Taglay vs Daray

G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Taglay was charged with qualified trespass to dwelling by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) filed by private respondent Palacay. Then
upon arraignment of the case, Taglay pleaded not guilty; a pre-trial was then
set.
However, it was found out that Palacay apparently was a minor when
Taglay committed the alleged offense. By virtue of R.A. 8369 (Family Courts
of 1997) and Circular No. 11-99, however, the case apparently is within the
jurisdiction of the family courts of the RTC. As such the case was transferred
to the RTC, where Taglay was brought to trial.
With this, Taglay moved to dismiss the case on the ground of RTC’s lack
of jurisdiction. She argued that MCTC erroneously transferred the case to the
RTC; and worse, she was not even arraigned before the RTC.
The RTC ruled however that Taglay cannot argue that there was defect
in the procedure because it was cured when Taglay’s counsel obliged on a
trial before the RTC without objecting. Besides, Taglay’s counsel was already
able to cross-examine Palacay’s witnesses.
Aggrieved, this petition was filed by Taglay.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Taglay’s case; and
whether or not Taglay should have been arraigned before RTC.
Held:
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Taglay’s case; and Taglay should
have been arraigned before RTC.
R.A. 8369 provides that where criminal cases have the accused below
18 years old, or when one of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission, the family courts shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Circular No. 11-99 provides that said cases filed in MCTC prior to
March 1, 1999 shall be transferred to the RTC. Those that are filed in the
MCTC after said date shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Second, People vs Pangilinan held that arraignment is the formal mode
and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Borja vs
Mendoza, on the other hand, states that absence of arraignment results in the
nullity of the proceedings before the trial court.
In this case, Taglay’s case was filed on November 19, 2001, MCTC
already then has no authority to transfer the case to the RTC. The case should
have already been dismissed. Secondly, while Taglay was indeed arraigned
before the MCTC, it is already established that MCTC had no jurisdiction to do
so. This means that RTC should have duly arraigned her. The fact that the
counsel of Taglay did not object is immaterial; due process was denied to
Taglay when the arraignment was wanting.
 Gamas vs Oco
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231, March 17, 2004

Facts:
Complainants Gamas and Sobrio, who were the accused in a theft case
pending before the sala of respondent judge Oco, were supposedly advised by
“police prosecutor” Adulacion, to plead guilty on their case and then apply for
probation to avoid imprisonment. Even though they did not understand the
term “plead guilty,” the two accused obliged with Adulacion’s suggestion to
have a lighter sentence; Oco then began with the procedure.
Prior to the arraignment, the following chronologically transpired:
1) Oco stated the complainants’ right in regards to be accused. Allegedly, the
complainants waive their rights to counsel but noted that the acquiring of a
lawyer would be their problem. They allegedly scoffed the need of a lawyer
and noted that being tricycle drivers only, they might be unable to pay for one;
and Oco obliged on their refusal; and
2) Oco stated the complainants’ right to probation.
Without representation for the benefit of the complainants, the arraignment
of their theft case began.
Later on, however, the complainants find out what the meaning of
“pleading guilty” means; thus, they resolve to withdraw their improvident
guilty pleas. Furthermore, they sought to hold the judge, administratively
liable for arraigning in spite of such irregular arrangement; hence this petition
for Oco’s gross ignorance of the law

Issue:
Whether or not Oco is liable administratively.
Held:
Oco is liable administratively.
Citing Sec. 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Sayson vs People
enumerates the four mandatory duties of a judge when a defendant appears
at the arraignment without an attorney:
1) Inform the defendant of his right to an attorney before being arraigned;
2) After informing him said right, ask the defendant if he desires the aid of
attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ an attorney, assign an attorney de
oficio to defend the defendant; and
4) If the defendant desires an attorney of his own, allow the same to find an
attorney in a reasonable time.
However, in People vs Baldoso, it stated that a defendant may waive his right
to counsel in an arraignment; however, to be a valid waiver, the defendant
must make it voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The court must also
take into account the educational attainment of the defendant. Finally, citing
Sec. 1(a), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, People vs Estomaca enumerates
how should an arraignment and plea be made by a judge:
1) Furnish the defendant a copy of the complaint and information;
2) Read the same in the language or dialect known to him. Such is an
important aspect of defendant’s right to be informed of the accusation
against him; and
3) Ask what defendant’s plea to the charge.
In this case, Oco had the duty to assign a counsel de officio for the
complainants as they were unable to afford one. Furthermore, being tricycle
drivers, the complainants were not able to comprehend of the charges against
them. Such can be faulted to Oco, who, though read it to them, informed
them not in the dialect they understand.
 People vs Gambao
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
Facts:
Accused-appellants, who were charged and already tried for kidnapping
for ransom, initially pleaded “not guilty.” However, upon the advice of their
counsel of a probable lighter sentence, they changed their plea to “guilty.” The
presiding judge then explained to accused-appellants the consequences of a
plea of guilty. After the explanation, the judge asked the accused-appellants
asked if their change from “not guilty” to “guilty” stands; they answered in the
affirmative.
After the prosecution presented their evidences, the court convicted
them guilty of kidnapping for ransom with the supreme penalty of death.
Aggrieved, this petition was filed by the accused-appellants who relied on the
promise that they to receive a lighter penalty should they plead guilty; they
argue that their pleas were improvidently given.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants’ pleas were improvidently given.

Held:
Accused-appellants’ pleas were improvidently given.
People vs Oden, laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense:
1) Conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of
the plea of guilt;
2) Require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and
3) Inquire whether or not accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he so desires.
People vs Ernas explains its rationale: to prevent improvident pleas of guilt
from the accused since he might be forfeiting his life and liberty without
having fully understood the significance and consequence of his plea.
In this case, even though the judge explained to them the consequence
their plea of guilt, accused-appellants. In fact, after the judge explained the
said consequences, accused-appellant Karim still had the assumption that his
plea would mitigate the penalty of his crime. The counsel, and especially the
judge, therefore, failed to explain consequences.
Nevertheless, the court here relied on sufficient and credible evidence
and not just the supposed improvident plea of the accused-appellants.
Improvident pleas lose legal significance where the conviction can be based
on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused
(People vs Oden).
 People vs Odtuhan
G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Odtuhan was an accused on a bigamy case. However, he
moved to have the information of bigamy be quashed on two grounds: 1) the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and 2) his criminal liability is
extinguished. The trial court denied the motion. Upon appeal by Odtuhan to
the Court of the Appeals (CA), the motion was granted; CA appreciated the
fact that the first marriage of Odtuhan was already declared by court void ab
initio when the case of bigamy is filed. Notwithstanding the fact that indeed it
may have been bigamy had there been no said declaration of nullity, the fact
remains that the information filed have facts that do not constitute an
offense; the quashing of the information was concluded to be an appropriate
motion.
Aggrieved, this petition filed by the prosecution, arguing that the
information filed sufficiently alleges the elements constituting Odtuhan’s
bigamy and the declaration of nullity does not extinguish the accused’s
criminal liabilty

Issue:
Whether or not the information sufficiently alleges the elements of
bigamy.

Held:
The information sufficiently alleges the elements of bigamy.
Sec. 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may
quash a complaint or information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. Furthermore, citing Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
Nollora, Jr. vs People effectively establishes the elements of bigamy:
1) Offender has been legally married;
2) The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case of an absent
spouses, such absence could not be presumed because of death, per Civil
Code;
3) He contracts a second marriage; and
4) The said second marriage has all the essential requisites of validity.
Finally, citing the Family Code, Teves vs People stated that a declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense.
In this case:
1) Offender indeed was married with Modina;
2) Such marriage was not legally dissolved, yet;
3) He contracts a second marriage with Alagon; and
4) Such marriage has all the essential requisites of validity.
Even if it can be conceded that Odtuhan secured a declaration of nullity of his
first marriage, the fact remains that he only secured the declaration by the
court only after his subsequent marriage. With that concluded, it can only be
said that the information filed was wrongfully quashed.
 Antone vs Beronilla
G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010

Facts:
An information of bigamy was filed against respondent Beronilla.
Alleged in the information that Beronilla’s first marriage with petitioner
Antone was not yet legally dissolved when the former contracted a second
marriage with Maguillo. Prior to the arraignment, Beronilla moved to quash
the information against him, arguing that the facts charged on said
information does not constitute an offense. He furthered that the trial court
already annulled his marriage with Antone.
On their opposition to the motion, the prosecution, through Antone,
argued that the bigamy was already committed before the court could even
declared Beronilla’s marriage with Antone null and void. Furthermore, to file a
motion to quash hypothesizes that Beronilla admits to the facts alleged in the
information, and facts contrary thereto (such as the subsequent dissolving of
his first marriage) are matters of defense which may only be raised during the
presentation of evidence.
After hearing the motion to quash, the court granted the same to
Beronilla. Antone petitioned against the grant. He was denied by CA, arguing
that this constitutes double jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition constitutes double jeopardy and whether or
not the motion to quash was proper

Held:
 The petition does not constitute double jeopardy and the motion was
not proper.
Sec. 8, Rule 117 (now Sec. 6, Rule 117) states that an order sustaining
the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Sec. 2 (f) and (h)
(now Sec. 3 (g) and (i) which are “an order sustaining the motion to quash is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense” and “that the accused
has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent“). Furthermore, Javier vs Sandiganbayan defined a motion to quash
an information as the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.
In this case, the petition does not constitute a double jeopardy as the
ground raised by Beronilla is neither Sec. 2 (f) nor (h), but he raised the
ground that the facts charge does not constitute an offense; thus, this does
not Antone’s petition. Furthermore, Beronilla cannot raise the fact that he
subsequently had his first marriage annulled by the trial court in his motion to
quash. Such was not reflected on the prosecution’s information; thus, it can
only be raised upon a full-blown trial.
 People vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 160619, September 9, 2015

Facts:
Respondent Castillo, the elected mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, allegedly
allowed the operation of a dumpsite, operated by co-accused Melencio and
Arciaga, without even securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate. As a
result, it caused the residents of the area to endure the stench, flies, rats, and
mosquitoes emanating from the site. As such, an information was filed
against Castillo for the violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) before the Sandiganbayan.
Aggrieved, Castillo moved to quash the information against him. He
argued that the facts charged against him does not constitute an offense.
Furthermore, citing Llorente, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan, he argued that the undue
injury, as an element of the offense on R.A. 3019, must not only be
mentioned in the information, but must also be specified to the point of moral
certainty. The Sandiganbayan found merit to Castillo’s motion; hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the lack of specific undue injury warrants a motion to
quash the information.

Held:
The lack of specific undue injury does not warrant a motion to quash
the information.
 Llorente vs Sandiganbayan held that undue injury must be specified
and proven to the point of certainty during the trial, not when the information
is filed.
In this case, Castillo’s reliance on Llorente is misplaced; requirement to
prove undue injury in a specific and proven-to-the-point-of-moral-certainty
manner is required only when the trial begins and not even prior to the
arraignment
In addition, even if the information was defective on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, an outright quashing of the
information is not proper.
Sec. 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that should there be a
defect on the complaint or information which may be cured by amendment,
the court shall order the amendment. Furthermore, People vs Andrade states
that if the defect can be corrected by amendment, courts are mandated not
to automatically quash the information and resolve to such relief in order for
a case to proceed without due delay.
In this case, Sandiganbayan failed to order for the amendment of the
information (which however is not necessary in this case) instead of
immediately quashing it.
 People vs Bayabos
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015

Facts:
Balidoy, a probationary midshipman, was admitted at the Philippine
Marine Merchant Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all
entrants were required to complete the mandatory Indoctrination and
Orientation Period. Balidoy, however, died on the second day.
An information was filed against the officers of the PMMA for allegedly
violating the Anti-Hazing Law. The information alleged the culpability of
respondents and the psychological pain and the physical injuries they inflicted
to Balidoy.
Respondent Bayabos, along with the several officers indicted in the
case moved to quash the same, arguing that the facts charged does not
constitute an offense. The respondents argued that the elements to warrant a
violation of the Anti-Hazing Law is wanting. The court granted the
respondents’ motion; hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the quashing of the information was proper.

Held:
The quashing of the information was proper.
Sec. 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states that any time before
entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court on
the ground that the facts charged does not constitute an offense. Also, Anti-
Hazing Law effectively enumerates the elements for its commission:
1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and
2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or
entry into an organization.
In this case, the information merely mentions psychological pain and
physical injuries that were inflicted to Balidoy. It did not state whether or not
the purported acts were employed as prerequisite for his admission or entry
to the PMMA.
To note however, this does not preclude the prosecution from filing
another information. Sec. 6, Rule 117 specifically states that an order
sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution; except,
however, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished, which effectively attaches double jeopardy.
 Veridiano vs People
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Facts:
A concerned citizen tipped the police that petitioner Veridiano was on
his way to San Pablo City to obtain drugs. When the police chanced upon
Veridiano, who was riding on a jeep at that time, the police flagged down the
jeep and, without warrant, arrested Veridiano, who was found with a teabag’s
worth of marijuana.
Subsequently a charge in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was filed against Veridiano; the RTC rendered convicted him for the same.
Aggrieved, he filed this petition on the ground that he was illegally
arrested.

Issue:
Whether or not his arrest was illegal.

Held:
His arrest was illegal.
Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for the three grounds of
a valid warrantless arrest:
1) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante delicto);
2) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (hot pursuit); and
3) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (escapee from law).
Furthermore, the Court held that the invalidity of an arrest leads to several
consequences among which are:
1) The failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused;
2) Criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
3) Any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the
evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.
In this case, when Veridiano was caught he did not display anything
criminal or anything suspicious that would warrant his warrantless arrest. As
such, the arrest was illegal.
To note, Veridiano could have very well dismissed the information
against him prior to arraignment as the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction of
his person as he was illegally arrested. Nevertheless, he is still found to be
acquitted.
 Loney vs People
G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners Loney, Reid, and Hernandez were officers of Marcopper
Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a mining firm in Marinduque. They are
hereby charged for the contamination of Boac and Makalupnit rivers when the
mine tailings from the operation gushed out from the drainage tunnel. From
the environmental destruction it caused, the officers were charged in violation
of P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines), P.D. 984 (National Pollution
Decree of 1976), R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995), and the Revised
Penal Code (Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Destruction of Property).
The MTC, RTC, and CA ruled for their conviction; hence, this petition.
They initially moved for the quashing of the 12 informations (4 for each) as
the said informations filed for being duplicitous, or rather for having been
charged for multiple offenses in a single act.

Issue:
Whether or not charges filed against petitioners except for one should
be quashed for duplicity of charges.

Held:
The charges filed against petitioners except for one should not be
quashed for duplicity of charges.
Sec, 3(e) Rule 117 of the Rules of Court implicitly provides that duplicity
of offenses in a single information is a ground for its quashing. Also, Nierras
vs Dacuycuy held that save for the exception that a person cannot be put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense twice, a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law.
In this case, the crimes pinned against petitioners involves different
elements for their commission. In P.D. 1067, the additional element involved
is the dumping of the mine tailings without securing prior permit from
authorities. In P.D. 984, the proof of the actual existence of pollution is
required. In R.A. 7942, willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is an element. Finally, in the Revised Penal Code, the
lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property is an
element to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. This just
proves that the informations filed against petitioners are not the same
offenses, which is prevented by the principle of double jeopardy.
 Dio vs People
G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Dio was the Treasurer and private respondent Desmond was
the Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium.
Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. Dio, allegedly, sent
emails to several persons that Desmond was bleeding their company for
money.
Upon the filing of the information, Dio moved to quash the information,
arguing that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. She explained
further that the informations failed to allege publication, an element of libel.
The court ruled partially in favor of Dio; the informations did not allege the
element of publication as mentioned by the court. The prosecution appealed,
arguing they were not given ample time to amend to defect. The petition of
the prosecution was affirmed;
Aggrieved, this petition was filed by Dio, arguing that not all defects in
the information cannot be cured by amendment. She elaborated that since
venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, the failure of the prosecution to
provide such in the information is a defect not curable by amendment.

Issue:
Whether or not the defect in the informations against Dio can be cured
by amendment.

Held:
The defect in the informations against Dio can be cured by amendment.
 Sec. 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that if the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made. Agustin vs Pamintuan discusses the dismissal of an information that
had failed to establish venue; but it also discussed that the accused was
already arraigned in such circumstance.
In this case, even if it can be established that venue was not set by the
prosecution, Dio is yet to be arraigned. As such, the case of Agustin does not
apply here. The informations against her may still be amended.
 Saldariega vs Panganiban
G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner Saldariega was charged in violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. When the cases were subject for hearing,
prosecution’s principal witness, PO2 Villas, the arresting officer of Saldariega,
failed to attend. As such, respondent judge issued an order provisionally
dismissing the case with the express consent of Saldariega.
Days after, Villas moved to re-open the case against Saldariega; hence,
this petition. She argued that the provisional dismissal of her cases was
considered an acquittal, and their revival would constitute double jeopardy.
She furthers that the absence of Villas in the proceedings have caused undue
delay to her cases. This amounts to, she emphasized, as violation to her right
to speedy trial.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisional dismissal of Saldariega’s cases
constitute acquittal, and their revival would constitute double jeopardy.

Held:
The provisional dismissal of Saldariega’s cases does not constitute
acquittal, and their revival would not constitute double jeopardy.
Condrada vs People enumerated the requisites of the general rule that
must be present for double jeopardy to attach:
1) A valid indictment;
2) before a court of jurisdiction;
3) The arraignment of the accused;
4) A valid plea entered by him;
5) The acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination
of the case against him without his express consent.
Anent the fifth rule, double jeopardy may attach even if there was express
consent by the accused for the dismissal of the case if:
1) When there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him;
and
2) When there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.
Finally, William Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products stated that a “speedy
trial” is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining, the
case furthered, whether such right was violated the delay should be viewed in
several factors:
1) Duration of the delay;
2) Reason therefor;
3) Assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
4) Prejudice caused by such delay.
In this case, Saldariega’s position falls under the exception to the
general rule, given that she gave express consent of the dismissal of the case.
However, the first requisite of the exception cannot be established that there
is insufficiency of evidence as the witnesses were absent. Saldariega also
failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the trial was attended
with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable
motive on the part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings.
 People vs Alejandro
G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018

Facts:
Accused-appellant Alejandro was charged with two counts of rape
against AAA, a 12-year old minor. AAA testified and recounted the acts that
led to her rape from Alejandro. Alejandro on the other hand, manifested that
he will no longer present any evidence before the court.
When the RTC rendered a decision, it initially acquitted Alejandro from
the two counts of rape. However, the court recalled the same decision, upon
the manifestation by the prosecution that the court failed to account the
testimony of AAA.
Aggrieved, this petition was filed by Alejandro, arguing that RTC had no
power to recall an acquittal as said acquittal attained finality after valid
promulgation; to recall the would be a violation of his right against double
jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall of RTC’s decision would amount to double
jeopardy.

Held:
The recall of RTC’s decision would amount to double jeopardy.
Chiok vs People provides for the requisites in order for double jeopardy
to attach:
1) A valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
of the crime charged;
2) A court of competent jurisdiction;
3) The accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
4) The accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without
his express consent.
Such rule, however has exceptions, as pointed out by Villareal vs Aliga:
1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a
finding of a mistrial; or
2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.
In this case, Alejandro was charged in an information for two counts of
rape before the RTC, where he pleaded not guilty. Notwithstanding that the
court had mistaken notion that AAA failed to testify; an acquittal was
rendered by said court. Furthermore, Alejandro’s case does not fall with the
exception as onto the first exception, the prosecution was allowed to present
their case and witnesses. Also, the acquittal was not based on grave abuse of
discretion, but through a mistake; thus, the second exception is also not
satisfied.
 People vs Lacson
G.R. No. 149453, May 28, 2002

Facts:
Respondent Lacson was charged with murder for the allegedly having a
hand in the killing of 11 people. Subsequently however, most of the witnesses
and the families of those killed recanted their statements and withdrawn their
cases. In view of these, the RTC initially dismissed the cases.
However, the case was once again revived. Aggrieved, Lacson moved to
dismiss conduct of further proceedings. He argued the provisional dismissal
they attained from the previous judgment has already lapsed for more than
two years. He furthered that to file the same information would amount to
double jeopardy

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstances attach double jeopardy.

Held:
The circumstances cannot sufficiently conclude double jeopardy.
Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states that there is provisional
dismissal by having these requisites concur:
1) Whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of
the accused;
2) Whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party;
3) Whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed; and
4) Whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-
year period.
 In this case, though it is conceded most of the offended parties
recanted their cases, the same cannot be said for the remaining offended
parties. As such, a provisional dismissal is uncertain.
 Bonsubre vs Yerro
G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015

Facts:
Respondents Yerro were charged with estafa before the RTC. It
stemmed from a criminal complaint by petitioner Bonsubre. During the
proceedings, Bonsubre’s then counsel on record, Atty Luna, Jr., manifested
that there was an on-going settlement between the parties, and that they
would just subsequently file the necessary motion.
Eventually, a Compromise Agreement was furnished by the parties
regarding to the civil aspect of the case. However, Bonsubre failed to furnish
RTC a copy of said agreement and the necessary motion to manifest. This
resulted in the case’s dismissal for failure by Bonsubre to comply with the
court’s order, in view of the respondents’ constitutional right to speedy trial.
However, after more than two years, Bonsubre moved to reconsider the
dismissal order by the court. His motion was denied; hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a provisional dismissal of the case.

Held:
There was a provisional dismissal of the case.
Sec, 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court effectively enumerates the
requisites that have to concur for there to have a provisional dismissal:
1) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the
accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
3) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
4)The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
In this case, none of the prerequisites concur. Bonsubre failed to inform
the court regarding the Compromise Agreement between him and the Yerros.
As such, there can be any basis that the accused expressly consented to the
provisional dismissal of the case. The respondents cannot be deprived of their
right for a speedy trial.
How will double jeopardy attach?
(1) a valid indictment;
(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the arraignment of the accused;
(4) a valid plea entered by him; and
(5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination
of the case against him without his express consent.
Exceptions even if the dismissal was with consent
1) when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him;
and
2) where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in
violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.