ART 7 SEC 21 USAFFE v.

Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)

FACTS: Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Natl Defense Forces of the RP. ISSUE WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Govt YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence) There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16. The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on the Govt. The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the Court The agreement is not a treaty as that term is used in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the only form that an intl agreement may assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt over intl relations. Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ART 8 SEC 1 VINUYA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: Petitioners claim that since 1988, they have reproached the Exec Dept through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese military officials; however, Exec Dept declined to assist them. ISSUE: W/N the Exec Dept acted with grave abuse of discretion? W/N the court has jurisdiction? RULING: No. The Exec dept did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan. In this case, the Exec Dept decided that it is best interest of the country to waive all claims of nationals in the Treaty of Peace 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the court to question.

Art 8 SEC 2 Mantruste Systems v Court of Appeals

Facts: Mantruste Systems, Inc. (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement dated August 26, 1986 with the Development Bank of the Philippines, the owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel. The agreement provides that MSI would operate the hotel for a minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. During the said period, the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of certain Government Corporations and/or the (acquired) assets thereof and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust The CA rejected the lower courts opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it upheld that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art. XVIII.

Issue: W/N a writ of preliminary injunction can be issued in this case? HELD: No. The writ of preliminary injunction in this case is violative of Sec 31, Proclamation No. 50 A. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. -main point There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

- Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the Asset Privatization Trust(administrative body), nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

SEC 5 LINA VS. PURISIMA 82 SCRA 344 (1978) FACTS: Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

HELD: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND GMA NETWORK, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters Petitioners challenge the validity of COMELECS Omnibus Election Code, with respect to print media, and 92, with respect to broadcast media. In the present case, we consider the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election Issue: WON petitioners has standing in filing the case I Court upheld their standing in view of the transcendental importance of the constitutional question raised which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioners substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a partys standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[3] Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency. Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review. Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue. held The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. Main point In a public suit, where the plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, our Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. (David v. Arroyo)

Direct Injury Test: The persons who impugn the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result

PEOPLE vs.HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur REYES, J.B.L., J.: Facts: A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman After investigation by the authorities, 2 informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons,who allegedly burned several residential houses. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits Issue:W/N the SC possesses inherent power and jurisdiction order a change of venue or place of trial

held Yes. We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government" . Main point Section 5(4). The Supreme Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.This power is deemed to be an incidental and inherent power of the Court.

Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284 Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987] FACTS: 1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. 2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. 3. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of Judges/Justices? HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitution protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded.