Summary of Updates in Political Law Prof REX M.

ALOBBA

Legislative Powers; Creation of Pet; Judicial Review 1. MACALINTAL VS. PET (G.R. No. 191618; November 23, 2010; MR denied on June 7, 2011) Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as it violates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. He contends that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court may promulgate its rules for the purpose), are not restricted but include all necessary powers implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plenary and the authority of the Court to decide presidential and vicepresidential election contests through the PET are derived from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court here rejected petitioners claim that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Consistent with the presidential system of government, the function of dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute. The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. Power of Judicial Review; Executive Power 2. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 (G.R. No. 192935; December 7, 2010) REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD (G.R. No. 193036; December 7, 2010) Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. Legal Standing of the Petitioners The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish." Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority. xxx

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied] In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary. The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. x x x

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,

"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights. Thus: "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted] Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power. Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation." The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, it was written: This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied]. Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes. Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. 3. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, ET AL. (G.R. No. 193459; February 15, 2011) Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts constituting the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Civil Service Commission 4. EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. No. 179370; November 19, 2009) The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department, to which herein petitioner belongs. Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC. In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or

anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner.

It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations.

5.

WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. MARIO I. MOLINA, ET AL./WINSTON F. GARCIA VS. MARIO I. MOLINA, ET AL. (G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010) The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law. Thus, GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.

Powers of COA 6. RAMON R. YAP VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. No. 158562; April 23, 2010) The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA. In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective. State Immunity 7. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. SPOUSES DAVID ELISEA RAMOS (G.R. No. 159402; February 23, 2011) In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.16 Thus, in De los Santos v.

Intermediate Appellate Court,17 the trial courts dismissal based on the doctrine of non-suability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO. x x x Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues, viz: x x x With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. 8. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 155504; June 26, 2009)

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates the Constitution. It is a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. The TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

9.

GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), et al., versus ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388; January 18, 2011) The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondents right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondents honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.

International Law 10. BAYAN MUNA versus ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs (G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011) International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.

Republic Act No. 9522

March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:

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Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows: Basepoint Number Station Name Location World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84) Coordinates Latitude (N) 1 PAB-01 2 PAB-02 3 PAB-04 4 PAB-05A 5 PAB-05B 6 PAB-05 7 PAB-06 8 PAB-06B Amianan Is. Balintang Is. Bigan Pt. Ditolong Pt. Ditolong Pt. Ditolong Pt. Spires Is. Digollorin Pt. 21657.73" 195738.19" 181835.30" 17716.30" 17614.79" 17551.31" 17236.91" 165918.03" 164956.11" 164738.86" 161844.33" 142954.43" 146.29.91" 146.10.40" 12416.37" 123618.41" 1232.33.62" 1231.57.45" 122836.42" 122737.51" 122141.64" 121727.17" 121321.95" 121148.16" 121120.67" 1267.00" 104516.70" 94959.58" 85316.62" 81311.53" 74245.02" 72949.47" 72916.93" 72830.97" 72729.42" Longitude (E) 1215727.71" 122946.32" 1222019.07" 1223128.34" 1223143.84" 1223142.66" 122313.28" 1222756.61" 1222650.78" 122264.40" 1221406.69" 1225751.15" 1241659.21" 1241726.28" 125353.71" 125850.19" 1251259.70" 1251332.37" 1251712.32" 125185.23" 125237.41" 125270.12" 1253019.47" 1253130.88" 1253148.29" 1253411.94" 125588.78" 126106.39" 1262048.81" 1262853.25" 1263429.08" 1263559.24" 1263559.50" 1263557.30" 1263551.31" Distance to next basepoint (M) 70.08 99.17 71.83 1.05 0.39 3.29 9.74 3.51 2.40 30.94 116.26 80.29 0.54 96.04 6.79 5.52 0.80 4.90 1.30 7.09 5.68 5.21 1.94 0.54 5.71 83.94 56.28 57.44 40.69 30.80 12.95 0.54 0.76 1.2 10.12

9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 10 PAB-07 11 PAB-08 12 PAB-10A 13 PAB-11 14 PAB-12 15 PAB-13 16 PAB-13A 17 PAB-14 18 PAB-14A Divimisa Pt. Dinoban Pt. Tinaga Is. Horodaba Rk. Matulin Rk. Atalaya Pt. Bacan Is. Finch Rk. Cube Rk.

19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 20 PAB-15 21 PAB-16A 22 PAB-16B SE Manjud Pt. S Sorz Cay Panablihon

23 PAB-16C Alugon 24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 25 PAB-17 26 PAB-18A E Bunga Pt. SE Tobabao Is.

27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 29 PAB-20A 30 PAB-21B 31 PAB-22 Arangasa Is. Sanco Pt. Bagoso Is

32 PAB-22C Languyan 33 PAB-23 34 PAB-23B Languyan Languyan

35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt.

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36 PAB-24 37 PAB-24A 38 PAB-25B 39 PAB-25 40 PAB-26 41 PAB-27 42 PAB-28 43 PAB-29 44 PAB-30 45 PAB-31 46 PAB-32 47 PAB-33A 48 PAB-34A 49 PAB-35 50 PAB-35A 51 PAB-38A 52 PAB-39 53 PAB-40 54 PAB-40A 55 PAB-41A 56 PAB-42A 57 PAB-43 58 PAB-44 59 PAB-45 60 PAB-46 61 PAB-47 62 PAB-48 63 PAB-48A 64 PAB-49 65 PAB-50 66 PAB-51 67 PAB-52 68 PAB-53 69 PAB-54 70 PAB-54A 71 PAB-54B 72 PAB-55 73 PAB-60 74 PAB.61

Pusan Pt. S Pusan Pt. Cape San Agustin Cape San Agustin SE Sarangani Is. Pangil Bato Pt. Tapundo Pt. W Calia Pt. Manamil Is. Marampog Pt. Pola Pt. Kantuan Is Tongguil Is. Tongquil Is Tongquil Is. Kirapusan Is Manuk Manka Is. Frances Reef Frances Reef Bajapa Reef Paguan Is. Alice Reef Alice Reef Omapoy Rk. Bukut Lapis Pt. Pearl Bank Bagnan Is. Taganak Is Great Bakkungaan Is. Libiman Is. Sibaung Is. Muligi Is. South Mangsee Is. Balabac Is. Balabac Great Reef Balabac Great Reef Balabac Great Reef Ada Reef Secam Is.

71719.80" 71614.43" 61714.73" 6168.35" 52334.20" 52321.80" 62155.66" 52158.48" 5222.91" 52320.18" 698.44" 62647.22" 6233.77" 618.51" 6017.88" 512.8.70" 44739.24" 42453.84" 4253.83" 436"9.01" 44252.07" 44555.25" 4475.36" 45510.45" 5223.73" 54635.15" 6558.41" 6414.08" 6114.65" 61339.90" 61743.99" 65214.53" 73026.05" 74830.69" 75127.17" 75219.86" 75436.35" 820.26" 81118.36"

1263618.26" 1263557.20" 1261214.40" 1261135.06" 1252842.11" 1252819.59" 1262511.21" 1252152.03" 1252059.73" 1251944.29" 1241542.81" 12213.34.50" 1215636.20" 1215441.45" 1216311.17" 1204138.14" 1195158.08" 1191450.71 1191415.15" 119322.75" 119144.04" 119315.19" 119512.94" 119221.30 1194418.14" 1193951.77" 1182657.30" 1181833.33" 118654.15" 118352.09" 11805.44" 1182340.49" 1171833.75" 1165939.18" 1165417.19" 1165328.73" 1165316.64" 1165410.04" 1165951.87"

1.14 63.28 1.28 67.65 0.43 3.44 3.31 0.87 1.79 78.42 122.88 29.44 2.38 1.72 85.94 55.24 43.44 0.61 15.48 6.88 8.40 2.28 18.60 23.37 44.20 75.17 8.54 13.46 3.97 5.53 41.60 75.06 26.00 6.08 1.18 2.27 5.42 10.85 30.88

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75 PAB-62 76 PAB-63 77 PAB-63A 78 PAB-64 79 PAB.64B

Latua Pt. SW Tatub Pt. W Sicud Pt. Tarumpitao Pt. Dry Is.

88756.37" 84417.40" 85332.20" 92.57.47" 95922.54" 111319.82" 121935.22" 135324.45" 154843.61" 155761.67" 16957.90" 161012.42" 161634.46" 163712.70" 161829.49" 161928.20" 16204.38" 173424.94" 174117.56" 17554.13" 182932.42" 183052.88" 191014.78" 204315.74" 21717.47" 21718.41" 21712.04"

1171551.23" 1172039.37" 1172815.78" 1173738.88" 1183653.61" 1191517.74" 1195056.00 12015.86" 1194656.09" 1194455.32" 11945.15.76" 1194511.95" 1194619.50" 1194628.62" 1194644.94" 119477.69" 1194720.48" 1202033.36" 120212.20" 1202440.56" 1203342.41" 1203455.35" 1211252.64" 1214657.80" 1215643.85" 1215648.79" 121573.65"

7.91 11.89 13.20 81.12 82.76 74.65 93.88 115.69 9.30 12.06 0.25 6.43 0.65 1.30 1.04 0.63 80.60 6.86 14.15 35.40 1.77 58.23 98.07 25.63 0.08 0.25 0.44

80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt. 81 PAB-67 82 PAB-68 83 PAB-71 84 PAB-72 85 PAB-72B 86 PAB-73 87 PAB-74 88 PAB-74A 89 PAB-75 Pinnacle Rk. Cabra Is Hermana Mayor Is. Tambobo Pt. Rena Pt. Rena Pt. Rocky Ledge Piedra Pt. Piedra Pt.

90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 92 PAB-76 93 PAB-77 94 PAB-78 95 PAB-79 96 PAB-79B 97 PAB-80 98 PAB-82 99 PAB-83 100 PAB-84 101 PAB-85 Dile Pt. Pinget Is. Baboc Is. Cape Bojeador Bobon Calagangan Pt. Itbayat Is. Amianan Is Amianan Is. Amianan Is.

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended. Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.

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Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law. Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly. Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation. Approved (Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES Speaker of the House of Representatives (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representative on February 17, 2009. (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP Secretary General House of Represenatives Approved: MAR 10, 2009 (Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES Secretary of Senate

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