICH ARE LEGALLY DEMAND A BLE AND ENFORCEABLE , AND TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON
THE PART OF ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT .

Q. What is judicial power?

A. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising

between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). It is "the
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights." Lopez v. Roxas, 17
SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
Q. How does the Constitution de[i8fine judicial power?

A. Section 1 says: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

Q. Does the judiciary resolve moot cases?

A. "A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by

virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review ..Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886,
July 30,2008.

Q. What is the "abuse of discretion" referred to in Section 1?

A. Not every abuse of, discretion, can be the occasion for the Court to
come in by virtue of the second sentence of Section 1. It must be "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." As Sinon
v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410,416-17 (1992), put it: By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

On this basis the Court can even check acts of Congress and of
the President, but with great hesitation. The principle must sometimes
yield to separation of powers or the doctrine on "political questions" or
to the "enrolled bill" rule. See e.g. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235
SCRA 630 (1994). In fact, it is difficult to see a clear pattern of the times
when the Court will check a co-equal department or not.

Q. Does the fact that the HRET has made a final decision divest the
Supreme Court of power to review the decision?

A. No. The Court can still determine whether the HRET com- mitted
grave abuse of discretion. Villarosa v. HRET, G.R. No. 144129,
September 14,2000.

NOTE: The question whether the Philippine government should espouse

claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision
is not for the courts to question. Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230, April 28,2010.

Q. Does the definition of judicial power do away with the "political

questions doctrine?"

A. No, it does not. At most it is a reproof of the practice of the Marcos

Supreme Court of shying away from reviewing abuse of discretion by
the Chief Executive and using the political questions doctrine as an
excuse. (More will be said about political questions under Section 5.)

Q. The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign corporation, was

attracted to situate its petrochemical plant in Bataan by "initial
inducements and other circumstances." Subsequently, however, it asked
the Board of Investments to be allowed to move to Batangas on the
ground that it has the right of final choice of plant site. On that basis, the
BOI yielded. The capitulation of the BOI is challenged as abuse of
discretion. Decide.
A. There was abuse of discretion. "In the light of all the clear advantages
manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown
to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near- absolute discretion given
by the BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it
from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
least." The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest contrary to
the thrust of the Constitution. Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No.
92024, November 9,1990.

Q. For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in

the 2004 elections, Comelec awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific
Consortium," an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite
this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with
"Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a company that joined the bidding but
had not met the eligibility requirements. Was there grave abuse of
discretion?
A. Yes. There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. In the present case, the Commission on Elections awarded
the subject contract not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence,
but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.
Infotech Foundation, et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, January 13,2004.

Q. On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a TRO staying the

execution of Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing, inter alia, that the
action of the Court not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Decide.

A. 1. The power to control the execution of its [i.e., the SC] decision is
an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. To be sure, the most important part of litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of evaluation of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts
to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of
control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice. 19, Art. VII "cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment
still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts [e.g., a death convict who becomes insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity] .. The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary suspension of
the execution of the death convict."

3) The same logic applies to Congress when, exercising its legislative

power, it amends the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of
death to life imprisonment. "The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life." To contend that "only the Executive can protect
the right of life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
our government." Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601, January 19,1999.

Q. On the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senators Fernan

and Tatad contested for the Senate Presidency.
Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2. With the agreement of Senator
Santiago, Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of
minority leader explaining that those who had voted for Fernan
comprised the majority, while those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority. However, the seven Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
Later, Fenian formally recognized Guingona as such. Santiago and Tatad
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto, alleging
that Guingona "had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
the position of Senate minority leader," a position that rightfully
belonged to Tatad. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

1)Petitioners claim that Art. VI, §16(1) has not been observed in the
selection of the minority leaden Decide.
A. 1) Yes. "It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives." Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577,
November 18,1998, p. 18. 2) This provision is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, but silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. The
method of choosing who will be the other officers must be prescribed by
the Senate itself. The Rules of the Senate neither provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders nor prescribe the manner of
creating such offices or of choosing the holders thereof. Such offices exist
by tradition and long practice. "But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature;
it is not within the province of courts to direct

Congress how to do its work." Id. at 23-24 (citing New York Public Interest
Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353 NE2d 558).
Q. What power is given to courts?
A. Courts are given "judicial power," nothing more. Hence, by the
principle of separation of powers, courts may neither attempt to
assume nor be compelled to perform non-judicial functions. Thus, a
court may not be required to act as a board of arbitrators. Manila
Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932). Nor may it
be charged with administrative functions except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. Noblejas v. Teehankee,2S
SCRA 405 (1968). Neither is it the function of the judiciary to give
advisory opinions. Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, 33 SCRA 494, 509
(1970).

Q. What is the difference between a declaratory judgment and an

advisory opinion?
A. What distinguishes a declaratory judgment from an advi- sory
opinion is that the former involves parties with real conflicting legal
interests whereas an advisory opinion is a response to a legal issue
posed in the abstract in advance of any actual case in which it may
be presented. As a consequence of this distinction, an advisory
opinion binds no one whereas a declaratory judgment is a final one
and is forever binding on the parties. The former is thus not a judicial
act but the latter is.
Q. What is the role of the legislature in the judicial process?
A. Although judicial power is vested in the judiciary, the proper
exercise of such power requires prior legislative action: (1) de-
fining such enforceable and demandable rights and prescribing
remedies for violations of such rights; and (2) determining the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies or dis-
putes arising from legal rights.

Q. Can the courts exercise judicial power when there is no

appli- cable law?

A. No. Thus in Channie Tan v. Republic, 107 Phil. 632,634

(1960), the Court ruled that it had no authority to entertain
an action for judicial declaration of citizenship because there
was no law authorizing such proceeding. Similarly, an award
of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not be
reversed by a court where the awards are governed by no
applicable law. Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188, 199
(1970). Nor may courts reverse the award of a board of
judges in an oratorical contest. Felipe v. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482
(1952).

SECTION. 2. THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO DEFINE,

PRESCRIBE, AND APPORTION THE JURISDICTION OF THE VARIOUS COURTS
BUT MAY NOT DEPRIVE THE SUPREME COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER
CASES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 5 HEREOF.

NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY WHEN IT

UNDERMINES THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF ITS MEMBERS .

Q. What power does Congress have over the judicial system?

A. Congress has the power to create new courts and to
apportion jurisdiction among various courts. However, in the
exercise of this power Congress may not impair the
independence of the judiciary. For this purpose, the
Constitution has given to the Supreme Court, in Section 5,
certain powers which Congress may not take away.
Moreover, any reorganization of the judicial system should be
done in a manner which does not impair security of tenure.
(More will be said about security of tenure under Section 11.)

Q. May any other body than Congress create courts or increase or

decrease the jurisdiction of courts?

A. No. Implicit in the conferment of power on Congress to create courts

and to determine their jurisdiction is the denial of the same power to
other departments.
Q. A law is passed prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects of the government. Does such law
violate judicial independence?
A. Such prohibition can only refer to administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. Outside of
this dimension and on issues involving questions of law, the courts
cannot be prevented from exercising their power. Malaga v. Penackos,
Jr., G.R. No. 86695, September 3,1992.
NOTE: Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have au-
thority over administrative agencies depend on the statutes governing
the subject. Where the statute designates the court having jurisdiction
other than courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general
jurisdiction do not have authority. But where there is silence, the gen-
eral rule applies. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 (1988).

SEC. 3. THE JUDICIARY SHALL ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
JUDICIARY MAY NOT BE REDUCED BY THE LEGISLATURE BELOW THE AMOUNT
APPROPRIATE D FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND, AFTER APPROVAL, SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.

Q. What is the meaning of fiscal autonomy and why has it been granted
to the Judiciary?
A. The second sentence of Section 3 states the meaning of fiscal
autonomy: "Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released."
Fiscal autonomy is granted to the Supreme Court in order to
strengthen its independence.

SEC. 4. (1) THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE COMPOSED OF A CHIEF JUSTICE AND
FOURTEEN ASSOCIATE JUSTICES. IT MAY SIT EN BANC OR IN ITS DISCRETION, IN
DIVISIONS OF THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN MEMBERS. ANY VACANCY SHALL BE FILLED
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE OCCURRENCE THEREOF. (2) ALL CASES INVOLVING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A TREATY, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, OR
LAW, WHICH SHALL BE HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, AND ALL OTHER CASES
WHICH UNDER THE RULES OF COURT ARE REQUIRED TO BE HEARD EN BANC, INCLUDING
THOSE INVOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL IT Y, APPLICATION, OR OPERATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, PROCLAMATIONS, ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS, ORDINANCES,
AND OTHER REGULATIONS, SHALL BE DECIDED WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY
OF THE MEMBERS WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE ISSUES IN
THE CASE AND VOTED THEREON. (2)CASES OR MATTERS HEARD BY A DIVISION SHALL
BE DECIDED OR RESOLVED WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS
WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE ISSUES IN THE CASE AND
VOTED THEREON, AND IN NO CASE, WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF AT LEAST THREE
OF SUCH MEMBERS. WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL
BE DECIDED EN BANC! PROVIDED, THAT NO DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE OF LAW LAID
DOWN BY THE COURT IN A DECISION RENDERED EN BANC OR IN DIVISION MAY BE
MODIFIED OR REVERSED EXCEPT BY THE COURT SITTING EN BANC.

Q. May Congress increase or decrease the composition of the Supreme

Court?

A. No.
Q. How many members constitute a division?

A. The Court is free to create divisions of three, five, or seven. The

purpose of allowing up to five divisions within one Court is to enable
the Court to dispose of cases more speedily.

Q. Are divisions separate and distinct courts?

A. No. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions

rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. Decisions or
resolutions of a division of the court are not inferior to an en banc
decision. People v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 16, 2003.

Q. How many justices are needed to constitute a quorum when the Court
sits en banc and there are only fourteen justices in office?

A. In People v. Ebio, G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004, since it was
a capital criminal case, the Court said that there should be eight. Q.
What cases must be heard en banc?
A. By command of the Constitution, the following cases must be heard
en banc: (1) all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law; (2) all cases which under
the Rules of Court may be required to be heard en banc; (3) all cases
involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations; (4) cases heard by a division when the required majority in
the division is not obtained; (5) cases where the Supreme Court
modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down
either en banc or in division;(6)administrative cases involving the
discipline or dismissal of judges of lower courts(Section 11); (c) election
contests for President or Vice-President.
Q. How many votes are required to decide a case heard en banc? in
division?
A. When the Supreme Court sits en banc cases are decided by the
concurrence of "of a majority of the members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." Thus,
since a quorum of the Supreme Court is eight, the votes of at least five
are needed and are enough, even if it is a question of constitutionality.
This is a liberalization of the old rule which required a qualified majority
of a definite number. Moreover, those who did not take part in the
deliberation do not have the right to vote.
Q. How many votes are needed to decide a case in division?

A. "Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved

with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc"
Q. Are decisions of a division of the Supreme Court appealable to the en
banc'?
A- No. Decisions or resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or
resolution of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting en
banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it exercises no
appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is
considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as
the Court en banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in
division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en
banc" Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, June 28,
2000.

Q. When the required number cannot be obtained in a division of three,

who decides the case?

A. "A careful reading of the above constitutional provision reveals the

intention of the framers to draw adistinction between cases, on the
one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are 'decided'
while matters, which include motions, are 'resolved.' Otherwise put,
the word 'decided' must refer to 'cases;' while the word 'resolved' must
refer to 'matters," applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is
true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where
these words appear. [See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Section
12 to 14.] "Cases" are controversies brought to the Court for the first
time. Where the required number of votes is not obtained, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the
Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by
the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the
failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. Quite plainly, if the voting
results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed
decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17,
1998. Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, August 19,1999.

SEC. 5. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING POWERS:

(1) EXERCISE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CASES AFFECTING AMBASSADORS , OTHER
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, AND OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI PROHIBITION,
MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, AND HABEAS CORPUS.

(2) REVIEW, REVISE, REVERSE, MODIFY, OR AFFIRM ON APPEAL OR CERTIORARI, AS THE

LAW OR THE RULES OF COURT MAY PROVIDE, FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
LOWER COURTS IN: ALL CASES IN WHICH THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF ANY
TREATY, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, LAW, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE,
PROCLAMATION, ORDER, INSTRUCTION, ORDINANCE, OR REGULATION IS IN QUESTION.

(a) ALL CASES INVOLVING THE LEGALITY OF ANY TAX, IMPOST,

ASSESSMENT, OR TOLL, OR ANY PENALTY IMPOSED IN RELATION THERETO.

(b) ALL CASES IN WHICH THE JURISDICTION OF ANY LOWER COURT IS IN

ISSUE.

(c) ALL CRIMINAL CASES IN WHICH THE PENALTY IMPOSED IS

SECLUSION PERPETUA OR HIGHER.
(d) ALL CASES IN WHICH ONLY AN ERROR OR QUESTION OF LAW IS
INVOLVED.

(3) ASSIGN TEMPORARILY JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS TO OTHER

STATIONS AS PUBLIC INTEREST MAY REQUIRE. SUCH TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT SHALL
NOT EXCEED SIX MONTHS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE JUDGE CONCERNED .
(4) ORDER A CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE OF TRIAL TO AVOID A
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

(5) PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION AND

ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS , PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND
PROCEDURE IN ALL
COURTS, THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, THE INTEGRATED BAR, AND LEGAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE UNDERPRIVILEGED. SUCH RULES SHALL PROVIDE A SIMPLIFIED AND
INEXPENSIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES, SHALL BE UNIFORM
FOR ALL COURTS OF THE SAME GRADE, AND SHALL NOT DIMINISH, INCREASE, OR
MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF SPECIAL COURTS AND QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODIES SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS DISAPPROVED BY THE SUPREME
COURT.
APPOINT ALL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY IN
(6)
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CLVIL SERVICE LAW.
 SEC. 6. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ALL
COURTS AND THE PERSONNEL THEREOF.

Specific powers of the court

Q. How would you classify the powers of the Supreme Court under
Section 5?
A. Section 5(1) and (2) are the judicial powers, and Section 5(3) to (6) are
auxiliary administrative powers.
Q. May Congress diminish the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

A. Congress may diminish the merely statutory jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court but it may not diminish the jurisdiction granted
by the Constitution itself.

Judicial review
Q. What is the power of judicial review?

A. It is the Supreme Court's power to declare a law, treaty, international

or executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This
power is explicitly granted by Section 5(2), (a) and (b).
Q. Does this make the Court superior to Congress and the President?

A. No. It shows the superiority of the Constitution over all.

Q. What are the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review?

A. It is now firmly established that the power of judicial review is merely

an aspect of judicial power. Hence, the first requisite for the exercise of
judicial review is that there must be before the court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. The question before it must be
ripe for adjudication, that is, the governmental act being challenged
must have had an adverse effect on the person challenging it. PACU v.
Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955); Tan v. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 678 (1972). Second, the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge, that is, he must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 58, 89 (1937). The above are the essential requisites for judicial
review. In addition to these essential requisites, jurisprudence has also
evolved other auxiliary rules. Thus, it was pointed out in People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 (1937) that "as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. . . But we
must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting constitutionality of a statute should be presented." Id. at 88.
Another rule is that the court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it really is unavoidable or is the very lis mota.
Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 522 (1946).

Q. The validity of the creation of the City of Makati is challenged on the

ground that it will allow the incumbent Mayor to extend his term beyond
he three terms allowed by the Constitution. Decide.

A. The challenge is premature considering that elections would not be

until three years later. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
118577 & 118627, March 7,1995.

Q. Dumlao challenges the constitutionality of Section 4 of B.P. Big. 52

disqualifying certain types of retired public officials from candidacy. No
one, however, has challenged the qualification of Dumlao. Igot
challenges the validity of the provision which disqualifies those against
whom charges for subversion or similar crimes have been filed. No such
charge, however, has been filed against Igot, although he claims that this
is a taxpayer's suit. Decide.

A. Clearly, Dumlao's petition presents merely a hypothetical case, not a

case or controversy. Hence, this is not a proper subject for judicial
review. Nor is Igot's. Moreover, Igot's claim that this is a taxpayer's suit is
not proper because his challenge is not against the holding of elections
with consequent expenditure of funds. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA
392, 401, 403 (L-52245, January 22, 1980.) [Because of
"paramount public interest," however, the Court ruled on the
substantive issues.]

Q. Is the rule that the Court will not decide a question of law when there
is no actual case or controversy an absolute rule?

A. No. Like all procedural rules exceptions to it may be dictated when, for
instance, lack of clarity may be creating a great of confusion detrimental
to public order, as in this case, the case of the confiscation of license
plates and drivers licenses for traffic violations. Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11,1991.
Q. Explain the concept of standing?

A. A person has "standing" to challenge the validity of governmental

act only if he has "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement." People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937); Macasiano v.
National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236 (1993). Thus in Joya v.
PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), art lovers seeking to enjoin the auction
sale of European artworks and silverware, part of the objects
recovered by the government after the ouster of President Marcos,
on the ground that these formed part of the Filipino cultural heritage
were deemed without standing to sue because they neither owned
the properties involved nor had they been purchased with public
funds. What appears in the jurisprudence on "standing" is that it is not
only a rule that assures concrete adverseness which can sharpen the
presentation of issues but it also involves considerations of policy
related to judicial self-restraint. Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910,
July 17,1995.

Q. Put differently, when will a citizen be allowed to raise a constitutional

question?
A. Only when he can show the following: (1) "that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of government;" (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action;" and (3) "the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action." Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April
21,1998.
Q. Is the rule inflexible?

A. No. Jurisprudence allows what it calls a "liberal approach" to standing.

When the subject in issue is of transcendental interest to the public, the
Court entertains the suit even if those suing do not have a personal and
direct interest such that they are stand to suffer harm. Thus, for
instance, Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 137-138 (1993),
Kilosbayan was allowed to challenge the validity of the lotto contract of
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes on the argument that the case was of
transcendental importance. Likewise, when President Estrada ordered
the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the
Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the
metropolis, the Court made constitutional pronouncements even
though those who brought the suit did not stand to suffer specific injury
to themselves. IBP v. Zamora et al, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
"In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined
its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people." Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 124360 and 127867,
November 5,1997.

Q. The President negotiated and the Senate ratified the Visiting Forces
Agreement with the United States. The constitutionality of the
agreement is challenged by groups which included private individuals
and organizations, some Senators and members of the house of
Representatives. Do they have standing?

A. Petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they

have sustained, or were in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners did not
establish that the VFA involved the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount
importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the
petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushed
aside the procedural barrier and took cognizance of the petitions. Bayan
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000. \

Q. Petitioners challenge the validity of Executive Order 185 placing the

NLRC under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor as being in
derogation of separation of powers. Decide.

A. Petitioners have no standing. The EO simply establishes a relation

between two offices both under the control of the President. The rights
of petitioner workers are unaffected. Automotive Industry Workers v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157509, January 18,2005.
NOTE: The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions
such as the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing
and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental
importance. In White Light Corp v.
City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, the Court recognized
"third party standing," a concept explained in Powers v. Ohio thus "We
have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must
have suffered an 'injury- in-fact,' thus giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant
must have a close relation to the third party, and there must exist some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."
In White Light the Court said that it was clear that the business interests
of the motel operators were likewise injured by the Ordinance
prohibiting "short term." They rely on the patronage of their customers
for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional
litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed
as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. American jurisprudence is
replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing
to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.
Taxpayer suit

Q. Can a taxpayer have standing to sue?

A. Yes, in cases involving expenditure of public funds, if it can be
shown (1) "that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation;" and (2) "that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute." Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil.
331 (1960);Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April
21,1998, 289 SCRA 337,343.

Q. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as
amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of
P3 million is "appropriated" for its operational expenses "to be sourced
from the funds of the Office of the President." Can a taxpayer challenge
the validity of the President's action?

A. No. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it isestablished that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus,
a taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The appropriations for the
PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. "In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined 'as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may
be paid out of the treasury,' while appropriation made by law refers to
the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to
its creditors.'" The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds
intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief
Executive's power to transfer funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of article
VI of the Constitution. Gonzalez v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August
14,2000.

Q. The authority of Pagcor to run jai alai or to subcontract it is challenged

by a group of members of Congress on the ground that Pagcor has no
franchise. Pagcor assails the locus standi of the petitioner members of
Congress on the ground that the integrity of Congress is not involved nor
will public money be used. Decide.

A. True, locus standi of petitioners cannot be anchored on their position

taxpayers. However, in line with the liberal polity of this Court on locus
standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to
our society, as members of the House of Representatives,
petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions at bar. In the instant
cases, petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an
infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature's exclusive power to grant
franchise. To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution, so petitioners
contend. The contention commands our concurrence for it is now settled
that a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office. Moreover, the instant petition is of
transcendental importance to the public. Relying on the first Kilosbayan
case the Court said that the issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the
aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral wellbeing of the people. Sandoval v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 138982,November 29, 2000.
Q. What is the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a
statute?

A. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that an unconstitutional act
confers no rights, imposes no duties,and affords no protection
whatsoever. Instead, the Court has adopted the view that before an act
is declared unconstitutional it is an "operative fact" which can be the
source of rights and duties. This recognition of an unconstitutional
statute as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional was
recently applied in de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429
(1971), where the period before a moratorium law was declared
unconstitutional was not allowed to toll the prescriptive period of the
right to foreclose a mortgage.

Q. May inferior courts exercise the power of judicial review?

A. Since the power of judicial review flows from judicial power and
since inferior courts are possessed of judicial power, it may fairly be
inferred that the power of judicial review is not a power exclusive to
the Supreme Court. This same conclusion may be inferred from Article
X, Section 5(2) which confers on the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. As the Court said in J.M.
Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696, 703-704 (1961):
"Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or
law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."
Considering, however, the majority vote which is required for the
Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, lower courts must
keep in mind "that a becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), cited in Vera v. Area, 28 SCRA 351, 361-2
(1969). Moreover, while a declaration of unconstitutionality made by
the Supreme Court constitutes a precedent binding on all, a similar
decision of an inferior court binds only the parties in the case.
Political questions
Q. It is an established rule that courts have no jurisdiction to pass upon
"political questions." What are "political questions?"
A. It is easy enough to define political questions in the abstract. As
Justice Concepcion said in Taiiada v. Cuenco, L-10520, February 28,
1965, political questions are "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."
But the difficult question which the Court is frequently called upon to
answer is whether a question is one "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." Lengthily argued majority
opinions, concurrences, and dissents characterize the cases where the
political questions doctrine has been invoked. Baker v. Corr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for de-
termining whether a question is political or not:

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a

political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. Id. at 217.

Q. Is everything in the above quotation from Baker v. Carr applicable

to Philippine jurisprudence?

A. No. It is submitted that, because of the duty of the court to determine

the existence of grave abuse of discretion, the question is not political
even when there is "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."

Q. The new Constitution defines judicial power as including "the duty of

courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Has this in effect nullified the long standing doctrine on
political questions as being beyond the pale of judicial power?

A. No. This partial definition of judicial power made by the new Constitution has for its purpose to
emphasize that when "grave abuse of discretion" is committed even by the highest executive authority,
the judiciary should not hide behind the political questions doctrine.

Q. Was the validity of the President's ban on the return of Mr. Marcos a
political question?
A. No. The Supreme Court has the power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.'' Marcos v. Manglapus, et al., G.R. No. 88211, September
15,1989.
Q. Was there abuse of discretion in the ban on Mr. Marcos?
A. No. From the pleadings, oral arguments, and briefings in chambers
we find that there was factual basis for the decision such that the
decision was not made arbitrarily. Marcos v. Manglapus, et al.,
G.R. No. 88211, September 15,1989. (The decision was 8-7.) However,
the Court added: "This case is unique. It should not create a precedent,
for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing
twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and
who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by
itself." Besides, the ban can be justified also under the "faithful execution
clause" of Article VII, Section 17.
Q. Petitioner was a member of the Commission on Appoint- ments
representing the Liberal Party. With the organization of the LDP (Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional members belonging to
the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP. When the
Commission on Appointments was reorganized, petitioner was replaced
by an LDP representative. Petitioner contends that the organization of
the LDP cannot affect the composition of the Commission on
Appointments because LDP is not a registered party and has not yet
shown the stability of a party. Does the situation present a "political
question?"
A. The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality not of wisdom.
The ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission on
Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate
their representatives. And even if the question were political in nature,
it would still come under the expanded power of review in Article VIII,
Section 1. Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21,1989. Court
review of capital sentences

Q. In mandating mandatory review of the Supreme Court of death and

other sentences, does the Constitution thereby proscribe intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals?
A. No. While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the
Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals
before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty
are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence
must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error
of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the
case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. People v. Mateo, G.R.
No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
Q. Is there an automatic review of a trial court's decision convicting an
accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetual
A. No. It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that
the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme
Court [now Court of Appeals] for automatic review of the conviction.
Where the petitioner does not file a notice of appeal or otherwise
indicate a desire to appeal from the decision convicting him of murder
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, the decision became final
and unappealable. Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 106531, November
18,1999. Auxiliary powers

Q. What are the auxiliary administrative powers of the Supreme Court?

A. See Section 5(3) to (6), and Sections 6 and 11. Rule making

Q. How has the 1987 Constitution affected the rule-making power of the
Court?

A. The 1987 Constitution enhanced the rule making power of this Court
[under] Section 5(5), Article VIII. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. [Hence the rule on amparo.] The
Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. Thus, for instance, the payment of legal fees is a
vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. Baguio Market Vendors v. Judge,
G.R. No. 165922, February 26,2010.
Q. By what authority did the Court create the remedy of amparo?

A. Through its authority to promulgate rules for the protection of human

rights.
Q. What is the writ of amparo?

A. It is a is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty

and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof
Q. What is the writ of habeas data?

A. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,

liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. The coverage of both writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty
and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Q. What is the writ of kalikasari?
A. It is a "remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered
with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces."

Q. Rules of Court require deposit of 15% of the value of the property

before an expropriator can enter. Can Congress amend this?
A. R.A. 8974, however, creates an exception in expropriation cases
involving public works and requires fullpayment before entry in public
works projects. In answering the question whether Congress may amend
Rules of Court, the Court said that since expropriation involves both
procedural and substantive matters, the substantive aspect is always
subject to legislation. Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February
1, 2006.

Q. May the Court suspend its Rules of Court?

A. The rule making power includes inherent power to suspend its own
rules in particular cases in order to dojustice. Lim, et al. v. CA, G.R. No.
149748, November 16,2006.

Q. What is the rule on the review of death penalty imposed?

A. Section 5 authorizes the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, lifeimprisonment, or death. However, the
Constitution has not proscribed an intermediate review. But to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penally of death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment is imposed, the Rule now is that such cases must be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals before they are elevated to the
Supreme Court. People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7,2004;
People v. Lagua, G.R. No. 170565, January 31,2006.

Q. What are the limits on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure and admission to the practice of law?
A. The Constitution imposes the following limitations and guidelines: (1)
they "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases;" (2) they "shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade;" (3) and they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."
Q. What is the test to determine whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right?
A. "[Tlhe test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it
is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure." Fabian v. Desierto, G.R.No. 129742, September
16,1998, p. 22 (citing 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§505, p. 936; People v. Smith, 205 P. 2d 444).
Q. Applying the foregoing test, is the Supreme Court's transfer of
pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative actions to the Court of Appeals
substantive or procedural?
A. Procedural, "because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law. The right has been preserved. Only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a
particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without
impairing vested rights, hence he can have non in rules of procedure
which relate to the remedy." Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998, p. 22-23 (citing Elm Park Iowa, Inc. v. Denniston,
et al., 280 NW 2d 262).
Q. The rule that, unless a reservation to file a separate civil action is
reserved, the civil case is deemed filed with the criminal case is
challenged on the ground that the rule is about substantive rights.

A. Whether or not the two actions must be tried in a single proceeding is

a matter of procedure. Maniago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104392,
February 20,1996.

Q. Why does the new Constitution have a new provision empowering the
Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights?
A. The provision is intended to emphasize that constitutional rights are
not merely declaratory but also enforceable.

Q. Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits lawyers

who are members of a local legislative body to practice law. Is this an
infringement of the power of the Court to provide rules for pleading,
practice, and procedure and the practice of law.
A. No. The law must be seen not as a rule on the practice of law but as a
rule on the conduct of officials intended to prevent conflict of interest.
Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government, G.R. No.
102549, August 10,1992.
Q. After the Supreme Court has declared candidates for the bar as having
flunked the examinations, may Congress pass a law lowering the passing
mark and declaring the same candidates as having passed?
A. No. This would amount to not just amending the rules but reversing the
Court's application of an existing rule. In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 563
(1954).
Q. May the Supreme Court nullify the results of the Bar Examination?

A. In 2003 the Court nullified the results of the exams on Commercial Law
when it was discovered that the Bar questions had been leaked. Bar
Matter No. 1222, February 4, 2004.
Q. May the Ombudsman investigate irregularities in the performance of a
judge independently of any administrative action taken by the
Supreme Court?
A. No. The power of administrative supervision of the Supreme Court
includes, according to Section 11, "thepower to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon." The exclusivity of this power is jealously
guarded by the Court. In Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993), the
Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not investigate a judge
independently of any administrative action of the Supreme Court.
Likewise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred
to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative
aspect is involved therein. Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
132177, July 19,2001

NOTE: Disciplinary authority over the Bar. The disciplinary authority of

the court over members of the Bar is an aspect of its authority to admit
to the Bar. The desistance of a complainant or witnesses does not strip
the Court of jurisdiction because this is a matter of public interest and
concern. Garrido v. Garrido, AC. No. 6593, February 4, 2010.

NOTE: No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction

under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide
complaints against erring officials and employees of the judiciary. The
issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a
cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has
breached the norms and standards of the courts. Neither can the
disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainant's
whims. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court
officials and personnel. Escdlona v. Padillo, AM. No. P-10-2785,
September 21, 2010.

Q. What is the effectivity of rules of procedure issued by special courts

and quasi-judicial bodies?
A. They are "effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."
Q. What is "bar integration?"

A. Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the

entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership
and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. In re Integration
of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 25-27, quoting Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, pp. 3-5, November 30,1972.

Q. What are the purposes of an Integrated Bar?

A. The purposes of an Integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain, on the part of its members, high
ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public
service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice, and procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and public information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recom-
mendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively. In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, quoting
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, pp. 3-5, November
30,1972.
Q. A practicing attorney refuses to pay membership dues for the
Integrated Bar and is recommended for removal by the Supreme Court
from the list of attorneys. In reply the lawyer contends that the
provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws requiring
membership in theIntegrated Bar as a requisite for the practice of law
violate his constitutional rights of association and property. Moreover,
he contends that the Supreme Court has no power to remove him from
the list of attorneys because such power is not judicial but
administrative. Comment.

A. (1) The practice of law is a privilege that is subject to reasonable

regulation by the State. Bar Integration is mandated by the Constitution.

(2) The lawyer is not being compelled to join the association.

Passing the bar examination already made him a member of the bar. All
that integration does is provide a national organization for a well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of lawyers. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues, and this is justified
by the need for elevating the quality of the legal profession.
(3) The Constitution vests in the SC plenary powers regarding
admission to the bar. In re Atty. Martial Edition, 84 SCRA 554 (3 August
1978).
Q. The Court had previously not allowed the respondent to take his oath
as a lawyer because of unbecoming conduct. After submission of
evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that he had reformed, may he be
admitted to the bar?
A. Yes. "This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not . . . an arbitrary
and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to
exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion." Andres v.
Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 (SBC- 585, February 29,1984).

SEC. 7. (1) No PERSON SHALL BE APPOINTED MEMBER OF THE

SUPREME COURT OR ANY LOWER COLLEGIATE COURT UNLESS HE IS A
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. A MEMBER OF THE
SUPREME COURT MUST BE AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE, AND MUST
HAVE BEEN FOR FIFTEEN YEARS OR MORE A JUDGE OF A LOWER COURT OR
ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES .
(2) THE CONGRESS SHALL PRESCRIBE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF
JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS, BUT NO PERSON MAY BE APPOINTED JUDGE
THEREOF UNLESS HE IS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND A MEMBER OF
THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

(3) A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN

COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE.

Q. What are the qualifications of a Member of the Supreme Court?

A. He or she (1) must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, (2)

must be at least forty years of age, (3) must have been for fifteen years
or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines, and (4) a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.

Q. What are the qualifications of a Member of a lower collegiate court?

A. He or she must be (1) a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, (2) a
member of the Philippine Bar, (3)possessing the other qualifications
prescribed by Congress, and (4) must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Q. What are the qualifications of judges of non-collegiate lower courts?
A. They must be (1) citizens of the Philippines, (2) members of the
Philippine Bar, (3) possessing the other qualifications prescribed by
Congress, and

(4) persons of proven competence, integrity, probity, and

independence.
Q. May Congress alter the qualifications of Members of the Judiciary?
A. Congress may not alter the qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court and the constitutional qualifications of other members of the
Judiciary. But Congress may alter the statutory qualifications of judges
and justices of lower courts.

NOTE: It behooves every prospective appointee to the judiciary to

apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness
for judicial office, includingsuch circum- stances as may reflect on his
integrity and probity. Thus the fact that a prospective judge failed to
disclose that he had been administratively charged and dismissed from
the service for grave misconduct by a former President of the Philippines
was used against him. It did not matter that he had resigned from office
and that the administrative case against him had become moot and
academic. In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22,2007.
Similarly, before one who is offered an appointment to the Supreme
Court can accept it, he must correct the entry in his birth certificate
saying that he is an alien. Kilosbayan u. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3,
2007. This was the case of Justice Gregory Ong of the Sandiganbayan
who was being promoted to the Supreme Court. (Ong, however,
remains in the Sandiganbayan.)
Q. How may the right of a judge to hold his position be contested?

A. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine

the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. A private person suing must show a clear right to the contested
office. Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 15,2008.

SEC. 8. (1) A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL IS HEREBY CREATED UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMPOSED OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE AS EX-
OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
CONGRESS AS EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTEGRATED BAR, A
PROFESSOR OF LAW, A RETIRED MEMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

(2) THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE

PRESIDENT FOR A TERM OF FOUR YEARS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS. OF THE MEMBERS FIRST APPOINTED,
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTEGRATED BAR SHALL SERVE FOR FOUR YEARS, THE
PROFESSOR OF LAW FOR THREE YEARS, THE RETIRED JUSTICE FOR TWO YEARS, AND
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR ONE YEAR .
(3) THE CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE THE SECRETARY EX-OFFICIO
OF THE COUNCIL AND SHALL KEEP A RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS .
(4) THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHALL RECEIVE SUCH
EMOLUMENTS
AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL
PROVIDE IN ITS ANNUAL BUDGET THE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL.
(5) THE COUNCIL SHALL HAVE THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF
RECOMMENDING
APPOINTEES TO THE JUDICIARY. IT MAY EXERCISE SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES
AS THE SUPREME COURT MAY ASSIGN TO IT.

Q. Does the representative of Congress come from the House or from the
Senate?

A. From either. This provision was formulated for a unicameral Congress

and no change was made when the final decision was for a bicameral
Congress. In practice, the two houses now work out a way of sharing
representation.

SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES OF

LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST
THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EVERY
VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.

FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS WITHIN
NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

Q. What is the principal function of the Judicial and Bar Council?

A. "The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Q. What is the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council?

A. The Judicial and Bar Council shall be composed of ex officio members

and regular members. The ex-offieio members are the Chief Justice as
ex-offieio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress. The regular members are a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
Q. How are the regular members appointed?

A. They are appointed by the President with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments.
Q. What is the rationale behind the creation of the Judicial and Bar
Council?
A. The Council was principally designed to eliminate politics from the
appointment of judges and justices. Thus, appointments to the Judiciary
do not have to go through a political Commission on Appointments.

Q. How are members of the judiciary appointed? A. See

Section 9.

SEC. 10. THE SALARY OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OF THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT, AND OF JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS SHALL BE FIXED BY LAW.
DURING THEIR CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE, THEIR SALARY SHALL NOT BE DECREASED.

Q. Is the salary of justices and judges subject to income tax?

A. Although the new Constitution no longer contains the explicit
provision in Article XVI, Section 6, of the 1973 Constitution which
made the salary of all subject to income tax, it was the clear intention
of the Constitutional Commission that the rule would be the same
under the new Constitution, contrary to the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer,
85 Phil. 552 (1950) and Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953).
NOTE: Although this is not clear from the text of the 1987 Constitution,
the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to subject the
salary of judges and justices to income tax. Nitafan v. Commission of
Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987).

SEC. 11. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES

OF LOWER COURTS SHALL HOLD OFFICE DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR UNTIL THEY REACH
THE AGE OF SEVENTY YEARS OR BECOME INCAPACITATED TO DISCHARGE THE DUTIES
OF THEIR OFFICE . THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO
DISCIPLINE JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS, OR ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL BY A VOTE OF A
MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON
THE ISSUES IN THE CASE AND VOTED THEREON.

Q. Must disciplinary cases be heard by the Supreme Court en banc?

A. The text of Section 11 yields the reading that decisions on
disciplinary cases must all be arrived at en banc. However, People v.
Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995, ruled, contrary to the
inclusive language of the text, that a decision en barn: is needed only
when the penalty to be imposed is dismissal of a judge, disbarment of
a lawyer, suspension of either for more than one year, or a fine
exceeding 10,000 pesos. In justifying this ruling, Justice Regalado, with
the approval of the Court en banc, relied on his recollection of a
conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was
the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.
Regalado admitted that there were no records to support his
recollection. He said, however, that to require more would contravene
the desire of the Constitution for a speedy disposition of cases, which
is one of the purposes for allowing the Court to rule in divisions.

Q. Does abolition of a judicial office violate security of tenure?

A. The Supreme Court, in Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil.

615 (1938) and Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 50 O.G. 147
(1955), applied to abolition of courts the principle used
relative to the abolition of civil service positions. Abolition
of office is valid when done in good faith and not for
political or personal reasons. In such a situation, properly
and logically speaking there is no removal from office
because a removal implies that the office exists after the
ouster.
Q. Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the Revised Judiciary Act,
mandates that justices and judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to inferior courts established by such Act, would
be considered separated from the judiciary upon the
completion of the reorganization provided in the Act as
declared by the President. The law is challenged as violative
of security of tenure guaranteed in the Constitution, as
arbitrary, and as undue delegation of powers to the
President. Petitioners, on the other hand, are challenged as
not possessing standing. Decide.
A. The Marcos Supreme Court decided this case thus: On the issue of
standing, one of the petitioners is a judge and is therefore directly
affected by the law; the rest have the standing of taxpayers. The claim of
arbitrariness is belied by the prolonged study and the number of
hearings as well as the length of the Batasan debates on the subject
(which fill 590 pages of records). On the main issue of security of tenure,
it must be said that what the act effects is the abolition of office, not
removal of officers. Abolition of office, when done in good faith, does not
violate security of tenure. The legislature's authority to abolish courts
inferior to the Supreme Court is undeniable. The act is designed to
remedy monumental problems in the Judiciary which clearly exist. It is
for the legislature to decide what solutions to adopt.

On the issue of undue delegation, the Court pointed out that the
law was complete in itself and there were clear standards for
implementation by the President.

NOTE: Teehankee dissented on the following grounds:

(1) The express guarantee of security of tenure should prevail

over the power toabolish merely implied from the power to
create courts; (2) The Act achieves something short of abolition
and substantial change of the existing system; (3) The spirit that
ruled the enactment of the law was not so much a desire for
reorganization as such but to use reorganization as an
instrument for a mass purge.
Q. Does the above decision still hold in view of Section 2
which says: "No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members?"

A. The new provision does not affect the principle

accepted in the de la Liana case, namely that
reorganization by itself need not affect security of
tenure.

Q. May justices or judges be removed by the President or by

impeachment?

A. Supreme Court Justices are removable only by impeachment. (Article

XI, Section 2) Justices and judges of courts inferior to the Supreme Court
are removable only by the Supreme Court sitting en banc.

Q. May a judge, while still in the Bench, present himself as a

congressional candidate?
A. No. Such a behavior constitutes misconduct. Vistan v. Nicolas,
A.M. MTJ-87-79, September 13,1991.
Q. What is the compulsory retirement age of Members of the Judiciary?

A. Seventy years.

SEC. 12. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF

OTHER COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE
DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY PERFORMING QUASI-JUDICIAL
OR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.

Q. Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos

Norte Provincial Committee on Justice by the Provincial
Governor. The function of the Committee is to receive
complaints and make recommendations towards the
speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
who are poor. May the Judge accept the designation?

A. No. The committee performs administrative functions, that is, functions which "involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence." In re Judge Manzano, 166
SCRA 246 (1988).
SEC. 13. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ANY CASE SUBMITTED TO IT FOR DECISION EN BANC OR IN
DIVISION SHALL BE REACHED IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE IS ASSIGNED TO A MEMBER FOR THE WRITING OF THE
OPINION OF THE COURT. A CERTIFICATION TO THIS EFFECT SIGNED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHALL BE ISSUED AND A COPY
THEREOF ATTACHED TO THE RECORD OF THE CASE AND SERVED UPON THE PARTIES . ANY MEMBER WHO TOOK NO PART, OR
DISSENTED, OR ABSTAINED FROM A DECISION OR RESOLUTION MUST STATE THE REASON THEREFOR . THE SAME
REQUIREME NT S SHALL BE OBSERVED BY ALL LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS .

Q. Will not the certification by the Chief Justice that he has assigned
the case to a Justice for writing the opinion expose such Justice
topressure?
A. No because the certification will not identify the Justice.
Q. What is the reason for the required explanation to be given by
individual Justices for their non-participation or abstention? A. To
encourage participation.
Q. What is the purpose of the certification required by Section 13?
A. "Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional
requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate
courts, such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court
sitting en banc or in division before the case is assigned to a member
thereof for decision-writing." Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
78272, August 29,1989.

Q. What is the effect of absence of certification?

A. "The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily
mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in
consultation before being assigned to one member

Sec. 14 ART. VIII - THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 361 for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the
regular performance of duty is presumed [Sec. 5(m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court.]. The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe certification
requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor.
[See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460] Such absence of certification would not have
the effect of invalidating the decision. Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78272, August 29,1989.

SEC. 14. No DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT

EXPRESSINGTHEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS
BASED. NO PETITION FOR REVIEW OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A DECISION
OF THE COURT SHALL BE REFUSED DUE COURSE OR DENIED WITHOUT STATING THE
LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR.
Q. What does the rule on "decisions" and "petitions" require?
A. "In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987),the Court clarified the
constitutional requirement [first paragraph] that a decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based
as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall
under the constitutional provision[second paragraph] which states
that, TSTo petition for review ... shall be refused due course ....
without stating the legal basis therefore.' When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motionsdecides to deny due course
to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for
some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. "Minute resolutions
need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in
the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of
the Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all
resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on
functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court. .."
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 82273, June 1,1990.

Q. The decision simply said: MEMORANDUM DECISION After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation
and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,. Metro Manila,
Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. WHEREFORE, judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Is this sufficient compliance with Article VIII, Section 14?
A. The purpose of this requirement is to inform the person reading the
decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court
after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the
applicable laws. There are various reasons for this: (1) to assure the
parties that the judge studied the case; (2) to give the losing party
opportunity to analyze the decision and possibly appeal or,
alternatively, convince the losing party to accept the decision in good
grace; (3) to enrich the body of case law, especially if the decision is
from the Supreme Court. On the other hand, memorandum decisions
can also speed up the judicial process, a desirable thing and a concern
of the Constitution itself. The Memorandum in this case was made
pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of B.P Big. 129. Because of
the above considerations the rule that should be followed is that,
where a Memorandum decision is used, the decision adopted by
reference must be attached to the Memorandum for easy reference.
Nonetheless, the Memorandum decision should be sparingly used and
used only where the facts as in the main are accepted by both parties
and in simple litigations only. However, this ruling is not to be applied
retroactively to this case at bar. Francisco v, Permskul, G.R. No. 81006,
May 12,1989.
Q. The proceedings in a military tribunal terminate with a simple guilty or
not guilty verdict. Does this violate the provision that a decision of a
court of record "shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based?"
A. No. A military commission is not a court of record within the meaning
of this Article. Moreover, the procedure followed in the case, including
the form the judgment takes, was given the seal of approval by the
Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution. Fernando, J. in
Buscayno v. Enrile, 102 SCRA 7, 19-20 (January 15,1982).

Q. If a judge in his decision adopts the report of a Hearing Examiner in

a labor case, does he thereby violate Section 14 which requires that
every decision of a court shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it is based?

A. No. Alba Patio de Makati v. Alba Patio de Makati Employees, 128 SCRA
253 (March 16,1984).
SEC. 15. (1) ALL CASES OR MATTERS FILED AFTER THE EFFECITVITY OF THIS
CONSTITUTION MUST BE DECIDED OR RESOLVED WITHIN TWENTY-
FOUR MONTHS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION FOR THE SUPREME COURT , AND,
UNLESS REDUCED BY THE SUPREME COURT, TWELVE MONTHS FOR ALL LOWER
COLLEGIATE COURTS, AND THREE MONTHS FOR ALL OTHER LOWER COURTS.
 (2) A CASE OR MATTER SHALL BE DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR DECISION OR
RESOLUTION UPON THE FILING OF THE LAST PLEADING , BRIEF, OR MEMORANDUM
REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF COURT OR BY THE COURT ITSELF .
(3) UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD, A
CERTIFICATION TO TEDS EFFECT SIGNED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE OR THE PRESIDING
JUDGE SHALL FORTHWITH BE ISSUED AND A COPY THEREOF ATTACHED TO THE
RECORD OF THE CASE OR MATTER, AND SERVED UPON THE PARTIES. THE
CERTIFICATION SHALL STATE WHY A DECISION OR RESOLUTION HAS NOT BEEN
RENDERED OR ISSUED WITHIN SAID PERIOD.

(4) DESPITE THE EXPIRATION OF THE APPLICABLE MANDATORY

PERIOD, THE COURT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SUCH RESPONSIBILITY AS MAY HAVE BEEN
INCURRED IN CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, SHALL DECIDE OR RESOLVE THE CASE OR
MATTER SUBMITTED THERETO FOR DETERMINATION , WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

Q. What rule applies to the Sandiganbayan?

A. The three (3) month period for deciding cases, not the twelve (12)
month period given to appellate courts,applies to the Sandiganbayan
because the Sandiganbayan is a trial court. Re: Problem of Delays
before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00- 8-05-SC, November 28,2001

Q. What effect does the lapse of the reglamentary period have

on cases filed after the effectivity of this Constitution?
A. The case remains undecided, but the court is enjoined to
decide the case or question without further delay.

Q. What effect does it have on the Justices or judges concerned?

A. It can be a ground for impeachment or other form of
disciplinary action if it is found to constitute culpable
violation of the Constitution. There is a growing number
of cases where the Court has disciplined judges of lower
courts for their failure to comply with the prescribed
deadlines.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to
decide cases and matters pending before them within the
period fixed by law...Their failure to do so constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanctions...
A heavy case load and a poor health may partially excuse
such lapses, only if the judges concerned request
reasonable extensions...In the present case, however, the
respondent made no effort to inform this Court of his
reasons for the delay, much less to request any
extension... Worse, he signed certifications that all cases
and motions pending before him had been attended to
within the prescribed period. Court Administrator v.
Quinanola, A.M. No. MTJ-99- 1216, October 20, 1999;
Edario v. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06- 2007, December 6,
2010.
Q. What effect does the lapse of the reglamentary period have
on cases filed before the effectivity of this Constitution?
A. Answer to this is to be found in Sections 13 and 14 of
Article XVIII. Even when there is delay and no decision or
resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is
no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision. This is
different from the rule under Article X, Section 11(2) of the
1973 Constitution which said that, in case of delay, the
decision appealed from was deemed affirmed. Sesbrefio v.
CA, G.R. No. 161390, April 16,2008.

SEC. 16. THE SUPREME COURT SHALL, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

FROM THE OPENING OF EACH REGULAR SESSION OF THE
CONGRESS, SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS AN
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
JUDICIARY.