Yap Vs Ca

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5
Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to
fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of
P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC.
He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right
to bail.
Issues:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against

excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.
Held:
1.Right to Bail
The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective
denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this
case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the
civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.
2. Liberty of abode and right to travel
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June
6, 2001)
The starting point is the presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which is a right
safeguarded both Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Dramayo
and Ecubin were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit
only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed.
There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then
is moral certainty. It cannot be denied that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in
moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by the Supreme Court as to the
culpability of Dramayo and Ecubin. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required
that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and Ecubin,
the requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no
question as to the other two who testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal
liability.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of Dramayo and Ecubin,
as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than
sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on
the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, Dramayo and
Ecubin would have been acquitted likewise just because the other 5 defendants were not similarly
sentenced. There had been cases where the Supreme Court, notwithstanding a majority of the
defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the
party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having arisen
as to their culpability
Mingoa
Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the
provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the
Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he
had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot
it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and
presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the
corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the
Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question.
Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved cannot be sustained.
Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley,
in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held
in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall,
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof
provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so
that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack
of connection between the two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may
be seen from the decisions of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725);
and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a presumption
of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming,
upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the
officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to
arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper
demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be
said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a
prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The
presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Herein,
Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising
from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without
Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for
release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on
the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police.
Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried to avoid meeting
the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many
teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to
believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure
invention.

Yap Vs Ca

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Yap Vs Ca

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Yap Vs Ca

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

You might also like