UY KAI HU, Petitioner-Appellee, v. H.B McCOY, Respondent-Appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellant.

Southworth & Hagris for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. IMMIGRATION LAWS; DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS; DETERMINATION OF FACTS AND LAW. — A determination

of the customs authorities of a question of facts in a deportation proceeding is not reviewable by the courts in the
absence of an abuse of discretion, if sustained by some evidence, but errors of law may be reviewed.

2. ADMINISTRATION OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS. — Both the general immigration law and the Chinese exclusion
laws are enforced in the Philippine Islands by the customs authorities, and the procedure for the enforcement of
both bodies of law is the same.

3. REGISTERED CHINESE LABORERS REQUIRE RETURN CERTIFICATES. — It is an indispensable prerequisite of this

legal right to reenter the Philippine Islands that a registered Chinese laborer shall secure a return certificate upon
his departure from the Islands. The law in this respect is mandatory and their is no escape from its provisions.

4. ID.; "ENTRY" DEFINED. — An "entry" in the sense of the immigration statutes means something more than
merely stepping upon dry land within the jurisdiction of the state. The mere fact that an alien has so far eluded the
vigilance of the immigration authorities as to pass the boundary line does not constitute an entry in the sense of
these laws when he is apprehended to soon thereafter that he is prevented from performing any of those acts of
business, pleasure, or travel for which alien enters the state; and his right to enter is still subject to the
administrative proceedings of the immigration authorities.

DECISION

TRENT, J.:

The accepted facts in this case are these: The petitioner, formerly a resident Chinese laborer or the Philippine
Islands, and, such, issue a certificate in 1903 in accordance with Act No. 702 of the Philippine Commission, went to
China in 1905 without first securing the certificate required by section 7 of the Act of Congress of September 13,
1888, to entitle him to reenter this country. He returned as a laborer on or about June 13, 1911, as a stowaway on
the steamer Taisang, and sought to enter the Philippine Islands without being passed by the immigration
authorities. To aid him in so entering, he dressed himself as a sailor, although he was not, as a matter of fact, a
member of the crew, and he being in the disguise of a sailor was not held in a quarantine as were the passengers
aboard the vessel, although he was being watched by the customs officers. He became ashore in as launch,
disembarked, ran a few yards, and was then arrested and taken before an immigration officer, who, on account of
the regular offices being closed for the day, permitted him to go where he pleased for the night upon his promise
to return the following morning for examination. He returned and after the proper preliminaries a board of special
inquiry was convened. After a fair and impartial hearing this board rendered the following
decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The board decides that Uy Kai Hu, alias Yu Ki Hu, arrives at this port as a stowaway and does not present the
certificate required by law for the admission of Chinese. He expresses a wish to return to China on the same boat.
It is accordingly so ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library
While petitioner was being held by the customs authorities awaiting deportation, he caused to be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila a petition asking for a writ of  habeas corpus on the ground that he was
illegally imprisoned and deprived of his liberty by the customs authorities and that there did not exist any order of
commitment which justified his detention. After hearing the trial court ordered the petitioner discharged from
custody, saying in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The petitioner having landed in the Philippine Islands and having his certificate of registration showing him to be a
resident of the Philippine Islands, the said board of inquiry had no jurisdiction over him and acted without
authority in ordering him deported."cralaw virtua1aw library

x          x          x

"The petitioner actually being in the Philippine Islands and having his certificate of registration in the Islands as a
laborer cannot be removed except in the manner as provided by law now in force in the Islands. The customs
authorities, acting as immigration officers, cannot, under the law, deport the petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library

From this order the Collector of Customs appealed and now insists that the court erred :(1) In not treating the
finding and action of the duly authorized immigration officers upon the question of the right of the petitioner to
enter the Philippine Islands and other questions of fact as final and conclusive, having been made by a tribunal
authorized to decide the same, since it was not alleged or made to appear that such officers had abused the
discretion or power invested in them; (2) in not holding that the petitioner’s certificate of residence was of no
value; and (3) in holding that the petitioner had "landed."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Act of Congress of August 18, 1894, provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In every case where the alien is excluded from admission into the United States under any law or treaty now
existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the
admission of such alien, shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury." cralaw virtua1aw
library

The jurisdiction of the Treasury Department was afterwards transferred to the Department of Commerce and
Labor by the Act of February 14, 1903. The above provisions are enforced in the Philippine Islands by the customs
authorities.

It is entirely clear that when the petitioner in cases of this character is an alien, and when the right to deport him
depends upon a question of fact and when there has been a hearing by the customs authorities of that question,
and the conclusion of those authorities is based upon some evidence, such conclusion cannot be reviewed by the
courts, and in fact so found does in law justify the deportation, it must proceed, however mistaken the conclusion
of that department may seem to the court to have been. On the other hand, it is equally clear that errors of law by
that department may be reviewed by the courts in any case wherein it appears that the error has resulted in
excluding one who would have been correctly decided; that an erroneous conclusion of law, made by those
officers, cannot be sustained by being mistakenly called a conclusion of fact; that a conclusion of fact based upon
no evidence tending to support it is of no force; that the hearing at which no evidence is introduced is no hearing;
and that the customs officers’ authority for deportation must be found in the statute. (Lewis v. Frick, 189 Fed., 146,
and cases cited therein under Note 1.) In the case at bar the petitioner was given a hearing and the broad found
that he arrived as a stowaway and did not present the required certificate. No other finding of fact was reduced to
writing , but we must assumed that the board also found that the petitioner was arrested at the time and place
and under the circumstances as stated in the accepted facts. From these facts as found the board reached the
conclusion (a conclusion of law) that the petitioner must be deported. While we are precluded from reviewing the
action of the board as to the findings of fact, we may inquire whether the facts so found do in law justify the
deportation.
Before determining the legal value of the petitioner’s certificate of registration and whether he had "entered" the
Philippine Islands before he was arrested so as to place him without the jurisdiction of the customs authorities , we
will inquire whether or not the customs authorities have the power or are authorized to administer and enforce
both the general immigration law and the Chinese exclusion Acts; and also whether or not a Chinese laborer
seeking to enter comes within the provisions of both of these bodies of law or within the latter only.

The immigration laws and the Chinese exclusion Acts are enforced in the Philippine Islands by the customs
authorities. (In re Allen, 2 Phil. Rep., 630; Ngo-Ti v. Shuster, 7 Phil. Rep., 355; Jo Igco v. Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep., 448;
Juan Co. v. Rafferty, 14 Phil. Rep., 235; and many other cases.) The procedure for the enforcement of both bodies
of laws is the same. (Chinese and Immigration Circular No. 186, which was promulgated under Act No. 355, section
19, and the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905.) Chinese persons of Chinese descent must be examined by the
customs officers as to their tight to admission under the provisions of the general immigration Act as well as under
the provisions of laws relating to Chinese exclusion. (Acts of Congress February 20, 1907, and April 29, 1902, and
cases cited, supra.)

When the petitioner was arrested in the manner set forth in the accepted facts he had in his possession a Chinese
laborer’s certificate of residence. This certificate was issued in 1903, or some two years before he left the Islands.
The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that this certificate is conclusive proof of the petitioner’s right
to remain in the Islands. Of course, this holding rests upon the proposition that the petitioner had entered the
Philippine Islands when he was arrested and that therefore the immigration authorities had no jurisdiction in the
premises. The certificate of registration was issued under the provisions of Act No. 702 of the Philippine
Commission and was conclusive proof of the petitioner’s right to then remain in the Islands, but he left this country
without first obtaining the return certificate required by section 7 of the Act of September 13, 1888. This section
reads in part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"And no Chinese laborer shall be permitted to reenter the United States without producing to the proper officer of
the customs at the port of such entry the return certificate herein required."cralaw virtua1aw library

The language her used is mandatory. There can be no escape from its provisions. A Chinese laborer must provide
himself with one of these return certificates prior to his departure from the country if he would return and reenter.
The fact of his departure admitted, as in this case, the only legal method of reentry is by the production of such a
certificate. It matters not that the petitioner might have been entitled to have a return certificate issued to him.
this certificate is the one prerequisite for reentrance; and if he has it not there is no remedy. There is no authority
for dispensing with the production of this certificate. And furthermore, section 7, supra, provides that such
certificate shall be good for only one year except in certain enumerated cases, when it may be extended for one
additional year. As a petitioner remained away for over five years, a return certificate issued on his departure, even
if he produced, would have no value whatever. It therefore appears that the petitioner has no possible ground for
claiming the right to reenter this country. (United States v. Tuck Lee, 120 Fed., 989.)

It is contended that the petitioner, having landed from the launch free from all physical restraint by the
immigration authorities, had "entered" the Philippine Islands and was therefore no longer subject to
administrative proceedings provided for the deportation of undesirable aliens; in other words, that the
immigration authorities no longer had jurisdiction over this person.

The words "enter" and "entry" have such a variety of meanings, not only in jargon of the law, but in their ordinary
lay acceptations, that it would be obviously improper to assign a meaning to either not sanctioned by the sense in
which the word is used. To enter a country in the sense immigration laws means something more than merely
stepping upon dry land within the jurisdiction. One does not go into a foreign country an immigrant with intention
merely of crossing the border. He enters there with the intention of performing acts of business, pleasure, or
travel, or to earn a livelihood, all of which necessitates his communicating with the inhabitants and mingling with
them. It being recognized as dangerous to the body politic to allow certain classes of aliens to do any of these
things, provision is made to examine all aliens upon their arrival at the border line or port of entry, and refuse
those are found to be ineligible any further opportunity of accomplishing whatever their object may have been in
coming to the country. What difference exists, if any between the case of an alien who submits to the lawful
method for gaining entrance to the country and the case of an alien who manages to land or cross the border at a
place not designated by the immigration authorities and is arrested by them before he has had time to accomplish
any of those things for which he may have come to the country? It is clear that whatever his object in coming to
the country may be, it is totally defeated by such an arrest, and that, as a matter of fact, he is in no better position
in respect to that object than if he had not been passed by the immigration officers. So long as such a person has
been prevented from acquiring a residence or domicile and engaging in the ordinary pursuits of life, there can be
no excess of authority on the part of the immigration officers in detaining him, for that exactly what the law
authorizes these officers to do until he has passed the required examination. If they may not be permitted to take
all steps necessary to accomplish this purpose, it will be very difficult indeed to enforce the law. If surreptitiously
crossing the border at a point along the miles and miles of unguarded border an alien places himself beyond the
administrative proceedings of the immigration laws, it is patent that very many who fear the examination will avail
themselves of this means of entering the country.

It has been urged that the only safe way for the courts to decide this question is to adhere to the rule that an alien
once within the boundary limits of the country free from all physical restraint, even for the shortest space of time,
must be considered as having "entered;" that any other method of deciding this question leads to confusion and
uncertainty, with the result that every case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. At first sight
this is plausible solution of the question, designed to relieve the courts of a great deal of trouble and worry. it is to
be inferred, according to this argument, that if the lawmakers do not desire to countenance such practices it is
their duty to pass appropriate legislation whereby the immigration authorities will be empowered to arrest such
persons after they had crossed the border. But we apprehend that the passage of such legislation is impracticable.
Such a law could not specify that the jurisdiction of the immigration officers extended to only a certain distance
into the interior, because in a crowded city an immigrant might take up his residence within a block of the
immigration officers and live there unmolested until he was thoroughly domiciled, while at other points along the
boundary line he might not be able to find food or shelter until he had penetrated miles into the interior. It could
not specify that after a certain time the immigration officers would lose jurisdiction, because he might be hiding for
a month without having been able to take up his residence in any one place, or he may have taken up the ordinary
pursuits of life within a very short period of time. We think the legislation on the subject is sufficiently clear as it
now stands and that the question of whether an alien has been domiciled or not is no more difficult in the case of
the immigration laws (and we include the Chinese exclusion Acts) than in any other case; not it is more difficult of
solution than the questions of contributory negligence, laches, whether evidence constitutes the res gestae of a
case, and many other questions daily decided by the courts, in which the particular facts and circumstances of the
case under consideration largely determine the decision of the court. The petitioner according to the accepted
facts having been arrested by the immigration authorities a few minutes after having landed, certainly cannot be
said to have "entered" the country in the sense of the immigration laws. Nor are we unsupported by authority in
so holding.

In Ex parte Chow Chok Et. Al. (161 Fed., 627) it appears that eight Chinese persons were detained by a Chinese
inspector for the purpose of returning them to China, they having been refused admission to enter the United
States. After full opportunity to be heard by the immigration authorities on their right to enter, Judge Ray
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The circumstances are somewhat peculiar, and R.M. Moore, an attorney at law, swears our these writs in behalf
of these person, alleging that their detention is unlawful, in that, when apprehended, they had already entered the
United States, and were found therein, and were not seeking admission, and that, conceding that they were then
unlawfully in the United States and had no right to remain therein, the Chinese inspector in charge, H.R. Sison, had
no jurisdiction or power to hold them in custody and deport them or return them to China or pass on their cases;
that they were found in the United States and in no sense have applied for admission into the United States; that
they are seeking to enter, but to remain unmolested; that for these reasons they are entitled to a hearing on the
question of their right to be and to remain in the United States before a United States commissioner or judge in
the regular way the usual right of appeal in such cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court, after stating the details concerning the execution of the plan of these eight Chinamen to enter the
United States and the action of the immigration authorities in watching their movements up to the point of the
arrival of the Chinamen near the border line said, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When near the line, the terms referred to halted, and the Chinese alighted and moved toward the border. The
inspectors, or some of them, kept them in sight, and, as the Chinese crossed the border, passing from the highway
to the railroad track, and thence along as they crossed, they were closely followed by Inspectors Yale and Dunton,
who had been waiting at a farm house on the Canada side. And these officers were there were for the purpose of
preventing the illegal to entrance of these persons into the United States, for the purpose of apprehending them if
they did enter, and sending them back to China if on due examination found not entitled to enter. The purpose
was to prevent their "entrance" into the United States, within the intent and meaning of the Chinese exclusion
Acts. Nothing was said to them as they crossed the border into the United States, not until they have proceeded
something like a fourth of a mile along the track after crossing the border. Then Inspector Dunton gave them to
understand they would have to go along with the inspectors. From the point into Rouse’s Point, the nearest
railroad station for taking the train to Malone, the nearest port of entry, these petitioners were accompanied by
Inspectors West, Dunton, and Landis, who took possession of and carried most of their baggage. These inspectors
were acting under the orders of their superior. I sustain the objection to the statement that the inspectors "took
charge of them" as a conclusion. Their purpose in being there, and what was said and done, are acts which speak
for themselves. It is evident that the officers took them actually into their custody and under their control for the
purpose of preventing their actual and completed entry in the United States as "entry" or "entrance" should be
construed; that is, to prevent their going to large or becoming domiciled in the United States . It is evident the
purpose was to take them from the place where they crossed the border by all necessary force, to Malone, the
designated point for the admission of Chinese persons into the United States, for due investigation of the facts
bearing on their right to enter into the United States.

x          x          x

"I think it is clear that ’found unlawfully in the United States’ refers to those Chinese persons who have entered the
United States, gone at large, mixed with and become a part of our population, and not to those who, arriving at
the border, and suspected of having an intention to enter unlawfully, are followed by the officers having authority
to exclude them and actually taken into custody and immediately conducted to the nearest port of entry for
investigation of their right to enter, so soon as it is developed that it is their purpose to enter unlawfully and go at
large in defiance of law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The writs are dismissed and the petitioners remanded. This order was affirmed in a per curiam opinion by the
circuit court of appeals. (163 Fed., 1021.)

In the case of Ex parte Li Dick (174 Fed., 674), the proceedings were conducted under the provisions of the
Immigration Law of February 20, 1907. It appears that Li Dick was apprehended and taken into custody in the city
of Utica, near the central part of the State of New York, on October 22, 1909, on the charge that he was then there
a Chinese alien and that he had surreptitiously entered the United States at or near the town of North Burke from
the Dominion of Canada without having produced a certificate of admission or having been examined or inspected
as required by the immigration laws and regulations of the United States, and that therefore he had surreptitiously
entered in violation of law. Three days later the acting Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor issued
his warrant under the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Immigration Act and the warrant was placed in the
hands of an immigration inspector for execution. Two days thereafter the inspector took Li Dick into custody and
he was do held in custody by the inspector when a writ of habeas corpus was applied for and allowed. Li Dick made
contradictory statements about his entrance into the United States but finally admitted that he left Montreal,
Canada, on Monday evening preceding his arrest and came by automobile; that he came to Montreal from China,
where he had been some eight or nine months; and that he had been to Montreal only few days. He was asked
why he smuggled himself into the United States and stated that he had lived in that country before and wanted to
come back again; that he had not made preparations to return at the time he left, as several of his friends had
been turned down and he thought he would meet their fate too, so he did not apply; that since he left the United
States last he had not applied for readmission at a port of entry for Chinese; that he was to pay the man who
brought him into the United States from Montreal in the automobile $170; that he remained in a barn after leaving
the automobile until they started for the train and took a rig and drove several hours; and that the same party that
brought him from Montreal to the barn took him to the train. The court held as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In so far as the status of Li Dick is concerned in his relation to the Department of Commerce and Labor and the
Bureau of Immigration, I am of the opinion that while he was, in a sense, ’found unlawfully within the United
States,’ he was when found and apprehended in precisely the same condition as to his right to be and remain in
the United States as though he had then presented himself at port of entry for admission, or had been
apprehended by the immigration officers in the very act of crossing the border into the United States in violation of
law at some point remote from a port of entry, and there stopped by them. Can there be any question that the
immigration officers may prevent such an entry by a Chinese alien even though he had a mercantile domicile in this
country prior to his departure, even though such a departure and absence was intended to be temporary only? In
this case Li Dick had just entered or crossed the border secretly and in the nighttime. He had not reached his
destination in the United States. He had not settled down and become a part of the resident population. He was
still engaged in the act surreptitiously entering the United States as much as though he had been on foot running
to gain entrance and had reached a point ten or twenty rods this side the boundary line when actually overtaken
and apprehended. In such a case as that, must be the alien Chinese persons to be taken before the justice, judge,
or a Commissioner as one found unlawfully within the United States? Clearly not. (Ex parte Chow Chok Et. Al. (C.C.)
, 1611 Fed., 627, affirmed by circuit court of appeals, 163 Fed., 1021, 90 C.C.A., 230; United States v. Ju Toy, 198
U.S., 263, 25 Sup. Ct., 644, 49 L. ed., 1040.)

"In my opinion he is lawfully in the custody of the Chinese inspector and inspector of immigration, and the
immigration officers may examine into his case and return him to Canada if he is denied admission. In my opinion
for purposes of disposition by the immigration officers under the immigration law he is deemed to be in Canada
seeking admission into the United States. I know of no right he has gained by surreptitiously entering in a defiance
and violation of law. When returned to Canada, whence he came, he may present himself to a port of entry,
submit to examination and inspection, present his case as an alleged domiciled Chinese merchant entitled to
return to and remain in the United States, and if he sustains his claim no doubt the immigration officers will admit
him."cralaw virtua1aw library

x          x          x

"But Li Dick concedes that he is Chinese person, an alien, that he departed to China some eight or nine months
ago, without making any preparation or arrangements for his return, and that when he did return he purposely
failed to comply with the law and entered surreptitiously. I think the law clear that he must be returned to Canada,
or deported to China if Canada will not receive him, and that his right as a domiciled merchant cannot be brought
in question in these proceedings or the proceedings pending before the Department of Commerce and Labor,
Bureau of Immigration. The warrant is not void, the Department has jurisdiction and possession of his person, and,
at this stage of the case, at least, the courts should not and will not interfere." cralaw virtua1aw library

The writ was dismissed and the petitioner remanded. The same Li Dick again sought discharge from custody on a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was illegally held and deprived of his liberty on a warrant of deportation
made by the Acting Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor. In its decision the circuit court again
considered his claim that the was not subject to the provisions of the Immigration Law on February 20, 1907, and
the writ was likewise dismissed and the petitioner again remanded. (Ex parte Li Dick, 176 Fed., 998.)

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petitioner is remanded to the Collector of Customs for
deportation. Without costs.

The appeal interposed by the clerk of the court from order of the court directing that the petition be filed without
requiring the fees of the clerk and sheriff to be paid in advance will be decided in a separate opinion.

Arellano, C.J. Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

ANG BENG, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, Respondent-Appellee.

Julio T. de la Cruz and Emerito G. Bagabaldo for Appellants.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Federico V. Siam for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. IMPORT CONTROL LAW; PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF LAW; EFFECT OF EXPIRATION OF
LAW; POWER OF PRESIDENT TO ISSUE DEPORTATION ORDER. — Petitioners were prosecuted in and convicted for
violation of the import Control Law (Republic Act No. 650). They were also charged before the Deportation Board.
Pending appeal of the criminal case, the Import Control Law expired, in view of which petitioners were ordered
discharged. The Deportation Board however, recommended petitioners’ deportation, and the President issued the
corresponding order of deportation. Held: That the expiration of the Import Control Law can not be considered
favorable to them in the sense that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law upholding such
proposition. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction provided in Article 266 and 22 of the Revised
Penal Code accrues when penal laws are repealed. In the case at bar, there is no subsequent repealing law that
petitioners could mention. The law violated by them expired in virtue of its own force. What is more, the
President, in the exercise of his executive prerogative and as an act of State, is vested with full power and
discretion to issue orders of deportation. Such orders do not depend on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal
case.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

The petitioners, both Chinese nationals, were prosecuted in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila’
for violation of the Import Control Law (Republic Act No. 650) in Criminal Case No. 21317. They were also charged
before the Deportation Board. Pending appeal of the criminal case in the Court of Appeals, the Import Control Law
expired, in view of which and with the conformity of the Solicitor General, petitioners’ motion for dismissal was
granted and they were ordered discharged. The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the President of the
Philippines its findings in the Deportation Case and recommended petitioners’ deportation. On January 18, 1954,
the President issued the corresponding order of deportation. On March 1, 1955, the petitioners filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the President’s order of
deportation be declared illegal and that they be released. From the dismissal of the petition the petitioners have
appealed before us.

The issue raised is whether the order deporting the petitioners should be set aside, because the law defining the
crime of which they were convicted had already expired, the order of deportation being based on said conviction.

The felony with which the petitioners were charged was committed during the effectivity of the Import Control
Law. The pertinent legal provisions are therefore Articles 366 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 36. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors,
committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in
force at the time of their Commission.

"ART. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." cralaw virtua1aw library

We cannot subscribed to petitioners’ contention that the expiration of the Import Control Law should be
considered favorable to them in the sense that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law upholding
such proposition. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction accrues when penal laws are repealed. There
is no subsequent repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law violated by them expired in virtue of its
own force. The case of Tamayo, 6 Phil., 225, invoked by petitioners is irrelevant, as it involved absolute repeal.

What is more, the order of deportation emanated from a branch of the government which exercises jurisdiction
independent from the judiciary. The President, in the exercise of his executive prerogative and as an act of State, is
vested with full power and discretion to issue orders of deportation.

"The power to expel or exclude aliens being a power affecting international relations is vested in the political
department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or act of Congress, and to be executed by the
executive authority according to the regulations so established, except as far as the judicial department has been
authorized by treaty or statute, or required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene." (In re
Paterson, 1 Phil., 96; In Re McGulluch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.)

To spearhead all other consideration, it is fundamental that an executive order for exportation is not dependent on
a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case. This axiom of law was reiterated in the decision in the case of Tan Tong
v. Deportation Board, (96 Phil., 934) which pertinently ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is
vested in the Executive by virtue of this office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject. (In re McGulluch
Dick, 38 Phil., 41)

x          x          x

"By no form or manner of reasoning can the inference be made that by section 2702 of the Revised Administrative
Code the Legislature intended that an alien can be deported for illegal importation only upon conviction therefor in
a competent Court, and thereby deprived the Deportation Board of its power to investigate charges of unlawful
importation of merchandise against an alien, especially, when as it appears from the record, no criminal action for
unlawful importation has been filed against him. The language of the provision and the chapter in which it is found
do not justify petitioner’s contention. No derogation of a power vested in the Chief Executive or a limitation
thereof can be presumed by the implication from the mere addition of the Clause he may be subject to
deportation at the end of Section 2702. This section punishes illegal importation and imposes , in addition to the
penalty prescribed, the liability to deportation if the person found guilty is an alien. Its sole import is that if a
competent court has found an alien guilty of a violation of section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
proceedings outlined in section 69 of the said Code are no longer necessary for deportation. Beyond this it is
unreasonable if not absurd, to presume that the legislature intended more. It could not have intended that if there
is no conviction for a crime of unlawful importation, or if no charges have been filed against an alien therefor, the
Deportation Board may not proceed to investigate said charges against him and recommend deportation."
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the
appellants.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL

INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO
CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL

INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO
CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T.
GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95612-13             May 31, 1991

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.

On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person
with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has
five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together
with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961
(Annex "D", petition).

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting
to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review  motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William
and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory (Annex "F",
petition).

The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20,
1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
assigned.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the
reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest
issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18",
counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the
same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54214.

On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge
has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent
judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for
injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day,
respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing
with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.

The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129
with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo
vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90
for forum-shopping.

In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is
not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case
until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously
and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-
judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already
prescribed.

For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.

Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank
with Regional Trial Courts.

Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court
and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to  all quasi-
judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court
of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions
of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the
Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:

. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the
same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic
Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department
of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as
the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission;
the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal
therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of
law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals,
the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and
 executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of
appeal.

Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,
and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)

There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in
terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.

However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject
to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides
as follows:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in
any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter,
provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court
specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).

True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).

However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should
the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial
proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the
affirmative, and We quote:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A
citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed
by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection,
either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If
he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability.

. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has
unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion ? (Emphasis
supplied)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]).
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed
only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board,  supra;
Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of
citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.

In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec.
21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.

Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We
deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent
for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this
case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to
this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger
Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).

In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp.,
et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:

Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia,
92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent.
In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already
settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is
being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).

According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the
actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners,  i.e., whether the decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was
superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6,
1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of
citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated
from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian.
Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim
to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make
any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of  res judicata does not
apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation
Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).

In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:

(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as  res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.

An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:

We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive
proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance
 will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any
other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the
finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.

Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence
based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33),
the Court finds the same devoid of merit.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)

From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against
the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24
SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation
of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990;  Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of
the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;

x x x           x x x          x x x
 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same
was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent,
respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for
re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which
was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens."
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s)
of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to
remain in the country."

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others
as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a
matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:

The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated
July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).

Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).

In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the
Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate
child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25,
1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry
which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.

The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing
to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in
issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20,
1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It
is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in
this case.

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation
"shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of
such inaction, thus:

There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she
gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than
that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission .
Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made
an spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection
with the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the
immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to
be married to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the
Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then
must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to
land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore
but wonder why two years later the immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take
steps to institute deportation proceedings against the minor.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would
be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and
acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after
having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction,
thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at
this late hour would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby
leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction
or oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of
equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28
long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of
exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others,
was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in  Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37
(b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.

The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings
should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the
offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2)
years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:

Penal Provisions

Sec. 45. Any individual who—

(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or

(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or

(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or

(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or

(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or

(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or

(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense,
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not
more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)

Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional
penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after  eight years for those punished
by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."

Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion
based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute
the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).

"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that
it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court
of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the
lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may
be enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an
action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:

1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or
exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a)
of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the
prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision
dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).

Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the
Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4)
minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and
earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He
engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and
Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent
claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and
discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.

"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped
the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special
Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that
respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The
action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out
that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid
by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.

After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.

In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of
Philippine law.

The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago
was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been
content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of
Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the
Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are
not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or
tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in
substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)

Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not
self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ."
And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage
may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner:
"In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual
presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law
bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate
child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV
of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling
arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to
have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.

LAO GI alias FILOMENO CHIA, SR., his wife, ONG UE, and his children FILOMENO, JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA
and DOMINGA, all surnamed CHIA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioners.

GANCAYCO, J.:

On September 3, 1958 the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr.,
alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born on
November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua, Pampanga. However on
October 3, 1980 the Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 cancelling Opinion No. 191, series
of 1958 and setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation. A motion for reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of Justice on February
13, 1981.

On March 9, 1981 a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.
An amended charge was filed with the CID on March 19,1981 alleging that said respondents refused to register as
aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. On August 31, 1981 another
amended charge was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.

On September 4, 1981 said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the CID
has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191, series of 1958. The motion to dismiss was
opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the
citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to respondents.
The respondents filed a reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a motion for
reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution dated December 10, 1981.

Said respondents then filed with this Court on February 11, 1982 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 59619. After
requiring a comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of
merit.

Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute
Sale of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5, 1982 on the ground that
Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and that revocation
thereof by Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable.

On June 1, 1982 respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of this Court dismissing
the petition but this was denied by another resolution of this Court dated August 17, 1982. A second motion for
reconsideration thereof was also denied by this Court on September 16, 1982.

On September 23, 1982 the CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing and Acting Commissioner
Victor G. Nituda gave respondents three (3) days to move for reconsideration of the order directing them to
register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest. On September 27, 1982 respondents filed said motion
for reconsideration and opposition but this was denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda on September 28, 1982.
The latter directed respondents to register as aliens within two (2) days from notice thereof. The deportation case
was set for hearing on October 5, 1 982 but on the same day respondents filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 82-
12935 whereby a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On April 17,1985 a decision was rendered by the trial
court dismissing the petition for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court on the particular subject involved. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved.

An appeal therefrom was interposed to the Court of Appeals. In due course a decision was rendered on August 19,
1987 dismissing the appeal with costs against petitioners. A motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by
petitioners was also denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1988.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they seek to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID dated September 28, 1982 and
directing it to proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners. The
issues raised in the petition are as follows:

1. The issues raised in G.R. No. 59619 before the Honorable Supreme Court were different from the issues raised in
Civil Case No. 82-12935-CV.

2. The minute resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 59619 did not make a categorical ruling that
petitioner entered and remained in the Philippines by false pretenses.
3. The issue of whether or not petitioners' citizenship was secured by fraud is precisely the subject matter of the
proceedings before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, in which no evidence had been presented
yet in support of the charge of fraud in the acquisition of petitioners' citizenship.

4. Petitioners are not subject to immediate deportation.

5. The order for the arrest of petitioners in case of failure to register as aliens was premature since there was no
competent determination yet that their citizenship was indeed procured by fraud.

6. The Honorable Court of Appeals overstepped its appellate jurisdiction, when it ruled on matters not covered by
the Decision of the lower court.

There can be no question that the CID has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation
case against petitioners and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by the petitioners.
Section 37(a) (1) of the Immigration Act provides as follows:

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by
Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...

From the foregoing provision it is clear that before any alien may be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground as charged against the alien.

In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry.

After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a
hearing should be conducted, and it is only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered deported.
In such a hearing, Opinion No. 191, Series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice and Opinion No. 147, Series of 1980 of
the Minister of Justice will bear much weight in the determination by the CID of the citizenship of said petitioners.

The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as aliens as required by the
Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to
require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is
so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a
previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and required to
register as aliens.

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power.  1 It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people. 2
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that
it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:

c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor
without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.

Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in
ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is
intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. 3

Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is
a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. 4 The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without
warrant and service of warrants should be in accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; 5 search warrants issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; 6 and so the matter of bail, motion to quash, and trial, 7 among others. Fealty to the prescribed rules of
procedure in deportation cases shall insure a speedy, fair and just dispensation of justice.

The Court takes note of the fact that a private prosecutor is assisting in the prosecution of the case by the special
prosecutor of the CID. The Court sees no reason why a private prosecutor should be allowed to participate in a
deportation case. Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 16, Rule 110 thereof, an
offended party may intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil liability arising from the criminal action
claimed by said party. In such case he may intervene by counsel.

In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any justification for a private party to have any right to
intervene. Even if such party can establish any damages due him arising from the deportation charge against the
alien, such relief cannot be afforded him in the deportation proceeding. His recourse if at all is in the ordinary
courts. Thus the Court rules that the intervention of a private prosecutor should not be allowed in deportation
cases. The possibility of oppression, harrassment and persecution cannot be discounted. The deportation of an
alien is the sole concern of the State. This is the reason why there are special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to
prosecute such cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned order of the respondent Commission on
Immigration and Deportation dated September 28, 1982 is hereby set aside. The respondent Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to continue hearing the deportation case against petitioners and
thereafter, based on the evidence before it, to resolve the issue of citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be
aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as
aliens. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

NATIVIDAD MIRANDA, LUIS MIRANDA, PEDRO MIRANDA, RAMON MIRANDA and FAUSTINO
MIRANDA, Petitioners, v. DEPORTATION BOARD, Respondent.

Jacobo Gonzales, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. DEPORTATION; JURISDICTION; ALLEGATION OF CITIZENSHIP. — While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board
as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person arrested is an
alien, the mere plea of citizenship, however, does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners
should make "a showing that his claim is not frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho v. White 259, U. S. 275), and must prove by
sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler v. Strecker (1939) 307 U. S., 21, 35-36. If such is the
primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the
evidence that may he presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is
inherent in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio v. Collector of
Customs 35 Phil., 37.) It is not therefore correct to state that the question of citizenship should be determined
exclusión by the courts. (Llaneo v. Deportation Board, L-6272, February 22, 1954)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BLOOD TEST. — With regard to the contention that the Deportation Board has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the taking of a blood test upon the persons of petitioners
to prove that they are not Filipino citizens, the same need not now be considered, it being a matter that said Board
can look into in the exercise its incidental power to pass upon the citizenship of petitioners.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to restrain respondent from hearing the Deportation case filed
against petitioners and, incidentally, to have an order issued requiring respondent to show cause why petitioners
should not be released on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On November 17, 1952, petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having entered the
Philippines through fraud and misrepresentation in that, being the children of Chinese parents, they succeeded in
showing through misrepresentation that they are the legitimate children of Faustino Miranda, a Filipino citizen,
had with a woman named Puy Siok and that, by reason of such misrepresentation, they were landed in this country
as children of a Filipino citizen. Because of these charges, petitioners were arrested and detained at the detention
station of the Bureau of Immigration although later they were set at liberty upon posting a bond of P1,000 each.

On June 18, 1953, petitioners filed a motion to quash the case alleging that they are Filipino citizens and, therefore,
the Deportation Board has no jurisdiction over them. The Deportation Board not only denied this motion but set
the case for hearing on July 7, 1953, whereupon petitioner filed the present petition seeking the suspension of the
hearing and their release.

The main contention of petitioners is predicated upon the theory that the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is
confined to persons who are admittedly aliens and are found to be undesirable and, having alleged that they are
Filipino citizens, said Board has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges filed against them.

While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable
aliens exists only when the person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the
Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is not frivolous" (Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U. S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler v.
Strecker (1939) 307 U. S., 21, 35-36. ] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation
Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first
instance if petitioners are Filipino citizen or not. This is inherent in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the
power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio v. Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37.) It is not therefore correct to state
that the question of citizenship should be determined exclusively by the courts. As this Court ruled in a recent
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Resuelto Por la Junta que tiene jurisdicción, es obvio que debe proseguir con el caso hasta su terminación. Si la
Junta halla infundados los cargos de indeseabilidad del recurrente, el caso habra terminado totalmente, pero si la
halla indeseable, puede apelar contra el fallo, y si la apelación fracasa, entonces sera el tiempo de considerar si
demostrando causa razonable debe haber un juicio ulterior sobre la ciudadania filipina que alega mediante  habeas
corpus." (Llanco v. The Deportation Board, G. R. No. L-6272, prom. February 22, 1954.)

The foregoing disposes of the claim relative to the illegality of petitioners’ confinement. With regard to the
contention that the Deportation Board has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the taking of a blood test upon the persons of petitioners to prove that they are not Filipino citizens, the
same need not now be considered, it being a matter that said Board can look into in the exercise its incidental
power to pass upon the citizenship of petitioners.

Wherefore petition is denied, with costs against petitioners. The writ of preliminary injunction issued against
respondent is hereby dissolved.

Paras, C.J., Reyes, Pablo, Jugo, Bengzon, Labrador, Padilla, Concepcion and Montemayor, Diokno, JJ., concur.

AGUS DWIKARNA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration, GEN.

LEANDRO MENDOZA,* Chief, Philippine National Police, GEN. JAIME G. CARINGAL, Chief, Intelligence Group,
Philippine National Police, RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Chief, Bureau of Special Inquiry, and the Board of
Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, filed under Rule 46, in relation to Rule 56, Sections
1 and 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for a temporary mandatory injunction for the immediate
release of petitioner from detention.

The facts of the case follow.

On March 13, 2002, at around 7:25 p.m., petitioner Agus Dwikarna and two other Indonesian nationals, namely,
Abdul Jamal Balfas and Hamsid Lin Rung, were at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, checking in their luggage
for x-ray screening in preparation for their departure for Bangkok, Thailand. The police authorities apprehended
them when they were found to be in possession of two pieces oval-shaped C-4 plastic explosives and five pieces
detonating cords.

The following day, on March 14, 2002, an information was filed against petitioner and his two companions in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition), as amended. The accusatory part of the information read:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
That on 13 March 2002, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
conspiring and confederating, together and mutually helping one another, with intent to possess, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control, incendiary devices capable
of producing destructive effects on contiguous objects and/or causing injury or death to persons without the
necessary license and authority to possess the same, viz. : two (2) pcs. oval shaped C-4 plastic explosives and five
(5) pcs. detonating cords.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1 cralawred

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0576.

On March 19, 2002, a charge sheet was filed by the special prosecutor of the Bureau of Immigration against
petitioner and his two co-accused, docketed as D.C. No. ADD No. 02-004, for violation of section 37 (a) (7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The charge sheet read:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges for deportation, AGUS DWIKARNA, ABDUL JAMAL BALFAS and TAMSIL
LIN RUNG all Indonesian nationals for violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the PIA of 1940, as amended, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

That herein respondents were arrested at the NAIA on 13 March 2002 at about 7:25 p.m. for violation of P.D. 1866
by joint elements of PNP, IG, NICA, BID, PAF-AISG in cooperation with ASG, PNP and under the supervision of TASK
FORCE SANGLAHI.

That on or about 7:15 PM March 13, 2002 the trio, AGUS DWIKARNA, ABDUL JAMAL BALFAS and TAMSIL LIN RUNG
entered the International Terminal 1, Pasay City, and submitted themselves for routine security check. However,
during the course of the inspection by the IRASCO personnel, PNP-ASG, the pieces of luggage of the trio yielded
components for making improvised explosive devices (IEDs) without necessary and legal authority to possess the
said items.

That consequently the corresponding charge for violation of PD 1866 was filed before Pasay City prosecutor. Office
and Inquest Prosecutor Bernabe Augustus C. Solis ordered their detention with the PNP Intelligence
Group.2 cralawred

On March 25, 2002, the charge sheet was amended and petitioner and his co-accused were further charged with
violation of section 37 (a) (8) of the same Act. The amended charge sheet read:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges for deportation, AGUS DWIKARNA, ABDUL JAMAL BALFAS, TAMSIL LIN
RUNG all Indonesian nationals for violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the PIA of 1940, as amended, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

That herein respondents were arrested at the NAIA on 13 March 2002 at about 7:25 p.m. for violation of P.D. 1866
by joint elements of PNP, IG, NICA, BID, PAF-AISG in coordination with ASG, PNP and under the supervision of TASK
FORCE SANGLAHI.

That on or about 7:15 PM March 13, 2002 the trio AGUS DWIKARNA, ABDUL JAMAL BALFAS, TAMSIL LIN RUNG
entered the International Terminal 1, Pasay City, and submitted themselves for routine security check. However,
during the course of the inspection by the IRASO personnel, PNP-ASG, the pieces of luggage of the trio yielded
components for making improvised explosive devices (IEDs) without necessary and legal authority to possess the
said items;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
OSG v De Castro

TZE SUN WONG, Petitioner, v. KENNY WONG, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution 3 dated
October 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607, affirming the deportation of petitioner Tze
Sun Wong (petitioner).

The Facts

Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines in 1975 and subsequently acquired a permanent
resident status in 1982. As the records would show, he studied, married, and continued to reside in the country,
and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel and Tours. 4

On September 12, 2000, respondent Kenny Wong (respondent), owner and proprietor of San Andres Construction
Supply, filed a Complaint-Affidavit 5 against petitioner before the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), alleging that the
latter had misrepresented, in his driver’s license application, that he was a Filipino citizen. Respondent also averred
that petitioner and his business partner, Tina Yu, issued post-dated checks in the amount of p886,922.00 which,
however, bounced to his damage and prejudice. Thus, taking cue from the foregoing acts, respondent prayed that
petitioner be investigated by the BOI for violation of immigration laws. 6

In his Counter-Affidavit7 dated September 28, 2000, petitioner denied respondent’s claim of misrepresentation,
stating that when he applied for a driver’s license, it was another person who filled up the application form for
him. However, said person entered the wrong information, particularly, on his name, birth year, and nationality. 8

Finding probable cause, the Special Prosecutor filed with the BOI the applicable deportation charges 9 against
petitioner, docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-02-280. 10 Thereafter, the BOI Commissioner issued a Mission Order 11 to
verify petitioner’s immigration status. The Mission Order was later recalled 12 and the Law and Investigation
Division endorsed the records to the Board of Special Inquiry which directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.13

The BOI Ruling

In a Judgment14 dated October 2, 2002, the BOI Board of Commissioners ordered the deportation of petitioner on
the grounds of: (a) illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph Wong, which was the name appearing in his driver’s license
application; and (b) misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application, in violation of Section 37
(a) (7) and (9)15 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, 16 otherwise known as “The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940”
(Immigration Act),  in relation to Sections 1, 2, and 3 17 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6085. 18 Aside from pointing out the
misrepresentations made by petitioner, the BOI took judicial notice of the fact that driver’s license applications
require the personal appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud. Thus, by allowing someone to apply for
him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a fraudulent driver’s license. By the same
account, he cannot then aver that he was without any participation in the entry of his supposed Philippine
citizenship in his driver’s license. 19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 20 which was eventually denied by the BOI in a Resolution 21 dated
December 4, 2002. As such, petitioner filed an appeal before the Secretary of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated March 22, 2004, Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez affirmed the ruling
of the BOI, holding that since it undisputedly appears on the face of petitioner’s driver’s license that he is a Filipino
citizen under the name of Joseph Wong, he cannot then raise the defense that it was not his doing but that of a
stranger who merely helped him. 23 It was further pointed out that petitioner’s use of the alias “Joseph Wong” was
illegal since said name is not registered in the BOI and does not fall under the recognized exceptions where use of
alias may be allowed.24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration 25 and raised the argument that the Judgment of the BOI was null and void
since only two commissioners26 participated in the decision-making process. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez
rendered a Resolution27 dated September 9, 2005, rejecting petitioner’s argument on the basis of Section 8 of the
Immigration Act which simply requires that “[i]n any case coming before the [BOI] Board of Commissioners, the
decision of any two members shall prevail[,]” as in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to
reconsider said Judgment, all four (4) commissioners 28 decided in favor of his deportation. 29

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision31 dated May 15, 2007, the CA denied32 the certiorari petition. Preliminarily, it found that petitioner
chose the wrong remedy considering that the decisions of the BOI Board of Commissioners are directly appealable
to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 33 The CA also observed that even on the assumption that the
Secretary of Justice was given the authority to countermand the BOI Judgment under the Administrative Code, no
countermand was made, and hence, the same should have already attained finality. 34 On the substantive aspects,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Justice that petitioner should be deported for violating the
abovementioned rules.35

Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a Resolution37 dated October 23, 2007, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly denied petitioner’s petition
for certiorari.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The Court first discusses the propriety of petitioner’s recourse before the CA.

Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines)
shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.

RULE 43

Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals

Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
(Emphasis supplied)

The statutory basis of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by quasi-judicial agencies (except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442) in the abovementioned respect is Section 9 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129,38 as amended:39

Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission , the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxxx

Notably, in Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete,40 it was clarified that the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies
under Section 1, Rule 43 is not exclusive:

The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase “among these
agencies” confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed. 41

Thus, although unmentioned in the enumeration, the Court, in the case of Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo42 (Dwikarna),
held that the decisions rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners may be appealable to the CA via Rule 43 in
the event that a motion for reconsideration therefrom is denied:

If petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, he can
move for its reconsideration. If his motion is denied, then he can elevate his case by way of a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure .43 (Emphasis
supplied)

It bears elucidation that the availability of a Rule 43 appeal to the CA from the BOI Board of Commissioners as
ruled in Dwikarna  presupposes the presence of any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,44 considering that the Secretary of Justice may still review the decisions of the aforesaid
body. In Caoile v. Vivo45 (Caoile), it was held:

[S]ince the Commissioners of Immigration are under the Department of Justice 46 and, in this case, they followed
the Secretary’s Order setting aside the individual actions of the former Commissioners, the aggrieved parties
should have exhausted their administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial
intervention.47
Citing Caoile, the Court, in the more recent case of Kiani v. The Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation,48 expounded on the procedure:

Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested on the
President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested
with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. 49 Thus, a
party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the [Board of Commissioner (BOC)] is proscribed from assailing
said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with [the] ruling of the Court in
[Commissioner] Domingo v. Scheer (see 466 Phil. 235, 264-284 2004), such party may file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that “there is no law or rule which provides that a
Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its
issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of
the BOC.” The Court, likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in a
suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order
under Rule 37 of said Rules.

In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Secretary of
Justice and, if the latter denies the appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines [(OP)]. The party may
also choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that
the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing the appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy. In case the Secretary of
Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may resort to filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.50

Thus, to recap, from the denial of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved
party has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that any
of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available
administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to
the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; 51 or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the
CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned remedies cannot be
taken as “adequate and speedy.” Anent the last of these options, the Court, in Rigor v. CA,52 had this to say:

For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that he has no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate
grievance. A recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or
tribunal is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” remedy. 53

Case law explains that “[a] remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.” 54  In this relation, it has been
recognized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari  may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x
and  x x x in case of urgency.” 55

In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter sought
direct recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available remedies, the first being a
subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43.
While these remedies remained available to him, the Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and
adequate relief in view of the plain imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of
deportation.56 The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.

This notwithstanding, the Court nonetheless denies the petition on substantive grounds.
It must be highlighted that the case under consideration essentially calls for the Court to determine whether the
CA’s dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition before it was correct.

“In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the
burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.”57

Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation
imputed against him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts
involves factual matters that have already been established during the proceedings before the BOI Board of
Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine
whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this
jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.” 58 As petitioner has not sufficiently
demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to
defer to its judgment.

Besides, petitioner’s defenses anent what had actually transpired during the relevant incidents surrounding his
driver’s license application apparently constitute mere self-serving allegations barren of any independent proof.
While he blamed the unnamed fixer filling up the erroneous details in his application, his version of the story
remained uncorroborated. The lack of testimony on the part of the fixer leaves much to be desired from
petitioner’s theory.

Moreover, the Court’s review of the present case is via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of
fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the
lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the
adduced facts.59 None of these exceptions was, however, convincingly shown to attend in this case.

Now, on the matter of the alleged nullity of the BOI Board of Commissioners’ Judgment due to the fact that it had
been signed only by two (2) commissioners, suffice it to state that Section 8 of the Immigration Act simply requires
that in any case coming before the BOI Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two (2) members shall prevail:

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Sec. 8. Decision of the Board. - The board of Commissioners, hereinafter referred to in this Act, shall be composed
of the Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of a member of the
Board, the Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as a
member thereof. In any case coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall
prevail.

Petitioner argues that the foregoing rule only refers to the number of votes necessary to constitute the decision of
the Board, insisting that deliberation should still be made by all commissioners as a collegial body. 60
Petitioner’s argument is correct in theory since deliberation by all members of the collegial body is evidently what
the rule contemplates, with the votes of only two (2) members being sufficient for a decision to prevail.
Unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any proof that deliberations were not conducted by all
commissioners before the questioned Judgment was made. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. 61 Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot
be given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity, which herein ought to prevail due
to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Bustillo v. People62 states:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 63

In particular, the presumption that the Judgment had been deliberated by the BOI Board of Commissioners as a
collegial body stands. In any event, the lack of any concurrence or dissension from the two (2) other
commissioners missing on the face of the October 2, 2002 Judgment has already been placated by their eventual
signing of full concurrence in the subsequent Resolution dated December 4, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 23, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92607 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191810               June 22, 2015

JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Petitioner,

vs.
BUREEAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION and its COMMISIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondents,

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeking to nullify the October
28, 2009 Decision1 and March 22, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840, which
affirmed as final and executor the April 17, 2002 Decision 3 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-
01-117.

In June 1999, the Concerned Employee’s of Noah’s Arc Group of Companies filed a letter0complaint against
petitioner Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano (Go) and his father, Carlos Go, Sr. a.k.a. Go Kian Lu (Go, Sr.) It was
claimed that Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien who later adopted the Filipino name ‘Carlos Go, Sr." Allegedly,
Go. Sr. obtained for himself some basic education and married a Chinese woman name Rosario Tan. Their union
produced ten (10) children, one of whom is petitioner Go. On the premise that Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien,
petitioner Go is also an alien, being a child of a Chinese citizen.

A year after, in April 2000, a complaint-affidavit 4 for deportation of petitioner Go was initiated, this time by Luis T.
Ramos (Ramos), before the Bureau of Immigration. Ramos alleged that while petitioner Go represents himself as a
Filipino citizen, his personal circumstances and relevant records indicate that he is a Chinese citizen born in the
Philippines to Chinese parents, which is in violation of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. To prove his contention, Ramos presented the birth certificates of
petitioner Go as well as that of his sister Juliet GO (Juliet) and older brother Carlos Go, Jr. (Carlos, Jr.). The birth
certificate indicates petitioner Go as "FChinese." The pertinent page from the Registry of Births also states that the
citizenship of Baby Jimmy Go is "Chinese." Further, the birth certificates of his siblings show that they were born of
Chinese parents.

Petitioner Go refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit. He alleged that his father, Go, Sr., who was the son of
a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship, as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of
Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship on July 12, 1950.
He added that Go, Sr. was a registered voter and actually voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. As regards the
entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, petitioner Go averred that Juliet and Carlos, Jr., were born on June 3, 1946
and April 2, 1949, respectively, or prior to their father’s election of Philippine citizenship. Finally, petitioner Go
asserted that his birth certificate states that his father’s citizenship is "Filipino."

In October 2000, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forwarded to the BI a copy of its Investigation Report
and probe on the investigation conducted against petitioner Go and GO, Sr. pursuant to the letter complaint of the
Concerned Employees of Noah’s Arc Group of Companies. The finding of the Special Investigator, which were
affirmed by the Chief of the SLPS-NBI, stated that the election of Philippine citizenship of Go, Sr. was in accordance
with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution and that the erasure on the original birth certificate of petitioner Go
could not be attributed to him or Go, Sr. because said document was on file with the local civil registrar of Iloilo
City.

Finding the evidence and report of the NBA as conclusive of the citizenship of petitioner Go and Go, Sr., BI
Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla subsequently rendered a Resolution dated February 14, 2001
that dismissed the complaint for deportation filed against petitioner Go. 5

However, on March 8, 2001,6 the BI Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed the case dismissal, holding that the
election of Philippine citizenship of Go, Sr. was made out of time. The Board then directed the preparation and
filing of the appropriate deportation charges against petitioner Go.

One July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet 7 was filed against petitioner Go for violation of Section 37(a)(9),
in relation to Section 45(e) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, committed as follows:

1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth
certificate wherein his citizenship was recorded a "Chinese";

2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true and
actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T.
GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, in violation of the above-cited
provisions of the Immigration Act[;] [and]

3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represents and introduces himself as a
citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the
immigration laws, also in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

In November 2001, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
injunctive reliefs before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking
to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001. 9 Essentially, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue
with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision dated April 17, 2002 in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the
apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent
JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without
prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings that are pending court or
before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered
barred from entry into the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.10

The Board gave weight to the documents submitted against petitioner Go, to wit:

1. The Certificate of Birth of petitioner Go, issued on November 23, 1999 by the local civil registrar of Iloilo
City, which showed that Baby Jimmy Go is "FChinese";

2. The Certificate of Live Birth of Juliet Go, which certified that her citizenship was Chinese. The same
certificate also stated that Go, Sr. was a "Chinese" and the mother "Rosario Tan" was also "Chinese"; and

3. The Certificate of Live Birth of Carlos Go, Jr., whose citizenship was also certified as "Chinese."

The Board held that all documents submitted were prima-facie evidence of the facts regarding the nationality of
petitioner Go pursuant to Article 410 11 of the Civil Code as they are considered public documents. Further, it was
opined that petitioner Go’s claim of being Filipino totally lacks merit since his father’s election of Philippine
citizenship was void for having been filed five (5) years after his attainment of the age of majority or when he was
twenty-six (26) years old. The Board also observed that the certified true copy of the Oath of Allegiance of Go, Sr.
appears to have been subscribed and sworn to before the Deputy Clerk of Court of Iloilo City on July 11,1950 while
his Affidavit of Election was subscribed and sworn to before the same public officer a day after. The Board
considered this a irregular since Go, Sr. filed his Oath of Allegiance prior to his actual election of the Philippine
citizenship contrary to Section 1 of C.A. 625, which provides:

Election of Philippine Citizenship must be expressed in a statement before any officer authorized to administer
oaths and filed with the nearest civil registry and accompanied by an Oath of Allegiance to the Philippine
Constitution.

In view of the adverse judgment, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed before the Pasig RTC a supplemental petition to
declare the nullity of the Board’s April 17, 2002 Decision. 12

The Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the
BI from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. 13 Later, however, it dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6,
2004, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 14 A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied in
an Order issued on May 3, 2004.15

Petitioner Go and Go, Sr. then questioned before the CA the RTC’s January 6, 2004 Decision and May 3, 2004 Order
by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. 16 The
appellate court, however, dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration on October 25, 2004
and February 16, 2005, respectively. 17
Meantime, on November 16, 2004, the Board issued a warrant of deportation, which led to the apprehension and
detention of petitioner Go pending his deportation. 18

Thereafter, petitioner Go and Go, Sr. filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 167569 and 167570, assailing the CA decision and resolution CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.

Petitioner Go also appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which, on September 29, 2004, concurred with the
findings of the Board.19 The OP likewise denied the motion for reconsideration on February 11, 2005. 20 As a result,
petitioner Go elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules. 21

Meanwhile, the Court resolved G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 when Go, Sr. v. Ramos 22 was promulgated on
September 4, 2009. The decision sustained the October 25, 2004 Decision and February 16, 2005 Resolution of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.

More than a month after, on October 28, 2009, the CA dismissed the Rule 43 petition, holding that the April 17,
2002 Decision of the Board which was the subject of appeal to the OP, had already become final and executor. The
CA denied petitioner Go’s motion for reconsideration on March 22, 2010; hence, this petition raising the issues as
follows:

1. The Honorable Court erred in dismissing the instant petition;

2. The Honorable Court erred in declaring that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117 is final and executor; and

3. The Honorable Court erred in not ruling on the irregularity of the issuance of the Office of the President
of its September 29, 2004 and February 11, 2005 Resolutions. 23

We deny.

Petitioner Go presume that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not yet attained finality due to the
pendency of his Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Second (2nd) Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court
allegedly failed to resolve. He is mistaken.

As a general rule, a second motion for reconsideration cannot be entertained. Section 2 or Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court is unequivocal.24 The Court resolutely holds that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and after an express leave has been first obtained may
such motion be entertained.25 The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration is emphasized in
A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended (Internal Rules of the Supreme Court). Section 3, Rule 15 of which states:

SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration,
and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote
of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the
assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s
declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the
Court En Banc.
The Court has the power prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation of and
when justice requires it. In the exercise of sound discretion, we may determine issues which are of transcendental
importance. This case is definitely not an exception.

Upon examination of the records of G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570, We found that on August 18, 2010 petitioner’s
Motion for Leave to Attach a Second Motion for Reconsideration and the Second Motion for Reconsideration were
denies and noted without action, respectively. Thus, the CA is correct in ruling that the April 17, 2002 Decision of
the Board may no longer be reviewed as it already attained finality and should remain so. Based on the principle of
immutability of judgment, a decision must become final and executor at some point in time; all litigations must
necessarily come to an end.

Xxx A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes
the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court much reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to
dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle our justice system, without which there would be no end
to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise
the power adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the
principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are
ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred. Xxx 26

Subject to certain recognized exceptions such a (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, which are not present in this case, the
principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as nothing further can be done except to execute it. 27

Notably, the subject matters of Go, Sr. and the present case are essentially the same as both involve identical facts
and evidence. Necessarily, this case should be disposed in the same way that G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 in Go,
Sr. were resolved.

In Go, Sr. which was promulgated on September 4, 2009, the validity of the April 17, 2002 BI Decision that ordered
the apprehension and deportation of petitioner Go was already passed upon with finality. Therein, one of the
issues presented for resolution was whether the evidence adduced by petitioner Go and his father, Go, Sr., to
prove their claim of Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the BI of its jurisdiction from
continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue
of alienage, While petitioner Go and Go, Sr. conceded that BI has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien,
they insisted that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so substantial that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that claim is correct. They posited that the judicial intervention required is not
merely a judicial review of the proceedings below but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the
rules of evidence are strictly observed. The Court disagreed and opined that the jurisdiction of the BI is not
divested by mere claim of citizenship, it was held;

There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a
deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. However, this Court,
following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation
board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted
in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the
evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be
recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound
discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.1âwphi1 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by
the mere claim of citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to
deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. The
decision of the Board on the question is of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to
oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were
presented particularly the birth certificated of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr.
indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine
citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether
substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular court is a question of fact
which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of facts. None of the exceptions in which this Court
may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the
evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached. 28

The Bureau of Immigration is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner Go violated certain provisions
of C.A. No. 613, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. 29 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality by the
courts.30

Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules generally bars any question pertaining to the factual
issues. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45,
subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s
judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts. 31 None of the exceptions was
convincingly shown to be present in this case.

In addition, this Court cannot let it pass to declare that petitioner Go is guilty of forum-shopping

Forum shopping is defined as:

[w]hen a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

Forum shopping consists of the following elements:

a. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;

b. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

c. The identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the under consideration. 32
In Go, Sr. petitioner Go and Go, Sr. challenged in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 the October 25, 2004 Decision and
February 16, 2005 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143, which affirmed the January 6, 2004 Decision and
May 3, 2004 Order of the Pasig RTC in SCA No. 2218 that upheld the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001 and the April
17, 2002 Decision of the Board. We eventually affirmed the CA Decision and Resolution.

On the other hand, in this case petitioner Go seeks to nullify the October 28, 2009 Decision and March 22, 2010
Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840 ruling that the April 17, 2002 Decision had already become final
executor in view of Our Decision in Go, Sr. To note, after filing G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 before this Court,
petitioner Go still appealed the same April 17, 2002 Board Decision to the Office of the President. Unfortunately
for him, the OP also denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. With the denial, he filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 before the CA, which, as aforesaid, sustained the BI Decision.

We have held in Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong 33 that from the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the BI
Board of Commissioners, the aggrieved party has three (3) options: (a) he may file an appeal directly to the CA via
Rule 43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the
exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies within the executive machinery, namely, an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP, and thereafter, appeal the OP’s decision via Rule 43; or (c) he
may directly resort certiorari before the CA strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of
the aforementioned remedies cannot be taken as "adequate and speedy."

Petitioner Go availed of remedies (b) and (c) above in his desire to obtain a favorable judgment. In Go, Sr.,
petitioner Go, together with his father, elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65 petition. In this case, he
immediately appealed to the OP, by-passing the Secretary of Justice.

Similar to Go, Sr., ruling on whether petitioner Go is a Filipino citizen is not what We are called upon to in this
case.1âwphi1 The Court does not even have to rule once more on the issue of citizenship to determine whether
the BI proceedings may be enjoined to give way to a judicial determination of the same because the matter was
already passed upon with finality in Go, Sr. At this moment, petitioner’s Philippine citizenship claim cannot be
settled before Us. There are factual issues that make his citizenship controversial; hence, must first be resolved
before the BI and not before the Supreme Court, which is not a trier of facts. 34

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The October 28,
2009 Decision and March 22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840, which affirmed as
final the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Immigration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.