THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128986. June 21, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Padilla and Padilla for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the Solicitor General

assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused, herein
private respondent, who was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of the
crimes of Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. The Court of Appeals accepted
the claim of self-defense of the accused which was rejected by the trial court. It
found that accused who earlier tried to pacify the fight between Frederick
Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling, his younger brother, was followed outside by
Frederick, took a shotgun from his vehicle and shot accused on the hip; that the
accused already wounded retaliated after being hit by Frederick who despite
being hit continued aiming the shotgun at accused who decided to fire the fatal
shot. That accused also shot Villaremo, a companion of Frederick, when the
latter took possession of shotgun from the wounded Frederick and aimed at the
accused. The Solicitor General questioned the review by the appellate court of
the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses despite its not having
been raised as an issue in the appeal brief and its misappreciation and wrongful
assessment of factual evidence.
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court
through an appeal or a petition for review. However, the State, on the principle
of double jeopardy, is prohibited from appealing or filing a petition for review of
a judgment of acquittal based on the merits of the case.
A review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. Stated otherwise, factual matters cannot normally be
inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding.
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not
necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review
and that the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may
be found in the appealed judgment. There was no denial of due process in
respondent court's decision to review the entire case. It did not entertain new
evidence. Petitioner was not deprived of any opportunity to rebut any evidence
on record.
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 SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; DOUBLE

JEOPARDY; ELEMENTS. — Double jeopardy is present if the following elements
concur: (1) the accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the
court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded;
and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their
express consent.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GROUNDS. — To

question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show
that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE USED TO CORRECT FACTUAL FINDINGS. — It
has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to
a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A
writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors
of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors
of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions
of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged
errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than errors of judgment, which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
special civil action for certiorari.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; WILL NOT ATTACH WHERE STATE IS DEPRIVED OF FAIR
OPPORTUNITY TO PROSECUTE. — A denial of due process likewise results in a
loss or lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where
the state is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or
where the dismissal of an information or a complaint is purely capricious or
devoid of reason, for when there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be
heard.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; REVIEW OF
FACTS AND EVIDENCE, BEYOND AMBIT OF APPEAL. — It is quite obvious from
the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to
Respondent Court because of the latter's supposed misappreciation and
wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the
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 present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental
aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem — beyond the ambit
of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by
the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go
over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them
again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the
other. caADIC

6. ID.; ACTIONS; ERRONEOUS DECISION DOES NOT NECESSARILY DEPRIVE

COURT OF JURISDICTION. — The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a
case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo
that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the
decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; THROWS WHOLE CASE WIDE OPEN
FOR REVIEW. — Basic is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case wide open for review; and that the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment. The
appeals court may even reverse the trial court's decision on the basis of
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. We, therefore, find
no denial of due process in Respondent Court's decision to review the entire
case. Significantly, it did not entertain new evidence. Moreover, petitioner was
not deprived of any opportunity to rebut any evidence on record.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

The rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of

acquittal. If said judgment is assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as in the present case, the petitioner must prove that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible error,
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A
judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is
void, does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of
an acquittal. However, where the petition demonstrates mere errors in
judgment not amounting to grave abuse of discretion or deprivation of due
process, the writ of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the alleged errors of
judgment cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused
against double jeopardy. Cdpr

The Case
Through the solicitor general, Petitioner People of the Philippines brings
before this Court a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the 65-page March 24, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of
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 Appeals (CA). 2 Petitioner prays that the Decision be annulled and the case
remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 5, so
that the latter can effect the entry of its judgment 3 convicting herein
Respondent Casan Maquiling of homicide and serious physical injuries.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Norte, Branch 5 dated September 25, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE
and a new order is hereby issued ACQUITTING the accused of the
crimes charged.

xxx xxx xxx

"Costs de officio." 4

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of homicide for killing the deceased Frederick Pacasum, and of serious
physical injuries for having physically injured Oligario Villarimo.

"For killing Frederick Pacasum, there being no aggravating or

mitigating circumstances attendant, accused is condemned to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of [n]ine (9) years of prision mayor to [fifteen
(15) years reclusion temporal, and pay the civil liability herein above-
awarded, including the cost of the suit.
"For the physical injuries of Oligario Villarimo, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance attendant too, accused is
condemned to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months ar[r]esto
mayor.
"The period of detention that accused underwent during the
pendency of trial shall be credited in full, in the service of his
sentence." 5

The Facts
Both the prosecution's and the defense's versions of the incident that
gave rise to this controversy were adequately summarized by the appellate
court as follows:
"The prosecution's witnesses insisted that it was Ramil Maquiling
who first boxed the deceased Frederick Pacasum who was compelled to
box back. That the appellant, elder brother of Ramil, appeared from
nowhere and boxed the deceased. Thereafter the accused and his
brother (Ramil) ran out of the disco but when the deceased and his
companions followed outside, Ramil Maquiling and his companions
were waiting and another fist fight ensued.

"While the commotion was going on, appellant went to his parked
Isuzu Trooper and got his .45 caliber pistol. Appellant then approached
the deceased. Before he could reach him, Audie Pacasum who was with
the group of the deceased, tried to prevent appellant from using his
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 gun. Appellant then fired a warning shot causing the people around to
scamper for safety. The deceased turned his back to see what was
going on. At that moment, appellant shot the deceased twice on the
left thigh. The deceased fell on the ground lying on his back with his
hands clutching his left thigh. Appellant then approached the deceased
and fired another shot hitting the deceased on the chest. Jojo Villarimo
was himself shot in the leg. As a consequence of the gunshot wounds,
Frederick Pacasum died while Jojo Villarimo suffered gunshot wounds
on his upper right leg which required medical attendance for six (6)
months.
"The accused and his witnesses on the other hand, maintained
that while the accused was entertaining his guests at the Spectrum
Disco located in the basement of Iligan Village Hotel, he saw
Frederic[k] Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling, his younger brother,
pointing at each other, then Frederick boxed Ramil who was hit on the
face and fell on the floor. As he approached Ramil and Frederick, he
saw Frederick hit Ramil on his head with a bottle as the latter was
attempting to stand up causing him to fall anew on the floor. He also
saw Frederick kick Ramil in several parts of his body. Hence, he
attempted to intervene to stop Frederick from mauling Ramil. Instead,
Frederick boxed appellant on the side of the cheek below his right eye.
Appellant wanted to retaliate by boxing Frederick but could not do so
because of Raden Pacasum and Jojo Villarimo who were standing
beside Frederick and who were much larger and bigger than appellant.
The accused then opted to back out and left the disco. He then noticed
the deceased Frederick and Raden Pacasum and Jojo Villarimo
following him outside. He proceeded to his Isuzu Trooper which was
parked about 12 meters from the entrance of the disco. As he was
about to open the door of his vehicle, he looked back and saw Frederick
coming from his vehicle and holding a shotgun. He then opened his
trooper vehicle and got his .45 caliber pistol. Frederic[k] approached
appellant holding the shotgun at hip level with the barrel pointed at the
appellant. Appellant then fired two (2) warning shots to the air to deter
the deceased from coming any closer. He then heard Raden Pacasum
shout: ' Barilin mo na.' Frederick fired the shotgun hitting the accused in
the hip. The accused fell to the ground with his elbow and knees, his
right hand still holding the pistol. He tried to stand up but could not. In
a kneeling position with his right foot extended backward, he aimed at
Frederick and shot him twice in the hip. His intention was not to kill but
to disarm. But Frederick would not release the shotgun and instead
prepared to aim the same at the accused. Left with no choice, the
accused shot Frederick on the chest. Then Jojo Villarimo ran towards
Frederick and picked up the shotgun. The accused then aimed at his
leg to disarm him.
"After shooting Jojo Villarimo, appellant examined his pistol and
finding the same to be empty, released the pistol's slide. He attempted
to stand up but could not and just crawled to his trooper. Raden
Pacasum then went near him and grabbed the pistol from his hand[,]
pointed same at him and squeezed the trigger but the gun did not fire
as it had no more bullets. Raden Pacasum then went away taking with
him the pistol. The accused was thereafter loaded into a [T]amaraw
vehicle which brought him to the Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital
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 where he was treated." 6

On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent
Casan Maquiling with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition
of the private complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed
the upgrading of the charge of homicide to murder. The Amended Information
reads: 7
"That on or about June 3, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a deadly weapon, to wit[,] a cal. 45 pistol, by means of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
shoot and wound one Frederick Pacasum, thereby inflicting upon him
the following physical injuries, to wit: dctai

— gunshot wounds
— hemorrhage shock
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength."

To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by Counsel de Parte

Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5,
1999. 8 Trial ensued. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting
private respondent of homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellate Court's Ruling
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of
self-defense and ruled:
". . . The witnesses have uniformly testified that a fight ensued
between the deceased Frederick Pacasum and Ramil Maquiling in the
course of which Frederick boxed Ramil causing him to fall on the floor.
When the accused-appellant tried to pacify and stop Frederick from
inflicting further harm on his brother, he was instead boxed on the
right cheek by Frederick. And while he wanted to retaliate he could not
do so because of the superiority in numbers and in strength of
Frederick and his companions who were not only more in [number] but
likewise taller and bigger. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco
but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun [i]n hand. The
deceased Frederick not only aimed the shotgun [at] him but actually
fired at the accused. And the accused shot at the deceased only after
he was himself injured by the deceased who fired a shotgun at him. He
likewise shot at Olegario 'Jojo' Villaremo to disarm him as he likewise
took possession of the shotgun.
"There was reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent
and[/]or repel the unlawful aggression. The accused fired a warning
shot to deter the deceased from attacking and even after he was
himself hit by the shotgun. He had fired first at the left thigh of the
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 deceased, as his intention was merely to disarm Frederick, not to kill
him. But when the appellant perceived that Frederick was still aiming
the shotgun [at] him, . . . he decided to fire the fatal shot.
"There was likewise lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. It was the deceased Frederick, with a
shotgun [i]n hand, [who] approached the accused who was then about
to open his Isuzu trooper. When accused looked back, he saw Frederick
coming with a shotgun. Accused then opened his trooper and got his
.45 caliber pistol. The deceased also disregarded the warning shots
fired by the accused and was the first to shoot at the accused." 9

The appellate court also noted various "flaws and inconsistencies" in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in effect strengthening the version
set forth by the accused. It held:
"To the mind of the court, the discrepancies as to the manner the
accused killed the deceased are material.
"Major and evident discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses
on various aspects, cannot but raise well founded and overriding
doubts on their credibility. (. . .) Irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution cast doubt on the guilt
of the accused and such contradictory statements will not sustain a
judgment of conviction (. . .)." 10

Through this special civil action for certiorari before us, the solicitor
general now seeks 11 to set aside Respondent Court's Decision, for having been
allegedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Assignment of Errors
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General raises a single
issue:
"Whether or not the Assailed Decision, dated 24 March 1997, of
respondent court is void ab initio, for having been rendered in denial of
due process and with grave abuse of discretion." 12

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Preliminary Matter:
Procedural Remedies
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court
in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this
tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed
reversible errors 13 or, in other words, mistakes in judgment. 14 A direct review
by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the state from appealing
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 or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the
merits of the case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court reads:
"SECTION 2. Who may appeal. — Any party may appeal from a
final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby
in double jeopardy."

This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating that "no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. . . " 15 It is rooted in the
early case U.S. v. Kepner , 16 in which the United States Supreme Court,
reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision, declared that an appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in double
jeopardy. 17
Double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1) the
accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an information sufficient
in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction;
(3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their express consent.
18

In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence of the
first, third and fourth elements. Petitioner, however, questions the presence of
the second element and submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted
of its jurisdiction, because it denied the petitioner due process and because it
committed grave abuse of discretion.

To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must
clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 19 Grave abuse
of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 20
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be
attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. 21 A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a
remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctable by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 22
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. 23 As
long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment,
which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for
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 certiorari. 24
A denial of due process likewise results in loss or lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, 25 or where the dismissal of an
information or a complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason, 26 or when
there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be heard. 27

First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that
Respondent Court of Appeals committed manifest bias and partiality in
rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent Court ignored and
discarded "uncontroverted physical evidence" which the trial judge had relied
upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had "base[d] his
decision on the testimony of witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally
witness." In addition, it supposedly harped on insignificant inconsistencies in
the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly
accepting the private respondent's claim of self-defense. dctai

Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed
to discuss the effect of Maquiling's escape from confinement during the
pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of proof on the prosecution to
prove Maquiling's guilt, although he had admitted killing the victim in self-
defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence — particularly the downward
trajectory of the bullets that had hit the two victims, thereby showing that
private respondent was still standing when he shot them; and the shotgun
wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and rendered him
incapable of shooting the victims.
It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed
grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Court because of the latter's supposed
misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as
earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not
the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem
— beyond the ambit of appeal. 28 Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot
normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. This
Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and
analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of
evidence of one party or the other. 29
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not
necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court
commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision,
considering that it has jurisdiction over the case. 30
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
shows no patent or gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither
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 does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising from passion or
hostility. In concluding that private respondent acted in self-defense, the Court
of Appeals found that the three requisites thereof were present, viz.:
"This Court is convinced that the accused acted in self-defense.
There was unlawful aggression. The witnesses have uniformly testified
that a fight ensued between the deceased Frederick Pacasum and
Ramil Maquiling in the course of which Frederick boxed Ramil causing
him to fall on the floor. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify and
stop Frederick from inflicting further harm on his brother, he was
boxed on the right cheek by Frederick. And while he wanted to retaliate
he could not do so because of the superiority in number and in
strength of Frederick and his companions who were not only more in
number but likewise taller and bigger. Hence accused had opted to
leave the disco but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun
[i]n hand. The deceased Frederick not only aimed the shotgun [at] him
but actually fired at the accused. And the accused shot at the
deceased only after he was himself injured by the deceased who fired
a shotgun at him. He likewise shot at Olegario 'Jojo' Villaremo to disarm
him as he likewise took possession of the shotgun.

"There was reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent

and[/]or repel the unlawful aggression. The accused fired a warning
shot to deter the deceased from attacking and even after he was
himself hit by the shotgun. He had fired first at the left thigh of the
deceased as his intention was merely to disarm Frederick[,] not to kill
him. But when the appellant perceived that Frederick was still aiming
the shotgun [at] him, . . . he decided to fire the fatal shot.
"There was likewise lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. It was the deceased Frederick with a
shotgun [i]n hand [who] approached the accused who was then about
to open his Isuzu trooper. When [the] accused looked back, he saw
Frederick coming with a shotgun. Accused then opened his trooper and
got his .45 caliber pistol. The deceased also disregarded the warning
shots fired by the accused and was the first to shoot at the accused."
31

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the appellate court based its
findings of self-defense on the strength of private respondent's evidence, not
on the weakness or inconsistencies of the prosecution's own.
Regarding the physical evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the
gunshot wound sustained by the accused was the best evidence that there was
an exchange of gunfire. Since the prosecution witnesses were silent on how it
occurred, Respondent Court was indeed left with only the defense version to
evaluate. Explaining the downward trajectory of the bullets that hit the victim's
thigh, private respondent stated that he was able to shoot in a kneeling
position by using his elbows and his left knee to prop himself up. This fact,
together with various inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, cast doubt on their credibility and led the appellate court to believe
that Casan Maquiling did act in self-defense; hence, his acquittal. cdll

Second Issue:
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 Denial of Due Process
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution was denied due process when
Respondent Court reviewed the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, despite its not having been raised as an issue in the appeal brief. 32

Such argument is untenable. Basic is the rule that an appeal in a criminal

case throws the whole case wide open for review; and that the appellate court
can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment. 33 The appeals court may even reverse the trial court's decision on
the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 34 We,
therefore, find no denial of due process in Respondent Court's decision to
review the entire case. Significantly, it did not entertain new evidence.
Moreover, petitioner was not deprived of any opportunity to rebut any evidence
on record.
Epilogue
We commend the solicitor general for his vigilance in questioning the
acquittal of private respondent. We appreciate the tenacity of his arguments
and his effort to protect the rights of the People and the State. However, the
present Constitution bars an appeal or a review of an acquittal based upon
mere errors of judgment of a lower court.
W h i l e certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the
petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the
lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of
its very power to dispense justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless
of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated.
Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an
appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.

In dismissing this petition for certiorari, this Court is not ruling on the guilt
or the innocence of Private Respondent Maquiling. Neither is it agreeing with
the findings of the Court of Appeals that the accused is innocent. Such
conclusions are rendered only in an appeal property brought before this Court.
But as already stated, an appeal or a petition for review of a judgment of
acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy.

In short, by rejecting this petition, the Court is merely ruling that the
petitioner failed to show (1) that the Court of Appeals has committed grave
abuse of discretion to such extent as to deprive it of the power to decide the
case, or (2) that it denied due process of law to the People of the Philippines to
such extent as to annul the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for its failure to clearly
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. No costs. LLjur

SO ORDERED.

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 Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Romero, J.,is abroad on official business.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 40-103.

2. Eighth Division, composed of J. Corona Ibay-Somera, ponente; and concurring, J.

Jaime M. Lantin, chairman; and J. Salvador J. Valdez Jr., member.
3. Rollo , pp. 104-143. The RTC Decision was written by Judge Maximino Magno-
Libre.

4. CA Decision, p. 64; rollo, p. 102.

5. RTC Decision, p. 41; rollo, p. 143.

6. CA Decision, pp. 23-27; rollo, pp. 61-65.

7. Records, Vol. I, p. 51.

8. Ibid., p. 60.

9. CA Decision, pp. 59-61; rollo, pp. 97-99.

10. Ibid., pp. 39 and 77. (Citations omitted)

11. This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of
private respondent's Memorandum on March 13, 1998.
12. Rollo , p. 273.

13. Remman Enterprises, Inc . v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 688, February 26,
1997; Engineering and Machinery Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 156,
January 24, 1996; Tañedo v . Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80, January 22,
1996.
14. Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617, October 28, 1996.

15. §21, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

16. 11 Phil 669 (1904); 195 US 100.

17. See also Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, 157 SCRA 518, 522 (1988).

18. People v . Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu ,
213 SCRA 138 (1992); Paulin v . Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386 (1993); Guerrero v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703, June 28, 1996.
19. Naguiat v. NLRC , 269 SCRA 564, March 13, 1997; Camlian v. Comelec, 271
SCRA 757, April 18, 1997; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC , 276 SCRA 391,
July 28, 1997; PMI Colleges v. NLRC , 277 SCRA 462, 1997; Caltex Refinery
Employees Association v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218, September 16, 1997;
Building Care Corp. v. NLRC , 268 SCRA 666, February 26, 1997; Pure Blue
Industries, Inc v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 259, April 16, 1997; Tañada v. Angara, 272
SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; National Federation of Labor v.NLRC, 283 SCRA 275,
December 15, 1997; Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc . v. NLRC, 261 SCRA
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 757, September 16, 1996.
20. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209,
June 4, 1996, per Kapunan, J.; quoted in Santiago v. Guingona Jr., GR No.
134577, November 18, 1998. See also Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518, July
31, 1997; Republic v. Villarama Jr., 278 SCRA 736, September 5, 1997.
21. Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc . v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,
273 SCRA 10, June 2, 1997.

22. Medina v. City Sheriff Manila, 276 SCRA 133, July 24, 1997; Jamer v. NLRC , 278
SCRA 632, September 5, 1997; Azores v. Securities and Exchange
Commission , 252 SCRA 387, January 25, 1996.
23. Chua v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 546, April 18, 1997; Santiago Land
Development Co. v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 535, July 9, 1996.
24. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, June 4,
1996.
25. People v . Bocar, supra; Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, supra ; Paulin v .
Gimenez, supra.
26. People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA 293 (1967); Aquino v. Sison, 179 SCRA 648 (1989).
27. Portugal v. Reantaso, 167 SCRA 712 (1988).

28. ComSavings Bank v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 307, June 14, 1996.
29. Alicbusan v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336, March 7, 1997.

30. People v . Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 56, December 8, 1994. See also Central Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 49, March 8, 1989; PurefoodsCorporation v.
NLRC, 171 SCRA 415, March 21, 1989 and M & M Management Aids, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 225, June 29, 1984.
31. Assailed Decision, pp. 59-61; rollo, pp. 97-99.

32. Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 24-25; rollo, pp. 276-277.

33. People v . Reyes , GR No. 91262, January 28, 1998; Obosa v. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 281, January 16, 1997; Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332,
February 17, 1997; People v. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386, September 4, 1997.

34. Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181, November 14,
1996.

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