[G.R. NO.

177223 : November 28, 2007]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CASTOR BATIN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

We are reviewing herein the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 6 February 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor and Neil
Batin, of the crime of murder. The conviction was for the killing of one Eugenio Refugio, who was shot in the
afternoon of 21 October 1994, while he was leaning against a mango tree near his house on St. Peter Street, San
Paolo Subdivision, Nagkakaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City.

The Information2 against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11
April 1995, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by
then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions
of the Civil Code.

Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.

The prosecution, presented as its witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar,
Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor Segundo and Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, offered the following version of
the facts, as summarized by the trial court:

Eugenio's wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he was shot, facing him as he leaned against the mango tree
and, in fact, had her arms resting on his shoulders. She recalled that before the shooting, she was at home at No.
4-A St. Peter Street that afternoon when, looking out of the window, she caught sight of Castor Batin washing his
feet at a nearby faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she distinctly heard him say, among the other things he
said: "Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na." Then, being through with washing himself, Castor
moved towards the street. Seeing this, she went down and also went to the street because of a feeling of
uneasiness ("Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi, ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing"). Finding
her husband leaning against the mango tree on the side of St. Peter Street, she went to him. She tried to talk
Eugenio into going home with her because Castor was again into one of his wild ways ("Nagwawala na naman,
daldal ng daldal"). As he was talking with Eugenio, she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to
their (Batins') compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the
parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter
stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken
from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to
him.

When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil
responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice
from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on
top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: "Nanay, may tama ako." She then pulled her husband by
the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take him to their house as he was already slumped to the right. She later
rushed her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he underwent surgery, but later expired.

Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented and they substantially corroborated her testimonial
account.

One of them, Eusebio Farrales, a resident of No. 7 St. Paul Street, in relation to which St. Peter Street was
perpendicular, recalled being at the barangay outpost near the corner of St. Peter Street and St. Paul Street
between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of the afternoon of October 21, 1994 - engaged in the clearing of the debris of the
recent typhoon - when he heard someone cursing and challenging to a fight. Walking towards St. Peter Street
where the voice came, he saw that it was Castor. He also saw other neighbors, namely, Eugenio, Josephine, and
Eugenio's mother, Emilia Refugio. According to Farrales, Castor was moving aimlessly for around five minutes
("Walang direktion at pa-ikot ikot lang siya doon") while cussing: "Putang ina ninyo, sino ang matapang lumabas."

Farrales stated that a white car and a white-and-yellow colored taxicab were parked on the side portion of the
street fronting the gate to the compound of the Batins and near where Eugenio and Josephine stood. Emilia, the
mother of Eugenio, then came towards him, but he advised her to seek assistance from the barangay tanod. After
Emilia proceeded towards St. Paul Street to do so, Neil came out through the gate, opened the door of the white
car, took out a gun from inside, and handed the gun to Castor, but the latter returned the gun to Neil. Upon getting
back the gun, Neil reentered the yard through the gate.

Farrales asserted that in the meanwhile Eugenio remained leaning against the mango tree with Josephine facing
him and her arms resting on his shoulders. They were in this position when Neil again came out through the gate a
few moments later and proceeded to the right side of the car, still holding the handgun. From there, Neil fired
twice at the Refugios. The Refugios both fell to the left of the mango tree. Farrales saw both Castor and Neil
quickly enter the compound. At that point, Farrales decided to run home in order to summon Alfredo Dizon, his
tenant, who was a police officer because he feared that the Batins might escape from the scene by car.

Farrales and Dizon lost no time in going to the place of the Batins. After Dizon talked with Castor at the gate of the
latter's compound, the latter entered the house of his nephew, Ricky Basilio, which was beside Castor's own house.
A few moments later, Castor came out of Basilio's house to let Dizon in through the gate. It was about this time
that the responding police officers arrived at the scene. The victim had been rushed to the hospital immediately.

Another neighbor, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez, resident of No. 7-A St. Peter Street, declared that while she was at
home taking care of her baby at between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of October 21, 1994, she heard someone challenging
others to a fight; that looking out of her window ("dungaw"), she saw that it was Boy Batin - Castor - and he was
then walking about on St. Peter Street; that just then, her child cried, and so she went to him; that upon returning
to the window to call her other child, she saw Castor hand over a handgun to Neil, and the latter thereafter
entered through their gate; that she next saw Neil load bullets into the gun and then tucking it in his right
waistline; that after loading, Neil went out to the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab,
aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko
na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." that, at that instant, Neil fired two shots; that as she went
down to get her other child upon hearing the gunshots, she heard Josephine say: "Tay, may tama ka"; that she
later reentered her house; and that she knew that Eugenio died afterwards.

Although Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital right after the shooting and was operated on,
he expired the next day. His remains were properly identified in writing by his brother, Tito Eugenio.3

The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Florante Baltazar, conducted an autopsy on
Eugenio's remains. In his Medico-Legal Report No. M-1715-94,4 he indicated that Eugenio sustained one gunshot
wound, which was, however, fatal, because "it went slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from the right to the left
of the body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic region, lacerating the right lumbar region." Dr.
Baltazar made the certification as to the cause of death in the death certificate.5

Upon a written request6 from the Novaliches Police Station, Quezon City, Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, Chief
of the Firearms Identification Branch of the Central Crime Laboratory, Northern Police District Command, Quezon
City, conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain whether or not the bullet recovered from the victim was
fired from the specimen firearm submitted for examination. P/Insp. Segundo prepared Ballistics Report No. B-042-
94,7 wherein he certified that the bullet from the recovery box8 and the bullet recovered from the victim's
body9 were fired from the same specimen firearm.10 This conclusion was arrived at after a test fire and a
comparison under the bullet comparison microscope.

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castor's common-law wife Maricon Pantoja, and
one Restituto Paller. Neil Batin's testimony is summarized by the trial court as follows:

Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct his younger brothers to school and fetch them by
car; that he also drove their taxicab; that it was about 7:00 o'clock in morning of October 21, 1994, while he was
cleaning the family-owned taxicab, that he found a short gun ("de bola") underneath it beside the right rear wheel;
that he picked the gun and concealed it in the compartment of the taxicab; that he continued with his chore of
cleaning; that as soon as he finished cleaning the taxicab, he drove the white Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-
year old brother Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja; that Mark was a pupil at the Magat Salamat
Elementary School in Tondo; that after picking up Mark, they drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in
Marulas, Valenzuela, to get his clothes from his cousin; that they arrived there at 11:00 am, and spent around two
hours there; that from Marulas, they went home, arriving at St. Peter Street at around 2:30 pm; that he parked the
car on the road in front of their fence; that he and Mark first entered the house to deposit Mark's school things
and later went outside to await the arrival of Mark's mother; that his other brothers were outside; that Castor was
also outside talking with a man whose name he did not know but whom he had seen thrice before as well as with
Boy Iñigo in front of the latter's house; that Iñigo's house was 15 meters from their gate; that Pantoja soon arrived
at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and playing with his brothers; and that at that point he decided to
take the gun from the compartment of the taxicab - then parked around 2 - meters away from where he and his
brothers were - and tucked it in his waistline.

Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side of the Datsun car which was parked facing the
mango tree ("halos magkatapat lang po"). Maricon came out to the street at that point to ask him about the time
he had fetched Mark. It was while he was standing there with the others that, according to Neil, he suddenly felt
the impulse of drawing the gun from his waistline ("Bigla kong naisipang bunutin ang baril"). He thus drew the gun
and turned around, but, as he did so, he accidentally pulled the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice ("Tumalikod
po ako, tapos nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang beses").

Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife Josephine because they were his neighbors with only
a high wall separating their houses; but denied seeing them that afternoon beside the mango tree.

At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he was in front of Iñigo's house, shouting twice to
his son: "Huwag!" Pantoja, for her part, forced Neil to enter the compound, where she brought him inside the
house of his aunt. Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunt's house.

Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; that his father did
not wrest the gun from him; that he did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; that his father did not
order him to shoot Eugenio; and that his father was not drunk and challenging others to a fight. He insisted that he
and the Refugios, with whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no misunderstandings, for he even had shared
drinks with the late Eugenio before October 21, 1994.11
As regards the testimonies of the defense's two other witnesses, the trial court could not make an intelligible
narrative of the version of the facts presented by them, considering the contradictions it found in their
testimonies. The trial court found glaring Maricon Pantoja's "self-contradiction" as to where she and the accused
were when Eugenio was shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she, Neil and Castor were outside their house
when Neil drew the gun and accidentally fired. However, in her affidavit,12 she alleged that they went outside their
house upon hearing a gun explosion and saw "Eugenio Refugio alone holding his stomach x x x we have no any
knowledge whether he was hit by a bullet."13

On 8 June 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused guilty of murder, qualified by treachery,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused CASTOR BATIN and NEIL BATIN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and they are hereby each sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; and ordered to pay the heirs of
EUGENIO REFUGIO, through his wife, JOSEPHINE REFUGIO, as follows:

1] P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2] P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3] P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4] P307,920.00, as indemnity for lost of earning capacity; and

5] The costs of suit.14

Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, on 13 November 2000, accused Neil
Batin filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The People interposed no objection to the Motion, which was
granted.

On 6 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Decision
of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila in
Criminal Case No. Q-95-61003 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil liabilities. With the exception of
the award of moral damages which is reduced to P100,000.00 and the indemnity for loss of earning capacity which
is increased to P723,840.00, the awards for death indemnity and actual damages are retained.15

Castor Batin now comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL FOR INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TRACHERY.16
Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and a new one entered
acquitting him of the crime charged. In the alternative, he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide
only, arguing that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently stated in the Information.

Whether there was conspiracy in the killing of Eugenio Refugio

It is evident from Castor's Supplemental Brief and all his other issuances after the withdrawal of Neil's appeal that
he had already discarded Neil's theory of accidental shooting. Instead, his arguments are geared toward his
distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio.

We cannot, however, dispose of the discussion of Neil's theory of accidental shooting. As Neil's testimony had
been the only evidence presented by the defense to rebut the prosecution's evidence concerning the acts of
Castor during the incident, we should carefully scrutinize Neil's testimony to determine his credibility.

Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he suddenly felt the impulse to draw the gun
from his waistline. He drew the gun, turned around with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired it twice without
aiming it at anyone.

As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and incredible. As observed by the trial court,

The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which belonged to the so-called double-action type of guns.
This type has a firing mechanism which permits two methods of firing - the first is by manually cocking or retracting
the hammer and then pressing the trigger to release the hammer; the second is by applying continuous pressure
on the trigger in order to cock the hammer and then releasing the trigger. The drop of the hammer by either
method propels the firing pin forward so that its other end strikes the primer cap to explode the propellant charge
inside the shell which then forces out the bullet through the gun barrel. From the nature of the firing mechanism
of Exhibit O, and there being no evidence showing that the hammer was manually cocked before the gun fired, it
was absolutely physically impossible for the gun to fire accidentally.

In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to cock the hammer into firing position, the
undersigned presiding judge personally tested the trigger pull of Exhibit O. Even assuming that the passage of time
from the date of the shooting caused some change on the efficiency of the firing mechanism, such change can only
show up by way of a weakening of the hammer spring. Nonetheless, it was not surprising for the undersigned
presiding judge to find heavy resistance at each trigger pull, such that he exerted some force to cock the hammer.
This actual testing easily validated the conclusion that firing the gun accidentally and unintentionally was
impossible.17

Neil's claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is, thus, even more incredible. Given the
difficulty of pulling the trigger to cock the hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how the gun could have
been fired by Neil twice in quick succession except by a deliberate and intentional pulling of the trigger.

Given the physical attributes and condition of the gun involved in the case at bar, the testimony of Eusebio Farrales
is likewise observed to be much more credible than that of Neil. Whereas Neil claims that he accidentally fired the
gun twice using only one hand, Eusebio Farrales testified that Neil fired at the Refugios while holding the gun with
both hands and from a standing position.

While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in
modern jurisprudence,18 Neil's credibility has been severely tarnished by the foregoing portion of his testimony.
Thus, we should likewise take with a grain of salt the following parts of his testimony which tend to refute the
account of the prosecution concerning the acts of Castor during the incident: (1) that Neil and Castor did not
grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; (2) that Castor did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that
Neil did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; (4) that Castor did not order Neil to shoot Eugenio; and
(5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging others to a fight.

As stated above, Castor has already discarded Neil's theory of accidental shooting and, instead, focuses on
distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio. Castor's principal defense in this appeal is that
the conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor.19

Castor claims that there is no conclusive proof that he participated in the shooting, and that "(h)is alleged
utterance of the words 'Sige, banatan mo na' " cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting.
According to Castor, if he had wanted his son to shoot Eusebio Refugio, he would not have shouted "Huwag" and
struggled for possession of the gun.

We are not persuaded.

First of all, the theory presented by the prosecution in both the Information and in their arguments before the
courts is not Castor's being a principal by inducement, but rather his being a co-conspirator. If conspiracy is proven,
the act of one is the act of all. As stated above, the widow, Josephine Refugio, and the neighbors - - Eusebio
Farrales and Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez - - testified to the fact that Castor handed the gun to Neil and urged the
latter to fire at the Refugio spouses. The trial court, whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of the
witnesses at the trial,20 found these witnesses credible, thus:

From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting
Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses - that Castor returned the
gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his
gun twice - were credible and sufficed to prove Castor's indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio.
Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the
killing, was.

The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot be doubted. Being the neighbors of both the
Batins and the Refugios, their claim of witnessing the events that culminated into the shooting of Eugenio was
unassailable. The accused, in fact, could not provide any reason or motive for them to testify against the Batins
unless it was upon the truth.21

While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he
tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to
Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that
Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming
the gun at the spouses. Thus:

(Atty. Siobal Cross-examining)

Q The second time around that you saw him was when he moved towards the right rear of the car?cra lawlibrary

A I did not remove my sight at Neil Batin as he moved towards this car, sir.

Q Also, without moving your glance or gaze at Neil Batin, you saw him proceed to the right rear portion of the car
and open the right rear door of said car, is it not?cra lawlibrary
A Yes, sir.

Q And without also removing your gaze or sight at Neil Batin, you saw him open and get a gun inside the car?cra
lawlibrary

A I saw Neil Batin opened the right rear door, as if he is putting all his body inside the car, when Mang Boy took
hold of Neil, they were grappling for possession of the gun, and raised it above, and that was the time when my
husband saw the gun raised, and I also saw the gun.

Court

So they were both inside the car, their arms were both inside the car and the gun was inside the car when you and
your husband saw this particular scene?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, your Honor.

Atty. Siobal

So you saw Castor Batin and Neil Batin grappling for the gun when they were inside the car?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir, and then Castor Batin shouted "huwag."

Q And at that time they were grappling for the gun inside the car and Castor Batin shouted "huwag," after that,
you and your husband saw the gun atop the roof of the car, is that what you want to convey to the Court?cra
lawlibrary

A The gun was still inside the car, only we saw it through the glass window, sir.

Q And what happened after that?cra lawlibrary

A Neil Batin got out of the car, followed by Castor Batin and then Castor gave the gun to Neil, and after receiving
the gun, Neil placed the gun at his waist, sir.

Q You said Neil Batin got out of the car ahead of Castor Batin, where did Neil Batin go or proceed, to what
direction?cra lawlibrary

A He proceeded to that place labeled as Exhibit G-7, sir.

Q And you said Castor Batin followed Neil Batin to the place where he proceeded here at Exhibit G-7?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir.

Q Of course, when Neil Batin got out of the car ahead, his back, he must have turned his back from you?cra
lawlibrary

A He was sidewise in relation to me, sir.

Q How about Castor Batin, when he got out of the car, he must have turned his back from you?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir.
Q And where was Castor Batin facing when you said he gave the gun to Neil Batin?cra lawlibrary

A He was facing Neil, sir.22

As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor's utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond
doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the
gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after
the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil - a
crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony.

Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the
crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.23 Prosecution
witnesses Josephine Refugio and Eusebio Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies that prior to the
shooting of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others to a fight, and was uttering angry
words. It was at this juncture that witnesses saw Neil retrieve his gun from the parked car, after which Castor
grabbed the gun from his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son, and ordered the latter to shoot the Refugios.

Secondly, even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same.
Castor's argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words 'Sige, banatan mo na' cannot be considered as the
moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.

Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words
of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have
held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. In People v. Tamayo,24 we held that
the moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the
same words coming from a stranger would make no impression.

There is no doubt in our minds that Castor's words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime. As
stated above, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez testified that the eighteen-year-old Neil Batin asked his father before
shooting: "Tay, banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the consent of his father before proceeding with the
act, and it was Castor's words "Sige, banatan mo na"25 that sealed Eugenio Refugio's fate.

Whether treachery was specifically alleged in the Information

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.26

According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio because Castor ordered Neil to fire at
Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was still leaning against the mango tree and being restrained by Josephine
who had her arms on his shoulders. Thereby, "the accused insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory
act of Eugenio who, in that position of helplessness and unpreparedness, obviously had no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate even if he wanted to. The accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from a
distance, all the more to enhance the chances of killing the victim without risk to themselves."27

Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was sufficiently proven during the trial.
All that Castor claims before us is that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information. The Information filed against the Batins states that "the accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a
handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death."28 Castor claims that this charge does not allege
the specific treacherous acts of the accused. According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused "with
treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence" is a mere conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9
of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 provides:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

Pertinently, we have held in Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas29 that the main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set forth in an Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. We added in
said case that

[I]t is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order
to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as
distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not
necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is
a matter of evidence at the trial.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances
surrounding it. Here are some of the cases:

In People v. Lab-eo,30 Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the following Information:

That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian, Mountain Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a sharp knife,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a
well-honed and pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim as reflected in that
medico-legal certificate, to wit:

Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which caused the death of the victim
thereafter.

That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft
attended the commission of the offense.

The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while captioned as "Murder," only charged him with
homicide as written. This Court found nothing wrong with the Information, and ruled that the Information
sufficiently charged the accused with murder, not even considering the absence of an explanation of the treachery
stated therein, thus:

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of
the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted.
That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair its sufficiency. Nothing in
the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the requirements of the law are
observed, the Information will pass judicial scrutiny.

xxx

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused's constitutional right to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his
defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his
right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the
Information.31

This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with murder qualified by treachery.

The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance was similarly assailed in People v.
Opuran,32 wherein the charge was as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill
and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon
the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.

This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the allegation of treachery sufficient, and later on
finding the accused therein guilty of murder qualified by treachery:

We do not find merit in appellant's contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio,
Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such
contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying
circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly
qualify an offense.33

Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar34 :

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay
Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill,
and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85
year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accused's father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be
allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the
victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14, paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code.

Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have sufficiently alleged treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of
defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.35

Whether the civil liabilities of the accused were correctly awarded by the lower courts

The trial court ordered the accused, Neil and Castor Batin, to pay the heirs of Eugenio Refugio in the following
amounts:

1) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2) P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3) P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4) P307,920.00, as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and

5) the costs of suit.36

Jurisprudence pegs the death indemnity in the above amount (P50,000.00) pursuant to the current judicial policy
on the matter. No proof thereof is required. The P61,500.00 in actual damages consists of the expenses incurred by
the family of Eugenio Refugio, which Josephine Refugio testified to and was summarized in Exhibit
H:37 (1) P25,000.00 for medicines, surgery and other expenses for the hospitalization and emergency
treatment;38 (2) P20,000.00 for funeral expenses, inclusive of the costs of coffin, funeral services, and expenses
during the wake;39 and (3) P6,500.00 as for burial expenses.

The Court of Appeals also modified the trial court's computation of the indemnity for loss of earning capacity. The
trial court, finding the work of Eugenio Refugio to be hazardous, reduced his life expectancy to 20 years.

This modification is in accord with our ruling in Pleyto v. Lomboy.40 Pleyto offers the following computation for the
award for loss of earning capacity:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 - Age at x (Gross Annual

Capacity time of death) Income - Reasonable

& Necessary Living

Expenses)
Eugenio Refugio, who was 31 years old at the time of his death, had a daily income of P145.00. The Court of
Appeals multiplied this amount by 26 working days to get Eugenio Refugio's monthly income of P3,770.00. The
Court of Appeals thus applied the Pleyto formula as follows:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 - 31) x [(P3770 x 12) - (P3770 x 12)]

Capacity

Net Earning = 2/3 x (49) x [(P45,240) - (P22,620)]

Capacity

Net Earning = 32 x [P22,620]

Capacity

Net Earning = P723,84041

Capacity

Lastly, the Court of Appeals found the award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to be excessive, and instead fixed
the amount at P100,000.00. In accord with prevailing jurisprudence, however, we further reduce this amount
to P50,000.00.42

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the conviction of accused-appellant
Castor Batin for murder is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral damages, which
is hereby reduced to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 13352728. December 13, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS

TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y
MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR
PECHA, CHARLES DUMANCAS (Acquitted), POL. OFFICER JOSE PAHAYUPAN (Acquitted), VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.
(Acquitted), Accused.

JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL.
OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R.
FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under two Informations which
pertinently read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562

The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY
INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECT AND/OR
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR
PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER,
committed as follows:

That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the
following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent
and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:

Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction
cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as the
Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and
cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario
Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also
taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. and shortly
thereafter at around 11 oclock in the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose
to extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and
the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded;
that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that said Gargar was victim of violence, did then and
there secretly bury the corpse in a makeshift shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in
order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to
the heirs of said victim, to wit:

P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages (lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
50,000.00 exemplary damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563

The undersigned hereby accused JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY
INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME
GARGALLANO, ROLANDO B. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY
PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA and EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:

That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the
following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent
and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouse Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction,
cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as the
Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and
cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario
Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also
taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one DANILO LUMANGYAO and shortly
thereafter at around 11 oclock in the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose
to extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and
the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded,
that accused CESAR PECHA and EDGAR HILADO, with knowledge that said Lumangyao was victim of violence, did
then and there secretly bury the corpse in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of
murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and
prejudice to the heirs of said victim, to wit:

P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages (lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
P50,000.00 exemplary damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I-A)

All thirteen accused (excluding Edgar Hilado, who was then still at large) entered pleas of NOT GUILTY upon
arraignment conducted on February 14, 1994 (per Certificates of Arraignment, Record Vol. I-A, pp. 372-384). After
a joint trial (excluding accused Edgar Hilado, who upon arraignment on April 11, 1994, pleaded NOT GUILTY
[Record, Vol. II, p. 866], was tried separately), judgment was rendered acquitting Charles Dumancas, Police Officers
Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., but convicting the rest of the accused for the crime charged, to wit:

Wherefore, finding the first nine (9) Accused herein

1. JEANNETTE (GINNETTE) YANSON DUMANCAS

2. POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES
3. POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO
4. POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ
5. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY
6. JAIME GARGALLANO
7. ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ
8. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA
9. TEODY DELGADO and
10.CESAR PECHA

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPALS and CESAR PECHA as accessory in the two (2) informations
filed in these cases, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered against them, as follows:

1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs
of Rufino Gargar Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as actual
damages; P300,000.00 for compensatory damages (lost income); P100,000.00 in moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an accessory is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the
cost;

2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of
DANILO LUMANGYAO in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as actual
damages; P100,000.00 as compensatory damages (lost income); P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an accessory is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of
the cost.

Accused CHARLES DUMANCAS, Police Officers JOSE PAHAYUPAN and VICENTE CANUDAY JR. are hereby Acquitted
of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with cost de
officio.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 272-273, Rollo.)

All ten accused filed their respective notices of appeal, and are now before us on review. After going through the
voluminous record of the case, the Court adopts the following summary of facts by the court a quo, to wit:

February 20, 1992

Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and
his cohort.

10:30 A.M. August 5, 1992 present in the house of Rolando Fernandez were:

a) Dominador Geroche
b) Rolando Fernandez
c) Jaime Gargallano
d) Edwin Divinagracia
e) Teody Delgado
f) Mario Lamis and
g) Moises Grandeza

On this occasion Mario Lamis brought out the plan to abduct Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. because
they swindled the Dumancas family.

4:30 P.M. August 5, 1992

The group of:

a) Dominador Geroche
b) Mario Lamis
c) Rolando Fernandez
d) Jaime Gargallano
 e) Edwin Divinagracia
f) Teody Delgado
g) Moises Grandeza

went to the office of Col. Nicolas Torres at PNP Headquarters where they met the colonel who told them that if
you find these two people (referring to Lumangyao and Gargar) to bring and hide them at Dragon Lodge Motel.

8:30 A.M., August 6, 1992

State witness Moises Grandeza went to the house of Helen Tortocion to invite Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino
Gargar Jr. to Tinolahan Eatery at Shopping Center Terminal but found only Gargar Jr. as Lumangyao went to the
house of a certain Bardot at BBB Avenue, this City.

Moises Grandeza together with Gargar Jr. proceeded to the house of Bardot where they found Lumangyao and
thereafter the three of them went to Tinolahan Eatery.

9:00 10:00 A.M. August 6, 1992

The three arrived at Tinulahan Eatery. Waiting for them were:

a) Dominador Geroche
b) Jaime Gargallano
c) Edwin Divinagracia
d) Rolando Fernandez
e) Teody Delgado; and
f) Mario Lamis

Then a) Fernandez b) Geroche and c) Lamis entered Tinulahan and handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar.

Waiting in the red Toyota Land Cruiser (Plate No. 689) were:

a) Gargallano
b) Divinagracia; and
c) Delgado

10:30 A.M. August 6, 1992

Lumangyao and Gargar were brought to the Office of Jeanette at Ceres Compound on board red toyota land
cruiser by:

a) Moises Grandeza
b) Gargallano
c) Lamis
d) Geroche
e) Divinagracia
f) Delgado, and
g) Fernandez

It was there that a) Divinagracia and b) Fernandez manhandled Lumangyao and Gargar. Jeanette then
investigated the two victims on the whereabouts of the money that they swindled from her and the two
answered that it was already spent.
It was then that Jeanette ordered Doming (Geroche) to take care of the two (Lumangyao and Gargar).

3:00 P.M. August 6, 1992

From Ceres Compound and while the group, together with the two victims, were already at Dragon Lodge Motel,
thereafter,

a) Abeto
b) Pahayupan, and
c) Canuday

arrived and investigated the two victims regarding the whereabouts of the gold bar and the two replied that it was
with Helen Tortocion.

4:00 P.M. August 6, 1992

a) Moises Grandeza
b) Fernandez, and
c) Geroche

went to the office of Col. Torres to inform him that Lumangyao and Gargar were already captured. So Col. Torres
ordered them to keep the two victims so that nobody would see them. After receiving this instructions they went
back to Dragon Lodge. Meanwhile, Geroche again interrogated the victims on where the money was if there was
still any let and Geroche received the same negative reply.

Past 6:00 p.m. August 6, 1992

The group, with the two captives transferred to DHacienda Motel.

9:00 P.M. August 6, 1992

At DHacienda Motel, Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, together with Rose Ines arrived. Jeanette and Rose Ines
investigated the victims where they kept the money that they swindled and the two gave the same reply that it
was already gone. Jeanette then reiterated her order to Geroche to take care of the two.

9:30 P.M. August 6, 1992

The group transferred to Moonlight Inn Motel.

3:00 A.M. August 7, 1992

The group transferred again to Casamel Lodge Motel.

10:00 A.M. August 7, 1992

The group returned to DHacienda Motel and it was there that the plan was pursued to liquidate the two victims at
12:00 midnight.

The persons who conceived of this plan were:

 a) Geroche, and
b) Fernandez
4:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
1) Canuday
2) Abeto
3) Dudero
4) Lesaca, and
5) Arollado

searched the residence of Helen Tortocion for the gold dust and simulated gold bar per search warrant 014-92
(Exh. D) but the search was fruitless.

7:30 P.M. August 7, 1992

The group, including the victims, partook of supper which was charged to Roy Yanson.

Then a) Abeto
b) Canuday, and
c) Pahayupan

entered the room and asked Fernandez what they are going to do with the two victims to which Fernandez,
replied that he will be responsible for the two.

11:00 P.M. August 7, 1992

a) Geroche
b) Lamis
c) Fernandez, and
d) Moises Grandeza

rode on the red Toyota Land Cruiser to conduct Geroche to his house. The victims were left behind.

From his house Geroche took an armalite rifle and the group then went back to DHacienda Motel.

12:00 P.M. August 7, 1992

a) Fernandez, and
b) Lamis
blindfolded and handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar (Exh. A and A-1) and have them board a
vehicle, with
a) Gargallano the driver
b) Geroche sitting in front, and with
c) Moises Grandeza also seated inside.

From DHacienda Motel, the group rode on the red toyota land cruiser. They proceeded to Hda. Pedrosa in Brgy.
Alijis. When they arrived there the two victims were ordered to alight and sit by the side of the road. Geroche then
asked Moises Grandeza to hold the hands of Lumangyao and then Gargar behind their backs. After that

a) Gargallano was the first to shoot. He shot Gargar at the back of his head (Exh. K) using a baby armalite. Then

b) Geroche followed suit by shooting Lumangyao with a .45 cal. Pistol at his right lower jaw (Exh. L).
Thereafter, the two dead bodies were loaded on board the land cruiser and brought to Hda. Siason where Pecha
and Hilado buried them in the shallow grave they dug.

August 8, 1992

In Sitio Cabalagnan were recovered

a) Three (3) empty shells of armalite rifle and one .45 cal. Empty shell (Exh. G, G-2)

In Hda. Siason were recovered

a) the dead bodies of Rufino Gargar, Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao

b) Both of the two victims hands were handcuffed (Exh. A and A-1).

August 9, 1992

The same group again went to see Col. Torres in his office and reported the extermination of the two and Col.
Torres promptly gave the instruction that you who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done but you
have to hide because the NBI are after you.

August 10, 1992

a) Lamis
b) Geroche
c) Fernandez
d) Divinagracia
e) Gargallano
f) Delgado, and
g) Moises Grandeza

went back to the office of Col. Torres and this time he told the group to hide because the NBI are now
investigating.

4:00 P.M. August 12, 1992

The same group that liquidated Lumangyao and Gargar again went back to the office of Col. Torres where they
were asked by Col. Torres to escort him to Ceres Compound because he would like to borrow money from Ricardo
Yanson as Col. Torres said that he has huge debts to pay. Col. Torres was able on this occasion, to meet Ricardo
Yanson.

On this same day,

a) Moises Grandeza
b) Lamis, and
c) Geroche

were picked up in a land cruiser by the driver of the Yansons to go to the house of Fernandez where Geroche will
give the money to the group. Each member of the group, after the check, which was drawn by Yanson, was
encashed were given the amount of P1,700.00 each.
August 13, 1992

Nenita Bello went to the office of Col. Torres to plead for his help in regard to the death of her relatives Lumangyao
and Gargar but was promptly turned down by Colonel Torres with the curt remark that her case was very difficult
because it involves the military and some big times.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City also passed, on this day, Resolution No. 328, series of 1992 urging the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the death of salvage victims Danilo
Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. as soon as possible (Exh. I).

September 24, 1992

The bodies of Rufino Gargar Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao were exhumed at Brgy. Buenavista Cemetery, Balintawak,
Escalante, Negros Occidental and autopsies were conducted (Exhs. M and N) by Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta, Medico Legal
Officer of the NBI.

a) Found on the body of Rufino Gargar, Jr. (per examination report, Exh. M) among others, were ligature marks,
wrist joint, right side (Exh. M-2, and

b) Gunshot wound (Exh. M-1)

As to Danilo Lumangyao, the exhumation report (Exh. N disclose

a) Ligature marks, right wrist (Exh. N-2) and among others, and

b) Gunshot wound (Exh. N-1)

After the National Bureau of Investigation, Bacolod Office, conducted its investigation, the State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice took over and the result were the filing of these two criminal cases of Kidnapping with
Murder against the above-named accused.

(pp. 73-85, Decision; pp. 202-

214, Rollo.)

After a thorough review of the factual findings of the trial court vis--vis the evidence on record, we find ourselves
unable to agree with the conclusions arrived at by the trial court convicting all 10 accused-appellants; rather, we
concur in the suggestion of the Solicitor General, that accused-appellants Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Police
Inspector Adonis Abeto should be acquitted. Too, by reason of his supervening death, accused-appellant Police Col.
Nicolas Torres is acquitted. The judgment of conviction of the rest of the accused-appellants is to be affirmed.

A. Jeanette (Ginette) Yanson-Dumancas

On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas (Jeanette, for short), the information charged her of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal by induction together with her husband, Charles, who
was found by the trial court not guilty of the crime.

Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing  the
killers to commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.

There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing
to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
From the factual findings of the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the victims was
hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without Jeanettes involvement or participation whatsoever (p. 202, Rollo).
The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said
meeting to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis
relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by
inducement, is the supposed commands or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two
occasions (one inside the Ceres Compound: p. 205, Rollo, and the other in DHacienda Motel: p. 207, Rollo). By no
stretch of the imagination may these so-called commands, standing alone, be considered as constituting irresistible
force or causing uncontrollable fear.

Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward  or  promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court,
to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct
and later kill the victims in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the name of Ricardo Yanson as
having lent money to accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for paying the latters debts or obligations. But
definitely, no money ever came from Jeanette herself. The trial courts surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo
Yanson to the group was with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette in completely baseless.

The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly given by Jeanette to accused-appellant
Geroche to take care of the two constitutes words of command which may be considered sufficient basis to convict
Jeanette as principal by inducement.

In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present: (1) the
inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute
inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort
to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation to commit the crime.

By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to take care of the two does not constitute the
command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs.
Indanan, supra, a chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some
independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case,
while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or
performed the act) would not be guilty of the crime committed (p. 219).
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the
crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of
the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told
accused-appellant Geroche to take care of the two. Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement
to commit the crime charged in this case.

Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the prosecution witness himself, Moises Grandeza, that the
intention of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its course, when in his cross-examination, the following
transpired:

ATTY. PARREO:

Q. And according to your testimony this morning, Jeanette Dumancas said, what more can we do that swindling
transpired four months ago, definitely that money could nowhere be around. Would you confirm that you testified
that this morning before this Court? Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Witness, this is very important. Please make a vivid recall. When Danilo Lumangyao made that answer that
the money was not around and Jeanette Dumancas said whats the use, the money is now nowhere to be found as
four months have already transpired, did not Jeanette Dumancas tell Doming: Doming, bring these two to the PC
or police and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them? Kindly make a recall on
that.

A. Yes, sir.

(pp. 54-55, tsn Feb. 14, 1994)

Thus, even the veracity of the allegation that Jeanette uttered the words: take care of the two is put to some
reasonable doubt by the prosecution witness himself. The remark, if made at all, cannot by any stretch of the
imagination, be basis for the conviction of Jeanette.

People vs. Manambit (271 SCRA 344 [1997]) finds apt application, to wit:

In criminal law, the quantum of evidence for conviction is that which produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced
mind that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. But, if the evidence is susceptible of two
interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the
accused must be acquitted.

(p. 385)

B. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto

With respect to accused-appellant Abeto, we quote with approval the observations of the Solicitor General as
follows:

Police Inspector Adonis C. Abetos appeal is meritorious. Be it remembered that Abetos only participation was to
serve the search warrant on Helen Tortocions residence and the subsequent interrogation of the two victims at the
Hacienda Motel. He was never part of the conspiracy to abduct and liquidate the two victims. He is similarly
situated as that of Canuday and Pahayupan.
The trial court, in acquitting Canuday and Pahayupan had this to say:

The evidence against Officer CANUDAY, JR. shows that in the afternoon of August 6, 1992, together with Officers
ABETO and PAHAYUPAN, they went to Dragon Lodge Motel to investigate LUMANGYAO and GARGAR, JR. as to the
whereabouts of the gold (fake) bar used in swindling JEANETTE. The two captives answered that it is with HELEN
TORTOCION. A subsequent search of Tortocions house led by Officer ABETO yielded no fake gold bar. Meanwhile,
in the evening of August 7, 1992, Officers ABETO, CANUDAY, JR., and PAHAYUPAN showed up at DHacienda Motel
to inquire from FERNANDEZ what he is going to do with the two.

Like Officer Pahayupan, his being in the company of Officers Abeto, on the two occasions can not give rise, to
without proof of previous agreement, a conspiracy. Thus, being present at the scene of the crime is not by itself
sufficient to establish conspiracy, as already averted to previously. So does mere companionship.

(p. 1720-1721, Rollo.)

After due consideration of accused-appellant Abetos constitutional right to the presumption of innocence, coupled
with the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions having simply followed the order of
his superior officers, much is left to be desired before the Court can sustain the trial courts conviction of accused-
appellant Abeto. The two presumptions negate the inadequate proof adduced against accused-appellant Abeto,
who must perforce be acquitted, in much the same manner that accused Canuday, Jr. and Pahayupan, who being
similarly situated, were cleared and absolved.

C. Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres

As for accused-appellant Col. Torres, who passed away during the pendency of this appeal, the following rule laid
down by this Court in People vs. Bayotas (236 SCRA 239 [1994]) applies:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file a separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.

(pp. 255-256)

With the application of the above set of rules to accused-appellant Torres, we hold that his death extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon. Accordingly, the appeal of accused-appellant Torres is
forthwith dismissed, such dismissal having the force and effect of an acquittal.

D. Pol. Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez,
Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, and Cesar Pecha

Now, in regard to the other accused-appellants, after a careful review of the evidence, we find the same sufficient
to affirm their conviction.

These accused-appellants assail the credence given by the trial court to the eyewitness account of Moises
Grandeza. Even after a thorough perusal of their main appellants brief (pp. 327-498, Rollo), plus the separate briefs
of accused-appellants Geroche (pp. 1453-1627) and Pecha (pp. 828-1009, Rollo), we find no cogent reason to
depart from the well settled rule that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the factual findings of
the trial court is generally accorded great weight. In People vs. Taedo (266 SCRA 34 [1997]) the Court had occasion
to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command
great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. The briefs of
accused-appellants Lamis, et al. are replete with generalities and legal principles relating to the issue, but are
utterly wanting in relevant particulars which may be the basis to rule that indeed, the trial court erred in lending
full credence to the testimony of witness Grandeza on the matter. As held in People vs. Ramirez 266 SCRA 335
[1997]), unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected.

In an attempt to buttress the contention that witness Grandezas testimony should not have been given credence
by the court a quo, accused-appellants referred to supposed inconsistencies between Grandezas sworn statements
before investigators vis--vis his testimony in court (pp. 349-359, Rollo; and 1465-1468, Rollo). The Court, however,
is not impressed. This will not be the first occasion for us to hold that discrepancies between the statements of the
affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-
parte affidavits are generally incomplete affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations (People vs. Padao, 267 SCRA 64 [1997]). A contradiction between a witness affidavit and his testimony
in open court may almost be explained by the fact that, being taken ex parte, an affidavit is often incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries
(Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). Grandezas perceived failure to mention anything in his 3
affidavits pertaining to the supposed meetings where the criminal plot was hatched, does not necessarily render
his testimony in court unworthy of credit.

In his brief, accused-appellant Geroche cites Grandezas failure to identify one of their co-accused, Charles
Dumancas, in open court, and the variance on the alleged instructions given by Jeanette, and the failure by
Grandeza to mention the supposed meetings in his previous affidavits, as grounds to totally disregard Grandezas
entire testimony for being unworthy of credence (pp. 1461-1469, Rollo). Indirectly, accused-appellant Geroche
wants this Court to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. In this regard, we held in People vs. Pacis (130
SCRA 540 [1984]):

The maxim of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, however, is not a positive rule of law. Neither is it an inflexible one of
universal application. If a part of a witness testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.
(p. 546)

Also in People vs. Li Bun Juan (17 SCRA 934 [1966]) we ruled:

. . . In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus  is not an absolute
one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was
quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:

18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected.  Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any
witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what
seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth . . . Even when witnesses are found to have
deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief.

(p. 945)

The grounds relied upon by accused-appellant Geroche do not, therefore, constitute cogent reasons to discredit
the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza in its entirety.

As regards accused-appellant Geroches defense of alibi, it is settled that alibi cannot prevail over positive
identification (People vs. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 [1997]). Being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, alibi
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification of the accused-appellant (People vs.
Datun, 272 SCRA 380 [1997]). Besides, the record is bereft of strong and convincing evidence that accused-
appellant could not have been at the scene of the crime because the certification proffered in support thereof
stated that he was in Mt. Calandog only after the commission of the crime. And, as aptly stated by the Solicitor
General in the Peoples brief, the trial court expressed puzzlement why this supposed fact was not mentioned in his
July 3, 1993 affidavit . . . The first impulse of an innocent man when accused of a wrongdoing is to express his
innocence at the first opportune time. The People can only conclude that Geroches defense of alibi is but an
afterthought (p. 1723, Rollo).

As to accused-appellant Cesar Pechas case, the Court finds it difficult to believe that he had no knowledge that the
2 victims he was burying were victims of violence. The deceased were surely bloodied from their gunshot wounds
and were in fact still handcuffed when exhumed from their shallow grave. It becomes almost impossible for
accused-appellant Pecha not to at least, entertain doubts as to the absence of foul play in this case. He is thus
guilty as an accessory to the crime committed under Paragraph 2, Article 19, of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 19. Accessories.  Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery;

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to habitually guilty of some other crime.
All told, there are only reasons to affirm, and none to reverse, the trial courts conviction of accused-appellants Pol.
Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin
Divinagracia, and Teody Delgado as principals by direct participation of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder, and that of Cesar Pecha as accessory thereto.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of kidnapping is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victims, the penalty is death. However, since the crime was committed before the re-
imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua is imposable upon all the accused-appellant found guilty
of the crime as principals. Accused-appellant Pechas penalty, as accessory is 2 degrees lower, which is prision
mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the penalty to be imposed is 6 months and 1 day (the minimum
of prision correccional), as minimum, up to 8 years (within the minimum period of prision mayor), as the maximum.

On the civil liabilities, accused-appellants who are herein convicted of the crime as principals are held solidarily
liable for the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each of the victims, as indemnity for their death. The amount
of P50,000.00, each, by way moral damages and P25,000.00, each, as exemplary damages are already deemed
sufficient. Accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is held liable for one-tenth of the above amounts. The appealed
judgment is silent as to any justification for the other damages awarded and can therefore not be sustained on
appeal.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellants JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS ABETO are hereby ACQUITTED and
forthwith ordered released from detention unless there may be reason for their further detention on other
criminal cases. The case and appeal of NICOLAS TORRES is DISMISSED by reason of his death. The convictions of all
the other accused-appellants for each case filed are AFFIRMED except for the modification that accused-appellant
CESAR PECHA is sentenced for each case to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional,  as minimum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Joint and several civil
liability for the accused-appellants found guilty as principals, is reduced to P50,000.00 for each case, as indemnity
for the death of each victim, P50,000.00 for each case, by way moral damages, and P25,000.00 for each case, by
way of exemplary damages. The civil liability of accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is maintained at one-tenth of the
above amount.

No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208170               August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446,
which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC).
in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted
accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts

Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information,3 dated February 13,
2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City,
the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping
substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a
white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a.
"John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at
B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two
(22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated; that
ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally
rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the
kidnapping:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a
practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was
billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra
Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the
vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He
noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have
short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he
was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what
transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was
handcuffed and chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and
introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his
handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone
calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a
special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his
girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to
inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell
them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00)
a day as room and board fee.

The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from the
former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation
and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.

Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired
US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private
complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual release.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his
family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John
or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of
wood which was made as target for a rifle.

On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor
was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand
Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla
White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER
group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM
Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the
Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it
down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle
was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted
the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him
for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce
any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation,
however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is
being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping
private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s
cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant]
was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.

Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the police car.
The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and
handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.

During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver.
Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used
by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5

Version of the Defense

Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to substantiate their claim of
innocence:

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated
with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the
Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had
not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore running
some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was
kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he
went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car
outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them held
his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the same
tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.

When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt
very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People
came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made
to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the cover of his
head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow
him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.

When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British passport,
alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of
Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost
those personal properties.

After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he was
brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought
the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for
resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does
not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as an occupation
since his driver’s license is non-professional.

Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she decided
to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4,
Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was placed in
the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his
house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had
markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.

During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his
constitutional rights.

Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter
served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named
Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite,
while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend.
Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.

On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and to
deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not
trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the
same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the hospital
where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were not
brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a
one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers, were detained for
three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and they went
home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.

Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is
engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name.
At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank
passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and
cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7

The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC
found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions of the incident
dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification
by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several
times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately
reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.

With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed
him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held
liable as an accomplice.

The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same were
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused
Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein
her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they
have already served in confinement.

Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM
actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus
interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00),
and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8

Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime
and the identities of the culprits thereof.

Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED
AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.10

Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately with
her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by
Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus in
the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated February
13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was
held captive and not because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11

On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any
supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in his
brief filed before the CA.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof;
and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v.
Maxion15 that:

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court,
it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity
of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.16

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the
factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions
assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17

In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no
cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and
calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the
person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was
able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115
which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was
conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face
towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good
look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify
him in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters
and the manner in which the craven acts are committed.19

Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was
established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times
a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique
tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron
John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the
phone for three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus
because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John
had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for
prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and their
testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20

Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led tothe
inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary
rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.22

The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and
the CA:
 1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23,
Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;

2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in going
to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost
consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;

3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the
Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;

4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with
padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two
(2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family footages, and the
other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards;
Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the
name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki
1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau;
marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of
their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT
bills;

5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus.
Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran,
also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and

6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house and
on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.23

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence,
when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the
kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his
liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.24

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using
sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-
appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was
taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00
for the release of the victim.

Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found
by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that
Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her
was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who
accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a
person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never
reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to
the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus’
illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and giving moral
support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and
indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy
orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it
was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice
rather thanthat of a principal.

Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in his
sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the
allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator’s
questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the
acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during
the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired.31

Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and
frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32 The defense of
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is
difficult to prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was
adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain
selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any
dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim
Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-
appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper
be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.

As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the
legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to the
kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial
of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The
accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might
have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over their persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests,
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally
arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.37

With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of
R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.

The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest committed
from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants,
the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to ₱200,000.00, as
the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family endured because of the
accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his
family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and
psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too
obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court also finds
the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand
for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the
amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages. This is
an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the
nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this
Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than
Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.

In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the amount
of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their participation, the
principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (₱573, 132.00 x 213) or
₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or ₱191,044.00.
Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in the amount
of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or ₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00
as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral damages; and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the
victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is maintained. The civil
liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
 1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00; moral damages in the
amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and

2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱91,044.00, moral damages
in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱33,333.33.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176385             February 26, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880 which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, finding appellants Emelio E. Tolentino and Jesus M.
Trinidad, guilty of the crime of Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder.

On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder were filed
before the RTC against appellants, together with accused Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. The murder case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0258 while the two frustrated murder cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
98-0260 and No. 98-0270. The accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 98-0258

For: Murder

That on or about 11:10 o’clock in the evening, more or less, on the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7,
Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, and helping each other to attain a common purpose, with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, while armed with firearms, assault,
attack, and use personal violence upon one JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO, by then and there shooting the
said victim on her face causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
proximate cause of the death of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

That the commission of the offense is attended by aggravating circumstance of nighttime purposely
sought to facilitate the same and dwelling.

Criminal Case No. 98-0260

For: Frustrated Murder

 That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente,
Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping each other to attain a common purpose,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, while armed with firearms and
knife, and with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault, and use
personal violence upon one ANTONIO BEA, by then and there, poking a firearm at said private offended
party, tying his hands with a rope and thereafter, stabbing said victim on different parts of his body, thus
causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds capable of causing death, hence, performing all the
acts of execution which could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of their (accused) will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said victim which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of
herein private complainant.

Criminal Case No. 98-0270

For: Frustrated Murder

That on or about 11:10 o’clock in the evening of August 29, 1997 at the fishpond at Purok 7, Barangay San
Vicente, municipality of Santa Elena, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with long firearms
and 12 gauge shot gun, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, kick and
strike one ANTONIO NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the different parts of his body and then shot
one said Antonio Novelo but missed, which ordinarily would cause the death of Antonio Novelo thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence,
but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Antonio Novelo, which prevented his death, to his damage
and prejudice.3

During the arraignment on 13 July 1998, appellants, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered their
respective pleas of not guilty.4 Accused Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad remained at large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the
merits of the three criminal cases ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses and their respective testimonies: (1) Antonio Bea testified as an
eyewitness on the killing of Josita Novelo and narrated his own near death experience; (2) Ricardo Basila testified
that he saw the accused escorting Antonio Bea whose hands were tied and disclosed that he was also subjected to
violent acts of the accused. He claimed that he later heard a gunshot coming from Josita Novelo’s house; (3)
Wilfredo Llarena, a Barangay Captain, testified that several persons went to his house carrying an injured Antonio
Bea and they proceeded to the hospital. He later reported the incident to the police officers; (4) Antonio Novelo
testified that the accused went to the house of Josita Novelo and attempted to kill him; (5) Dr. Noli Bayani, the
rural health physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Josita
Novelo; (6) Belen Avellera testified on the existence of the medical records of Antonio Bea; (7) SPO2 Nelson
Ricierra testified that Wilfredo Llarena reported to him the stabbing and the killing incidents and that he was a
member of the team who made a follow-up investigation of the report; (8) Rogelio Novelo testified that Jesus
Trinidad used to be his partner in operating a fishpond and that their partnership turned sour as Jesus Trinidad
harvested the yields of the fishpond without his consent; (9) Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI, Manila, conducted an autopsy of the body of Josita Novelo.

As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" - a photograph of the bloody body of
Josita Novelo; Exhibit "A-1" - the "x" mark on the face of Josita Novelo; Exhibit "B" – a photograph showing the
victim prostrate on the ground; Exhibits "C" and "D" - photographs of the house where the incident of killing took
place; Exhibit "E" - the medical certificate of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "F" - the affidavit of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "G" - the
affidavit of Ricardo Basila; Exhibit "H" - the affidavit of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "I" - the medical certificate of
Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "J" - the death certificate of Josita Novelo showing the result of the post-mortem
examination; and Exhibit "K" - the NBI autopsy report.

The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that sometime in January 1997, Rogelio Novelo, the
surviving spouse of the deceased-victim Josita Novelo, and appellant Jesus Trinidad agreed to manage and operate
a rented fishpond located at Baranggay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte. Sometime in April of the same
year, when the fishpond was yielding its first harvest, Rogelio Novelo and his wife Josita brought the produce to
Manila to be sold, while appellant Jesus Trinidad was left to manage the fishpond. Upon the couple’s return, they
discovered that all the fish and crabs in the fishpond had already been harvested and disposed of. Believing that
appellant Trinidad was responsible for the pilferage, Josita demanded from him either the return of the couple’s
investment or be allowed to buy appellant Trinidad’s share in the partnership. Appellant chose the latter and was
paid by the couple the amount of P9,700.00 as his share in the partnership. After their partnership with appellant
Trinidad was terminated, the couple proceeded to replenish the fishpond with crab seedlings. When the crabs
were ready for harvest, appellant Jesus Trinidad with appellant Emelio Tolentino, Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad,
without the permission from the couple, harvested the crabs for their own benefit. The couple confronted
appellants and their cohorts, but the former’s protestation was merely ignored by the latter. The couple filed a
complaint before the barangay which was then set for hearing on 30 August 1997. A few days before the
scheduled hearing, Rogelio Novelo took a trip to Manila, leaving his wife Josita to manage the fishpond.

On 29 August 1997, at around 10:30 p.m., Antonio Bea, one of the complainants and the caretaker of the couple’s
fishpond, was inside his house located at Purok 7, Tinagong Dagat, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines
Norte.5 He heard someone calling his name from outside his house. Carrying a flashlight, Bea went outside and
focused his flashlight towards the direction of the fishpond watergate ("prensa").6 Suddenly, someone whom he
recognized to be appellant Emelio Tolentino grabbed his hand and pulled him out of the house.7 There he saw
appellant Jesus Trinidad, Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. Jesus Trinidad kicked Bea on the right side of his hip,
and tied a rope around his hands behind his back. Then appellant Emelio Tolentino pulled him by the rope towards
the house of a certain Ricardo Basila.8 Upon reaching the house of Ricardo Basila, Arnel Trinidad called out the
former. Ricardo Basila, with a flashlight in his hand, went out of his house and focused the flashlight at the faces of
the four perpetrators. Irritated by what Ricardo Basila did, Emelio Tolentino, Jesus and Arnel Trinidad took turns in
kicking Ricardo Basila and ordered the latter to get inside his house.9 While inside his house, Ricardo Basila noticed
that Emelio Tolentino was carrying a weapon.10

The assailants, together with Antonio Bea, proceeded to the house of the spouses Novelo situated alongside the
fishpond which was more or less 100 meters from Basila’s house.11 When they arrived at the Novelo house, Jesus
Trinidad called Josita Novelo to get out of the house.12 Josita Novelo went out of the house holding a light.13 Jesus
Trinidad quickly grabbed Josita Novelo by her mouth and the two of them went inside the house together with
Emelio Tolentino, Jesus Trinidad and Antonio Bea. From inside the house, Emelio Tolentino and Jesus Trinidad took
Antonio Bea to another door leading outside and chanced upon Antonio Novelo, Rogelio Novelo’s
brother.14 Immediately, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino kicked Antonio Novelo causing the latter to fall right
into the fishpond and disappear from sight.15 Antonio Bea was then tied to the door from the waist down with
Emelio Tolentino guarding him.16 In that position, Antonio Bea saw Josita Novelo being mauled by Jesus Trinidad
and Arnel Trinidad. All of a sudden, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo on the left cheek with a gun.17 Immediately
after, Emelio Tolentino entered the house and slashed the face of Josita with a jungle bolo.18 The three assailants
untied the binding on Antonio Bea’s feet while leaving the ropes tied behind his back.19 They left Novelo’s house
proceeding towards the fishpond watergate which was about three meters from the house. Emelio Tolentino led
the way, followed by Bea, with Jesus and Arnel Trinidad taking the rear. Without warning, Emelio Tolentino
stabbed Antonio Bea four times in the stomach with the former’s jungle bolo. Antonio Bea fell into the fishpond.

The assailants left the victim and boarded a boat which was operated by Jimmy Trinidad. Injured and bleeding,
Antonio Bea managed to untie his hands and swim across the river to ask for help. He received help from the
people of Purok 7 and was brought to the house of the Barangay Captain Wilfredo Llarena in a hammock.20 The
barangay captain then brought the victim to a hospital. From the hospital, Barangay Captain Wilfredo Llarena,
along with some members of the police, went to the house of spouses Novelo and came upon the dead body of
Josita Novelo.21

Dr. Noli Bayani, the Rural Health Physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted an autopsy of the body and
found that the cause of Josita Novelo’s death was "[h]ypovolemic shock secondary to gunshot wounds and
lacerated wound."22 Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who
also conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased, testified that the shotgun wound at the left side of the
face of the victim caused her death.23

The medical certificate of Antonio Bea shows that the four stab wounds inflicted on him caused damage to his
intestines.24

On 19 October 1999, the prosecution rested its case and made a formal offer of evidence.25

On 13 April 2000, appellants through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence, without leave of court.26 In an
order27 dated 17 May 2000, the RTC denied the demurrer and submitted the case for decision pursuant to Section
15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.28 On 31 May 2000, appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration, praying that the order denying their Demurrer to Evidence be recalled and that they be allowed to
present evidence. The RTC denied the said motion. Unfazed, appellants filed a petition for certiorari before this
Court. This Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated 2 December 2002, which became final and executory on
5 February 2003. As a result, the case was submitted for decision without any evidence proffered by the defense.

On 30 November 2004, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the crimes charged in Criminal Case
No. 98-0258 and Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for murder and frustrated murder, respectively. The decretal portion
of the RTC decision reads:

CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0258

For: MURDER

WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Josita Novelo, the amount
of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0260

For : FRUSTRATED MURDER

WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay their victim, Antonio Bea the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.29

The trial court, however, acquitted appellants of the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed against
Antonio Novelo in Criminal Case No. 98-0270.

On 10 December 2004, appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that "errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial."30 Appellants argued that
in the interest of justice and equity, they should be given the opportunity to testify in their favor considering that
they are meted out by the RTC the supreme penalty of death.

In an Order31 dated 15 December 2004, the RTC denied appellants’ motion for new trial ratiocinating that the error
of appellants’ counsel during the trial does not amount to error of law or irregularity which constitutes a valid
ground for the granting of a motion for new trial. It appears that appellants no longer questioned the denial of
their motion for new trial.

The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court. Thereafter, this Court ordered
the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.32

The Court of Appeals, on 8 November 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
convicting the appellants, with modifications on the award of civil liabilities, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, of Labo,
Camarines Norte finding accused-appellants Emelio Tolentino y Estrella and Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0258, and frustrated
murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, accused –appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and in addition, to pay the heirs of the victim Josita Fernandez
Novelo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for her death; P50,000 as moral damages
and P25,000 representing exemplary damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, accused-appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum. Moreover, they are ordered
to pay the victim Antonio Bea the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages; P30,000 as moral
damages, P30,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages.33

Hence, the instant case.

In their brief, the appellants assign the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO PRESENT DEFENSE
EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.

III

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF INFLICTING INJURY ON

ANTONIO BEA, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THEM GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED
MURDER ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT BEA’S WOUNDS WERE MORTAL.34
Before proceeding to the first and third assignment of errors, the Court deems it proper to first deal with the
second assignment.

Appellants, as earlier mentioned, urge this Court to revisit the issue as to the propriety of the trial court’s Order
dated 17 May 2000 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and preventing them from presenting evidence due to their
failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence.

It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial court’s order dated 17 May 2000 was elevated by
appellants to this Court via petition for certiorari. This Court in a Resolution dated 2 December 2000, dismissed the
said petition, and upheld the trial court’s ruling that appellants are barred from presenting their evidence for
failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was denied by the lower court.
Since the issue of whether or not appellants may be allowed to adduce evidence despite their failure to file a prior
leave of court had already been finally put to rest, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the
case. Any attempt to pass upon anew this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of
procedure.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.35 More specifically, it means that
whatever is already irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.36 Indeed, courts
must adhere thereto because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final
judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.37

Besides, under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that when an accused files
a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, thus:

SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence
for the accused.38 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to
convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated.39 An accused cannot be allowed to
wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience.40 The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a
demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its
evidence.41 Thus, when the trial court disallowed the appellants to present evidence on their behalf, it properly
applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a
particular offense can change this rule. As stressed by this Court:

The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial results in the
submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on record. Considering that the
governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental component of criminal procedure,
respondent judge had the obligation to observe the same, regardless of the gravity of the offense
charged. It is not for him to grant concessions to the accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The
 rule is clear that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this case, the accused, who failed to ask
for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence in his behalf.42

Going back to the first issue, appellants take exception with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence before it
and in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants maintain that
considering the lateness of the hour when the incident took place, and the fact that it was dark, witness Antonio
Bea could not have seen clearly the faces of his attackers and that of the deceased Josita Novelo. Antoio Bea,
according to appellants, is incompetent to testify on matters relating to what was done to the late Josita Novelo
because he was tied from the waist down to the door outside the house, thus, he could not have seen what had
happened inside the house where the deceased was brutally attacked.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in
light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.43 Thus,
appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of
witnesses, unless it be manifestly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts
and circumstances of significance in the case.44

In the instant case, prosecution witness Antonio Bea steadfastly pointed to appellants and their companions as the
malefactors. Such identification was detailed as follows:

Q:     Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla?

A:     Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q:     A certain Emelio Tolentino y Estrella, do you know a person with such name?

A:     Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q:     These persons that I made mention to you since when have you known them?

A:     For almost ten (10) years.

Q:     And because of that length of time you could not possibly [be] mistaken as to their identity?

A:     Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q:     On August 29, 1997 at about 10:30 or 11:00 in the evening thereof, do you recall of any unusual
incident that happened?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     Will you please tell us what is that incident that you recalled?
A:     There was somebody that called me, sir.

xxxx

Q:     When you heard somebody called you on that occasion, what did you do?

A:     I flash[ed] a light to the Prensa, sir.

xxxx

Q:     x x x [W]hat happened next?

A:     Somebody hold (sic) my hand sir.

Q:     Did you recognize who held your hand?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     Who?

A:     Emelio Tolentino.

xxxx

Q:     Mr. Witness, what happened next after Emelio Tolentino held your hand?

A:     He pulled me outside, sir.

Q:     And what happened next after you were pulled outside your house?

A:     I am (sic) telling him I have no fault.

xxxx

Q:     Nang oras na iyon sino pa ang nakita mo kung mayroon man?

A:     Jesus Trinidad, sir.

Q:     Who else if any?

A:     Arnel Trinidad, sir.

Q:     What happened after you told them you have (sic) no fault?

A:     He kicked me, sir.

Q:     Who kicked you in particular?

A:     Jesus Trinidad, sir.45

 Cross-examination:

Q:     Who was the person who held you?

A:     Emelio Tolentino, sir.

Q:     How did you recognize him to be Emelio Tolentino?

A:     When I focused the light, I saw them because of the light, wearing bonnet and their faces were
exposed to the light.

Q:     You said "them", how many were they?

A:     Jesus Trinidad, Emelio Tolentino and Arnel Trinidad, sir.46

The identification of witness Antonio Bea of the perpetrators of the crimes evinces factual truth of what really
occurred on that fateful night. He could not have been mistaken as to the identity of the appellants since, at that
time, he has known them personally for ten (10) years already. Their faces were illuminated by the flashlight when
witness Antonio Bea focused the same in their direction. Also, Bea’s identification of the assailants was
corroborated by Ricardo Basila and Antionio Novelo who testified that they likewise suffered violent acts from the
malefactors during the incident.

Although Antonio Bea was tied at the door outside the house of Josita Novelo, he declared with clarity the
circumstances leading to the killing of Josita and his near-death experience, viz:

Q:     x x x Mr. Witness, where were you when you said you went out of the house let’s go back to the
situation wherein you entered the house of Josita Novelo in one door and then you exited on the other
and there you said the other two, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino saw Antonio Novelo, where you at
that time?

A:     I was with them sir, because they are holding the other end of the rope.

Q:     And what did they do to you afterwards?

A:     They tied me at the door, sir.

Q:     That door where you exited?

A:     Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q:     From the place you were tied did you see Josita Novelo?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     And while you were tied on that occasion what happened to Josita Novelo?

A:     They are asking Josita Novelo where was it placed?

Q:     Do you know what were they asking?

xxxx

Q:     Did you hear the reply of Josita Novelo, if any?

A:     I cannot hear the reply of Josita Novelo because they are mauling her or "binubugbog nila."

Q:     Who in particular was mauling Josita Novelo?

A:     Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad, sir.

Q:     What about Emelio Tolentino, what was he doing?

A:     He is outside guarding me, sir.

Q:     What happened after Josita Novelo was mauled by these two you mentioned?

A:     Suddenly, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo.

Q:     Did you see where Josita Novelo was hit?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     Where was she hit, if you have seen?

A:     On the left cheek which exited at the back of her head.

Q:     After they have shot Josita Novelo, what did they do next?

A:     They get (sic) out, sir.

xxxx

Q:     What about Emelio Tolentino, what did he do if any?

A:     Emelio Tolentino entered the house and then slashed the face of Josita Novelo.

Court: Anong ginamit? Nakita mo?

A:     Jungle bolo.

Q:     Saan? Sa kanan o kaliwa?

A:     Sa kaliwa, po.

xxxx
 Q:     Now, Mr. Witness, you said that after Josita Novelo was shot by Jesus Trinidad, and Emelio Tolentino
went inside the house and put an X mark on the face of that dead woman, what happened next?

A:     They untied me, sir.

Q:     And what did they do after untying you?

A:     They passed through the prensa and stabbed me, sir.

Q:     Mr. witness, you said you were untied is it (sic) not?

A:     Yes, sir, sa paa lang.

xxxx

Q:     So in other words from the time you were untied you walked towards that ‘prensa’ for about three
(3) meters?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     When you walked, who was ahead of you, if any?

A:     Emelio Tolentino, sir.

Q:     Were your hands still tied?

A:     Yes, sir.

Q:     What about Tolentino who was ahead of you what was he doing?

A:     He has a jungle bolo sir, and stabbed me.

xxxx

Q:     How many times were you stabbed on that occasion?

A:     Four times, sir.47

The foregoing testimony can only be told by a person who had really witnessed the incident and had been
subjected to personal violence from the perpetrators, hence, such testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Furthermore, Bea’s testimony jibed with the physical evidence. The nature of the wound of the deceased was
affirmed by the medical experts to be a result of a gunshot wound. The location of the wounds found on Josita
Novelo’s face as described by witness Bea was consistent with the documentary evidence, i.e., photographs,
autopsy result and the physical examination of the corpse of the victim. All these tend to dispel any doubt that
witness Bea would have concocted the whole story. The prosecution successfully established beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants and their cohorts killed Josita Novelo.

Anent the third issue, appellants argue that in the stabbing of Antonio Bea, they should have been liable only for
attempted murder and not frustrated murder since the prosecution failed to prove, due to its failure to present the
attending physician, that the injury suffered by the victim was fatal.
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in the
consummation of the crime.48 The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the
crime.49 Subjectively, the crime is complete.50 Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the
subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated
by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.51 In homicide cases, the offender is
said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the
death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.52

In the instant case, the prosecution established that Antonio Bea sustained four stab wounds inflicted by Emelio
Tolentino which caused damage to the victim’s abdomen resulting in massive blood loss. The victim was
hospitalized for two months because of these injuries.53 In fact, at the trial, the victim showed the scars in his
abdomen. All these tend to show the seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim and which would have
caused his death had it not been for the timely medical intervention.

The trial court, in assessing the testimonial evidence of the prosecution, made this appropriate observation:

In the instant cases, the corroborative testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Antonio Bea, Ricardo Basila
and Antonio Novelo, positively identifying the accused as the perpetrators of the crime satisfactorily
persuade the Court. x x x.

xxxx

Witness Antonio Bea testified that accused Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino are known to him for
almost ten (10) years x x x.

Likewise, witness Antonio Novelo, on cross-examination, testified that he recognized the accused because
their voices are very familiar to him being neighbors and he had known the accused for a long time.

xxxx

The identification of an accused through his voice is acceptable, particulary if the witness knows the
accused personally.

The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the
witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.54

Worth stressing is that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. The settled rule is that when the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon
this Court.55 We find no cogent reason to veer away from their findings.

In an effort to exculpate themselves from the charges, appellants identified inconsistent statements of witness Bea
such as the latter’s declaration that he was a friend of Jesus Trinidad which is contradictory to his earlier testimony
the he got mad at Jesus Trinidad four months prior to the incident. They also make an issue of the statement of
Bea during the cross-examination wherein he made mention that a gun was poked at him, which declaration is
missing in the direct examination.

These inconsistencies are very trivial and insignificant. Minor inconsistencies do not warrant rejection of the entire
testimony nor the reversal of judgment.56 Accuracy in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the
credibility of witnesses are tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of
emotions and the passage of time.57 Witness Bea’s inconsistencies rather enhance truthfulness for it erases
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The RTC convicted the appellants of murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 for the killing of Josita Novelo and
frustrated murder for the assault of Antonio Bea in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 by appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling.

The RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Josita Novelo and in the
stabbing of Antonio Bea.

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape.58 Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and
the victim is unarmed.59 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself/herself or to retaliate.60

In the killing of Josita Novelo, the victim was at her home when someone called her. When the victim went
outside, suddenly Jesus Trinidad held her. Thereafter, Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo.
Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot the helpless victim on the cheek. Said attack was so sudden and unexpected
that the victim had not been given the opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression. She was unarmed
when she was attacked. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the assault on the victim was treacherous.

The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with treachery. While Bea, whose hands were tied behind his back,
and the assailants were walking along the dike, Emelio Tolentino unexpectedly stabbed the victim four times. The
victim could not put up a defense as the attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel the same since his
hands were tied.

Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling
in Criminal Case No. 98-0258. Evidence shows that Josita Novelo was killed in her own house. When the crime is
committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.61 Here, the crime was committed inside the house of the deceased
victim. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human
abode.62 He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.63

Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 considering that the same was not alleged
in the information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances must be
alleged in the information and proved otherwise; even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall
not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused.64

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases was improperly appreciated by the RTC. Nighttime is
considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to
ensure their escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime
and that the perpetrators took advantage of it. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no
evidence that the appellants and their companions took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime.

Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, in Criminal Case No. 98-0258, it must be borne in mind that the
prosecution successfully established the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Josita
Novelo. With this, the crime committed by the appellants is murder in accordance with Article 248. With the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed should be in its
maximum, which is death.65

In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has
been prohibited.66 Thus, the penalty imposed upon appellants in Criminal case No. 98-0258 should be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.67

As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.68

The RTC awarded P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo as civil indemnity. The Court of Appeals reduced
the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of
civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo is in order.69

The RTC also correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the
victim. This does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs.70 Article 2230 of the Civil
Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, as in this case.71 To deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award
of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.

In Criminal Case No. 98-060, the RTC imposed upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14
years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Under Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of frustrated murder is one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.72 Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1
day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be
taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime.73 The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision
mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the frustrated murder, an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum74 may be considered
reasonable for the frustrated murder under the facts of this case.

As to the award of actual damages, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to substantiate Antonio Bea’s
hospitalization expenses. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Antonio was actually hospitalized and operated
upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he
suffered pecuniary loss. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order.75 Moreover, Antonio
is also entitled to moral damages which this Court hereby awards in the amount of P40,000.00. Although there was
no testimony on the moral damages that he sustained, the medical certificate issued by the hospital indicated that
Antonio Bea sustained serious stab injuries inflicted by appellants. It is sufficient basis to award moral damages as
ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Antonio Bea would naturally
cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.76 Finally, the award in the amount
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is also in order considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or
generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.77 This
kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrong-doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.78

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 08 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880 finding
appellants guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case. No. 98-0258, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modifications:
 (1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim
Josita Novelo the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 representing exemplary damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, for the crime of Frustrated Murder, appellants are sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In addition, appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally
the victim Antonio Bea the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P20,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

G.R. No. L-2873             February 28, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.

Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of at the
time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of  prision mayor  for the crime of
robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with
the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.

Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below
which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor
General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised
Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years age, "The penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."

There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the Government's contention.

One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to
each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention in the same statute are never to be supposed or so
regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)

This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read together as whole. "An
amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and a new and independent
act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any
action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form the
amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others. Where an amendment
leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning
and effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be
amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally
or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment." (59 C. J., 1096,
1097.)

We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and article 80 as amended.
There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance
and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words,
there is no inconsistency between sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower
than the imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances. Let it be remember that the privilege
of article 68, supra, is not by its nature inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this
privilege is granted adult offenders under given conditions.

At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68. Indeed the rational
presumption is that if there had been such an intention the lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead of
leaving the change to inference.

One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or amendment is that penal law is
to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the state. "Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed,
that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In
other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into
effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly
included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly
within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in
favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those
from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)

The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is punishable under article 294,
case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being no modifying circumstance,
the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional. Being entitled to an indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act No. L-4103 as
amended, the accused should be, and he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months
of arresto mayor and not more than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect the appealed
judgment is affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

April 12, 1950

TUASON, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision.

The main theme of the Solicitor General's argument is that articles 13 (2) and 68 (2) of the Revised Penal code
"complement each other;" that "the application of article 68 takes place only when the court has to render
judgment and impose a penalty upon a minor who has been proceeded against in accordance with article 80 and
who had misbehaved or is found incorrigible," and that "article 80 must be applied first before article 68 can come
into operation, and the court can not apply the latter article in total disregard of the former." In short, as we infer
from this line of reasoning, what article 80 does not touch, article 68 can not touch.

We do not think the premise and conclusion of the motion are correct. There seems to be a confusion of ideas.

It may do us well to make brief review of the legislation, past and present, relative to juvenile offenders and dissect
and analyze its various provisions and the differences between them and the role assigned to each. .

Article 68 of the Revised Penal code provides:.

Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article
80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.

Sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of the foregoing article are a reproduction of article 85 of the Spanish Penal Code.

Into the Revised Penal Code, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was incorporated. It has become in the new code article
80, the first paragraph of which provides that "whenever a minor under 18 years of age, of either sex, be accused
of a crime, the court . . . shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or
charitable, institution, etc." And in the paragraph immediately preceding the last, it is further provided that "In
case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulation of the institution to which he has been
committed, or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person,
or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be
returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by
him."

The latest legislation on the subject was Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code
so as to reduce to below 16 the age of minors coming within its purview.

A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68, according to its main paragraph, is to lay off
and watch while the minor is in the hands of a charitable institution or person mentioned in article 80 trying to
reform him or her. This has to be so because article 68 is a rule for the application of penalties, and there is no
penalty when there is no judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or other place of similar character or
entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if and when the minor turns out to be hopeless or incorrigible,
he is returned to the proper court and the court passes sentence on him or her. In other words, article 80
withdraws, as it were, and sub-paragraph 1 and 2, as the case maybe, of article 68 takes control.

From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these articles complement each other
if by complement is meant that they are two mutually completing parts so that article 68 could not stand without
article 80. It is more appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to article 80 but is, in all other respects,
self-sufficient and independent of the latter. Parts of one system of penology and working in coordination with
each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed that article 68 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled
"Application of Penalties," while article 80 comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled "Execution and Service of
Penalties." Two different subjects, these.

It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of the Revised Penal Code do not function
at the same time and are designed for different purposes. Each has its assigned, separate sphere of action without
in any way intermingling with the other. When article 80 operates, article 68 keeps out of the way; article 68 steps
in when article 80 steps out.

While a minor is in the process of being reformed he is, in a manner of speaking, in an intermediate or
indeterminate state, neither in prison nor free. Through repentance and by observing good conduct, he is
rewarded with freedom, released upon reaching the age of majority or before, but if he shows no promise of
turning a new leaf, Bilibid claims him.

It is the minors so situated; it is selection of two should be committed to are formatory school or to the custody of
a private person with which article 80 has to do, and no more. Article 80 does not concern itself with what should
be done with minors when they are consigned to jail because of misbehavior; much less is it concerned over
minors who, after the passage of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to prison without having been under the
custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths between 16 and 18. On the other hand, article 68
is intended for minors who are sent to jail, a matter foreign to the province of article 80.

To press the argument further, article 85 of the original Penal Code conferred upon minors under 18 the right to a
penalty. Then came the Juvenile Delinquency Act giving additional concession to juvenile delinquents. When, later,
Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 so as to eliminate from its beneficent provisions minor of the age of 16 or
over and under 18, the logical effect of the amendment can no other than to correspondingly reduce the age of
minors regarding whom the suspensory inhibition on article 68 is to be confined. Only to the extent and within the
limits that article 80 applies is article 68 bound to defer to that article. Where article 80 does not apply article 68 is
supreme. When article 80 says that it will deal only with minors below 16, it relinquishes authority over minors
above that age in favor of article 68. When and if article 80 should by amendment further reduce the age to 15, to
that extent the operation of article 68 will be correspondingly enlarged.

In fact, if Republic Act No. 47, instead of limiting the operation of article 80 to minors under 16, had totally
abolished the scheme of juvenile reformation, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal Code
would, in our opinion, remain intact, with the only difference that, as before, they would have full sway,
unhampered by any consideration of suspended judgment. The predecessor of article 68 was in the original Penal
Code since that code was put in force in Spain in 1870 and in the Philippines in 1884, long before the idea
embodied in article 80 was conceived. Before the Revised Penal Code went into effect, article 85 of the old Penal
Code and the Juvenile Delinquency Act worked in the manner herein set forth although there was not any express
provision coordinating their operation. It can safely be said that the main paragraph of article 68 was inserted
merely to explain in clear and express terms when it should stand aloof and when it should play its role. The
Revised Penal Code merely states the obvious as befits a scientific system of law.

In conclusion, when Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing the age of
persons who may be placed on probation under that article, the amendment did not change in any form or
manner the degree of punishment that should be meted out to those who are to be committed to jail or how they
are to treated. After the minor is turned over to the court for sentence, article 80 ceases to have any interest in
him or her. In saying that the 16-and 18-year old should no longer be given a trial or placed on probation in a
reformatory institution but should go straight to prison upon conviction, Republic Act No. 47 does not, by
implication or otherwise, connote that such minors should also be deprived of a reduced penalty. In no standard of
statutory construction is there support for the proposition that the mitigating circumstance which minors between
16 and 18 enjoyed before Republic Act No. 47 came into being, notwithstanding the fact that they had shown
evidence of incorrigibility, should be denied them now for no other reason than that the right to be committed to a
reformatory school has been taken away from them; now that they are confined in jail without having committed
any fault other than the crime for which they were prosecuted in the first instance.

Let it be remembered that by virtue of the amendment minors between 16 and 18 do not now come under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80.

Of course, the effect of a law amendment would different if the amendatory law had absorbed the law which it
had amended. In that case, the original law become part and parcel of the new law, with the result that if the
amendatory law be later repealed, both that law and the law which it had superseded or amended would be
considered abrogated. There was no law of its own force could survive. But, as we have indicated, article 68 as well
as its predecessor is an independent provision and has not been merged with article 80 or any other article of the
Revised Penal code. It is an independent provision inoperative only during the suspension of the sentence but
possessing all the vigor which article 85 of Spanish Code had, when the minors are sentenced to jail.

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we emphasize the rule of statutory construction to the effect that all
parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof,
and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon
the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.) The motion for reconsideration has not pointed to any
conflict, and we can not find any, between the retention of the privileged or special mitigating circumstance in
favor of minors below 18 and over 16 and the fact that such minors are not entitled to the benefits of article 80
under any circumstances. The motion for reconsideration is conspicuous for its silence on any incongruity or
absurdity that might result from our ruling on the scope and extent of Republic Act No. 47.

The sole consideration that might commend itself in favor of the Government's position is the general welfare. For
the good of society it may have been better if Republic Act No. 47 had amended articles 13 and 68 also by
correspondingly reducing the age of accused minors entitled to a mitigating circumstance by reason of age. But it is
write to say that we are not authorized to insert into a law what we think should be in it or to supply what we think
the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission. This is specially true in penal
legislation which, as we have repeatedly stressed in our decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even
room for construction in this case. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No. 47 can not be used as
basis for giving it an meaning not apparent on its face. A preamble or explanatory not is resorted to only for
clarification in cases of doubt. There is no ambiguity in Republic Act No. 47.

The motion and the request to set it for oral argument are denied.

G.R. No. 157171             March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section
27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero,
Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The
information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public
School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine
hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine
(159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418,
008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected
in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156
with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except
petitioner who was convicted as follows:

xxx

5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total
of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia
is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also
deprived of her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her
person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the
minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as
errors of the appellate court:

I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY
RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS
BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.

II

ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE
IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.

III

ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE
OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
BOARD.

IV

THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and
conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private
complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which
falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se  or mala prohibita?
Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and
262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases
the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed
due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within
a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law
to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of
votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless
the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:

1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof
were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;

2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement
of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the
Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.

3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray
in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of
electrical adding machines.

4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to
appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of
Votes.

5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added
all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.

6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was
handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the
column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of
the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422
was raised as an issue.

At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand
total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for
private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the
number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC)
No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921,
which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner
likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our
mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in
the COC.18

Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV
(Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As
chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic
entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure
but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b)
of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable
under the said provision.20

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has
consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
on the matter coincide.21

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers
in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the
voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and
statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly
attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of
Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially
when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 115182             April 6, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RESTITUTO ROCHE y NICANOR, MARCELINO FALLORE y NICANOR, FRANCISCO GREGORIO y MONCADA and
DORICO CABALLES y NICANOR,accused, RESTITUTO ROCHE, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kaloocan City, finding accused-appellant
Restituto Roche guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Roderick Ferol, in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are as follows:

On June 4, 1992, an information for murder was filed against accused-appellant Restituto Roche and three others,
namely, Marcelino Fallore, Francisco Gregorio, and one John Doe. The information, filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Kaloocan City, alleged —

That on or about the 31st day of May 1992 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and being armed, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one RODERICK FEROL Y TUDIC @
DIKDIK with bladed weapons on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
physical injuries, which injuries caused the victim's death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

When arraigned on June 18, 1992, all of the accused, with the exception of John Doe, pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged, whereupon they were tried. The prosecution presented Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Helen Amarille,3 Rodel
Ferol, PO3 Orlando Valencia, Rosalinda Ferol, and Rogelio Rossel whose testimonies and documentary evidence
showed that, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992, Roderick and Rodel Ferol were having drinks
with a friend named Bobot inside the Ferol compound at Block 4, Lot 40, Bagong Silang, Kaloocan City. Without any
warning, accused-appellant Restituto Roche and Francisco Gregorio barged into the compound. Francisco tried to
hit Rodel Ferol with an empty beer bottle marked "Beer Grande" but failed because his common-law wife, Helen
Amarille, pulled him away on time.4 Roderick Ferol was not as lucky as his brother. Roderick was stabbed on the
back with an ice pick by accused-appellant. Roderick ran towards the house of his friend Bobot 5 but, outside the
compound, Dorico Caballes caught up with him. Roderick fell to the ground and was repeatedly stabbed with a
knife by Dorico. Rogelio Rossel tried to stop Dorico but he was chased by the latter. A brother of the victim, Jon-
Jon, threw bottles at Dorico, forcing the latter to run away, and leave his victim behind. Roderick was then taken to
his house by Rogelio and Jon-Jon.6 But at the time, Roderick was already dead.7

Helen Amarille sought assistance from the police station in Bagong Silang.8 She led PO3 Orlando Valencia, PO3
Celerino Vertez, PO3 Jose Marle, and PO2 Gil Torres, all of the Kaloocan City Police Station, to the scene of the
crime, but as the victim was no longer there, they proceeded to Roche's residence. Helen pointed to accused-
appellant, Marcelino Fallore and Francisco Gregorio as the assailants of Roderick Ferol. The suspects were taken to
the Bagong Silang Police Station for investigation.9

Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Laboratory Service Station, conducted an autopsy on the
body of Roderick Ferol. His findings were embodied in Medico-Legal Report No. M-0899-92 10 which, in pertinent
parts, reads:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Cadaver of Roderick T. Ferol, about 21 years old, student, 165 cm in height and a resident of Phase 5, Pkg 4, Blk G
Lot 2, Bagong Silang, Kalookan City.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

. . . To determine the cause of death.

FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent
portions of the body. Conjunctivae and lips are pale. Nailbeds are cyanotic.

HEAD, TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(1) Stab wound, left maxillary region, measuring 3 by 0.8 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline, 4
cm deep, directed downwards, anteriorwards and medialwards, fracturing the left maxilla.

(2) Stab wound, left shoulder, measuring 2 by 0.6 cm, 21 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm
deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and medialwards.

(3) Stab wound, chest, measuring 5.5 by 2 cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline, 5 cm deep,
directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards, fracturing the sternum at the level of the
2nd thoracic rib, lacerating the upper lobe of the right lung.

(4) Abrasion, right shoulder, measuring 1.5 by 1 cm, 12 cm from the anterior midline.

(5) Linear abrasion, right infraclavicular region, measuring 2 by 0.5 cm, 12 cm from the anterior
midline.

(6) Stab wound, chest, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 1.5 cm right of the anterior midline, 4 cm deep,
directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards, fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib,
lacerating the middle lobe of the right lung.

(7) Stab wound, left lumbar region, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 12 cm. from the posterior midline, 3 cm
deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and medialwards, passing thru the 9th left intercostal
space, lacerating the lower lobe of the left lung.

(8) Stab wound, left lumbar region, measuring 2.8 by .8 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline,
directed downwards, medialwards and anteriorwards.

(9) Stab wound, left costal region, measuring 1 by 2.5 cm, 2 cm from the anterior midline, 5 cm
deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and medialwards, lacerating the left lobe of the liver.

(10) Abrasion, right cubital fossa, measuring 3 by 2 cm, 2 cm medial to its anterior midline.

(11) Grace abrasion, middle 3rd of the right forearm, measuring 7 by 7 cm, along its anterior
midline.

(12) Incised wound, distal 3rd of the right forearm, measuring 4 by 0.5 cm, along its anterior
midline.

(13) Incised wound, proximal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 8.5 to 0.3 cm, 2 cm lateral to its
anterior midline.

(14) Incised wound, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm, 3.5 cm lateral to its
anterior midline.

(15) Abrasion, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 3.5 by 0.7 cm, 2 cm medial to its posterior
midline.
There are 1,500 cc of blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic and abdominal cavities.

Stomach is full of dinuguan.

x x x           x x x          x x x

C O N C L U S I O N:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds in the head
and trunk.

x x x           x x x          x x x

EXAMINED BY: (signed)

DARIO L. GAJARDO
Superintendent MS (PNP)
Medico-Legal Officer &
Chief

The defense presented as witnesses accused-appellant, Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and Leticia Costo
whose testimonies are as follows:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 1992, accused-appellant's son was baptized in a church with
Francisco Gregorio as godfather. After the baptism, at around 12:00 o'clock, as the party was on its way to
accused-appellant's residence, accused-appellant noticed Roderick and Rodel Ferol having drinks inside their
compound.

After reaching his residence, accused-appellant went out to buy two cases of beer from a nearby store. On his way
back to his house, he was stopped by Roderick and Rodel Ferol. Roderick tripped him, so he fell to the ground. As
Roderick drew a knife, accused-appellant did not fight him, rather, he ran home. After learning what had
happened, some of the guests, among whom were Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and Dorico Caballes tried
to help him, but they were initially prevented from going out of the house by the women. However, Dorico
Caballes and the other guests were later able to get out of the house. Dorico Caballes, with knife in his hand, went
after Roderick Ferol. Francisco Gregorio followed Dorico, holding in his hand a beer bottle marked "Grande."

At past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, policemen, accompanied by Helen Amarille, arrived at the house of accused-
appellant. On the information of Amarille, the police arrested Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and accused-
appellant. 11 Dorico Caballes escaped and has remained at large. 12

On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on
December 21, 1993 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence has established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused Restituto Roche for the crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the
guilt of accused Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could not be arraigned.

The Court hereby sentences accused Restituto Roche to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstance, and to indemnify the heirs the sum of P50,000.00.
 Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of accused Francisco Gregorio and
Marcelino Fallore, both accused are hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED. 13

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends:

1. The finding of guilt against the accused-appellant is contrary to the evidence;

2. The trial court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the testimony and/or
affidavit of prosecution witness Rogelio Rossel and other facts in the case at bar;

3. For clear lack or absence of conspiracy among the accused, the accused-appellant herein should have
been acquitted. 14

First. Accused-appellant contends that he could not have stabbed the victim with an ice pick, considering the
nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the latter. He questions the credibility of witnesses Helen Amarille and
Rodel Ferol, both of whom stated they saw accused-appellant barge into the Ferol compound and stab Roderick
Ferol at the back with an ice pick.

To be sure, Helen Amarille's testimony is, by itself, clear, categorical and consistent. She testified that in the
afternoon of May 31, 1992, she was in the kitchen doing the laundry while her common-law husband, Rodel Ferol,
was having drinks with Roderick Ferol and a friend named Bobot when all of a sudden accused-appellant and
Francisco Gregorio came. Immediately, accused-appellant started stabbing Roderick Ferol on his left side with an
ice pick. On the other hand, Francisco Gregorio tried to attack Rodel with a beer bottle marked "Grande," but she
was able to pull him away. Marcelino Fallore also tried to attack Rodel Ferol with a stainless knife but she
intervened and stop Marcelino from harming Rodel. Angered by her intervention, Marcelino threw a stone at her.
Rodel then ran away. Roderick also ran but Dorico Caballes was able to catch up with him. Accused-appellant and
Francisco Gregorio followed. She ran to the police station in Bagong Silang for help. 15

We note, however, that Helen Amarille's testimony detailed the events leading to Roderick Ferol's death with such
thoroughness it raises the suspicion that it had been rehearsed. "A witness whose testimony is perfect in all
aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays
herself open to suspicion of having been [coached] or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed. . ." 16

Amarille's testimony sounds so perfect that instead of inspiring belief, it becomes suspect. It differs so substantially
from the testimony of her common-law husband Rodel Ferol, who also claims to have been present during the
incident, that its credibility is placed in doubt. In contrast to Amarille's version, Rodel Ferol testified:

Q: At about 5:00 p.m., on May 31, 1992, do you remember where you were?

A: I was in our house, sir.

Q: Who was with you at your house on said date?

A: My brother Roderick, sir.

Q: What were you doing at that time?

A: We have a drinking spree in front of our house, sir.

Q: Aside from your brother Rodel and you, were there other persons who were drinking with you at that
time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were these other person who were with you at that time?

A: The friend of my brother, sir.

Q: What is the name?

A: Bobot, sir.

Q: Aside from Bobot, are there other persons with you?

A: No more, sir.

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened at about 5:00 o'clock of May 31, 1992 while you
and your brother were having a drinking spree?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that unusual incident that you are referring to?

A: When Restituto Roche entered our compound, sir.

Q: You mentioned the name of Restituto Roche, how many persons were there who entered your
compound with Restituto Roche?

A: Three (3) sir.

Q: Do you know who are these three (3) other persons?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who are these three (3) other persons?

A: Restituto, Marcelino and Francisco, sir.

Q: What happened when these three (3) persons entered your compound at about 5:30 in the afternoon
on said date?

A: They suddenly stabbed my brother, Restituto stabbed my brother, sir.

Q: With what instrument was your brother stabbed by this Restituto Roche?

A: Ice pick, sir.

Q: On what part of the body of your brother was he hit by this instrument?
A: At the back, sir.

Q: How many times was your brother Roderick Ferol stabbed by Restituto?

A: Two (2) times, sir.

Q: You mentioned that he was stabbed at the back portion near your left side, where was the other stab
made?

A: Also at the back portion but I cannot be sure [where] exactly, sir.

Q: When Restituto Roche stabbed your brother at the back, what was these Mario [or Marcelino Fallore]
and Afran [or Francisco Gregorio] doing at that time?

A: Mario boxed me while Afran was holding a bottle, sir while standing, sir.

Q: What kind of bottle was Afran holding at that time?

A: A bottle of Grande, sir.

Q: You mentioned that you were boxed by Mario, where were you hit?

A: At my nose, sir.

Q: Now what was Restituto Roche saying at that time he was stabbing Roderick [Ferol] at that time, if
any?

A: He was not saying anything because I already fell down [when] I was boxed, sir.

Q: How about this Mario, what was he saying at that time this incident was [occurring]?

A: He is not saying anything, sir.

Q: How about this Afran, was he saying anything at that time?

A: None, sir.

Court:

This Mario refers to Marcelino?

A: Yes, [Your] Honor.

Court:

And Afran refers to Francisco Gregorio?

A: Yes [Your] Honor.

Fiscal Quimpo:

How about your brother Roderick Ferol was he saying anything at that time he saw Restituto Roche?

A: None, sir.

Q: How about you did you say anything?

A: None, sir.

Q: What happened when your brother was stabbed and you were boxed by Mario?

A: My brother ran away, he was able to [run] away, sir.

Q: Towards, what direction did he [run] to?

A: Going towards his friend, sir.

Q: And where is that friend that you are referring to?

A: At the house of Bobot, our drinking companion, sir.

Q: Now when Roderick Ferol ran towards the house of his friend, what if any did Restituto Roche do?

A: He ran after him, sir.

Q: And what was Restituto Roche holding at that time when he was running after Roderick Ferol?

A: An itak, sir, bolo.

Q: How about the ice pick that you mentioned that he used in stabbing, where was that ice pick at that
time he ran after Roderick Ferol?

A: I do not know where he left the ice pick, sir.

Q: When you first saw him [arrive] at your compound referring to Roche, what [was] Restituto Roche
holding at that time . . . that you first saw him?

A: Ice pick, sir.

Q: Is it ice pick only?

A: Yes, sir, but when he ran after my brother he was holding a bolo, sir.

Q: When your brother ran towards the house of his friend, what did you do if any?

A: I followed him, sir.

Q: How about this Mario and Afran, what were they doing when Roche was running after your brother?
 A: I was not able to see what they did, sir.

Q: Why did you not go after Restituto Roche and your brother?

A: I was not able to see what [they] are doing because I was not able to catch up with them, sir.

Q: Now after Restituto Roche ran after your brother Roderick Ferol when was the last time that you saw
your brother Roderick Ferol?

A: When he was already lying face down in front of the house of his friend, sir.

Q: How far was that place [where] he was lying down from the place where you had a drinking session?

A: It is far sir more or less five (5) meters, sir.

Q: When you saw your brother lying down on the ground where was Restituto Roche?

A: I was not able to see him there, sir.

Q: What did you do with your brother Roderick Ferol when you saw him lying down?

A: I carried him, sir.

Q: What was his condition at that time you saw him?

A: He was already dead, sir.

Q: And how did you know that he was already dead?

A: He was not breathing anymore, sir. 17

A comparison of the testimonies of Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol reveals discrepancies on material points. While
Amarille claimed that Marcelino Fallore tried to attack Rodel Ferol with a stainless knife, Rodel Ferol stated that
Marcelino boxed him (Rodel) in the nose. Amarille said she intervened to protect Rodel Ferol from the attack.
However, Rodel Ferol makes no mention of Helen's presence during the incident. Neither did he mention any
attempt by Marcelino Fallore to hit him with a knife. On the other hand, Helen Amarille remembered no "itak" or
"bolo" which accused-appellant carried. It taxes one's credulity that while Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol could
remember such details as to the kind of bottle Francisco Gregorio was carrying, they could not remember who
tried to punch whom and who carried what kind of weapon, or even who was present during the incident. These
are inconsistencies concerning substantial matters that cannot just be overlooked. It is settled that "where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be
telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction." 18

Whose testimony then may be believed by this Court? The testimony of neither one.

There is no question that Rodel Ferol was present at the time of the incident. He was having drinks with the victim
Roderick and a friend. He belied Amarille's claim that she was present when the incident happened. Rodel
testified:

Q: How about your wife did you see her [get] out from the compound?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did she go if you know?

A: She went to the house of my grandmother, sir.

Q: What time was that when she went to the house of your grandmother?

A: Around 4:00 o'clock sir.

Q: And she never came back up to the time this incident happened?

A: She returned sir but it was after the incident, sir.

Q: So at that time of the incident your wife was not in your house?

A: Yes, sir. 19

On the other hand, Rodel's testimony is contrary to the physical evidence. Rodel testified that accused-appellant
stabbed the victim with an ice pick. Recalling the events, he said:

Q: Now Mr. Witness you said you were present when Restituto Roche stabbed your brother with an ice
pick, where were you [at] that time when you saw for the first time Roche holding an ice pick?

A: He was inside our compound, sir.

Q: Where was your brother when you claimed you saw Roche holding an ice pick?

A: I was also inside the compound, sir.

Q: Now, you mentioned that Roche was able to [approach] your brother with that ice pick?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: This ice pick that you saw which Roche was holding was this the kind of ice pick which you used in
breaking ice?

A: I did not say it is being used to break ice, sir.

Q: Why did you say that the one he was holding was an ice pick?

A: Because it is sharp, sir.

Q: It is pointed and round that is why you said it is an ice pick?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How far were you from Roche when you saw that ice pick being held by him?
 A: Five (5) steps away, sir.

Q: So you could clearly see this ice pick being held by the hand of Roche?

A: Yes, sir. 20

Contrary to Rodel Ferol's testimony, however, the autopsy report reveals that the stab wounds sustained by
Roderick Ferol at the back, (stab wound nos. 7 and 8), measuring 2 x 1 cm., with a depth of 3 cms. and 2.8 x 0.8 cm.
respectively, could not have been inflicted by an ice pick. As the medical examiner Dr. Gajardo observed, these
injuries were caused by a pointed single-bladed weapon. 21

The victim sustained stab wounds in the front and back parts of his body. "[Stab or puncture wounds] are wounds
whose depth is greater than their length or breadth, and are produced by an instrument being driven through the
skin. The size and shape varies with the instrument." 22 Different types of weapons, as well as the manner in which
the victim was stabbed, can produce different types of wounds:

. . . With a sharp-edged weapon like a knife the form of the skin opening is determined not only by the
shape of the blade but also by the direction in which the elastic fibers in the dermis of the wounded area
happen to be directed. If a flat blade enters in a direction parallel with the fibers a slit-like or elliptic
wound with sharp edges and pointed ends is produced. On the other hand, if the elastic fibers are severed
transversely, the wound usually gapes because of the contraction of this tissue. If the fibers are severed
obliquely, the opening in the skin may gape unevenly and assume an asymmetrical oval shape. If the knife
blade is drawn out in a slightly different direction from that in which it entered, other fibers are cut and
the wound may show a notch . . . An instrument with three-cornered edges, like a triangular file, produces
a three-cornered wound . . . An implement with a thin circular shaft like an ice pick inflicts a round hold or
a slit in the skin. If the shaft is comparatively thick and roughened there may be a marginal abrasion
around the opening . . . Other weapons produce their own characteristic lesions. 23

Undoubtedly, an ice pick would cause a wound that is considerably smaller than that inflicted on Roderick Ferol.
That an ice pick could not have produced surface wounds measuring 1 x 2 cms. and 2.8 x 0.8 cm., (stab wound nos.
7 and 8 respectively) is a material fact which the trial court obviously overlooked.

The wounds found in the front parts of the victim's body (stab wounds nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9) measured as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(1) Stab wound, left maxillary region, measuring 3 by 0.8 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep,
directed downwards, anteriorwards and medialwards, fracturing the left maxilla.

(2) Stab wound, left shoulder, measuring 2 by 0.6 cm, 21 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep,
directed downwards, posteriorwards and medialwards.

(3) Stab wound, chest, measuring 5.5 by 2 cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed
downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards, fracturing the sternum at the level of the 2nd thoracic rib,
lacerating the upper lobe of the right lung.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(6) Stab wound, chest, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 1.5 cm right of the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed
downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards, fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib, lacerating the middle
lobe of the right lung.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

(9) Stab wound, left costal region, measuring 1 by 2.5 cm, 2 cm from the anterior midline, 5 cm deep,
directed downwards, posteriorwards and medialwards, lacerating the left lobe of the liver. 24

Dr. Gajardo testified that the stab wounds found at the front and back of the deceased could have been inflicted
by a single-bladed weapon. 25 They could not have been caused by an ice pick. As clearly stated, an ice pick is a
pointed circular shaft, not a pointed single-bladed weapon. A puncture wound resulting from an ice pick attack
would obviously be different from that produced by a single-bladed weapon. It has been held that a cane knife,
having a maximum width of five inches, cannot cause a fatal wound which is only one centimeter in
length. 26 Conversely, an ice pick cannot create a surface wound that is more than one inch, such as stab wound no.
8, but would produce a wound so minuscule in length and width that it can be missed even by an experienced
medical examiner.

Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony of
witnesses. We have held:

. . . Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy
of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his
liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 27

Thus, among the testimonial evidence, only the testimony of Rogelio Rossel remains. He declared:

Q — Do you remember any unusual incident at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992 while
you were standing in front of your house?

A — Me and my companions were telling story when somebody shouted there is trouble.

Q — And what did you do when you heard somebody shouting that there is trouble?

A — I tried to see it.

Q — And what is that trouble that you saw?

A — There were persons who were [stabbing] sir.

Q — How many persons that were stabbing?

A — Two (2) sir.

Q — And who was the person if you know being stabbed?

A — Roderick Ferol, the victim sir.

Q — And do you know this Roderick Ferol referring to the victim?

A — Yes, sir.
Q — Do you know these persons that were stabbing Roderick Ferol?

A — I know them sir.

Q — How many were they?

A — I only saw one (1) person.

Q — And who is that person you saw stabbing Roderick Ferol?

A — Doric sir.

Q — Now, will you look around this courtroom and check if that Doric is present today?

A — He is not here, he escaped.

Q — Now, what was the position of Roderick Ferol when he was being stabbed by Doric?

A — He was lying down, sir.

Q — Aside from this Doric were there other persons you saw in the trouble?

A — No more, sir.

Q — What did you do after that?

A — I pacified Doric so that he would stop stabbing the victim, sir.

Q — And what happened when you approached Doric?

A — He attempted to chase me, sir.

Q — And what did you do when Doric attempted to chase you?

A — I ran away, sir.

Q — Towards what direction did you [run] to?

A — I turned left of our house, sir.

Q — And what happened after that when you turned left to your house?

A — The brother of Roderick by the name of Jon-Jon arrived sir.

Q — And what happened when Jon-Jon arrived?

A — He threw bottles against me, sir.

Q — Against who?
 A — Against Doric, sir.

Q — And who were there aside from Doric and Jon-Jon?

A — No more, sir we are only three (3) persons at that time.

Q — What happened after that?

A — Doric ran away, sir.

Q — And how about you what did you do?

A — I went to the person who [was] stabbed.

Q — Are you referring to Roderick Ferol?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — What did you do when you approached Roderick Ferol?

A — Jon-Jon, Rodel and me carried him, sir.

Q — Towards what direction or to where did you carry Roderick [Ferol]?

A — In front towards our house, sir.

Q — Do you know certain person by the name of Restituto Roche or Toto?

A — Yes,  sir I saw him because he is one of my friends.

Q — Was there any occasion that you saw him in the afternoon of May 31,  1992?

A — I did not see him.

Q — How about Marcelino Fallore also known as Mario was there any occasion that you saw him in the
afternoon of May 31, 1992 at 5:00 o'clock?

A — I did not see him there, sir.

Q — How about Francisco Gregorio also known as Afran, did you know him?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — Was there any occasion when you saw him Francisco Gregorio in the afternoon of May 31, 1992?

A — I did not see him,  sir. 28

Rogelio Rossel positively identified Dorico Caballes as the assailant. Dorico Caballes is the brother of accused-
appellant. He escaped after the incident and until now is still at large. It is quite probable that the victim's relatives
pointed an accusing finger at one they perceive could be responsible for the victim's death. They blame accused-
appellant for the incident because it was the latter who, by telling Dorico that it was the victim who had caused
him (Restituto) to fall to the ground, made Dorico angry. Had not accused-appellant told Dorico Caballes that the
victim was the one who had tripped him, Dorico Caballes would not know the person responsible and would not
have killed Roderick Ferol.

Second. Nor can accused-appellant be held liable for the killing of Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy.
"[F]or conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent.
It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of
the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest." 29

In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was
stabbing Roderick Ferol. 30 Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no
other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission of the
offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed
as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped
him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. As we ruled
in People v. Elijorde: 31

. . . Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence,
not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy
exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great
majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the
reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the
task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of
proof do reasonably yield that inference.

Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack
Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out
of the desire to get even with him for the offense committed against his brother. In no way can such act be
attributed to accused-appellant.

Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must
concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,

(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice. 32

There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico
Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes' plan to
attack and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-
appellant, we cannot uphold the trial court's finding of guilt. "Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof
beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or
even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with
all of them." 33 This is certainly not the case here.1awp++i1

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kaloocan City, is REVERSED and accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. He is, therefore, ordered immediately released from custody
unless he is lawfully held for another cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1
HONORIO CARTALLA, JR., Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232-H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to
wit: chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or any aggravating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic
Act No. 7659 entitled An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes and Art. 63, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code. chanrobles virtual law library

In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet shall be credited in full with the period of
his preventive imprisonment. chanrobles virtual law library

The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also
been established beyond any reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. chanrobles virtual law library

Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet is likewise hereby ordered to pay, unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles,
the following sums: chanrobles virtual law library

a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles; chanrobles virtual law library

b. P226,298.36, as actual damages; chanrobles virtual law library

c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles death; chanrobles

virtual law library
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3) children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and
another P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma. Odyssa Suzette Tecarro-Tuadles, as moral damages; chanrobles virtual
law library

e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; chanrobles virtual law library

f. Costs. chanrobles virtual law library

In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet, accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and
HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-adjudicated
sums or the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles. chanrobles virtual law library

In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. chanrobles virtual law library

Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with Serial Number BER-041965-Z,
including its black magazine and five (5) live bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the Firearms and Explosives Office,
Camp Crame, Quezon City. chanrobles virtual law library

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet from the San Juan
Municipal Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.[1 chanrobles virtual law library

On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards between two
erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the
other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to
a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol. chanrobles virtual law library

Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of the
Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially
acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when they both started frequenting the
International Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses
amenities such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and
friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or
pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of
pesos. chanrobles virtual law library

The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain
Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third
night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however,
failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two
(2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the
restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat
breakfast. chanrobles virtual law library

When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this
point where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged
and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from
behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the
nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T.
Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred. chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio himself,
who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a
heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable.
Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of the
gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned
to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his
only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring
that SG Bobis could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who
were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the
floor. chanrobles virtual law library

While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if he was still alive.
Instead, and there is no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards,
prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision,
Quezon City, after which they proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member
of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios residence for several hours, during which time Antonio
made phone calls and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by
SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police
authorities. Later, the two security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for
the police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his statement at the
police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days later. chanrobles virtual law library

On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as
accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that: chanrobles virtual law
library

On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Antonio, armed with a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, by
then and there suddenly, unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles
on his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death; chanrobles virtual law library

The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder, either as principal or accomplice, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his
public functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or assisting the accused Antonio, by then and there
failing to arrest and surrender immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false
information which tended to deceive the investigating authorities; and chanrobles virtual law library

The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of murder either as principal or accomplice,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his
public functions and position as a public officer, by concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the
body of the crime, in order to prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the gun used
in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime, and
purposely failing to call on the crime laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate
action. chanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to law.[2 chanrobles virtual law library

Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of Not Guilty. Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto
both refused to enter a plea, and the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for both of them. chanrobles virtual
law library

After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged, imposing on them the appropriate
penalties and ordering them to pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages,
set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed separate appeals assailing the trial
courts findings and disposition. chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following assigned errors:

I chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOSE JIMMY BOBIS WHICH
CONFLICTS DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY
EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES,
AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.

II chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.

III chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO.

IV chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.

V chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM
ARNULFO ARNIE TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT
APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

VI chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00 AS COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY
REASON OF ARNIE TUADLES DEATH, DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.

VII chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE MORAL DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE
TUADLES.

VIII chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[3 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision, arguing that:

I chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN ACCESSORY

II chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED
ANTONIO WAS MURDER[4 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following grounds:

I chanrobles virtual law library

THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS
ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES
THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.

II chanrobles virtual law library

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT SHOWN FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY
THE GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE
INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.

III chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE
POLICE SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO
SUSTAINING MORE HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.[5 chanrobles virtual law library

Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal first with the issues raised in his
appeal, foremost of which is the credibility of the prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant
Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and credibility as an eyewitness on two (2) grounds. chanrobles virtual law
library

First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities averred that he did not see the
actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took place
when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern Police District (EPD) and in
his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had
indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun
at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis testimony,
according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness.
He also points out the contradictions and inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second statements and
court testimony. chanrobles virtual law library
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San Juan Police investigators false
information in his first statement, saying that nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant
Antonio. On the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who
coerced SG Bobis to change his statement and testimony so that the murder charge against appellant Antonio
would be strengthened. chanrobles virtual law library

There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court testimony, on the one hand, contradicted what
he previously narrated in his first statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is more
credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused? chanrobles virtual
law library

It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight.[6 Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in
open court do not necessarily discredit said witness.[7 Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more
credence to SG Bobis testimony given in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement which was
inconsistent with his testimony. chanrobles virtual law library

Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis explained the reasons why he was
moved to give false information in his first statement. He had testified that moments after he saw appellant
Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: Ikaw, wag kang tumistigo, ha.[8 Later, he and the other
security guard, SG Olac, were allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in Quezon City. He also testified
that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer instructed him (Bobis), should the police
investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident.[9 chanrobles virtual
law library

At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say that they were both outside the club
when the trouble started, saying: kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club.[10 Bobis stated that he
was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police investigator, appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2,
1996, that he did not see appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the stairs when the
gun went off. chanrobles virtual law library

Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that time, but also remorse and
confusion. As found by the trial court: chanrobles virtual law library

He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of conduct of private security guards
when he did not make a formal report to his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the
Club but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him to the latters house. This being so,
neither was he able to put said accused Antonio under arrest. chanrobles virtual law library

Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active service who was with them at the time
and who should have done so, had also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who are
just ordinary security guards. (Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po
nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.) chanrobles virtual law
library

True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time. Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked:
parang galit pa sila sa amin he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the house of accused
Antonio, he will effect the arrest.[11 chanrobles virtual law library
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing Tuadles widow crying on television, he
gathered enough resolve and courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at the EPD. When he
testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his declaration that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly
pull his gun from behind and shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away. chanrobles virtual law library

Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that: chanrobles virtual law library

Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (Underscoring ours). chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, this Court has uniformly held that: chanrobles virtual law library

Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his attention was
first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed
impeached.[12 chanrobles virtual law library

We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons given by SG Bobis sufficiently explained
the conflicting declarations he made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court testimony. Therefore, he
cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to
volunteer information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to
fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility
of witnesses.[13 chanrobles virtual law library

Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier contradictory statement, his direct testimony and
answers under cross-examination appear clear and convincing. We agree with the trial court when it
held: chanrobles virtual law library

But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible. chanrobles virtual law library

Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict with each other, SG Bobis had fully
explained to the satisfaction of the Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused
Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in completely prevailing upon SG Bobis.
For did not SG Bobis tell their lies? chanrobles virtual law library

Still, the conscience of a good man had won over. chanrobles virtual law library

SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward answers to the gruelling questions
propounded on him and had stuck to his truth. chanrobles virtual law library

The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses demeanor on the stand. While SG Bobis was
steadfast with his words, accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The other
prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like SG Bobis, untainted in their testimonies.
[14 chanrobles virtual law library

Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the findings of the trial court on the
issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and observed his deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[15 chanrobles virtual law library

In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that: chanrobles virtual law library

It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court
on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
[16 chanrobles virtual law library

And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that: chanrobles virtual law library

It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of an accused
would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect.[17 chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that: chanrobles virtual law library

The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his
demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a more competent position to
discriminate between the true and the false.[18 chanrobles virtual law library

There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a
mere security guard, realized he was no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy
businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant Antonio admitted in court that he
surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see
then Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice President, what
happened in his own words.[19 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police Force who was close to appellant
Antonio. Considering SG Bobis lowly station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis
believed then, and no one can fault him for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of
appellant Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him, knowing they were well-connected to
the powers that be. This perceived threat, whether real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out
and just repeat what appellants told him to say. chanrobles virtual law library

There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies, but he can never run away from
himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to their
dictates, but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience. He realized he had to right a wrong, and this
he did with selflessness and at great risk to himself. chanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG Bobis except the statement that it
was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing evidence to the contrary deserve full
faith and credence.[20 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by claiming that the shooting of
Tuadles was caused by mere accident without his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-
defense. chanrobles virtual law library

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused admits having killed the victim but
invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his plea of self-
defense by clear, credible and convincing evidence.[21 To successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio
must clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not
have provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.[22 chanrobles virtual law library

Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events that took place, we shall discuss the
points raised by appellant Antonio only for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-defense
were attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that Tuadles committed an act of
aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then
concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against him (Antonio), so he grappled with
Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince
us that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows that Tuadles was calm
in answering Appellant Antonios loud invectives, and it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor
under such a situation. And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles
intended to keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him
considering the state of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable
scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused with anger, his temper short due to three
(3) consecutive sleepless nights. chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him. There is no evidence, apart from
appellant Antonios uncorroborated testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no
convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.[23 The burden of proving unlawful aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but
he has not presented incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this
requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an
extenuating circumstance.[24 chanrobles virtual law library

Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if indeed the latter had grabbed the
gun from the table. Antonio himself admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage.
Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to get the
gun so that appellant Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was
provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio, not from Tuadles. chanrobles virtual law library

In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was an accident. He further argues that
Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio, was performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault or intention
of causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of self-defense, (i.e., there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no basis for
us to argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.[25 chanrobles
virtual law library

We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took place leaves much room for conjecture. It is
true that there is no fixed dictum on the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden death he may
have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of them even irrational. However, we respect the trial
courts findings. The trial court upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio indeed
shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be
brought to a hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio left
Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed he and
Tuadles both had their hands on the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that
appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch the gun barehanded to preserve the
fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for preserving the fingerprints on
the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible
piece of evidence that could have proven his claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his
lack of presence and due care. chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the records. First, he denies that he
pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who fired
the gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next, he admits firing the gun, but he
did it in self-defense. Only, he could not indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Tuadles. Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it was an accident. Again, he failed to prove
that he was in the process of performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles. chanrobles virtual law library

When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to escape criminal liability, he admits
having caused the death of the victim. And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of the accused is inescapable.
[26 Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is already an open admission of
responsibility for the killing.[27 As it was, appellant Antonios testimony is not only uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself[28 for being ambivalent and self-serving.
[29 chanrobles virtual law library

Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio claims the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. On this score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he had not been actually
arrested; Second, he surrendered himself to a person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of
no moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only after the
lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case of People v. Bautista,[30 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a
police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was considered attenuating. There is no dispute
that appellant Antonio voluntarily surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested,
hence the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant Antonios favor.
[31 chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of Tuadles. To
avail of this mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended party.
[32 However, apart from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence that he
was provoked by Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or could not pay his
winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt
cannot, and never will, be a reason to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof
that he won and that the argument arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-
serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.[33 chanrobles virtual law library

There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which the trial court overlooked and
disregarded. chanrobles virtual law library
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court when it relied on the testimony of
SG Bobis. However, we have carefully examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the
justifications of the trial court upon which it based its decision. chanrobles virtual law library

There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.[34 It ruled that
treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for
a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision, typed single space, the trial court
devoted only a few sentences to the issue of treachery. chanrobles virtual law library

There was no treachery in this case. chanrobles virtual law library

It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate
adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. chanrobles virtual law library

All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime. chanrobles
virtual law library

The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them: chanrobles virtual law library

Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no preparation or
employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a
crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may take.[35 chanrobles virtual law
library

A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a
mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.[36 chanrobles virtual law library

A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where it did not appear that the aggressor
had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to
himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when the latter refused appellant's invitation to have some
more alcoholic drinks.[37 chanrobles virtual law library

The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of alevosia if the mode adopted by the
accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that might be offered.
[38 chanrobles virtual law library

The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was arrived at on the spur of
the moment.[39 chanrobles virtual law library

The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the
offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the
offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.[40 Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-
existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment. 41 chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a murder because of treachery is
not consistent with the decisions of this Court.[42 Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of
attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an established principle that the quantum of
evidence to prove a person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same degree of
proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may also be reached respecting the
attendance of treachery, whether as qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.[43 There is no such proof in
this case. chanrobles virtual law library

There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles spent several hours having fun
playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his
alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet
away from each other, a fact attested to by the defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness
himself. chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just
before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi. The argument precluded the presence of
treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was no reason to call
for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for that matter. chanrobles virtual law library

To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44 where we held that there was no treachery where
the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced
that: chanrobles virtual law library

There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded
the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have
been unforseen.[45 (Underscoring Ours) chanrobles virtual law library

Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua,[46 we
reiterated our consistent view that: chanrobles virtual law library

While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant
showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on
guard. chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have anticipated the
aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation
between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be
concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery. chanrobles virtual law library

It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was
an offshoot of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because
treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung
from an unforeseen occurrence.[47 chanrobles virtual law library

In People v. Nitcha,48 we held that: chanrobles virtual law library

To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to kill the victim in
such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked
to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. (Underscoring ours) chanrobles
virtual law library

It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said
passion, however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In
treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the
heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or
form of attack in the execution of the crime.49 Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended
by treachery. chanrobles virtual law library

That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably considered by the trial court to elevate
the killing to murder, was not proven by convincing evidence 50 is advocated by the Solicitor General in the
Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's contention on the matter: chanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with this particular submission of Antonio.
Antonio and Tuadles engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they were heard laughing and kidding each other
(nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned into verbal altercation. chanrobles virtual law
library

Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence. Hence, Tuadles could have braced
himself with the aggression of Antonio. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation
or spat between the victim and the assailant such that the victim must have been forewarned of the impending
danger. In this case, Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his
hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio
immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself.[51 chanrobles
virtual law library

Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal code. chanrobles virtual law library

Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should be imposed on appellant Antonio
should be reduced to reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed shall be the minimum period
of reclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed shall be the
penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of its periods.[52 Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing
that said award was unsupported by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as
compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely on the testimony of the victim's widow, Suzette
Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his
construction business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,
[53 and People v. Quilaton,[54 the trial court arrived at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages
for loss of earning capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot just rely on the sole testimony
of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess
work. chanrobles virtual law library

In People v. Silvestre[55 and People v. Verde,[56 we held that the absence of documentary evidence to support
the prosecution's claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of
said damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity computed on the basis of the
testimonies of the victim's wives. This was reiterated in People v. Dizon,[57 where we held that: chanrobles
virtual law library

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary
evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent this Court from awarding
said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was
then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an
award. x x x As in People vs. Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. (Underscoring ours) chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should be calculated as follows: chanrobles
virtual law library

Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income - living expenses chanrobles virtual law library
(50% of gross annual income) chanrobles
virtual law library
x = 2(80-40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00] chanrobles virtual law library
3 chanrobles virtual law library

= 26.67 x P300,000.00 chanrobles virtual law library

= P8,001,000.00 chanrobles virtual law library

Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into
account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.[58 We agree
with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award of moral damages was excessive. While there is no hard and
fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each case must be governed by
its own peculiar circumstances.[59 And though moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation to
compensate the claimants for actual injury, they are not designed to enrich the complainants at the expense of
the accused.60 chanrobles virtual law library

Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his family and they will also be deprived
of his love and companionship. No amount of money could ever compensate for their loss. While the award of
moral damages may help ease the emotional and psychological trauma that they continue to suffer, this Court
has not granted so large an amount as moral damages. Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00
granted by the trial court in this case is excessive, and the same is therefore reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover,
there being no aggravating circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages should also
be deleted.[61 chanrobles virtual law library

We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto. He argues that the trial court erred in
convicting him as an accessory. The trial court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest
appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information tending to deceive the investigating authorities.
[62 chanrobles virtual law library

The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the
crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to
prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.[63 chanrobles virtual law library

Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which
is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have
acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not
a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when he failed
to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime
committed. chanrobles virtual law library

The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is concerned, shows that in the middle of
the argument between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, Sarge!
Sarge! Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant
Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto
did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them,
and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in
Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made
some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while
Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis
and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the San Juan
police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening.
After the police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his
instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to the
police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the questions of the police
investigator.[64 chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant Nieto's actuations immediately after
the commission of the crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active service,
he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he
himself witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead, he rode with
the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v.
Yacat, et al., it was held:[65 chanrobles virtual law library

It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president of the town of Cabiao at the time
the crime was committed, has incurred criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to prosecute the
crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for them to escape, as the defendant
Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been unable to explain
his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him,
and consequently he should suffer a penalty two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of article
405 of the Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof. chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the shooting, appellant Antonio called him
and he immediately went upstairs. He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to
arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter. To this extent, he assisted appellant
Antonio in his escape.[66 chanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided false information to deceive the
investigating authorities. He instructed Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating officer, in
order to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and thus make it more difficult for the
police to solve the crime. chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an accessory to the crime, and he should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose on
appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
of prison correccional, as maximum. chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After carefully reviewing the facts and issues
raised therein, we find that the trial court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an accessory. chanrobles
virtual law library

The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was his failure to produce the laser sight
of the gun as evidence during the trial. However, such omission does not amount to concealing or destroying the
body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery. The laser sight had been
surrendered to the police authorities so there was no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make
appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as custodian thereof, he may be made answerable
administratively. chanrobles virtual law library

In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further stated: chanrobles virtual law
library

Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as alleged in the information that you
tried to conceal or destroy the effects or body of the crime to prevent its discovery? chanrobles virtual law
library

A It's not true, sir. chanrobles virtual law library

Q Why? chanrobles virtual law library

A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body of the crime and as far as I know, I
did all my job as investigator and I worked for it up to the wee hours of the morning up to the next morning, I
still did it and I gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and even when at the time, I have
been hearing that I will not be the one who will investigate, they got it from me without proper notice, that they
will take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I was asked by Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve
the slug and what I did was even the investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and I still
worked hard, I even remember chanrobles virtual law library

Atty. Flaminiano chanrobles virtual law library

We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment. chanrobles virtual law library

COURT chanrobles virtual law library

Continue. chanrobles virtual law library

A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this policeman is very hardworking, even
the investigation is not with him anymore, but still, he's working and I answered him, whatever, whatever they
will charge to me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my job. Because as far as I know, I will not be
implicated because I have not done anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is why my youngest child even told me
"kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told him that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like
that. chanrobles virtual law library

Atty. Fernandez chanrobles virtual law library

That's all for the witness, your Honor. chanrobles virtual law library

COURT chanrobles virtual law library

The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because according to one of the witnesses, the
gun together with the laser sight was handled to you and when that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no
longer there, answer me, what happened? chanrobles virtual law library

A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I
immediately made the transmittal for the laboratory and I described what is there, together with the laser and
after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the second day, I was really busy on that
day because I was the only one. I was asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I
just found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave the envelope together with the
transmittal and when it was being received, he checked it and he said Sgt. Where is the laser sight? and I said it's
there, attached. And he said please look at it. chanrobles virtual law library

COURT chanrobles virtual law library

Who told you that? chanrobles virtual law library

A The person who received, your Honor. chanrobles virtual law library

COURT chanrobles virtual law library

But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser? chanrobles virtual law library

A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was planning to go back right away but I just
said, okay, I will just cross it out and I did not erase because I want that I will not hide anything. It has happened
because maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in my drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's why I
did not sno-pake it and I just crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial and when I came back, I
asked them who touched my things. chanrobles virtual law library

COURT chanrobles virtual law library

What answer did you get? chanrobles virtual law library

A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking.[67 chanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not intentionally conceal or destroy the laser
sight, and the prosecution failed to prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the principal
accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory device attached to the gun, it was not
essential to the commission, investigation and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself, which was the
instrument of the crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as evidence in court. The failure of
appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in any way affect the
outcome of the trial, much less prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing that
appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of the laser sight. chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code and jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla,
Jr.'s omission does not make him liable as an accessory to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even the
Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to convict appellant Cartalla, to wit: chanrobles virtual law
library

At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its corpus delicti had been discovered.
Hence, the loss of the laser sight could not have prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential instrument
of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with serial number BER-041965-7 and black magazine
had been preserved and presented as evidence. chanrobles virtual law library

Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of the laser sight as this was not
proved by the prosecution. Either way, concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have
so committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case. chanrobles virtual law library

It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not make him an accessory to the crime
committed by Antonio, although he may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.[68 chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 111232-H is hereby
MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the crime of HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum. chanrobles
virtual law library

Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles the following
sums: chanrobles virtual law library

(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles; chanrobles virtual law library

(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages; chanrobles virtual law library

(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity; chanrobles virtual law library

(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and chanrobles virtual law library

(5) Costs. chanrobles virtual law library

For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to
the crime, he is ACQUITTED and absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil. chanrobles virtual law library

In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ Ambet, appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to
pay one-half (1/2) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo
B. Tuadles. chanrobles virtual law library

In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. L-35022 December 21, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO VERZOLA & JOSEFINA MOLINA, accused-appellants.

Alberto Benesa for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by Ricardo Verzola and Josefina Molina from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, finding
them guilty of the crime of Murder and sentencing them, respectively, viz.: Verzola, as principal, to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay 3/4 of the costs; and Molina, as an accessory after the fact, to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional  as maximum, and to pay 1/4 of the indemnity and
costs.

At about 10:00 o'clock on the night of September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo
Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The
body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs.
Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and
underwear, including the piece of wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to
the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police
authorities. together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a photographer went to Lipcan to
conduct the investigation. They found the body of the deceased Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the
bamboo ladder (Exhibit "I"). Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and ears. There were bloodstains on the floor
of the bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the beddings of the deceased. The bloodstains led to the
bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be found on the steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police,
Josefina revealed that the assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola. Upon her request, she was brought to the
Office of the Chief of Police of Bangued, where at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she
gave a written statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in question and pointing to
appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband (Exhibits 'K" and "9"). In that extra-judicial statement, she stated
that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo Verzola went to their
house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra. entered the room where she was sleeping with her husband, Bernardo
Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise
from the floor, that was the moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times that
afterwards, she heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the voice of Verzola saying that he was
leaving and warning her not to say anything about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw her husband
already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge
Francisco T. Valera.

At about 4:00 o'clock that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and brought to the
municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement (Exhibit "L") admitting that he clubbed the
victim several times. Thus, in his extra-judicial confession of September 29, 1969, the following statements appear

6. Q:—You stated that you killed Bernardo Molina inside his house, will (you)
relate the true events or what happened when you killed him?

A:—Yes, sir.

Last night at the stated hour in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra, inside the house of Bernardo Molina I went and when
I was under their house that was the time when I pricked with a bamboo twig just under the place where Josephina
Molina, wife of Bernardo Molina was laying down, and I noticed that she was awake, and not long afterwards she
came down and came to my place, and that was the time when we did everything that wanted both of us to do,
but before that in the night, Josephina Molina told me 'THAT HER HUSBAND WAS PLANNING TO KILL ME and just
after we were through what both of us did, Josephina went upstairs inside (the) house, and because I cannot
withstand anymore the plan of her husband to kill me that was why I went upstairs and I went direct inside their
room and I saw Bernardo Molina lying down sleeping, and that was the time when I clubbed him three times at the
nape, and when he did not move anymore that was the time when we both with Josephine Molina throw him
downstairs of their house. After that I went home.

7. Q:-What is the weapon that you used in clubbing Berno Molina'

A:—-A wooden club which is rounded and about two palms in length, Sir.

Q:—You stated that while you were under the house of Bernardo Molina and
you pricked with bamboo twig in awakening Josephina Molina and not long
afterwards she came down and went to you hat is your relationship with
Josephina Molina the wife of Bernardo Molina?

A:—Josephina Molina is my paramour.

Q:—How long have you been in that relationship with Josephina Molina?

A:—What I know is that it is already about 10 years, Sir. Because her daughter
who is already 12 years old was still small.

Q:—With this relationship that you have with Josephina Molina did not her
husband Bernardo Molina notice, so that Josephina told you that her husband
was planning to kill you?

A:—Probably he had already, Sir. Because that is what his wife told me.

Q:—Who witnessed when you killed Bernardo Molina that you know'

A:—It was only Josephina the wife of Bernardo Molina, Sir.

Q:—What did Josephina say when you delivered club blows at her husband?

A:—'That is enough he is dead, let us bring him down', that is what she said, Sir.

Q:—Therefore, you want to say that you and Josephina Molina the wife of
Bernardo helped each other in this killing?

A—I told her when she was going up, I'LL GO AHEAD OF HIM and what she
answered to me, IT IS UP TO YOU', Sir.

Q:—And where was Josephina while you were clubbing Bernardo, if you
remember?

A:—She was there lying down, and when Bernardo did not move she said that is
enough.

Q:—What was your clothing when you went to club Bernardo Molina and also
your trousers that you used?
 A:—-Sweater with long sleeves colored light gray and white shorts, Sir.

Q:—Where are these sweater and shorts?

A—I dropped it inside our toilet, Sir.

Q:-And where is that club that you said you used in clubbing Bernardo Molina?

A—I also dropped it inside our toilet, Sir.

Q:—Is it not correct that you kill Bernardo Molina because he surprised you
while you were beside his wife inside their room that night?

A:—No, Sir.

Q:—So that in this where you clubbed to death Bernardo Molina you admit as
your guilt?

A:—Yes, Sir.

Q:—Do you have something more to add to this statement of yours?

A:—-No more, Sir. Unless there are more questions to me.

Q:—Were you forced, intimated, instructed or you were mauled in this where
you made your statement?

A:—No, Sir.

Q:-Do You want to sign this statement of yours?

A—Yes. Sir." (Exhibit "Translation")

After execution his aforesaid written statement, he was brought to the residence of Judge Francisco T. Valera.
Judge Valera sent the n out of his house, a Verzola of his constitutional rights, then read to him the contents of his
aforementioned extrajudicial confession After satisfying himself that the statement was given voluntarily, he
administered the oath to all appellant. Appellant Verzola then guided the po authorities to his house where, in their
presence, he retrieved from the toilet his bloodstained clothes as well as the piece of wood which he used in
clubbing the deceased.

Dr. Luis P. Bringas Municipal Health Officer of Bangued, Abra, who conducted the autopsy, testified that the died
not instantaneously as a result of cardio-respiratory failure caused by "cerebral compressions and hemorrhages".
The deceased sustained the following wounds:

LACERATED WOUND NO. I:—7 Cm. in length with irregular borders or edges extremities, the
deeper tissues unevenly divided with tags of tissues showing in the wound. The edges and
surrounding parts bruised and some hairs were found in the wound. Situated 6 Cm. in level of the
posterior outer upper part of left Helix of the left ear, extending slantingly downwards below to
middle portion of Occipital region.
 LACERATED WOUND NO. II:-6 Cm. in length situated 3 Cm. lateral to Lacerated Wound No. I,
placed horizontally form mid point of the Lacerated Wound. The characteristics of the wound is
the same as the above wounds.

LACERATED WOUND NO. III:-Same characteristics as of the above wounds. 5 Cm. in length
situated 2 Cm. below Lacerated Wound No. II, extending slightly to the right side.

LACERATED WOUND NO. IV:-4.5 Cm. in length same as the characteristics of the other wounds
above, but extending opposite Lacerated Wound No. I only from the right side." (Exhibit 'A").

He also declared that on the basis of the tion and direction of the w the t must have been behind the victim and
said wounds were while the victim was lying in prone position, face downwards.

Both appellants admit that ft was appellant Verzola who the fatal blows on the victim. Versola, however, after
impugning the (Exhibit "L'), claims that he did so in self- defense. Thus, V veracity of the facts contained in his
extrajudicial confession testified that while he was feeding his two cows in front of his house at about 10:00 o'clock
on the night of September 28, 1969, he heard cries for help coming from the direction of the house of Bernardo
Molina- Upon recognize it to be the voice of the wife of Bernardo, he proceeded to the couples house. Upon
reaching the yard of said house he heard the loud voice of a man. Thus that some intruder had entered the
Molina's residence, he to am himself. At the threshold of the ladder, he picked up a pan of a plow (Exhibit B) At the
door of the room, he heard the man say: 'Vulva of your mother, I will kill you." As he entered the room, he saw his
co-appellant Josefina Mo in a comer, being maltreated by Bernardo Molina. After noticed his presence, he said:
"Vulva of your mother, I will kill all of you." At that juncture, Bernardo stooped to pick up a bolo from the floor. As
Bernardo was still bending towards the Mm V struck him twice with the piece of wood, hitting the head of the
victim, causing him to fall. After he had fallen, he tried to revive the victim by ng the head of the latter on his lap
will it, saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy". He explained that this was the reason why there were bloodstains on his clothes.
When Josefina asked him what happened, he replied that Bernardo met an accident. At his suggestion, they both
carried the body of the victim down the stairs because according to him they wanted to bring the body to the
hospital. As the hospital was too far and it was too dark, they left the body on the ground. After instructing Josefina
to go and summon persons to help the victim , he went home. After changing his clothes and throwing his
bloodstained clothing inside their toilet, he went to the municipal building in Bangued, Abra, and reported to the
guard that there was a person who met an accident in Lipcan.

His co-appellant, Josefina Molina, also testified that during the first week of September, 1969 she had a quarrel
with her husband because of Bernardo's o theft men, namely, Bocarile Santos Beloy and appellant Ricardo Verzola;
that on the night in question, she and her husband had another quarrel and in the course thereof, she was boxed
and strangled by her husband, causing her. to shout for help; that after a while, as she was crouching in a comer of
the house, with her face covered, she heard a thud As she looked up, she noticed that Verzola was already inside
their room, squatting on the floor and holding on his lap the head of her husband, that while Verzola was shaking
the head of the deceased, he was saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy." She c that out of fear, she assisted Verzola in carrying
the body of Bernardo at the foot of the stairs where Verzola left her. After looking at the wounds of her husband,
she became afraid and went up the house where her children were sleeping.

Both appellants c that they were not aware of the contents of their extra- judicial confessions as they were made to
sign them by the police authorities without being able to read their contents.

There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the burden is on him to
establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense
committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.  1  He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that for the prosecution for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself had admitted the killing.  2 It is evident that no such proof was adduced by appellant Verzola.
To begin with, the conduct of appellant Verzola lately after he committed the crime is incompatible with the
reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although he claims that he brought the victim down
the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet when he was able to get a jeep he did not utilize it for that
purpose but instead used it in going to town. Moreover, although appellant Verzola was present at the scene of the
crime when the police authorities were investigating the case, he kept quiet about the incident. It was only from
Josefina Molina that the police learned for the first time that Verzola was the assailant of the deceased. Even then,
Josefina had to request the police authorities to bring her to the poblacion so that she could talk more freely about
the killing For his part, Verzola attempted to conceal his participation in the crime by hiding inside his toilet his
bloodstained clothes and the weapon that he used in clubbing the deceased . These actuations of appellant Verzola
reveal a behaviour which is incompatible with the reaction of one who acted in legitimate self-defense.  3  More
significant however, are the undisputed physical facts of the case, such as nature, character and location of the
wounds sustained by the deceased and the presence of the bloodstains on the beddings of the victim. These facts
and circumstances belie the claim of the appellant that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the contrary, they
sufficiently indicate that the fatal injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying defenseless on
the floor, as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.

Although appellant Josefina Molina admitted in her extra-judicial statement (Exhibits "K", "K- 1 " to "K-91) that she
was the paramour of her co- appellant for over a year, there is no proof that she had knowledge of the criminal
design of her co-appellant. Neither has she cooperated with him by previous or simultaneous acts, much less is
there any showing that she supplied the principal with material or moral aid. Her only participation was in assisting
her co-appellant in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground. The question, therefore, is whether or not by
said overt act she could be held criminally responsible as an accessory.

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with
knows of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the
effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its
discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with
abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The main difference separating
accessories after the fact the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the consummation of the crime and
subordinate to that of the principal.

According to the trial court, " the bringing down of the body of the victim ... was to destroy the body of the crime,
or its effect that as to make it appear that the death of the victim was caused by an accident. We disagree. There is
no iota of proof that Josefina Molina ever attempted "to destroy the body of the crime" or to make it appear that
death of the victim was accidental. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co- appellant bring
the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress,
simply Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to
see, cannot be classified as an attempt to or destroy the body of the crime the effects or instruments thereof, must
be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a
place where it was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any attempt on
the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment, insofar as appellant Verzola is concerned, is hereby
AFFIRMED. The judgment against Josefina Molina is, however, reversed and said appellant is ACQUITTED with
proportionate costs de oficio.

G.R. NO. 190475 : April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had
convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612,
otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain for
himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown
person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter
selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-
Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with
accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC's finding of guilt was
affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He
acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the
tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk
before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley
1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in
charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained
inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires
were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with
caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a
store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was
selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant
brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his
warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he
had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the
store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's
store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by
Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District,
proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-
buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza
asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately
produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any
more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located
beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected
them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private
complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop
were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.

After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store.
However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by
representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when
appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the
buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito
Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his
warehouse.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of
buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling
stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to
sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all
the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold
Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer
bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went
inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen
tires.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession
of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials,
he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10)
years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to
gain for oneself or for another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that
all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by
Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of
robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales
Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise
testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police
District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila
on 27 February 1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact
that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a
principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were
found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's
possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ?
45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of
tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from
an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even
ask for proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires
happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if
Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may
have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the
sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the
goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found
in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the
Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything
else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit
from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment
or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of
obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all practical
purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a
defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of
the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were
fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was
actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of
robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the
total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total
amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable
presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the
ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the
transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient
basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and
modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 146584. July 12, 2004]

 ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19110 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, finding petitioner Ernesto
Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and
to pay the corresponding value of the subject pieces of jewelry.

The Indictment

The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on June 23, 1993, the accusatory
portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

That in or about the month of November 1991, in the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla,
with intent to gain for himself, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess and
acquire from one Pacita Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces of jewelry, to wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

One (1) pair of earrings (Heart Shape) ---P 400,000.00

One (1) White Gold Bracelet ----150,000.00

One (1) Diamond Ring---- 100,000.00

One (1) Ring with Diamond ----5,000.00

with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Contrary to law.3 cralawred

The petitioner was arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial forthwith
ensued.

The Case for the Prosecution

Jovita Rodriguez was a resident of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal.4 She was engaged in business as a
general contractor under the business name J.C. Rodriguez Contractors. Macario Linghon was one of her workers.
She and her husband, the former Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired several pieces of jewelry which
were placed inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside
the room. The couple and their son resided inside a compound. They hired Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister, as one
of their household helpers us sometime in February 1989.5 Pacita swept and cleaned the room
periodically.Sometime in May 1991, she left the employ of the Rodriguez family.
Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, who resided in Sitio
Baloongan, Barangay Paltok, Meycauayan, Bulacan,6 and asked him to sell some pieces of jewelry. She told
Macario that a friend of hers owned the jewelry.7 Macario agreed. He then went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto
Erning Francisco located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,8 which had a poster outside that said,
We buy gold. Macario entered the shop, while Pacita stayed outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings
and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed to buy the jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He also gave
Macario P300 as a tip.9 cralawred

Sometime in November 1991,10 Pacita asked Macario anew to sell a pair of earrings.He agreed. He and a friend of
his went to the shop of Ernesto and offered to sell to Ernesto the pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter agreed
and paid Macario the amount.Ernesto gave a P200 tip to Macario. After these transactions, Macario saw the
petitioner in his shop for about five to six more times and received some amounts.11 cralawred

Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to be a principal sponsor at a wedding. She was shocked when she
opened the locked cabinet containing her jewelry, and found that the box was empty. She noticed that the lock to
the cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings
worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones
worth P150,000; and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it was Pacita who
stole her jewelry. She was, however, occupied with her business ventures that she had little time to gather
evidence and charge Pacita.

On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion Linghon with the
Counter-Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City. She stated that she
owned several jewels, viz: one (1) heart-shaped pair of earrings with diamond worth P400,000; one (1) heart-
shaped ring with diamond worth P100,000; one (1) white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and,
one (1) ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She also averred that Pacita had stolen the pieces of
jewelry, and that she and her mother Adoracion disposed of the same.

A team of police investigators, including PO1 Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the Counter-Intelligence Group, invited Pacita
and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation in connection with Jovitas complaint. Pacita arrived
in Camp Crame without counsel and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she
sold Jovitas jewelry. On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that she sold
one pair of heart-shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring, and one
ring with big and small stones to Mang Erning of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price of P50,000 to cover the
cost of her fathers operation and for food. When asked about the full name of the person to whom the jewelry
was sold, Pacita replied that she knew him only as Mang Erning.

Pacita accompanied a group of five police officers, which included SPO1 Dremio Peralta and PO1 Roldan, Jr. to the
shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the Mang Erning who had purchased the jewelry
from her. The policemen alighted from their vehicle and invited the petitioner for questioning in Camp Crame.
Upon his insistence, the petitioner was brought to the police station of Meycauayan, Bulacan.When they were at
the police station, the petitioner, in the presence of SPO4 Valdez, offered an amount of P5,000 to the policemen as
a bribe, for them not to implicate him in the case.PO1 Roldan, Jr. rejected the offer.12 They again invited the
petitioner to go with them to Camp Crame, but the petitioner refused and demanded that the policemen first
secure a warrant for his arrest should they insist on taking him with them.13 cralawred

Nevertheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76.14 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2005.Adoracion was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612
(Anti-Fencing Law), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1992. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

Meanwhile, Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario to testify against the petitioner, assuring him that he would
not be prosecuted for violation of P.D. No. 1612. Macario agreed to testify against the petitioner.
PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta executed a joint affidavit on their investigation.

On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn statement in the office of the police station of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, charging the petitioner of buying stolen jewelry worth P655,000.15 A criminal complaint against the
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-13841. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that they sold a set
of earrings, bracelet and two rings to the petitioner for P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. According to
Pacita, she found the jewelry belonging to Jovita while she was cleaning the room in the house, and that she
brought the jewelry home.16 The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for his
arrest.

On June 23, 1993, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the RTC charging the petitioner with
violating P.D. No. 1612.

In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment was rendered by the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No.
1612, beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the decision reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases, as

follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.In Crim. Case No. 2005, finding accused Pacita Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft, as defined and penalized under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her
to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Nine (9) years and Four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to
Eighteen (18) years, Two (2) months and Twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum, to return to
complainant Jovita Rodriguez the unrecovered stolen pieces of jewelry subject of this case and if restitution is not
possible, to indemnify the said complainant in the amount of P1,300,000.00; and to pay the costs.

2.In Crim. Case No. 1992, finding accused Adoracion Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor; to indemnify complainant Jovita Rodriguez in the amount of P45,000.00; and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.17

The Case for the Petitioner

The petitioner testified that he was a resident of Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. He had a shop located at Pacheco
Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, where he bought and sold jewelry. He had been in this business since
1980.18 He did not transact with Pacita regarding Jovitas missing jewels.19 In fact, he did not even know Jovita and
met her only during the preliminary investigation of the case before the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He,
likewise, denied knowing Pacita Linghon, and claimed that he first saw her when she accompanied some
policemen in civilian clothes to his shop, where he was thereafter invited to Camp Crame for investigation.20 He
saw Pacita again only during the preliminary investigation of the case.21 The petitioner also averred that he had no
transaction with Macario of whatever nature.22 cralawred

The petitioner further testified that when the policemen in civilian clothes approached him in his shop, they asked
who Mang Erning was, as the sign in his shop carried such name. When he responded to the question, the
policemen identified themselves as members of the police force. The petitioner then gave them his full
name.23 When the policemen invited him for questioning, he refused at first. Eventually, he agreed to be
interrogated at the municipal hall, where the policemen insisted on bringing him to Camp Crame. He told them
that he would go with them only if they had a warrant of arrest.24 He denied ever offering any bribe to the
policemen.25 cralawred

On November 29, 1995, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating P.D. No. 1612. The decretal portion of the decision reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.Finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Pres. Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing
Law) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to 20 years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.

2.Ordering the accused to pay to private complainant Jovita Rodriguez the corresponding value of the subject
items of jewelries (sic) :chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

one (1) pair of earrings, heart shaped P400,000.00

one (1) white gold bracelet 150,000.00

one (1) diamond ring 100,000.00

one (1) ring with diamond 5,000.00

TOTAL VALUE --> P655,000.00

with 6% interest on all amounts due from the filing of the information on June 23, 1993 until said amounts have
been fully paid.

SO ORDERED.26 cralawred

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE ALL HEARSAY
EVIDENCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING ON THE CONTRADICTING TESTIMONY (sic) OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AS TO THE ALLEGED
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OFFER OF BRIBE WITHOUT SHOW OF MONEY.
 V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.27 cralawred

On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.28

The Present Petition

In the present recourse, petitioner Ernesto Francisco asserts that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.

The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the conflicting testimonies of prosecution witnesses, all of which consisted
of hearsay evidence.29 cralawred

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.He avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and that
Macario sold the said pieces of jewelry to him. He, likewise, posits that the prosecution failed to present Pacita as
its witness to prove that she stole the pieces of jewelry and sold the same to him, and to adduce in evidence the
jewelry allegedly sold to him. He contends that the testimonies of Macario and PO1 Roldan, Jr., on his investigation
of Jovitas complaint for theft, are hearsay evidence. The appellant argues that assuming that Macario sold the
subject jewelry to him, Macario had no personal knowledge that the same belonged to Jovita. The petitioner avers
that the testimony of Macario, the principal witness of the prosecution, is inconsistent on substantial matters;
hence, should not be given credence and probative weight.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of the crime charged. It asserts that the first element was proved through Pacitas conviction for theft
in Criminal Case No. 2005; the second element was shown to exist with moral certainty via the testimony of
Macario identifying the petitioner as the one who bought the subject pieces of jewelry, corroborated by the
testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the third element was proven by evidence showing that the petitioner had been
in the business of buying and selling jewelry for a long period of time, and that he had the expertise to know the
correct market price of the jewelry he purchased from Macario and Pacita. The OSG asserts that the petitioner
must have been put on his guard when the subject pieces of jewelry worth P655,000 were sold to him for
only P50,000.30 It contends that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses referred to by
the petitioner were minor, and could not be made as a basis to disregard the trial courts findings of facts, which
are entitled to great respect and credit.31

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.32 Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima faciepresumption
of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which
has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The
stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the
testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on
the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house
of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that
Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.

We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005
convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the
jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when
the trial court rendered its decision in the instant case.

On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution proved the same
beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005;
that Pacita had confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1
Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr.
relating to said investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Pacita and
her brother Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of
Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the
supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of
Macario before the trial court.

However, we find and so hold that

First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold
four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule
is that only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment of said case.34 Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said criminal cases during the trial in the
court a quo. The prosecution did not present Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly
made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations
of a person are not admissible in evidence against a third party.35 cralawred

Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841, as well as her
supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a
quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness against
him.

Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to the petitioner, while the latter
was having a drinking spree, as the person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in
evidence against the petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario. However, such testimony
is admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the
subject jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner was
the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must be stressed that the policemen had no personal knowledge
of the said sale, and, more importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was
deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the policemen.

Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-
13841 is admissible in evidence against the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-
examined on his testimony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and
Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the
preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo.

Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to anchor a
judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible and reliable.36 In this case, we find the
testimony of Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight.

Macario admitted when he testified in the court a quo that his testimony during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 92-13841 and his testimony in the court a quo were inconsistent. He even admitted that some
portions of his testimony on direct examination in the court a quo were inconsistent with his testimony on cross-
examination and on re-direct examination. These admissions are buttressed by the records of the case, which
show that such inconsistencies pertained to material points and not merely to minor matters. Thus, during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841, Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991, he and his
sister Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the petitioner for P25,000, while in November 1991, he and Pacita
sold a pair of earrings to the petitioner for P25,000. On direct examination in the court a quo, Macario testified
that he and Pacita sold the earrings to the petitioner in May 1992, not in November 1991, and only for P18,000. On
cross-examination, Macario testified that he and his sister Pacita went to the petitioners shop in Meycauayan,
Bulacan and sold the subject jewelry on both occasions. On further cross-examination, Macario changed his
testimony anew, and declared that he sold the jewelry to the petitioner for P18,000 and not P25,000; only to
change his testimony again, and declare that he sold the jewelry for P25,000. However, Macario testified during
the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 that when he transacted with the petitioner for the
second time, he was with a friend, and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect examination, Macario declared that in
October 1991, he and Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry, namely, two rings, one bracelet and a pair of earrings,
contrary to his testimony on direct examination. He also testified that he and his sister sold the earrings in
November 1991. Because of the contradicting accounts made by Macario, the court made the following
observations:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Court

qAccording to you, you were nalilitobut you gave the correct answer, you are not nalilito here but you gave the
wrong answer. Bakit ganoon, sabi mo nalilito ka roon (sic) pero ang sagot mo pala tama. Dito hindi ka naman
nalilito, bakit mali. Bakit ka nalilito eh tama iyong P25,000.00. Hindi ka nalilito, mali ang sabi mo.

aBecause I am scare[d] here thats why I gave the wrong answer.

qYou better think about it.

aI was confused, Sir.37 cralawred

The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the averments of the Information, that the petitioner received the
said jewelry from Pacita.

Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no evidence on
record that the petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know that the jewelry
was stolen. He testified that his sister Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they
belonged to a friend of hers.

Atty. Lerio
QAt that time you and your sister sold those jewels to Mang Erning did do you know already [that] it was Mrs.
Rodriguez who is the owner of those jewels?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ANo, Sir, I do not know.

QAnd who do you know was the owner of that jewels and that time you and your sister sold those jewels to Mang
Erning?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AAccording to my sister, it is (sic) owned by a friend of hers.

Court

QHow did you come to know of this Mang Erning?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AOnly at that time when we brought the jewels.

QBut previous to that, do you know him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ANo.38 cralawred

Macario learned, after the case against Pacita had already been filed in the trial court, that the jewelry was, after
all, owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform the petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen. Following is the
testimony of Macario:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Atty. Lerio

QWhen you learned that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, did you, if at all, informed (sic) Mang Erning
about it?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Court

QNo basis, when did you come to know that the jewels belong to Mrs. Rodriguez?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AIn 1992, when my sister already had a case.

QWhat did you do when you come (sic) to know about that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AI was not able to do anything but just to help my sister with her case and also to help the case of Mrs. Rodriguez.

Atty. Lerio

QAfter that, after knowing that these jewels are (sic) owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, was there any occasion where you
(sic) able to inform Mang Erning that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ANo more, I have no more time.39 cralawred

The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known which pieces of jewelry were
stolen, considering that Macario was selling the same for P50,000 when the said pieces stolen from Jovita were
alleged to be worth P655,000. This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to
prove the value of the said stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and uncorroborated testimony
of Jovita, that they were worth P655,000:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Atty. Lerio

QNow, will you tell this Court some of those jewels which you own?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AI own several jewels and the one (sic) in question are: 1-pair of earrings, diamond heart-shaped P400,000.00; 1-
ring, heart-shaped diamond worth P100,000.00; 1-bracelet, white gold full of stones, diamond worth P150,000.00;
1-diamond ring with small stones worth P5,000.00. So, all in all, the jewelry is (sic) worth P665,000.00.40 cralawred

When asked by the trial court to declare the present market value of the stolen jewelry, Jovita merely
declared:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Atty. Lerio

QNow again, when did you acquire those jewels if you can still remember?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AI remember several years ago when my husband is (sic) alive.

Court

QPlease tell the court, [is] the market value of the jewels the same today?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ANo, that is (sic) the market value several years ago.

QSo, can you explain [if] the market value, more or less, [is] the same today?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ANo. The price, if we will appraise now, is much bigger.41 cralawred

When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts reflecting the price of the
pieces of jewelry to show that she purchased the same, Jovita answered that she had no such receipts.
Thus:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Court

QYou bought it from [a] private person?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AYes, Your Honor.

Atty. Bernal

QWhat then is your proof that you bought these jewelries (sic) from a private person?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Atty. Lerio

That was already answered, Your Honor. She said, no receipt.42 cralawred

In People v. Paraiso,  43 we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos  44 that an ordinary witness cannot establish the
value of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice of the value of the same:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People v. Antonio Marcos, an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of
jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it
capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides
the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen
jewelry.45 cralawred

It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was
stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the
accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic
purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine
the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court
will fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator:46 cralawred

In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its
contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case.More pertinently, in the case of People v.
Reyes, this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the
prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the
minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.47 cralawred

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134298           August 26, 1999

RAMON C. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals * affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, ** convicting petitioner of the crime of fencing.

Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo,
Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one
of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company.
Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and
stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and
stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of
Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that
he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant's warehouse some boat spare parts such as
bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked the complainant's forgiveness. He
pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of
P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a
case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing Law) committed as follows:

That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive, keep, acquire and possess several
spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or
should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented the testimonies of complainant Rosita Lim,
Victor Sy and the confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez.

On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile witnesses and petitioner
himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were summarized by the trial court in its decision, as follows:

ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits A, A-1, and B). That sometime in
February 1991, after one of her employees left the company, she discovered that some of the
manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February 19, 1991, an inventory was conducted and it
was found that some welding rods and propellers, among others, worth P48,000.00 were missing.
Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who recommended Mr. Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr.
Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his having stolen the missing
spare parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who denied having bought the
same.1âwphi1.nêt

When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their stocks were bought under the name of Asia
Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and stated further that whether the stocks
are bought under the name of the said corporation or under the name of William Tan, her husband, all of
these items were actually delivered to the store at 3012-3014 Jose Abad Santos Street and all paid by her
husband.

That for about one (1) year, there existed a business relationship between her husband and Mr. Tan. Mr.
Tan used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they likewise bought from the former brass woods,
and that there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame up Mr. Tan.

MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at Bueno Metal Industries from November 1990 up
to February 1991. That sometime in the third week of February 1991, together with Gaudencio Dayop, his
co-employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita Lim some boat spare parts, such as bronze and
stainless propellers, brass screws, etc. They delivered said stolen items to Ramon Tan, who paid for them
in cash in the amount of P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half (1/2) of the amount), he went home
directly to the province. When he received a letter from his uncle, Victor Sy, he decided to return to
Manila. He was then accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs. Lim, from whom he begged for forgiveness on
April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, he executed an affidavit prepared by a certain Perlas, a CIS personnel,
subscribed to before a Notary Public (Exhibits C and C-1).

VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the former being the
nephew of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in February 1991, his auntie called up and
informed him about the spare parts stolen from the warehouse by Manuelito Mendez. So that he sent his
 son to Cebu and requested his kumpadre, a police officer of Sta. Catalina, Negros Occidental, to arrest and
bring Mendez back to Manila. When Mr. Mendez was brought to Manila, together with Supt. Perlas of the
WPDC, they fetched Mr. Mendez from the pier after which they proceeded to the house of his auntie. Mr.
Mendez admitted to him having stolen the missing items and sold to Mr. Ramon Tan in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta. Cruz where he pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer, but when
confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same.

ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness, narrated that she owns Bueno Metal Industries
located at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2) days after Manuelito Mendez and
Gaudencio Dayop left, her husband, William Tan, conducted an inventory and discovered that some of the
spare parts worth P48,000.00 were missing. Some of the missing items were under the name of Asia
Pacific and William Tan.

MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as a hostile witness, stated that he received a
subpoena in the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a policeman of Buliloan, Cebu on
April 8, 1991. That he consented to come to Manila to ask forgiveness from Rosita Lim. That in connection
with this case, he executed an affidavit on April 12, 1991, prepared by a certain Atty. Perlas, a CIS
personnel, and the contents thereof were explained to him by Rosita Lim before he signed the same
before Atty. Jose Tayo, a Notary Public, at Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila (Exhibits C and C-1).

That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted the items delivered to Ramon Hardware.
Further, he stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were placed in a sack and he talked to Mr.
Tan first over the phone before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr. Tan himself who accepted the
stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock and paid P13,000.00 for them.

RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman engaged in selling hardware
(marine spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito
Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts presented by Mrs. Lim are not under her
name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, all in all amounting to
P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-g).

He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the delivery of the
stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for everytime (sic) goods are delivered
to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not possible for him to be at his office at about
7:00 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning, because he usually reported to his office at 9:00 o'clock. In connection
with this case, he executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).1

On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS
of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the
sum of P18,000.00.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.
 Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996.

(s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA

Judge

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Courts of Appeals rendered decision finding no error in judgment
appealed from, and affirming the same in toto.

In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 16, 1998,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, this petition.

The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against
petitioner.2

We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.

"Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."3

"Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things."4

The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things.5

"The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have
been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."6

Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact
of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it
was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.7

P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of
robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under
the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on
the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses.8 The State may thus choose to
prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would
seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing9 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.10

In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as
follows:
 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.11

Consequently, "the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the
elements of the crime charged."12

Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there
can be no conviction for such offense.13 "It is an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found
guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)."14

In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing?

Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those
items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she
forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a
private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold
for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that
is, crime of robbery or theft has been committed.

There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another's property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an
extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an
admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person
admitting or confessing.15 Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel;
otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.16 Here, the extra-
judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the
witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.17 There must be
corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.18 Corpus delicti means the "body or
substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually
committed."19 The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000)."20 In theft, corpus delicti  has two elements, namely: (1) that the property
was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.21 In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She
sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the
warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without
evidence of corpus delicti.22

What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold him. "One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness
or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that
a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the
constitutional presumption of innocence."23

Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of "fencing".24

Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 20059
and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila.1âwphi1.nêt

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.