People v Mosende (GR 97170, December 10, 1993)

FACTS:
Carlo "Lelot" Alipao was last seen alive by his mother in the late afternoon of
September 18, 1986, when he left his home with two friends, Jinky Mozol and Marlon
Escuyos, to visit another friend, Rudy Mosende. After Carlo failed to come home,
Mrs. Gloria Alipao asked Mozol and Marlon Escuyosabout her son but they did not
know where he was. She searched for her missing son in different places in the
vicinity of Mainit, Mainit, Surigao del Norte but without success.
Eventually, Gloria Alipao dreamed that her son was buried somewhere in the place
of Rudy Mosende. When she went to the place and stood outside, she smelled a
very bad odor coming from inside the lot. She told many people about her belief
that her son was buried there. Exhumed from the residential lot of the Mosende
family were the remains of a human body and was identified by Mrs. Alipao to be
that of her missing son Carlo Alipao.
According to Mosendes former friends Benceslao and Fidelino the former told them
to dig a hole in the ground bury the cadaver in the hole they had just dug. They
eventually did as they were told when Mosende drew out a bolo and angrily
threatened them with it. Fearing for their lives, they carried the corpse to the hole,
dropped it in, and covered it with soil. Benceslao asked Mosende who was the
person they had just buried, Mosende said it was Lelot Alipao. Mosende then told
them that if word ever got out of Lelot's (Carlo's) killing, they and their parents
would themselves be slain. With Mosende's threat ringing in their ears, Benceslao
and Fidelino left the shack; and not long afterwards, fled to Surigao City. 1 They
returned to Mainit after Mosende was arrested sometime in April, 1987, and
revealed what they knew to the authorities.
The Trial Court found Mosende guilty of the murder of Carlo Alipao, on the basis of
circumstantial evidence sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties; to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, Carlo Alipao, in
the amount of P30,000.00, and moral damages of P10,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not circumstantial evidence can lead to the conclusion of guilt
Held :
The Court AFFIRMED the Trial Court s decision. Circumstance, if the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11
These requisites are adequately met in this case at bar. There are several
circumstances generating certitude of Mosende's guilt, these being:
1) it was in the shack of the family of Rudy Mosende that the corpse of Lelot Alipao
bound hand and foot, head and upper body encased in a sack, dead from severe
blows to the head from a blunt instrument was dug up from a shallow hole in the
dirt floor;

2) the body had been buried in that place by Benceslao Resullar, Jr. and Fidelino
Balaga some seven months earlier;
3) it was on the invitation and request of Rudy Mosende that Benceslao and Fidelino
had gone to that
shack and dug the hole themselves;
4) it was Rudy Mosende who showed them the cadaver of Lelot Alipao, lying in the
toilet; and it was
Rudy who told them to carry it to the hole and bury it there, and who bullied them
into doing so when
they initially demurred;
5) Mosende told them it was Lelot Alipao they were interring;
6) Mosende threatened to kill Benceslao and Fidelino and their parents if anyone
should come to
know of the evening's bizarre event; and because of their fear, the two exiled
themselves in Surigao
City, returning to Mainit only after they learned of Mosende's arrest;
7) when Lelot left his home for the last time, with two friends, it was allegedly to
visit Rudy Mosende.

US v Ah Chong (GR L-5272, March 19, 1910)

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, Ah Chong was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch,
the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At
that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought
that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom
he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that
the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door
against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant

was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one daypresidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law.
Issue:
Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of
a mistake as to the facts
Held:
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his
bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
Under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. The
defendant acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.
People v Oanis (GR L-47722, July 27, 1943)
FACT
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and
they are overpowered.
They arrived at the suspected house and went to the room, they simultaneously or
successively fired upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where
they, it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal AnselmoBalagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
SerapioTecson.
The lower court found Oanis and Galanta guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and six months to two years and two months of prison correccionaland to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants
appealed separately from this judgment.

The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of
homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months
ofprision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of SerapioTecson
in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Oanis and Galanta were liable by reason of honest mistake
of fact
Held:
The judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years ofprision correctional to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of
the deceased SerapioTecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
costs.
Ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in
their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty
by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and
to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
People v Guillen (GR L-1477, January 18, 1950)
FACT
Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has
voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel
A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine
Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during
the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his
country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President. After he had pondered

for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a
big crowd.
Guillen hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his
speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave
the platform. General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking,
hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought
the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his
body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the
ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close
to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found
that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela )
who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the
fragments of the grenade Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.
The Court of First Instance of Manila , is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and
is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon
Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Issue
Whether or not Guillen was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard
to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang
Held
The court affirmed the sentence of the trial court. The death sentence shall be
executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of
the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days
from the date the record shall have been remanded.
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the
accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that
meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his
preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by
throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and
causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main
and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive
nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the
appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his
wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another

act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada,
"in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either
malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists,
the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have
been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.'
(Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
People v Cagoco (GR L-38511, October 6, 1933)
Fact
On the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on
the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of
San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back
to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon
once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, the man that
had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and
suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head.
Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower
part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away.
Yu Yee said that he could recognize his father's assailant, and described him as
being about five feet in height, 25 or 30 years old, with long hair and wearing a suit
of dark clothes. Yu Yee was immediately called to the police station. The accused
was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven persons that had been
detained for investigation. They were wearing different kinds of clothes. Yu Yee
without hesitation pointed out the defendant, Francisco Cagoco as the person that
had assaulted Yu Lon.
The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
asesinato.
Appellate court found the defendant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to suffer
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of P1,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Issue
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of
murder.
Held
The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death, and there being present in this case one mitigating
and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to
seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal. As thus modified,
the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)

although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in
order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present,
to wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
offender. Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing
of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious
act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a
treacherous manner he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although
he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the
crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
People v Quianzon (GR 42607, September 28, 1935)
FACT:
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person
was being held in the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, in Paoay, Ilocos Norte,
with the usual attendance of the relatives and friends. Andres Aribuabo, one of the
persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to
all appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that
Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter,
greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied it to the neck of Aribuabo who
shortly afterwards ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming that
he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a
wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on
the tenth day after the incident.
The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte charged with and convicted Quianzon of
the crime of homicide in and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven months
and one day of reclusion temporal.
ISSUE
Whether Quianzon should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical
injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have
survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which was placed to control or
isolate the infection.
HELD
The court modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty with a minimum of four years of prision correccional and a maximum of a
eight years of prision mayor. Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of
instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as the committed should be
taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating
circumstances adverse to him.

One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide
if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The
fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar
to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the
consequences of his act and in this case the physical condition and temperament
of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be
judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually
produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was
the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its
effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.
Urbano v IAC (GR 72964, January 7, 1988)
FACT:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner FilomenoUrbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, and Pangasinan and found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened
and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who
was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he
was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked
palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo
hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by
Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of
said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
On October 27, 1980 Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital; he had lockjaw and was
having convulsions. Dr.EdmundoExconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus. Javier died on the following day.
Then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City and Intermediate Appellate Court find
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
ISSUE

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's
death.
HELD
The court ACQUITTED Urbano of the crime of homicide.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however,
lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been theproximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do.