People v. SB (July 5, 2010)

6/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 623
G.R. No. 164577. July 5, 2010.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), VICTORINO A.
BASCO, ROMEO S. DAVID, and ROGELIO L. LUIS,
respondents.
Double Jeopardy; Appeals; The rule barring an appeal from a

judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute—the following are
the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is
denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’
demurrer to evidence.—Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a
wrong remedy. Section 1 of Rule 122 allows “any party” to appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused
against double jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic that an
appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for
review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the
accused in double jeopardy. The rule barring an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The following are
the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is
denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’
demurrer to evidence. Such issues are brought to the attention of
a reviewing court through the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In assailing the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner resorted to this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, purportedly
raising pure questions of law. This is erroneous for which reason
this petition is dismissible outright.
Demurrer to Evidence; The demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and as
such, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000172acb41f4222884e73003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
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* SECOND DIVISION.
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)
to an acquittal of the accused.”—The demurrer to evidence in

criminal cases, such as the one at bench, is “filed after the
prosecution had rested its case.” As such, it calls “for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to
an acquittal of the accused.” Judicial action on a motion to dismiss
or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. Accordingly, unless the Sandiganbayan acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, its decision
to grant or deny the demurrer may not be disturbed.
Questions of Law; There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain
state of facts; Judicial review under Rule 45 does not envisage a re-
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which respondent
court’s action was predicated; It bears reiterating that a judgment
of acquittal, “even if seemingly erroneous,” is the final verdict.—
Granting arguendo that petitioner’s recourse under Rule 45 was
proper, nevertheless, petitioner failed to raise pure questions of
law. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the determination of whether
the established facts fall squarely within the provisions of the
law, that is, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, would require us to
reassess and reexamine the evidence, and essentially to supplant
the lower courts’ finding. This is beyond the province of Rule 45.
Judicial review under Rule 45 does not envisage a re-evaluation of
the sufficiency of the evidence upon which respondent court’s
action was predicated. It bears reiterating that a judgment of
acquittal, “even if seemingly erroneous,” is the final verdict.
Criminal Law; Administrative Law; If the criminal case will
be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the
administrative case, and the court trying the latter already
squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances
sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to

still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite
the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent
evidence, will be a futile and
149
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 149
useless exercise.—Although the dismissal of the criminal case

cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings
primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required to
sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that
necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold true if it
were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the
administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal case.
The reason is that the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in
the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from
adducing additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof
required in the criminal cases. However, if the criminal case will
be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the
administrative case, and the court trying the latter already
squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances
sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to
still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite
the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent
evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

Sandiganbayan (First Div.).
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor for petitioner.
Edna Herrera Batacan for Romeo S. David.
Redemberto R. Villanueva for Rogelio L. Luis.
De Borja, Medialdea, Bello, Guevarra & Gerodias for
Victorino A. Basco.
MENDOZA, J.:
The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting

the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is equivalent
to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently
prove that the court’s action is attended with grave abuse
of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the
accused against double jeopardy will be violated.
150

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by the People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman,
assailing the July 23, 2004 Resolution1 of the
Sandiganbayan granting the accused’s respective
demurrers to evidence filed with prior leave of court.
The Facts:
On November 23, 1999, private respondents Victorino A.
Basco, Romeo S. David and Rogelio L. Luis were charged
with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2
as amended, (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before
the Sandiganbayan.3 The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 25752, alleged:
“That between November 15, 1996 to May 7, 1998 or some time

prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David and
Rogelio L. Luis, all high ranking public officers, being then
Chairman and
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a member of this

Court) with Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (now a member of
this Court) and Rolando B. Jurado, concurring.
2 SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
3 Rollo, p. 87.
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VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 151

President/Presidents and Chief Executive Officers of the Bases

Conversion Development Authority [BCDA], Clark Development
Corporation/Clark International Airport, [CDC/CIAC] and
Philippine National Construction Corporation [PNCC],
respectively, while in the performance of their official functions,
taking advantage of their positions and committing the offenses in
relation to their office, confederating and conspiring with one
another, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into
contracts/transactions for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark
Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road, without the benefit of
public bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167% than the
typical roadway construction cost, thus, depriving the government
of the opportunity of obtaining the most advantageous
construction cost, causing undue injury to the same and giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to their
preferred private contractors.”
Before the arraignment, the accused filed a Motion for

Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation. Acting thereon, the
Sandiganbayan required the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to comment and submit the final action taken
by the Office of Ombudsman.
In a Memorandum, dated March 26, 2000, Special
Prosecution Officer Roberto T. Agagon recommended the
withdrawal of the information without prejudice to the
conduct of further preliminary investigation to resolve the
issue on overpricing by referring the matter to the
Commission on Audit (COA) “whose report shall serve as
legal basis for indictment against the accused.”4 Then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, however, disapproved the
recommendation and directed the prosecutor to “proceed
with the trial.”
_______________
4 Said recommendation was endorsed for approval by Prosecution

Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil and Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo. Respondent David’s Demurrer to Evidence, p. 3, Rollo, p. 89.
152

Upon arraignment, the three (3) respondents pleaded

not guilty.
On August 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-
trial Order identifying the issues as follows: (i) whether or
not the construction projects involved should have been
subjected to a public bidding as mandated by P.D. 1594,5 as
amended;6 (ii) whether or not there was overpricing in the
construction costs of the projects; (iii) whether or not the
government suffered undue injury or damage as a
consequence; (iv) whether or not the accused acted with
evident bad faith and/or manifest partiality; and (v)
whether or not the accused conspired with each other in
committing the offense charged.
During the trial, the prosecution presented its lone
witness, Atty. Emora C. Pagunuran, Legal Counsel, Office
of the Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter,
the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. After the
evidence were admitted, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents
filed their respective motions for leave to file their
demurrer to evidence based substantially on the following
grounds: (i) that Atty. Pagunuran had no personal
knowledge of the transactions involved and so her
testimony was hearsay; (ii) that the
_______________
5 “Sec. 4. Bidding.—Construction projects shall generally be

undertaken by contract after competitive public bidding. Projects may be
undertaken by administration or force account or by negotiated contract
only in exceptional cases where time is of the essence, or where there is
lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is a conclusive
evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved through
this arrangement, and in accordance with provisions of laws and acts on
the matter, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or
the Minister of Energy, as the case may be, if the project cost is less than
P1 Million, and of the President of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Minister, if the project cost is P1 Million or more.”
6 Executive Order No. 164 and Executive Order No. 80.
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VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 153

prosecution failed to prove that the questioned contracts

were indeed overpriced as Atty. Pagunuran merely relied
on the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

table of “Typical Construction Costs, 1999” without more;
and (iii) that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in an
administrative case (CA-G.R. SP No. 62084), which upheld
the validity of the direct negotiated contracts, even in the
absence of a public bidding, was already the law of the
case.
The motions were granted and the Sandiganbayan
directed the prosecution to file its opposition.
It appears that accused Rogelio L. Luis and Victorino A.
Basco (and several other BCDA officers) were also charged
administratively in the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed
as OMB-ADM-0-98-0430 and entitled Joseph M. Ocol/FFIB
vs. Victorino A. Basco et. al., based on the same act subject
of the criminal indictment. The Office of the Ombudsman
found one of the respondents therein (Isaac Puno III)
administratively liable for simple misconduct. In the case
of Basco and Luis, however, the complaint against them
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.7
Isaac Puno III then filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals (CA). After a study of his case, the CA
exonerated him on the ground that the failure to conduct a
public bidding was legally justified as “time was of the
essence.” It likewise considered the absence of a prior
written approval from then President Ramos as merely
confirmatory rather than curative in nature and, as a
consequence, did not render the negotiated contracts8
invalid.
_______________
7 Isaac Puno III v. Office of the Ombudsman and Joseph Ocol, CA-G.R.
SP. No. 62084, February 11, 2002.
8 Referring to the November 15, 1996 Memorandum of Agreement for
the construction of the Mabalacat Clark Spur Road and Clark Perimeter
Road Projects, and likewise the August 15, 1997 Supplemental Agreement
to the same MOA entered into by all the accused herein.
154

On April 15, 2004, Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9

denying the demurrers to evidence. It opined that the
prosecution’s evidence substantiated the essential elements
charged in the Information. For said reason, it was
incumbent on the respondents to present controverting
evidence. On the exoneration in the administrative case,

Sandiganbayan was of the view that there was disparity in
the nature of the two proceedings and in the quantum of
evidence required, and so it did not necessarily bar a
successful criminal prosecution involving the same or
similar acts.
The private respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration which was granted in a Resolution dated
July 23, 2004. The fallo of the resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court is

constrained to GRANT, as it hereby GRANTS, the Motions for
Reconsideration of accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David
and Rogelio L. Luis, as the evidence of the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish the essential elements of the offense charged
and to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the said
accused. Accordingly, the cases against accused Victorino A.
Basco, Romeo S. David and Rogelio L. Luis are hereby
DISMISSED.”
In making such a turnaround, the Sandiganbayan took

into account the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
administrative case, which upheld the legality and validity
of the subject contracts, as a “persuasive ruling”
considering that it involved the same issues, subject matter
and parties. It reasoned out that since the bases for the two
(2) separate and distinct proceedings pertain to the same
evidence, then the principle that the dismissal of an
administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of
the administrative complaint, on which its previous
resolution was anchored, no longer applies. It, thus,
concluded that there being want of substantial evidence to
support an administrative charge, there could
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 49-53.
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VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 155

be no sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that there

is probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
The Sandiganbayan further stated that the prosecution

failed to establish the fact of overpricing. The prosecution
witness was unable to justify her sole reliance on DPWH
table of “Typical Construction Costs, 1999” vis-à-vis the
roadway construction cost of the projects involved to prove
overpricing. It noted that the Office of the Ombudsman
itself was not firmly convinced of respondents’ culpability
as shown by (i) its issuance of two conflicting memoranda,
viz: one in the administrative case dated June 28, 2000
(OMB-ADM-0-98-0430) where it found that there was no
overpricing; and the other, in the criminal case (this case)
dated June 19, 2000 (OMB-0-98-1629 and OMB-0-99-0368),
where it found evidence that the project was overpriced;
and (ii) the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Roberto
Agagon that the contracts be reviewed by the COA, at a
time when the Information was already filed in court.
Hence, this petition.
In the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman raises the
following:
Issues
I. WHETHER THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENTS IN

ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MABALACAT-
CLARK SPUR ROAD AND CLARK PERIMETER
ROAD PROJECTS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF P.D. 1594
II. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN CAN ADOPT
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE BEFORE
THE FORMER COURT IS CRIMINAL IN NATURE,
WHILE IN THE LATTER IT IS ADMINISTRATIVE
156

In their respective comments on the petition, the

respondents are one in questioning the propriety of
resorting to this present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 on the ground that it places them in double
jeopardy.
In its Reply, petitioner argued that the right of the
accused against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because
the issues presented for resolution are purely legal.10 In
resolving the legal issues, there is no need to reevaluate
the evidence already adduced before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners also lament the fact that the Sandiganbayan
ignored the legal dictum that the dismissal of the
administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar act/s subject of the
criminal case. Under that doctrine, a criminal case already
filed must proceed in the normal course of litigation.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition fails.
Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy.
Section 1 of Rule 122 allows “any party” to appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused
against double jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic
that an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case
wide open for review by an appellate court. As a
consequence, an appeal by the prosecution from a judgment
of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double
jeopardy.11
The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
is, however, not absolute. The following are the recognized
exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due
pro-
_______________
10 Petitioner’s Reply, p. 4, citing People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521

(1990).
11 People v. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 402,
403.
157
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 157

cess of law;12 and (ii) when the trial court commits grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accused’ demurrer to evidence.13
Such issues are brought to the attention of a reviewing
court through the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In assailing the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner resorted to
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
purportedly raising pure questions of law. This is
erroneous for which reason this petition is dismissible
outright. In People v. Laguio,14 the same procedural

misstep was addressed by the Court in this wise:
“By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’ demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order,
being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus,
when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an
appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the
right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, xxx
filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure
question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
x x x
Also, in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of
certiorari and appeal are two different remedies mutually
exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where
appeal is avail-
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 403-404, citing Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72670,
September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
13 Id., at pp. 405-406, citing People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005,
471 SCRA 668.
14 Id.
158

able, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal

case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such
an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari,
however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the
Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible.
The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial
court by appeal without violating private respondent’s right
against double jeopardy.” [Emphasis Supplied]
Stated differently, although the dismissal order

consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to
appeal, it is still reviewable but only by certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such a case, the factual

findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing
court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the
order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear
showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus,
rendering the assailed judgment void.15
Petitioner attempts to justify its position by relying on
our pronouncement in People v. Villalon,16 which reads:
“As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case

after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid
information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the complaint or information. However, an
appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the
_______________
15 Dayap v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 134.
16 192 SCRA 521, recited in Petitioner’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 424.
159
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 159

evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be

passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should
the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (emphasis
supplied)
A cursory reading of the above judicial pronouncement

readily betrays petitioner’s posture on the matter. The use
of the conjunctive word “and” which even originally17
appeared italicized suggests the concurrence of those three
requisites to prevent double jeopardy from attaching.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the
one at bench, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its
case.” As such, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a

dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.”18 Judicial action on a motion to
dismiss or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. Accordingly, unless the
Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, its decision to grant or deny the
demurrer may not be disturbed.19
Not surprisingly, petitioner has not attributed any
commission of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Sandiganbayan in issuing the questioned resolution, on the
mistaken assumption that it can assail the resolution on
purely legal questions. As explained above, it cannot do so.
A judgment of acquittal cannot be reopened or appealed
because of the doc-
_______________
17 People v. Villalon, supra, which cited the case of People v. City Court
of Manila, 154 SCRA 175 (1987), merely reiterated People v. Desalisa, 125
Phil. 27 (1966), where the Supreme Court at the time admittedly made
“certain loose statements” on the subject of double jeopardy.
18 Dayap v. Sendiong, G.R. 177960, January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 134.
19 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 137707-11, December 17, 2004,
477 SCRA 291.
160

trine that nobody can be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Granting arguendo that petitioner’s recourse under Rule
45 was proper, nevertheless, petitioner failed to raise pure
questions of law. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented. There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on certain state of facts.20
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the determination of
whether the established facts fall squarely within the
provisions of the law, that is, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
would require us to reassess and reexamine the evidence,
and essentially to supplant the lower courts’ finding. This
is beyond the province of Rule 45. Judicial review under
Rule 45 does not envisage a re-evaluation of the sufficiency
of the evidence upon which respondent court’s action was
predicated. It bears reiterating that a judgment of

acquittal, “even if seemingly erroneous,” is the final
verdict.21
Similarly, the second issue posed by petitioner is a
question of fact disguised as a question of law. An
affirmative ruling thereon would also require us to review
the factual bases of the ruling of the CA in the
administrative case. In fact, as noted by respondent court,
the same issue of legality or validity of the subject
contracts had already been passed upon by the CA, and the
Ombudsman did not even attempt to question the CA
ruling, which could only mean its adherence thereto.
Petitioner would also make much of the principle in law
that the dismissal of the administrative case does not
necessarily prevent a criminal prosecution from proceeding.
Indeed, the dismissal of an administrative case does not
bar the
_______________
20 Oscar M. Herrera, 2000 ed., p. 648, citing Moran, Comments on the

Rules of Court, 1979 ed.
21 People v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
161
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 161

filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar

acts subject of the administrative complaint. Neither does
the disposition in one case inevitably govern the resolution
of the other case/s and vice versa. Administrative liability is
one thing; criminal liability for the same act is another.22
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding
from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and,
correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions
imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may
offend against two or more distinct and related provisions
of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as
well as administrative liability.23
Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be
pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily
on the ground that the quantum of proof required to
sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than
that necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold
true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal
of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the

criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in
the administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal case. The
prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing
additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof
required in the criminal cases.24 However, if the criminal
case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and
evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court
trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of
facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of
the criminal indictment,25 then to still burden the accused
to pre-
_______________
22 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996, 252

SCRA 641.
23 Paredes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528
SCRA 577.
24 Id.
25 Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008,
544 SCRA 324.
162

sent controverting evidence despite the failure of the

prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence,
will be a futile and useless exercise.
Petitioner’s claim that the respondent court should not
have adopted the Court of Appeal’s findings and instead
made its own separate finding on the matter deserves scant
consideration.
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Nachura, Brion** and Abad, JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—It is settled that when the accused appeals

from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his right to
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to review by the appellate

court. (People vs. Caraang, 418 SCRA 321 [2003])
A duplicitous information is a valid indictment—such a
defect may be waived and the accused, because of such
waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those
charged in the information and proved during trial.
(Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 121 [2004])
The dismissal by the Court of the administrative case
against the accused based on the same subject matter and
after examining the same crucial evidence operates to
dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding
that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
(Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan, 533 SCRA 205 [2007])
——o0o——
_______________
** Designated as additional member vice Associate Justice Diosdado M.

Peralta, per raffle of December 9, 2009.
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6/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 623

G.R. No. 164577. July 5, 2010.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

Double Jeopardy; Appeals; The rule barring an appeal from a

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)

to an acquittal of the accused.”—The demurrer to evidence in

sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 149

People vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)

useless exercise.—Although the dismissal of the criminal case

PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

“That between November 15, 1996 to May 7, 1998 or some time

1 Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a member of this

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 151

President/Presidents and Chief Executive Officers of the Bases

Before the arraignment, the accused filed a Motion for

4 Said recommendation was endorsed for approval by Prosecution

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Upon arraignment, the three (3) respondents pleaded

5 “Sec. 4. Bidding.—Construction projects shall generally be

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 153

prosecution failed to prove that the questioned contracts

on the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On April 15, 2004, Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9

evidence. On the exoneration in the administrative case,

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court is

In making such a turnaround, the Sandiganbayan took

9 Rollo, pp. 49-53.

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 155

be no sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that there

The Sandiganbayan further stated that the prosecution

I. WHETHER THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENTS IN

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In their respective comments on the petition, the

the evidence already adduced before the Sandiganbayan.

10 Petitioner’s Reply, p. 4, citing People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 157

outright. In People v. Laguio,14 the same procedural

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

able, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal

Stated differently, although the dismissal order

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such a case, the factual

“As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 159

evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be

A cursory reading of the above judicial pronouncement

conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

predicated. It bears reiterating that a judgment of

20 Oscar M. Herrera, 2000 ed., p. 648, citing Moran, Comments on the

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 161

filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar

of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the

22 Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996, 252