gkgn0600 Iss 1 PDF

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Uncontrolled When Printed Railway Group Guidance Note

GK/GN0600
Issue One
Date April 1999
Signalling and
Operational
Telecommunications
Design: Technical
Guidance
Synopsis
Guidance on the technical details to
enable the design of railway signalling
systems to meet the requirements of
GK/RT0206
Submitted by
This document is the property of
Railtrack PLC. It shall not be
Signatures removed from electronic version reproduced in whole or in part without
the written permission of the Controller,
Nick Howland
Railway Group Standards,
Standards Project Manager
Railtrack PLC.
Authorised by Published by
Safety & Standards Directorate,
Railtrack PLC,
Floor DP01, Railtrack House,
Euston Square,
London NW1 2EE
Richard Spoors
Controller, Railway Group Standards © Copyright 1999 Railtrack PLC
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Railway Group Guidance Note
Signalling and Operational
GK/GN0600
Telecommunications Design: Issue One
Technical Guidance Date April 1999
Page A1 of 4
Contents
Section Description Page
Part A
Issue record A4
Distribution A4
Health and Safety Responsibilities A4
Supply A4
Part B
1 Purpose B1
2 Scope B1
3 Definitions B1
4 Use of this Guidance Note B27
5 Signalling System B28
6 Alterations to Existing Installations B28
Appendix B1 Conflicting Standards B29
Appendix B2 Safety Hazards Requiring Retrospective Work B31
Appendix B3 Temporary Work B35
Part C not used
Part D Electrical Circuits

1 Introduction D1
2 Design Principles D1
3 Circuit Design for Occupational Safety D5
4 Circuits (General) D9
5 Circuit Conductors D13
6 Circuit Components D13
7 Relay Logic Circuit Techniques D18
8 Time Delays D20
9 Proving D24
10 Repeat Relays D30
Appendix D1 Fusing and Looping of Signalling Circuits D34
Appendix D2 Electromagnetic Compatibility of Electronic Equipment D36
Part E not used
Part F Interlockings
1 Introduction F1
2 Design Principles F2
3 Interlocking Requirements F7
4 Application to Mechanical Signalling Systems F92
5 Application to Electro-Mechanical Signalling Systems F96
6 Application to All-Electric Non-Route Setting Interlocking Systems F102
7 Application to Route Setting Interlocking Systems F106
8 Hybrid Systems F111
Appendix F1 Lever Frame Interlocking Guidelines F113
Appendix F2 Free-Wired Relay Route Setting Interlocking Guidelines F145
Appendix F3 Geographical Relay Interlocking Guidelines F165
Appendix F4 Electronic Interlocking Guidelines F183
Appendix F5 Layout and Control Tables to Illustrate Examples F197
Part G not used
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Issue One Telecommunications Design:
Date April 1999 Technical Guidance
Page A2 of 4
Part H not used
Part I not used
Part J Transmission Systems (including Cables, Terminations and Cable Routes)

1 Introduction J1
2 Design Principles J2
3 Requirements J3
4 Application J6
5 Railway Signalling Cable J9
6 Terminations J11
7 Cable Routes J14
8 Special Arrangements J14
9 Earthing and Equipotential Bonding Conductors J15
Appendix J1 Typical Loop Resistance and Current Carrying Capacities J17
Part K not used
Part L not used
Part M not used
Part N not used
Part O not used
Part P Points
1 Introduction P1
2 Design Principles P1
3 Point Operation P4
4 Point Detection P8
5 Point Switch Heaters P11
Appendix P1 Supplementary Mechanical Information for Point Fittings P12
Appendix P2 Relay Circuits for Points P15
Appendix P3 SSI Application for Points P16
Part Q not used
Part R not used
Part S Signals
1 Introduction S1
2 Design Principles S1
3 Main Signals S1
4 Permissive or Shunting Signals S1
5 Junction Signals and Route Indicators S1
6 Miscellaneous Indicators S1
7 Electrical Requirements S2
8 Signal and Lamp Proving S5
9 Signal Post Replacement Switch S11
10 Signal Structures and Physical Arrangements S11
11 Supplementary Train Interactive Systems S11
12 Speed Restrictions S11
13 Positioning of Running Signals S11
Appendix S1 Supplementary Information for Semaphore Signals S12
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Appendix S2 Relay Circuits for Signals S13

Appendix S3 SSI Application for Signals S18
Part T not used
Part U not used
Part V not used
Part W not used
Part X not used
Part Y not used
References Ref1
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Part A
Issue Record
This Guidance Note will be updated when necessary by distribution of a
replacement Part A and such other parts as are amended.
Amended or additional parts of revised pages will be marked by a vertical black

line in the adjacent margin.
Issue Date Comments
One April 1999 New Document superseding

GK/RC0706 & STDGs 017
and 021.
Health and Safety

Responsibilities
In issuing this Guidance Note, Railtrack PLC makes no warranties, express or
implied, that compliance with all or any Railway Group Standards and Approved
Codes of Practice is sufficient on its own to ensure safe systems of work or
operation. Each user is reminded of its own responsibilities to ensure health
and safety at work and its individual duties under health and safety legislation.
Supply
Controlled and uncontrolled copies of this Guidance Note may be obtained from
the Industry Safety Liaison Dept, Safety and Standards Directorate, Railtrack
PLC, Railtrack House DP01, Euston Square, London, NW1 2EE.
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Part B
1 Purpose
This Guidance Note, in support of GK/RT0206, gives guidance on meeting the
minimum technical requirements to ensure that the design of railway signalling
and operational telecommunications systems is safe and dependable.
2 Scope
This Guidance Note applies to all types of signalling and operational
telecommunications works and systems defined in GK/RT0206.
This Guidance Note covers both hardware and software, including software
development, software tools and data used in programmable signalling systems.
This Guidance Note does not cover the general duties of design authorities,
including:
• qualifications and competence requirements (see GM/RT2450 and

GK/RT0101);
• presentation and production processes for design details (see GK/RT0201);
• documentary requirements for the different types of design detail drawing
and their inter-relationship (see GK/RT0201).
Reference to particular items of equipment in this Guidance Note does not imply
product acceptance or type approval.
3 Definitions
In the remainder of this Guidance Note, the term “signalling”
includes operational telecommunications.
A glossary of general signalling terms is given in GK/RT0002. Those terms are

not repeated here except where they have been given a more technical
definition for use within this Guidance Note.
Safety terms are defined in GH/ZC0002.
Symbols to be used on plans and sketches are defined in GK/RT0004, on

signaller’s display systems in GK/RT0025 and on circuit diagrams in GK/RT0205.
In the definitions that follow, a word or group of words in bold type refers to
another entry providing further information. Any reference to source indicates
that the definition has been taken from an external document.
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TERM DEFINITION
930 Series (relay) A miniature plug-in relay in one of the following styles (see GK/RT0330 and
GK/GN0630):
930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 945,
946, 947, 949, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 966 (all variants) or 968.
A.C. Electrified Area An Electrified area equipped for a.c. electric traction; including a buffer zone,
where the track circuit equipment is immunised against the a.c. traction
frequency, extending generally for at least 3000m along any lines equipped
solely for d.c. traction.
A.C. Immune Relay A d.c. relay which is immune to operation by a.c. of specified voltage and
frequency.
Abnormal (conditions) Extreme loading on a part of the railway system (e.g. as a result of extended
delays on one part of the service impinging on another). [source: RSPG]
Acceptable (risk) Associated with a risk that is either:
• Tolerable AND as low as reasonably practicable; or

• Negligible
as defined in Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case.
Acceptance (product or The status given by Railtrack before use is permitted.

engineering details)
Accident Unplanned, uncontrolled event giving rise to death, injury, ill-health, damage or
other loss.
Anti-Preselection The prevention of Preselection of a Signalling Function, thus maintaining the

protection of the Signalling System should a wrong side failure occur.
Apparatus A product with an intrinsic function intended for the end-user and supplied or
taken into service as a single commercial unit. [source: EMC Regs - modified]
Apparatus Case An Apparatus Housing which is intended for unprotected outdoor use, is
smaller than a building or REB and is usually capable of being transported as a
made-up unit. It is usually of metallic construction. The wooden equivalent is
commonly known as an Apparatus Cupboard.
Apparatus Cupboard An Apparatus Housing which is intended for unprotected outdoor use, is
smaller than a building or REB and is usually capable of being transported as a
made-up unit. It is usually of wooden construction. The metal equivalent is
commonly known as an Apparatus Case.
Apparatus Housing This is provided to house relays and/or other equipment at lineside Locations or
Interlockings, and may consist of an apparatus case, Apparatus Cupboard,
Disconnection Box, equipment room, REB, signal box, control centre, or other
equipment building.
Application Criteria Document(s) specifying the constraints applied to the installation and
maintenance of a system or an item of equipment in order that it can be
guaranteed to deliver the performance attributes stated in the system or
equipment specification.
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TERM DEFINITION
Apportionment A process whereby the dependability elements for a system are sub-divided
between various items which comprise the system to provide individual targets.
[source pr EN50126]
Approval The status given by the requisite authority when the product or works complies
in all respects with the specification and addresses all identified risks.
Approval In Principal The status given to a signalling scheme when the Scheme Plan is approved.
Approved For Construction The status given to engineering details by the Responsible Design Engineer
following Acceptance by Railtrack.
Assessment The undertaking of an investigation in order to arrive at a judgement, based on

evidence, of the suitability of a product, competence of a person or acceptability
of a risk. [source: pr EN50126 expanded]
Authorisation The formal permission to use a product within specified application constraints.
[source: pr EN50126]
Automatic Function A Signalling Function that, under ordinary operation, is operated automatically
by the passage of trains and is not interlocked with any other Signalling
Function. The function is generally associated with a particular signal box from
which its operation is supervised, unless some form of local monitoring is
provided.
The state of the function when there are no trains present is designated normal.
Auxiliary (optical system) Duplicate lamp or filament on hot or cold stand-by.
Availability The probability that a system will be able to perform its required functions under
given conditions at a stated instant of time or over a given time interval,
assuming the required external resources are provided. [source ENV50129]
Available The state of an item when it is capable of performing its required functions in the
defined condition of use. [source: BS 4778]
Back (B) Contact A contact of a relay which is made when the relay is released and broken when
it is operated.
Back Feed An inadvertent feed which has arisen at an intermediate point within a circuit
due to the uncontrolled combination of positions of several pieces of control
equipment.
Basic Event See Fundamental Cause.
Bearer An item of steel or concrete of non–standard dimensions used to support the

track in Switch And Crossing (S & C) areas. (See also Sleeper and Timber.)
Biased Relay A d.c. relay which only operates when a d.c. supply of the correct polarity and
voltage is applied to the coil.
Otherwise referred to as a 2-position polarised relay.
Bonding Plan A detailed plan of the track layout showing individual rails and position of IRJs,
together with track circuit feed and relay connections with polarities, cross
Bonds, Structure Bonds, Impedance Bonds, etc., as applicable. This term
may also include track plans and negative bonding plans in D.C. Electrified
Areas.
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TERM DEFINITION
Cab Secure Radio (CSR) A form of radio telephone system provided as an alternative to a signal post
telephone system. Facilities include secrecy of call under normal operations,
emergency override calls and system wide broadcasts.
Cable Core Plan A plan showing the allocation of Signalling Functions or systems to specific
cores in multicore and data link cables.
Cable Route Plan A layout plan showing the position of principal cable routes relative to signal
boxes or Interlockings and Locations.
This plan is generally combined with the Location Area Plan.
Cable Schematic Plan A plan showing all signalling and power distribution cables required, together
with sizes, to be installed between signal boxes or Interlockings and
Locations.
Catch Point A point (switch and tiebar only), on running line gradients to de–rail wagons etc.,
running away in the wrong direction.
Central Processing Unit (CPU) The central part of an electronic system or sub-system that manipulates data. It
receives inputs from various interfaces, processes them in accordance with the
control program and geographical data in the memory and returns the resulting
outputs to the interfaces.
Certificate Of Completion Advice that works are ready for inspection.
Certificate Of Compliance A statement of conformity to requirements and standards.
Certificate Of Conformity (plant A statement of compliance with Type Approval.

or equipment)
Change Control See Configuration Control.
Change-Over Contact See Dependent Contact.
Check Rail See figure under Switches And Crossing.
Circuit Controller A circuit switching device containing a number of contact bands, each of which
may be individually cut to length and adjusted to make and break separate
circuits at appropriate points in the cycle. The bands are operated by a
mechanical device, such as a lever or signal.
Circuit Diagrams A collection of individual drawings showing the equipment layout and circuit
arrangement associated with a location, an interlocking or signal box.
Class I Equipment Electrical equipment that requires the connection of the Exposed-Conductive-
Parts to a Protective Conductor connected to earth, to ensure personal
safety. See also BS7671.
Class II Equipment Electrical equipment with double or reinforced insulation, either to prevent
contact with Exposed-Conductive-Parts, or to ensure no contact between
such parts and live parts. The insulation is not therefore to be pierced by
screws. Such equipment is never connected to earth. See also BS7671.
Closure Panel (track) See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Closure Rail See figure under Switches And Crossings.
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TERM DEFINITION
Common Cause Failure (CCF) A failure which is the result of an event(s) which, because of dependencies,
causes a coincidence of failure states of components in two or more separate
channels of a redundancy system, leading to the defined system failing to
perform its intended function. [source: IEC 61508]
Common RAIL The rail of a single rail track circuit that is electrically common to one or more
adjacent track circuits or forms the traction return path where an isolated single
rail track circuit is provided.
In non-electrified areas the common rail is bonded with track circuit bonding. In
electrified areas the common rail is known as the traction return rail and carries
the traction return current. It is therefore bonded with traction return bonding.
Also referred to as single rail or traction rail.
Common Rail Bonding (CR) A track circuit arrangement where only one rail (the Insulated Rail) is used with
IRJs to separate the track circuits. The other rail (the Common Rail) is
electrically continuous but is not used for traction return purposes.
Competent Person A person who has the qualifications or certification, experience and ability
necessary to perform a particular task. (See GK/RT0101.)
Comprehensive Approach A form of approach locking on a signal, by which the approach locking is only
Locking effective when a train is approaching in order to afford maximum train operating
flexibility. It uses look-back circuitry or logic to ascertain the line occupancy
between a given signal at danger and the sighting point of the signal displaying
the first caution aspect for the signal under consideration.
Concentrator A facility to connect several telephone circuits to one terminal and thus avoid the
need for a telephone instrument for each circuit.
Configuration (system) The structuring and interconnection of the hardware and software of a system.
Construction The carrying out of any building, civil engineering or other engineering work,
particularly that which falls within the scope of the Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations 1994.
Also known as installation.
Contactor A relay with heavy duty contacts.
Continuity Bonding Fishplate bonding specifically provided for traction return purposes, i.e. on non-
track circuited lines in electrified areas, including non-electrified sidings, etc. Rail
to rail bonding is required and Cross Bonding may also be provided.
It is denoted by the addition of a 'c c c' symbol on the bonding plan.
Control Area The area of railway controlled or supervised by a particular signal box or control
centre, as defined by the Signalling Plan.
Also known as signal box control area.
Control Point A signal box (including control centre), gate box or ground frame (including
ground switch panel or shunting frame).
Controlled Function A Signalling Function that, under ordinary operation, is controlled from the
signal box (or other control point) to which the function is allocated and may be
interlocked with other Signalling Functions.
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TERM DEFINITION
Corrective Maintenance The maintenance carried out after fault recognition and intended to put a
product into a state in which it can perform a required function. [prEN50126]
Correlation The comparison of the configuration and version status of a system with the
design records to ensure that the two are in agreement.
Cross Bond A Jumper Cable cross connecting the Common Rails or centre points of
impedance bonds of parallel tracks to form a mesh of alternative paths, e.g. for
traction return current.
Crossing Angle See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Crossing Back See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Crossing Nose See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Cut-Section (location) Non-preferred term; see Repeater Location.
Cut-Section (track circuit) A method of reducing the continuous length of a track circuit by the use of
individual track circuits, each one controlling a common final track repeat relay,
or equivalent. These are indicated as one track circuit on the signaller’s panel.
This is also known as a multi-section track circuit.
Cut-Off Contact (Relay) A Front Contact of a Latched Relay, internally wired in series with the Release
Coil such that the coil cannot be energised unless the relay is in the Operated
position. Also known as economising contact.
D.C. Electrified Area An Electrified Area equipped for d.c. electric traction; including a buffer zone
where the track circuit equipment is immunised against the d.c. traction voltage,
extending generally for at least 3000m along any lines equipped solely for a.c.
traction. (The distance is subject to specialist assessment and verification.)
Data (signalling) Site specific geographical and control information in an electronic form, which
may be of a safety-critical nature or otherwise. In order to be used in an
electronic system or sub-system, data from master data files is usually
permanently stored in an EPROM (erasable programmable read only memory).
Data Collection Area The area of railway over which the train describer or IECC gathers information
about train movements. It extends beyond the Control Area of the signal box.
Data Link A Serial data transmission system.
In SSI systems, this refers to the link between the interlocking and the lineside
location and may take the form of a baseband unmodulated trackside data link
cable, or a long line link using standard telecommunications PCM equipment.
Internal data link cables are also provided between the modules in an SSI
cubicle and, where applicable, between modules in adjacent interlocking
cubicles.
De-Energised (relay) See Released.
Defect See Fault, Defect, Error, Failure, Mistake.
Degraded Conditions The state of the part of the railway system when it continues to operate in a
restricted manner due to the failure of one or more components.
[source: RSPG]
Demodulator See Modem.
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TERM DEFINITION
Dependability The ability of a product to perform one or several required functions under given
conditions. See also RAMS. [source: pr EN50126]
Dependent Contact A contact set which consists of a front contact, a back contact and one arm
shared between them, with not more than one contact path made at any one
time.
Also referred to as change-over contact.
Design A wide term including specification and the production of drawings, design
details and bills of quantity (including specification of systems or equipment).
[source: CDM Regulations - modified]
Disconnection Box An Apparatus Housing for unprotected outdoor use, which is intended to
contain mainly terminations and is commonly smaller than an Apparatus Case.
Disproved Wrong Side Failure A Failure which was reported as wrong side but where the Failure was
conclusively shown not to have occurred or to have been a Right Side Failure.
Diversity A means of achieving all or part of the specified requirements in more than one
independent and dissimilar manner. [source: ENV50129]
Double-Coil A.C. Vane Relay A double element relay with separate local and control (or track) coils which are
required to attain a particular phase relationship for the relay to operate.
Double-Cut (circuit) The inclusion of controls in both feed and return legs in order to mitigate the risk
associated with a false feed.
Double-Junction The point of junction of two double track routes. It comprises two turnouts and
a crossing.
Double-Pole (lamp) A double-filament lamp in which both filaments are connected permanently in
parallel. [source BS 469]
Double-Rail Track Circuit A track circuit, either jointless, or defined by IRJs in both rails at all its
extremities. On electrified lines, both rails carry traction return current.
Double-Rail Track Circuit A track circuit arrangement where both rails are fitted with IRJs, or tuned zones
Bonding (DR) are used to completely isolate a track circuit.
Double-Wound A relay fitted with two electrically independent operating coils. Application of
rated voltage across either coil causes the relay to operate.
Down Time The time interval during which a product is in a down state. [source: pr
EN50126]
DRACAS An acronym meaning Data Recording and Corrective Action System
Driver Only Operation (DOO) A form of Cab Secure Radio especially provided to facilitate driver only
Radio operation.
Drop–Away Time (Track Circuit) The time between the application of a shunt to the rails and the front contacts of
track relay (TR) fully opening.
The converse is Pick–Up Time.
Drop Away (DA) Voltage (Relay) The maximum voltage applied to an operated relay coil at which the last front
contact breaks.
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TERM DEFINITION
Drop Shunt The maximum value of non–inductive resistance which, when placed across the
rails, causes the track relay to fully open its front contacts.
Dual Electrified Area An Electrified Area meeting the criteria of both an A.C. Electrified Area and a
D.C. Electrified Area.
Earth Fault Detector A permanent device, wired to the busbars, that will detect an earth fault on the
power supply and give an alarm that will alert the maintainer.
Also known as earth leakage detector.
Earth Fault Loop Impedance The impedance of the earth fault current loop starting and ending at the point of
earth fault. [source: BS7671 extract]
Earth Leakage Detector See Earth Fault Detector.
Economising Contact (Lever A contact internally wired in series with the coil such that the lock coil is not
Lock) energised when the lever is in the full travel position. Alternatively the function
may be controlled externally (which is the only available method where cut-off is
required at other than a full travel position).
Economising Contact (Relay) See Cut-Off Contact.
Electric Traction Engineer Engineer responsible for the electric traction fixed equipment.
Electrical System An installation, identified by the relationship that the source and the exposed-
conductive-parts of the installation have to earth:
• TN System: where one or more points of the energy source are directly
earthed, the Exposed-Conductive-Parts of the installation being connected
to that point by Protective Conductors, either completely separate from the
neutral or return conductors (TN-S), with the neutral and protective
functions combined in a single conductor throughout the system (TN-C), or
with the neutral and protective functions combined in a single conductor in
part of the system (TN-C-S).
• TT System: where one point of the energy source is directly earthed, the
Exposed-Conductive-Parts of the installation being locally earthed,
independent of the source earth electrodes.
• IT System: where there is no connection between the live parts and earth,
the Exposed-Conductive-Parts of the installation being locally earthed,
e.g. an unearthed signalling power supply.
[source BS7671 adapted]
Electrified Area An area of railway encompassing all lines equipped for electric traction,
extended to include any non-electrified lines or sidings. The area also includes
a buffer zone where track circuit equipment is immunised against traction
interference, extending generally for at least 800m, or the length of two track
circuits with double IRJs, whichever is the further, beyond the end of the
electrified line.
See also A.C. Electrified Area, D.C. Electrified Area and Dual Electrified
Area.
Emergency Situation A current unforeseen or unplanned event which has life threatening or extreme
loss implications and requires immediate attention (e.g. a fire). [source: RSPG]
Energised See Operated.
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TERM DEFINITION
Equipotential Bonding Electrical connection maintaining various Exposed-Conductive-Parts and

Extraneous-Conductive-Parts at substantially the same potential. It need not
include a direct connection to earth. [source: BS7671 augmented]
Exposed-Conductive-Part A conductive part of equipment that can be touched and which is not a live part
but which may become live under fault conditions. [source: BS7671]
External (circuit or power Failing to wholly meet the Internal criteria.

supply)
Extra Low Voltage See Voltage, Nominal.
Extraneous-Conductive-Part A conductive part liable to introduce a potential, generally earth potential, and
not forming part of the electrical installation, e.g. structural metalwork.
[source: BS7671 augmented]
Fail-Safe A concept which is incorporated into the design of a product such that in the
event of failure, it enters or remains in a safe state. [source: ENV50129]
Failure The termination of an item to perform a required function. [source: BS4778]
See also Fault, Defect, Error, Failure, Mistake, Common Cause Failure,
Random Hardware Failure, and Systematic Failure.
Failure Classification Classification of a failure as Right Side, Wrong Side, protected, etc.
Fault Tolerance The attribute of an item that makes it able to perform a required function in the
presence of certain given sub-item faults. [source: IEC 61508]
Fault, Defect, Error, Failure, The cause of an error is a fault (for example a hardware defect) which resides
Mistake temporarily or permanently in the product. An error is that part of the product
state which is liable to lead to a failure. A failure occurs when the delivered
service deviates from the intended service. A failure is the effect of an error on
the intended service. A mistake occurs when human action (at any phase of
the life- cycle) may result in unintended product behaviour. [source: pr EN50126
modified]
Faulting See Corrective Maintenance.
Feed Power Supply phase (BX) or positive (B) connection.
In some cases may be used as a composite term to incorporate both feed and
Return (e.g. track circuit feed).
Fishplate Bond Provided to ensure electrical continuity between two rails mechanically
connected, e.g. by a steel fishplate, common chairs, or other bolted
connection.
Also referred to as fishplate type bond, or rail joint bond.
Fishplate Type Bond See Fishplate Bond.
Fixed Data See System Program.
Free-Wired Interlocking A relay interlocking that comprises individually wired relays rather than pre-wired
sets of relays.
Frequency Division Multiplex A data transmission system that uses unique frequencies to separate channels
(Fdm) over a single pair of conductors.
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TERM DEFINITION
Frequency Rotation The sequential application of specified frequencies.
Front (F) Contact A contact which is made when the relay is operated and broken when it is
released.
Functional Earthing The connection to earth necessary for the proper functioning of electrical
equipment, i.e. an earth return. This may be used for telecommunications
purposes, but is no longer permitted for new signalling circuits. Conductors for
functional earthing are identified by the colour cream. [source: BS7671
augmented]
Functional Safety Analysis Assessment of elements within a safety system to demonstrate that it attains
the required safety integrity.
Functional Unit An entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified

purpose. [source: ENV50129]
Fundamental Cause (failure) A primary deficiency or prevailing condition which permitted the Immediate
Cause to lead to a Wrong Side Failure.
Also known as basic event.
Geographical Data Fixed information stored in EPROMs that configures an electronic system or
sub-system to the requirements of a particular site.
Geographical Interlocking A route relay interlocking in which standard pre-wired sets of relays are
provided for each Signalling Function, arranged and electrically interconnected
in a geographical manner.
Graceful Degradation A means by which a more complex control sub-system has the facility to switch
into some other (more restricted) mode of operation if a particular input fails, or
if availability is otherwise reduced by some means.
Guaranteed Power Supply See Secure Power Supply.
Hazard A physical situation with a potential for human injury. [source: IEC 61508]
Headway Chart A time/distance graph based on standard braking and acceleration curves that
may be used to determine optimum signal positions.
Heavy (H) Duty Contact (relay) A relay contact that is rated to make and break a current of up to 30A. These
generally have magnetic blow out to suppress the arc, but are not guaranteed
to be non-weld and so the relay must be down proved.
Heel (of switch) See figure under Switches And Crossings.
High Current D.C. Electrified A D.C. Electrified Area capable of supplying trains with a peak total traction
Area current in excess of 6.5kA.
Immediate Cause (failure) A direct act, omission or equipment fault which triggered the Failure.
Impedance Bond Special device which presents a low impedance to traction current and a higher
impedance to track circuit current.
Incident (Near Miss) An unplanned, uncontrolled event, which under different circumstances could
have resulted in an Accident.
Infrastructure Controller A railway business which is responsible for the control and operation of the
railway lines, including the track, structures, plant and control equipment. An
Infrastructure Controller may either own or lease the infrastructure concerned.
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TERM DEFINITION
Installation (activity) See Construction.
Installation (infrastructure) That part of the Signalling System associated with the infrastructure at a
particular place.
Insulated Block Joint (IBJ) Non-preferred term; see Insulated Rail Joint.
Insulated Rail The rail of a single rail track circuit that is fitted with IRJs to separate adjacent
track circuits. The insulated rail is always bonded with track circuit bonding, as it
does not carry traction return current.
Also known as signal rail.
Insulated Rail Joint (IRJ) A method of joining rail ends together whilst maintaining electrical insulation
between them.
An alternative non-preferred term is insulated block joint (IBJ)
Interlocking (building) The (generally dedicated) building housing the Interlocking System, where
separate from the signal box (or other control point).
Interlocking (equipment) The equipment that performs the role required of the Interlocking System.
Interlocking (system) The safety-critical locking provided between Signalling Functions in

accordance with control tables.
Interlocking Area The area of railway controlled by a particular interlocking, extended up to a

boundary with each other adjacent interlocking controlled by the same or
another signal box.
Internal (Circuit) A circuit that does not leave the Apparatus Housing in which it originates and
which is fed from a busbar which feeds only internal circuits. This includes the
feed to an isolating transformer supplying an External Circuit. Circuits that
extend between adjacent Apparatus Housings may be considered to be
internal if they are run in a protective non-conducting duct and are judged to be
away from any environment that might be susceptible to earth faults.
Internal (Power Supply) A power supply feeding only Internal Circuits. Also known as local power
supply.
Intolerable (Risk) Associated with a risk that is greater than the upper limit of tolerability, as
defined in Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case.
Joint Hopping Where fast moving short vehicles pass from one track circuit to the next, the
difference between the Pick–Up and Drop–Away Times can cause the vehicle
to momentarily be undetected.
Jointed Track Circuit A track circuit whose extremities are defined by the use of IRJs.
Jointless Track Circuit A track circuit whose extremities are defined by the use of tuned circuit
techniques. The extreme limits of a jointless track circuit area are either defined
by the use of IRJs or by the use of a tuned circuit between the rails.
Jumper An interconnecting cable (commonly single core) between two termination

points within an apparatus housing.
Jumper Cable (Track An interconnecting cable (commonly single core) between two pieces of rail that
Circuit/Traction) are not adjacent, for track circuit or traction purposes. This includes midpoint
connections to Impedance Bonds.
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TERM DEFINITION
Junction Indicator (JI) A route indicator that has category one (long range) performance and displays
the route at a signal by means of a line of white lights.
Keyboard An interface between an operator and a system facilitating the input of

commands or data.
Lamp Proving Relay A neutral d.c. relay designed to operate from the current supplied to signal
lamps and to release when lamp or lamps burn out. Some relays incorporate a
bridge rectifier to operate from a.c. lamp currents.
Latch A memory location that switches between two states, representing a particular
Signalling Function. The states are commonly known as set and unset.
Latched Relay A relay that switches between two states, representing a particular Signalling
Function, and stays in the last set position when the operating feed is removed.
The states are known as Operated and Released.
Left Hand Relay The left hand half of a twin relay as viewed from the front. In a 930 Series twin
relay this controls the Contacts in banks C and D.
Level Crossing Ground Plan A scaled and dimensioned drawing showing the position of all equipment,
utilities and associated features in the vicinity of the level crossing, and the detail
necessary for engineering, operating and statutory requirements.
Level Crossing Order A statutory instrument describing the application of the RSPG to a specific level
crossing. Formerly known as section order.
Lever (Or Switch) Nomenclature A plate fixed to a lever or adjacent to a switch, describing the lever/switch
Plate function, together with 'order of pulling' details.
Life-Cycle Cost The total cost of ownership of an item taking into account all the costs of
acquisition, personnel training, operation, maintenance, modification and
disposal. [source: BS 4778]
Also known as whole-life cost.
Like-For-Like Work The removal and restoration of an item of equipment (including a cable
renewals), where the work does not require any update to signalling Design
Details.
Line Circuit An external relay circuit, which is not an On-Track Circuit.
Lineside Location See Location.
Local Panel A panel (sometimes simplified) provided at the interlocking and capable of being
used to take over control from the main panel at the signal box. It may also be
used as a maintainer's monitoring panel, when the operating function is not in
use.
Local Power Supply See Internal Power Supply.
Location A group of all signalling lineside Apparatus Housings (including buildings) at a

particular site and the equipment contained therein. (This excludes Apparatus
Housings that perform a main Interlocking function, although some
Interlocking local to ground frames or level crossings may be included.)
Alternatively known as lineside location.
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TERM DEFINITION
Location Area Plan A scale layout plan showing every signalling Location, together with their
identities, position and type of cases, Interlocking boundaries, certain
equipment identities (e.g. TFMs) and the area of signalling equipment that is
controlled by each Location.
This plan is generally a sub-version of the Scheme Plan or Signalling Plan.
Low Voltage See Voltage, Nominal.
Low Voltage Alarm See under voltage detector.
Main (Optical System) Primary lamp or filament of a duplicated pair.
Main Cable A twin or multicore lineside cable carrying Signalling Functions or power
supplies between Apparatus Housings.
Main Earthing Terminal (Met) The terminal or bar provided for the connection of Protective Conductors,
including Equipotential Bonding conductors, and conductors for functional
earthing if any, to the means of earthing. [source: BS7671]
Maintainability The ability of a product under given conditions, to be retained in, or restored to,
a state in which it can perform it’s required function. [source: ENV50129]
Maintained Locking An alternative to the term route locking. (see GK/RT0002)
Maintainer's Monitoring Panel An indication panel situated at the interlocking that repeats the indications sent
to the signaller and allows the maintainer to observe the state of the
interlocking. It also indicates various fault conditions. This may be combined
with a Test Panel.
Maintainer's Terminal This consists of a VDU, keyboard and printer connected to a solid state
interlocking, or an IECC system monitor sub-system. It is used to obtain
essential fault diagnostic information and also acts as an interface with the
system to enable restrictive controls on the equipment to be set.
Also known as technician’s terminal.
Maintenance The combination of all technical and administrative actions, including supervision
actions, intended to retain a product in, or restore it to, a state in which it can
perform a required function. [source: pr EN50126]
Major Works Any infrastructure alterations which are outside the scope for Minor Works.
Make-Before-Break Contacts A pair of relay contacts, where at each state of the relay only one of the pair is
made, but which during transit momentarily have both contacts made.
Mechanical Locking Chart A plan showing the arrangement of mechanical locking components to achieve
the mechanical locking control tables.
Mechanical Locking Control A tabulation of the locking between Signalling Functions associated with a
Tables mechanical lever frame.
Medium (M) Duty Contact A relay contact that is rated to make and break a non-inductive current of 3A to
6A.
Meshed Circuit Complex circuitry feeding more than one relay, where the same could be
achieved by independent circuits, thereby requiring duplication of contacts. Not
all paths in a meshed circuit are applicable to all relays.
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TERM DEFINITION
Microcore A Parallel data transmission system using a multicore cable having a large
number of small diameter conductors. Interface buffer relays may be provided
at each end.
Miniature Route Indicator (MI) An alphanumeric route indicator having category three (short range)
performance (equivalent to the former stencil route indicator).
Minor Works Infrastructure alterations which are listed as such in HSE/HMRI Guide to the
Approval of Railway Works, Plant and Equipment.
Mistake See Fault, Defect, Error, Failure, Mistake.
Mod State See Modification Status.
Modem An electronic device that converts a signal to make it suitable for transmission
(modulator) or reception (demodulator) of information over a particular
medium.
Modulator See Modem.
Monitored (level crossing) Checked by the observation of indications which provide the signaller with the
status of equipment.
Movement Authority Permission for a train to run to a specific location.
Multi-Processor Module (MPM) The part of an SSI system that performs the Interlocking. Each SSI cubicle
contains three MPMs that control the signalling using a majority voting
technique to ensure safety and availability.
National Radio Network (NRN) A radio telephone system provided specially to facilitate railway operations.
Multi-Section (track circuit) See Cut-Section.
Negligible (risk) Associated with a risk that is less than the lower (broadly acceptable) limit of
tolerability, as defined in Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case.
Neutral Relay A d.c. relay which operates with either polarity of supply to the coil.
Non-Safety Contact A relay contact that is not a safety contact. This includes metal to metal
contacts for medium duty use, where both elements are made of silver, silver
cadmium oxide, or 60/40 silver palladium.
Non-Safety-Related A Signalling Function or sub-system where operational safety and the

integrity of the interlocking are not directly affected. Manual intervention, where
a failure would be noticed, may be part of the process.
Formerly known also as non-vital.
Non-Vital See Non-Safety-Related.
Normal (function) Position of a lever when it is fully back in the lever frame. The un-operated or
quiescent state of a two-state system.
The converse is Reverse.
Normal Contact A contact in a Polar Relay, which is closed when the relay is operated to the
Normal position.
Normal (Conditions) The operating conditions which a part of a railway is designed to

accommodate. This would include peaks, e.g. rush hours, and troughs in
demand experienced during the day. [source: RSPG]
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TERM DEFINITION
On-Track Circuit An External circuit run to, or via, an item of on-track signalling equipment in a
Tail Cable.
Operate Coil A winding which when energised at the rated voltage and frequency, causes the
armature of a relay to move to the operate position.
Operate Time (Relay) The time interval between the energisation of the relay coil and the first front
contact making.
The converse is Release Time.
Operate Voltage (Relay) The minimum voltage applied to a released relay coil at which the last front
contact makes.
Also known as pick-up (pu) voltage.
Operated (Relay) The state of a relay when the armature is energised, picked up (PU), or latched,
all Front Contacts are made and all Back Contacts are broken.
Also known as energised, and colloquially as ‘picked’ or ‘up’. The converse is

Released.
Optical Fibre An optically transparent fibre consisting of a central core surrounded by a

cladding of lower refractive index and used to transmit light by means of
multiple internal reflections.
Ordinary Acting (Relay) A relay without a particular stated specialised operating characteristic.
Out Of Use Non-operational equipment that is still connected to the infrastructure.
See also Spare.
Overlay Track Circuit A track circuit which can be superimposed over another, neither having any
effect on the other and both operating independently.
Parallel (Bonding) The method of bonding Rail Sections with diverse parallel electrical paths for
Availability. Track circuit bonding in this mode is non-fail-safe, since failure of
a single Jumper Cable, Fishplate Bond, or IRJ will not necessarily release the
track circuit relay, and hence could result in loss of vehicle detection.
Parallel (Data Link) A means of data transmission by which many discrete bits of information are
sent at the same time along a Microcore link.
Pick–Up (PU) Shunt The minimum value of resistance between the two running rails at which the
track relay just closes its front contacts.
Pick-Up (PU) VOLTAGE (Relay) See Operate Voltage.
Pick-Up TIME (Track Circuit) The time between the removal of a shunt to the rails and the first front contact
of the track relay (TR) making.
The converse is Drop–Away Time.
Pin-Code See Registration Pin-Code
Plug-In The attribute of an item of electrical equipment which can be replaced without
disconnecting any wiring.
Plugboard The permanent mounting block and termination for external wiring, for use with
plug-in equipment.
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TERM DEFINITION
Polar (Relay) A relay with two Operated positions (Normal and Reverse) and a central,
Released state. The Operated position depends upon the direction of the
current or phase of the current in the operating circuit. A polar relay may not
have contacts in the Released position.
See also Biased Relay (sometimes referred to as a 2-position polar relay).
Polarised Circuit A circuit where the resulting operation is dependent on the polarity or phase
angle of the feed.
Preselection The selection of a Signalling Function prior to the conditions becoming

available, so that it is automatically set when some other function is restored.
This could result in a protected Wrong Side Failure becoming unprotected.
Preventative Maintenance The maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or according to

prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the probability of failure or the
degradation of the functioning of an item. [source: pr EN50126]
Primary Function Relay The relay by which the logic required to control a Signalling Function is
brought together. It is the first relay in a chain that directly controls all safety-
critical Signalling Functions. It is the only function relay which has Back
Contacts valid for use in safety-critical functions.
Product Acceptance Authorisation of a product type for use. See GI/RT7002.
Programmable Logic Controller A self-contained electronic sub-system that manipulates data. It receives inputs
(PLC) from an interface, processes them in accordance with the System Program
and Geographical Data in its memory and returns the resulting outputs to the
interface.
Protective Conductor A conductor used for some measures of protection against electric shock and
intended for connecting together any of the following parts:
• Exposed-Conductive-Parts,
• Extraneous-Conductive-Parts,
• the Main Earthing Terminal,
• earth electrode(s),
• the earthed point of the source or an artificial neutral.
Protective conductors are identified by the colours green and yellow.

[source: BS7671 augmented]
Public Emergency Telephone A special telephone system for use at level crossings, which includes provision
System (PETS) for proving that handset connections are intact and also for the transmission of
level crossing status indications. The speech path has priority over other
facilities.
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) A Serial data transmission system by which many channels of information are
passed over a data link, by use of a multiplexer.
Quartz Halogen Lamp See Tungsten Halogen Lamp.
Rail Joint Bond See Fishplate Bond.
Rail Section (track circuit) A section of one running rail continuously electrically bonded with its extremities
defined by IRJs, and within which all continuity connections are by Fishplate
Bonds. It may extend over several track circuits (as the Common Rail) or only
part of a track circuit.
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TERM DEFINITION
RAMS An acronym meaning a combination of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability

and Safety. See also Dependability. [source: pr EN50126]
Random Hardware Failure Failures occurring at random times, which result from a variety of degraded
mechanism in the hardware.
Note 1) There are many degradation mechanisms occurring at different rates in

different components and since manufacturing tolerances cause components to
fail due to these mechanisms after different times in operation, failures of a total
equipment comprising many components occur at predictable rates but at
unpredictable (i.e. random) times.
Note 2) A major distinguishing feature between random hardware failures and

Systematic Failures is that system failure rates (or other appropriate
measure), arising from random hardware failures, can be predicted with
reasonable accuracy but systematic failures, by their very nature cannot be
accurately predicted. That is, system failure rates arising from random
hardware failures can be quantified with reasonable accuracy but those arising
from systematic failures cannot be accurately quantified. [source IEC 61508]
Receiver (RX) An electronic device that converts, filters or decodes into a discrete output,
information that has been received from another site.
Red Bond A traction bond that has been designated as being dangerous to staff if
disconnected. It is marked red to draw attention to its importance and to aid
inspection. Special procedures are in place for the reporting of damage to a red
bond.
Redundancy The provision of one or more additional elements, usually identical, to achieve or
maintain Availability under failure of one or more of those elements.
[source: ENV50129]
Registration Pin-Code A series of locating pins assembled in a unique pattern to prevent equipment
being incorrectly used. The unique pattern also acts as a means of
identification for a specific style and variant of a relay.
The term registration pin-code is commonly abbreviated to pin-code.
Release Coil A winding which, when energised at the rated voltage, disengages the latching
mechanism and causes the relay to release.
Release Time (relay) The time interval between the removal of the supply (at rated voltage) to the
relay coil and the last front contact breaking.
The converse is Operate Time.
Released (relay) The state of a relay when the armature is de-energised, dropped away (DA), or
unlatched, all back contacts are made and all front contacts are broken.
Also known as de-energised and colloquially as ‘dropped’ or ‘down’.
The converse is Operated.
Reliability The ability of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions for
a stated period of time. [source: ENV50129]
Relocatable Equipment Building Apparatus housing to specification BR 1615 or equivalent.

(REB)
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TERM DEFINITION
Repeater Location A Lineside Location where all Line Circuits are interrupted by the provision of
repeat relays for the purpose of limiting interference voltage.
Also known as Cut-Section location.
Residual Voltage The voltage remaining across the rails or relay of a track circuit after the feed
has been disconnected.
It may be caused by mutual interference between adjacent Single Rail Track

Circuits, the battery effect of the track formation, cathodic protection measures,
or d.c. traction return or other stray currents.
Resolved (failure) At the time of closure of the investigation, the engineer is satisfied that a fault
occurred and the cause has been established.
Return Power supply neutral (NX) or negative (N) connection.
The converse is Feed.
Reverse (function) Position of a lever when it is pulled fully forward in the lever frame. The
operated state of a two-state system.
The converse is Normal.
Reverse Contact A contact, in a Polar Relay, which is closed when the relay is operated to the
reverse position.
Right Hand Relay The right hand half of a twin relay as viewed from the front. In a 930 Series
twin relay this controls the Contacts in banks A and B.
Right Side Failure A Failure which does not result in the protection normally provided by the
Signalling System being reduced.
Route Holding An alternative to the term route locking (see GK/RT0002).
Safe State Any one of the following:
• the state of the last valid request at the Interlocking,

• correspondence with the state of the trackside equipment, or
• the most restrictive state.
Safety Contact A relay contact that is specified for safety purposes in the 930 Series
specifications. These are non-weld contacts, generally silver to carbon for
ordinary use. For medium duty use, the contact elements may be of silver
impregnated graphite (SIG) and silver.
Safety Integrity (SI) The probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required
functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time.
[source: IEC 61508)
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) One of four possible discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity
requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety-related
systems. Safety Integrity Level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; Safety
Integrity Level 1 has the lowest. Safety Integrity Level 0 is non-safety-related.
[source: IEC 61508 augmented]
Safety-Critical Carries direct responsibility for safety. [source: ENV50129]
Safety-Critical Failure See Wrong Side Failure.
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TERM DEFINITION
Safety-Related Carries responsibility for safety (direct or indirect). [source: ENV50129]
Scheme Plan A longitudinally scaled layout plan, based on the record Signalling Plan, that is
produced to depict proposed new or altered signalling systems.
Section Order An obsolete term, see Level Crossing Order.
Secure Power Supply A power supply system that can be relied upon to keep certain Safety-Critical
Signalling Functions operating for a predetermined minimum time, in the event
of a total failure of the main incoming supply.
Also known as Guaranteed Power Supply.
Selective (telephone system) A system with many telephones on one circuit, where one telephone may call
another chosen telephone without all the other telephones receiving the call.
Sensitive Relay Generally a Neutral Relay with a high coil resistance and low power
consumption. It may be used to give accurate timings in conjunction with a
capacitor/resistor unit.
Serial (data link) A means of data transmission by which many discrete bits of information are
encoded and sent in turn along a Data Link.
Series Bonding The fail-safe method of bonding track circuits with Rail Sections connected in
series, such that the failure of a single Jumper Cable, Fishplate Bond, or IRJ
results in de-energisation of the track circuit.
Sheath (cable) An outer protective layer of a cable containing the insulated conductor(s).
Short Circuit Bond A Jumper Cable between the rails immediately beyond the final track circuit
IRJs, in order to detect double joint failure. This is the only bonding required on
non-track circuited lines in non-electrified areas.
Signal Box Control Area See Control Area.
Signal Box Notes A list of the key features of a signal box, or control centre, including any
functions that are not clear from the Signalling/Scheme Plan.
Signal Rail Non-preferred term; see Insulated Rail.
Signal Sighting Form A form that depicts the profile, location and other details of each signal as
agreed by the signal sighting committee.
Signal Spacing Parameters A tabular representation of the parameters (such as braking distances and
average gradients) that may influence the relative positioning of signals.
Signaller’s Area The area of railway controlled or supervised by any one signaller, as defined by
the boundaries between control panel sections or Signalling Workstations.
Formerly known as signalman's area.
Signalling Function Final discrete component of a Signalling System listed on control tables with a
unique identity (such as signals, points, train detection devices, releases and
level crossing barriers) and the circuitry or logic by which it is controlled and/or
proved.
Signalling Functions are allocated (as defined by the control tables) to a

specific interlocking controlled by a particular signal box (or other control point)
and are given a unique identity within a particular signaller’s area.
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TERM DEFINITION
Signalling System Equipment, circuitry and software associated with:
• lineside signals;
• point operatio;
• level crossings;
• train detection;
• trainborne equipment conveying information about the state of the line;
• operational telecommunications (excluding electrification control systems
and electrification telephones); and
• fixed trackside safety systems.
Signalling Workstation A workstation controlled by a signalling display sub-system with facilities for
signalling control by trackerball and keyboard together with signalling display
monitors and a general purpose VDU.
Signalman's Area Obsolete term, see Signaller’s Area.
Significant Failure A Wrong Side Failure which by its seriousness or because of its volume
introduces a risk requiring attention.
Single Rail Non-preferred term; see Common Rail.
Single Rail (SR) Bonding A track circuit arrangement where only one rail (the Insulated Rail) is used with
Configuration IRJs to separate the track circuits. The other rail (the Common Rail) is
electrically continuous and is used for traction return purposes.
Single Rail Track Circuit A jointed track circuit with IRJs in only one rail (the insulated rail) that is series
bonded (except for the presence of spurs of limited length at switches and
crossings). The other rail, known as the common rail, is electrically common to
one or more adjacent track circuits.
Sleeper An item of wood, steel or concrete of standard dimensions, used to support and
gauge the track. (See Bearer and Timber.)
Slow Acting Relay A relay in which both Operation and Release are intentionally delayed.
Slow To Operate Relay A relay in which the Operation is intentionally delayed and the operate time is
significantly longer than the Release Time.
Slow To Release Relay A relay in which the Release is intentionally delayed and the Release Time is
significantly longer than the Operate Time.
Spare Equipment not connected to any part of the infrastructure. See also Out Of
Use.
Spur (track circuit) A section of running rail required to be electrically common to a series bonded
rail, but which is not itself in series.
Stagger (electrical) The phase or polarity difference between one track circuit and the next, or
between the rails on either side of an IRJ within one track circuit.
Stagger (physical) Occurs where two IRJs in a pair of rails are not exactly opposite each other,
thus creating a dead section between track circuits or within a track circuit.
Standard Route Indicator (SI) An alphanumeric route indicator having category two (medium range)
performance (equivalent to the former theatre type route indicator).
Standby The state of an item when it is available but not required to be operating.
[source: BS 4778]
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TERM DEFINITION
State (of a function) Position or action of the equipment. Examples of complementary states are:
Operated/Released, Normal/Reverse, on/off, raised/lowered, locked/free,
enabled/inhibited, energised/de-energised.
In data driven systems this is stored as Variable Data.
State (of the infrastructure) Configuration of an Installation.
Stock Rail See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Structure Bond A bond required in a.c. electrified areas, that connects adjacent lineside metal
structures to the traction return rail system, where required to ensure staff
safety through equipotential zoning.
Supervised (level crossing) Checked by visual observation, either directly or by use of CCTV.
Supervisory (circuit) Control or indication circuit, particularly in respect of electric traction power
supplies.
Switch Nomenclature Plate See Lever (Or Switch) Nomenclature Plate.
Switch Rail See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Switch Reinforcing Bond A jumper cable installed around the switch in S&C, in order to strengthen the
fishplate bonds between the switch and crossing components and also to link
two spur ends together, so improving the integrity of a parallel bonded rail
section.
Switch Toe See figure under Switches And Crossings.
Switches And Crossings (S&C) Sections of track other than plain line. See the figure for constituent parts.
Closure Panels
Heel Of Switch Rail
Wing Rails
Crossing Angle
Switch Rails Stock Rails

Switch Toes Crossing Nose Check Rail
Closure Rails
Crossing Back
System Program The software necessary to drive a programmable electronic system.
Also known as fixed data.
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TERM DEFINITION
Systematic Failures Failures due to errors (including mistakes or acts of omission) in any safety life-
cycle activity which cause it to fail under some particular combination of inputs
or under some particular environmental condition. Systematic failures could
arise in any safety life-cycle phase.
Examples of systematic failure include:
• Systematic failures due to errors in the safety requirements specification;

• Systematic failures due to errors in the design, manufacture, installation,
operation of the hardware;
• Systematic failures due to errors in the design, implementation etc. of the
software.
[source: IEC 61508]
Systems Approval Approval granted to systems.
Tail Cable A cable between trackside or on-track signalling equipment and other such
equipment or a lineside Apparatus Housing.
For track circuits, see also Track Cable.
Technician's Terminal See Maintainer's Terminal.
Terminal Line The length of plain line approaching buffer stops. Single rail traction return is
adequate for the final 300m of such lines in d.c. electrified areas, as traction
return current is low.
Test Panel A control panel provided at the interlocking for testing or maintenance purposes.
It may be provided temporarily for a commissioning or the function may be
performed by the Local Panel.
Through Circuit An external circuit drawn in entirety from supply to destination.
Timber An item of wood of non–standard dimensions, used to support the track in S &
C areas. (See also Bearer and Sleeper.)
Time Division Multiplex (TDM) A non-safety-critical serial data transmission system that addresses each
channel in turn and converts it into a unique digital code. It is generally used to
transmit operating controls and indications between a signal box and
Interlockings.
Time Element Relay A relay, whose timing contacts do not change state until a predetermined time
after Operation or Release, as appropriate.
Commonly known as timer.
Timer See Time Element Relay.
Tolerable (risk) Associated with a risk that is within the limits of upper & lower tolerability, as
defined in Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case.
Touch Potential The potential difference between a person's hand which is touching an
Exposed-Conductive-Part and any other part of the body which is touching
another Exposed-Conductive-Part at a different potential.
Track Cable A track circuit tail cable which connects directly to the rails.
Track Circuit Actuator (TCA) Non-preferred term, see track circuit assister.
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TERM DEFINITION
Track Circuit Actuator Non-preferred term, see Track Circuit Assister Interference Detector.
Interference Detector (TCAID)
Track Circuit Assister (TCA) A device fitted to a vehicle which causes a 165kHz signal to pass between the
wheels of the vehicle and assists in the breakdown of the insulation at the wheel
to rail interface due to leaf-fall, rust etc.
Track Circuit Assister A device fitted to the track which, when it detects the presence of a 165kHz
Interference Detector (TCAID) signal in the rail, causes the track circuit to show occupied.
Track Circuit Bonding The connection of one rail or component of a track circuit to another rail or
component, so as to ensure electrical continuity. On rails carrying traction
return current its function is performed by the Traction Return Bonding.
Track Circuit Interrupter A device that records the passage of a vehicle by causing a permanent
disconnection within the track circuit until the device has been renewed.
Track Jumping Occurs when a fast moving vehicle passes over a very short track circuit (or a
short arm of a longer track circuit) and fails to de–energise the track relay.
Track Relay (TR) Generally a neutral relay with a low coil resistance and low power consumption,
which acts as part of a track circuit. It is either connected directly to the rails, or
via a capacitor or tuner unit.
Trackside Functional Module SSI signal or points modules situated in lineside locations to operate and prove
(TFM) trackside equipment and interface with the Data Link from the interlocking via
the data link module.
Traction Bond A cable specifically provided for continuity of traction return current, although it
may additionally carry track circuit current.
Traction Rail See Common Rail.
Traction Return Bonding The bonding required to carry the traction return current on both ac and dc
electrified lines. Traction return bonding is generally parallel bonded.
Transmitter (Tx) An electronic device that converts, modulates or encodes a discrete input, into a
form that is suitable for sending to another site.
Transposition Bond A jumper cable provided where track circuit polarities and/or traction return rails
change sides across a pair of IRJs, or transposition joints. Purposes include the
correction of track circuit polarity stagger or traction current imbalance, or to
facilitate Series bonding in S&C.
Transposition Joint An IRJ where transposition bonds are used to transpose the traction and/or
track circuit rails.
Trap Point A point (usually switch and tiebar only), inserted in sidings etc., to unauthorised
movements away from a running line.
Triple-Pole (Lamp) A double-filament lamp in which one end of each filament is connected to the
cap shell and the other ends of the filaments are connected one to each contact
plate. [source BS 469]
Tungsten Halogen Lamp A lamp in which the tungsten filament is enclosed in a gas filled quartz bulb
containing a quantity of a halogen.
Twin Relay A unit which contains two electrically and mechanically independent relays.
Type Approval See Product Acceptance
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TERM DEFINITION
Under Voltage Detector A permanent device, wired to the busbars, to inhibit operation and/or give an
alarm to alert the maintainer, when the voltage falls below an acceptable level.
Also known as low voltage alarm.
Uninterruptible Power Supply A power supply with a secondary source which is capable of providing an
(UPS) uninterrupted changeover in the event of a failure of the incoming supply. It
generally consists of low maintenance cells, a charger, voltage regulator, and
monitoring, changeover and bypass devices.
Unresolved (Failure) At the time of closure, exhaustive testing has failed to reveal the fault but the
possibility of a fault has not been totally eliminated.
Variable Data Information associated with a data-driven system which records the real-time
State of Signalling Functions.
Visual Display Unit (VDU) Map A full size layout plan that details the information to be displayed for each screen
Layout overview or detailed view on a VDU.
Voltage, Nominal Voltage by which an installation (or part of an installation) is designated. The
following ranges of nominal voltage (r.m.s. values for a.c.) are defined:
Extra-low. Generally not exceeding 50V a.c. or 120V ripple-free d.c., whether
between conductors or to earth,
Low. Generally exceeding extra-low voltage but not exceeding 1,000V a.c. or
1,500V d.c. between conductors, or 600V a.c. or 900V d.c. between conductors
and earth.
[source: BS7671 amended]
Wing Rail See figure under Switches and Crossings.
Wrong Side Failure A Failure which results in the protection normally provided by the Signalling
System being reduced.
Also known as Safety-Critical Failure.
Yellow Bond A jumper cable that is necessary to ensure the electrical integrity of a track
circuit that is fully or partially Parallel bonded. It is marked yellow to draw
attention to its importance and to aid inspection.
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4 Use of This Guidance

Note
The subsequent Parts of this Guidance Note set out means by which an
acceptable level of dependability can be achieved for each type of equipment or
sub-system, in the form of Codes of Practice.
Where they entirely address the situation under consideration, their use is an
alternative to the risk-based approach illustrated in GK/RT0206. However,
where the particular application or intended environment for the system
introduces additional risks, these should be subject to separate assessment.
The Design Principles in each Part give guidance on the minimum requirements
that need to be addressed, even when a risk-based approach is used.
Supplementary material is provided in the form of appendices to each Part of the

Guidance Note.
5 Signalling System
It is convenient to divide the signalling system into the following sub-systems.
The examples and exceptions are quoted for illustrative purposes only in order to
define the scope, and are not intended to be exhaustive:
a) signal box to signal box interface, including block instruments, emergency

alarms and radio electronic token block (RETB) sub-systems;
b) signalling control and display system, including any train describer (TD),
automatic route setting (ARS) and level crossing CCTV supervision sub-
systems, but excluding signaller’s information sub-systems, such as
automatic train reporting (ATR), automatic train supervision (ATS) and
timetable processor (TTP);
c) signaller’s voice communication systems used in the protection of trains,

public, or staff, e.g. signal post telephone (SPTs), cab secure radio (CSR),
level crossing emergency telephones and point zone telephones (PZT), but
not national radio network (NRN) or electrification telephones;
d) transmission systems for controls and indications between the signal box and
its interlockings;
e) interlocking systems;
f) transmission systems for functional controls and proving between each

interlocking and its lineside locations;
g) operating equipment for signalling functions contained within lineside

locations;
h) lineside location to trackside equipment feeds;
i) functional trackside signalling equipment;
j) train detection system; and
k) track to train transmission systems and train-borne equipment using

signalling data to control some function of the train or to provide safety-
related information to the driver, including the automatic warning system
(AWS), automatic train control (ATC), automatic train protection (ATP), train
protection and warning system (TPWS), and track circuit assister
interference detectors (TCAID), but not track to train information systems
that are not safety-related.
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6 Alterations to Existing
Installations
Examples of conflicting standards whose perpetuation is generally acceptable
are given in Appendix B1.
Examples of certain safety hazards within an existing installation, which may

have no bearing on proposed alterations, but may justify the retrospective
upgrading of the whole installation to certain new standards, are given in
Appendix B2.
Examples of relaxations that are generally acceptable for temporary work, are
given in Appendix B3.
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Appendix B1:
Conflicting Standards
Examples of situations where the perpetuation of existing arrangements is
generally acceptable when alterations are undertaken, are as follows:
B1:1 Identification
Existing signalling functions should not be renumbered or lettered to the current
practice given in GK/RT0009 unless the alterations are of such magnitude that
all functions of a particular type in the locality concerned can be identified in the
new manner.
More than three point ends on the same number may be tolerated, for power
operated points, where it is particularly expedient, e.g. for the addition of switch
diamonds.
B1:2 Line Circuits and On-Track Circuits

A.C. line circuits may be perpetuated for alterations to existing installations in
non-a.c. electrified areas and may extend up to 5,000m in length, subject to
voltage drop considerations, the use of converters giving sufficient capacitive
immunity and any other relevant factors, such as electromagnetic compatibility
with rolling stock. It is recommended that common returns are not perpetuated
for safety-critical line circuits and that earth returns are not perpetuated for any
line circuit.
Any down proving of line relays that is not a current requirement should not be
removed unless the line circuit is double cut and does not use a common return.
It is recommended that single cutting of circuits is not perpetuated where the

current requirement calls for double cutting.
On-track circuits feeding trackside equipment extending up to 1,375m in length,

rather than limited to 200m, may be perpetuated for alterations to existing
installations in non-a.c. electrified areas, subject to voltage drop considerations
and any other relevant factors, such as electromagnetic compatibility with rolling
stock.
See Part D.
B1:3 Relays
The use of predecessors of the 930 series, shelf type relays, a.c. line relays,
double element vane relays, moving iron relays, WBS type 'P', larger plug-in type
relays and other types may be perpetuated, subject to availability and any
conditions imposed in GK/RT0129, for alterations to existing installations. This
includes the perpetuation of local batteries as a power source for moving iron
relays.
Any down proving of older style relays that is not a current requirement should
not be removed until relays are replaced by those meeting current standards.
Any standard convention may be perpetuated for the orientation of relay

contacts with respect to the supply polarity, for alterations to existing
installations.
The use of non-safety relays in safety-related applications, such as signalling

control and display systems, may be perpetuated for alterations to existing
systems, provided that a satisfactory safety history can be demonstrated.
The use of 12V circuits to feed indication lamps, instead of a minimum of 24V,
may also be perpetuated, unless the whole diagram structure is being replaced.
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See also Part D.
B1:4 Meshed Circuits

Care should be taken when altering meshed circuits or removing back proving
contacts that are no longer a requirement, in case the original designer intended
them to prove sequence of operation or to prevent certain right side failures
causing a wrong side failure. See Part D.
B1:5 Negative Fusing

The fusing of the negative leg of circuits instead of the positive may be
perpetuated for alterations to existing installations. See Appendix D1.
B1:6 Geographical Circuitry

It is important, so as not to create a hazard for the unwary, that geographical
circuitry is altered in a consistent manner with the necessary straps and free
wiring, in accordance with the manufacturers' design documentation. Similar
occurrences of the required controls should also be studied to ensure
consistency. See Part F.
B1:7 Obsolescent Signals

Lower quadrant semaphore signals, as described in GK/RT0031, may be
retained for the sake of consistency, but consideration should be given to
conversion to upper quadrant.
Other types of signal that are illustrated in the Rule Book, but are not included in
GK/RT0031, may be retained for the sake of consistency, but consideration
should be given to replacing them with those that meet current standards.
B1:8 Point Re-drive

Point re-drive may be omitted for the sake of consistency, at existing
interlockings that have not employed this facility. See Part P.
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Appendix B2:
Safety Hazards
Requiring Retrospective
Work
When alterations are undertaken on existing signalling installations, the
infrastructure controller should consider whether certain retrospective safety
work, both on the parts of the installation being altered and on those parts of the
installation not being altered, should be carried out.
A fully documented process of risk assessment should be conducted if the

infrastructure controller considers that the work is not merited by the reduction of
risk that would be achieved.
The infrastructure controller should keep a record of which safety hazards have
been addressed at each installation, and those that have not been addressed.
See GK/RT0206.
Examples of such safety hazards are as follows:
B2:1 Repositioning of Non-Safety Contacts

Interlockings and lineside locations being altered should be checked to ensure
the correct positioning of non-safety relay contacts. Any incorrect positioning
found should be dealt with in accordance with Part D.
B2:2 Approach Locking

Interlockings being altered should be checked to ensure that approach locking
circuits provide the current requirement of sequence proving (see Part D).
Remedial work should be undertaken to correct any discrepancies, such as the
omission of down proving, which could give rise to a hazardous failure.
Situations where the de-energisation of the RGPR is delayed by the use of
several repeat relays, or vital FDM transmission are particularly vulnerable.
B2:3 Checking of Back Contacts

the correct use of relay back contacts in existing circuits (see Part D). Remedial
work should be undertaken to correct any discrepancies which could give rise to
a hazardous failure or false indication to the signaller.
Particular attention should be paid to track repeat relays which give approach
releases (including temporary approach control). See Appendix F2.
B2:4 Delayed Signal Replacement

Interlockings being altered should be checked to ensure that signals with
delayed replacement controls are in accordance with the requirements (see
Part F). Remedial work should be undertaken to correct any discrepancies that
could give rise to a hazardous failure, particularly if the signal in rear can be
cleared before a train has replaced the signal with delayed replacement. Where
appropriate, this may be effected by converting the replacement to first wheel.
B2:5 Swinging Overlaps

that the design of swinging overlap circuits address all significant risks (see
Appendix F2). Remedial work should be undertaken to correct any
discrepancies which could give rise to a hazardous failure, such as preselection
of points.
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B2:6 Single Post Terminations

Where work is to be done in an apparatus housing, one of the following should
be applied (see Part J):
• either separate sliding links should be provided for every incoming and
outgoing cable, eliminating the use of binding posts; or
• all cable termination sheets should be issued, inscribed with the following
note: "All Single Post Terminations to be Fitted with Red Dome Nuts", to act
as a reminder in case cable fault jumpering becomes necessary.
B2:7 Shrouds for Terminals

Where work is to be done in an apparatus housing, equipment should be
checked to ensure that any terminals located on horizontal surfaces are
adequately shrouded to prevent items being dropped on them causing false
circuit operation. This applies to shelf-type relays, transformers, capacitors, and
terminal blocks, etc. Remedial work should be undertaken as necessary. See
Part D.
B2:8 BR 998 Detector Boxes

All BR 998 detectors should be wired in one of two permissible wiring
configurations, i.e. right hand switch normally closed or left hand switch normally
closed. An extract of the layout showing the orientation of the detectors should
be provided on the circuit diagram.
Because of microswitch deficiencies, BR 998 detectors should either be

duplicated, or used in conjunction with some other detection device, such as a
point machine, unless mechanically connected to a lever frame or ground frame.
See also Part P.
B2:9 Level Crossing Modifications

See Part X for a schedule of the modifications to be made to level crossings
when any alteration is undertaken.
B2:10 Transmission of Safety-Related Controls

Transmission systems that are not safety-critical and do not fail safe should be
checked to ensure that safety-related single function controls, where a failure
could lead to a hazardous event, are not transmitted by a single channel, but by
two independent channels. This applies particularly to signal and crossing clear
controls. Remedial work should be undertaken as necessary. See Part L.
B2:11 Replacement Indications for Automatic Signals

Signal boxes where alterations are being undertaken should be checked to
ensure that all replacement indications for automatic signals prove the signal on
(HR de-energised), signal alight (ECR energised) and signal box replacement
control effective at the signal. Additionally, where provided, related distant
and/or banner repeating signals should also be proved on and alight in the
signaller’s indication. Remedial work should be undertaken as necessary. See
Part L.
B2:12 Absolute Block Controls

Signal boxes where alterations are being undertaken should be checked to
ensure that all absolute block sections on passenger lines are equipped with the
block controls required in GK/RT0042. Remedial work should be undertaken as
necessary.
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B2:13 Overlaps
Interlockings being altered should be checked to ensure that the overlaps of all
signals requiring them are of adequate length in accordance with GK/RT0078.
Remedial work should be undertaken as required by risk assessment and in
particular where:
• the attainable speed approaching the signal has increased;

• the signal sighting has worsened;
• any warning arrangements (e.g. AWS, ATP, banner signals, or the number
of cautionary aspects) have been changed; or
• the signal has a history of SPADs (signal passed at danger).
B2:14 SPAD Mitigation

Interlockings being altered should be checked to ensure that any starting signals
or other signals with particular SPAD risks, requiring enhanced overrun
protection in accordance with GK/RT0078, are adequately protected. Remedial
work should be undertaken as necessary.
B2:15 Track Circuit Clearances

Whenever permanent way alterations are undertaken, the actual position of all
affected and adjoining insulated rail joints should be correlated with their
dimensioning on signalling and bonding plans, and checked to ensure
compliance with GK/RT0011. Minimum track circuit length should also be
checked. Any discrepancies found should be remedied. This may be effected
by an extension of track circuit locking, or a special sequential control on the
track circuit clearance.
B2:16 Track Circuit Joint Hopping

that any necessary delay is incorporated into the operation of track circuit
primary function relays. Details may be found in GK/RC0752. Remedial work
should be undertaken to correct any discrepancies that could give rise to a
hazardous failure, particularly where locking could be released because of a
delay in registering the occupancy of a track circuit in the interlocking, or where
intermittent incorrect aspect sequences could occur.
B2:17 Track Circuit Residual Voltage

Whenever track circuit alterations are undertaken, the residual voltage occurring
on any altered d.c. track circuit should be checked, where a wrong side failure is
likely to lead to a hazardous event. Details may be found in GK/RC0755. Any
discrepancies found should be remedied. This may be effected by any means
permitted within GK/RT0252 that do not affect adjacent track circuits not
otherwise being altered. There is no requirement to extend the remedial work
beyond the original track circuit being altered, unless this is shown to be
necessary during the risk assessment.
B2:18 Statutory Requirements

When alterations are undertaken at any installation, the opportunity should be
taken to review its compliance to recent statutory changes, in particular the
following regulations, as interpreted in this Guidance Note and in GK/RT0206:
• the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989;

• the Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 1992;
• the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992;
• the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992;
• the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994; and
• the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996.
Adequate information should be provided on the design details, as described in

GK/RT0206.
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Appendix B3:
Temporary Work
B3:1 General
This appendix covers the following types of work as described in Section B3:2:
• temporary non-conceptual work;

• short-lived work;
• stagework progressing towards an approved overall scheme; and
• redundant assets left in situ for a limited time (see Section B3:3).
Temporary work is defined as alterations which remain in use for a limited period
of time.
Where it is desired to use the relaxation given in Section B3:4, the protection
described in Section B3:5 should also be applied.
The following considerations should be addressed by a fully documented

process of risk assessment:
• the time for which the work may remain;

• the likelihood of future alterations to the temporary work;
• the possibility of protracted timescales, requiring imposed solutions in the
event of slippage; and
• the introduction of temporary work on life-expired equipment with no
maintainability.
B3:2 Specific Examples of Temporary Work

The following are examples of the types of temporary work to which the
relaxation given in Section B3:4 applies:
• Like-for-like emergency work (imposed due to genuine emergency situations

such as accidents, fire and vandalism).
• Rectification of cable faults (using red cable fault jumpers to spare
conductors). See GK/RT0231.
• Temporary speed restrictions (TSRs) (involving the disconnection of AWS
inductors associated with the planned application of a TSR). See
GK/RT0038.
• Release of controls for engineering work or single line working, in
accordance with Rule Book, Section E and the instruction on giving releases
in GK/RT0231.
• Short-lived alterations to circuitry during civil engineering works after which all
signalling returns to the previous arrangement (either to maintain point
detection, and disconnection of affected routes, or to maintain track circuit
operation following temporary removal of defective switch and crossing
components).Short-lived new work and alterations to circuitry during
disarrangement of locking or long term civil engineering works after which all
signalling returns to the previous arrangement (including the temporary
provision of automatic signalling or single line operation).
• Stagework at installations with a very limited life.
• Partially commissioned work.
• Minimum stagework alterations where switch and crossing work is to be
recovered before the final design work can be completed (in order to
maintain point detection and/or track circuit operation, and hence associated
signal or route operation, when redundant switch and crossing components
are to be recovered).
• Recovery of redundant assets, but only in situations (c) and (d), defined in
Section B3:3.
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B3:3 Redundant Assets

In order to maintain the integrity of circuit principles set out in this Guidance
Note, circuits and relays made redundant by the abolition or change of facilities
should generally be shown to be removed in full on circuit diagrams.
Spare terminals and fuses may be left in situ, providing their existence is
correctly shown on circuit diagram layouts and analysis. Where cable cores
become spare as a result of circuit alterations, disconnection links at
intermediate locations and their associated jumpers should be left in situ (subject
to circuit length limitations due to induction). See Part J.
The only permitted relaxation to this rule is for certain specific temporary
alterations:
• stagework;
• at installations with a very limited life; and
• at installations with degraded or fragile wiring.
The proposed extent of recoveries should be established with the infrastructure

controller, considering:
the need to maintain the integrity of circuit principles; and

whether it is safe to disturb the existing wiring.
The recovery work should then be categorised as follows:
a) retrospective work to be undertaken to recover redundant assets;
b) assets made redundant by the current alteration to be recovered;
c) assets to be recovered at the next major alteration; or
d) no recoveries to be undertaken until the installation is renewed.
Categories (a) and (b) should accord with permanent design procedures and are
not subject to the relaxation given in Section B3:4, but (c) and (d) are temporary
expedients that require justification within the risk assessment.
B3:4 Relaxation
The following expedients may be used in connection with temporary work:
• the retention of redundant circuitry and equipment, as described in Section

B3:6;
• the retention of temporarily out of use circuitry and equipment;
• the provision of not yet commissioned circuitry and equipment in working
installations;
• the disconnection, insulation and securing of wires in accordance with
Section B3:5, in lieu of complete removal;
• the bridging out of contacts with crimped straps;
• the replacement of fuses with dummy fuses;
• the removal of links to form single post terminals with red domed nuts and
insulating battens to prevent the replacement of links;
• "top-nutting" single post terminals, or provision of horizontal terminals, for
stagework cable connections;
• the use of coloured jumpers crimped at each end;
• the false feeding of circuits by the use of jumpers crimped at each end;
• the patching of signal box diagrams and panel faceplates with overlays.
Note that non-commissioned latched lock relays should be removed and their
bases plugged and labelled to prevent the insertion of a relay latched the wrong
way. If necessary, crimped straps may be used to enable other circuits to be
introduced.
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B3:5 Protection
Protection should be arranged in accordance with the following principles, whilst
the temporary arrangements remain in force:
• the strategy for any stagework should be identified in the design specification
for the scheme (see GK/RT0201) and be subject to a fully documented
process of risk assessment;
• the affected wiring should be correlated as far as reasonably practicable, in
accordance with GK/RT0115;
• all the relevant diagrams, including analysis, cable core plans and bonding
plans, should be produced and issued for production, testing, commissioning
and maintenance purposes, in accordance with GK/RT0201, except for non-
conceptual work (see Section B3:7);
• temporarily out of use, not yet commissioned and redundant circuitry should
be identified on the production and record diagrams by the use of special
notes with arrows, or symbols, as described in GK/RT0201 (but non-
conceptual temporary alterations to circuitry need only be identified on the
record diagrams);
• trackside equipment that has temporary alterations, is temporarily out of use,
not yet commissioned, or redundant and left in situ should be shown on
record signalling plans, as described in GK/RT0004;
• not yet installed trackside equipment with circuitry provided in the interlocking
and recovered trackside equipment with circuitry left in the interlocking should
also be shown on record signalling plans, as described in GK/RT0004;
• temporarily out of use, not yet commissioned and redundant controls, where
the circuitry (or mechanical locking) is left in the interlocking, should be shown
on record control tables, as described in GK/RT0201; and
• each end of redundant / temporarily out of use wiring should, as appropriate,
be fully terminated or “bomb tailed” at all times;
B3:6 Recovery of Redundant Assets

When the relaxation given in Section B3:4 is applied to the recovery of
redundant assets, the following rules should be adopted:
B3:6.1 General
All out of use equipment, fuses and links should be permanently labelled as
such. A note to that effect should be provided on the design details.
B3:6.2 Trackside Equipment

Generally, all equipment should be recovered, but the following special
requirements apply:
• Points. See Rule Book GO/RT3000, Section B (Part ii).

• Point mechanisms. Track equipment and tail cables should be recovered.
Operating circuits should be isolated by the removal of fuses and links in the
adjacent apparatus housing.
• Point detection (entire abolition of a set of points). Detection circuits should
be isolated by the removal of fuses and links in the adjacent apparatus
housing and false fed at the interlocking.
• Point detection (abolition of one end of a set of multiple ended points).
Detection circuit and point end lettering should be altered to the final
arrangement.
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• Ground frames. Track equipment and tail cables should be recovered.

Incoming and outgoing circuits should be isolated by the removal of fuses
and links in the adjacent apparatus housing. If partially in use, the track
fittings should be removed and levers fixed normal.
• Signals and AWS. Track equipment, tail cables and disconnection boxes
should be recovered. Incoming and outgoing circuits should be isolated by
the removal of fuses and links in the adjacent apparatus housing. If part of
the signal remains in use, the profile on the sighting form should be altered.
• Route indicators. PLJIs and route indicators should be recovered.
Redundant feeds to partially operative route indicators should be
disconnected. PLJIs should be rearranged, if necessary, for remaining
routes.
• Track circuits. Tail cables and disconnection boxes should be recovered.
Bonding should be altered. Adjacent track circuits may require adjusting.
Remaining track circuits should not be altered, unless they can be
rationalised by abolishing TRs and combining TPRs at the interlocking.
B3:6.3 Lineside Locations

Generally, tail cables, fuses and links should be removed, but the internal wiring
and equipment may be left in situ. False feeding in locations should only be
considered where no other solution is reasonably practicable. In such cases, the
false feeds should be crimped, wired and labelled to permanent standards.
Wherever possible, busbar fuses should be removed and dummy fuses inserted.
Main cables may be left in situ, in which case they should remain terminated with
the links removed and red dome nuts fitted.
B3:6.4 Signal Boxes and Interlockings

Work should be undertaken as follows:
• Lever frames. Levers and locking should be left in situ. Levers retained
solely to maintain locking and which have to be pulled to release other levers
should be plated “Interlocking Lever” or otherwise according to existing
practice at the signal box. Levers that are temporarily fixed, preferably
normal, to maintain locking should be plated “Not in Use”. (Any levers fixed
reverse require the agreement of the infrastructure controller.) Levers that
are free of all locking should be painted white, in accordance with
GK/RT0005. Redundant locks should be recovered and looping restored.
Locking charts should be accurately updated.
• Free wired interlocking. Wherever possible, busbar fuses should be

removed and dummy fuses inserted. Otherwise power should be removed
from redundant parts of the circuitry by disconnecting wires in accordance
with Section B3:5. Out of use latched lock relays should be removed and
their bases plugged and labelled to prevent the insertion of a relay latched
the wrong way. Points free relays (WZR or equivalent) are thus de-
energised. Other redundant relays should be treated similarly. Any false
feeds or straps used to maintain working circuits, including point detection,
should be crimped, wired and labelled to permanent standards. A controlled
signal with only one route remaining may be converted to an automatic
signal.
• Geographical interlocking. To be similarly treated, but by fitting dummy

relays, or reconfiguring straps, generally on plug couplers.
• Solid State Interlocking. No relaxations are permitted.
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• Signal box diagram. An overlay may be used for a minor alteration,

otherwise a new diagram print should be provided. Redundant track circuit
lamps should be removed. Redundant points should be marked "C&P"
qualified by “RHSC” (right hand switch closed) or “LHSC” (left hand switch
closed), as appropriate.
• Signal box block shelf. Redundant repeaters, indicators and block

instruments, etc., should be removed.
• Control panel. An overlay may be used for a minor alteration, otherwise
permanent artwork should be provided. Redundant track circuit lamps
should be removed. Redundant points should be marked "C&P" as above.
Redundant push buttons, switches and train describer displays should be
removed, replaced with blank tiles and strapped as necessary.
Train describers. These should be altered to reflect the actual situation as far as
practicable.
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Part D
Electrical Circuits
1 Introduction
1.1
This Guidance Note applies to the design of electrical circuits associated with:
• electro-mechanical signalling systems;

• electro-pneumatic signalling systems;
• relay based signalling systems; and
• electronic signalling systems.
It applies to both internal and external circuits, commencing on the load side of
the final busbar.
1.2
It does not apply to wiring associated with the power supply side of the final
busbar or to earth bonding, which are covered in Part C, nor to circuits
associated with signalman’s voice communication systems, which are covered in
Part N.
For the presentation and use of circuit diagrams within the design process see
GK/RT0201. Relay and circuit nomenclature, as well as symbols, are defined in
GK/RT0205.
1.3
Where it entirely addresses the situation under consideration, the use of this
Guidance Note is an alternative to the risk-based approach illustrated in
GK/RT0206. However, where the particular application or intended environment
for the system introduces additional risks, these should be subject to separate
assessment.
The Design Principles in Section 2 give guidance on the minimum requirements

1.4
Use of the following guidelines will satisfy the principles encompassed within the
Guidance Note:
• Guidelines on fusing and looping are given in Appendix D1.

• Guidelines on the electromagnetic compatibility of electronic equipment are
given in Appendix D2.
• Guidelines on the application of different types of circuit are given in the
relevant parts of this Guidance Note.
• Typical circuits may be used. As a minimum, any typical circuits should follow
the guidance of this Guidance Note.
2 Design Principles
2.1 General
Circuits should be provided, as necessary:
• to interlock the signalling functions in accordance with the control tables;

• to operate the trackside and on-track signalling equipment and prove that
operation;
• to control the signalling functions from the signalbox and to indicate their
state; and
• to monitor the system to warn of failures or operating irregularities.
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Consistency in the operating and proving circuits associated with any interlocking
should be maintained, irrespective of whether the trackside and on-track
equipment is directly or indirectly fed from the interlocking. Where it is necessary
to house the controlling relays at the interlocking, the same type of circuitry
should be used, as far as practicable, as if the relays were remote.
2.2 Safety Integrity

The use of fail-safe circuits and components should be commensurate with the
levels of safety and availability required, as described in GK/RT0206. The
following areas should be considered:
• safety-critical systems and components to fail safe, such that no foreseeable

failure mode can introduce a hazard within the signalling system that was not
present before the failure;
• safety-related systems and components that are not safety-critical to fail safe
wherever reasonably practicable;
• the possible failure modes of each component of a safety-related system and
the implications of a fail safe circuit component failing in its predetermined
mode (such as a relay failing to energise, or overcurrent protective device
operating);
• circuits to be designed to prevent feedback from current taking an
unintended path, both under ordinary and failure conditions (care should be
taken when interfacing with electronic equipment where outputs could be
conductive even when nominally de-energised);
• circuits to be designed to take all transient conditions into account, i.e.
concurrent changes in other circuits (care should be taken to consider any
fleeting outputs from electronic equipment that could occur under either
normal or failure conditions);
• circuit faults to be self-revealing and rapidly detectable, to reduce the risk of
a subsequent fault, in combination with the first fault, leaving the system in
an unsafe state;
• circuit components that do not fail safe (e.g. diodes, relays with non-safety
contacts, and electronic flashers), and cannot be otherwise proved, to be
used only where a hazardous failure cannot arise;
• secondary protection, or proving, to be provided for safety-critical functions
(even at a lower safety integrity level) such that, if a wrong side failure were
to occur, a hazardous event would be unlikely to follow;
• warnings to the signalman or train driver in the event of a failure of safety-
related functions; and
• the use of a probabilistic approach with complex systems.
2.3 Proving
Where necessary to reduce risks to an acceptable level, proving should be used
to ensure equipment is in a safe state before another operation can be carried
out. Proving should automatically disable a potentially conflicting operation.
Proving is generally provided for safety-critical functions, as in the following

situations, but this list is not exhaustive:
• to verify the state of trackside and on-track equipment, in accordance with

control tables (lamp proving, point detection, etc.);
• to verify correspondence between outputs from systems duplicated by
diversity;
• to verify that certain safety-critical relays, repeat relays, latched relays,
contactors and timers have reverted to the de-energised or released position
(down proving);
• to verify the removal of a bridge path in certain locking levels;
• to verify that two mutually exclusive safety-critical functions are not operated
at the same time (cross proving);
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• to verify that certain safety-critical events have occurred in the correct

sequence (sequence proving); and
• to verify that certain lever locks are effective (lock proving contacts).
The application of proving is considered further in Section 9.
2.4 Fault Monitoring

Where necessary to achieve the required availability level, monitoring should be
provided to warn the signalman or maintainer of a failure, by means of an audible
and/or visual alarm. The result of monitoring functions that directly affect train
operations should be communicated to the signalman as an alarm, but other
alarms need only inform the maintainer. Details of interlocking monitoring
requirements are given in Part F and the signalman’s display in Part L.
Where circuit components or cables are duplicated to ensure continued

availability in the event of a single failure, a facility should be provided to permit
the independent monitoring, either manual or automatic, of both elements, for
example disconnection links for duplicated tail cables.
2.5 Maintainability
Circuits should be designed to facilitate preventive and corrective maintenance,
minimise failure potential and the consequences of failure, and simplify testing,
as required in GK/RT0206.
Where a risk to train operations is presented by the resetting of equipment

following a failure, a means of isolation to enable out-of-service resetting and
testing by the maintainer prior to restoration by the signalman should be
provided, in accordance with GK/RT0027.
2.6 Power Supply Considerations

The voltage drop within a circuit should not be sufficient to prevent the circuit
operating correctly under all permitted conditions of power supply fluctuation (as
stated in GM/RT1102), and should, in any case, not exceed 10%.
Circuits should be designed to ensure that systems revert to a safe state in the
event of a power failure. Where this is impracticable, or there is no safe state, a
secure power supply should be provided.
Safe state is explained in GK/RT0206.
Where necessary to achieve the required availability level, the state of safety-
critical interlocking functions should be stored by a means that will remain secure
in the event of a total failure of all power supplies.
Circuits should be designed to prevent an unsafe state occurring during power

supply failure or restoration, including momentary loss. Where the state of
safety-critical information is not, or cannot be stored, e.g. in the case of
electronic interlocking systems, processes should be provided to reset or refresh
the system to correspond to the state of the railway before being restored to
use.
Wherever practicable, circuits should function in their usual manner following

power supply loss and restoration without having to be manually reset by a
maintainer, unless a safe state cannot otherwise be ensured.
See also Part C for power supply requirements.
2.7 Electrical Safety

Appropriate measures should be taken to comply with the Electricity at Work
Regulations 1989.
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The main requirements are as follows:
• Protection from direct contact. See Section 3.1.

• Protection from indirect contact. See Sections 3.2 and 6.6, and Part C.
• Provision of a single earth. See Part C.
• Use of appropriate equipment. See Section 6 and GK/RT0206.
• Overcurrent protection. See Section 3.3.
• Ability to disconnect the supply. See Section 3.4.
• Sufficient working space. See Part G.
• Competent staff. See GK/RT0101.
• Accurate documentation. See GK/RT0201.
2.8 Circuit Conductors

The current carrying capacity of circuit conductors should be adequate for the
design, considering its environment, range of ambient temperature, insulation
and whether the current is continuous or intermittent. Conductors (including
earth and equipotential bonding, where reasonably practicable) should be
capable of carrying overload and short circuit currents to survive beyond the time
necessary to operate the protective device(s). The insulation should be
sufficient to withstand the operating temperature and provide adequate
protection against the highest voltages present in the immediate vicinity of the
conductor.
Conductors are considered further in Part J.
2.9 Circuit Components

The continuous and intermittent rating of circuit components should be adequate
for the design. Circuit switching devices should be sufficiently robust to make
and break the highest current for which the circuit is designed, within its
designed life-cycle, without sustaining damage. Components should be capable
of carrying overload and short circuit currents to survive beyond the time
necessary to operate the protective device(s).
Insulation should be effective to enable the equipment to withstand the applied

voltage and any likely transient overvoltages.
A circuit component that presents a hidden or unexpected danger to staff should

have a warning sign affixed indicating the specific danger, e.g. hazardous
substance, hot surface, moving parts, etc.
Where circuit components are provided with plug-in connectors, measures

should be taken to prevent a hazard being caused by a wrong component being
plugged in.
Components are considered further in Section 6.
2.10 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

All electrical and electronic systems and equipment should be capable of
demonstrating conformity to the following EMC protection requirements, in
accordance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 1992:
• the electromagnetic disturbance (a.c., d.c. or h.f.) it generates, by conduction

or radiation, should not exceed a level allowing other equipment to operate
as intended, unless the electromagnetic emission is a stated necessary
function of operation; and
• it should have a level of intrinsic immunity adequate to enable it to operate as
intended.
It may be assumed that such equipment present in the electromagnetic

environment is that which might reasonably be expected to be present. The
manufacturer's declaration of conformity and associated Conformité Européene
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(CE) marking should only be used to demonstrate compliance for the particular
application and in the particular environment specified by the manufacturer in the
instructions supplied with the equipment.
Systems and equipment that are assembled from components that individually
may, or may not, have CE markings should, nevertheless, be provided with a
declaration of conformity and CE marking for the overall configuration. This also
applies to existing systems that are altered to such an extent that their EMC
characteristics are substantially changed, and to systems that are used in
different applications or environments from those specified by the manufacturer.
Conformance may be demonstrated by application of experimental European

Standards ENV50121-1 (for the railway system environment as a whole) and DD
ENV50121-4 (for signalling and telecommunications apparatus within the railway
system environment).
Protection of signalling equipment is required against:
• direct contact with traction current through rail connections;

• direct contact with earth or rails through insulation damage;
• high frequency (h.f.) contamination of power supplies; and
• induction from parallel a.c. or h.f. circuits;
so as to ensure an appropriate level of system safety and dependability and

safeguard staff from danger.
The application of these requirements is considered in Section 4.
3 Circuit Design for

Occupational Safety
The Electricity at Work Regulations 1989, made under the Health and Safety at
Work Act 1974, require both employers and employees to take precautions in
respect of electrical systems, equipment and conductors, and activities on or
near such equipment.
All electrical and electronic systems and equipment are required to comply with
these regulations. They may generally be satisfied by following the IEE Wiring
Regulations (BS 7671). Although BS 7671 is not mandatory for railway signalling
equipment, every area of protection addressed therein should be covered, either
by compliance with BS 7671, or by providing an equivalent degree of protection.
Note that the use of an earth-free supply alone is not recognised as an adequate
form of protection from direct contact or indirect contact with live parts.
Procedures and training for work on or near electrical equipment are outside the
scope of this Guidance Note, but are covered in GM/RT1040.
3.1 Direct Contact with Live Parts

All live parts that could present danger to staff should be insulated, or enclosed
with external warning signs affixed. Transient and likely fault conditions should
be considered in assessing whether bare conductors may be tolerated. See
Sections 3.1.2 and 4.3.
Protection from direct contact is assured by the total insulation or enclosure of all
live parts able to be raised to a potential exceeding 25V a.c. or 60V ripple-free
d.c., or able to be supplied with a current exceeding 25A. This may be satisfied
by the provision of locked apparatus cases, or other enclosures. Where
insulation is not reasonably practicable, voltages up to a nominal 110V a.c. or
120V d.c. may be tolerated on open fuses and terminals, provided they are
clearly labelled and it can be demonstrated that all persons having access are
trained and aware of the dangers.
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Where insulation is not practicable, the use of enclosures and intermediate

physical barriers should be considered in order to prevent or deter unintentional
contact with live parts. Such enclosures and barriers (with the exception of
portable shields) should be removable only by use of a tool and should carry a
permanent warning label. They should be arranged so that the removal of a
barrier to permit one work activity will leave other live parts protected. Barriers
may be made of transparent material to reduce the need for removal. For
further details see Part G.
3.1.1 Precautions to be Taken in Electrified Areas

Danger from a.c. overhead line equipment is addressed in GO/RT3087. Danger
from induced voltages from parallel a.c. overhead lines should be avoided by
following Section 4.3.
A special exemption from insulation or enclosure exists for live conductor rails.
Danger should be reduced by the provision of warning notices, special training
for staff and, where appropriate, barriers. On-track equipment should be
positioned such that no lid, or other movable part, can make contact with the
conductor rail. Where there is danger to maintainers working on such
equipment, precautions should be taken to reduce the risk to be as low as
reasonably practicable. The following options are in order of effectiveness:
• the conductor rail should be gapped;

• conductor rail protective boarding fitted; or
• staff provided with portable shields.
Further precautions are given in GO/RT3091.
3.1.2 Danger from Track Cables in Electrified Areas

In order to protect staff and signalling equipment in electrified areas from traction
voltages under fault conditions, track circuit tail cables should be fully insulated,
generally by terminating them on a pair of BS 88 fuse carriers and bases in the
lineside apparatus housing nearest to the rail connections. The terminals of all
track circuit equipment should be shrouded or enclosed, except when using the
safety procedures for work on electrical equipment. Connections to impedance
bonds and track circuit capacitors that are not at running rail potential could be
charged at a dangerous voltage at any time.
A fuse is to be provided in one fuse carrier and a link in the other, as follows.
Fuses in both legs would give unpredictable results.
• Single rail track circuits should be fused in the insulated rail leg.
• Double rail track circuits should be fused in the leg connecting to the
impedance bond winding.
For double rail track circuits, a two electrode surge arrestor should generally be
provided across the track circuit tail cable (on the external side of the fuse) in the
apparatus housing nearest to the rail connections. It should not be connected to
earth, unless precautions are taken to prevent a surge creating multiple earth
faults.
Electrical isolation between track cables and the interlocking environment is

desirable. Consequently, track relays and track feeds should generally be
confined to lineside locations with repeat relays provided in interlockings.
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The requirements of this section (3.1.2) do not apply to track circuits which are
coupled to the rails by means of isolating transformers or tuning units adjacent to
the track, such as HVI and TI 21 types. Detailed arrangements for individual
types of track circuit are given in the Train Detection Handbook, GK/RH0751.
3.1.3 Danger from Back Electromotive Force (EMF)

Inductive loads generate a back EMF when the current is broken, which is
usually dissipated through the power supply unit. This applies particularly to
AWS inductors, hydraulically powered trainstops and lever locks.
Precautions should be taken to guard against dangerous voltages occurring on

the cable in the event of the disconnection links being removed.
These may take the form of:
• a reverse biased protection diode for back EMF suppression provided across
the external side of the cable terminations; or
• fully insulated cables terminated on a pair of BS 88 fuse carriers fitted with
links.
Suitable diodes are as follows: 1A, 400V for standard strength AWS inductors
and suppressors, or 6A, 800V for high strength.
Details of the protection of electronic devices from back EMF are given in
Appendix D2:6.
3.2 Safety Equipotential Bonding

The purpose of equipotential bonding is to protect against indirect contact with
exposed-conductive-parts and extraneous-conductive-parts made live by an
electrical fault. Earthed equipotential bonding within apparatus housings is
associated with the signalling power supply system and is required where
specified in Part C.
Equipotential bonding of extraneous-conductive-parts that are not within

apparatus housings is associated with external electrical systems, such as
traction supply, and is required where specified in Part J. In a.c. electrified areas
and where overhead power distribution lines cross the track in non-electrified
areas, equipotential bonding provides protection from dangerous touch potentials
appearing between adjacent metalwork (and rail connections) in the event of a
fault on the high voltage system. The connection of equipotential bonding to the
traction return system facilitates the automatic disconnection of the traction
supply if damaged overhead lines should make contact with structural
metalwork.
However, in d.c. electrified areas, a greater danger would arise from large
traction currents flowing to earth via the equipotential bonding, which
consequently is not provided.
3.3 Overcurrent Protection

An overcurrent protective device should be provided for each circuit or group of
circuits, of sufficient rating to prevent damage from the current carrying capacity
of a circuit conductor or circuit component being exceeded under failure or
overload conditions and, where applicable, to make safe any exposed-
conductive-parts or extraneous-conductive-parts made live by an electrical fault.
Indirect contact protection is considered further in Part C.
Protective devices should be selected by considering the following

characteristics:
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• nominal current of the device;

• speed of operation and sensitivity, depending on the type of load, e.g. highly
inductive, starting or in-rush currents, or electronic equipment;
• voltage rating;
• discrimination between successive stages of protection (see Part C);
• suitability for the railway environment;
• reliability;
• whether fuses or circuit breakers;
• whether a monitoring facility is required;
• whether required to be enclosed to provide protection from direct contact
(see Section 3.1);
• whether required to provide disconnection facilities, e.g. fuse switches, (see
Section 3.4); and
• whether required to provide isolation facilities, e.g. locking off, (see
Section 3.4).
The nominal current of the device should be chosen to be greater than the
design load of the circuit, but less than the current carrying capacity of the circuit
conductors. This will ensure operation of the device before the conductors are
exposed to a current greater than they can safety withstand (generally accepted
as 1.45 times their current carrying capacity), or the insulation is subjected to an
unacceptable rise in conductor temperature.
The design load should include any foreseeable peak load of a protracted
nature. Where this excludes anticipated transients, such as motor starting
currents or transformer inrush currents, it may be necessary to use reduced
sensitivity or slow operation devices to avoid nuisance tripping.
The infrastructure controller should be informed of any measures taken to avoid

nuisance tripping and an appropriate note should be made on the design details.
It should also be ensured that the current rating of each circuit component is
greater than the nominal current of the device.
Overcurrent protective devices should generally be provided in all non-earthed

legs (only) of final circuits. However, for supplies with no earth connection that
do not exceed 120V, protective devices may be provided in one leg only. For
non-earthed supplies, it should be recognised that there is a risk of a return
circuit conductor in an unfused leg of a low current circuit being unprotected, in
the event of a double earth fault allowing a fault current from an adjacent high
current circuit to flow in it.
All branches of a circuit (including both branches of a ring feed) should be

connected to a single overcurrent protective device. Where practicable, every
feed (phase ‘BX’, or positive ‘B’) device or terminal should have a corresponding
return (neutral ‘NX’, or negative ‘N’) terminal or device.
Overcurrent protective devices should be arranged so as to minimise potential

disruptions to train operations in the event of a fault. Discrimination between
successive stages of protection should therefore be arranged, as described in
Part C.
The standard arrangement for signalling circuits is given in Appendix D1.
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3.4 Isolation and Emergency Switching

Where necessary to prevent danger, each circuit should be capable of
emergency on-load switching and isolation (fixing off).
Emergency switching is a means of de-energising a circuit to prevent danger

from operating equipment or from electric shock. (Overcurrent protective devices
are not generally suitable for on-load switching, unless specifically designed, e.g.
fuse switches.) Risk of danger with respect to emergency switching may be
considered to be acceptably low if:
• the electrical equipment has no moving parts that could cause danger; and
• there are no bare conductors in the circuit over 25V a.c. or 60V ripple-free
d.c., or carrying over 25A.
Isolation is a means to allow work in safety, e.g. by locking off. Isolation facilities
may be omitted if all the following apply:
• it is unreasonable for the equipment to be disconnected to allow work to take

place;
• it is reasonable for work to be undertaken on the live conductors; and
• suitable precautions, such as protective equipment and/or permit to work, will
be available.
Emergency switching and isolation devices should be clearly labelled, and their
accessibility should be appropriate to the risks involved. Emergency switching
and isolation facilities may be combined, and may be common to several items of
equipment where it is appropriate for them to be energised and de-energised as
a group.
In practice, lockable 650V fuse switches will generally satisfy both these
requirements for each individual apparatus case. For further details see Part C.
4 Circuits (General)
Except where stated otherwise, the following requirements should be adopted
for all new installations irrespective of the type of traction present, and also apply
to non-safety-related circuits:
4.1 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

Measures should be taken to prevent false operation of circuits arising from
interference from any source.
The most common sources and preventative measures are listed in Figure D1.
Note that any CE marking on manufactured equipment only demonstrates
conformity to the EMC protection requirements for the particular application and
in the particular environment specified by the manufacturer.
4.2 Internal Circuits

Internal circuits should be designed to minimise the length of wire runs between
relay contacts.
Internal circuits do not require to be double cut because they are fed from a
separate internal supply, thus rendering them significantly less susceptible to
earth faults. Where an external supply is used to feed circuits that would
otherwise be internal, they should be treated as line circuits and should comply
with Sections 4.3 and 4.5.
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Interference Source Preventative Measures Reference

Traction current • the use of traction immune signalling equipment, such as see the equipment
contamination point machines, track circuits and relays. parts of this Code of
• feeds to on-track circuits that are not susceptible to Practice
contamination by the type of traction interference likely to be
present, i.e. a.c., d.c., coded or audio frequency.
Induction from parallel • the use of d.c. feeds and a.c. immune relays for external see Section 4.3
a.c. or high frequency circuits (except for circuits to trackside and on-track
circuits equipment in d.c. and dual electrified areas).
• limiting the length of through connected conductor parallel to
the railway, such that the maximum induced current would
be insufficient to operate any a.c. circuit.
• limiting the length of signal lamp circuits parallel to the see Section 4.4
railway, such that the maximum induced current would be
insufficient to light a lamp.
Earth faults • double cutting of all external safety-critical circuits. see Section 4.5
• separate power supplies for certain groups of circuits. see Part C
• earth fault monitoring on vulnerable power supply busbars.
High frequency • keeping leads to electronic equipment as short as see Appendix D2
contamination of practicable.
electronic systems • segregating systems capable of mutual interference.
• providing special cables, such as twisted pair or screened.
• using highly coded systems for safety-critical applications.
• prohibiting the use of radio transmitters or mobile
telephones, etc., in the vicinity (with warning notices).
Electrical surges, such as • fast transient earths. see Appendix D2
lightning strikes,
flashovers from the
traction supply and • surge suppressors (not connected to earth unless the
switching transients, system is coded to prevent multiple earth faults).
affecting solid state
components
Magnetic interference • moving iron relays and indicators not to be placed in close see Section 6.1.1
between low current proximity where the magnetic field generated can affect an
devices adjacent device.
Figure D1 Protection Against Electromagnetic Interference
Circuits between adjacent buildings and/or apparatus cases and under signal
box lever frames may be treated as internal, provided that measures are taken
to sufficiently reduce the risk of earth faults, e.g. by use of a protective non-
conducting duct.
Isolating transformers, including converters, may be used in the feed to individual

on-track or line circuits to reduce the need for earth fault detection and double
cutting, as the circuit on the primary side of the transformer is effectively an
internal circuit.
Where components of non-safety-related circuits are particularly susceptible to

earth faults, such circuits should not share a common power supply with safety-
critical circuits.
4.3 Line Circuits and Lineside Cables

All relay line circuits for new installations should be for d.c. operation to allow
maximum immunity to a.c. interference. The standard arrangement should use
50V d.c.
The physical length of line circuits is limited by the following considerations:
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• the external effect of resistive, inductive and capacitive links with other
circuits;
• restricting induced voltages from any adjacent high voltage a.c. line, including
any parallel overhead power distribution line, to ensure the safety of staff
(see Section 3.1);
• prevention of induced voltages under traction fault conditions from exceeding
430V a.c. and thus preventing false operation of an a.c. immune relay; and
• keeping the line circuit voltage drop within acceptable limits, particularly
where biased relays are used on polarised circuits, allowing universal use of
0.75mm2 multicore cable.
Note that an a.c. traction fault current of 5,500A for 200ms may be considered
as a maximum.
A length of through connected conductor parallel to the line not exceeding

2,000m will generally satisfy these constraints. Where necessary, line circuits
should be terminated within the length limit and intermediate repeater circuits
created. However, in special cases in a.c. and dual electrified areas, including
sites where traction booster transformers and return conductors are not used, or
where the cable route is elevated, calculations will be required to verify the
maximum length of through connected conductor to ensure staff safety. Any
proposal to exceed 2,000m should be subject to documented risk assessment.
For the use of polarised circuits, see Section 7.6.
Similarly, loop inputs to electronic devices, such as Solid State Interlocking (SSI)
trackside functional modules (TFMs), should feed an absolute maximum distance
of 2,000m (4,000m loop). Further considerations are given in Section 4.4.2.
Where a common power supply feeds line circuits in more than one direction, the
maximum length should be applied to the distance between the extremities of
circuits fed from the one supply. Consequently, consideration should be given to
providing separate power supplies for the groups of line circuits feeding in the up
and down directions.
Precautions necessary with remote control systems are described in

Appendix D2.
When determining the degree of protection necessary from direct contact with
live parts, the induced voltages from normal traction load should be considered.
If such voltages are likely to exceed the values stated in Section 3.1, it may be
necessary to shroud any exposed terminations.
4.4 On-Track Circuits

4.4.1 General
The maximum voltage at which on-track equipment is fed should be
commensurate with the degree of protection that it is practicable to afford to on-
track tail cables. A supply not exceeding 120V nominal will satisfy this limitation.
Signal and indicator lighting circuits are not required to be double cut, as partial
earth faults would be insufficient to illuminate a lamp. However, two wire feeds
generally are double cut, as this is easily provided.
Immunisation of AWS equipment should be provided by individual isolating

transformer rectifiers.
Circuits to other track mounted equipment, such as point detectors, switch

heaters, insulated track circuit interrupters, treadles and ground frame lever
contacts and locks, are particularly susceptible to earth faults and to traction
interference. This also applies to other on-track circuits, such as first filament
failure proving, plungers and switches, where the tail cables cross the tracks at
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ground level. Double cutting should be provided for all such circuits that are
classified as safety-critical.
Separate supplies may also be of benefit, unless the on-track supply is equipped
with earth fault detection. For further details of circuits associated with particular
equipment, see the appropriate parts of this Guidance Note.
On-track relay circuits should be fed from a 50V d.c. external supply in
conjunction with a.c. immune relays, except in d.c. electrified areas, where a
110V a.c. supply should be used to feed a.c./d.c. converters (adequately
isolated and protected against capacitive coupling) connected to relays which
may be non-immune. A dual immune system, such as reed or SSI, should be
used in dual electrified areas. For line circuits see Section 4.3.
The requirements of this section (4.4.1) are not mandatory for non-safety-related
functions, such as switch heaters, first filament failure proving, and TRTS and
CD plungers, provided they are not fed from a power supply feeding safety-
related functions.
4.4.2 Maximum Lengths of On-Track Circuits

The distance between a signal and its signal control relays (or TFM), parallel to
the line, is limited by the following considerations:
• limiting induced voltages from any adjacent high voltage a.c. lines, including
any parallel overhead power distribution line, to a level that will be inadequate
to illuminate the lamps;
• restricting induced voltages from any adjacent high voltage a.c. line, including
any parallel overhead power distribution line, to ensure the safety of staff
(see Section 3.1);
• keeping the voltage drop within acceptable limits using 0.75mm2 cable;
• reducing electromagnetic interference in electronic circuits (see Appendix
D2:6); and
• facilitating testing and maintenance.
A length not exceeding 200m will generally satisfy these constraints, except for
signals fed at low voltage d.c.
Exceptionally, in non-a.c. electrified areas, longer circuits may be used, subject

to voltage drop, to feed into tunnels or along viaducts, or in other situations that
are particularly expedient. Such arrangements where on-track circuits exceed
200m should be subject to documented risk assessment.
In a.c. and dual electrified areas, where a common power supply feeds more
than one signal, the maximum length should be applied to the distance between
the most remote signals fed from the supply.
The considerations applicable to other types of on-track equipment are given in

the appropriate parts of this Guidance Note.
Whilst the absolute maximum lengths for relay circuits and loop inputs to
electronic devices are considered in Section 4.3, when these are connected to
trackside and on-track signalling equipment, the considerations of this section
(4.4.2) are applicable and any circuits exceeding 200m should be subject to
documented risk assessment.
4.5 Double Cutting

The following should generally be double cut:
• all safety-critical line circuits in their entirety.
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• all safety-critical on-track circuits in their entirety, except for signal lighting.
This includes external loop inputs to electronic devices and their external
outputs.
• any other circuit fed from a power supply that feeds either of the above.
This is because signalling circuits are susceptible to earth faults, due, for
example, to mechanical damage or insulation degradation permitting contact with
a relay rack, lever frame, apparatus case body or running rail. As signalling
supplies are not generally earthed, two earth faults would be necessary to
create a hazardous failure, e.g. by bridging out contacts, although the first fault
could go undetected. By duplicating contacts in both legs of a circuit, four faults
would be required to cause such a failure (and these faults would probably short
circuit the supply and disable the circuit).
This precludes the use of common returns for safety-critical line circuits. Earth
returns should not be used for new installations, nor under any circumstances in
electrified areas.
Where practicable, contacts of the same relay should be used in each leg of the
circuit in order to double cut. Where different relays are used in each leg, for
consistency the first relay to operate and release should be placed in the feed
leg. (For polarised circuits see Section 10.5.3.)
The requirement to double cut does not apply to:
• contacts used solely to impose non-safety-related controls on safety-critical

circuits;
• back contacts used solely for down proving;
• back contacts used solely for cross proving;
• contacts used solely for correspondence proving;
• contacts used solely to economise power consumption;
• contacts on the internal side of an isolating transformer, or transformer
rectifier, feeding external circuits (see Section 4.2);
• signal lighting circuits (see Section 4.4);
• internal circuits on a dedicated power supply (see Section 4.2);
• non-safety-related circuits on a dedicated power supply; nor to
• systems that use alternative equivalent measures to mitigate the risk of earth
faults, such as earth fault disconnection devices.
4.6 Further Measures to Address Earth Faults

Further details on the requirements for separate power supplies and earth fault
monitoring are given in Part C.
5 Circuit Conductors
Cables and wiring should be in accordance with Part J.
6 Circuit Components
6.1 Relay Types
Generally, only 930 series plug-in relays (see GK/RT0330 and GK/GN0630) are
available for new work, but exceptions include:
• specialised applications where no 930 series relay provides the required

facility, e.g. double element track relays, flashers and timer relays (see
Section 8); or
• non-safety-related uses.
Wherever practicable, relays should be mounted in 930 series cases and

allocated a unique pin code by Railtrack S&SD.
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Relays for the control of signalling functions should generally be for 50V d.c.
operation, except for track relays, lamp proving relays (which are current
operated) and relays associated with the control of level crossings (which may
operate at 24V d.c. to simplify the provision of secure power supplies).
All relays fed from an external 50V d.c. supply should be a.c. immune. Non-
immune relays may be used on internal circuits where a separate supply is
provided, but, in new installations, a reduction in the variety of relays in use
should be considered by the use of a.c. immune relays for both internal and
external circuits. The following is a complete list of standard a.c. immune relays
(excluding track relays):
Style Description
931 Neutral Line Relay
932 Biased Neutral Line Relay
933 Slow Pick-Up Neutral Line Relay
934 Slow Release Neutral Line Relay
943 Biased Contactor Relay
961 Twin Biased Neutral Line Relay Unit
966 F4 Biased Contactor Relay
966 F6 Twin Neutral Line Relay Unit
Relays manufactured to these specifications should be immune up to
1,000V a.c.
Point detection circuits for new installations should generally use four wire d.c.
circuits with biased relays (see Section 7.6), except in d.c. and dual electrified
areas. See Part P for further details.
Circuits should be designed so that the relays specified may be obtained from
any manufacturer. Where certain attributes, such as coil resistance or operating
times, are not given in the relay specification, care should be taken to ensure
that the circuit characteristics cannot be adversely affected by changing a relay
for one from a different manufacturer. See Sections 7.5, 8.3 and 8.4 for
examples.
6.1.1 Shelf-Type Relays

Shelf-type relays are not generally available for new work, although they may be
necessary in association with battery supplied block circuits.
Shelf-type relays should be mounted in a stable manner to resist vibration and

prevent falling.
To prevent magnetic interference, low current devices, such as moving iron

relays, should not be mounted back to back, nor placed within a relay space
apart.
The terminals of shelf-type relays should be fully shrouded to reduce their

vulnerability to false circuit operation. See Section 6.7.
6.1.2 Double Element A.C. Vane Relays (BS 561 or BS 1745)

Local and control (or track) coils should always be fed from the same power
supply point, as it is essential that their relative phases remain constant.
1
Vane relays operating at 83 /3 Hz provide immunity in a.c. and dual electrified
areas. In this situation the local coil is fed from a separate supply obtained from
a converter which is linked in a fixed phase relationship with the main supply.
Double element 50 Hz track relays for use with a.c. track circuits may be used to
give immunity in d.c. electrified areas. Detailed arrangements for individual types
of track circuit are given in the Train Detection Handbook, GK/RH0751.
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Three position vane relays may be found providing immunity on polarised point
detection circuits, but are not generally available for new work.
6.1.3 Flasher Units

The following flasher units are suitable for safety-critical applications, provided
they are wired in the configuration intended by the specification:
• specification BR 901 for level crossing road lamps; and

• specification BR 991 for signals with flashing aspects, or signal passed at
danger (SPAD) indicators.
Pulsed supplies to operate ratchet impulse timers (see Section 8.2) should be
provided to safety-critical integrity, e.g. by using duplicated and monitored pulse
generators.
Flasher units providing supplies to operate flashing panel indications should be

duplicated where necessary to give the appropriate level of safety and
availability. Signalman’s display systems are safety-related, but maintainer’s
panels are generally non-safety-related.
6.2 Relay Contacts

6.2.1 Polarity
For new installations, the following convention should be applied to the wiring of
relay contacts, in both the feed and return legs of circuits. Other conventions
can be found in some existing installations.
D.C. feeds over relay contacts (except for heavy duty contacts of 943 and
966 F1, F4 & F5 style contactors) should be standardised, so that the fixed
spring which carries the carbon contact is positive with respect to the moving
spring carrying the silver contact. On 930 series relays the fixed spring has an
odd number (A1, B1, etc.) for front contacts and an even number (A8, B8, etc.)
for back contacts. A similar arrangement should be used for a.c. circuits.
The 943 and 966 F1, F4 & F5 style contactors have permanent magnets fitted
adjacent to the heavy duty contacts in order to suppress the arc. It is essential,
therefore, that they are always wired in parallel such that the current flows in the
following sequence:
• Positive supply - connectors C1 & C2;

• Connectors C3 & C4 - load - connectors C5 & C6;
• Connectors C7 & C8 - negative supply.
Internal wiring loops are provided between each pair of connectors. In order to
reduce the current flowing through the connectors, external connections should
always be made to both connectors (in a ring configuration so that the current
carrying capacity of the conductor is not exceeded), with a loop between them.
6.2.2 Rating
The 930 series metal to carbon relay contacts will make or break an unquenched
current representing a load of three 930 series relay coils. They should not be
used to break higher currents, such as d.c. lever lock circuits, unless a spark
quenching device is in use. If such circuits can be designed to be broken under
ordinary operation by higher rated devices, such as lever or economiser
contacts, rather than relay contacts, it is permissible to use 930 series relay
contacts up to their continuous rated value of 3A. Another situation where a 3A
rating is appropriate, is where it is unlikely that the contact will break the circuit,
e.g. the (PO)JR contact in Figure D2.
Medium duty contacts (elkonite or metal to metal) are generally designed to

carry 6A continuously for lamps, subject to individual relay specifications. For
example, each medium duty back contact of a 966 F3 style relay will supply a
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maximum of one 50W halogen lamp unit, as used in level crossing road traffic
signals. Metal to carbon contacts may be used to break such a load, but should
not make the circuit, unless there is a series component, such as a ECR coil, to
reduce the surge current.
The 943 and 966 F1, F4 & F5 style heavy duty contacts will make or break a
point operating mechanism circuit passing up to 30A (for a limited number of
operations during the service life of the contactor). The operating circuits should
be protected by overcurrent protective devices rated at a maximum of 15A.
6.2.3 Minimum Voltage

The 930 series relay contacts should not be used where the applied potential is
less than a nominal 24V since high resistance contacts are likely to develop,
except to feed 12V signal lamps, as in this case the current is relatively high and
the load largely non-inductive.
6.2.4 Contact Resistance

Circuit design should generally restrict the number of relay contacts wired in
series to a maximum of twenty. However, this may be increased to a maximum
of thirty in certain special applications, such as push button ring proving circuits,
provided that calculations are made to ensure that the voltage drop across all
the series contacts leaves an adequate voltage to operate the circuit. A nominal
worst case resistance of 7Ω per relay contact should be used in this calculation.
Where there is no other practicable solution, e.g. in geographical relay

interlocking systems, contacts of the same relay may be wired in parallel.
6.2.5 Non-Safety Relay Contacts

Non-safety relay contacts should not be used for safety-critical or safety-related
purposes. However, they may be used in safety circuits for non-safety-related
purposes, provided that no failure mode of the contact, i. e. open circuit, closed
circuit, earth fault, or false feed from another circuit, would give rise to a
hazardous failure of the safety circuit.
This may be achieved by grouping all non-safety contacts at the power supply
ends of a circuit so that no failure mode could enable a false feed to bypass
safety contacts. (Application to the positive or negative end of the circuit will give
equal protection.) Alternatively, the non-safety contact can be used to drive a
safety relay and contacts of that relay used in the controls.
6.3 Switching Devices

When a switch, plunger, or microswitch is required in a safety-critical signalling
circuit then the mechanical construction and possible failure modes of the device
should be considered to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is achieved.
Microswitches cannot be relied upon to fail in a particular position and so require
cyclical back proving and back-up duplication, as used on point detection. See
Part P for details.
Any switching devices that do not fail safe, and cannot be otherwise proved
and/or duplicated, should be treated in accordance with Section 6.2.5.
Where untrained persons have access to switches or plungers, full protection

against direct contact (see Section 3.1) and indirect contact (see Part C) with
live parts should be provided.
6.4 Converters
Generally available 12V/50V d.c./d.c. or 24V/50V d.c./d.c. converters will
simultaneously feed a maximum of six 930 series relays, but, due to a thermal
cut-out, they should not be used for safety-critical circuits requiring sequential
operation, such as line clear or route releases, where an automatic restoration of
supply could lead to a hazardous failure. The pin codes are pc 106 or pc 229
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(12V) and pc 186 (24V). They are used to feed 50V relays from secondary
cells.
Converters used for 110V/50V a.c./d.c. or 110V/24V a.c./d.c. should give

adequate isolation and immunity to inter-cable capacitance up to 1µF. 'QXR1'
style models, pc 6015 (50V) and pc 6011 (24V) comply and will feed one or two
930 series relays. See Section 4.4 for their use with on-track circuits.
Relay contacts should be positioned on the appropriate side of converters and

transformer rectifiers:
• on the primary side: where necessary to avoid excessive wear from back
EMF, or to avoid double cutting external circuits; or
• on the secondary side: where necessary to obtain an immediate cut-off, or
to enable one unit to feed several circuits.
6.5 Other Components

When some other device is required in a safety-critical signalling circuit then the
possible failure modes of the device in the particular application (open circuit or
closed circuit, etc.) should be considered. The consequences of such failure
should be examined by a fully documented process of risk assessment to ensure
that an acceptable level of safety is achieved. For example, note the restrictions
placed on equipment with thermal cut-outs in Section 6.4.
Any devices that do not fail safe, and cannot be otherwise proved, should be
treated in accordance with Section 6.2.5.
Where practicable and where an improvement in reliability will result, the device
should generally be rated higher than the working requirement.
Wherever practicable, special units should be mounted on 930 series bases and
allocated a unique pin code by Railtrack.
6.6 Double Insulated Equipment

Where it is not reasonably practicable to achieve an earthing system that is
sufficient to make safe, by automatic disconnection of the supply, any exposed-
conductive-parts or extraneous-conductive-parts made live by an electrical fault
(see Part C), then class II, double insulated, equipment should be provided. This
will ensure that a single fault cannot cause a dangerous exposed potential.
Class II equipment, by definition, should not be earthed and an associated

earthing terminal should not be provided. Socket outlets should not be included
in class II systems and warnings should be provided on the design details to
prevent the connection of any equipment other than class II. Where it is
impracticable to obtain class II equipment, supplementary insulation of an
equivalent standard may be applied on site, provided the degree of safety
achieved can be verified by testing.
Where class I and class II equipment is mixed within an electrical system, Part C
should be followed with regard to the provision of an earthing system.
All newly specified trackside and on-track equipment should be double insulated.
Existing designs of signalling equipment should comply with this requirement
from their next revision.
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6.7 Component Terminals

Components should be chosen with terminals that are capable of securely
terminating up to two conductors of sufficient size to carry the design load of the
circuit.
The terminals should be fully shrouded in the following circumstances:
• where they are vulnerable to items being dropped on them that could cause
false operation of the circuit (especially applicable to terminals on horizontal
surfaces); or
• where the likely exposed voltage could present a danger to staff (see
Section 3.1).
A suitable note should be added to design details.
7 Relay Logic
Circuit Techniques
7.1 Meshed Circuits
Where meshed circuits feeding more than one relay are necessary, they should
be kept as simple as reasonably practicable. Circuit design should ensure that
the relays cannot be falsely energised by means of an unintended path, or as a
result of a circuit disconnection. Measures to prevent feedback are described in
Section 10.5.3.
Complex meshed circuits should not be used, because of the extra work
involved in testing and corrective maintenance, unless their suitability can be
demonstrated by documented risk assessment and approved by the
infrastructure controller. Such circuits in geographical relay interlocking systems
are risk assessed as part of the system approval.
Note that each path in a meshed circuit should be fed from the same overcurrent
protection device. Further considerations for changeover paths in meshed
circuits are given in Section 10.5.3.
7.2 Power Supply Restoration

Special measures are required in certain situations to retain the stored
information in the event of a power failure. A contact of a power off timer relay,
(PO)JR, set at 5 to 10 seconds, should be included in safety-critical stick circuits
that use back contacts of track repeat relays, to allow the slow to operate relays
time to operate after a total power failure. See Figure D2.
Contacts should also be used where power up transients would cause a

confusing display to the signalman, such as with point route lights.
7.3 Stick Circuits

The stick circuit is used in relay logic where the condition(s) required to switch a
relay from the de-energised state to the energised state are not the converse of
those which are to switch it from energised to de-energised. It can thus be used
to store information or remember a previous occurrence.
Disengage Pick Up SR (PO)JR

Controls Controls Where
SR Necessary
Hold Up
(Section 7.2)
Controls
Figure D2 Stick Relay Circuit
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The circuit consists of a relay wired with a parallel path, known as the stick path,
that contains a front contact of the same relay, the stick contact. This path is
capable of holding up, or sticking up, the armature, but cannot pick it. The circuit
is illustrated in Figure D2.
Note that both paths in a stick circuit should be fed from the same overcurrent
protection device. Further considerations for changeover paths are given in
Section 10.5.2.
7.4 Bridge Paths

These are in some respect similar to stick paths except they operate in the
opposite way, allowing a relay to energise without proving a particular function,
but then de-energising to ensure the function concerned is proved before further
levels of locking are considered.
Where it is necessary to by-pass standard control contacts in circuits, e.g. for

complex swinging overlaps, circuit design should ensure that such bridge paths
are broken before the signal can clear, and that a circuit disconnection, or the
failure of a relay to energise, would not cause a hazardous failure.
706
RZLPR 506 NLR 506 RLR
DG(UP) 707 707
USR ROAR CR
Bridge Path
DG(UP)
USR 506 GR
Figure D3 Bridge Path Used for Swinging Overlaps
The situation can be protected against by ensuring that the bridge path has been
removed before the next level of locking can be achieved. The most convenient
way of doing this is to down prove a function in the bridge path in the next level
of locking. If necessary it is perfectly acceptable to introduce a function into the
bridge path purely for this purpose. This is illustrated in Figure D3. (The
signalling plan for this example can be found in Appendix F5.)
7.5 Latched Relays

Latched relays may be used to store the state of signalling functions in a way
that will remain secure in the event of a total failure of all power supplies. The
relay has two coils (operate and release) and remains secure in each state until
specifically driven to the other state. This security is achieved magnetically. In
fact the relay will operate if both coils are energised and will only release when
the operate coil is de-energised.
(Magnetic stick relays serve a similar purpose, but have two polarised operating
coils, so that, when they are wired in series, the armature is driven to a state
that is dependent on the direction of the current.)
Pairs of latched relays may be either mechanically or electrically interlocked to

prevent both relays being operated at the same time. They may thus be used
as lock relays to lock a signalling function in the normal or reverse state. Both
relays should be released, or unlocked, to allow the function to change state.
A typical electrically interlocked configuration is shown in Figure D4. Applications

are given in Part F. Note that it is essential for controls (generally the
signalman’s request conditions) to be provided in the negative legs of the circuit
to prevent a backfeed through a common return from falsely unlatching a relay
(see Appendix D1:3).
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Normal RLR NLR Normal

Controls ↑ Controls
Unlock ↓
Controls
Reverse NLR RLR Reverse

Controls ↑ Controls
Unlock ↓
Controls
Figure D4 Typical Circuit for a Pair of Lock Relays
The only relays generally available for new work are magnetically latched 935
style relays.
Circuits that require latch relays to latch up over their own back contacts should
not be used, because that feature is only available with certain manufacturer’s
relays and is additional to the requirements of the specification.
Designers should ensure that maintainers are warned, when changing relays, to
observe that the replacement is in the correct state before plugging in.
7.6 Polarised Circuits

Pairs of biased relays (two 932 style relays or a 961 style twin relay) may be
used to save cable cores on line circuits. Two wire circuits should generally be
used for new work. However, in existing installations, and where the voltage
drop would otherwise be excessive, particularly where the standard form of
cross proving (described in Section 9.2.3) presents an energising load of two
relay coils in parallel, three wire circuits (using separate feeds and a common
return) may be found.
Details of the relay end of the circuit are given in Section 9.2.3, intermediate
repeaters in Section 10.4.1 and the feed end in Section 10.5.3.
8 Time Delays
8.1 Timing Circuit Requirements
Time delays are required in electrical circuitry for a variety of reasons. Each
application has different requirements with regard to:
• time delay (150ms to 24 hours);

• safety integrity;
• whether slow to operate, or slow to release (or both).
Safety-related applications should distinguish between requirements for delayed

operation and delayed release, so as to prevent any premature de-energisation
causing a hazardous failure:
• If a function must not operate until after a given time has elapsed, this should
be effected by the front contact of a device with delayed operation.
• If a function must cease to operate before the expiry of a given time, a front
contact of a device with delayed release should be used.
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Safety Integrity Application Category

Safety-Related To release safety-critical controls in accordance with control tables, giving Operate after time
time for a train to reduce speed or come to a stand, such as in the timed (delayed
release of approach locking, approach release of signal aspects, and operation)
release of route locking with a train at a stand, or overlap locking in front of
a train. See Appendix F2 for examples.
Similarly, to provide a safety margin, e.g. when giving a manual release, operate after time
slow to pick route sticks, and performing auto normalisation of points or (delayed
other automatic working. operation)
To give other equipment time to operate, e.g. delaying the release of a operate after time
signal protecting a level crossing. (delayed
operation)
To reset functions that have not completed their operation within a due operate after time
time, such as resetting an automatic level crossing. (delayed
operation)
To reset functions that have not completed their operation within a due cease before time
time, such as replacing signal aspects if a swinging overlap does not (delayed release)
complete its operation, or a flashing aspect in rear has not been proved to
flash.
To momentarily delay the response to a change of state to give other operate after time
equipment time to respond first, e.g. to avoid momentary loss of train (delayed
detection when a vehicle moves from one track circuit to another, or where operation)
information is transmitted by different speed systems, or to protect circuits
following a power failure. See Section 10.2 for further details.
To overcome timing problems in relay logic circuits. For example, a relay operate after time
may be required to hold up while its feed changes over from one path to (delayed
another. See Sections 8.4 and 10.5.2. operation)
To create a sequence of operations, as in the level crossing barrier cease before time
operating sequence. See Part X. (delayed release)
Non-Safety- To reset functions that have not completed their operation within a due cease before time
Related time, such as preventing panel push button circuits from locking up. (delayed
operation)
To reset functions that have not completed their operation within a due cease before time
time, such as preventing points from overrunning. (delayed release)
To give the signalman time to respond, e.g. in the operation of NX push cease before time
buttons, or the timing of short audible alarms. (delayed release)
Long interval timers for non-safety-related applications, such as operating cease after time
point heaters for a predetermined time. (delayed release)
Figure D5 Typical Timing Applications
Back contacts of timing devices should not be used to operate safety-related

time-dependent circuits, unless no additional risk could be created by any
foreseeable failure of the device.
These requirements do not apply to non-safety-related uses, so, for instance, a

point operation timer can use a back contact of a non-safety timing device.
Some of the most common applications are given in Figure D5.
Safety-critical applications of conventional (slow to operate) timers should

generally be down proved as stated in Section 9.1, but see Section 8.2 for
exceptions. Timers used in certain level crossing applications should always be
down proved, where required to enhance the safety integrity (see Part X for
details). Where timers have insufficient back contacts, a repeat relay may be
used as the primary function relay (see Section 10.5) for all timing and down
proving requirements. Appendix F2 describes how down proving is applied to
track circuit timers.
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The method of initiating the timer is another consideration, especially when there
are several repeat relays (see Section 10.5). A timer relay used for track circuit
occupied application (TJR) should be controlled by a back contact of the track
circuit primary function relay (usually the TPR) wherever practicable. If there are
none available, front contacts of the T2PZR, or T3PZR, etc. may be used. (The
PZR nomenclature is explained in Section 10.5.1.)
A timer relay used for track circuit clear application (TZJR) should be controlled
by a front contact of the track circuit primary function relay (usually the TPR)
wherever practicable. If there are none available, front contacts of the T2PR, or
T3PR, etc. may be used.
8.2 Types of Timing Device

Timing devices for use in safety-critical applications should be chosen from the
following:
• Slow to operate or slow to release relays (neutral d.c. relays with a built in
copper slug) increase the operate time by 400ms (933 style relay) or the
release time by 250ms (934 style relay). The 963 style twin relay increases
both times by 150ms. Slow to operate devices are not required to be proved
down as timer relays, but only when required to prove the sequential
operation of the interlocking in accordance with Section 9.4.
• Ratchet impulse timers (slow to operate) may be used where a pulsed supply
is available (see Section 6.1.3).
• Thermal timers (slow to operate) are not appropriate for new work as they
are susceptible to voltage fluctuation and overheating, and the timing varies
with repeated operation and changes in ambient temperature. (Economising
contacts should be used to prevent any operation that is not required, e.g. a
timer should not operate for every passage of a train if it is only required
when a particular route is set.)
• Synchronous motor timers (slow to operate) require a 110V supply and a
secure 50V supply.
• Commercially available timers (either slow to operate or slow to release) may
be used if there is no other practical solution, e.g. Agastat 24V timers for
level crossing applications. (However, if employed in a safety-critical or
safety-related circuit, the timers should be duplicated and their contacts wired
in series.)
• Capacitor/resistor networks (slow to release) are described in Section 8.3.
The 946 style relay includes a dedicated capacitor/resistor network and
voltage regulator within the casing, for use in level crossing applications with
a 24V battery supply.
• Electronic timers are available as direct replacements for many of the above
types of timer. Where so determined in the approved safety case, they do
not require down proving.
8.3 Capacitor/Resistor Network

The simplest form of slow to release device is obtained by delaying the release
time of a conventional relay.
The time taken for a relay to drop may be increased by providing a capacitor (C
farads), in series with a resistor (r1 Ω), in parallel with the coil. The capacitor is
charged by the supply until the circuit controls are de-energised, at which point
the capacitor discharges through the relay coil, holding up the relay for a further
time. The time delay (t sec) is given by the formula:
t = -C(r1+r2) loge (V/E)

where E is the supply voltage;
V is the relay drop away voltage;
r2 is the resistance of the relay coil in Ω; and
loge means logarithm to the base e.
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The tolerances associated with each element in the formula may result in the
maximum time delay being up to three times the minimum. The capacitor should
be electrolytic and rated at (say) 100V. If intermediate values are required,
capacitance may be added by connecting capacitors in parallel.
A typical circuit is shown in Figure D6.
r1 Ω C δ
R
β
R
α R
Controls r2 Ω
Figure D6 Typical Arrangement
The potential across the capacitor when fully charged is dependent on the type
of power supply. For instance, a ripple-free 50V d.c. supply (either smoothed or
from a battery) will charge the capacitor to 50V. However, a 50V supply
obtained directly from a transformer/rectifier is in the form of a rectified sine
wave with a peak value of 70V (to give a root mean square value of 50V).
Consequently, the capacitor will charge to 70V. A diode (δ) should therefore be
provided in the capacitor feed path where the 50V busbar is fed from a
transformer/rectifier, in order to prevent a back feed from the capacitor raising
the busbar voltage. However, a diode should not be used where a.c. immunity
is required, including any circuit fed from an external 50V supply.
The resistor (r) is generally situated in both the charge path and the discharge
path. It is necessary when charging because a fully discharged capacitor would
otherwise effectively present a short circuit to the supply. A resistor of minimum
value, say 150Ω, will limit the charging current and prevent the overcurrent
protective device from operating. For a ripple-free supply, r should have a
minimum value of 150Ω, whereas, for a rectified supply:
(r1+r2)/r2 = 70/50, i.e. r1 = 0.4 r2.
This is because the resistor serves to divide the potential of the fully charged
capacitor in the discharge path between itself and the relay coil, in the ratio of r1
to r2.
The resistor (r1) should be suitably rated to carry the maximum charging current
(say 50W). Note that the recharge time is proportional to the value of the
resistor.
Where a dangerous situation would result from the capacitor discharging and
momentarily picking up a de-energised relay, due to the clearing of a possible
high resistance fault on the capacitor path, a precaution should be taken by
adding a front contact (marked α on Figure D6) of the relay in series with the
capacitor/resistor.
If the relay is only re-energised for a short time before it is required to drop
again, the capacitor should be recharged by connecting it to the supply with a
back contact (marked β on Figure D6) of the relay, in conjunction with the front
contact (α) between the capacitor/resistor and the relay coil.
Care should be taken to specify the use of relays whose coil resistance does not
vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. Any variation in coil resistance should
not be capable of affecting the time delay (nor the discharge voltage across the
relay coil) by more than the permitted tolerance for the application concerned.
Examples of useful configurations for 50V operation are given in Figure D7.
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Relay Coil Resistance Capacitor Resistor H/O Unit Nominal

Style or (r2) (C) (r1) Pin Code Time Delay
Pin Code (t)
931 835 - 920 Ω 470 µF 330 Ω pc 177 1s
931 835 - 920 Ω 1,000 µF 330 Ω pc 176 2s
931 835 - 920 Ω 2,000 µF 330 Ω pc 175 5s
pc 6058 1,000 Ω 3,000 µF 400 Ω pc 6059 7.5 s
pc 201 16,000 - 18,000 Ω 1,000 µF * 150 Ω - 30 s
pc 201 16,000 - 18,000 Ω 22,000 µF * 150 Ω - 600 s
* for ripple-free supply only
Figure D7 Typical Values
8.4 Timing Problems
In any complex circuitry the transient conditions should always be considered to
avoid timing problems.
The only way to identify such a problem is to carefully consider the operation of a
circuit, not only in terms of the proving that is included in that circuit but also
when each condition becomes applied, and the effect each relay operation has
on other relays in the system, if any. For example, a relay may be required to be
slow to release in order to hold up while its feed changes over from one path to
another. The circuit techniques involved are described in Section 10.5.2.
Inputs to programmable electronic systems that are required to give rise to a

rapid response (e.g. an instantaneous response is necessary for SPAD
detection) should be examined to ensure that the maximum scanning time is not
likely to exceed the required response time or give unpredictable results. If such
a risk exists, precautions should be taken to prevent incorrect operation. For
instance, if the condition “treadle A occupied after treadle B occupied” is required
in SSI, it may be necessary to generate a stick circuit to prove the condition and
give a single input to the SSI.
Alternative action may be required where an unwanted delay is created by the

transmission system, particularly where cross proving is used. For instance,
because the position of the signalman’s control device is cross proved in the
point calling circuit by the alternative means (described in Section 9.2.2), when
this is transmitted by FDM the repeater of the centre position should be held up
until after the normal or reverse repeater has de-energised. See Part L and also
the section on anti-bobbing in SSI design standards for further examples.
Other timing problems are described in Appendix F2.
9 Proving
Consideration should be given to the use of various types of proving, wherever
reasonably practicable, as a diverse or secondary line of defence against the
residual risk of a fail-safe item of equipment failing in an unexpected mode and
thereby creating a hazardous situation. Proving may be regarded as
impracticable if the added complexity or reduced availability, etc., are considered
to outweigh the benefits.
9.1 Down Proving

The 930 series non-latched relays can generally be relied upon to drop after the
feed has been removed from the coil. This is also applicable to WBS type ‘P’
miniature relays and larger plug-in type relays at existing installations.
The situations where the down proving of 930 series relays, and their
predecessors, is necessary may be summarised as follows:
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• Magnetic stick or latched relays should be proved down to ensure correct

operation, unless other precautions are taken to prevent hazardous failures.
• Contactors should be proved down to ensure that their heavy duty contacts
have not welded, unless other precautions are taken to prevent hazardous
failures. The 943 and 966 F1, F4 & F5 style contactors should have both
banks of contacts proved down together.
• Timer relays used for safety-critical controls should generally be proved down
to ensure correct operation. See Section 8 for details and exceptions.
• Trackside and on-track equipment is vulnerable to circuit faults. As far as
reasonably practicable, down proving should be used to ensure that the
principal control and detection relays are appropriately de-energised.
• Cross proving. See Section 9.2.
• Sequence proving. See Section 9.4.
For examples see Appendix F2.
Other types of relays, such as shelf-type relays, may require more extensive
proving, in addition to the above, according to application.
Down proving should be accomplished by including a back contact of the relay in

a second circuit, so as to cause it to fail right side should the first relay fail to
drop. The second circuit should be chosen so that it will monitor every operation
of the first relay. It is not required to be double cut by the back contact (see
Section 4.5).
9.2 Cross Proving

Cross proving is the mutual down proving of relays with complementary
functions, such as normal/reverse, on/off, clear/occupied and left/centre/right.
The prime purpose of cross proving is to avoid a confusing or unsafe condition

arising if complementary relays are energised at the same time. Without cross
proving this condition could occur as a transient during an ordinary change of
state (if the relay pick-up time is less than its release time). The condition could
also occur due to a relay or circuit fault, but cross proving does not automatically
provide full protection against these faults and is not generally provided for this
reason.
Due to the transient problem, cross proving should be provided on

complementary primary function relays and their subsequent repeats, unless one
of the following applies:
• The time taken for the function to change states is inherently much greater
than the release time of the de-energising relay.
• The provision of cross proving creates consequential problems.
• The provision of cross proving is particularly complicated.
A secondary use of cross proving is to reduce the load on a polarised circuit

when the polarity change is detected by a pair of biased relays connected in
parallel.
The following four sections give further details on the provision and omission of
cross proving. However it is always necessary to assess the benefits and
disbenefits of cross proving.
9.2.1 Standard Form of Cross Proving

With this method of cross proving, the control circuit of each relay includes a
back contact of its complementary relay(s) and the transient problems are
avoided, as shown in Figure D8. However, if a relay fails to release, the
complementary relay(s) will not energise and the incorrect state will prevail. This
basic arrangement is therefore a recognised compromise and, although
additional protection is not generally provided, it is not precluded.
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RR NR NR
N50 B50
NR RR RR
N50 B50
Figure D8 Standard Form of Cross Proving

9.2.2 Alternative Form of Cross Proving
With the standard form of cross proving, the complementary back contacts delay
the response to a change of state as these back contacts have to make before
the correct relay starts to respond. Where it is necessary to minimise the delay,
an alternative form of cross proving should be used.
This alternative form of cross proving does not have complementary back
contacts as in the standard form but the equivalent cross proving is included in
all functions controlled by the complementary relays, as shown in Figure D9.
NR NR RR
N50 B50
RR RR NR
N50 B50
Figure D9 Alternative Form of Cross Proving

Another example of this arrangement is the control of point lock relays
NLR/WZR/RLR (in the typical free-wired route setting interlocking circuits
described in Appendix F2) by switch relays NR/CR/RR and for this simple
arrangement there is a slight reduction in the number of back contacts required.
This alternative form of cross proving has the additional merit of providing some
protection against a relay failing to release, as all the controlled circuits are
interrupted if more than one complementary relay is in the energised position.
9.2.3 Polarised Circuits with Biased Relays

When a pair of biased relays are used to detect the polarity of a polarised circuit,
then as far as practicable, the load on the circuit should be minimised by
confining the current flow to the coil of the appropriate relay.
It is preferable to use local controls in order to select a path to the correct biased
relay (shown as “selection or correspondence proving” in Figure D10). This will
ensure that at all times the maximum load on the circuit is a single relay coil. The
selection in this particular example is double cut because it also provides
additional controls in the circuit.
Selection or
Correspondence
Proving
105G/BR PR (1) 105 HR 105G/BR (ON)PR 105 HR
105 HR 105G/BR (OFF)PR 105 HR
105G/BR PR (2)
Figure D10 Polarised Circuit: Relay End
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This preferred type of selection should not be used where both relays de-
energised would be unacceptable because it is necessary to monitor the actual
state of the incoming function. For example, the standard signal proving circuit
(RGPR/HGPR) should not be selected at the interlocking by the state of the
corresponding GR. In such cases, the biased relays should have the standard
form of cross proving as described in Section 9.2.1. Although the initial load on
the polarised circuit will be two relay coils the load will reduce to a single coil
when the appropriate relay responds and disconnects the complementary coil.
Unless the selection or correspondence proving inherently prevents both

complementary relays being energised at the same time (using either front and
back contacts of the same relay or front contacts of complementary pairs of
relays that are themselves cross proved), additional cross proving should be
provided for primary function relays and subsequent repeats, as shown in
Figure D11.
Selection or Additional
Correspondence Cross
Proving Proving
42 PR (1) 99 NR 42 RPR 42 NPR
101 NR 42 NPR 42 RPR
42 PR (2)
Figure D11 Polarised Circuit with Correspondence and Cross Proving

For the arrangement at the feed end of polarised circuits, see Section 10.5.3.
9.2.4 Omission of Cross Proving

Cross proving is not essential on intermediate relays that control the primary
function relay and it is preferable to avoid the standard form of cross proving
when circuits, other than polarised, are vulnerable to external faults.
An example of inherent delay that makes cross proving unnecessary occurs with
the correspondence proving of points. The relay feed for the initial state of
correspondence is disconnected when the interlocking starts to change and the
relay feed for the new state of correspondence is dependent on the operating
time of the point mechanism. This point operating time is significantly greater
than any appropriate delay in the release of the initial relay and the transient
problem is not a valid consideration.
An example of a consequential problem that is avoided by the omission of cross

proving, occurs with the (UP)KR/(DN)KR circuits at manned barrier crossings.
The provision of cross proving could lead to the road traffic lights cycling on/off.
Therefore cross proving is deliberately omitted and due allowance made in the
overall design.
An example of unnecessary complications that could be created by the zealous

provision of cross proving, occurs when complementary primary function relays
are repeated in two or more interlockings (or lineside locations). It is generally
considered unnecessary to provide complicated cross proving between the
relays in different interlockings but the overall design should ensure that the
omission does not lead to problems, transient or otherwise.
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9.3 Correspondence Proving

Correspondence proving is a means of ensuring that a proving circuit for a
function cannot give information that conflicts with the state of its respective
operating circuit, as shown in Figure D10.
It is generally provided for related outgoing and incoming polarised circuits (see
Sections 9.2.3 and 10.4.1) and for point detection circuits (see Part P).
9.4 Sequence Proving

The integrity of interlockings (and level crossings) requires relays to operate in
the correct sequence. It is possible for this sequence to be interrupted,
particularly if there is some delay inherent in the operation. Proving should be
used to prevent this occurrence and ensure that the interlocking is effective.
Sequence proving should be applied in the following situations. (The terminology

relates to the typical free-wired route setting interlocking circuits described in
Appendix F2.)
• The local signal relay(s) that control the signal off, should be proved down in
the signal on proving relay (RGPR). A front contact of the RGPR should be
placed in the unconditional path of the approach lock stick relay (ALSR)
circuit to prove the signal on in the approach locking. (When situated at the
interlocking, the local signal relay may be proved down in the ALSR instead
of generating an RGPR.) A back contact of the signal control relay (GR)
should also be added in series with the RGPR contact, to set the approach
lock by “controls off”. Finally, the ALSR should be down proved in the control
circuit feeding the local signal relay.
• The first route stick relay (USR) past a signal should prove all routes from
that signal normal before it can energise. Conversely, a front contact of the
opposing USR for the first track past the signal should always be included in
the common leg of all routes from that signal and, wherever the route passes
a signal reading in the opposite direction, a front contact of the opposing
direction USR should be included for the last track of the route leading up to
the opposing signal. In the aspect level, a back contact of the last USR that
is released when the route is set should be included in the signal GR circuit.
This ensures the route locking is correctly applied before the signal clears
and prevents the momentary clearance of opposing signals.
• The ordinary approach lock release condition is a sequential operation of
tracks, usually one clear and another occupied after both occupied
simultaneously. Both tracks occupied will be included in the train approach
stick relay (TASR), with the one shown as becoming clear stuck out by a
contact of the TASR. By including front contacts of both the TASR relay,
and the track required clear, in one leg of the ALSR, sequential track
operation is proved. Such circuitry should be provided to prove the
sequential operation of tracks in accordance with the control tables.
• The proving of bridge path removal in the aspect level is a form of sequence
proving that should be applied as described in Section 7.4.
• At automatic level crossings relays should be correctly primed to ensure
automatic closure of the crossing. Down proving should be used to verify the
required priming. See Part X for further details.
• The equivalent of sequence proving on lever frames is sequential locking,
whereby each running signal lever requires the lever for the signal ahead
normal, so that levers have to be pulled and replaced in order, thus ensuring
that each signal is replaced behind a train before it can be cleared again for a
subsequent train. This should be provided wherever signals are not
automatically replaced, in accordance with GK/RT0039.
• Where it is reasonably practical to provide it, the proving of sequential
operation of track sections should be considered.
• Other situations similar to those listed above, as required by risk assessment.
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10 Repeat Relays
10.1 General
Repeat relays are used for four basic purposes:
• To delay the response of the primary function relay. See Section 10.2.
• To provide electrical isolation. See Section 10.3.
• To overcome limitations on circuit length. See Section 10.4.
• To provide additional contacts when it is impracticable to directly control all
circuits by the primary function relay. See Section 10.5.
A single repeat relay may provide any or all of the first three functions, but a
repeat relay provided to supply additional contacts will not generally perform any
other purpose.
10.2 Delayed Response

To avoid momentary loss of train detection to the interlocking, or to the
signalman, when a vehicle moves from one track circuit to another, some types
of track circuit require one or more slow to operate repeat relays (see
Section 8.2), unless extra delay can be incorporated into the interlocking system.
A detailed Guidance Note, GK/RC0752, is included in the Train Detection
Handbook.
10.3 Electrical Isolation

Electrical isolation between certain trackside equipment and the interlocking
environment is desirable. The requirements for electrified areas are given in
Section 3.1.2.
10.4 Limited Circuit Length

The physical length of line circuits is limited by consideration of voltage drop
within the circuit and also the external effect of electromagnetic interference with
other circuits, necessitating line circuits to be terminated within the length limit
and intermediate repeater circuits created. See Section 4.3.
10.4.1 Safeguards with Polarised Circuits

Related outgoing and incoming polarised circuits should, wherever practicable,
be repeated at a common lineside location. Correspondence proving should
then be provided between the associated circuits in order to protect against an
untoward change in the polarity of the power supply.
This protection is particularly relevant to point circuits as an incorrect polarity can

convert an outgoing normal control into reverse and also convert the associated
reverse detection back to the expected normal. The repeater location circuits
should therefore ensure that the incoming detection matches the outgoing
control. All power supply arrangements should be considered in designing
appropriate protection.
10.5 Repeat Relays to Provide Additional Contacts

When the primary function relay has insufficient contacts to control the required
circuits, repeat relays are provided.
Circuits should be designed such that, if a repeat relay fails to energise when its
primary relay is energised, it will not result in a hazardous situation. As repeat
relays can cause various problems, care should be exercised in their use. See
Appendix F2 for examples of potentially hazardous situations.
(The primary function relay is defined as the relay by which the logic required to
control a signalling function is brought together. With a chain of repeat relays,
such as TPR, T2PR, etc., the primary function relay is the first one to directly
control safety-critical signalling functions, rather than just operate the next repeat
relay in the chain.)
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If the primary device does not have a full range of safety contacts, such as a
switch, a reed receiver, or a timer with only one or two contacts, then a separate
primary function relay may be generated, fed over a contact of the device.
Any control device for the function concerned, that precedes the primary
function relay, should not be used for any other safety-related purpose and
should generally have only the one contact used (two if the circuit is double cut).
The contact analysis should have a note added to this effect.
10.5.1 Back Contacts of Repeat Relays

Back contacts should not be used for control purposes except on primary
function relays. Back contacts of repeat relays give no positive information.
When there are insufficient contacts on a primary function relay, repeat relays
may be provided fed over a front or back contact of the primary relay. To justify
the provision of a repeat relay at least two of its front contacts have to be used.
When repeat relays of both front and back contacts of a primary function relay
are provided, they should be cross proved.
No relay should be operated directly in parallel with a primary function relay.
Repeat relays of the back contacts of primary relays should be designated

PZRs. The designation CR for a simple back contact repeat does not imply the
repeating of the primary relay.
Where both front and back contact repeats of a primary function relay are
required in two or more interlockings, PR and PZR relays, directly controlled by
the primary relay, should be provided in each interlocking.
Back contacts of front contact repeats of primary relays may only be used in the
following circumstances:
• where the sole function is to prevent feedback in meshed circuits, when used
in conjunction with a front contact of the same relay (see Section 10.5.3);
• for cross proving (see Section 10.5.4);
• for indication purposes, except for red signal indications (see Section 10.6);
or
• to economise power consumption.
Back contacts of back contact repeats of primary relays may only be used in the
following circumstances:
• where the sole function is to prevent feedback in meshed circuits, when used
in conjunction with a front contact of the same relay (see Section 10.5.3); or
• for cross proving (see Section 10.5.4).
10.5.2 Repeat Relays in Changeover Paths

A relay may be required to hold up while its feed changes over from one path to
another. The relay required to hold up should be slow to release (see
Section 8.2). The contacts performing the changeover should preferably be of
the same relay, as shown in Figure D12. (This does not apply to changeover in
meshed or polar circuits. See Section 10.5.3.)
If the changeover is between contacts on more than one relay, it should have a
minimum drop away time of 250ms, as provided on the 934 style relay. If,
however, the changeover is from front to back on the same relay, 150ms will
suffice, as on the 963 style.
An application is in the last wheel replacement circuit, where the signal relay is
required to hold up whilst one of the track repeat relays breaks its front contact
and makes its back contact.
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DG TPR 212 GSR 212 GR

Changeover
Contacts
DG TPR 212 GR
Figure D12 Changeover Contacts

If the back contact were replaced by a contact of a repeat relay, e.g. back
contact repeat T2PZR, the required hold up time would increase. Conversely, if
the front contact were replaced by a contact of a repeat relay, T2PR, the
required hold up time would decrease.
In order to minimise this problem, the use of contacts of slow acting repeat
relays for changeover purposes should be avoided wherever practicable. (Note
that a.c. immune relays are slightly slow acting.) If, due to lack of contacts,
further repeat relays are required, so as not to introduce a further delay these
should preferably be parallel repeat relays, e.g. T2P(2)R or T2PZ(2)R, rather
than T3PR or T3PZR.
See Section 8.4 for other timing problems.
10.5.3 Changeover Paths in Meshed Circuits

The 930 series relays are constructed such that front and back contacts cannot
be made at the same time. This permits their use in polarised, and other
meshed circuits, without the risk of a momentary back feed. (This does not
apply to heavy duty or medium duty contacts.) However, if one of the contacts
in Figure D13 were to be replaced by the contact of a repeat relay, there would
be the possibility of a momentary short circuit.
JG TPR JG T2PR/T2PZR (1)

B50
JG TPR
N50
JG TPR JG T2PR/T2PZR (2)

N50
JG TPR
B50
Figure D13 Polarised Circuit: Feed End
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To prevent momentary back feed, a back contact of the repeat relay should be
inserted in the opposite leg of the circuit, as shown in Figure D14, or Figure D15,
respectively. Note that this should be in addition to the contact of the primary
function relay, as back contacts of repeat relays should not be used for controls
(see Section 10.5.1).
JG T2PR JG T3PR/T2PZR (1)

B50
JG TPR JG T2PR
N50
Figure D14
JG TPR JG T2PZR JG T2PR/T3PZR (1)
B50
JG T2PZR
N50
Figure D15
Where both front and back contact repeat relays are provided, the circuit shown
in Figure D16 may be used with simply a front contact of each, providing the
repeat relays are cross proved (see Section 10.5.1), thus preventing both
contacts being made together. Otherwise, an additional back contact of each
would be required in the meshing.
JG T2PR JG T3PR/T3PZR (1)

B50
JG T2PZR
N50
Figure D16
Any combinations of these arrangements shown in Figures D13 to D16 may be
used in the (1) and (2) legs of polarised circuits.
Similar precautions are required in other meshed circuits, particularly where stick
paths are present.
For the arrangement at the relay end of polarised circuits, see Section 9.2.3.
10.5.4 Provision of Multiple Track Relay Repeats

Where required, up to three repeat relays may be provided in parallel, so long as
all the front contact repeat relays are cross proved in all the back contact
repeats (if any), and vice versa (see Section 10.5.1). The 930 series relay
contacts are not suitable for switching more than three relays. See
Section 6.2.2.
Special care should be taken when the TR controls any circuit other than just
one TPR, because the TPR is then not the primary function relay (see
Section 10.5) and the back contacts of the TPR should not be used for controls.
The TR becomes the primary function relay and its back contact repeat, if
required, would be a TPZR.
10.6 Indication Circuits

Where repeat relays are used, signalman's and maintainer's panel indications
should generally be controlled by contacts of the last repeat relay, so that the
failure of a repeat relay to energise would be apparent to the signalman.
The application to each type of indication is given in Part L.

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Appendix D1:
Fusing and Looping of
Signalling Circuits
D1:1 Fuse Values
The preferred overcurrent protective device for final circuits in the railway
environment is the BS 88 or BS 714 cartridge fuse, as appropriate, although
faster acting fuses may be necessary to protect electronic equipment. The
minimum conductor size for each fuse is given in Figure D17, which includes
some allowance for the grouping of cables.
The design process should take place as follows:
• assess the design load of the circuit;

• select the nearest fuse value higher than the design load (of a type that is
suitable for any anticipated transients, as described in Section 3.3);
• obtain the conductor size from Figure D17;
• ensure the rating of each circuit component exceeds the fuse value.
Protection of Cables
BS 714 3A 5A 10A 15A 20A
Fuse Rating
Environment internal, internal internal external internal external on-track internal external on-track internal external,
external (SSI) on-track
Minimum 0.75mm2 1mm2 1.15mm2 0.75mm2 2 x 1.5mm2 2.5mm2 2 x1mm2 1.5mm2 2.5mm2 2 x 2.5mm2
2 2
Conductor (pink) * 1.15mm or 2x 1.15mm
Size # 1.15mm2
Notes: * 0.75mm2 is permissible if wiring is not tightly grouped
# single 1.15mm2 (or 1mm2) is permissible if wiring is not tightly grouped
Figure D17
D1:2 Positive Fusing and Looping

Final circuit fusing should generally be in the positive feed only.
Positive final circuit looping for internal circuits should take the form of one or two
radial feeds from a fuse (and not as a ring). The number of looping connections
should be limited to those which may be simultaneously supplied from a 3A fuse.
The voltage drop at the end of the loop should also be considered. For the
convenience of maintainers, where fuses are provided on each relay rack, the
positive feed for each relay should originate from the rack on which the relay is
situated.
The following should generally be fed from individual fuses:
• internal circuits rated at higher than 3A;

• any circuit requiring an individual point of isolation; and
• all circuits that are not entirely within an apparatus housing.
D1:3 Negative Looping

Negative final circuit looping for internal circuits should take the form of one or
two radial feeds from a busbar terminal (and not as a ring). For the convenience
of maintainers, the feed for each circuit should originate from the negative
busbar associated with the busbar from which the positive feed came.
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Negative looping should be arranged so that feedback in the event of a high

resistance connection is impossible. This may be achieved either by having
separate negative feeds from the busbar for each function, or by eliminating all
meshing of circuits that could permit coils to be fed in series following a looping
fault. In the latter case, the number of looping connections should be limited by
the current carrying capacity of the conductor and the voltage drop at the end of
the loop. Where meshed circuits are essential, other precautions may be
necessary (see Section 7.5 for an example).
D1:4 A.C. Final Circuits

Sections D1:1 to D1:3 should also apply to a.c. final circuits, where, by
convention, BX is treated in the same manner as positive and NX as negative.
Generally, internal 110V looping has limited application. One example is for
synchronous motor timers. 24V looping is used for signalman's panel indication
feeds.
D1:5 Grouping of Circuits

Looping connections that are not crimped should be positioned at the end of the
looping in order to minimise fault conditions in the event of a loose connection.
Where power supply monitoring is required, power off relays and repeaters
should be wired at the end of significant loops, to detect any loss of feed. Any
safety-related functions that do not fail safe may need to be grouped with other
functions whose failure would be apparent in the event of a blown fuse.
D1:6 Fusing of Cable Terminations

In d.c. electrified areas, the practice of terminating multicore cables entering
interlockings on fuses instead of termination links provides a degree of protection
for interlockings where conductor rails and trackside cables lie in close proximity.
It should be provided:
• for tail cables;

• for main multicore cables not running entirely in a protected route; or
• where justified by risk assessment.
Where provided, it is not necessary to discriminate and each such fuse should
be rated higher than the respective circuit busbar fuse.
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Appendix D2:
Electromagnetic
Compatibility of
Electronic Equipment
This appendix applies to electronic signalling equipment, such as: operational
telecommunications equipment, electronic train describers, remote control
systems, panel processors, electronic track circuits, SSI, IECC and CCTV
equipment.
In order to avoid problems, electronic equipment should have leads as short as

practicable, which may be screened or consist of twisted pairs, and not be
located close to known interference sources, such as HVI track circuit
equipment. Where surge protectors or filters are provided, the ‘clean’ side wiring
should be segregated from the ‘dirty’ side and from unfiltered power supplies.
Equipment likely to produce electromagnetic disturbance in apparatus housings,

such as base station transmitters, should have the associated cabling screened
and earthed, and any aerial should be mounted externally.
Where special restrictions apply to positioning or wiring of equipment, this should

be clearly shown on circuit diagrams or rack/case layouts, so that if alterations
are made at a later date the restrictions are readily apparent.
On electrified lines with route acceptance for three phase traction, restrictions on
the use of equipment operating at certain frequencies, such as reed and FDM,
should be obtained from the relevant safety case.
D2:1 Audio Frequencies

Relay coils in axle counter circuits may require suppressing to prevent
electromagnetic interference to axle counter evaluators by connecting a reverse
biased diode across the coil. Where axle counters and audio frequency track
circuits are installed in the same vicinity, it is preferable for the track circuit
receiver, rather than the transmitter, to be adjacent to the axle counter section.
SEL axle counter heads should not be installed within 5m of a track circuit tuned
zone, 15m of an end termination unit, 100m of a 1550 Hz or 1850 Hz transmitter
(applies only to 5 kHz heads), nor 200m of a 1700 Hz transmitter (applies only to
5 kHz heads).
To avoid intermodulation effects, the following audio frequency equipment should

be separated from each other by a minimum of 150mm:
• reed equipment;
• Aster track circuit equipment; and
• TI 21 track circuit equipment.
Their wiring should not run parallel in the same ducting.
CCTV equipment and audio frequency equipment should not be housed
• in the same apparatus case, nor

• in an equipment building within 2m of each other.
Only one TI 21 transmitter or receiver of a given frequency should be fed from

any one TI 21 power supply unit.
Only one reed transmitter or receiver of a given frequency should be fed from
any one reed power supply unit.
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D.C./d.c. converters should not be housed adjacent to, nor fed from a battery
supplying, any audio frequency signalling equipment.
Additional restrictions to prevent the mutual interference of track circuits may be

found in the Train Detection Handbook, GK/RH0751.
Wherever non-suppressed reed or axle counting equipment is mounted, a

warning notice should be affixed to equipment racks and apparatus cases (inside
the door), prohibiting the use of equipment that does not conform to the
requirements of the particular EMC environment, e.g. portable radio transmitters,
mobile telephones, vacuum cleaners or power tools within one metre. (Type RR
reed receivers with radio frequency suppression have a type number suffix 'B' or
'C'.)
Care should be taken when locating equipment, such as TI 21 transmitter tuning

units, emitting an audible frequency, so as not to cause a nuisance to local
residents. If necessary, sound proofing should be specified on the design
details.
D2:2 Reed Systems

All connections to reed filters, and other reed system wiring longer than 400mm,
should be run in twisted pair cable and segregated from other wiring. The
positioning of equipment should be carefully designed, so as to keep the wiring
as short as reasonably practicable.
Non-safety a.c. relays should not be used to provide input contacts for reed
transmitters as they could give rise to a.c. harmonics on the line.
To avoid mains based interference, reed power supply units should not be
mounted within 150mm from reed transmitters and receivers.
High and low frequency type R reed transmitters should not be housed
• in the same apparatus case, nor

• in an equipment building within 2m of each other;
to avoid over amplifying lower frequency signals and subsequent false operation
of adjacent channels.
The following restrictions should be observed between reed track circuit, point
detection and FDM equipment:
• receiver filters should not be housed in the same apparatus case, on the
same equipment rack, nor on an immediately adjacent rack, as other reed
equipment of the same frequency (this does not apply to two track circuits of
the same frequency, which should follow the guidelines given in
GK/RH0751);
• track circuit receiver filters should not be mounted within 700mm of a track
filter of the same frequency;
• receiver filters should not be mounted within 300mm of a track filter of a
different frequency, nor a constant voltage transformer;
• receiver filters should not be mounted within 50mm of any power amplifier or
reed follower relay; and
• reed track circuit, point detection and FDM systems should not share power
supply units.
The proximity restrictions given in this section are provisional and await up to
date information from the manufacturer. For restrictions between reed and other
equipment, see Section D2:1.
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D2:3 Frequency Division Multiplex (FDM)

Safety-critical FDM systems should be carried in an approved twisted pair
signalling cable. Other FDM systems may be carried in conventional signalling
cable, provided that:
• the direction of lay alternates for successive core layers;

• each system uses a pair of adjacent conductors in the same layer; and
• additional systems in the same cable are separated as far as practicable and
do not use a conductor adjacent to another system.
In a.c. and dual electrified areas, transmission lines for FDM systems should
have isolating transformers (or line amplifiers incorporating transformers)
installed to restrict induced voltages to a safe level. The system should be
designed to operate satisfactorily in the presence of interference containing any
odd harmonic of a fundamental in the range 48.5 to 50.5Hz, up to 100V per
harmonic. Safety-critical systems should also make allowances for traction
supply faults, e.g. including even harmonics and induced voltages up to 1,000V
a.c. This will generally be satisfied by restricting the permissible frequencies and
installing an isolating device every 1,000m (alternately an isolating transformer
and line amplifier).
For further details of transmission systems for general signalling purposes see
Part J.
D2:4 Time Division Multiplex (TDM)

TDM systems are susceptible to electromagnetic interference and are not
generally suitable for safety-critical applications, unless specifically designed to
have the required integrity, in conjunction with an appropriate medium for
transmission.
Signalling circuits in telecomms cables should be identified at all access points

with red markers and should be jumpered in accordance with Part J. See
GK/RT0197.
In a.c. and dual electrified areas, TDM transmission circuits should use balanced
pairs in telecomms cables. Earth free terminations should be used, preferably
with a maximum unbalance ratio in excess of 200. The TDM system should be
approved for this particular environment and designed to operate satisfactorily in
the presence of 10mV induced interference.
For further details of interlocking to signal box transmission systems see Part F.
D2:5 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Transmission Systems

For proximity restrictions between CCTV and other equipment, see Section D2:1
In a.c. and dual electrified areas, lengths of co-axial transmission lines for CCTV
level crossings vulnerable to dangerous levels of induced voltages should be
screened. A 10 MΩ resistor should be provided between each conductor and
earth at each termination to prevent the build up of static charge.
D2:6 Solid State Interlocking (SSI)

HVI track circuit transmitters, feed transformers, or cable connecting them,
should not be housed in the same apparatus case as SSI TFMs (signal and
points modules), DLMs (data link modules), or LDTs (long distance terminals).
SSI interlockings and HVI track circuit equipment should not be situated in the
same equipment room, without a risk assessment to demonstrate that adequate
separation or screening of the HVI equipment has been provided. The
requirements of this paragraph only apply until all the equipment concerned is
provided with EMC declarations of conformity and CE markings.
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Wiring between DLMs (or LDTs) and their associated repeater DLMs and TFMs
should be in twisted pair cables and limited to a length of 5m. Where SSI DLMs
and TFMs are housed in the same equipment room, the TFMs connected to
each pair of DLMs should be mounted in a related group, so as to avoid
confusion.
Wiring from tail cables should be segregated from the data and power wiring
(see Part J). It is also preferable for track circuit tail cables to be routed
separately from other tail cables directly connected to a TFM. Segregation
between individual data link cables is not, however, necessary.
To avoid electrically induced noise, SSI cabling should be kept as short as

practicable. All SSI circuits should be subject to the requirements of Section 4,
particularly those relating to length restrictions and double cutting. However, due
to the highly coded nature of SSI, any corruption will not affect safety, but only
dependability. Generally SSI systems are extremely tolerant to interference and
a length of external loop input to TFMs of 2,000m (4,000m loop) is permitted, but
it is preferable to limit this length to 200m (400m loop) for inputs from on-track
equipment. External inputs should be double cut.
TFM outputs that require double cutting should be buffered with an interface
relay, isolating transformer, or transformer rectifier, as they are not double cut by
the module. (Lever locks require an interface relay.)
Interface relays for connection across TFM signal module outputs should be
110V a.c. 966 F7 style. Where voltage-free contacts are required from a
standard TFM output feeding equipment, such as signal lighting, a lamp proving
relay (941 style) may be used in series between the TFM and the load, in the
supply leg (not in the return leg).
In a.c. and dual electrified areas, trackside data link cables should be immunised.
To prevent damage to TFMs from back EMF, relay contacts that can de-
energise the output load should not be introduced into the circuit between the
TFM and its load. However, contacts used for down proving or cross proving
are acceptable.
Wherever SSI equipment is mounted, a warning notice should be affixed to

equipment racks and apparatus cases (inside the door), prohibiting the use of
equipment that does not conform to the requirements of the particular EMC
environment, e.g. portable radio transmitters, mobile telephones, vacuum
cleaners or power tools within one metre. (Test equipment should only be
connected in accordance with GK/RT0221.)
D2:7 Panel Multiplexers (PMUXs)

Panel multiplexers are vulnerable to electromagnetic interference and the
following safeguards are required:
• for new panels and where practicable for existing panels (subject to the last
bullet point), the panel multiplexer should be located within the panel
framework; or otherwise in a cubicle as close as reasonably practicable to
the panel.
• the panel multiplexer to panel cabling should be screened cable, the screen
of which should be earthed at one end only. The inputs and outputs should
be in separate cables. See Part J.
• the proximity of adjacent equipment and cables should be considered so as
to minimise possible electrical interference, especially when routing the panel
multiplexer to panel cabling.
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D2:8 Earthing of Equipment

Fast transient earths (FTEs) minimise the effects of interference from electrical
surges, such as lightning strikes, flashovers from the traction supply and
switching transients. Solid state devices require that fault surges are
suppressed very quickly to avoid malfunction and damage. FTEs are generally
provided for telecommunication equipment, electronic train describers, remote
control systems, panel processors, electronic track circuits, SSI, IECC and
CCTV equipment. This equipment should be earthed as described in the system
documentation.
A FTE need not have a very low resistance, but should have low inductance.
This can be met by ensuring as short, straight and rigid a connection as
practicable, i.e. at least 16mm2, between the equipment and the earth electrode.
Spur earth connections should be used rather than ring configurations. A typical
value of a FTE would be 20Ω.
Long earth leads should be avoided, where practicable, by bonding equipment to

the mounting rails, which, in turn, are bonded to the structure of the apparatus
housing.
Wherever practicable, particularly at lineside apparatus cases, a common earth

rod, bonded to the structure of the apparatus housing, should be used to provide
both a FTE and a safety earth. If a separate safety earth exists, this should be
bonded to the FTE to avoid the need to shroud the FTE and all metalwork
connected to it, and to avoid damage due to the high potential differences
between the two earths in the event of a lightning strike. Electrodes joined end
to end vertically should be used, rather than connected in parallel, and bonded to
the main earth terminal (MET) in the apparatus housing. Where the exposed-
conductive-parts of equipment are earthed, the MET should always be bonded
to the structure of the apparatus housing. For further details see Part C.
Surge arrestors on safety-critical circuits should not be earthed, unless the

equipment has been specifically designed to resist dangers from multiple earth
faults, e.g. by coding. In such cases, line surge protection units (e.g. for SSI
data links and TDM transmission) should be connected to the earth busbar and
positioned as close as practicable to it. In a suite of apparatus cases, datalink
cables should always be terminated on surge protection units situated in the
same apparatus case as the MET. All cases situated within 2m of each other
should be bonded together.
TI 21 tuning units are not required to have the earth terminal connected to earth.
The requirements for earth bonding conductors are given in Part J.
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Part F
Interlockings
1 Introduction
1.1
This Guidance Note applies, in support of GK/RT0060, to the design of
interlockings (including ground frames) associated with:
a) mechanical signalling systems;
b) electro-mechanical signalling systems;
c) electro-pneumatic signalling systems;
d) all-electric non-route setting signalling systems;
e) free-wired route setting signalling systems;
f) geographical route setting signalling systems;
g) electronic signalling systems; and
h) hybrid systems.
Where appropriate, reference to “signals” should be understood in relation to

movement authorities within both lineside signalling and cab signalling systems.
1.2
This Guidance Note does not cover the presentation and production processes
for design details.
For the presentation and use of mechanical locking charts, interlocking circuit
diagrams and central interlocking data listings within the design process, see
GK/RT0201 and GK/RT0205. Documentary requirements for control tables are
given GK/RT0202.
1.3
Guidance Note is an alternative to the risk-based approach described in
GK/RT0206. However, where the particular application or intended
environment for the system introduces additional risks, these should be subject
to separate assessment.
The design principles in Section 2 give the minimum requirements, even when
the risk-based approach is used. More detailed requirements for the design of
interlockings are given in Section 3. Sections 4 to 8 describe the application of
the design principles and requirements, as evolved through different interlocking
systems, starting with the most basic.
The Appendices describes in further detail arrangements for some commonly

encountered types of interlockings.
The examples shown in this Guidance Note are based on the signalling layout
and control table illustrations given in Appendix F5.
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2 Design Principles
2.1 Regulatory Requirement
Suitable and sufficient interlocking, in conjunction with appropriate operating and
maintenance procedures, must be provided to prevent, so far as is reasonably
practicable, the following occurrences:
a) collision between vehicles;
b) collision between a vehicle and a buffer stop;
c) derailment caused by confliction with movable infrastructure; and
d) derailment caused by excessive speed.
This is a requirement of the Railway Safety (Miscellaneous Provisions)

Regulations 1997.
2.2 Selection of Interlocking System

The choice of interlocking system should be made to achieve an appropriate
balance between manual and automatic protection, in order to control risks so
far as is reasonably practicable. A risk assessment should consider such
factors as:
a) service frequency;
b) traffic type and mix (including light railway/metro, passenger and/or freight);
c) permissible speeds;
d) layout complexity;
e) interfacing with trains;
f) interfacing with adjacent interlockings and existing systems;
g) available space or housing;
h) power supply availability;
i) target life span; and
j) skills availability (in design, installation, operating and maintenance fields).
2.3 Interlocking Integrity and Proving

Interlockings and interfaces between interlockings should follow the principles for
safety-critical systems given in GK/RT0206. The interface with the trackside
signalling equipment (or cab signalling system) should also be safety-critical.
Interlocking equipment should provide for the operation of interlocked trackside

signalling equipment, corresponding to the state of the appropriate function
within the interlocking. Where necessary to reduce risks to an acceptable level,
proving should be used to ensure interlocking and/or trackside equipment is in a
safe state before another operation can be carried out, as described in the
design principles in Part D.
Where necessary to achieve the infrastructure controller’s specified availability

level (see Part P of GK/RC0701), the state of safety-critical interlocking functions
should be stored by a means that will remain secure in the event of a total failure
of all power supplies, e.g. by locked lever, latched relay or non-volatile memory.
Interlockings should be designed to prevent an unsafe state occurring during
power supply failure or restoration, including momentary loss.
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Where the state of safety-critical information is not stored (e.g. in the case of
relay interlocking systems without latch relays, or certain electronic interlocking
systems), the system should be designed to revert to a safe state, or refresh to
correspond to the state of the railway, before being restored to use. Wherever
practicable, circuits should function in their usual manner following power supply
loss and restoration without having to be manually reset by a maintainer, unless
a safe state cannot otherwise be ensured. Where necessary to re-establish the
integrity of the interlocking, a delay should be incorporated into the restoration to
ensure that all movements have come to a stand.
Transient conditions or faults in the train detection system should not allow
conflicting routes to be set, or routes to be prematurely released.
2.4 Movement Authorities and Proving of Route

It should only be possible to give a movement authority when it is safe to do so,
i.e. when movable infrastructure over which it is given is set and locked in the
correct position. The interlocking should ensure that no conflicting authority can
be given to trains or level crossing users.
Wherever practicable, the interlocking should be proved effective before a

movement authority can be given.
The operation of the trackside signalling equipment should be proved to be in

correspondence with the state of the appropriate function within the interlocking
before a movement authority can be given. For example, points should be
detected before a signal reading over them can be cleared and a signal should
have been proved on before a conflicting signal can be cleared.
A movement authority should not be given if any foul track sections on the flanks
of the route are occupied.
Facilities should be provided to allow for the maintenance of a safe distance

between trains travelling on the same line through, or within, the interlocking
area. Except where permissive working is authorised, an authority should not
be given for a running movement to proceed over a line of route that is occupied.
The requirements for block systems are given in GK/RT0041, GK/RT0042 and
GK/RT0051.
Signals should not show a proceed aspect unless the next signal ahead is
displaying a valid aspect, in accordance with GK/RT0032. Wherever
practicable, this should be engineered in such a way that will facilitate degraded
operation with a reduced level of protection, as detailed in Section 2.10. Any
shunting signals in the line of route that are not associated with a main aspect
should be cleared before authority for a running movement past them can be
given.
It should not be possible to give a movement authority for a diverging route

unless the train speed has been appropriately controlled, or the driver has had
sufficient warning of the divergence to be able to appropriately control the train
speed.
Wherever practicable, the movement authority should be automatically cancelled

if any of the conditions that allowed the authority to be given are lost, except for
those conditions that are required only at time of signal clearance.
2.5 Permissive Movements

Where facilities for attaching and detaching operations are required, at terminal
platforms, or otherwise where specially authorised in the Sectional Appendix, a
subsidiary signal (PLS or semaphore) should be used to give authority for a
shunting movement, or permissive movement in accordance with GK/RT0044,
as appropriate.
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It should not be possible to select more than one class of route from a signal at
any one time.
2.6 Withdrawal of Authority

Once authority to proceed over a line of route has been given, the route should
remain protected until that authority is withdrawn. The interlocking should
prevent the release of points and conflicting signals that have been locked to
give an approaching train authority to proceed until the train has passed through
the route or has been proved to have come to a stand before entering the route,
in accordance with GK/RT0063. The route may be released progressively for
operational flexibility. The route may also be released in order to authorise a
permissive movement up to a stationary train.
Wherever practicable, movement authorities should be withdrawn as soon as

possible after the passage of a train. Where this is not practicable, other
precautions should be taken to prevent more than one train being inadvertently
admitted to the same signal section. The route may be released automatically
once it has been confirmed that the train has passed through the route.
Facilities should be provided for the signaller to withdraw movement authorities

from any train under his/her control. These facilities should be maintained under
degraded operating conditions. Under ordinary operating conditions, an
independent facility should be available for each signal or train.
2.7 Movable Infrastructure

Once authority to proceed over a set of points, controlled level crossing,
movable bridge, or traverser, etc. has been given, the infrastructure should be
locked until that authority is withdrawn. The locking of the infrastructure should
be maintained, preventing operation:
a) when the section of track over the infrastructure is occupied (track locking);
and generally
b) when the section of track between a protecting signal and the infrastructure
concerned is occupied (route holding).
2.8 Overrun Protection and Mitigation

Where the risk of a Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) is high, and it is
impracticable to reduce the risk, special precautions should be taken to warn the
driver in the event of a SPAD (see Part S) and, where reasonably practicable,
withdraw movement authorities on conflicting routes. Risk criteria are given in
GK/RT0078.
A minimum distance between trains (i.e. overlap) should be maintained, in

accordance with GK/RT0078. This requirement should be enforced in the case
of running movements in track circuit block by proving the overlap clear in the
signal in rear, as if it were in the line of route. Where there is a low risk of a
SPAD, the overlap may be shorter than normal, or may be zero length.
Examples of movements where this may apply include:
a) those made under the restricted approach arrangement;
b) permissive movements; and
c) non-running movements.
Where facing points are situated in the overlap, they may be moved to give an
alternative overlap without replacing the signal, providing the alternative is
available and detection is re-established within a certain time. Where trailing
points are situated in the selected overlap, they should be locked as if they were
in the line of route. Such overlap locking may be released once the movement
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authority has been withdrawn and the train is proved to have come to a stand at
the destination signal.
Trap points and other points that afford flank protection should generally be set
to avoid the risk of collisions, in accordance with GK/RT0078.
2.9 Control Point

The interlocking equipment should be controlled from a signal box (or other
control point). The state of the signalling equipment should be indicated at the
signal box (or other control point). Control and display systems should be
designed in accordance with GK/RT0025.
Where proving or detection is required in Section 2.4 for use in the interlocking
(e.g. for the state of controlled functions, train detection, routes and time
releases) it should also be indicated to the signaller. See Part L.
The interface between the interlocking and the signalling control and display
system should be safety-related.
2.10 Degraded Operation

Wherever reasonably practicable, provision should be made for the graceful
degradation of operating facilities in the event of a failure of a strategic signalling
system. (See GK/RT0206 for the shortcomings of graceful degradation and
other means of improving availability.) It should be possible to give restricted
movement authorities with a certain minimum level of protection in order to
maintain safe operation under degraded conditions.
Examples include:
a) facilities to allow a signal to clear to single yellow with the signal ahead
displaying no aspect, provided the controls of the signal ahead are off, (but,
wherever reasonably practicable, a failed green aspect at the signal ahead
should step down to display a cautionary aspect);
b) allowing a signal to clear with the signal ahead displaying a single yellow
aspect in lieu of a double yellow, (but, wherever reasonably practicable in
four aspect sequences, the signal in rear should step down to display a
cautionary aspect);
c) use of the restricted approach arrangement;
d) remote control override (an interface system with restricted facilities that can
override the main signal box to interlocking transmission system);
e) reconfiguration to isolate failed equipment and permit other parts of the

system to be reinstated; and
f) initiation of single route setting following the failure of flank protection.
Where necessary, procedures should permit maintainers or signallers to release

certain equipment to permit restricted movement authorities to be given.
2.11 System Monitoring

Where necessary to achieve the infrastructure controller’s specified availability
level (see Part P of GK/RC0701), monitoring should be provided to warn the
signaller or maintainer of a failure, by means of an audible and/or visual alarm.
Monitoring alarms that directly affect train operations should be communicated to
the signaller, but other alarms need only inform the maintainer.
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2.12 Maintainer’s Facilities

The following maintainer’s facilities should be provided at the interlocking, to the
degree necessary to satisfy the infrastructure controller’s specified maintainability
requirements (see Part P of GK/RC0701):
a) monitoring of indications being transmitted to the signalling display;
b) means of taking local control;
c) failure monitoring, giving indication of faults;
d) operation monitoring, including event recording equipment and data loggers;
e) maintenance facilities to assist the tracing of faults;
f) isolation devices to allow off-line resetting of equipment, as required by

GK/RT0027; and
g) means to set restrictive controls, in accordance with GK/RT0060.
2.13 Identity of Interlocking Functions

All signalling functions should bear an identity, in accordance with GK/RT0009,
that is unique to the interlocking and corresponds with the identity shown on the
signalling display.
2.14 Documentation
The signalling functions controlled from each interlocking should be depicted on a
signalling/scheme plan and their interlocking logic should be tabulated in the form
of control tables, as described in Part N of GK/RC0701.
2.15 Relaxation
Certain principles that it is not reasonably practicable to satisfy may be relaxed
where the section of track concerned is clearly visible from the controlling point.
These may include the requirements for:
a) continuous train detection in non-track circuit block;
b) approach control of signals;
c) approach locking of signals, as permitted in GK/RT0063;
d) track locking and route holding of controlled level crossings, where the
protecting signal is within 100m of the crossing;
e) track locking and route holding of ground frame points, as permitted in

GK/RT0061;
f) track locking and route holding of trailing points and other movable
infrastructure; and
g) detection or locking of facing points (non-passenger movements only). See

Part P.
In such cases the automatic protection generally afforded by the interlocking

should be provided manually by the signaller, in accordance with instructions.
Any proposed use of this relaxation should be subject to the agreement of the
infrastructure controller and should demonstrate that risks are acceptably low.
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3 Interlocking
Requirements
This section gives the detailed requirements to be incorporated, where
appropriate, in all types of interlocking.
For the application of the design principles and requirements to different types of
interlockings, see the following sections:
a) purely mechanical lever frames - Section 4;
b) electro-mechanical lever frames - Section 5;
c) all-electric non-route setting interlockings - Section 6; and
d) route setting interlockings - Section 7.
The following abbreviated terms are used in this section:
At a stand = the track section has been occupied for such

a time that it may be assumed that
the movement has stopped.
Block overlap (BOL) = the acceptance overlap beyond the home

signal up to the clearing point in non-track
circuit block.
Hinge points = facing points within an overlap that

are permitted to swing in order to give an
alternative overlap.
Independent PLS = a position light signal not associated

with a main aspect.
LC/TA = block indicator at “line clear”

(absolute block)or “train accepted”
(tokenless block).
Limit of shunt (LOS) = shunting signal fixed on (PLS or

semaphore), or LOS indicator.
Non-colour light signal = semaphore signal or reflectorised

board.
Non-track circuit block = absolute block or one of the various

(Non-TCB) types of single line block.
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Overlap (OL) = for a stipulated distance ahead of the

next signal in advance, or to the end
of the overlap track section (where
provided), whichever is the greater.
Permissive track = the track section(s) where permissive

working is authorised, e.g. where
attaching and detaching operations
take place.
Phantom overlap (POL) = the limit of overlap locking in cases

where the overlap track section
extends further.
Power operated signal = motorised semaphore, or colour light

signal.
Pre-set signal = a facing signal in the line of route

that is required off by a pre-setting
signal.
Pre-setting signal = the signal that requires pre-set

signal(s) off in the line of route.
Related stop signal(s) = in relation to a distant signal, all of

those signals that are required to be
proved clear before the distant signal
can be cleared.
Reduced overlap = a full overlap of reduced length.
Restricted overlap (ROL) = a short overlap used under the

restricted approach arrangement
(e.g. delayed yellow) where there is
also a full overlap.
Subsidiary PLS = a position light signal associated with

a main aspect.
TOL/TIS = block indicator at “train on line”

(absolute block) or “train in section”
(tokenless block).
Track (Tk) = track section, i.e. track circuit(s) or

other means of continuous train
detection.
Train interactive systems = train interactive systems for SPAD

mitigation, such as the automatic
warning system (AWS), automatic
train protection (ATP), train
protection and warning system
(TPWS) and trainstops.
The requirements of this section are summarised in tables (Figures F1 to F6 and

F12 to F18) which are referred to in the text. Options which are explained in the
appropriate columns of the tables are shown in [square brackets]. Controls that
are required unconditionally are marked with a tick (ü).
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3.1 Signallers Interface

The interlocking system should be capable of operating from a specified
signalling control and display system, using an appropriate interface. It should
also operate, where required, in conjunction with an automatic route setting
system that simulates the signaller's controls.
Full details of signalling control and display systems are given in Part L.
3.1.1 Content
The interface for a lever frame is mechanical (see Appendix F1).
The interface for a non-route setting interlocking operated from a control panel is
generally directly wired (see Section 6). (It may also include a remote control
system, where the interlocking is remote from the signal box, and/or generation
of suitable track and route displays from the indication functions.)
The interface system for a route setting interlocking may include:
a) derivation of the interlocking control functions from the signaller’s requests;
b) route setting, unless provided in the interlocking system;
c) automatic route setting (ARS), where required (see Section 3.1.3);
d) train operated route release (TORR), where required (see Section 3.7.4);
e) generation of track and route displays from the indication functions, to suit
the display system; and
f) remote control system, where the interlocking is remote from the signal box
(see Section 3.10.2).
The operation of an interface system is described in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
3.1.2 Arrangement
The infrastructure controller’s future requirements should be considered when
designing the signaller’s interface with the interlocking, e.g. whether control of
the interlocking might subsequently be transferred to a remote signal box or a
VDU based system.
The interface system is required to be safety-related, but not safety-critical (see

Section 3.10.1), so there are advantages in separating it from the safety-critical
interlocking system. However, it should satisfy the infrastructure controller’s
availability requirements (see Part P of GK/RC0701).
There are disadvantages in using non-standard components, such as sub-

miniature or non-safety relays.
Note that the interface system may be located either at the interlocking or at the
signal box. The location should generally be chosen to minimise the number of
remote control system channels.
The length of cabling susceptible to interference, the number of interfaces and

the size of equipment rooms should also be minimised after considering the
other factors.
The following are examples of interface systems (requiring appropriate approval

for each application in accordance with GK/RT0201):
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a) The most fundamental arrangement comprises an interlocking system

without route setting that simply locks the signalling functions, together with a
comprehensive interface system (as in Section 3.1.1) that inputs the
signaller’s requests, performs the route setting and outputs signalling
functions normal or reverse.
b) Panel processors are interface systems with inputs and outputs that may be
configured to suit the required control and interlocking systems.
Programmable logic controllers may be used.
c) The BRS-SW67 route relay free-wired interlocking system (see Appendix F2)
incorporates a push button interlocking (PBI) interface using relays at the
interlocking. (WBS systems are similar.) This is the conventional interface
designed for use with entrance-exit (NX) panels, transmitting button
pushed/pulled. Route setting and TORR is performed within the interlocking
system, using safety relays.
d) With the solid state interlocking (SSI) system (see Appendix F4) the interface
is a panel processor module (PPM) in the interlocking cubicle, but the route
setting is performed in the safety-critical interlocking multi-processor module
(MPM).
e) Electronic route setting equipment (ERSE) is an interface system, located at

the interlocking, between a simplified relay interlocking without route setting
and an NX panel.
f) An electronic interface between a BRS-SW67 route relay interlocking (RRI)

and a VDU based control system is available, but route setting is performed
within the interlocking system, using safety relays. TORR and ARS can be
provided in the electronic control system at the signal box.
g) The E10k free-wired interlocking uses an interface system of non-safety

relays at the signal box. This may be used with turn-push panels,
transmitting route set to the interlocking. Alternative circuits are provided for
NX and one control switch (OCS) panels. (AEI-GRS systems are similar, but
with the interface at the interlocking.)
h) The GEC geographical system uses a common control set as the interface.
i) Other arrangements that comply with the considerations of this section

(3.1.2) may also be used.
See References for the interlocking systems quoted above.
3.1.3 Automatic Route Setting (ARS) Systems

These are systems, invariably electronic, for setting routes without any action of
the signaller, based upon a stored timetable, train running information, defined
priority selection criteria and operating algorithms.
It is a requirement of ARS that TORR be provided (see Section 3.7.4).
They are provided where necessary to reduce the workload of the signaller, and
form part of the interface system with the interlocking.
For automatic platform or junction working see Section 3.2.11(c).
3.2 Signal and Route Controls

This section describes the signalling controls, interlocking and other signalling
facilities which the interlocking system should be designed to provide.
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Each controlled signal (except for co-acting signals) should generally be

controlled by a separate signaller’s request (but see Section 3.2.6 for calling-on
arrangements). Signals reading to more than one destination should generally
be controlled by separate signaller’s requests for each destination.
For signal positioning, operation and proving, aspect sequence controls and
special signal controls, see Part S.
3.2.1 Controlled Stop Signals Associated with Non-Route Setting

Interlockings
Non-route setting interlockings should provide the controls and facilities
summarised in Figure F1. The requirements for normalisation are summarised
in Figure F2. The controls for each signal should be specified in control tables,
in accordance with GK/RT0202.
Figures F1 and F2 may be read for any type of non-route setting interlocking, as
follows:
a) On purely mechanical lever frames, both the interlocking and aspect (arm)
controls are mechanically operated. Mechanical controls require lever
reverse, mechanical point detection and mechanical slots off. Electric locks
are only required where there are track circuits, electrical detection, or block
controls, etc.
b) On electro-mechanical lever frames, the interlocking is generally mechanical,

but electrical locking is applied through an electric lock known as the
selection lock (to distinguish it from the interlocking lock, where electrical
interlocking is provided). Mechanically operated signals also have the
controls applied through the selection lock as shown, as they have no aspect
circuits.
c) Non-route setting interlockings with lock relays, e.g. individual function switch
(IFS), combine the interlocking and selection lock functions in the lock relay
operation and release circuits.
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NON-ROUTE SETTING SIGNALLING SYSTEMS

INTERLOCKED STOP SIGNALS Main Subsidiary or Shunt
Mechanical or Mech’l Electric Mech’l Mech’l Electric Mech’l
Inter- Selection Op or Inter- Selection Op or
Electro-Mechanical Interlocking locking Lock, if Aspect locking Lock, if Aspect
- Level → provided Controls provided Controls
All-Electric (Miniature) Lever Frame Inter- Selection Aspect Inter- Selection Aspect See
locking Lock Controls locking Lock Controls Sect-
- Level → Lock Lock ion
All-Electric Relay (IFS) Interlocking Lock Relays Aspect Lock Relays Aspect or
Controls Controls Part
Controls and Facilities ↓ - Level →
R
E
Signal requested by operation of signal lever or ü ü 3.2.1
Q switch, the class of route being selected by Part L
U separate lever or switch.
E
S
T
Signal lever reverse or reverse lock relay ü ü 6.5
energised.
Directly opposing signals normal, including conflicting Confliction Confliction 2.4
overlaps. in route or in route, 3.2.1
OL [or 4.2
opposing
locking
omitted]
Other classes of route from this signal normal. ü ü 2.5
3.2.1
Any slot from another control point given. ü ü 3.2.9
Where required for junction signals, approach control ü 3.2.10
satisfied, including special controls for signals with
flashing yellows, splitting distant, or splitting banner in
rear.
Approach controlled to clear when train nearly at a Mech op Approach Signal in Mech’ly Approach 3.2.10
stand, OR main signal in rear locked normal. [May be sigs only: control if rear operated control 5.3
by instruction in non-TCB.] appr contr sema- normal sigs only:
if signal phore sig approach
ahead on ahead on control
When applied, temporary approach control satisfied. ü 3.2.10
Signal clearance is delayed, where necessary, to give Mech'ly ü Mech'ly ü 3.2.12
sufficient warning for an automatic level crossing or train operated operated
activated warning system. sigs only sigs only
Signal clearance is delayed until train is at a stand in Mech'ly ü Mech'ly ü Part X
platform, for an automatic level crossing with stopping operated operated
selected. sigs only sigs only
Permissive track occupied for calling-on at time of For call-on For call-on 3.2.6
selection and at time of signal clearing. only only
Where provided, Lime Street controls satisfied. For call-on
only
Signals required to be pre-set by this signal reverse and All shunts Mech’ly Power Any shunt 3.2.8
proved off. in route operated operated close
reverse signals signals ahead
with power proved off reverse
op sig
ahead
The line of route, foul tracks [and overlap] are clear Mech’ly Up to end Mech’ly In route up 3.3.1
[delayed replacement tracks clear at time of signal operated of OL operated to 3.3.4
clearing only]. [May be by instruction in non-TCB.] signals signals permis’ive 3.4.1
only only track (ex- 3.7.1
clusive)
Figure F1 Non-Route Setting Signalling System Controls continued ...
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Electro-Mechanical Interlocking Inter- Selection Op or Inter- Selection Op or
- Level → locking Lock, if Aspect locking Lock, if Aspect
provided Controls provided Controls
- Level → locking Lock Controls locking Lock Controls Sect-
Lock Lock ion
Controls and Facilities ↓ - Level → Controls Controls Part
Points set, locked (except where released by other Set and Mech- Locked Set and Mech- Locked 3.4.2
points that release signal), and detected in line of route, locked in anically and locked in anically and 3.4.4
[overlap], and flank/trap points. [Flank points detected route, OL, operated detected route, operated detected 3.4.5
where required only.] [Power operated facing points in flank and sigs only: in route, flank and sigs only: in route, 3.5.4
OL set to acceptable position and detected only.] [FPLs trapping electrical OL, flank trapping electrical flank and
provided only for mechanical facing points. Non- & FPLs in detection and & FPLs in detection trapping
passenger moves require FPL or detection.] [Trailing (route and trapping (line of (and FPLs
mechanically operated points not detected.] [BOL OL only) (and FPLs route only) detected)
locking is by instruction in non-TCB.] detected)
Trailing points, switch diamonds, etc. in overlap set to Shunts 3.4.3
prevent conflicting moves. only
Facing train operated points detected and pressure Mech'ly ü Mech'ly ü 3.5.1
normal. operated operated
sigs only sigs only
Facing hand points or spring points detected normal. For shunt
moves
GF releases and GF points set, locked, and detected In route, Mech'ly In route, In route, Mech'ly In route, 3.6.1
normal in line of route, [overlap] and flank/trap points. OL and operated OL and and flank operated and flank
[Trailing mechanically operated points not detected.] flank: sigs only: flank: only: sigs only: only:
[BOL locking is by instruction in non-TCB.] release electrical detected release electrical detected
normal detection normal normal detection normal
Gate box releases are normal (with gates locked across ü ü 3.6.1
road or barriers proved down and crossing clear).
Signal stick set (not applied). Or auto ü 3.2.11
working
selected
Where necessary for permissive working, signal ahead ü 3.7.1
locked normal.
All authorised opposing and conflicting movements clear ü 3.7.5
of route and overlap, or overlap swung away. (Route
locking.)
All authorised opposing and conflicting movements at a ü
stand on permissive track or at destination signal, or
clear of route [or opposing locking omitted]. (Route
locking.)
Interlocked gated level crossings in the route: gates Gate Gate 3.8
proved locked across the road. [Does not generally stops stops Part X
apply to gated level crossings in the overlap.] normal or normal or
gate locks gate locks
in in
Controlled barrier crossings, in the route [and 50m Where Mech'ly In route Where Mech'ly In route
overlap]: proved barriers down and crossing clear, at lock lever operated and lock lever operated only
time of signal clearing only. [CCTV crossings also provided sigs only overlap provided sigs only
require barriers intact and local controls locked.] (route & (route & (route (route
OL) OL) only) only)
Any movable bridge set, locked and detected normal. Bolts in ü Bolts in ü 3.9.1
Any lockout devices normal. ü ü ü ü 3.9.2
Where provided, all-signals-on switch not operated. ü ü 3.7.1
Where required for route holding or sequential locking, ü ü 4.3
trailing points in rear locked both ways. 4.5
Signal ahead proved on if it is not automatically replaced Non- ü 4.5
by the passage of a train. (Sequential locking.) reciprocal
mech’l
lock’g (not
new work)
Figure F1 Non-Route Setting Signalling System Controls continued ...
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Inter- Selection Op or Inter- Selection Op or
Electro-Mechanical Interlocking locking Lock, if Aspect locking Lock, if Aspect
- Level → provided Controls provided Controls
locking Lock Controls locking Lock Controls Sect-
- Level → Lock Lock ion
Controls Controls Part
Controls and Facilities ↓ - Level →
Main colour light signal ahead proved alight (both distant Mech'ly ü Not for 2.4
and stop signals where applicable, including each head operated call-on Part S
of a splitting distant). Any banner repeater ahead sigs with
proved on and alight or controls off. (For signals leading colour light
onto single lines, controls are bypassed by lamp failed signal
alarm acknowledged.) ahead
Independent PLS ahead proved red lamp alight or Not for Part S
controls off, for limiting wrong road moves. LOS proved call-on
alight.
Where required for colour light junction signals, route ü ü
indicator proved alight.
Special controls satisfied where signal ahead is for ü
closing-up.
Where provided, special controls satisfied where signal ü
ahead is a tunnel signal, at time of signal clearing only.
Where provided, special controls satisfied for signals in Mech'ly ü
advance of junction signals to guard against reading operated
through, at time of signal clearing only. sigs only
Section signal for non-TCB requires: LC/TA or token Bi- Mech'ly ü Bi- Mech'ly Authorised Part K
release (one train only), at time of signal clearing only. directional operated directional operated by special
lines only signals lines only: sigs only: instr’ns
only by special by special
instr’ns instr’ns
Entrance signal for direction lever working requires: This SB Next SB This SB Next SB
lever lever lever lever
normal reverse normal reverse
Where provided, released when king lever reversed. ü ü
Hazard detectors (trip wire etc) proved normal. ü ü
Figure F1 Non-Route Setting Signalling System Controls
Inter- Electrical Aspect See

locking Selection Replaced Sect-
Normalisation Facilities Backlock ion
Any related distant signal normal. ü 3.7.1
Any other signal normal that requires to be preceded by this one. ü 3.2.8
Signaller’s control device not reversed. ü Part L
Withdrawal of electrical aspect controls (except those marked at time of clearing only). ü 3.7.1
Signaller’s control device not reversed, signal on and free of approach locking. ü 2.6
Signaller’s control device not reversed with signal approach locked. Timed or 3.7.2
manual 3.7.4
release
Line is clear between signal and points, where separate route locking is not provided. ü 3.5.6
5.3
Figure F2 Normalisation of Controlled Signals (Non-Route Setting Systems)
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3.2.2 Controlled Stop Signals and Routes, Associated with Route Setting
Interlockings
Route setting interlockings should provide the controls and facilities summarised
in Figure F3. The requirements for normalisation are summarised in Figure F4.
The controls for each signal should be specified in control tables, in accordance
with GK/RT0202.
Figures F3 and F4 may be read for any type of route setting interlocking, as
follows:
Conventional route setting interlockings register a route request if the locking is

free (i.e. points available), and then automatically call the points to the required
position. The route request with the points correctly called sets the route,
which, in turn, locks the points.
With programmable electronic interlockings, the route request may control the
points and set the route, if the points are free to move. There may be no
separate locking.
With route setting systems, signals should be controlled by the following types of
route:
a) main colour light or semaphore signal: main or warning route;
b) subsidiary signal (PLS or semaphore): call-on or shunt route;
c) shunting signal (PLS or semaphore): shunt route;
d) semaphore calling-on signal: call-on route;
e) semaphore shunt-ahead signal: shunt route;
f) semaphore warning signal: warning route (not for new work).
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ROUTE SETTING SIGNALLING SYSTEMS

Signal Type Main Main Subsidiary PLS Any PLS See
Route Class Main (M) Warning (W) Call-On (C) Shunt (S) Sect-
Level → Route Set Aspect Route Set Aspect Route Set Aspect Route Set Aspect ion
and Controls and Controls and Controls and Controls or
Controls and Facilities Locked Locked Locked Locked Part
↓
Route requested by switch, Normal Selected Auto step- Normal Permis’ive Selected 3.2.5
push buttons, tracker ball, exit [with by special up to (M) exit, with track by shunt 3.2.7
R or keyboard. perm’sive exit device route if permissive occupied exit device 7.3.1
E tk clear at or full OL a’propriate track occ'd at time of Part L
Q setting, if un- (before sig at time of signal
U (C) route available clears) setting clearing
E exists]
S Route set (both parts of (M) route, (W) route, (C) route (S) route, 3.2.2
T route if dual controlled). or or (M) (or pre-set 7.3
stepped- route if no - indep
up (W) locking in PLS only)
route OL
Directly opposing routes In route In route In route In route 2.4
normal, [unless opposition only and full OL and ROL only only [or 7.3.3
in overlap and able to be opposing
swung away]. locking
omitted]
Other class routes from this ü ü ü ü 2.5
signal normal. 7.3.3
Any slot from another control ü ü ü ü 3.2.9
point given.
Approach controlled to clear Clears to ü Only for 3.2.10
when train nearly at a stand. yellow subsidiary
aspect PLS
only
Where required for junction ü
signalling, approach control
satisfied.
When applied, temporary ü
approach control satisfied.
Signal clearance is delayed, ü ü ü ü 3.2.12
where necessary, to give
sufficient warning for an
automatic LC or train activated
warning system.
Signal clearance is delayed, for ü ü ü ü Part X
an automatic level crossing
with stopping selected, until
train is at a stand in platform.
Where provided, Lime Street ü 3.2.6
controls satisfied.
Routes from any signal pre-set ü ü ü ü 3.2.8
by this route normal.
Routes pre-setting this signal Indep PLS
normal. only
Signals pre-set by this route ü ü ü ü
proved off.
Aspects of routes pre-setting Independ-
this signal ready to clear. ent PLS
(Aspect controls as pre-setting when pre-
route.) set
The line of route and foul tracks ü ü Up to Up to 3.3.1
are clear [delayed replacement perm’sive perm’sive 3.3.4
tracks clear at time of signal track (ex- track (ex- 3.7.1
clearing only]. clusive) clusive)
The overlap and foul tracks are Up to full Up to ROL 3.3.4
clear, or alternative overlap OL if separate 3.4.1
available. track
Figure F3 Route Setting Signalling System Controls continued ...
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↓
Points set, locked & detected in Set and Locked Set and Locked Set and Locked Set and Locked 3.4.2
the route, [overlap, or locked in and locked in and locked in and locked in and 3.4.4
alternative overlap available], route, full detected route, detected route, detected route, detected 3.4.5
and flank/ trap points. [Flank OL, flank in route, ROL, flank in route, flank and in route, flank and in route, 3.5.4
points detected where required and full OL, and ROL, flank trapping flank and trapping flank and
only.] [Facing points in overlap trapping flank and trapping and only trapping only trapping
set to acceptable position and trapping trapping only only
detected only.] [Trailing
mechanically operated points
not detected.]
Trailing points, switch Up to in- 3.4.3
diamonds, etc. in overlap set dependent
and locked to prevent PLS/LOS
conflicting moves.
Facing train operated points ü ü ü ü 3.5.1
detected and pressure normal.
Facing hand points or spring ü
points detected normal.
GF releases and GF points set, Set and Locked Set and Locked Set and Locked Set and Locked 3.6.1
locked, and detected normal in locked in and locked in and locked in and locked in and
the route, [overlap, or route, full detected route, detected route, detected route, detected
alternative overlap available] OL, flank in route, ROL, flank in route, flank and in route, flank and in route,
and flank/trap points. [Trailing and full OL, and ROL, flank trapping flank and trapping flank and
mechanically operated points trapping flank and trapping and only trapping only trapping
not detected.] trapping trapping only only
Gate box releases are normal ü ü ü ü
with gates locked across road
or barriers proved down and
crossing clear.
Signal stick set (not applied). Or auto Or auto ü ü 3.2.11
working working
selected selected
All authorised opposing and Route and Route and 3.7.5
conflicting movements clear of full OL ROL
route and overlap, or
alternative overlap available.
(Route locking.)
All authorised opposing and ü ü
conflicting movements at a
stand on permissive track or at
destination signal, or clear of
route [or opposing locking
omitted]. (Route locking.)
Controlled level crossings in In route In route In route In route 3.8
the route [and overlap]: proved and and ROL only only Part X
barriers down and crossing overlap of
clear at time of signal clearing 50m
only. [CCTV crossings also
require barriers intact and local
controls locked.]
Any movable bridge in route In route, & In route, & In route, & In route, & In route In route In route In route 3.9.1
[and overlap]: set, locked by OL if no OL if no ROL if no ROL if no only only only only
this route and detected normal. trap points trap points trap points trap points
Any lockout devices normal. ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 3.9.2
Where provided, all-signals-on ü ü ü ü 3.7.1
switch not operated.
Route [or aspect] not disabled. Route Aspect Route Aspect Route Aspect Route Aspect 3.11.7
Figure F3 Route Setting Signalling System Controls continued ...
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↓
Signal ahead proved alight ü ü For shunt 2.4
(both distant and stop signals moves up Part S
where applicable, including to main
each head of a splitting signal only
distant). Any banner repeater
ahead proved on and alight or
controls off. (For signals
leading onto single lines,
controls are bypassed by lamp
failed alarm acknowledged.)
Independent PLS ahead ü Part S
proved red lamp alight or
controls off, for limiting wrong
road moves. LOS proved
alight.
Where required for junction ü ü ü ü
signalling, RI proved alight.
Special controls satisfied to ü
ensure driver sees whole
sequence where flashing
yellows, splitting distant, or
splitting banner in rear.
Special controls satisfied when Full OL Plat occ,
signal ahead is only for closing- (platform) next tk
up, at time of signal clearing. clear occ ROL
clear
Special controls satisfied when ü ü
signal ahead is a tunnel signal,
at time of signal clearing only.
Special controls satisfied to ü ü
guard against reading through,
at time of signal clearing only.
Section signal for non-track Bi- ü Bi- Restricted Perm’sive Bi- Authorised Part K
circuit block requires: LC/TA or directional directional accept- working directional by special
token release (one train only), lines only lines only: ance arr- only (uni- lines only: instr’ns
at time of signal clearing only. restricted angement directional) by special
accept’ce instr’ns
Hazard detectors (trip wire etc) ü ü ü ü
proved normal.
Note: For signals designated controlled solely to protect a controlled level crossing, see Figure F5.
Figure F3 Route Setting Signalling System Controls
Route Aspect See

Released Replaced Sect-
Normalisation Facilities ion
Route cancelling device operated. ü Part L
Withdrawal of aspect controls (except those marked at time of clearing only). ü 3.7.1
TORR, or route cancelling device operated, signal on and free of approach locking. ü 2.6
Route cancelling device operated with signal approach locked. Timed 3.7.2
release 3.7.4
Pre-set signals: pre-setting route cancelling device operated, unless train between pre-setting and pre- ü 3.2.8
set signals.
Figure F4 Normalisation of Controlled Signals and Routes (Route Setting Systems)
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3.2.3 Stop Signals not Associated with an Interlocking

a) General
This section applies to signals without separate locking and aspect levels,
where all the controls are provided in the signal aspect. (Signals operated
from a lever frame should instead follow Section 3.2.1.) These signals are
not centrally interlocked and should generally be provided with the controls
and facilities summarised in Figure F5. The controls for each signal should
be specified in control tables, in accordance with GK/RT0202.
A non-interlocked signal should be controlled as follows:
i. by the passage of trains, for automatic and semi-automatic colour light

signals in track circuit block only (see GK/RT0035);
ii. by a single device, for signals (including non-block signals) that are only
designated controlled in order to protect a neutral section, or other hazard
(together with an automatic working facility in track circuit block);
iii. by an entrance/exit request in route setting interlockings, with an
indication of route set, for controlled signals protecting a controlled level
crossing; or
iv. exceptionally, for non-block signals, by the absence of a hazard.
(Where necessary to maintain consistency in existing signal boxes, signals in

category iii may instead be controlled by a single device in route setting
interlockings, with no indication of route set.)
Certain of these signals may be controlled or locally locked by a ground

frame or level crossing, as shown in Figure F5 (see GK/RT0061). Signals
that work automatically may be normally off.
Block signals should be automatically replaced following the passage of a

train wherever reasonably practicable, and under all circumstances where
permissive working is authorised. Block signals that protect movable
infrastructure, such as a ground frame or controlled level crossing, should
not be designated automatic or intermediate block home. Stop boards, such
as those instructing the driver to obtain token, should be regarded as
unworked block signals.
Non-block signals are not required to be controlled by train detection, but

only by a particular hazard or infrastructure detection system. Non-block
signals should be located close to the hazard or infrastructure that they are
to protect, but overlap distance clear (see Figures F12 and F13). Where
non-block signals are arranged to be normally off with automatic replacement
by the presence of a hazard (e.g. if a rock fall is detected, or if detection of
ground frame points is lost), special instructions should be issued to inform
train crew of the action to be taken if such signals are found to be at danger.
Remote ground frame markers and stop boards, such as those protecting
unmanned or automatic level crossings, should be regarded as unworked
non-block signals.
In the case of ground frame markers (and gated level crossings without a
protecting stop signal), the controls should be applied to a worked distant
signal (see Sections 3.4.2(h), 3.6.2(a) and 3.7.2(j)).
Both block and non-block signals that protect movable infrastructure should
generally be provided with approach locking and route holding, although
relaxations are available. See Sections 3.7.3 and 3.5.7.
For signals on bi-directional lines, see Section 3.5.9.

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See
Aspect Controls Sect
ion
R Automatic and semi-automatic signals: signal box replacement control not operated, OR 3.2.3
E
Q Non-interlocked controlled signals (simple control, e.g. single push button): signal box control operated for signals protecting a Part L
U track sectioning cabin/ neutral section, or where train must not pass red signal with failed SPT (signal designated controlled or
E non-block signal), OR
S Non-interlocked or locally-locked controlled signals (standard control): signal box control operated for signals protecting a
T controlled level crossing or ground frame (signal designated controlled or non-block signal).
Where provided, hazard detectors (trip wire, etc.) proved normal. 3.2.3
Signal clearance is delayed, where necessary, to give sufficient warning for an automatic level crossing (e.g. with stopping 3.2.12
selected, clearance delayed until train is at a stand in platform).
Facing train operated points detected and pressure normal. 3.5.1
Ground frame points (facing points within 800m of signal) are set, locked, and detected normal (signal designated semi-automatic 3.6
or non-block signal). [Trailing mechanically operated points are not detected.] [Signals over 800m from facing points, including
points in overlap, to be designated controlled or non-block signal].
Level crossing gates in route locked across road (signal designated semi-automatic or non-block signal). [Does not generally 3.8
apply to gated level crossings in the overlap.] Part X
Controlled level crossings in route [and 50m overlap]: proved barriers down and crossing clear, at time of signal clearing only
(signal designated controlled, semi-automatic or non-block signal). [CCTV crossings also require barriers intact and local controls
locked.]
Any lockout devices proved normal. 3.9.2
B The line of route and overlap are clear. 3.3.1
L Restricted overlap, with approach control to clear only to yellow aspect when train nearly at a stand, automatically stepped up 3.4.1
O to full overlap if available before signal clears [requires special controls satisfied when the next signal is for closing-up].
C Facing points in overlap set to acceptable position and detected. 3.4.2
K Entrance route to bi-directional lines set [or, for signals reading in predominant direction, opposing entrance route not set]. 3.5.9
Gate box or ground frame releases are normal or slots off (signal designated semi-automatic or controlled). 3.6
S Signal stick set (not applied) or auto working selected, where signaller's control provided. 3.2.11
I Where signal box control transmitted by main remote control system, all-signals-on switch not operated. 3.7.1
G Aspect not disabled [SSI signals] or signal post switch [where provided] set to auto. 3.11.7
N Where provided, special controls satisfied where signal ahead is a tunnel signal, at time of signal clearing only. Part S
A Where provided, special controls for signals in advance of junction signals to guard against reading through, at time of signal
L clearing only.
S Block signal ahead proved alight (both distant and stop signals where applicable, including each head of a splitting distant).
Any banner repeater ahead proved on and alight or controls off.
Note: For signals designated semi-automatic because signal box can switch out, see Figure F1 or F3, as appropriate.
Figure F5 Block and Non-Block Stop Signals Not Associated with an Interlocking (all systems)
b) Replacement Devices
Signaller’s replacement devices should be provided for all block signals that
are not controlled (i.e. automatic and semi-automatic signals). These should
always be given safety-critical integrity, so that they can be used to provide
the following facilities, as applicable:
i. protection for personnel working under possession;

ii. protection for users at unmanned or automatic level crossings, when
verbally authorised by the signaller;
iii. suppression of level crossing strike-in or gate box warning when shunting
movements are taking place; and
iv. provision of stopping/non-stopping controls where a station platform is
located within the strike-in of an automatic level crossing.
(Where necessary to maintain consistency in existing signal boxes, signals

providing facilities ii, iii or iv may instead be controlled by a single device in
route setting interlockings with an automatic working facility, but no indication
of route set. Such signals should be designated automatic.)
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A typical replacement arrangement would be a direct wired circuit operated

by a stick relay at the signal box, de-energising a replacement relay at the
signal, which in turn controls the signal aspect relay. A red replacement
indication should prove that the remote replacement has been effective
(replacement relay de-energised), as well as proving the signal on (aspect
relay de-energised) and proving the lamp alight. Any related distant and/or
banner repeating signals should also be proved on and alight. An off
indication should not be provided. In the case of semi-automatic signals that
are approach locked to protect ground frames, etc., (see Section 3.6.2) the
red indication should flash whilst any manual approach lock release is timing.
See Section 3.7.1 for general signal replacement requirements.
Wherever such a signal is equipped with a signaller’s replacement facility,

any signal post replacement switch should be removed, to prevent personnel
placing reliance on a device which could be susceptible to hazardous failure.
3.2.4 Repeating Signals and Indicators

Distant and banner repeating signals should be provided with the controls and
facilities summarised in Figure F6. The controls for each signal should be
specified in control tables, in accordance with GK/RT0202.
A separately controlled distant signal should be released by the related stop

signal(s). If no lever is provided for a power operated distant signal there can
be no interlocking or selection lock, so any such controls should be provided in
the aspect. The signal should then work automatically, its aspect dependent
upon the aspects displayed by its related stop signal(s).
A distant signal should be controlled as follows:
a) by a different device from its related stop signal(s) for mechanically operated
signals;
b) by the same signaller’s request as the related stop signal in route setting
interlockings; or
c) by either method (a) or (b) for other power operated signals. (If a common
device is used, a replacement device should also be provided in
circumstances where: non-track circuit block working is in force; a level
crossing is situated in the route beyond any related stop signal; or otherwise
as requested by the infrastructure controller.)
In semaphore signalled areas, where the minimum signal spacing distance (from
GK/RT0034) places a distant signal within the station limits of a signal box in
rear, it should be mounted on the same post as the next stop signal in rear,
repeated below any intervening stop signals between the outer distant and its
first related stop signal, and slotted in accordance with Section 3.2.9.
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Inter- Electrical Aspect See

locking Selection Controls Sect-
Controls and Facilities Lock ion
Distant or inner distant requires all related stop signals ahead levers reverse, and aspect Levers Proved off 3.2.1
requires any signals proved off if power operated. (In the latter case the distant should be reverse
power operated.)
Outer distant requires inner distant lever reverse, and aspect requires it proved off if power Lever Proved off
operated. (In the latter case the outer distant should be power operated.) reverse
Distant signal lever/switch reverse, if provided. ü
Distant arm is slotted to require any stop arm off, either on the same post as the distant, or ü 3.2.9
between the distant and its first related stop signal. (In the latter case, a repeat distant arm is
required.)
Distant arm requires slot off from any other signal box for which it acts also as distant. ü
Distant signal associated with remote ground frame marker requires ground frame points ü 3.6
detected normal. (Mechanically operated signals require mechanical detection.)
Distant signal requires colour light stop signal ahead proved alight. Any banner repeater Mech’ly ü Part S
ahead proved on and alight or controls off. op signals
only
Banner repeater requires its related stop signal proved off (and alight if colour light). ü
Any train detection device between a power operated distant signal or banner repeater ü
(except in terminal platforms) and its first related stop signal is clear.
Figure F6 Distant Signal and Banner Repeating Signal Controls (all systems)
A banner repeating signal should be controlled by the same signaller’s request

as its related stop signal.
Wherever reasonably practicable, and under all circumstances where permissive

working is authorised, a distant or banner repeating signal should be replaced by
a train detection device situated between itself and its first related stop signal.
An exception is made in the case of a banner repeating signal in a terminal
platform, where it is generally more informative for it to reflect the state of the
platform starting signal.
Where provided (for the use of station personnel), an off indicator should be
controlled simply by the platform starting signal and never be replaced by a train
detection device between itself and the signal. Where permissive working is
authorised, off indicators should not be positioned such that they can be read by
a driver.
3.2.5 Restricted Approach Arrangement (also known as Warning

Arrangement)
Under the restricted approach arrangement trains are brought nearly to a stand
at a main signal before it is allowed to show the most restrictive proceed aspect
to indicate that the next stop signal is at danger and the overlap may be
unavailable. For new work, movements made under the restricted approach
arrangement should be signalled with the main signal, approach controlled in
accordance with Section 3.2.10, and should be provided with a restricted
overlap. Otherwise, these controls may be imposed by instruction.
(However, a slightly higher approach speed is preferable to minimise the

likelihood of drivers accelerating sharply between the signals. The overlap
length related to the approach speed is given in Section 3.3.3(c).)
In colour light track circuit block, such movements should be authorised by a

warning aspect (delayed yellow); also where colour light signals are used within
station limits in non-track circuit block. In route setting interlockings they should
be controlled by a separate warning route, if the overlap locking is less than that
required by the main route. Otherwise the main route should suffice, controlled
by a restricted approach arrangement when only the restricted overlap is
available.
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If the signal ahead is subsequently selected such that the full overlap becomes
available (locked and clear), before the warning aspect has cleared, the
interlocking (or aspect if the locking is the same) may step up to allow an
unrestricted main aspect to be displayed, in accordance with GK/RT0078.
An automatic signal may also be provided with a warning aspect where

necessary for operating purposes, e.g. as a closing-up signal. Likewise, a
controlled signal may be provided with an automatic working facility. These
signals may step up to a main aspect, as above, but should revert to restricted
overlap conditions following the passage of each train.
For non-track circuit block sections, restricted acceptance arrangements are

given in the appropriate regulations in the BR30062 series. Where stated in
signaller’s instructions, this should be enforced by manually delaying the
clearance of the section signal. If the section signal is colour light, it is
preferable for it to be combined with the distant signal ahead (subject to the
signal spacing requirements of GK/RT0034), to enable a delayed yellow, rather
than a delayed green, aspect to be displayed.
A signal authorising movements under the restricted approach arrangement

should be controlled as follows:
a) in non-route setting interlockings where the overlap locking is the same, or

where the control system is subject to particular constraints (e.g. on lever
frames), by a single device, but with the restricted overlap selected by a
supplementary operating device (such as a plunger);
b) in route setting interlockings and other non-route setting interlockings, by a

different signaller’s request from the main route;
c) by the passage of trains, for automatic signals; or
d) by a separate device from the main signal where a separate warning signal is
provided (not for new work).
Examples are given in Figure F1:12 for non-route setting systems and
Figure F5:5 for route setting systems. For further details of restricted overlaps
see Section 3.4.1.
3.2.6 Permissive Movements

a) General
The provision of permissive running movements, as distinct from shunting

movements, for either passenger or freight trains, requires risks to be
controlled so far as is reasonably practicable in accordance with GK/RT0044.
A permissive movement should be signalled with a subsidiary signal (PLS or

semaphore), and should be controlled by a call-on route in route setting
interlockings.
A signal authorising permissive movements should be controlled as follows:
i. by a different device from the main signal for mechanically operated

signals;
ii. by the same signaller’s request as the main route in route setting
interlockings;
iii. by either method i) or ii) for other power operated signals (a different
device should generally be used where the main signal has interlocking in
the overlap).
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Examples are given in Figure F1:12 for non-route setting systems and
Figure F5:5 for route setting systems.
In track circuit block, signals authorising permissive movements require a

permissive track section occupied, both when setting the route (or selecting
the signal) and at time of signal clearance, but subsequent clearance of the
track section should not replace the signal. Conversely, a main signal
associated with a permissive signal requires the permissive track section
clear, both when setting the route (or selecting the signal) and at time of
signal clearance. Stepping down of aspects is not permitted. Stepping up of
aspects is not permitted where permissive passenger movements are
authorised.
In non-track circuit block, permissive working is permitted in accordance with

GK/RT0042 (absolute block), GK/RT0051 (only within station limits on single
lines), or GK/RT0054 (RETB). (See also the BR30062 series of regulations.)
In absolute block sections a counting device (or special block instrument)
may be used to determine when the line is clear.
For new work, approach control should be provided, in accordance with

Section 3.2.10.
No controls ahead of the destination signal are required.
Automatic working facilities for controlled signals authorising a permissive

movement are not permitted. However, on a permissive goods line,
intermediate automatic signals may be provided, with selection of main or
subsidiary aspect by track occupancy. Such signals should be track
replaced with the subsidiary aspect approach controlled to prevent the
stepping down of aspects. Stepping up may be permitted when the train
ahead is clear of the route and overlap.
b) Platform Space
Where passenger trains of more than two vehicles are required to be

signalled into an occupied terminal platform, the following controls (commonly
known as Lime Street Controls) may be provided:
i. a berth track section, known as the measuring track, at the signal

controlling the entrance to the platform, of the same length as the outer
platform track section;
ii. two platform track sections, the inner one nearer the buffer stops being
as short as possible to accommodate the longest train that may be in the
platform when it is necessary to signal in a further train;
iii. the permissive aspect controls should require the inner platform track
occupied (for a permissive movement), the outer platform track clear
(short space available), the measuring track occupied (for approach
control) and the track section in rear of the measuring track clear (proves
short train).
These controls prevent a train that is longer than the available space from
being signalled into a platform.
If it is desired to signal one or more locomotives onto a train when both

platform tracks are occupied, the measuring track may be divided to prove
the length of the locomotive(s). Alternatively, a shunting facility may be
provided, controlled by a different signaller’s request as described in
Section 3.2.7.
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Similar controls, but with only one platform track and a shorter measuring
track, may be provided where it is not required to signal more than
locomotive(s) into an occupied platform.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, similar controls may be

provided at through platforms.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, more complex controls may

be provided for longer platforms, perhaps using three platform tracks and
two measuring tracks.
3.2.7 Shunting Movements

A shunting movement should be signalled with a shunting signal or subsidiary
signal (PLS or semaphore) and should be controlled by a shunt route in route
setting interlockings.
A signal associated with a main aspect that authorises shunting movements

should be controlled by a different signaller’s request from the main signal.
In track circuit block, shunting signals (PLS or semaphore), that read onto or
along running lines, should generally require all track sections clear up to the
signal (or LOS) ahead. However, where attaching or detaching operations are
necessary, the track sections where these operations occur may be omitted
from the controls. In such cases, the signal ahead should have a separate
overlap track section and first wheel replacement.
In non-track circuit block, train detection control may be omitted from shunting
signals, except for those reading into an intermediate block section. Shunting
ahead into the block section should be in accordance with GK/RT0042,
GK/RT0051 or GK/RT0054, as appropriate. (See also the BR30062 series of
regulations.)
For new work, approach control should be provided for subsidiary signals (PLS
or semaphore), in accordance with Section 3.2.10.
For pre-set shunting signals see Section 3.2.8. For shunt overlaps see
Section 3.4.3. For omission of opposing locking see Section 3.5.9.
3.2.8 Pre-Set Signals

One or more independent shunting signals (PLS or semaphore) may be pre-set
by any class of route from a signal. When such signals are pre-set, they should
not clear until the aspect controls for the pre-setting route are off, awaiting only
the clearance of the pre-set signal(s). Once the signals have cleared, the track
sections between the pre-setting and the pre-set signals should be selected out
of the pre-set aspect controls to prevent premature replacement. These aspect
controls should then include any further pre-set signals in advance proved off.
Approach locking and route locking should be applied to the pre-setting route, as
if the pre-set signal did not exist.
Replacement conditions should be as follows:
a) Before the train passes the pre-setting signal, restoring the pre-setting signal
control device should replace the pre-setting and pre-set signals. The signals
may be recleared by re-stroking the whole route. (If the train has, by then,
entered the route, only the signals ahead of the train should clear.)
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b) After the train enters the route, restoring the pre-setting signal device should
have no effect on the pre-set signals. (Additionally on permissive lines it
should be possible to extend the replacement of the pre-set signal to include
“replacement only after the pre-setting route has been cancelled and the
route locking release has reached the pre-set signal”).
c) Restoring the pre-set signal control device(s) at any time should replace the
signal whose device is restored, as well as pre-set signals to the rear and the
pre-setting signal. Such restoration should not initiate the approach lock
release timer. The restoration may be nullified by re-stroking the whole
route.
d) Once the pre-setting signal has been replaced, an emergency replacement

facility should be provided, whereby the restoration of any pre-set control
device should replace all the pre-set signals in the route. The restoration
may be nullified by simply operating the device again to reclear the pre-set
signal(s).
e) Track section replacement conditions should be as described in

Section 3.7.1. The pre-set signal should have the same type of replacement
as the pre-setting signal when in pre-set mode, but may have another type in
non-pre-set mode.
Exceptionally a main signal may be required to be pre-set by another main route,

in which case controls similar to those described above should be provided.
3.2.9 Slots and Releases

Where signals are required to be controlled from more than one signal box or
ground frame (as described in Section 3.6.1), a slot should be provided such
that signal clearance requires authority from two or more control points. The
withdrawal of any authority should replace the signal.
It should not be possible to fully normalise a slot so as to release other locking,

until the signal concerned is proved on and free of approach locking.
Semaphore distant signals mounted below any stop signal for another signal box
should be slotted by that stop signal. An outer distant should also be slotted by
any stop signal mounted on the same post as the inner distant. The outer
distant should, conversely, be back slotted by the inner distant and any stop
signal mounted on the same post. The slotting should be extended in like
manner where there are more than two distant signals. See also Section 3.2.4
for distant signals.
Back slotting is a means of ensuring that an outer distant arm cannot be off
when either:
a) the inner distant arm is on; or
b) an intervening stop signal worked from another box is on.
Slotting should be achieved either mechanically or electrically, as appropriate.

Where any of the slot controls are electrical, the slotted signal should be made
power operated, so that it is replaced immediately any of the controls are
withdrawn. A combination of mechanically operated signal and electrical slot
(via the lever lock) should not be provided for new work. Mechanical slotting
should be achieved by balance levers on the signal post, as described in Part S.
Previous alternative methods of control (such as by underbolting the signal lever
with a release from the other signal box) should not be provided for new work.
(In the case of underbolting, the signal is not automatically replaced when the
slot is withdrawn.)
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Where such slotting is not practicable, a separate electrical release may be

provided to release the locking on one or more signals, e.g. for a shunter or at a
gate box. Where the withdrawal of such a release does not replace the signals,
it may be necessary to provide an emergency replacement facility, or alarm, at
the appropriate control point.
The response of the signal (aspect or arm) and slot control (disengaging relay or
slot balance lever) in the on position, and of the slot control in the off position
should be suitably repeated and indicated. The minimum indication requirement
is to show slot off from the other control point(s) at the signal box that has
primary control of the signal, i.e. the signal box whose identification plate and/or
signal post telephone is provided at the signal.
For ground frame releases see Section 3.6. For ground frame and slotted
signal control circuits see Appendix F2:10.
3.2.10 Approach Control

Approach control of power operated signals should generally be provided, with
automatic signal clearance, in the following situations:
a) where there is insufficient spacing between a single yellow and a red aspect
in a four aspect sequence, as described in GK/RT0032 (the signal to be
released after passing the previous signal);
b) at the commencement of a four aspect sequence to avoid a signal displaying

the first cautionary aspect for more than one signal, as described in
GK/RT0032 (the signal to be released after passing the previous signal);
c) to ensure that train speed is adequately reduced to safely negotiate a

turnout, as an alternative to advance warning of divergence, either by
approach control from red or from yellow, in accordance with GK/RT0035
(the signal to be released when the train has attained the correct speed, as
shown in Figure F10);
d) to prevent the driver sighting a proceed aspect before the route indicator,
where no advance warning of divergence has been received and this could
result in a train approaching the turnout at an excessive speed (the signal to
be released at the sighting point of the route indicator, as shown in
Figure F9);
e) to ensure that train speed is adequately reduced to stop short of buffer stops
in a bay platform (the signal to be released when the train has attained the
correct speed, as shown in Figure F10);
f) before displaying a delayed yellow (warning) aspect, to ensure that train

speed is adequately reduced to safely approach the signal beyond with only
a restricted overlap available (the signal to be released when the train has
attained the correct speed, as shown in Figure F10); and
g) before displaying a subsidiary aspect (permissive or shunting), where

necessary to ensure that train speed passing the signal is such that the train
can stop short of any obstruction (the signal to be released when the train is
nearly at a stand, nominally 15mph, at approximately 50m from the signal, as
shown in Figure F8).
For mechanically operated signals, the above should be applied where

reasonably practicable, with manual signal clearance by the signaller. Other
options include providing advance warning of divergence by means of splitting
distant arms and subsidiary signals that lock the signal in rear.
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See Section 3.3.3 for the use of track section timers. See Section 4.5 for
approach controlled signals with sequential locking.
Additionally, a temporary approach control facility (requiring berth track section

occupied) should be provided to cover any such need for a reduction in speed
that may arise, but a timer or additional track circuit is not required for the
purpose. See also Section 3.11.7.
3.2.11 Automatic Working Facilities

Facilities should be provided in the interlocking to allow controlled signals in track
circuit block to be automatically re-cleared, as well as replaced, dependent upon
track section conditions, in the following situations:
a) for nominated signals, by the provision of an additional automatic working

control device for each signal;
b) where automatic working is in operation under remote control failure

conditions (see Section 3.10); or
c) for automatic terminal platform or junction working, initiated by special control

device and/or a remote control override system. TORR is a requirement. A
“first come, first served” arrangement may be used for trailing junctions.
Routing information may be derived from a train describer system for facing
junctions. See Section 3.2.13 for other arrangements. The points should not
be called until a time has elapsed after the release of all point locking, to
protect against wrong side failure of track sections.
The interlocking should be capable of allowing a signal to work automatically for

each main route to which it applies as selected by the signaller on initiation of
automatic working. This facility may also be extended to warning class routes,
as described in Section 3.2.5.
Automatic working of controlled signals should otherwise be inhibited by means

of a signal stick. This control should be applied by the occupation of the first
track section beyond the signal when the signal is off. (The berth track is
required occupied at the same time to guard against a failure of the first track.)
Once applied the signal route must be cancelled and re-set to enable the signal
to clear when the remainder of the controls come off again.
3.2.12 Delayed Clearance

Where signal clearance requires some other function to have been operating for
a time, automatic operation may be achieved by arranging for the signal aspect
controls to initiate the other function and operate a timing device for the required
time. Signal clearance then requires the aspect controls and the time cycle
completed. Examples include signals positioned within the strike-in point of an
automatic level crossing, or of a train activated warning system. See
Section 3.2.13(a) for a manual option.
3.2.13 No Signaller Route Setting

Signal route setting may be initiated by train or station personnel under certain
circumstances. The following examples are illustrative:
a) Where a station platform is located close to an automatic level crossing and

the time for station duties is not consistent, a train ready to start (TRTS)
plunger may be provided for train crew to initiate the time cycle described in
Section 3.2.12.
b) Where automatic terminal platform working is provided (see

Section 3.2.11(c)) and there is more than one platform, TRTS plungers may
be used to select the first departure.
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c) Where automatic junction working is provided (see Section 3.2.11(c)) and

there is no train describer, TRTS plungers may be used to select the
appropriate route at the facing junction. At a remote token control point, the
route may be selected by withdrawal of the appropriate token.
3.3 Track Sections

Mandatory requirements are given in GK/RT0011.
For the engineering constraints that are dependent on the type of train detection
system in use (such as maximum and minimum lengths and response times of
track circuits), see GK/RH0751.
a) Track Sections to be Repeated at the Interlocking or Signal Box
All track sections that directly control the operation of interlocking functions
should be individually repeated at the interlocking. See Section (b), below.
The following track sections should be individually indicated to the signaller:
i. those that directly control the operation of interlocking functions, up to the

berth track of the first caution signal approaching the signal box;
ii. any others that control a signalling function operated from the signal box;
iii. those associated with the release of in-section ground frames, but only as
required in Section 3.6.3(g);
iv. those that control any non-track circuit block, but only as required in
GK/RT0042 and GK/RT0051;
v. those that control automatic and semi-automatic signals; and
vi. those that indicate the position of trains relative to fixed infrastructure
(such as tunnels and level crossings), but only where continuous train
detection is provided.
Where continuous train detection is provided, track sections that are

subdivided to operate automatic level crossings, train activated warning
systems, or ground frames, etc., are not required to be individually indicated
to the signaller, unless they fulfil item vi), above. Subdivided track sections
should generally be combined into a single indication to the signaller, and do
not need to be separately repeated at the interlocking, except where they
consist of more than two non-monitored subdivisions (see Section 3.11.1).
Where continuous train detection is not provided, isolated train detection that
is provided to operate automatic level crossings, or train activated warning
systems is not required to be indicated to the signaller, unless it also controls
any of items i) to iv), above.
All track sections (including subdivisions provided to operate automatic level

crossings, train activated warning systems, or ground frames, etc.) should be
individually identified in the control tables and on the signalling/scheme plan.
However, track sections that are subdivided because of equipment limitations
(e.g. too long to be one section, or part single rail/part double rail track
circuit) need not be identified on the signalling/scheme plan, provided they
are shown in the control tables and on the location area plan.
For the signaller's indication requirements, see GK/RT0025.
b) Precautions with Track Repeat Relays
When a track circuit is used to control any signalling function the first repeat
relay within the interlocking should be of the slow to operate type, to ensure
that trains cannot be lost to the interlocking due to different response and
transmission times of the train detection system. Similarly, extra delay should
be provided with such inputs to electronic interlockings. Full details are given
in GK/RC0752.
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Train detection devices that fail safe (see Part T) generally fail in the
occupied state. Consequently, where a less restrictive control requires a
track section to be occupied (e.g. approach control), or a more restrictive
control requires a track section clear (e.g. last wheel replacement),
precautions should be taken to prevent a right side failure creating an unsafe
situation. Track repeat relays and timers should be proved as described in
Section 3.3.3(e).
c) Jointless Track Circuits
Certain train detection devices do not provide precise track section

extremities, e.g. jointless track circuits (tuned zones and centre points).
These are only suitable for applications with sufficiently wide tolerances and
should not generally be used to define clearance points, nor replacement
joints at 5.5m or less beyond a signal.
d) Short Track Circuits
Track circuits that are shorter than the maximum distance between adjacent
wheel centres on any vehicle (see GK/RT0011) require special controls to
prevent them clearing until an adjacent track section is clear. For example in
Appendix F5, considering the portion of DD track section over the diamond
crossing with 713 and 714 points reverse, DD track repeat would be
additionally controlled by 713 detected normal, or 714 detected normal, or CE
track clear, or FA track clear.
3.3.1 Track Circuit Block

Lines signalled by track circuit block (see GK/RT0041) should be provided with
continuous train detection compliant to GK/RT0011. Each line should be divided
into track sections on the following basis. An illustrative example is given in
Appendix F5.
a) The line should be divided into separate track sections between each stop
signal. For signal replacement requirements see Section 3.7.1. Wherever
practicable, the first track section should start at between 5.5m and 20m
beyond the signal. However, where trains regularly stop in advance of a
signal having accepted its authority to proceed (e.g. at a station platform or
when setting back to shunt), the first track section should commence 0m to
5.5m beyond the signal, so that the signaller and the interlocking are aware
that the train has passed the signal. At signal gantries with signals reading in
both directions, it may be necessary for the first track section to commence
at the signal post. Where it is necessary for the first track to commence 0m
to 5.5m beyond the signal, the required distance should be shown on the
signalling/scheme plan.
b) Separate overlap track sections should be provided beyond signals

protecting S&C, movable bridges, or controlled level crossings; beyond
signals provided with route locking for some other reason (e.g. trailing points
in the destination signal overlap); beyond signals within the strike in point of
an automatic level crossing; and beyond signals that have permissive
movements up to them. Otherwise, berth and overlap track sections may be
combined. (Where the first track section commences 0m to 5.5m beyond the
signal, this track section should always be provided in the controls of the
signal in rear, including warning aspects. This is to ensure that a train that
has passed through the section does not overhang onto the approach side of
the signal.) See also Section 3.4.1.
c) In S&C, as few track sections as practicable should be provided, whilst

considering all other requirements and ensuring that parallel movements do
not share common track sections. Care should be taken that points are not
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track locked by one movement, when they could be legitimately moved to

allow a parallel movement (see also Section 3.5.4). Wherever practicable
track sections over S&C should extend to include all applicable clearance
points (see Section 3.3.4).
d) Track section joints should generally be provided immediately in advance of

any points and level crossings, so that track locking can be released as soon
as possible after a train has passed clear, to prevent other traffic being
unnecessarily delayed.
e) Additional track sections should be provided to control an AWS inductor

and/or replace a distant or banner repeating signal on a permissive line (see
GK/RT0016 and GK/RT0060). These signals should also be replaced by a
train detection device, where reasonably practicable, on non-permissive lines.
See Section 3.2.4.
f) Separate track sections should be provided to prove tunnels (and other

similar environments) clear of trains, in accordance with GK/RT0011.
g) Additional track sections may be required where it is necessary to compare

the length of a train about to enter a permissive section with the length of the
unoccupied track section available (Lime Street controls). See
Section 3.2.6(b).
h) Additional track sections may be required where it is necessary to approach

release a junction signal at the point the route indication becomes readable,
or to approach release a warning aspect or a subsidiary signal (PLS or
semaphore) when a train is nearly at a stand. It is preferable for these berth
track sections to be within 275m of the signal. See Section 3.2.10.
i) For train detection requirements associated with ground frames that are not
within interlocking areas, see Section 3.6.2.
j) In the case of direction lever working, continuous train detection should be

provided between the entrance and exit signals (in both directions) through
the direction lever section, in accordance with GK/RT0041.
3.3.2 Station Limits in Non-Track Circuit Block

The requirement for continuous train detection, given in Section 3.3.1, may be
relaxed, as permitted in GK/RT0042 or GK/RT0051, provided that any length of
track not clearly visible from the controlling point is provided with train detection,
and it is demonstrated that risks are controlled so far as is reasonably
practicable, taking account of fog conditions.
The following considerations and minimum requirements should apply:
a) Where track sections are provided within station limits, they should generally
extend to the next signal ahead, or its overlap, (unless provided solely to lock
movable infrastructure) and should be indicated in the signal box.
Section 3.3.1, items (c) to (h), should also be considered, where applicable in
station limits.
b) Where a track section is provided, it should be divided at each signal to

provide an overlap, which should generally be as follows:
i. block overlap at 400m beyond the home signal;

ii. intermediate block home signal overlap at 400m;
iii. overlaps of other signals within station limits (where the signal in rear is
subject to the restricted approach arrangement when the signal is on) at
90m, wherever reasonably practical.
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The 400m overlap may be reduced to 180m where the distant signal is colour
light (see Figure F13). The restricted approach arrangement may be
avoided for a colour light signal that is signal spacing distance beyond a
signal capable of displaying a first caution aspect, by providing a 180m
overlap. See also Section 3.4.1.
c) Train detection (track circuit or FPL bar, etc.) should be provided between a
junction signal and the facing points ahead, to ensure that, once a train has
passed the signal, the points cannot be unbolted or moved until the whole
train has passed clear of the points. Where reasonably practicable, this
should also be applied to other movable infrastructure. Such train detection
may be used both to release the signal approach locking and to apply route
holding.
d) Track sections should be provided to track lock any power operated points.
Where reasonably practicable, this should also be applied to other movable
infrastructure.
e) For train detection requirements associated with in-section ground frames,

see Section 3.6.3.
f) In the case of non-token systems, a berth track section should be provided

at the home signal, generally commencing between 180m and 230m on the
approach side (but not less than 180m). Sighting of the signal should be
ensured from the commencement of the track section to facilitate use of the
restricted approach arrangement. An audible annunciator may be associated
with the berth track section where necessary to alert the signaller in order to
avoid undue delay. A separate track section should be provided, where
reasonably practicable, from the home signal to the block overlap (or to the
next stop signal, if situated in the overlap). A block overlap track section
should always be provided, and included in the block controls, where there is
no conflicting movement within the overlap, unless an additional signal
intervenes.
g) In the case of non-token systems on bi-directional lines, additional train out of

section proving should be provided in accordance with GK/RT0051.
h) Where reasonably practicable in absolute block, and elsewhere as required

by GK/RT0051, suitable train detection should be provided beyond the
section signal to detect a train entering the section and/or to automatically
replace the section signal.
i) For intermediate block home signals, continuous train detection should be

provided from the section signal to the overlap beyond the intermediate block
home, with a separate overlap track section, in accordance with GK/RT0042.
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3.3.3 Estimation of Train Position or Speed by Expiry of an Elapsed Time

Length Track
of Berth Section
Track Timer
a) Release of Locking Section
50m 13s
Figure F7 should be used 60m 14s
to determine the timed 80m 18s
release of opposing route 100m 21s
locking and overlap 120m 23s
locking necessary to 140m 25s
prove a train at a stand. 160m 28s
180m 30s
200m 32s
250m 34s
300m 39s
350m 42s
400m 45s
500m 51s
600m 55s
700m 60s
800m 65s
900m 68s
1000m 72s
Figure F7 Timing to a Stand
b) Approach Control of Length Track

Subsidiary Signals of Berth Section
Track Timer
Figure F8 should be used Section
to determine the timed <55m 0s
approach release of signal 75m 7s
aspects necessary to 100m 11s
prove a train nearly at a 120m 13s
stand (speed reduced to a 140m 15s
nominal 15mph). 160m 18s
180m 20s
However, under the 200m 22s
restricted approach 250m 25s
arrangement, a slightly 300m 28s
higher approach speed is 350m 32s
preferable, as described 400m 35s
below. 500m 40s
Figure F8 Timing to Nearly at a Stand
c) Approach Control of Warning Aspects
Figures F9 and F10 should be used to determine the timed approach control
of aspects (delayed yellow) where the length of a restricted overlap ahead of
the next signal in advance is not less than 55m. The aspect may then be
released when the train speed has been reduced to that appropriate to the
overlap available, in accordance with GK/RT0078.
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The signal clearance point can be obtained from the overlap length in
Figure F10. The approach release time can then be read down from the
signal clearance point and across from the berth track section length in
Figure F9. The approach speed should not generally exceed 30mph under
the
restricted approach arrangement. See also Section 3.2.5.
If the overlap available is less than 55m in length, the train should be brought
nearly to a stand in accordance with Figure F8 (non-preferred).
d) Approach Control of Junction Signals
Figure F9 should also be used to determine the timed approach control of

main aspects on junction signals, where required by GK/RT0035 (generally
where the main aspect is visible before the route indicator is readable). The
aspect is held at red or yellow until the train is at the sighting point of the
route indicator, i.e. until the indication is readable. The readability of different
types of route indicators are given in GK/RT0031. The achievable sighting
distance for each signal is recorded by signal sighting committees in
accordance with GK/RT0037.
e) Proving of Repeat Relays and Timers
Such time releases should be initiated by track section occupation or by

operation of a discrete train detection device, in accordance with
GK/RT0011. The track repeat relay, or other device, initiating operation of
such time delay or effecting approach control without time delay (including
temporary approach control) and the timing device (if it requires proving)
should be proved in its normal position in the aspect controls of the main
signal(s) in rear, as described in Appendix F2:4.2. See Part D for further
details of timing devices.
f) Application of the Timings
The times given in Figures F7 to F9 will generally suffice for all ranges of
approach speed and gradient, and for the braking and acceleration
performance of all permitted trains. Nevertheless, each application should be
checked to ensure that the worst combination of these factors cannot give
rise to an unsafe situation.
For instance, a slow train will take longer to travel from the timer initiation
point to the signal clearance point than a fast one. Consequently, the timing
of trains over distances greater than 275m should be avoided where there is
a danger of relatively slow trains seeing the aspect clear too early (e.g.
before the route indication is readable, unaware of the need to brake to the
turnout speed). This applies to the shaded region of Figures F8 and F9. An
additional track section should instead be provided within 275m of the
clearance point. If a treadle is used, it should be at least 75m from the
clearance point so as to require a timer (and prevent the driver anticipating
the clearance as he passes the treadle), it requires the track section
occupied and it should be proved normal in the signal(s) in rear. Signal
clearance should not be unnecessarily delayed by extending the times given
in the table to cater for occasional slow trains.
Figure F11 is a similar table for use with reduced overlaps which are considered
in Section 3.4.1.
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Signal Clearance with Train Approaching

Length of Signal Clearance Point on Approach to Signal
Berth Track 60m 75m 100m 140m 180m 200m 230m 250m 285m 300m 340m 400m 500m 600m 700m 800m
Section(s) Track Section Timer
60m 0s
75m 4s 0s
100m 7s 4s 0s Use timer on track section(s) in
rear,
140m 11s 6s 4s 0s summing length of all track
sections.
180m 16s 11s 8s 4s 0s
200m 18s 13s 10s 5s 0s 0s
230m 20s 15s 12s 7s 4s 4s 0s
250m 21s 17s 14s 9s 5s 4s 0s 0s
285m 22s 18s 15s 10s 6s 5s 4s 0s 0s
300m 24s 20s 17s 12s 8s 7s 5s 4s 0s 0s
340m 27s 23s 20s 15s 11s 10s 8s 6s 4s 4s 0s
400m 31s 27s 24s 19s 15s 14s 12s 10s 8s 7s 4s 0s
500m 36s 32s 29s 24s 20s 19s 17s 15s 14s 13s 10s 6s 0s
600m 41s 37s 34s 29s 25s 24s 22s 20s 19s 18s 15s 11s 6s 0s
700m 46s 42s 39s 34s 30s 29s 27s 25s 23s 22s 19s 15s 10s 6s 0s
800m 50s 46s 43s 38s 34s 33s 30s 28s 27s 26s 23s 20s 14s 10s 8s 0s
Readability Junction Indicator - maximum readability 300m to 800m, depending on angle of sight
of Standard Route Indicator
Indicators Miniature Rt Ind
Figure F9 Track Section Times to be Used for a Given Signal Clearance Point
Note: Shading represents non-preferred area of table. For details see text.
Release Speed and Restricted Overlaps

<55m 55- 60- 70- 75- 80- 90- 105- 125- 135- Range of Restricted OLs for
59m 69m 74m 79m 89m 104m 124m 134m 179m Early Clearance of Signal
15mph 20mph 25mph 30mph 35mph 40mph 45mph 50mph 55mph 60mph Release Speed for Signal
Clearance
use 60m 75m 100m 140m 180m 230m 285m 340m 400m Signal Clearance Point on
Fig F8 Approach to Signal
ROL generally limited to 30mph
Figure F10 Signal Clearance Point to be Used for a Given Release Speed or Restricted Overlap Length
Reduced Overlaps
15mph 20mph 25mph 30mph 35mph 40mph 45mph 50mph 55mph 60mph Unrestricted Approach Speed
45m 55m 60m 70m 75m 80m 90m 105m 125m 135m Reduced Overlap Length
Figure F11 Reduced Overlap Length to be Used for a Given Unrestricted Approach Speed
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3.3.4 Foul Track Sections

Where it is not practicable to extend track sections over S&C up to all applicable
clearance points, the track sections between those in the direct line of a signal
route (including the overlap) and the clearance points should be regarded as foul
track sections. Where it is only possible for such track sections to be foul when
occupied with points on the flank of the route in a certain position, the foul track
section control may then be conditioned upon the lie of the flank points.
a) Track Locking of Points
Point track locking controls should be extended to prevent points being called
to any position that would allow a route to be set with a track section
occupied that was foul of the route, i.e. points may be allowed to move into
the line of an occupied track, but not away from it. Where such foul track
section control is conditioned upon the lie of other flank points, those points
should be proved set and locked (and, if necessary, detected - see sub-
section c, below) with the track locking, unless the foul track section is clear.
This will generally prevent any route being set with an occupied foul track
section (except where it is possible for a train to ease back and re-occupy a
foul track that had been cleared) and also provide protection for hand
signalled movements. (Where it would not be unduly restrictive on other
movements, points may be dead locked by foul tracks, rather than
conditionally, provided that route setting could not be prevented by a train
proceeding on a parallel route.)
For example in Appendix F5, considering the branch line junction, the track
locking on 707 points (N>R) requires (CC clear or 708N) and (FC or 706R)
and (R>N) DH clear, as well as track DG in dead. Points 708 track locking
(N>R) requires (DG clear or 707N) and (R>N) DH clear, and track CC in
dead. Considering the double junction and assuming the joints in the ten foot
are foul, the track locking would be as follows if each set of points were
treated separately:
Points Dead Locking N to R R to N

709 BD, BE, CD, CE (AC OR 712N), (DE OR 710N)
710 DE (BE, CD OR 709R) (CE OR 709N)
711 BE (BD, CE OR 709R) (AC OR 712N), (CD,CE OR 709N)
712 AC (BD OR 709R) (BE OR 709N)
However, considering that each route requires at least two sets of points, the
track locking can be simplified as follows, whilst still preventing points being
called to a position that would allow a foul route to be set:
Points Dead Locking N to R R to N

709 BD, BE, CD, CE (DE OR 710N)
710 DE CE
711 BE AC
712 AC BE
b) Foul Tracks in Signal Aspect Controls
Generally, foul tracks should also be proved directly in the signal aspect
controls, to ensure that any unauthorised movement foul of the route
replaces the signal. Providing it does not restrict other permissible
movements, signal routes should set and lock (and, if necessary, detect - see
sub-section c, below) flank points upon which foul tracks are conditioned.
For example in Appendix F5, considering the branch line junction, routes from
105 set and lock points 707 normal, and route 212B sets and locks 708
normal. Considering the double junction: route 51 requires 711N; 56A
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requires 711R; 56B requires 712N; and 105B(M) and 203B(M) (and shunt
routes) require 710N and 711N. Where flank points are called by the route,
they should be held by route locking until the movement has passed beyond
the place at which the track section was foul.
Only those foul track sections that have not been conditioned out by calling
flank points then need to be proved in the signal aspect controls. Where
such foul track section control is conditioned upon the lie of flank points that
are not called by the route, those points should be proved set and locked
(and, if necessary, detected - see sub-section c, below) in the signal aspect,
unless the foul track section is clear. (Such foul tracks may be provided dead
in the aspect, rather than conditionally, except where a train proceeding on a
parallel route would replace the aspect.)
For example, considering the branch line junction, 203 aspect requires DH
clear or 707R, and 212A requires DH clear or 708R. Considering the double
junction: 56 (B route) aspect requires CE or 710N; 105 (A route) and 203 (A
route) require CE or 710R; and 214 requires CE or 709N.
In the case of foul tracks over diamond crossings, flank points on adjacent
track sections may be used for conditioning, but it is preferable to use the
sequential operation of track sections if the foul track could be occupied by
an overrun, rather than conditioning by flank points unrelated to the overrun.
(This type of overrun protection is considered further in Section 3.4.6.)
c) Detection of Flank Points
Where flank points are called by a route to give flank protection from SPADs
(see Section 3.4.4), as well as to condition out foul tracks, they should be
detected at time of signal clearance. Points that have to be swung away,
because they are facing points within a flank overlap, should also be detected
at time of clearing, when the flank overlap is locked, as described in
Section 3.4.2(d).
Otherwise, where foul track section controls are conditioned on the lie of flank
points, it will not generally be necessary to include point detection in the
conditioning, unless it is considered, after balancing the following risks, that
continuous detection, or detection at time of signal clearance (for foul tracks
in signal controls), is necessary:
i. the likelihood of a collision between a signalled movement and a hand

signalled movement;
ii. the permissible speed of any movement that might conflict;
iii. hand operation of power operated flank points destroying the foul track
controls for a signalled movement; and
iv. where continuous detection is provided, the secondary hazard created by
detection failure.
The minimum requirements are summarised in Figures F16 and F17.
3.4 Overrun Protection and Mitigation

3.4.1 Main Overlaps
An overlap should be provided beyond every block signal that acts as a
destination for a movement from a main aspect, in accordance with GK/RT0078
(see also GK/GN0678). Overlaps have two purposes: to maintain a minimum
distance between following trains; and to prevent conflictions occurring
immediately ahead of a train approaching a signal at danger.
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a) Length
Overlap length should be determined by the risk of a SPAD and the likely
overrun in that event. Generally an overlap length of 180m will be sufficient
for stop signals where the related caution signal(s) are colour light, or 400m
where any related caution signal is not colour light. See Figures F12
and F13 for details. Consideration may be given to reducing these distances
in the following circumstances to avoid restrictions to other movements:
i. Reduced Overlap
Where the maximum attainable approach speed under clear signals (from
400m in rear of the signal whose overlap is under consideration) does not
exceed 60mph (with no local reduction in permissible speed), Figure F11
may be used to derive the overlap length. See also GK/GN0678 for
further guidance on this subject.
ii. Restricted Overlap (ROL)
Where a train has been brought nearly to a stand at the signal in rear,
under the restricted approach arrangement (see Section 3.2.5) a
restricted overlap should be provided. Restricted overlaps are provided
in addition to a full overlap.
Although a minimum length is not prescribed, for new work and otherwise
where reasonably practicable, the restricted overlap should be 45m beyond a
colour light signal or 90m beyond a semaphore signal. It is preferable, if a
longer restricted overlap length is available, for approach control on the
signal in rear to be relaxed in accordance with Figure F10, on the assumption
that the train will not accelerate before sighting the next signal at danger.
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Overlap Destination Signal Minimum Length Separate Track OL Required Clear OL Required Level Cross-
Type Section Locked ing in OL
Colour light stop signal with 180m generally, but see ü ü locked within
colour light caution(s) Section 3.3.1(b) first 50m #4
Full OL Stop signal/board with any 400m ü ü ü locked within
non-colour light distant first 50m #4
Non-colour light stop signal 180m, but 400m in ü #3 ü ü locked within
with colour light caution(s) fog & falling snow first 50m #4
Colour light stop signal with 45m to 135m #1 generally, but see ü ü locked within
Reduced colour light caution(s) Section 3.3.1(b) first 50m #4
OL Any non-colour light stop or where specially ü ü ü locked within
distant signal authorised #1, #2 first 50m #4
Colour light stop signal 45m to 70m #1 may combine with not unless separate ü not locked
ROL (for new work) first track past sig track
Non-colour light stop signal 90m where points, etc., ü ü not locked
(for new work) in overlap
Shunting signal or LOS with 180m not applicable no ü not locked
passenger movement (or 45m #2)
confliction in overlap
Shunt OL Shunting signal or LOS with 45m not applicable no ü not locked
non-passenger movement
confliction in OL
Main signal ahead of shunt high risk signals not applicable no ü not locked
move with confliction in OL only #2
Figure F12 Types of Overlap - Track Circuit Block
Overlap Destination Signal Minimum Length Train Detection #5 OL Required Clear OL Required Level Cross-
Type Locked ing in OL
Colour light stop signal with 180m where BOL clear of in block controls or by signaller’s no restriction
Block colour light caution(s) fouling point by instruction instruction #4
Overlap Stop signal/board with any 400m where BOL clear of in block controls or by signaller’s no restriction
(BOL) non-colour light distant fouling point by instruction instruction #4
Non-colour light stop signal 180m, but 400m in where BOL clear of in block controls or by signaller’s no restriction
with colour light caution(s) fog & falling snow fouling point, #3 by instruction instruction #4
Colour light stop signal with 180m required for IBH, where train ü locked within
colour light caution(s) otherwise #6 detection provided first 50m #4
Full OL Stop signal/board with any 400m required for IBH, where train ü locked within
non-colour light distant otherwise #6 detection provided first 50m #4
Non-colour light stop signal 180m, but 400m in 400m required for where train ü locked within
with colour light caution(s) fog & falling snow IBH, otherwise #6 detection provided first 50m #4
Reduced All cases where specially (see appropriate cases above)
OL authorised #1, #2
Colour light stop signal 45m to 70m where provided not unless separate ü not locked
ROL #1, #6 track
#7 Non-colour light stop signal 90m #6 where provided where train ü not locked
detection provided
Shunting signal or LOS with 180m not applicable no ü not locked
passenger movement (or 45m #2)
confliction in overlap
Shunt OL Shunting signal or LOS with 45m not applicable no ü not locked
non-passenger movement
confliction in OL
Main signal ahead of shunt high risk signals not applicable no ü not locked
move with confliction in OL only #2
Figure F13 Types of Overlap - Non-Track Circuit Block
Notes:
#1 = depending on approach speed.
#2 = subject to risk assessment.
#3 = 400m track, or 180m track with instructions for double block working, or two tracks (for 180m & 400m OL) with fog switch.
#4 = preferred arrangement is for stop signal to be 50m clear, or ROL provided, so as not to unduly delay road traffic.
See Section 3.4.2(h).
#5 = separate OL track sections for BOLs, IBH OLs and where there are points, etc., in the OL (see Section 3.3.2).
#6 = where reasonably practicable, but not mandatory.
#7 = also applies to stop signals beyond the home signal within station limits and related to the same distant signal(s) as the
home.
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iii. Train Interactive Systems

Where a trainstop, automatic train protection (ATP), or train protection
and warning system (TPWS) is provided to reduce the risk of SPADs,
overlap lengths should be appropriate to the system. If inter-running of
trains equipped for different systems is permitted, the overlap should
cater for the worst case. See Section 3.4.8.
Factors to be considered as reasons for not reducing the overlap length to

the degree permitted above are given in GK/RT0078.
b) Proving the Overlap Clear
Full overlaps (and reduced overlaps) should generally be proved clear

(including foul tracks) with a separate track section or sections, except where
combined overlap and berth tracks are permitted. See Section 3.3.1(b).
Overlap track sections may be longer than the required overlap, but the
actual length should be shown on signalling/scheme plans if it differs from the
standard 180/183m. Overlap track sections may not be necessary in non-
track circuit block (see Section 3.3.2) where the overlap is directly visible to
the signaller, but, where provided, overlap track sections should be proved
clear. An example of a combined berth and overlap track is given at signal
54 in Appendix F5.
Restricted overlaps (ROLs) do not generally have to be proved clear, unless

a suitable track section otherwise exists. See example ROLs at signals 203
and 214 in Appendix F5. For restricted phantom overlaps (RPOLs) see
Section 3.4.2(g).
c) Suitability
Any line may be used as part of an overlap provided there is continuous train
detection, and, where applicable, route holding, between the destination
signal and the end of the overlap, irrespective of whether any route of any
class of the destination signal reads over the line. However, where certain
lines are selected as preferred overlaps, these should be set, if available at
time of route setting. Cancellation of such a route ahead should not change
the overlap position. Preferred overlaps should be identified on the control
tables.
Alternative permitted overlaps over trap points reverse that usually protect
the overlap, should not be set unless a route ahead has been set over the
trap points, or the points are locked by the signaller’s individual control
device. (It should not be possible to move points to a non-permitted overlap,
e.g. to a line without continuous train detection, until the route in rear and its
overlap are normalised.)
The sharing of overlaps for opposing main signals is not permitted, but a
common track section may be shared, provided that its length is at least
equal to the sum of the lengths required for each overlap.
d) Block Overlaps
In non-track circuit block, the end of the block overlap (BOL) beyond the
home signal is known as the clearing point. The block overlap is locked only
by instruction, as shown in Figure F13. Except in the case of restricted
acceptance (see Section 3.2.5), the signaller should ensure that the block
overlap is clear with no conflicting movement authorised before accepting a
train. (See the BR30062 series of regulations.)
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Where there is no signaller present, the requirements of GK/RT0078 may be

satisfied by the provision of a home signal in the form of a stop board
instructing the driver to stop and proceed if the platform line (or loop, etc.) is
clear.
With RETB, the distance between the stop board instructing the driver to
obtain token and the train clear marker should equal the maximum train
length plus an appropriate overlap, unless a separate home signal stop
board, as above, is provided.
e) Terminal Lines
Buffer stops acting as a destination for a movement from a main aspect

should provide an acceptable arresting arrangement in lieu of an overlap.
Stop boards acting as a destination for a movement from a main aspect and
acting in lieu of buffer stops should be provided with an appropriate overlap
or a retarding device suitable for the approach arrangements, as described in
Section 3.4.5(b).
Track circuit interrupters may be used where necessary in these situations

(see Section 3.4.5(f)).
3.4.2 Locking of the Overlap

Where points, ground frames, level crossings or movable bridges are situated in
the overlap, or where opposing routes apply, overlap route locking should
generally be provided as described in Section 3.5.8. All signalling functions,
except facing points that act as a hinge for a permitted alternative overlap,
should be set and locked in the appropriate position until the route and overlap
locking are normalised. Such locking may be conditional upon the position of
the hinge points. Overlap locking also applies to trap points required to protect
the overlap (but see Section 3.4.1(c)) and flank points required to condition out
foul tracks (unless the conditioned foul track is included instead, see
Section 3.3.4(b)), but points required solely to provide flank protection should not
be set or locked.
Point locking and proving is summarised in Figures F16 and F17.
For the release of overlap locking see Section 3.7.5.
a) Facing Points in the Overlap
Power operated facing points may be moved in order to swing the overlap to
a permitted alternative when that is available. (Available means track
sections clear, trailing points set or free, and no conflicting route or overlap,
or, on route setting systems, locked by another overlap that can be swung
away.) Signalling functions, particularly trailing points, beyond such facing
points in the overlap are locked conditionally by the signal in rear and may be
released when the facing points have been swung to the new overlap (or, on
route setting systems, are about to swing once the trailing points have been
released from their old position to allow the new overlap to be established).
The counter of this conditional locking prevents the hinge points moving to an
overlap that is not available.
Signals should lock mechanically operated facing points in the overlap in

either position with the FPL in.
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b) Time of Operation Locking
Time of operation locking should be applied to facing points in the overlap

situated within 20m of the commencement of the first track section ahead of
the signal, to ensure that, should a train pass the signal at danger, it would
not reach the points until they had completed any movement in progress.
This point locking should be effective only when a main class route is set up
to the signal (or unrestricted main aspect selected for non-route setting
systems) and requires the signal berth track section clear, or occupied for
sufficient time to prove any approaching train at a stand.
c) Swinging Overlaps on Route Setting Systems
On route setting systems, facilities should be provided for overlap swinging

either by individual point control device or by the setting of a second route
that is foul, or its overlap is foul, of the first overlap. Where a point control
device is used to swing an overlap, the remainder of the new overlap should
set automatically without any further action by the signaller. An overlap may
also be swung by the setting of a route onwards from the destination signal.
(However, where this would swing to a non-permitted overlap, the first route
would have to be normalised before setting the onward route.)
d) Proving the Overlap Points
The detection requirement of signalling functions in the overlap is the same

as if they were in the route.
Signal aspects should not replace momentarily as an overlap is swung. If,

when an attempt is made to swing an overlap, the detection of the points that
are required to move is not made up within a nominal five seconds, the
entrance signal should be replaced.
Points that have to be swung away, because they are facing points within a
flank overlap, should be detected at time of clearing, when the flank overlap
is locked.
e) Examples of Swinging Overlaps
In Appendix F5, signal 214 requires DG clear, 707 detected N or R, ([DH

clear, 708 set and locked normal, and 705 set and locked normal and
detected at time of clearance, or locked reverse by a conflicting overlap that
is free to be swung away] or 707 set and detected normal), ([FC clear and
706 set, locked and detected normal] or 707 set and detected reverse); 705
and 707 control ineffective for 5s after overlap starts to swing. (Points 708
are included to condition out CC track which is foul, so detection is not
generally required. Points 705 are included for trapping protection and so
should be detected. The latter can be swung when locked reverse by
another overlap; hence the 5s inhibition in the detection requirement. Note,
however, that 705 cannot be locked reverse by the overlap if 103 is an auto
signal, as considered below.)
Points 705 and 708 are set and locked normal, when 214 is set and 707 is
set reverse. Similarly, points 706 are set and locked normal, when 214 is set
and 707 is set normal. When 214 is set, hinge points 707 are called normal,
if the new overlap is available, by: point control device; route 212A; a route
from 105 which requires 705 and 708 reverse; or a route up to 105 when
705 is locked reverse. They are called reverse, if the new overlap is
available, by: point control device; route 212B; or routes 505B or 506 which
require 706 reverse. The point locking thus includes: 707 is set and locked
normal by 214 route when 705 or 708 are locked reverse; and 707 is set and
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locked reverse by 214 when 706 is locked reverse. To swing the hinge
points 707 (N>R) when 214 is set, the counter conditional locking (proving
new overlap available) requires DH clear, 708 set normal or free, and 705 set
normal, free, or locked reverse by a conflicting overlap that is free to be
swung away. Similarly, 707 (R>N) requires FC clear and 706 set normal or
free.
Exactly the same locking is required for 56A route, as 214 above.
For a second example, consider if 103 were a controlled signal leading up to

105. Signal 103 would require EL clear, 705 detected N or R, (DH clear or
705 set and detected normal), ([707 set and locked normal, and detected at
time of clearing, or 705 set and detected normal] when routes 56A or 214 are
set); 705 and 707 control ineffective for 5s after overlap starts to swing.
Points 707 would be set and locked normal at time of setting route 103, when
705 is set reverse, for overlap flank protection. When 103 is set, hinge points
705 would be called normal by: point control device; route 212B; or routes
56A or 214 when 707 is locked reverse. They would be called reverse, if the
new overlap were available, by: point control device; or routes from 105. To
swing them reverse when 103 is set, the counter conditional locking would
require 707 set normal, free, or locked reverse by a conflicting overlap that is
free to be swung away.
In fact the controls can be simplified by making 103 an automatic signal, as

shown on the layout plan. Facing points 705 in the overlap would then be
free of controls of 103, but required to be swung normal for trapping
purposes by: 212B route; 201 main, but not warning route; routes from
203; and routes up to 212 when 707 is set reverse. If considered
necessary, 103 could detect 707 normal when 705 reverse and route 56A or
214 set. (The aspect controls for 103 are included in an example of safety
analysis in GK/RT0701, Part R.)
f) Swinging Overlaps on Lever Frames
In the case of power operated facing points on lever frames, the trailing
points have to be moved first to establish the new overlap before the hinge
points lever becomes free, but otherwise the controls are as stated in items
(a), (b) and (d) above. The counter conditional track controls are provided in
the selection lock and point locking in the interlocking lock. (Mechanically
operated facing points should be locked by the signal in rear, because
continuous motion is not guaranteed.)
g) Phantom Overlaps
Where the overlap track section is extended beyond the required overlap
length, then any facing points situated beyond the required overlap length
need not be proved in the rear signal controls. Similarly, the overlap track
section may be allowed to extend foul of another line, but without restriction
to movement on that line. In both such cases the required overlap length
should be marked on signalling/scheme plans as a phantom overlap (POL).
An example is given in Appendix F5, where the overlap from 105 signal, with
705 reversed, conflicts with route 212B, but does not conflict with routes
from 203 signal.
A similar situation occurs where ROLs have no separate overlap track

section. Because it is not necessary to prove the ROL clear (see
Section 3.4.1), the extent of the ROL may be defined on the plan by a
restricted phantom overlap (RPOL) symbol. An example is given in
Appendix F5 at 203 signal, where the RPOL is clear of routes over 708
reversed.
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h) Level Crossings in the Overlap
Signals should preferably be situated 50m clear of a level crossing. This

distance may be reduced to 25m where the risks of a SPAD are controlled so
far as is reasonably practicable, e.g. where the crossing is situated
immediately beyond a station platform or where the protecting signal is a stop
board. Exceptionally, a non-block protecting signal may take the form of a
red target mounted on the crossing gates with a worked distant signal.
Where the above is not practicable, a controlled level crossing should

generally be proved closed to road traffic before the signal in rear can clear.
However, where there is a requirement for trains to approach the protecting
signal with the crossing open to road traffic, so as to avoid undue delay to
road users, a restricted approach arrangement may be provided, as
described in Section 3.2.5. Alternatively, the crossing may be closed to road
traffic to allow the signal in rear to be cleared and re-opened once the train
has come to a stand at the protecting signal.
In non-track circuit block, a controlled level crossing situated in the block

overlap should not control the block, but the level crossing operation should
be regulated by the signaller.
Any additional restrictions at existing level crossings should not be relaxed,

except as part of an overall review of the crossing protection arrangements.
i) Movable Bridges in the Overlap
Signals should preferably be situated full overlap clear of a movable bridge.
Where this is not practicable, the bridge controls (see Section 3.9.1) should
be locked by the signal in rear. However, where there is an operating
requirement for trains to approach the protecting signal with the bridge open
to water traffic, trap points should be provided in lieu of an overlap, together
with a retarding device suitable for the approach arrangements, as described
in Section 3.4.5(b).
j) Passing Loops
At passing loops on single lines, section signals (or stop boards) in the loop
should preferably be situated overlap clear of the single line connection.
Where this is not practicable, the opposing home signals should be locked to
prevent simultaneous entry to the loop. However, where there is an
operating requirement for trains to enter simultaneously, trap points should be
provided in lieu of an overlap, together with a retarding device suitable for the
approach arrangements, as described in Section 3.4.5(b).
3.4.3 Shunt Overlaps

Simplified overlaps are required for shunting movements on running lines, but
the overlap does not have to be proved clear. Only the following functions in
the overlap are required to be locked:
a) conflicting passenger movements, i.e. (M), (W) and (C) routes, generally
within 180m of the destination signal (but not their overlaps); and
b) conflicting non-passenger movements, i.e. (S) routes, within 45m of the

destination signal.
Where necessary for operating reasons, and the risk is acceptable (i.e. the cost
of provision is grossly disproportional to the safety improvement gained), item (a)
may be relaxed to within 45m. The infrastructure controller may relax all
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requirements where the destination signal is equipped with a main red aspect
and has a low risk of SPADs, except where regular propelling movements take
place.
It is generally simpler in free-wired systems to lock the necessary routes normal,

rather than locking points in the overlap, although geographical systems
generally apply overlap locking via the points. Overlap route lights are only
required on the signalling display (and overlap symbols on the signalling/scheme
plan), if the locking is accomplished through the points.
So, for example in Appendix F5, 510B generally locks 105A(M) and 105B(M),
when 707 reverse, but does not lock 105C(S) or 105D(S) in the overlap, and
does not require DG, DH, or FC tracks clear. (However, in practice all routes
from 105 will call 707 points normal in order to give flank protection, as described
in Section 3.4.4.)
Conversely, 505A locks 105C(S), 105D(S), 203C(S) and 203D(S) because they
conflict within 45m, but does not lock 216, even with 713 reverse, and does not
require DC or DD clear, unless a SPAD is detected at 214.
3.4.4 Flank Point Setting (Flank Protection)

Where suitable points exist in a layout, overrun protection should generally be
provided by setting, locking and detecting points on the flank as if they were in
the line of route, so as to protect that route, or its overlap, from a SPAD.
Requirements and relaxations are given in GK/RT0078.
Generally, for new work, detection of flank points is only required at time of
signal clearance. Flank points that do not provide overrun protection, but are
set so as to avoid having to prove foul tracks, do not generally require detection,
as described in Section 3.3.4(c).
For example in Appendix F5, considering the branch line junction, routes from
105 call points 707 normal, to protect against a SPAD at signal 212. Flank
protection is achieved at the double junction by giving both facing points the
same number, 709.
In the event of a failure in the setting, locking, or detection of flank points, the
signal may still be allowed to clear where the interlocking system can
automatically inhibit routes over the failed points and routes up to the appropriate
protecting signals. So, if 707 points cannot be set, locked or detected normal,
routes from 105 would lock routes 56A, 214 and 510B.
3.4.5 Trap Points (Trapping Protection)

Trap points may be provided in lieu of overlaps, flank point setting and enhanced
overrun protection, to protect authorised routes from unauthorised movements.
The following features should be considered:
a) Provision
Trap points (or derailers where speeds are extremely low) should generally
be provided, unless other connections serve the same purpose (see
Section 3.4.4), in the following circumstances:
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i. where sidings and terminal platform lines join passenger running lines,
particularly where there is shunting not under the signaller’s control, or
where vehicles could run away on a falling gradient (see GK/RT0078);
ii. where trains regularly come to a stand at a signal and there is a risk of a
SPAD after the overlap locking has released (see GK/RT0078); or
iii. in lieu of an overlap at movable bridges, passing loops, the convergence
of a non-passenger running line with a passenger line, etc. (see
Section 3.4.2).
b) Retardation
Guide rails should be provided at trap points to minimise the risk of vehicles
fouling other running lines. Where such trap points are situated within the
required overlap length for a running movement, i.e. (M) or (W) route, they
should lead to a retarding device, e.g. a sand hump or interlaced sand drag,
designed to arrest any likely unauthorised movement, such as vehicles
travelling at up to 20mph. See example at 705 trap points in Appendix F5.
Otherwise the trap points would have to be reversed and an appropriate
overlap provided before the signal in rear could be cleared.
c) Proving
Routes should generally require normal (trap position) any trap points, or
other connections (see Section 3.4.4), that would prevent vehicles from
fouling the route or its overlap. Such routes should prove trap points set,
locked and detected. Generally, for new work, detection of trap points that
are not in the line of route is only required at time of signal clearance.
Where power operated trap points are situated on the flank of the route and
their setting would be unduly restrictive to traffic movements, the following
relaxations should be considered:
i. the provision of controls to inhibit the proving when a train is proceeding

over the points reverse, away from the route requiring protection; or
ii. if the distance from the points to the converging clearance point on the
protected route sufficiently reduces the risk of a fouling movement,
setting and proving may be totally dispensed with. Distances in excess of
200m may generally be considered to reduce the risk sufficiently.
d) Illustration
For example in Appendix F5, 714 points provide trapping protection. They
are situated in the route of 214, which requires them set, locked and
detected in the usual way. They are also on the flank of 56A route, where
there are two options, depending on the relaxations granted:
i. set and locked normal and detected at time of clearance; or

ii. set and locked normal and detected at time of clearance, except when
train moving away (routes 105D(S), or 203D(S) clear of CE track, or
507B clear of DE track).
Points 705 (set, locked and detected at time of clearance) provide trapping
protection on the flank of routes from 203, 201(M) and 212B. (These points also
act as “facing points to be swung away when flank overlap locked”, for 212B
route which conflicts with the overlap. Routes from 203 do not conflict with the
overlap because of the POL.) See the examples in Section 3.4.2(e) for overlap
trapping protection provided by 705 points.
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e) Normalisation
Normalisation of trap points, and other flank points providing similar

protection, should be ensured by one or more of the following means:
i. protected routes require such points normal, as described in item (c)

above;
ii. where all authorised movements over trap points are in the trailing
direction, the points may be train operated and/or spring controlled to the
trapping position;
iii. the signaller should be required to return the point lever/switch to its
normal position, in accordance with signalling instructions, after the
passage of each train over the points reverse (see Part L for details of the
signaller’s reminder alarm), or
iv. exceptionally, power operated points may be self restored where the risk
of a fouling movement warrants it, to take effect 5 to 10s after the release
of all locking on the points (see Part L for details of the failure alarm). Self
restoration is generally only required in high risk situations, e.g. where the
ruling gradient from the trap points falls towards the next signal section
and vehicles are left unattended.
f) Interrupters
At trap points fitted with track circuits, an interrupter should be provided to

maintain the track section concerned in its occupied state, in the event of
vehicles passing over the trap points whilst set in the normal (trap) position.
See GK/RC0752 for further details of interrupters. Signals protecting
adjacent lines that could be fouled by such a movement should prove the
interrupter intact, unless they are controlled by the track section concerned
(see GK/RT0078).
For example in Appendix F5, 706B interrupter controls FC track section,

which is in the aspect controls of 212 (A route) and 505, but, if considered
necessary, the interrupter may also be proved in signal 105. The interrupter
at 705 controls EL track section, but should also be proved in 212 signal (B
route), and possibly in 203 signal as well.
Similar protection may be afforded by an axle counter track section.
3.4.6 Overrun Detection using Flank Track Sections

Where it is not practicable to provide flank protection by setting flank or trap
points, and a significant safety benefit would arise, the provision of flank track
section overrun detection at vulnerable signals should be considered, either in
conjunction with enhanced overrun protection (Section 3.4.7) or separately. It
may be initiated by overlap track section, or treadle, occupied without signal
having cleared, or by sequential operation of track sections (e.g. overlap track
occupied after berth track occupied). It may effect automatic replacement of
conflicting signals and/or actuation of a signaller’s SPAD alarm (see Part L).
Further considerations are given in GK/RT0078.
In Appendix F5, the following overrun detection might be provided: SPAD at

signal 51 replaces signals 105 and 203, or points 709 normal; at signal 56
replaces 214 or 709N; at 203 replaces 105 and (51 or 709N); and at 214
replaces 56 or 709N.
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At a diamond crossing, it can be preferable to use the sequential operation of

track sections for foul track proving in the signal aspect (e.g. foul track clear after
flank track in rear occupied, until both tracks clear), rather than conditioning a
foul track section by flank points unrelated to any possible overrun (see
Section 3.3.4(b)). Signal 214 controls in Appendix F5 include: (CE clear and no
SPAD at 56) or 709N.
However, if 709B points did not exist to divert the overrun as shown above, the
foul track proving could become: (CE clear after BD occupied, until BD, CE
clear), or alternatively with full SPAD protection: (BC, BD, CE clear) after (BC
and BB occupied, unless 56 used). Track BB occupied is only included to
protect against a right side failure of BC track.
Each case should be judged on the simplicity and effectiveness of the protection,
considering also secondary hazards in the event of a right side track section
failure.
3.4.7 Enhanced Overrun Protection

When a train comes to a stand at the signal before an onward route has been
set, the overlap locking may be released in accordance with Section 3.7. This
removes any protection against passing the signal at danger. The provision of
enhanced overrun protection, described in GK/RT0078, should be considered at
high risk signals such as these. See also GK/GN0678.
3.4.8 Train Interactive Systems

Full details of train interactive systems are given in Part S. The special controls
required for each system should be specified in control tables, in accordance
with GK/RT0202.
AWS should generally be provided in accordance with GK/RT0016 and

GK/RT0364. In addition to the basic controls of signal at green and alight (with
economisation where required), the following controls should be provided, either
locally or from the interlocking:
a) to energise an AWS suppressor for movements that do not require the AWS,
particularly on bi-directional lines, e.g. by sequential operation of train detection
devices, or using route sticks; and
b) to prevent the energisation of an inductor on a permissive line when a second
train is entering the section, either by requiring track sections between the
inductor and the signal replacement point clear, or by inhibiting the inductor on
clearance of a permissive signal.
Where trainstops are provided in accordance with GK/RT0017 and GK/RT0363,
the overlap length should be sufficient to accommodate an emergency brake
application made at the permissible speed on passing the trainstop. Special
controls may be necessary to make the trainstop mechanism ineffective for
movements in the opposite direction, but the mechanism should only be lowered
when the opposing movement is being made, using similar controls to those
provided for AWS suppression.
TPWS should generally be provided in accordance with GK/RT0090.
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3.5 Controls for Points and Other Movable Infrastructure

Points operated from a signal box, ground frame, or other control point should
be set (by signaller’s individual point control device, or route setting system),
locked (by signal control, or route set) and detected in the signal controls, as
summarised in Figures F14 to F17. Note that when the control point can be
closed with the line remaining open to traffic, the combination of mechanically
operated signals and electrically detected points is prohibited by GK/RT0039.
The controls for each set of points should be specified in control tables, in
See also Section 3.4.2 in connection with overlap swinging, Section 3.4.4 for
flank point setting and Section 3.4.5 for trap points. For trackside point
operation and detection, see Part P.
3.5.1 Control and Numbering

Points on passenger lines should be operated by one of the following means:
a) signal box control, in accordance with GK/RT0062;
b) ground frame control, in accordance with GK/RT0061; or
c) the passage of trains, in accordance with GK/RT0065.
On non-passenger lines, hand points may be used. Facing hand points should
be detected in signals reading over them, up to 100m beyond the destination, or
beyond the limit of train detection. Trailable points on non-passenger lines need
not be set or locked for movements over them in the trailing direction.
Hybrid methods of control are not generally permitted, but an electrical release
may be given from a second control point, either by individual control device, or
by route setting over the points reverse. If it is considered that preselection
presents a risk, then the release should be given before the points are called by
the controlling signal box. Where two portions of a route are set by different
signal boxes, then both portions of the route should be set before the points
concerned may be called. (This is particularly applicable to crossovers between
running lines controlled by different signal boxes.)
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Mechanical or Mech’l Electric Mech’l or

Inter- Selection Electrical
Electro-Mechanical Interlocking locking Lock, if Operat-
- Level → provided ion
All-Electric (Miniature) Lever Frame Inter- Selection Operat- See
locking Lock ion Sect-
- Level → Lock Requires ion
Relay or Electronic Interlocking Lock Relays or Operat- or
Logic Conditions ion Part
- Level → Requires
Controls and Facilities ↓
R Points requested by operation of point lever, switch or tracker ball, or called automatically ü 3.5
E by route setting equipment when switch in centre position. Part L
Q
U Point lever normal or reverse, lock relay energised, or logic conditions fulfilled. ü 6.5
E 7.5
S Point switch in centre position immediately before normal or reverse. (Anti-preselection.) ü 3.5.5
T
Track locking track sections clear, including flank tracks which may be conditional on lie of Clearance Track 3.5.6
points, or clearance bar not occupied. bar locking
All signals normal reading over the points, requiring the points for flank protection. All signals 2.7
(This may be provided through the route locking in route setting systems.) normal 3.5.6
All signals normal with these points in the overlap, or overlap swung away, except in the case All sigs Counter 3.4.2
of power operated facing points, which are only locked if an alternative overlap is unavailable. normal conditional
(This may be provided through the route locking in route setting systems.) (condit- locking of
ionally for facing
trail'g pts points in
in an OL
alternative
OL)
All authorised movements over the points, or requiring the points for flank protection, at a ü 3.5.8
stand in platform or clear of points, with signal normal. (Route locking.)
All authorised movements with points in the overlap at a stand at the signal ahead, with ü
signals normal, or overlap swung away, except in the case of power operated facing points,
which are only locked if an alternative overlap is unavailable.
Any release from another control point given. Release Electrical 3.5.1
lever release
To move reverse, points releasing these points are required reverse. (Point to point locking.) (N) lock 3.5.4
To move reverse, points locking these points are required normal. (Point to point locking.) (N) lock
To move normal, points released by these points are required normal. (Point to point (R) lock
locking.)
Where provided for route holding or sequential locking, trailing points require signal ahead ü 3.5.6
normal.
Mechanically operated facing points require FPL plunger out and FPL lever in unlocked ü ü 4.3
position (where separate lever).
FPL levers require all signals normal reading over the points in a facing direction, including Signal Track 3.5.6
points in the overlap, and track locking clear. They are locked both ways by signals in a locking locking
trailing direction.
Figure F14 Point and Facing Point Lock (FPL) Controls (all systems)
Where more than one point end is required to operate together (e.g. crossovers,
a plain lead with a swing nose crossing, both ends of switch diamonds, two ends
of single or double slips, both switches of wide to gauge trap points, etc.), they
should be given a common point number with different suffix letters, in
accordance with GK/RT0009. This is to simplify the point locking, facilitate flank
protection and reduce the incidence of run-throughs. For instance, giving the
facing points at left hand double junctions the same number provides significant
flank protection (see Section 3.4.4).
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Such an arrangement should, wherever practicable, be restricted to two point

ends, in order to simplify testing and corrective maintenance. Thus, in
Appendix F5, points 711 and 712 have separate numbers. Common numbering
may be extended to three point ends where it is particularly expedient, subject to
the agreement of the infrastructure controller, e.g. points 713 and 714 in
Appendix F5.
Under certain circumstances, however, it may be beneficial for them to be
operated separately, in order to improve availability or maintainability.
Common numbering should only be used where each point end is operated by
the same signaller’s control device. So, for example, where the facing end of a
crossover is operated from a signal box, but the trailing end is train operated,
then each end should be separately numbered.

Electro-Mechanical Interlocking
locking Lock, if Operat-ion
- Level → provided
All-Electric (Miniature) Lever Frame Inter- Selection Operat-ion See
- Level → locking Lock Requires Sect-
Lock ion
Relay or Electronic Interlocking Lock Relays or Operat-ion or Part
- Level → Logic Conditions Requires

Lever frames require point lever replaced normal after use, as in Figure F14. ü 3.5.4
Points giving trapping protection may be self restored on route setting systems. ü 3.4.5
Where indication locking is provided, detection must be obtained to move beyond the checklock. (NBDR) 5.3
lock
Ground frames and lockout devices generally require local levers/switches replaced normal before GF proved 3.6.1
release can be given back. (GF signals and slots are proved on in their backlocks.) closed
Any signal requiring GF reverse: normal. ü 3.6.1
GF normalisation requires signal box lever/lock relay normal (or control device restored for non- Release GF closed, 3.6.1
interlocked signals), GF closed, power operated GF points in running line or for flank protection normal detection
detected normal, and mechanically operated facing points detected normal.
Normalisation of other releases require signal box release lever/lock relay normal (or control device Release Detection 3.8
restored for non-interlocked signals), lockout devices locked in traffic mode and gate locks/bridge bolts normal 3.9.1
detected in, etc.
Figure F15 Normalisation (of Points and Ground Frames, etc.)
3.5.2 Split Detection

Where two or more point ends work together, and a detection failure on one end
would unduly restrict train movements over the other end(s), split detection may
be provided.
In such cases, the point end(s) in the direct line of route should be detected in
the signal aspect, whilst any other end should be treated as flank points and the
degree of detection described in Sections 3.3.4(c) and 3.4.4 applied. Where
flank detection is omitted, in the event of detection failure at one end of a set of
points, signalled movements may be made over the end still detected. Where
flank detection is provided, under similar circumstances, hand signalled
movements may be made over the end still detected, without the points being
secured, so long as the signaller has observed the appropriate point indication.
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Signal to Signal In the Overlap See

Set Locked Detected Set Locked Detected Sec’n
Permitted hinge facing points Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable To preferred No Except when 3.4.2
OL if provided swinging
Other points in direct line ü ü ü Conditional on Conditional on Conditional on 3.5.4
hinge points. hinge points. hinge points.
Facing points in conflicting ü ü At time of At time of At time of At time of 3.4.2
overlap to be swung away signal clearing setting setting signal clearing
when flank overlap locked
At time of At time of 3.4.4
Flank overrun protection, Or “train Or “train signal clearing Or “train Or “train signal clearing 3.4.5
where applicable, and trap moving away” moving away” or “train moving away” moving away” or “train
points <200m from conflict if provided if provided moving away” if provided if provided moving away”
point if provided if provided
Flank points locked by track ü ü Only if req’d Only if req’d Only if req’d Only if req’d 3.5.4
section in direct line of route for overrun for overrun for overrun for overrun
protection protection protection protection
Flank points called to simplify ü ü Optional ü ü Optional 3.3.4
foul track section proving
below
Foul track sections conditioned In signal aspect controls, and Optional In signal aspect controls, and Optional 3.3.4
by flank points above track locking of points track locking of points
Note that where indication locking is provided, detection in the signal controls is only required for facing points in direct line. 5.5
Figure F16 Minimum Requirements for Proving of Power Operated Points
Signal to Signal In the Selected Overlap

Set by Locked by Detected in Set by Locked by Detected in See
Point Lever Signal Signal Point Lever Signal Signal Sect-
Lever, etc. Controls Lever, etc. Controls ion
Facing points in direct line ü Or by FPL For passenger ü Or by FPL For passenger 3.5.4
lever, if moves, and lever, if moves, and
provided where no FPL provided where no FPL
Facing point lock on above By FPL lever ü Pass’gr By FPL lever ü Pass’gr 4.3
moves moves
Other points in direct line ü ü Optional ü ü Optional 3.5.4
Flank overrun protection, ü ü At time of ü ü At time of 3.4.4
where applicable, and trap signal clearing signal clearing 3.4.5
points <200m from conflict
point
Flank points locked by track ü ü Only if req’d Only if req’d Only if req’d Only if req’d 3.5.4
section in direct line of route for overrun for overrun for overrun for overrun
protection protection protection protection
Flank points called to simplify ü ü Optional ü ü Optional 3.3.4
foul track section proving
below
Foul track sections conditioned In signal aspect controls, and Optional In signal aspect controls, and Optional 3.3.4
by flank points above track locking of points track locking of points
Note that mechanical detection is only appropriate for mechanically operated signals. Part P
Figure F17 Minimum Requirements for Proving of Mechanically Operated Points
Split detection should not be provided for the two ends of switch diamonds and
is generally not practicable for other situations using a common operating
mechanism, such as adjacent ends of double slips. Where normal detection is
split, reverse detection may, nevertheless, be common for more than one end.
The provision of separate point indications for the signaller is described in Part L.
3.5.3 Lie of Points

The lie of points has most significance for lever frames, where levers are
generally returned to their normal position in the frame after the passage of a
train. The following principles should be applied:
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a) trap points should lie with the normal position set for trapping;
b) points providing flank protection should, wherever practicable, have the

normal position set to give maximum protection, e.g. see the lie of 707 points
at the double junction in Appendix F5;
c) where single lines become double, the facing points should normally lie in the
appropriate position for a train leaving the single line;
d) where there is a risk of an unauthorised movement running onto a running

line in the wrong direction, points should, wherever practicable, normally lie in
a position that would divert vehicles away from the wrong line; and
e) other points should lie normally in the most regularly used position.
These general principles should, where appropriate, be maintained for route

setting and other systems as well.
3.5.4 Setting of Points

a) Non-Route Setting Systems
On lever frames, ground frames and certain individual function switch (IFS)
panels, point to point locking forms the basis for all other locking. Control
table design should therefore commence with the point to point locking.
General principles may include:
i. Scissors crossovers, or facing and trailing crossovers, should lock one

another.
ii. Where slip points, switch diamonds, or swing nose crossings are worked
by separate levers, they should be released by the points within which
they lie.
iii. If crossovers are not worked by one lever, one end should be released by
the other.
iv. Tandem points should be locked as if they were two following leads.
v. If the lie of the points shown at the simple double junction in Appendix F5
cannot be achieved for some reason, then the facing points should
release the trailing points, to provide flank protection.
vi. In left hand four road double junctions, as in Appendix F5, the two trailing
points should be released by their respective facing points. Right hand
double junctions should work as two independent crossovers.
vii. The levers of FPLs fitted with an FPL bar, should be locked both ways, by
all signals leading over the points in a trailing direction.
viii. Where trailing points between the arrival and departure lines at terminal
stations lie set to divert an unauthorised movement away from the wrong
line, towards the departure line, it may be necessary for the crossover to
lie such that either end locks the other normal.
ix. Other points may also lock or release one another, in such a way that will
not restrict traffic movements, where this simplifies signal locking.
x. Where a signal requires several sets of points normal or reverse, any
points that lock or release other points that in turn release the signal,
should not lock the signal directly.
b) Route Setting Systems (route calling)
On route setting systems, points should be free of any point to point locking.
Setting a route should call (initiate the setting of) the following points,
provided the individual point control device for each is in the centre or in the
required position (N or R) and the points are free to move accordingly (or
locked by an overlap that is free to be swung away):
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i. all points in direct line of route and overlap to the correct position;
ii. facing points in the overlap to the preferred overlap position, or, if not
available, to an alternative position;
iii. trap points to the trapping position, where necessary (see Section 3.4.5);
iv. facing points in a conflicting overlap to swing the overlap away (see
Section 3.4.2(c));
v. flank points that condition out foul track sections (see Section 3.3.4);
vi. other points giving flank protection to the protecting position (see
Section 3.4.4); and
vii. points not in the direct line of route that are locked by a track section in
the direct line of route, to allow parallel movements.
Such points should be called by the route (set and locked only) to the
position that will allow a parallel route to be set.
For example in Appendix F5, points 713 or 714 should be called normal by
route 56A, because 714 points are track locked by DD, FA, and (R>N) CE
or 713N. Otherwise, 509 and 510A routes could not be set if 714 were
reverse and CE track occupied by a train on route 56A. (Points 714 may
be set, locked and detected normal, in any case, to give trapping
protection in accordance with Section 3.4.5.)
c) Other Calling
The following events should also call particular points:
i. operation of the appropriate individual point control device;

ii. operation of a individual control device for facing points in a locked overlap
calls the subsequent points in the alternative overlap (route setting
systems only);
iii. setting a flank route calls facing points in a conflicting overlap to swing the
overlap away (route setting systems only) see Section 3.4.2(c); and
iv. where necessary, certain power operated trap points self restore after the
passage of a train, once a time delay has elapsed (see Section 3.4.5).
These should be identified in the control tables.
3.5.5 Anti-Preselection
Where an unacceptable risk is presented by the preselection of a signalling
function by the signaller prior to the conditions becoming available, so that it is
automatically set when some other function is restored, measures should be
provided to effect anti-preselection. This applies particularly to points and signal
routes that call points. Legitimate swinging of overlaps should not be inhibited by
this control feature.
Anti-preselection should only be omitted where the cost of provision is grossly

disproportional to any safety improvement gained.
3.5.6 Locking of Points and Other Movable Infrastructure

a) Track Locking
Points should generally be locked when a train is passing over the points, or
standing foul of a route over the points. This should be achieved by one of
the following means:
i. For mechanical signalling systems without continuous train detection, the

retraction of facing point lock (FPL) bolts may be prevented by the
occupation of an FPL bar on the approach to the facing points. Where it
is necessary to prove that a train is not standing foul, a clearance bar may
be used.
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ii. Where train detection is provided, points, ground frame releases, level
crossings and movable bridges, etc., should be track locked by
occupation of the track section(s) in which the infrastructure is situated
and, in the case of points, by certain flank track sections, in accordance
with Section 3.3.4. The latter may be conditional upon the lie of the points
concerned, or of adjacent points. Track locking that is not conditional is
known as dead locking.
However, once points have started to move they should be allowed to

complete their movement.
b) Route Holding
Signals and routes that require points (as described in Section 3.5.4), ground
frame releases, controlled level crossings and movable bridges, etc., to be
set in a particular position, should also lock them. This does not apply to
power operated facing points in the overlap, which should be free to swing to
any permitted overlap that is available (see Section 3.4.2(a)). Where FPLs
are provided, the locking may be accomplished by the signal levers locking
the FPL levers in the bolt in position, and the FPL levers (bolt in) locking the
point levers normal, reverse, or both ways, as appropriate.
The locking should not be released until the protecting signal(s) are on and
free of approach locking and, in route setting systems, the route has been
cancelled. This also applies to the locking of directly opposing signals and
routes (see Section 3.5.9).
The direct locking between signals and movable infrastructure should

generally be extended to provide route holding of infrastructure in the route
and overlap. Once the route is set, infrastructure should be locked until the
train has passed over it; or, for flank points, clear of the place where the
protection was required (or the flank track section was foul); or until overlap
locking (including time of operation locking) release conditions have been
fulfilled.
On route setting systems where sectional route locking (option iv, below)
comprehensively locks all necessary infrastructure and opposing routes, the
direct locking between signals and infrastructure may be omitted, provided
that risks arising from the right side failure of track sections, necessitating a
release of locking, are adequately controlled. See Appendix F2:6.4.
The route holding should be achieved by one of the following means, and
should be specified in control tables:
i. Where the signal is close to the infrastructure concerned, the signal

locking should be prevented from being fully normalised until the train has
locked the infrastructure by occupying the dead locking track section, or
FPL bar. This may be accomplished by the signal backlock circuit being
extended to require the intervening track sections clear (see
Section 5.3(b)), or it may be associated with an approach lock release
circuit. Track locking of points may also be extended, where necessary,
to meet the extended backlock. (This option should generally be used at
electro-mechanical interlockings and non-block signals protecting ground
frames or level crossings, etc.) Examples are given in Figure F1:12.
ii. For mechanical signalling systems without continuous train detection,
where facing points are less than a train length apart and are provided
with FPL bars, each subsequent FPL should be released by the previous
one. Trailing points within 440m of the next signal ahead may be locked
both ways by that signal, thus providing route holding when a train is
signalled through.
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iii. Where continuous train detection is provided from the protecting signal to
the infrastructure concerned, basic route locking may be provided, by
which a route stick relay is de-energised when the signal is selected (or
route set) until the signal is normalised and all the track sections between
the signal and the infrastructure (or furthest point of conflict with an
opposing route) are clear. See Section 3.5.8 for application details.
Examples are given in Figure F1:12.
iv. Where continuous train detection is provided throughout the interlocking,
sectional route locking may be provided, as described in Section 3.5.8.
This is the preferred option for operational flexibility.
v. In non-track circuit block, route holding of ground frames should be
accomplished by means of the arrangements described in Sections 3.6.3
or 3.6.4. Route holding for opposing movements should be achieved by a
recognised method of single line control permitted by GK/RT0051 or
GK/RT0054.
Examples of options i) and iii) are given in Figure F1:12.
3.5.7 Relaxation of Point Locking, etc.

Track locking and route holding of trailing points and other movable infrastructure
(but not interlocking by signals and/or routes) may be relaxed where the section
of track concerned is clearly visible from the controlling point and it is not
reasonably practicable to provide train detection and/or electric lever locks. This
relaxation generally includes track locking and route holding of controlled level
crossings, where the protecting signal is within 100m of the crossing.
Route locking of directly opposing movements clearly visible from the controlling
point (but not interlocking of signals and/or routes) may be relaxed, provided that
the signals aspects are controlled by the intervening track sections that would
otherwise require route locking. An example appears in Figure F1:10, where
opposing signals 23 and 31 have extended backlocks and the intervening track
sections, DE and DF, are required in both aspects.
For all relaxations, it should be demonstrated that risks are controlled so far as is
reasonably practicable. (The cost of provision would have to be grossly
disproportional to the safety improvement gained.)
See Section 3.6.5 for relaxations at ground frames. See Section 3.7.3 for
relaxations in approach locking.
3.5.8 Route and Overlap Locking

This section describes both basic route locking and sectional route and overlap
locking. See Section 3.7.5 for the release of the locking, including special
releases for infrastructure in the overlap and opposing routes.
a) Application
In the case of basic route locking, a route locking section may be applied to a
group of track sections where the release of the section requires the whole
group clear.
In the case of sectional route locking, a separate route locking section should
generally be provided for each track section separately indicated (except as
described in Section 3.5.9). This provides a consistent signalling display, and
allows points and conflicting routes to be released as soon as possible after a
train has passed clear, so as to prevent other movements being
unnecessarily delayed.
Route locking and overlap locking should be applied in one of the following
ways:
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i. individually setting all the sections of route and overlap locking at the
same time when the route is set (as with SSI); or
ii. setting the first section when the route is set and then cascading the
setting of each subsequent section in sequence (as with route relay
interlockings, where each route section is set by de-energising its route
stick relay); or
iii. setting the route locking when the signal is ready to clear (as with some
non-route setting interlockings). See Section 6.2.4 for further details.
b) Route Locking Provision
Route locking should be provided, as necessary, to:
i. prevent the setting of a second route for a directly opposing movement,

whilst a train is passing between the protecting signal and the end of the
first route;
ii. maintain the overlap locked, whilst a train is passing between the
protecting signal and the end of the route;
iii. lock points in the route, whilst a train is passing between the protecting
signal and the dead locking track sections over the points;
iv. lock trap and flank points protecting the route from unauthorised
movements, whilst a train is passing between the protecting signal and
the place beyond which the protection is required;
v. prevent the operation of a lockout device, whilst a movement is taking
place in the wrong direction or in either direction, as appropriate;
vi. lock controlled level crossings in the route, whilst a train is passing
between the protecting signal and the dead locking track sections over
the crossings, but see Section 3.7.2 i) for locally locked protecting signals;
vii. lock movable bridges in the route, whilst a train is passing between the
protecting signal and the dead locking track sections over the bridges;
viii. lock the releases for ground frames that control points in the route, whilst
a train is passing between the protecting signal and the track sections
that directly lock the releases, but see Section 3.7.2 i) for locally locked
protecting signals and Section 3.6 for alternative methods of route
holding;
ix. lock the releases for ground frames that control trap and flank points
protecting the route from unauthorised movements, whilst a train is
passing between the protecting signal and the place beyond which the
protection is required, but see Section 3.7.2 i) for locally locked protecting
signals and Section 3.6 for alternative methods of route holding; and
x. lock the route, as in items i) to ix) above, for a train departing from a
ground frame without a departure signal, from the time the release is
given. See Section 3.6.1(b).
c) Locking the Overlap
Overlap locking should extend beyond the route destination signal only as far
as is required to provide the necessary locking for the overlap concerned,
which may vary according to:
i. the route set (entrance signals with different approach conditions may
require different lengths of full overlap);
ii. the class of route set (full overlap for main class, or restricted overlap for
warning class); and
iii. for warning class routes, whether the route has stepped up to a main
class, thus requiring full overlap locking.
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d) Overlap Locking Provision
Overlap locking should be provided, as necessary, in case the train for which
the route has been set inadvertently passes the destination signal and
occupies the overlap. Until the overlap locking is released, it should:
i. prevent the setting of a route for a directly opposing movement;

ii. lock points in the overlap;
iii. lock trap and flank points protecting the overlap from unauthorised
movements;
iv. lock the releases for ground frames that control points in the overlap, or
trap and flank points protecting the overlap from unauthorised
movements;
v. lock controlled level crossings within a 50m overlap, but see
Section 3.4.2(h) for alternatives; and
vi. lock movable bridges in the overlap, but see Section 3.4.2(i) for
alternatives.
e) Proving of Route and Point Locking
In relay interlockings, the locking of points should be proved effective in the

aspects of signals reading over them. This should be accomplished by the
following means:
i. for sectional route locking, the last route stick relay to be de-energised
when the route is set should be proved down to prove the integrity of the
route stick chain (this proves all the points route locked) see also
Appendix F2:2.4;
ii. for basic route locking, the route stick relays actually locking the points
should be proved down in the appropriate signals;
iii. where points free relays are used, these should be proved down in the
point detection used in the aspect circuit.
3.5.9 Opposing Locking and Bi-Directional Lines

Directly opposing signals and routes should be locked and route holding provided
as described in Section 3.5.6(b). (This also applies to other conflicting routes
which are not locked by means of point locking, e.g. those that conflict at
diamond crossings.)
Indirectly opposing routes are those that initially conflict at points, but, after a
train has proceeded through the route over the points and released the route
holding on the points, can become directly opposing. If sectional route locking is
not provided, additional route holding may be necessary to protect against this
eventuality and should be shown in control tables. In Appendix F5, 216(M) route
does not lock 203C(S) because it requires points 713 normal, whereas 203C(S)
requires 713 reverse. However, once a move from 203 clears DD track, 713
can be normalised and route holding is necessary to prevent 216(M) route from
being set.
The same example for a system without sectional route locking appears in
Figure F1:10 with indirectly opposing locking between signals 15 and 32. In this
case, the additional route locking should be separately provided and shown in
the control tables (Figure F1:12).
Opposing locking may be omitted from directly opposing shunting signals for
operating purposes (illustrated by signals 509 and 510 in Appendix F5).
Opposing main signals generally create a bi-directional line. Bi-directional lines

should be controlled in one of the following ways:
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a) In track circuit block, where both ends of the line are controlled by the same
signal box, route locking should be provided to prevent the setting of a
second route for a directly opposing movement, whilst a train is passing
between the protecting signal and the end of the first route, as described in
Section 3.5.8. An indication of route set (e.g. signaller’s white route lights)
should generally be provided in a manner consistent with the signalling
display.
b) As method (a), but with intermediate signal sections, generally provided with
automatic signals. The aspect of the intermediate signals should be
controlled by entrance route set, or, alternatively for the predominant
direction, opposing route not set. Route locking should be maintained until
the train enters the exit route at the other end of the line, although neither
exit route should be locked by the occupation of the intermediate section(s).
A directional indication of route set (e.g. white arrow) should be provided for
the intermediate section(s) in lieu of route lights.
c) In track circuit block, where both ends of the line are controlled by different
signal boxes, directional interlocking (using, for example, direction levers or
lock relays) should be provided to prevent the setting of a route for a directly
opposing movement, in accordance with GK/RT0041. The directional
interlocking should be maintained until the train reaches the exit signal,
although neither exit signal should be locked by the occupation of the line
between them. A directional indication of the interlocking (e.g. white arrow)
should be provided at both signal boxes.
d) As method (c), but with intermediate signal sections, generally provided with
automatic signals. The aspect of the intermediate signals should be
controlled by the directional interlocking.
e) In non-track circuit block, by a recognised method of single line control

permitted by GK/RT0051, or GK/RT0054 (RETB).
Separate route locking controls should be provided for each direction for
methods (a) and (b). However, the intermediate track sections on bi-directional
lines may be grouped for sectional route locking purposes. The route locking
release should be enhanced, to protect against wrong side track section failures,
as described in Section 3.7.5.
With methods (b) and (d), where there is a predominant direction of traffic, the
signalling in the non-predominant direction may be simplified as permitted by
GK/RT0035.
3.6 Ground Frames and Gate Boxes

Shunters’ releases, ground frames and gate boxes should be provided as
required by GK/RT0061, and equipped with the facilities listed therein, as
summarised in Figures F15 and F18. The controls for each release should be
specified in control tables, in accordance with GK/RT0202.
Ground frames and gate boxes should be regarded as interlockings in their own
right, and the full requirements of this part of the Guidance Note should apply to
each. Details of mechanical ground frames are given in Appendix F1:8 and
switch panels in Appendix F2:10.
In all instances the release requires the protecting signal(s) on and free of
approach locking.
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3.6.1 Ground Frames in Interlocking Areas and Station Limits

For station limits at a token control point, see Section 3.6.4 instead.
For locking and normal proving at the main signal box, ground frames in
interlocking areas should be treated as power operated points.

Electro-Mechanical Interlocking locking Lock, if Operat-
- Level → provided ion
All-Electric (Miniature) Lever Frame Inter- Selection Operat- See
locking Lock ion Sect-
- Level → Lock Requires ion
Relay or Electronic Interlocking Lock Relays or Operat- or
Logic Conditions ion Part
- Level → Requires
Release requested by operation of signal box lever, switch, push button or tracker ball, or ü 3.6.1
called automatically by routes requiring the GF reverse.
Centrally interlocked protecting signals: signal box release lever reverse or reverse lock Release
relay energised. given
Locally locked protecting signals: signal box control device operated. Release 3.6.2
given
All signals normal reading over the GF points normal, with GF in the overlap (or overlap Inter- Local 3.6
swung away), or as required for flank protection. (Interlocked signals are proved on and free locked approach
of approach locking in the backlock/approach lock release of the signal locking. For locally signals lock
locked signals this proving is applied locally to the GF release instead, or a special timer normal release
provided in lieu of approach locking.) (Signals reading over GF points reverse should be
controlled or slotted by the GF.)
All authorised movements over the GF points normal, or as required for flank protection, at a Inter- Local
stand in platform or clear of points, with signal normal. With GF in the overlap, movements locked route
required at a stand at signal, with signals normal, or overlap swung away. (Route locking.) signals locking
Figure F18 Ground Frame Releases (Applies similarly to Lockout Devices, Controlled Barrier
Crossings, Interlocked Gated Crossings and Movable Bridges, etc.) (all systems)
a) Locking the Release
The ground frame release should thus be locked normal in the following
circumstances:
i. when a route is set (or signal selected in a non-route setting system) that
requires ground frame points in running lines normal (including trap and
flank points, points in the set overlap and in an alternative overlap when it
swings);
ii. when ground frame points in running lines are track locked;
iii. when ground frame points in running lines are route locked.
b) Giving the Release
The ground frame locking should not be released until the protecting signal(s)
are on and free of approach locking and, where applicable, the route has
been cancelled. (This may require a timed release of route locking with a
train in the section, as described in Section 3.7.5.) Any points located
between the protecting signal(s) and the ground frame should be locked in
the appropriate position by the ground frame release being given.
Where there is no signal to control the departure of trains from the ground
frame, the release should additionally prove any track sections or other
signalling functions in the route up to the signal ahead, or LOS, (including an
appropriate overlap if departures are regarded as running movements), and
should initiate route locking unless the relevant functions are track locked by
a departing train.
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Where necessary, train detection may be overridden by a train at a stand

waiting to use the ground frame, as described in Section 3.6.2(c), or the
appropriate track section omitted from the controls (e.g. if timed release of
route locking is provided, or if the portion of line is clearly visible from the
signal box).
The ground frame release should be given either:
i. by operation of the signaller’s ground frame release device, in which the

giving of a release to the ground frame sets and locks the ground frame
reverse in the interlocking; or
ii. by the signaller setting a route through a ground frame controlled
connection in the reverse position.
The latter, route operated, release should generally be provided, where
required by the infrastructure controller, where a movement into or out of
the ground frame would pass over power worked points, move against
the normal direction of traffic, or foul other lines. Such routes require a
signal box controlled entrance signal, which is slotted by the ground
frame, and proves the ground frame release set. The release should be
withdrawn when the route normalises.
c) Ground Frame Signal Controls
Facilities may be provided for ground frames to have sole control of certain
routes of a signal, other routes of which may be controlled solely or jointly by
the main signal box.
Ground frame signals that read to or from running lines should be provided
with approach locking, route holding and train detection appropriate to the
method of block working, including overlaps for running movements.
d) Protecting Signal Controls
Protecting signals and routes reading over the ground frame points normal
require the ground frame release controls at the signal box normal, as
described in (e), below. The signal aspect controls should provide continuous
detection of the ground frame points in the same way as other points (see
Figures F16 and F17), as follows:
i. power operated ground frame points in the running lines set, locked and
detected normal;
ii. mechanically operated facing points in the running lines set, locked and
detected normal (and FPL bolts detected in for passenger movements);
iii. any flank or trapping protection afforded by the ground frame proved
effective at time of signal clearance.
Note that a combination of electrically detected points and mechanically

operated protecting signals controlled from a ground frame is prohibited, to
prevent a detection failure remaining unnoticed (see GK/RT0039).
e) Normalising the Release
Normalisation of the ground frame release (ground frame closed state)

requires at time of restoration:
i. power operated ground frame points in the running lines set, locked and
detected normal;
ii. mechanically operated facing points in the running lines set, locked and
detected normal (and FPL bolts detected in for passenger movements);
iii. mechanically operated trailing points in the running lines set and locked
normal;
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iv. trap points set, locked and detected in the trapping position;
v. slots operated by the ground frame normal, unless required when the
ground frame is closed; and
vi. ground frame release lever normal (and lock proved in, where
necessary), or closed plunger operated for a switch panel.
The signaller also requires a verbal assurance from the ground frame
operator that it is safe to normalise.
For lever frames, the detection should generally be proved in the release
lever backlock.
For ground frame normal indications see Part L.
Where ground frames control more than one connection to the running lines,
each may have a separate release. In such cases the controls stated above
should only refer to the relevant connections, slots and releases in each case.
Similarly, the ground frame may control internal shunting movements when the
release(s) are normal.
3.6.2 Remote Ground Frames: Track Circuit Block and Intermediate

Block Sections
The same principles should be followed as for ground frames in the interlocking
area, but modified as follows:
a) Protecting Signals
In track circuit block (see GK/RT0041), ground frames are often protected by
block signals that carry no other interlocking. They may be designated semi-
automatic provided they are not further than 800m from any facing ground
frame points. Otherwise they should be designated controlled (see
GK/RT0035).
Approach locking of any semi-automatic signals protecting the ground frame

should be released by a timer that runs when all such signals have been
replaced by operation of the signaller’s release. See Appendix F2:10 for
details.
Where there is no block signal within a reasonable distance of the ground

frame and there is a requirement to detect the ground frame points (see
Figures F16 and F17), a non-block signal or remote ground frame marker
may be provided for the purpose. This prevents the loss of block proving in
the event of ground frame detection failure. Ground frame markers or non-
block signals are not appropriate in areas of continuous 3 or 4 aspect
signalling.
b) Protecting Signal Controls
The protecting block signal requires the ground frame release controls at the
signal box normal (see Section 3.6.1(e)) and continuous detection of the
ground frame points (Section 3.6.1(d)).
Where a non-block signal is provided closer to the ground frame, the

continuous detection of the ground frame points should be applied to the non-
block signal instead of the protecting block signal. In the case of a ground
frame marker, the detection requirements should apply to the distant signal
associated with the marker.
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c) Giving the Release
When it is necessary to release a ground frame with a train in section, the

release should generally prove the safe position of a train for ground frame
operation. It is necessary to provide a separate release track section for
approximately 100m on the facing side of the ground frame point(s) in the
running line(s). For example, the release of a ground frame operated
crossover would require:
i. protecting signals on and free of approach locking; AND

ii. where there is no departure signal, track sections clear up to the overlap
of the signal ahead, together with any other ground frame or level
crossing within the signal section normal (with route locking initiated by
this release, unless the relevant functions are track locked by a departing
train); AND
iii. up line section clear and down line section clear (including the overlap of
the signals ahead); OR
iv. up line section clear and down line release track section occupied for a
time sufficient to ensure that the train has come to a stand; OR
v. down line section clear and up line release track section occupied for a
time sufficient to ensure that the train has come to a stand.
The time sufficient to ensure that the train has come to a stand may
generally be taken to be 60 seconds. To guard against track section failure
giving a premature release, sequential operation of track sections should be
proved wherever practicable, e.g. release track section occupied for 60
seconds after release track clear and an adjacent track section occupied.
The release track section(s) do not need to be separately indicated at the

signal box.
d) Direction Lever Working
With direction lever working the ground frame release may require a direction
lever reverse, in addition to the requirements of item (c) above, to maintain
the integrity of the interlocking. Where the direction lever gives a one train
release on the respective entrance signal to the bi-directional line, this should
be cancelled by the ground frame release being given.
3.6.3 In-Section Ground Frames: Absolute Block and Single Line Block
without Tokens
For ground frames within absolute block sections (see GK/RT0042), or tokenless
block or one train working without train staff sections (see GK/RT0051), the
same principles should be followed as for remote ground frames within track
circuit block, but modified as follows:
a) General Requirements
Ground frames should be released by a signal box that controls entry to the
block section. `Where there is more than one ground frame or other
signalling function on the same line within the block section, then each should
be released or supervised from the same signal box, so as to allow the route
to be proved up to the overlap of the signal ahead, either in the ground frame
release, or in a ground frame departure signal.
In the case of interlocked absolute block on bi-directional lines, use of the

ground frame should only be authorised for movements in a single direction,
away from the releasing signal box.
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Trains should only be permitted to depart from the ground frame when the
block section is clear (see Section (c), below) and no other movements can
be signalled into it. Operation of the ground frame release in the signal box
should lock the section signal(s) and, conversely, clearing a section signal
should prevent the ground frame release being given.
Where a shutting-in facility is provided, sufficient continuous train detection on

the running line should be provided in accordance with GK/RT0042 or
GK/RT0051, as applicable, so as to prove that a train has been completely
shut-in. Where more than one track section is provided, sequential operation
may be used to prove a train completely shut-in and protect against a wrong
side failure. Risks should also be controlled by the provision of train detection
throughout the section or from the section signal to the ground frame, or
otherwise by the provision of signal box local instructions.
Shutting-in is not permitted where the one-train system without train staff is in
use.
b) Giving the Release
The ground frame release conditions should be as follows:
i. protecting signals on and free of approach locking; AND

ii. where there is no departure signal, any other ground frame or level
crossing within the block section normal (with route locking initiated by this
release, unless the relevant functions are track locked by a departing
train); AND
iii. ground frame track section(s), where provided, occupied for a time
sufficient to ensure that the train has come to a stand and block indicator
at TOL/TIS (not enforced for one-train working); OR
iv. where a shutting-in facility is provided, ground frame track section(s) clear
and block indicator at LC/TA.
c) Block Controls
Where there is a shutting-in facility, controls should be provided to ensure

that a LC/TA release can only be used for one train, by one of the following
means:
i. The occupation of any running line track section maintains the respective
block indicator at TOL/TIS. (With this option, a track failure would prevent
clearance of the section signal.)
ii. Giving the ground frame release cancels the LC/TA release (non-
preferred).
iii. A train entering the block section at the ground frame cancels the LC/TA
release.
iv. A departure signal is provided at the ground frame, which requires a
LC/TA release.
d) Normalisation
Where sequential operation of track sections is provided, ground frame

normalisation may additionally include:
i. (ground frame points detected reverse, AND

ii. track section over points occupied and adjacent track clear, AFTER
iii. adjacent track occupied and points track clear), THEN
iv. ground frame closed, as in Section 3.6.1(e).
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e) Protecting Signals
The protecting block signal should either be:
i. a section signal, but not an intermediate block home (IBH); or

ii. a signal that performs the role of an IBH, but is not so designated.
f) Protecting Signal Controls
Clearance of the protecting block signal requires:
i. block indicator at LC/TA (at time of clearance);

ii. ground frame release controls at the signal box normal (see
Section 3.6.1(e)), unless proved in the opposing normal block indication
for interlocked absolute block;
iii. continuous detection of the ground frame points (see Section 3.6.1(d)),
unless there is a non-block signal closer to the ground frame; and
iv. any running line track sections clear, unless their occupation automatically
puts the block indicator to TOL/TIS (see option (c)i, above). This is
optional, as there is not generally a requirement for continuous proving of
train detection in non-track circuit block, because a track failure would
prevent clearance of the section signal.
Where a non-block signal is provided (see Section 3.6.2(a)), it should

continuously detect the ground frame points.
g) Signal Box Indications
At the signal box controlling the ground frame release, the running line track
section(s) should be indicated, unless their occupation maintains the block
indicator at TOL/TIS. More than one track section on the same line (and
associated with the same ground frame) may have a combined indication. As
these track sections do not control the block, it is the responsibility of the
signaller to ensure the safety of each movement.
For further details of block operation, see Part K.
3.6.4 In-Section Ground Frames: Key or Token Releases

a) General Requirements
Such ground frames are released by one of the following means, in

accordance with GK/RT0051, and require no train detection:
i. unlocked by the electric token for the block section;

ii. unlocked by the train staff (one-train systems); or
iii. unlocked by Annetts key, or similar apparatus (see GK/RT0039).
The key should be held captive while the ground frame is in use, and the
points should be locked normal for the running line (and, where necessary,
detected normal) before the key can be withdrawn.
Where a train can be shut-in at a ground frame, an intermediate token

instrument should generally be provided for token working. Otherwise,
means should be available to transport the token or train staff to the signal
box or another instrument. (See GK/RT0054 for details of the arrangements
with radio electronic token block.) It is the responsibility of the train crew to
ensure that the train is clear of the running line before the token is returned.
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b) Controls
The following controls should be provided only if there is a requirement to

detect the ground frame points (see Figures F16 and F17). These should
apply to the section signal, unless a non-block signal is provided for the
purpose (see Section 3.6.2(a)).
i. ground frame release controls at the ground frame normal; and

ii. continuous detection of the ground frame points (see Section 3.6.1(d)).
Where applicable, the ground frame release may be interlocked with the
section signal by requiring the Annetts key, etc., not released, at time of
clearance. For further details of key releases see Appendix F1:7.5.
In the case of ground frames at token control points remote from the
controlling signal box, the ground frame should be protected by the home
signal, or stop/instruction board that protects the station limits of the token
control point. The ground frame may be released by any appropriate means
to ensure security.
3.6.5 Relaxation in Interlocking Principles for Ground Frames

Approach locking (if the signal is clearly visible from the ground frame), track
locking and/or route holding may be omitted, as permitted in GK/RT0061, if the
ground frame is protected by the method of block working, or it can otherwise be
demonstrated that risks are controlled so far as is reasonably practicable. (The
cost of provision would have to be grossly disproportional to the safety
improvement gained.) This is likely to be the case in non-track circuit block
sections (unless train detection is required for the operation of the ground
frame), or if the ground frame is only required for emergency or engineering use
(possibly during a failure of train detection).
Where necessary to control risks (e.g. if a release may be given with a train
anywhere in the section, or other locking is omitted, to give operating flexibility),
the signaller’s ground frame release device should feature a security
arrangement, e.g. captive key, sealed release or swipe card.
3.7 Signal Replacement and Route Normalisation

Generally, stop signal replacement is effected by the withdrawal of any aspect
control (except those required at time of clearing only), including signaller’s
control device and/or route set. Full details are given in Section 3.7.1.
The signal remains locked until the approach lock release conditions are fulfilled,
and also, where provided in lieu of route locking, the backlock release conditions.
See Sections 3.7.2(d) and 3.5.6(b)i).
Restoring the signaller’s control device once the approach lock, and/or backlock,
release conditions are fulfilled releases the locking of conflicting signalling
functions and initiates the normalisation of the route locking behind a train
passing through the route. See Section 3.7.5.
Restoring the signaller’s control device before the approach lock release
conditions are fulfilled initiates a separate release, usually involving a time delay,
to prove that any approaching train has come to a stand at the signal. See
Section 3.7.2(e).
Where train operated route release (TORR) is provided, route normalisation

should occur without the signaller’s control device being restored once the signal
replacement and approach locking release conditions are fulfilled, i.e. signal on
and free of approach locking. See Section 3.7.4.
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3.7.1 Signal Replacement

a) Manual Replacement
Signal replacement should be effective on any signal at any time by

normalising the signaller’s control or replacement device, in accordance with
GK/RT0060. (Where, consistent with previous standards, certain automatic
signals have no replacement device, a replacement facility is provided at the
signal instead.)
Where mechanically interlocked signals are released by other signals, e.g.

distant signal or preceding signals, signalling instructions require the signaller
to normalise the first signal lever immediately after the passage of the train,
so that the subsequent signal(s) are not locked reverse. Other signals that
are not automatically replaced should similarly be normalised immediately
behind the train.
Wherever a signalling system is subject to common mode failure, an

independent emergency replacement (all-signals-on) facility should be
provided for each area concerned, as required by GK/RT0025. This can
apply, for example, to electronic interlocking systems, remote control
systems, interface systems and VDU based control systems. It does not
apply to systems, such as power supplies, where any failure automatically
restores all signals. The facility may be provided in conjunction with remote
control override systems (see Section 3.10.3).
b) Automatic Replacement
Signal replacement should be provided automatically for all power operated

signals where suitable train detection exists. For the positioning of the first
track section beyond the signal, and situations where berth and overlap track
sections may be combined, see Section 3.3.1. For the replacement of non-
block and automatic signals, see Section 3.2.3. For the replacement of
distant or banner repeating signals, see Section 3.2.4.
One of the following replacement conditions should be provided:
i. Standard replacement for main signals and subsidiary signals (PLS or

semaphore): First wheel on the first track section beyond the signal,
generally commencing within 5.5m to 20m of the signal.
ii. Where the first track section starts less than 5.5m beyond a main or
subsidiary signal: First wheel on the second track section (or off the first
track, where there is no second track), OR the last wheel off the signal
berth track section (where provided).
iii. Where facilities are required for a train to be driven or assisted from the
rear: Last wheel off the berth track (where provided), OR last wheel off
the first track, OR first wheel on the first track section that is a train length
beyond the signal (where provided).
iv. Standard replacement for an independent shunting signal (PLS or
semaphore) is the same as condition iii) for a main signal. (Note that such
signals should generally be located 2m in rear of the track section joint
approaching the first set of points over which they are to read, or at the
clearance point, whichever is the further from the points.) Where
opposing locking is omitted (Section 3.5.9), automatic replacement may
be inhibited. The replacement conditions for independent shunting signals
cleared as pre-set shunt signals are specified in Section 3.2.8.
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c) Last Wheel Replacement
Where delayed replacement conditions (b) ii) or iii) are provided for a main
signal, special precautions are required as follows:
i. Such signals are depicted with an L symbol in the table of signal routes.
ii. The train detection device, or repeater thereof, that is required clear to
replace the signal, e.g. the berth track, should, wherever practicable, be
proved clear in the signal in rear, so that a right side failure cannot create
an unsafe situation.
iii. Where a signal in rear of a signal equipped with last wheel replacement is
not controlled by the berth track section of the signal ahead, as is the
case with a call-on or shunt route, such routes should lock the signal
ahead, or other controls should be provided, to prevent a second train
approaching a signal that has not been replaced after the first train, in the
event of the berth track failing in the occupied state. It is preferable for
the signal controls to be arranged to give first wheel replacement when a
permissive move is set in rear.
iv. Where a main signal in rear is not controlled by separate track section(s)
in the overlap, e.g. for a warning route, such that it would clear at the
same time as the signal ahead were replaced, it should be controlled by
“signal ahead on, or first track beyond it clear” to prevent a momentary
false aspect sequence.
v. Where an automatic signal, without a separate overlap track section, is
provided with last wheel replacement, it is essential that the berth track
section of the signal ahead is not bypassed by the signal replacement
controls.
d) Re-Stroking
A route may be capable of being re-initiated (re-stroked) and a proceed

aspect obtained at any time subsequent to the replacement of the signal.
When the train has occupied and cleared the replacement track section of
the route it should be possible to re-stroke the same route for which the
signal has been cleared for the same class of aspect irrespective of the
approach locking release and track section occupancy at the time. The
signal would therefore clear when track section occupancy permitted.
3.7.2 Approach Locking

Approach locking should be provided on all signals carrying interlocking
(including local locking with ground frames and signal regulation at level
crossings), in accordance with GK/RT0063.
a) Provision
One of the following types of approach locking should be employed for each
signal:
i. applied when the signal clears (approach locked when cleared); or

ii. for main aspects, applied when the signal clears and a driver could sight
an aspect at a previous signal that would indicate that the signal
concerned was displaying a proceed aspect (comprehensive approach
locking); or
iii. for an independent shunting signal (PLS or semaphore), applied when the
signal clears and the approach track section(s) within at least 45m of the
signal are occupied. (Where this signal is the exit of other routes, the
proving may be extended back to the signal(s) in rear, for TORR
purposes.)
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b) Comprehensive Approach Locking
The use of comprehensive approach locking should be considered wherever

enforced time delays might occur sufficiently frequently to be detrimental to
train or level crossing operation. The type of approach locking required and
the track sections that apply comprehensive approach locking should be
identified in the control tables for each signal. Such track sections should
extend back to the sighting point of the main signal(s) that would display the
first caution, but may be conditioned out by the lie of points, or intervening
signals being on and free of approach locking. The train detection may
extend back further to avoid the provision of an additional track section.
Conditioning to discount a train moving away from the signal is generally only
necessary where trains regularly reverse on the approach to the signal.
c) Proved Effective
Clearance of the signal in relay interlockings should prove the approach

locking applied, by proving the relay which applies it in the appropriate state.
d) Approach Lock Release
Both the following types of approach lock release, (e) and (f), should be
provided. Either may effect the release, provided the signal (and any related
distant and/or banner repeating signals) are proved on at the time.
e) Timed Release
A reasonable assurance that any approaching train has come to a stand may
be obtained by the expiry of a time delay. The selection of suitable time
delays is considered in GK/RT0063 and the chosen period should be stated
on the control tables. The time release should generally be initiated by the
restoration of the signaller’s control device for a signal, when approach
locked. Alternatively, it may be initiated by the replacement of the signal,
provided that the route locking is not released until the signaller’s control
device is restored.
f) Train-In-Section Proving
The train should be proved to have passed the signal by one of the following
methods:
i. Standard method: occupying concurrently the first and second track

sections beyond it and subsequently clearing the first track section;
ii. Long train release to release opposing locking, or the overlap beyond the
signal ahead (where it contains trailing points), when the first track section
is still occupied: as standard method, but with alternative condition of all
tracks occupied between the signal and the next signal ahead (with the
berth track of the signal ahead occupied for the time required to release
the overlap);
iii. No second track provided, but not where trains may divide on the signal
berth track: occupying concurrently the berth and first track sections and
subsequently clearing the berth track section;
iv. No second track provided, where there is no berth track either, or trains
may divide on the berth track: the first track clear after being occupied for
a time (the time taken to traverse the track section at permitted speed,
less 2 seconds equipment operation time); or
v. Any other method that addresses the relevant situations and risks, and
provides the appropriate degree of integrity. See Section 5.4.
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The train-in-section proving may be omitted where continuous train detection

is not provided, e.g. in non-track circuit block, in which case the timed release
would be used to normalise the signal after the passage of every train. This
is not appropriate for signals protecting level crossings because of the delay
to road users.
g) Special Features
The releases should allow for:
i. right side train detection failure not giving a premature release;

ii. delayed signal replacement (the release requires signal on) see
Section 3.7.1; and
iii. for a release to be given when a train sets back behind the signal, having
partially moved into the section ahead.
h) Protection
Protection against the following risks should also be incorporated:
i. power supply restoration protection (see Part D);

ii. very short track sections: for short fast trains, two adjacent tracks may
be treated as one; and
iii. very long track sections: a treadle, proved not operated before operated,
may be used to avoid excessive delay in TORR (its failure should not
prevent the signal from clearing).
iv. Wherever practicable, checks should be included to ensure protection
against irregular sequences of events.
Where approach track section occupancy applies approach locking,

clearance of such track sections, once approach locking has been applied,
should not release the approach locking. This guards against the risk of train
detection response times that are not sufficient to cater for short fast trains,
or other transient wrong side track section failures.
i) Local Interlocking
Signals protecting ground frames and controlled level crossings (or

associated with signal regulation at automatic level crossings) are required to
have approach locking, but where there is no other interlocking on the signal,
this approach locking should instead be applied locally to the ground frame or
level crossing concerned (thus rendering route locking unnecessary).
For signals protecting ground frames see Section 3.6.2(a) and for signals
associated with level crossings see Section 3.8.
j) Distant Signals without Worked Stop Signals
Where worked distant signals protect ground frames or gated level crossings
(Section 3.2.3(a)), the requirements for both approach locking and route
holding may be satisfied by proving a track section clear (or occupied for a
time to bring a train to a stand) from the sighting point of the distant signal to
the infrastructure concerned, before the distant signal can be fully
normalised.
3.7.3 Relaxation of Approach Locking

The requirement to approach lock signals associated with low speed non-
passenger movements (e.g. shunting signals) may be relaxed, as permitted in
GK/RT0063, where the section of track concerned is visible from the controlling
point. This relaxation may also be applied to other signals (e.g. non-block
signals) if it is not reasonably practicable to provide train detection.
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It should be demonstrated that risks are controlled so far as is reasonably

practicable. (The cost of provision would have to be grossly disproportional to
the safety improvement gained.)
3.7.4 Train Operated Route Release (TORR)

TORR should be provided on route setting systems where required by
GK/RT0063. It may be applied either as a safety-critical control within the
interlocking, or as a safety-related interface with the signal box control system,
provided that a consistent response is presented to the signaller.
The operation of TORR requires:
a) signal proved on and free of approach locking;
b) signal disengaged, i.e. prevented from reclearing;
c) signal was off when passed;
d) signal not set to work automatically; and
e) except where the risk is minimal, as specified in GK/RT0063 (i.e. no

conflicting routes ahead of the signal involving passenger movements at
speeds in excess of 15mph), one of the following should be provided:
i. Proof of no train approaching, where provided for comprehensive

approach locking (see Section 3.7.2). This requires the clearance of the
signal in rear for a subsequent movement to approach the signal to be
delayed until after TORR has operated for the previous movement.
ii. Proof of train having passed the signal, by a different train detection
sequence or method from that used to release the approach locking, as
specified in GK/RT0063 (such that a common mode failure could not both
release the approach locking and operate TORR), but addressing the
same situations and risks (see Section 3.7.2).
f) Sequential Operation
Note that in the design of sequential train detection, events should occur in
the following order:
i. signal disengaged (signal off when passed);

ii. signal replaced (Section 3.7.1);
iii. approach locking released (Section 3.7.2);
iv. TORR operated.
3.7.5 Release of Route and Overlap Locking

This section describes the release of sectional route and overlap locking, but
may equally be applied to the release of basic route locking, where applicable.
The restoration of the signaller’s control device, or operation of TORR, with the
signal on and free of approach locking, should initiate the normalisation of the
route locking behind a train passing through the route. In route setting systems,
the routes for all signals reading over the appropriate section should also be
proved normal.
The first route locking section beyond a signal should be released when its own
track section (or sections) become clear, once the signal is proved normal, on
and free of approach locking. Each subsequent route locking section should be
released when its own track section(s) become clear, provided that the previous
route locking section has already been released.
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Where there is a particular risk of a wrong side track section failure giving a
premature release (e.g. in high leaf fall areas), or where the consequences of
such a failure are potentially severe (e.g. on bi-directional lines), the following
enhancement should be applied to the track section clear release condition:
(track section required clear for 15 seconds OR track section required clear
with track section next in advance occupied).
Commercial operating requirements may be balanced against the whole-life cost

of provision to determine whether a simplified option would be satisfactory:
(track section required clear for 15 seconds).
This enhancement may be provided as standard within a signalling system. It

does not apply to overlap locking.
Where an opposing call-on or shunt route may be required to set up to an

occupied track section (or a ground frame release given), that route locking
section may be released after a sufficient time has elapsed that the movement
may be assumed to have come to a stand. The track section occupied timer
should not operate until the previous track section has cleared behind the train,
in order to avoid a premature release caused by track section failure. Note that
this control is applied only if the next track section has not been occupied. It is
represented as follows and may be further conditioned by a set of brackets, for
example in Appendix F5 for 505A route:
Routes Normal Clear or Occupied Secs

214 DG, DC, DD, (DE, DF - - - - - - OR DF- - 20)
This would indicate that the applied route locking is released when DF track has
been occupied for 20 seconds, DG is still clear and the back of the train has
cleared DD track.
The first overlap locking section beyond the destination signal should be released
when the previous route locking section is released (see above), provided that
its own track section(s) are clear, and the main and warning class signals
requiring the overlap are proved normal, on and free of approach locking, for the
destination concerned.
It may also be released without the previous section being released, after a
sufficient time has elapsed that the movement may be assumed to have come to
a stand. Usually this control is applied where there is a set of trailing points in
an overlap. In this case all the tracks in the route are generally bracketed, for
example in Appendix F5 for 706 points N>R:
Routes Normal Clear or Occupied Secs

214 OR 707R DG, FC, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - OR DF - 20)
The necessary release times are given in Section 3.3.3(a).
Each subsequent route locking section should be released when the previous
overlap locking section is released, or an alternative available overlap is being
set, provided that its own track section(s) are clear. Note that facilities may be
required to release all or part of the overlap locking for a second train when a
main route steps down to (or is overset by) a warning route, or a main or
warning route is overset by a call-on or shunt route.
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3.8 Level Crossings

Provision should be made for the locking and control of level crossing gates and
barriers operated from the signal box, including those supervised by closed
circuit television (CCTV), as summarised in Figures F15 and F18. The controls
for each level crossing should be specified in control tables, in accordance with
GK/RT0202.
Controlled level crossings may have local locking between non-interlocked

signals and the level crossing controls, which includes approach locking and
route holding. See Section 3.2.3.
For route holding see Section 3.5.6. Special approach locking is described in
Section 3.7.2(i)&(j). For level crossings in the overlap see Section 3.4.2(h). For
gate boxes see Section 3.6.
3.8.1 Interlocked Gated Crossings

Generally, level crossing gates should be interlocked with the signals or routes
reading over the crossing.
The gate stops (or gate lock) function should only be released when the
protecting signals are normal (on and free of approach locking), and vice versa.
Track locking should be applied by the track section(s) in which the crossing is
situated, and route holding should be provided where necessary (see
Section 3.5.7).
Gate operating mechanisms may be mechanical (e.g. by wheel), or motorised

with a separate signaller’s control device. For further details of gate wheel
interlocking, see Appendix F1:7.8.
Detection of level crossing gates that are locked by gate stops or gate locks is
not required.
For the use of key lock and Annetts key releases see Appendix F1:7.5.
3.8.2 Controlled Barrier Crossings

Barriers are not required to be interlocked with signals or routes, but should be
proved down at the time of clearing the aspect of signals reading over the
crossing. The proving should include barrier mechanism doors closed and the
signaller’s crossing clear device operated. For crossings that are not adjacent to
the signal box, it should also be proved that the booms are intact and remote
control is selected on the local control unit.
The barrier raise controls should only be released when the protecting signals
are normal (on and free of approach locking) and all track sections between the
signals and the far side of the crossing are clear. Main signals that have no
interlocking other than the crossing should have their approach locking applied
directly to the crossing as described in Section 3.7.2(i).
In the event of a train passing a protecting signal at danger, the road light
sequence should be initiated, but the barriers should not be lowered. This may
be effected by an overrun treadle if there are no suitable track sections.
Where a gated crossing operated from a mechanical interlocking is converted to

barriers, the lever that locks the signals (gate lock lever or gate stop lever) may
be retained to release the barrier controls, unless the infrastructure controller
considers its retention to be detrimental to train or level crossing operation.
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3.8.3 Automatic Crossings

Automatic crossings are not interlocked with signals unless a signal is situated
within the strike-in distance, in which case some form of approach locking and
overrun detection should be provided.
For delayed clearance of signals situated within the strike-in distance, see
Section 3.2.12.
3.9 Miscellaneous Facilities

3.9.1 Movable Bridges
Movable bridges should be protected by interlocked signals equipped with
approach locking and, where necessary, track locking and/or route holding, in
accordance with Section 3.5.6, as summarised in Figures F15 and F18. The
signal interlocking requires the bridge set for the railway, bolted and controls
locked. Additionally to clear the protecting signals, the bridge bolts should be
detected in.
Where the risk of an overrun warrants it, trap points should also be provided to
divert an unauthorised movement away from an unsecured bridge (see
Section 3.4.5). Where a movable bridge is situated in an overlap and trap points
are provided as described in Section 3.4.2(i), the bridge may be omitted from the
controls of the signal in rear of the protecting signal. Otherwise, the same
controls should be provided as for the protecting signals.
To release the bridge bolts, the protecting signals should be proved on and free
of approach locking, with route holding normal; the track locking track sections
should be clear; and trapping protection should be proved effective.
3.9.2 Lockout Devices

Lockout systems should be provided on bi-directional lines which are not
regularly used in the wrong direction, and elsewhere as required by the
infrastructure controller, in accordance with GK/RT0030.
Protected areas should be protected by signals equipped with approach locking,

and route locking for the inhibited routes, in accordance with Section 3.5.8, as
summarised in Figures F15 and F18. To clear the protecting signals, all the
enabling devices should be proved in the normal (traffic) state.
To give a lockout release, the protecting signals should be proved on and free of
approach locking, with route locking normal. Where only wrong direction routes
are inhibited, this may be achieved by maintaining the route locking in the right
direction route set state.
The diagram required to be provided adjacent to each fixed trackside enabling

device should be presented in a consistent manner for all protected areas with a
common user. It should give a representation of the layout of the protected
area that is geographically correct and orientated in relation to the user. Any
movements that are not inhibited should be clearly stated, e.g. “Area Covered by
the Lockout, except for the following movements: All right direction movements.”
3.9.3 Train Activated Warning Systems (TAWS)

TAWs should be provided where required by the infrastructure controller, in
accordance with GK/RT0029. The controls for each system should be specified
in control tables, in accordance with GK/RT0202.
The basic controls to operate the warning generally consist of:
a) any approach track section (within strike-in point) occupied (when moving
away routes not set, for bi-directional line); or
b) any protected area track section occupied.

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Wherever practicable the signalling should be arranged so that no signal, station

platform, or other place where trains regularly reverse, intervenes between a
strike-in point and the commencement of the protected area. Where this is not
practicable, additional controls may be necessary to address the risk of
excessive or spurious warnings encouraging users to fail to respond. Signal
controls are described in GK/RT0029.
Special safeguards or warnings may be necessary if it is possible for a second

train to strike-in before the first train has cleared the protected area, to ensure
that users remain in a position of safety after the passage of the first train.
3.10 Interfaces and Transmission Systems

The internal and external interfaces of the interlocking should be controlled, in
accordance with GK/RT0206, so as to satisfy the safety integrity requirements of
the respective signalling system or sub-systems.
See Section 3.1 for the signaller’s interface.
3.10.1 Safety Integrity Requirements

Safety integrity requirements for signalling functions may be determined
qualitatively from the following examples:
a) Examples of Safety-Critical Functions
Functions where operational safety or the integrity of the interlocking is

directly affected, may be deemed to be safety-critical. These may include:
i. signaller’s replacement control on automatic signals;

ii. CCTV crossing clear circuits;
iii. ground frame releases in interlocking areas (see Section 3.6.1), also
remote ground frame releases that prove signals on and free of approach
locking;
iv. emergency ground frame releases that bypass safety-critical controls
(see Section 3.6.5);
v. block circuits;
vi. the control of signals, points and other signalling functions between the
interlocking and the trackside;
vii. the proving of signals, points, train detection and other signalling functions
back to the interlocking;
viii. automatic warning system (AWS) and automatic train protection (ATP);
ix. right away and off indicator circuits;
x. main interlocking logic;
xi. ground frame local interlocking circuits;
xii. level crossing local circuits;
xiii. automatic signal control circuits.
b) Examples of Safety-Related, but not Safety-Critical Functions
Functions which may be protected by the interlocking, but where human

intervention is part of the process and misleading information could create an
unsafe situation or allow one to remain unnoticed, may be deemed to be
safety-related (but not safety-critical). These may include:
i. signalling display indications of safety-critical functions, including route

locking, that can be used for operating purposes in the event of a failure;
ii. signaller’s control device repeating circuits of safety-critical functions;
iii. remote ground frame releases where the signal proving is included at the
ground frame (see Section 3.6.2);
iv. emergency box to box alarms and other signaller’s operational alarms;
v. train describers;
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vi. voice communication systems used in the operation of trains, including

signal post telephones and cab secure radio;
vii. supplementary systems, such as remote control override and all-signals-
on circuits (see Section 3.10.3) and signal passed at danger (SPAD)
indicators.
c) Examples of Non-Safety-Related Functions
Functions where operational safety and the integrity of the interlocking are
not directly affected, may be deemed to be non-safety-related. These may
include:
i. signalling display indications and signaller’s control device circuits, not

associated with safety-critical functions;
ii. train ready to start and close doors circuits;
iii. point heater circuits;
iv. maintainer's control panel circuits;
v. fault monitoring circuits.
3.10.2 Transmission Systems

The sub-system interfaces described below should use approved transmission
systems that comply with the respective safety integrity requirements. It should
also be determined that the system response time is adequate for the intended
use. The correct application of the various available systems is identified in
Part J.
Diverse routing should be used for critical systems where necessary to ensure
availability. See Appendix D2 for interference considerations.
a) Interlocking to Location
Data to be transmitted between an interlocking and an associated lineside

location, generally includes safety-critical functions, such as signal control
and proving, point operation and detection, and train detection, as listed in
Section 3.10.1(a).
An appropriate remote control system is vital FDM (frequency division

multiplex). The circuits are generally the same as for a direct wired multicore
link, except that inputs are formed by a closed contact in a loop to an FDM
transmitter and outputs are obtained over a contact of a reed follower relay.
b) Interlocking to Signal Box
Data to be transmitted between an interlocking and the signalling control and

display system at its controlling signal box generally includes safety-related
signaller’s controls and the functions that create the indications, as listed in
Section 3.10.1(b).
Appropriate remote control systems include less-vital FDM, duplicated non-

vital FDM, or duplicated time division multiplex (TDM) systems. (The less-
vital FDM system uses double tuned reed filters and safety reed follower
relays in an otherwise non-vital system.)
However, the requirement for duplication is satisfied by functions that require

two changes of state to operate, such as:
i. point controls that require NN or RN energised and CN de-energised to

move the points; and
ii. signal controls that require an entrance and exit button operated to clear
the signal.
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Thus where a non-vital FDM or TDM system is not duplicated, any signal
push button that can alone clear a signal, including individual replacement
facilities, should be individually duplicated (e.g. using two TDM channels in
different addresses), such that the two outputs are required to be operated
simultaneously.
In addition, certain controls where the signaller has the sole responsibility for
safety unprotected by the interlocking, such as those listed in
Section 3.10.1(a), items i) to iii), should be transmitted in a safety-critical
system.
Further details of signalling control and display facilities are given in Part L.
See Section 3.1 for interface arrangements.
c) Signal Box to Location
Data to be transmitted between the signalling control and display system at a

signal box and a lineside location generally includes safety-critical and safety-
related signaller’s controls and indications that are not directly associated with
an interlocking.
Vital or less-vital FDM systems are particularly useful for dropping off
functions intermediately, such as remote ground frame releases (vital or less-
vital - see Appendix F2:10), emergency releases (vital) and automatic signal
replacement (vital). Indications include ground frame and replacement
proving, and track indications for automatic sections (all less-vital).
d) Signal Box to Signal Box
Data to be transmitted between signal boxes includes emergency box-to-box

alarms (safety-related) and block circuits (safety-critical). The systems
described in items (a) to (c) above may be used, if suitable, or a dedicated
link may be provided, e.g. for a train describer system.
3.10.3 Remote Control Failure

a) General
A signaller’s alarm and indications should be provided to warn the signaller of

any failure of the remote control equipment to a remote interlocking that may
affect his reliance on the display indications.
Facilities should also be provided so that in the event of a failure of the

remote control system (including all forms of panel multiplex or VDU control
systems):
i. all signals can be restored in the area of failure, using an independent all-
signals-on facility (see Section 3.7.1(a));
ii. through routes can be set for automatic working with a limited choice of
alternatives available to the signaller, by means of an override system
(where required in (b), below);
iii. any route set will remain set until the route is normalised by the passage
of the train and the signal, if not already off and subject to approach
control, will clear and remain off until replaced by the train;
iv. routes may be set on a local control panel at the interlocking, the switch
operations reproducing the button operations that would normally be
transmitted from the signal box control system (where required in
Section 3.11.2).
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b) Remote Control Override System
Where necessary to satisfy the infrastructure controller’s availability

requirements (see Part P of GK/RC0701), an override arrangement should
be provided for each remote control system.
Override is generally required unless the main remote control system is

duplicated. A supplementary non-safety-related system is generally of a
sufficient integrity for a safety-related function (see GK/RT0206). This allows
override control to be transmitted either by direct wire, by an independent
(usually non-vital) FDM system, or by an independent TDM system. Where
reasonably practicable, diverse cable routes should be used for each remote
control or override system.
The minimum requirement is for all-signals-on and automatic working facilities

using a three position switch capable of switching directly between any two
positions without passing through the third (labelled signals-on/normal/ auto).
The position of the switch should be transmitted to the interlocking in such a
way that will revert to all-signals-on in the event of a failure. Operation at the
interlocking should be confirmed by appropriate indications adjacent to the
switch.
At the interlocking, the automatic working control should disable those

signalling functions which are required normal in override (delayed to allow
the passage of any train approaching signals provided with comprehensive
approach locking) and enable those that are required to work automatically
(so that they set when their interlocking is free). These categories of
signalling functions should be respectively defined on control tables.
Restoring the override switch to normal should cancel the automatic working
facility, but not replace any signals.
The all-signals-on control should replace to danger all signals controlled over
the main remote control link, including automatic signals with individual
replacement facilities.
Selective routing with single push button control for each alternative route, or
set of routes, may be provided if required by the infrastructure controller for
operating purposes. As many non-conflicting routes as possible should be
grouped to each push button and, once set, they should continue to work
automatically until the button is pulled. Exceptionally, for heavy traffic
conditions, the following features may be considered:
i. one button per route;

ii. effective for one movement only (with TORR), and/or
iii. pre-selection of routes, effective 5 seconds after the release of conflicting
routes.
Automatic platform or junction working may also be initiated by the override

system, as described in Section 3.2.11(c).
Where required by the infrastructure controller to permit hand signalling

without clipping points in the event of a local failure preventing signal
clearance, a routes set indication, proving all override routes correctly locked
and detected, may be provided on the signalling display. In such cases, any
selective routes should be proved in the push button lamp.
The controls for each system should be specified in control tables.
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3.11 Maintainer's Facilities

a) Layout of Racks
The layout of equipment racks and interlocking housings should be designed,

in accordance with Part G, to facilitate:
i. inspection of relays and other equipment to determine their state; and

ii. access to check voltages on circuit connections.
b) Provision
Either of the following should generally be provided at each new interlocking:
i. a maintainer's monitoring and fault indication panel with wiring for a test
panel; or
ii. an electronic maintainer's terminal and display.
Where a signal box controls an interlocking that is local to the signal box, the
equivalent facilities may instead be provided on the signalling display.
Maintainer's monitoring panels should be wired to the standards given in

Part L.
Where provided, maintainer's terminals and technician's display systems

(TDSs) should be in accordance with the appropriate electronic interlocking or
display systems standards. An SSI maintainer's terminal will serve up to six
SSI central interlockings and will provide all the facilities listed in (c).
c) Requirements
The following facilities (described in Sections 3.11.1 to 3.11.7) should be

provided to the degree necessary to satisfy the infrastructure controller’s
specified maintainability requirements (see Part P of GK/RC0701):
i. monitoring of indications being transmitted to the signalling display;

ii. means of taking local control;
iii. failure monitoring, giving indication of faults;
iv. operation monitoring, including event recording equipment and data
loggers;
v. maintenance facilities to assist the tracing of faults;
vi. isolation devices to allow off-line resetting of equipment; and
vii. means to set restrictive controls.
Where it is necessary for maintainers to release certain equipment to permit

degraded operation under failure conditions, it should be ensured that any
interlocking that must be maintained cannot be inadvertently released. See
also Section 5.8.
3.11.1 Indication Monitoring

The following indications should be provided on a simplified layout diagram, using
colours that are consistent with GK/RT0025:
a) track occupation, using one indication per track section (subdivisions of track
sections may be monitored here to avoid the requirement to indicate them
separately at the signal box);
b) entrance (to flash when the entrance is registered, become steady when the
route is set and locked, and be extinguished as the route cancels);
c) route set for each track section (extinguished by each portion of the route
releasing);
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d) main, distant and position light signals on or off;
e) point detection;
f) slot;
g) ground frame or lockout release;
h) level crossing indications;
i) direction indicator;
j) auto working;
k) individual auto signal replacement; and
l) train ready to start, etc.
Monitoring panels should be equipped with an appropriately rated on/off switch

to extinguish the indications.
3.11.2 Local Control Panel

A lockable and/or transportable control panel fitted with plug-couplers (key coded
in accordance with GK/RT0330, where necessary) may be provided for test
purposes, or for the use of local operating personnel. Provision should be made
adjacent to the panel for some form of communication with the signal box that is
independent of railway cable routes.
A two position key operated rotary switch (labelled signal box/local) should be
provided to enable local control to be taken. No action from the signal box
should be required. The key should be captive while the switch is in the local
position. Where override is provided and local operating personnel may be
available, an additional three position rotary switch (signals on/normal/auto)
should be provided for use when the interlocking is under local control (see
Section 3.10.3).
Rows of coloured three position toggle keys, or equivalent, with provision for
labelling, may be provided, consistent with GK/RT0025 push buttons and
switches, as follows:
a) route setting, auto working and signal replacement - non-locking with centre
return: depress to make F contact; push up to make FM contact;
b) points, etc. - locking in each position: depress to make R contact; push up

to make N contact; restore to centre to make C contact.
Alternative types of panel may also be provided. For electronic interlockings,

these facilities may be provided through the maintainer's terminal.
3.11.3 Failure Monitoring

Monitoring of the following items should be considered, either locally or remotely,
at a site where the state can be readily observed by a maintainer, but this list is
not exhaustive:
a) signal lamp main filament failure indications (where arranged in groups, the
groups should not exceed six signals);
b) level crossing failure;
c) main power supply non-availability;
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d) standby power supply non-availability;
e) busbar earth fault (where vulnerable);
f) under voltage detectors (for secondary cells);
g) electronic system failure (including remote control amplifier monitoring); and
h) pulse generator operation (where ratchet impulse timers are in use).
Where necessary, a stick feature, with reset button, should be provided to store
a previous or intermittent fault, particularly for filament failure and earth fault
detectors.
Controls may be required for earth fault detector remote reset and power supply
changeover, etc. Where equipment is duplicated by redundancy with automatic
changeover, a three position switch should be provided (labelled one/auto
changeover/two) to enable one item at a time to be taken off line for
maintenance purposes.
The following colours should be used:
red = fault;
white/yellow = previous fault stored; or
available (off line) for duplicated equipment; or
release from signaller to allow resetting (see
Section 3.11.6);
green = working or fault cleared.
These monitoring functions should be repeated on a common fault indication

panel at the signal box. For this purpose the power failure functions for each
interlocking may be grouped together. Where 24 hour maintenance cover is not
provided at the signal box, the functions should be included in an appropriate
indication on the signal box display. As this monitoring is regarded as being
non-safety-related, it may be transmitted to the signal box by any convenient
means.
The maintainer should be able to observe the grouped filament failure and earth
fault indications at the same time as the track and signal indications associated
with the passage of trains. If necessary, these circuits should be capable of
being switched through to the signal box display, to allow this observation.
For electronic interlockings, these facilities should be provided through the

maintainer's terminal. Means of remote interrogation may be provided.
3.11.4 Operation Monitoring

Commercially available event recording equipment may be used to assess the
operation of a complex system, such as a level crossing controller. Data loggers
using magnetic tape are generally used for electronic systems.
Where these facilities can be used to investigate incidents, it should be ensured

that there is an appropriate degree of security and processes are in place to
prevent the required data from being overwritten.
Where a temporary monitoring system is provided, this should conform to the

requirements for temporary work given in Part B. Otherwise, the installation of
the system should be subject to the full requirements of GK/RT0201 and
GK/RT0221.
For electronic interlockings, these facilities should be provided in conjunction with

the maintainer's terminal.
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3.11.5 Maintenance Facilities

Maintenance facilities, in the form of fixed or specialised equipment and wiring,
may be required to provide assistance in fault finding. The infrastructure
controller should specify which of the following are required to facilitate the
tracing of faults:
a) comprehensive common equipment indications appropriate to the circuitry in

use to indicate the stage that route selection has reached within each PBI
ring, e.g. equipment quiescent, entrance registered, exit awaited, exit
registered, etc.
b) means to inhibit the function that effects the rejection of route initiation
attempts (known as DJR hold) (with this facility in use signal clearance
should be prevented within the affected PBI ring);
c) level monitoring unit for geographical systems;
d) facilities to inhibit automatic operation of equipment;
e) facilities to interrogate an electronic system, with provision of fault diagnostic

information;
f) a condition monitoring system to detect impending random failures;
g) computer aided diagnostic and simulation systems; or
h) specialised test equipment for electronic systems.

3.11.6 Resetting and Restoration
Resetting and restoration is a two stage process required by GK/RT0027.
Where resetting systems presents a hazard, and automatic resetting is not
provided, a means of manual isolation should be provided, so that the signaller
has to request its restoration after it has been reset.
For electronic interlockings, this facility should be provided through the

maintainer's terminal.
3.11.7 Restrictive Controls
Means should be provided at each interlocking to enable a maintainer to readily
comply with the requirements of Section E of the Rule Book, GO/RT3000, in
applying restrictive controls, as specified in GK/RT0060, including:
a) temporary approach control; and
b) aspect and/or route disconnection.
The controls provided for each function should be specified in the appropriate
control tables, in accordance with GK/RT0202.
Temporary approach control, releasing the signal from red by occupation of its
immediate berth track section, should be provided for all power operated
controlled signals. In the case of junction signals, this should prevent the signal
clearing for any route until after the route indication is readable (or absence of
indication is apparent), to ensure trains obey temporary speed restrictions for the
route they are taking, for the situations described in GK/RT0038, Part D.
Generally, standard railway signalling terminals fitted with disconnection links, in

accordance with Part J, should be provided. They should be fixed so as to
enable ready access and operation and should be clearly and durably labelled so
as to identify the function of each.
For electronic interlockings, these facilities should be provided through the

maintainer's terminal.
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4 Application to
Mechanical Signalling
Systems
4.1 General
On basic mechanical lever frames, both the interlocking and operation are
mechanical. Signal arm controls require lever reverse, with mechanical point
detection and mechanical slots off, whereas point operation requires lever
operated with facing point lock (FPL) plunger out.
See Section 5 for enhancements to the basic mechanical interlocking, including

the provision of train detection and electric locks.
Purely mechanical signalling systems have the following attributes:
a) long life span;
b) minimum power supply requirement (assuming no track circuits, etc.);
c) particular housing requirement for the interlocking (mechanical locking

attached to a lever frame);
d) the control point is at the interlocking (a signal box);
e) all trackside signalling equipment should be close to the interlocking and,

except where additional protection or proving is provided, should be clearly
visible to the signaller;
f) particular design, installation, test and maintenance skill requirement;
g) interfacing with adjacent interlockings (signal boxes) by simple block systems;
h) only suitable for simple track layouts; and
i) only suitable for low speed lines with low traffic density, where approved by
the infrastructure controller.
4.2 Mechanical Control and Interlocking

The signaller's control device is a lever generally connected to a tappet passing
through a locking box, where the mechanical interlocking locks levers, depending
on the state of other levers. (Other mechanical arrangements may also be
used to achieve the same result.) The levers are also physically connected to
the trackside signalling equipment which they operate mechanically (using wires
for signals and slots, and rodding for points, FPLs and level crossing bolts).
This arrangement is only capable of maintaining the basic requirements:
a) interlocking between points and signals; and
b) in conjunction with a simple block system (which may be three position

absolute block, using polar line circuits), a safe distance of separation
between trains.
These together fulfil the minimum regulatory requirement (Section 2.1), but are
not generally appropriate for new work, without some form of electrical control
(see Section 5).
Point to point locking forms the basis of the interlocking. See Sections 3.5.3
and 3.5.4.
The design of mechanical locking frames is described in Appendix F1. See

GK/RT0039 for further details of mechanical signalling.
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4.3 Point Locking

Point locking is required on facing points as described in Part P, achieved with
mechanically operated points by means of a facing point lock (FPL), generally
operated by a separate lever interlocked with the point lever. It is preferable
that the points are unlocked when the FPL lever is normal in the frame, but, in
the case of ground frames, the points should be locked when the FPL lever is
normal in the frame. Thus operation of facing points from a signal box frame
involves replacing the FPL lever to withdraw the lock plunger, moving the point
lever to the correct position and then pulling the FPL lever again to relock the
points. FPLs may be omitted on non-passenger lines so long as the points are
detected in the signal selection.
Track locking may be provided by means of an FPL bar on the approach to

facing points.
Where points are situated less than a train length apart, route holding may be
achieved by interlocking the FPL bars that protect each set of points.
A degree of route holding may be provided by trailing points or ground frame

releases being locked by the signal in advance, to prevent their movement until a
train has passed through the section and the signal replaced behind it.
See Section 3.5.6(b)ii) for further details.
4.4 Indications
Indications should be provided to show the state of signalling equipment that is
not clearly visible to the signaller. These may take the form of needle indicators
to specification BR 925, repeating the position of signals, slots, train waiting
treadles, etc. They may be worked directly over polar line circuits.
See GK/RT0025 for further details.
4.5 Sequential Locking and Other Proving

Non-reciprocal sequential locking between adjacent signal levers and between
the section signal and the block should be provided to ensure that each signal is
replaced before a following train can approach. This may be achieved in one of
the following ways:
a) non-reciprocal mechanical locking, but not for new work (see Appendix F1:4);
b) signal ahead normal lever contact (and arm proved on, where repeated) in
the normal lever lock of the signal in rear (see Section 5.3); or
c) a stick circuit to store the fact that option (b) has taken place, for use with
signals that are approach controlled.
The locking of trailing points in the signal section in rear (see Section 4.3), will
also prevent the sequential locking being defeated by a train approaching on a
different route.
Mechanical detection should be used to prevent a signal clearing until a point

switch is correctly closed, in accordance with Figure F17. Further details are
given in Part P.
Signal arm proving, and train waiting detected at home signal, may be provided
in the block circuit, using polar moving iron relays to specification BR 923 in
series in the repeater circuits. Further details are given in Part S.
Electric lever locks should be fitted with a force down feature, as described in
Appendix F1:7.1.
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4.6 Numbering Associated with Lever Frames

Signalling functions controlled from a lever frame should take the number of the
controlling lever. They should be allocated with ergonomic considerations, so
that as far as possible they are pulled in ascending or descending numerical
order. The need to pull, or replace, a lever between two levers lying reverse is
prohibited (except in the case of miniature lever frames).
It is usual to place up and down line running signals at opposite ends of a small
frame (the end from which trains approach), or towards the centre of larger
frames. Points are laid out in geographical order from left to right. Shunting
signals and FPLs are numbered next to the points to which they apply. Level
crossing functions are allocated to levers at the end of the frame nearest to the
crossing.
On new frames a minimum of ten per cent spare levers should be provided,
evenly distributed and preferably in small groups to cater for future signalling.
An illustrative layout is given in Appendix F1 (Figure F1:10).
4.7 Lever Nomenclature Plates

The description should be that shown on the locking tables, with the lever
number shown boldly at the top.
Subject to locking constraints, the order of pulling details should be written in the
same order that the signaller will pull them, avoiding unnecessary walking.
Where optional routes are available, the first left route should be given first, then
the next in order over to the right. When a ‘nil’ move occurs among other
options, the nil pull should be quoted in the appropriate order.
Levers retained solely to maintain locking following alterations and that have to
be pulled to release other levers should be plated “Interlocking Lever” or “For
Release of Mechanical Locking”, according to regional practice.
When undertaking alterations at an existing installation, plates should be

manufactured (e.g. from xylonite, aluminium, cast iron, or brass) and painted or
engraved to match existing plates.
An illustrative set of nomenclature plates is given in Appendix F1 (Figure F1:13).
4.8 Lever Painting

Lever painting details are prescribed in GK/RT0005.
Stripes or bands should generally be 75mm wide on full levers and 6mm wide on
miniature levers. Stripes should be arranged with the darker coloured stripe
nearest the quadrant. On bi-directional lines, chevrons should point upwards on
the up side of the lever and downwards on the down side, or alternatively point
upwards on the top half of the lever and downwards on the bottom half.
Where levers bear two colours, the top colour relates to the function that
operates first.
Quadrants should be painted black.
Levers should not be painted white until all locking has been removed from them.
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5 Application to
Electro-Mechanical
Signalling Systems
5.1 General
Electro-mechanical signalling systems essentially comprise a mechanical
interlocking with the addition of electric lever locks to provide a second level of
locking, known as electrical or selection locking. This may involve track circuits
and/or electrical point detection. Mechanically operated signals have aspect
(arm) controls applied through the selection lock, whereas power operated
signals generally incorporate the controls in the operating (aspect) circuits. This
is summarised in Figures F1 and F2.
Alternatively, frames may be equipped with all electric locking using either
separate (preferred, see Appendix F1:4), or combined (not for new work),
electrical interlocking and selection locks. Miniature lever frames may have
either mechanical or electrical interlocking, but only power operation of points
and signals. (See Section 6 for all-electric frames.)
There is, therefore, a power supply requirement, but the trackside signalling
equipment does not have to be so close to the interlocking, as it can be power
worked over much longer distances, by means of circuit controllers attached to
the levers. Likewise, by use of electrical point detection, more complex layouts
can be signalled.
A home signal berth track section to place the block indicator at "train on line" is
a minimum requirement for a block system. The provision of track sections
between signals and points enable route holding to be provided. Track sections
over the points are generally necessary for track locking. These features make
the system more suitable for use on passenger lines. See Section 3.3.2 for the
minimum train detection requirements.
The line capacity between signal boxes may be increased by the addition of an
intermediate block section, with a track section extending from the most
advanced starting signal to the overlap of the intermediate home, as described in
GK/RT0042.
5.2 Interlocking
The interlocking is generally accomplished mechanically, as in Section 4.2.
However, signals are not required to lock trailing points in rear (see Sections 4.3
and 4.5), provided that:
a) the signal is automatically replaced, OR this signal is proved on in all signals

in rear; AND
b) route holding and track locking are provided, OR the points are over the
maximum train length from the signal ahead.
5.3 Electric Selection Locking

Electric lever locks, fitted to those levers that require electrical locking, should be
used to apply the additional controls that enable a signalling function to be
selected. See Figure F19(b) for the basic circuits.
a) Signal Selection
A signal lever is generally fitted with a normal and back lock, the normal
position, (A), releasing the lever, the lock being energised by the following, as
necessary, in accordance with the electrical control tables:
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i. electrical point detection (mechanically operated signals);

ii. track sections in signal section, overlap and flank (non-permissive
mechanically operated signals);
iii. approach control track occupied (diverging or subsidiary mechanically
operated signals) - see Section 3.2.10;
iv. line clear release (mechanically operated signals);
v. sequential locking (main signals) - see Section 4.5; and
vi. route locking (opposing signals) - see Section 3.5.9.
Where mechanically operated signals are approach controlled, an audible

warning of an approaching train may be provided to remind the signaller to
pull the lever. Alternatively, particularly where there is no berth track section,
the signal concerned may lock the main signal in rear to prevent a high speed
approach.
For power operated signals it is preferable for point detection, train detection,
lamp proving and block conditions to be provided as electrical controls (see
Section 5.5), so that the signal lever is free to be pulled, and so protect the
route by means of the mechanical interlocking, even if any of the electrical
conditions should fail.
b) Signal Backlocks
The back, (B), position should be used where any of the following are
provided, in order to backlock the lever and prevent it being replaced in the
frame until the conditions are met:
i. track section(s) clear between the signal and points, in lieu of route
locking (see Section 3.5.6(b)i), and
ii. power operated signal proved on (proved instead in the approach locking
for new work), or, for new work, proved free of approach locking (see
Section 5.4).
c) Point Selection
Point levers should be locked both ways with an (AE) lock, the lock being
energised by the following, in accordance with the electrical control tables
(see Section 3.5.6):
i. track sections over the points to provide track locking; and

ii. route locking, where there are several tracks between signal and points.
d) Point Checklocks
Where it is the practice to provide indication locking to prove the point

operation before releasing the interlocking, ABDE locks (often referred to as
NBDR) should be provided to hold the lever in the checklock position until the
appropriate detection is obtained. See Figure F19(c) for the basic circuits.
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LOCATION
LOCATION
1 1 11 11 11
GR ALSR 1 HR W JR NKR RW MR
11 11 NW MR
NA 11 11
1
11 RKR NW MR 11 RW MR
1 HGPR HR
Double cutting
and polar circuits RE
1 Contactors
1 RGPR HR not shown. 11
11 NW KR 11 W JR
NA 11
RW KR
11
1 1 1 AB AC LOCATION
GR RGPR GSR TPR TPR 1 ALSR RE Correspondence
proving 11 11
1 11 NW KR 11 NKR RW MR
ALSR
NA
1 11 11
AJR 11 RW KR RKR NW MR
11
RE
1
1 1 1 AA AB (PO)
NA ALSR HGPR TPR TPR
1 1 AJR ALSR 1 GSR JR
B 1
1 GSR Combines signal
stick and train-in-
RB section proving
53 11 AB AC AD AA 1 1
ECPR NW KR TPR TPR TPR TPR GSR AJR
1 1 GR
1
R
TACL
(a) Circuits Common to All Systems

1 AB AC BE CD
ALSR TPR 1(B)L TPR TPR TPR 11(AE)L
Extended Extended track locking

backlock in lieu in lieu of route locking
of route locking from signals 2 & 10
(b) Lever Frame with Mechanical Interlocking

AC BE CD
1 AB TPR TPR TPR 11 11(ABDE)L
ALSR TPR 1(B)L
NA
11
Detection of trailing points (11 11 RE
NWKR) is omitted from 1GR. NKR 11
Detection without
Feeds to point contactors are 11 BC
correspondence
fed over NB and RD contacts, proving RKR 11
rather than NA and RE.
DC
(c) Lever Frame with Indication Interlocking

Point to point locking
12 1 1(A)L 12 11 11(AE)L 1 13 12 12(AE)L

N A R A N R A
2 10 11 11 14 12
These interlocking lock circuits
are additional to the selection lock N N E N N E
circuits shown in items (b) or (c).
(d) Lever Frame with Electrical Interlocking

Figure F19 Basic Interlocking Circuits (Lever Frames) to Demonstrate Principles
See Figure F1:10 for Layout Plan; Figures F1:11 & 1:12 for Control Tables
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Locks should be economised, as described in Appendix F1:7.2.
Where necessary, track sections should be conditioned by the lie of points (see
Section 3.3.4).
A list of lever lock and controller positions is given in Figures F1:17 and F1:18.
Lever notation is defined in GK/RT0205.
5.4 Approach Locking and Signal Disengaging

The provision and release of approach locking should be in accordance with
Section 3.7.2. Where continuous train detection is provided, the approach
locking should either be extended back to the sighting of the first caution, or
become effective as soon as the signal is ready to clear. Without continuous
train detection, the approach locking should become effective as soon as the
signal is ready to clear.
The signal backlock requires the approach locking to be free.
Where track circuit replacement is provided, a signal disengaging stick should

prevent controlled signals clearing a second time until the lever is replaced and
pulled again. The signal is generally disengaged by the berth track and first
track past the signal being occupied whilst the signal is off, and is reset when the
lever is normalised.
The signal stick may also be used to prove that the train has passed the signal in
order to release the approach locking, provided that it is designed to fulfil the
necessary requirements. In addition, a manual timed approach lock release
should be provided, initiated by the lever in the backlock position, when
approach locked. Where the provision of train detection cannot be justified, a
timed release alone may suffice.
See Figure F19(a) for the basic circuits.
5.5 Electrical Control and Operation

Levers controlling power operated equipment or electrical releases should have
shortened handles to warn the signaller of the reduced force necessary to pull
the lever. This does not apply to levers retained solely to maintain locking
(Section 4.7), which should be marked in a temporary manner.
Power operated trackside signalling equipment should be designed to revert to a

safe state in the event of a control being removed, e.g. signals return to danger
and point mechanisms complete their movement.
Power operated trackside signalling equipment should generally be controlled

over lever contacts on the circuit controller. In order to take advantage of the
safety integrity of the equipment, the selection controls (point detection and train
detection) should be transferred to the operating circuit. Thus, if any of the
controls are lost, the equipment is made safe. This continuous monitoring will
result, for instance, in motorised semaphore signals being automatically replaced
in the event of a disconnection in the circuit. Signals should thus be replaced by
track sections, avoiding the need for sequential locking.
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a) Signal Controls
Signal controls should generally contain the following:
i. signal lever reverse (R or RE lever contact);

ii. track sections in signal section, overlap and flank;
iii. approach control track occupied (diverging or subsidiary signals);
iv. electrical point detection;
v. signal ahead lamp proving; and
vi. signal disengaging stick (where signal is track replaced).
Point detection of trailing points may be omitted where indication locking is

provided.
Where colour light signals are provided, the control circuits operate a signal
relay at the interlocking, which in turn operates the aspect relay(s),
conditional upon the aspects of the signals in advance, in accordance with
GK/RT0032. The aspect relay(s) are generally situated in a lineside location
adjacent to the signal. See Part S for full details of signal control circuits.
b) Point Controls
Point controls contain the following:
i. point lever normal or reverse (NA or RE lever contacts);

ii. selection controls, as in the lever lock (optional).
The point control circuit generally energises a contactor situated in a lineside

location adjacent to the points. Point operating currents should not be fed over
ordinary relay contacts, or lever contacts. See Appendix F2:6.3 for features to
be incorporated into all point control circuits. See Part P for full details of point
operating circuits.
c) Track Locking
Circuits should be arranged to prevent point movement when the track

locking is effective, but allow any movement in progress to be completed.
This may be accomplished either:
i. by the use of special stick relays, where the armature is held up by the
point operating current flowing through a separate winding; or
ii. by arranging the point control circuit to operate in the direction set by the
point lever, until the appropriate detection is obtained.
Note that, in selection circuits, course lever contacts, such as (NA) and (RE), are
more reliable than fine, (N) and (R), contacts.
5.6 Proving
Proving should be provided as in Section 4.5.
The appropriate form of point detection should be provided for mechanically

operated facing points (except for certain non-passenger movements) and all
power worked points, in accordance with Figures F16 and F17.
Wherever practicable, signal on proving (signal aspect relay de-energised for

colour light signals) should be provided in the signal lever backlock (via the
approach lock release circuit for new work). Sequential locking is not required
where signals are automatically replaced to danger by the passage of the train,
but a signal stick should be provided as described in Section 5.4.
Colour light signals should be proved alight in the aspects of the signal in rear in
such a way that will facilitate degraded operation. Junction signal aspect relays
should prove route indicators alight as necessary.
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5.7 Indications
Indications for semaphore signals, etc., should be provided as in Section 4.4.
Where several track sections are provided, they should be indicated by more
than one lamp per track section on an illuminated diagram, arranged in the
correct geographical orientation as seen by the signaller. Where track section
occupation is indicated by lamps, the availability of the power supply should also
be indicated.
Point detection relays should be repeated by indication lamps, generally located

on the block shelf. The state of colour light signals (on or off) should be
indicated similarly. They should repeat the aspect relay and include lamp
proving. (Alternatively the individual aspects may be repeated instead.) Where
necessary, a white lamp should be provided to indicate that a lever is free to be
moved, i.e. lock ready to be energised.
See GK/RT0025 for further details, including signalling display options.
5.8 Sealed Emergency Releases at Signal Boxes

Where it is necessary for maintainers to release certain equipment to permit
degraded operation under failure conditions, it should be ensured that any
interlocking that must be maintained cannot be inadvertently released.
A sealed emergency release should be provided for mechanically operated

points and FPLs, to override any track locking or route locking, in the event of a
failure of train detection equipment. It should only bypass track section controls.
Where route locking is overridden, the signal lever normal and free of approach
locking controls should be included separately in the point (and FPL) lever locks.
Sealed releases should not be provided at ground frames.
6 Application to All-
Electric Non-Route
Setting Interlocking
Systems
6.1 General
One example of an electrical non-route setting system is a lever frame or
miniature lever frame where all signalling functions are power operated. It is
preferable for each lever to have two electric locks, the interlocking lock and the
selection lock, as explained in Section 6.8. (See Section 5 for the case where
some functions are mechanically operated.)
Another example is an individual function switch (IFS) panel, with separate

switches for each function. Power operated ground frames often use this type
of panel. Here lock relays are used to combine the interlocking and selection
lock functions in the lock relay operation and release circuits.
Where such an interlocking is combined with colour light signalling and

continuous train detection, the signalling system becomes suitable for medium
density, high speed traffic, with reasonably complex layouts. Continuous train
detection between signal boxes is a requirement of track circuit block (see
GK/RT0041). Automatic signals may be provided, as necessary, to increase the
line capacity with additional signal sections.
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6.2 Interlocking
6.2.1 Lever Frames
With lever frames, the interlocking should be accomplished electrically by means
of interlocking lever locks (see Section 5.8), with lock slides cut for the (A) and/or
(E) positions. The locks should be energised by contacts of the appropriate
levers in either the (N) or (R) positions. All converses and counter conditional
locking, where necessary, should be specifically wired and identified on special
locking tables. Fine (N) and (R) contacts should be used, because, in
conjunction with the force down feature, these prove that the locks are effective.
Further details are given in Appendix F1. See Figure F19(d) for the basic
circuits.
6.2.2 Switch Panels with Latched Relays

Switch panels use similar circuits to operate two position latched lock relays,
which perform the interlocking and imitate the action of a lever. Unlike a lever, a
switch is not interlocked to prevent its movement, but it is only able to throw
down its respective lock relay when permitted by the interlocking circuit. Only if
the selection conditions (e.g. track locking) are correct can the lock relay for the
opposite position be operated and so release the interlocking and operate the
function concerned, in the same way as a lever completing its stroke. Where
points are equipped with indication locking, a further stage is added, by which
the points are operated if the selection is made, but the lock relay is not operated
until detection is obtained. This, however, requires additional relays.
The latched relay armatures should be mechanically or electrically interlocked to

prevent both being operated at the same time. The equivalent of the mid stroke
position of a lever, where locking has been performed but no locking has been
released, may be achieved by both lock relay armatures being thrown down. In
systems where the integrity of latched relays is such that they can only be
thrown down by operation to the opposite position, and a mid stroke position is
not required, a single latched relay or magnetic stick relay may be used instead
of separate normal and reverse latched relays. See Figure F20(a) for the basic
circuits.
Signal lock relays thus represent the (A) and (B) lock positions. The reverse
lock relay operated (preceded by normal lock relay thrown down) requires the
switch reverse and interlocking free, including route locking (equivalent to signal
lever reverse). The normal lock relay operated (preceded by reverse lock relay
thrown down) requires the switch normal and approach locking free, and should
release the signal interlocking (equivalent to signal lever normal). Both
armatures thrown down together thus maintain the signal interlocking with the
signal on, waiting for an approach lock release. The reverse relay does not have
to be latched and the substitution of a ordinary acting relay will ensure the
immediate replacement of the signal if the switch is restored, or any interlocking
condition is lost.
Similarly, point lock relays represent the (A) and (E) lock positions. The reverse
lock relay operated (preceded by normal lock relay thrown down) requires the
switch reverse and interlocking free for the points to go reverse (including track
and route locking) and should release the normal interlocking, and vice versa.
Both armatures thrown down together maintain the normal and reverse
interlocking and prevent the points from moving.
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6.2.3 Alternative Arrangements

Magnetic stick relays (see Part D) are used in place of latched relays in some
systems.
Alternatively, conventional stick relays may be used for point locking and the
approach lock stick relay (ALSR) for signal locking. The signal relay may
combine the route and aspect requirements, but, if anti-preselection is provided,
the signal cannot be set until the aspect controls are satisfied, so any approach
control tracks should be included in the outgoing signal feed, rather than the
signal relay. See Figure F20(b) for the basic circuits.
6.2.4 Route Locking

Where required (see Section 3.5.6), route stick relays should be de-energised by
the release of the signal normal lock relay (NLR). If there are no lock relays, the
ALSR should be used instead to de-energise the route sticks. See
Figure F20(c) for the basic circuits.
The final route stick relay should be down proved in the aspect controls (see
Section 3.5.8(e)). If the signal relay combines the route and aspect
requirements, the route stick relay should be included in the outgoing signal
feed, rather than the signal relay, as the route stick is not de-energised until the
signal relay energises, thus de-energising the ALSR.
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1 ALSR/AJR as Figure 19(a), but with 1 NLR (front contact) instead of the NA lever contact and 1 NR (front contact) instead of the B contact.
1 GSR as Figure 19(a), but with 1 NR (back contact) instead of the RB lever contact. 1 HR, HGPR and RGPR as Figure 19(a).
11 NWMR/RWMR/WJR as Figure 19(a), but with 11 NLR and 11 RLR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts, respectively.
11 NWKR/RWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 11 NLR and 11 RLR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts, respectively.
1 1 53 11 AB AC AD AA 1 1
RR RLR ECPR NWKR TPR TPR TPR TPR GSR AJR
1 GR
1
TACL
IFS relays for
each function Interlocking Extended Track locking
Point to point
1 1 NR 12 backlock 1 AC BE CD 12 locking 11
NLR 1 RLR RR TPR TPR TPR RLR 11 RLR RR
N
1 AB 1 2 10 11
1 1 RR ALSR TPR NR NLR NLR NR
Extended
R 1 NLR 11 NLR
Backlock track locking Interlocking
(a) Individual Function Switch (IFS) Panel with Point to Point Locking (Conventional)
1 ALSR/AJR as Figure 19(a), but without the NA lever contact and with 1 NR (front contact) instead of the B contact.
1 GSR as Figure 19(a), but with 1 NR (back contact) instead of the RB lever contact. 1 HGPR and RGPR as Figure 19(a).
11 NWMR/RWMR/WJR as Figure 19(a), but with 11 NWR and 11 RWR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts respectively.
11 NWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 11 NWR (front contact) and 11 RWR (back contact) in series, instead of the NA lever contact.
11 RWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 11 RWR (front contact) and 11 NWR (back contact) in series, instead of the RE lever contact.
AC BE CD 1 37/38 2/3/4 9/10/15 11 11 11

TPR TPR TPR ALSR ALSR ALSR ALSR 11 LR LR RR NWR 11 RWR
Track locking 13 13 11
NWR RWR 11
Points RWR
LR Point
NRs and RRs as in item (a). free
Interlocking using ALSRs relay 11 control
NWR stick
1 relays
11 11
TACL NR RWR
Approach control 11 NWR
Prove points locked LOCATION
here to allow anti- AA 11 12 1 1
preselection to be TPR LR LR GR ALSR 1 HR
incorporated in GR
Use ALSR front 1

1 53 11 12 AB AC AD 1
contacts here to GSR
RR ECPR NWKR NWR TPR TPR TPR AJR
prove any 1 GR
opposing locking.
Flank points (not detected) required here in lieu of point to point locking
(b) IFS Panel with Stick Relays and No Point to Point Locking
2/3/4 EL DH AC BE AC(DN) BE(UP) BE(DN) 11 11
ALSR TPR TPR DH(DN)USR TPR TPR USR USR USR RR NWR 11 RWR
DH(DN) Track locking 11
AC Interlocking using USRs
USR RWR
TPR
9/10/15 DH(DN) CC BE 11
ALSR USR TPR TPR NWR
CC(DN)USR
11 11
Route sticks CC(DN) AC(DN) Use AC(DN)USR (back NR RWR 11 NWR
USR USR
initiated by contact) in 1 HR to prove
ALSRs BE(UP) points locked, rather than
CC(DN) CD 37/38 BC BD
USR 11 LR and 12 LR, as shown
USR TPR ALSR TPR TPR BD(UP)USR
CD(DN)USR in item (b).
BE(DN)
CD(DN) USR BD(UP)
Other circuits as in item (b).
USR USR
CD(DN) BE 1 AB AC BD(UP) 11
USR TPR BE(DN)USR ALSR TPR TPR AC(DN)USR USR NWR BE(UP)USR
13 BE(DN) AC(DN) 13 BE(UP)
NWR USR USR RWR USR
(c) IFS Panel with Route Locking and No Extended Backlocks or Extended Track Locking
Figure F20 Basic Interlocking Circuits (Non-Route Setting Systems) to Demonstrate Principles
See Figure F1:10 for Layout Plan. Anti-preselection is not shown.
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6.2.5 Anti-Preselection
Anti-preselection should be incorporated into the switch operation, as required
by Section 3.5.5, to guard against risks of premature release of locking and
incorrect operation of switches.
6.3 Selection Locking

For lever frames, selection lock circuits should be provided as in Section 5.3.
Where lock relays are provided, all electrical locking (approach locking,
backlocking, route locking, checklocking and track locking) should be in the lock
relay circuits (see Section 6.2). All route proving for signals should be in the
signal control circuits (Section 6.5).
6.4 Approach Locking

Approach locking should be in accordance with Sections 3.7.2.
Signals should be proved free of approach locking as follows:

a) in the backlock of levers; or
b) in the normalisation of the signal lock relay(s).
6.5 Control and Operation

Selection (or control) circuits should be provided as in Section 5.5, initiated either
by lever contacts or by lock relay contacts, as appropriate.
Where lock relays are provided, all electrical locking should be in the lock relay
circuits. The signal control circuits should include the following:
a) train detection;
b) point detection and correspondence with the point lock relay;
c) signal ahead lamp proving;
d) any other route proving;
e) signal not disengaged;
f) signal lock relay reverse; and
g) signal switch reverse, to allow manual replacement (not required if the signal
reverse lock relay is not latched).
See Section 6.2.3 for alternative arrangements, combining the route and aspect
controls,
Repeat relay(s) may be used in operating and proving circuits to extend the
operating distance as far as necessary. See Part D. Alternatively, a safety-
critical transmission system may be used, such as vital FDM. See
Section 3.10.2(a).
6.6 Proving
Proving should be provided as in Section 5.6.
6.7 Indications
Indications should be provided as in Section 5.7, on the block shelf and
illuminated diagram, or on a control panel.
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6.8 Separate Electric Locks

For new lever frames, or newly relocked frames, where the interlocking is to be
accomplished electrically, separate interlocking locks and selection locks should
be provided. Where separate locks exist, the interlocking lock (body and cover)
should be painted red, as a warning to the maintainer that they must not be
released to facilitate degraded operation.
7 Application to Route
Systems
7.1 General
Route setting interlockings generally register a route request if the locking is free
(i.e. points available), and then automatically call the points to the required
position. The route request with the points correctly called sets the route,
which, in turn, locks the points. In electronic systems, these actions may be
accomplished at the same time: the route request controls the points and sets
the route, if the points are free to move, with no separate locking.
Examples of route setting systems include free-wired route relay, geographical

route relay, or electronic interlockings, controlled from one control switch (OCS)
or entrance exit (NX) panels, integrated electronic control centres (IECCs), or
other VDU based systems. By using a signaller’s control device that does not
remain in the position in which last set, e.g. a push button, automatic route
setting (ARS) is possible. This should be specified where ARS might be a future
requirement. (The requirements for control and display systems are given in
GK/RT0025.)
Route setting signalling systems are suitable for complex layouts and, where
incorporating ARS sub-systems, they are suitable for particularly high density
traffic. Considerable space, however, is required for route relay systems (even
more for geographical interlockings) and power consumption is heavy. Little
space and less power consumption is required for electronic interlockings, but
data preparation skills are required. Electronic systems, due to their flexibility,
present the opportunity for incorporation of advanced safety features,
particularly to allow for the safe passage of trains under degraded conditions, as
described in GK/RT0206. However, they can be less flexible as regards
alterations and slow to respond due to cycling time.
Interlockings should be designed to prevent an unsafe state occurring during

power supply failure or restoration, as described in Section 2.3.
7.2 Signaller's Controls

In addition to the route setting devices, individual three position point control
devices are required to control points for maintenance purposes or during
failures, to select an alternative route, to swing an overlap, or to inhibit point
movement. In order to permit route setting, the point control device must be left
in the centre position.
The signaller’s control devices may be switches, push buttons, tracker ball,
mouse, keyboard, or some combination thereof. There is no longer a
requirement for points free indications on route setting systems.
The signaller’s workload may be reduced by the provision of special facilities,

such as:
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a) automatic route setting (see Section 3.1.3);
b) automatic working facilities for controlled signals (see Section 3.2.11);
c) automatic platform working at simple terminal stations (see

Section 3.2.11(c));
d) override controls (see Section 3.10.3);
e) through setting of several consecutive routes by one action; and
f) route demand storage, but unavailable routes should not be stored to await
conditions becoming available, unless measures are taken to address the
risks arising from preselection (see Section 3.5.5).
Several interlockings may be controlled from a single signal box control system
by means of remote control transmission links. See Section 3.10.2(b).
7.3 Route Setting

The BRS-SW67 free-wired route relay system is described in Appendix F2. The
requirements for geographical relay interlockings are given in Appendix F3 and
for electronic interlockings in Appendix F4, which also defines the solid state
interlockings (SSI) filenames used in this section.
Simplified circuits showing the basic requirements are shown in Figure F21.
Route setting interlocking systems are broadly configured on four levels (in
geographical systems these levels may relate to specific lines in the geographic
cables connecting the functional sets), viz:
7.3.1 Route Initiation (or Registry) Level

This is basically the interface with the signaller’s route setting devices, by which
entrances registered await a valid exit. If any of the points in the route are
unavailable, the request should not succeed.
Further details of the signaller’s interface is given in Section 3.1.
With some systems, such as OCS, the route setting device(s) simply energise a
route relay or route reverse lock relay, if the points are free, which in turn calls
the route. In the AEI-GRS geographical system, an entrance device registered
in a signal set sends out a feed, both ways at any available facing points, until a
registered exit is found in another signal set. These systems require no special
control panel interface. See Figure F3:10 an application of the basic circuits to
the example in Appendix F5.
7.3.2 Completion Level

The completion level checks route availability, selects or calls the route, and sets
the points. This may be regarded as part of the signaller’s interface system
(see Section 3.1).
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712 712 These six summation relays should 51

CR LR 712 NZLPR be provided as necessary
OCS relays for UR
712 NCUR
each function 712 712 712
(centre position LR NWKR 56B
NLR Points free or 712 NKLPR
for points only) UR Route calling
appropriately
locked relays 712 summation
51 51 NR 712 712
RWKR 105A(M) relays
CR LR 712 RZLPR 712 RKLPR
N UR
712 RCUR
712 Points locked and 203A(M)
51 51 RR RLR detected relays UR
R
AC BE AC(DN) BE(UP) BE(DN) LOCATION
TPR TPR USR USR USR 712 LR 51 51
712 712 CR
GR ALSR 51 HR
C Track locking Route locking including all
conflicting and opposing routes
(a) Circuits Common to All Systems
51 ALSR/AJR as Figure 19(a), but with 51 NLR (front contact) instead of the NA contact and 51 NR (front contact) instead of the B contact.
51 GSR as Figure 19(a), but with 51 NR (back contact) instead of the RB lever contact. 51 HGPR and RGPR as Figure 19(a).
712 NWMR/RWMR/WJR as Figure 19(a), but with 712 NLR and RLR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts, respectively.
712 NWKR/RWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 712 NLR and RLR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts, respectively.
51 51 53 712 711 711 AC(DN) AB AC AD AA 51 51

RR RLR ECPR NKLPR NWR LR USR TPR TPR TPR TPR GSR AJR
51 GR
51
LRs prove
TACL
points locked Last USR proves all locking effective 712
Route calling
Points normal or free RR
Locking
Route stick
Use route NLRs 712 712 712
711 712 51 relay chain as
or USRs here to LR RCUR CR
NZLPR NZLPR 51 RLR RR Figure 20(c), 712 RLR
prove any
but initiated by
51 opposing locking 51 712
route NLRs
ALSR NR NCUR 712
instead of
712 NLR NR
51 NLR ALSRs.
(b) One Control Switch (OCS) Panel with Latch Relays
51 ALSR/AJR as Figure 19(a), but without the NA lever contact and with 51 UR (back contact) instead of the B contact.
51 GSR as Figure 19(a), but with 51 UR (front contact) instead of the RB lever contact. 51 HGPR and RGPR as Figure 19(a).
712 NWMR/RWMR/WJR as Figure 19(a), but with 712 NWR and RWR (front contacts) instead of the NA and RE lever contacts respectively.
712 NWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 712 NWR (front contact) and RWR (back contact) in series, instead of the NA lever contact.
712 RWKR as Figure 19(a), but with 712 RWR (front contact) and NWR (back contact) in series, instead of the RE lever contact.
51 53 712 711 711 AC(DN) AB AC AD AA 51 51

UR ECPR NKLPR NWR LR USR TPR TPR TPR TPR GSR AJR
51 GR
51
LRs prove
TACL
points locked Last USR proves all locking effective
Points normal or available
711 712 51
Use USRs here to Route stick relay chain as Figure 20(c), but
NZLPR NZLPR 51 UR RR
prove any with a back contact of the respective UR in
opposing locking series with each ALSR to initiate the route
712 712 locking as soon as the UR picks.
RR Route calling NR
Locking
712 712 712 712 712 712 712 712
CR RCUR LR NWR 712 RWR CR NCUR LR RWR 712 NWR
712 712 712

RWR 712
LR LR NWR
712 712 712 51 NR is not required.

712
NR CR Reverse stick path RR Normal stick path is 712 NZLPR and RZLPR
CR
is converse of converse of reverse as item (a), but with NWR
712 normal pick up path 712 pick up path and RWR contacts
NCUR RCUR instead of NLR and RLR.
(c) One Control Switch (OCS) Panel with Stick Relays

(see Figure F3:10 for an application of this circuitry to a geographical interlocking)
Figure F21 Basic Interlocking Circuits (Route Setting Systems) to Demonstrate Principles
See Appendix F5 for Layout Plan and Control Tables. Anti-preselection is not shown.
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Route availability should be tested by checking the position of the point lock or
point free relays, or by the PRR file (see Figure F4:9) in the SSI interlocking
multi-processor module (MPM). This may be done at the initiation level. If all
the points are free (SSI PFM file - see Figure F4:8), or locked in their correct
positions, and any directly opposing routes are normal with route locking free,
the required route is set and the points called (by the operation of the route
reverse relay in free-wired interlockings).
Where there are alternative routes from a signal to a given destination, a

preferred route may be identified on the control tables. The preferred route
should set whenever the route is requested, if it is available. If it is not available
a non-preferred route should set. This may be achieved by delaying the setting
of the non-preferred route(s). Particular alternatives should be selected either
by the use of the individual point control devices, or, where required by the
infrastructure controller, by the provision of additional push buttons.
In geographical systems, paths through S&C that do not comprise a valid route
should, if necessary, be inhibited, e.g. divergences at switch diamonds.
7.3.3 Route Locking Level

When the route is set (normal lock relay released) route sticks in the route
should be de-energised (subroutes set in the FOP file of the SSI MPM - see
Figure F4:10).
The points that have been called by the route setting should be locked (normal
or reverse lock relays prevented from being released) by the last route stick (or
subroute) over the points.
This is accomplished within SSI by the points free to move (PFM) file. In free-
wired relay interlockings points are also locked by the appropriate route lock
relays, although this may be unnecessary where sectional route locking is
provided.
The actual interlocking (Section 6.2) is a two stage process by which firstly the
route is proved available (Section 7.3.2) and then, if successful, conflicting
functions are locked.
Directly opposing routes, including those over diamond crossings, should be

required normal before a route can be set, but conflicting routes are interlocked
through the point locking (i.e. one route requires points normal; the conflicting
route requires them reverse). Point to point locking should not generally be
provided.
Main (M), warning (W), call-on (C) and shunt (S) class routes from a main signal
should be interlocked with one another, but provision should be made for
warning routes to be stepped up to main routes should the track occupancy
conditions change and stepped down after use in automatic working mode (see
Section 3.2.5).
7.3.4 Aspect (or Route Proving) Level

This is equivalent to the signal control circuits described in Section 6.5. The SSI
equivalent is the OPT file (see Figure F4:11).
Call-on class routes require the permissive track occupied in the aspect level
(not replacing signal) as well as the route locking level, so as to force re-stroking
to main class routes should the track occupancy conditions change before the
signal clears (see Section 3.2.6).
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In a route relay interlocking, the signal aspect should prove points locked (i.e. not
free to move) as well as detected, because they are not proved locked when the
route is set at the completion level, but only available. This is achieved by
proving the points free relay de-energised.
Where sectional route locking is provided, the last route stick relay to be de-
energised when the route is set should be proved down in the signal relay to
prove the integrity of the route stick chain (see Section 3.5.8(e)).
7.4 Route Releasing

Manual releasing is accomplished by the signaller operating a device, such as
pulling an entrance button, which stores the normalise request. If the train has
passed the signal, or when the signal becomes free of approach locking, the
normal route lock relay re-energises (route becomes unset in SSI) and the route
sticks energise (subroutes unset) as the track sections clear behind the train.
Approach locking should be as described in Section 6.4.
Provision should also be made, until the approach locking becomes free, for the
signaller to cancel the normalise request by re-stroking the route (see
Section 3.7.1(d)).
Where required, train operated route release (TORR) is provided in accordance

with Section 3.7.4.
Points should not be restored to their normal position by the route releasing,
except where required for trapping purposes in accordance with Section 3.4.5.
7.5 Operation
Relay operating circuits should generally be provided as in Section 6.5, unless
trackside signalling equipment is to be operated directly from trackside functional
modules (TFMs) in accordance with SSI applications (see Appendix F4:3.6), or
by some other safety-critical means. TFMs are connected to the interlocking by
a safety-critical data link. The OPT file in the SSI MPM is used to address the
TFMs via the data link.
The requirement for signalling equipment to revert to a safe state is achieved in

SSI by the provision of a "red retain" output from the signal TFM. The most
restrictive aspect of every signal should be connected to this output to prevent
the signal being completely extinguished in the event of a failure of the data link.
7.6 Proving
Trackside signalling equipment should generally be proved as described in
Section 6.6, or by some other safety-critical means. Where TFMs are used, the
equivalent proving should be provided in accordance with the SSI applications
manual. The IPT file for this purpose in the MPM is addressed via the data link.
The proving of relay circuits should be as described in Part D.
The outputs from electronic processor interlocking systems duplicated by

diversity should be proved to be in correspondence. Single processors should
have a self checking capability.
7.7 Identification in Route Setting Systems

All routes should be identified in accordance with GK/RT0009.
Route sticks (known as subroutes and suboverlaps in SSI) are directional, and
so require a directional label after the track section name. Conventionally the
labels (Up) and (Dn) have been used, but in some systems a more
comprehensive identification is necessary.
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The SSI system is based upon the orientation of the subroute/suboverlap plan
(see Figure F4:7), on which the extremities of each track section are labelled A,
B, C, etc. in a clockwise direction (starting at twelve o'clock), thus identifying the
direction of travel as -AB, -AC, etc. For other SSI nomenclature, see
Appendix F4:3.4.
Geographical systems have to be based on the orientation of each individual

set, e.g. whether points are facing or trailing. As the sets are generally named
after the main function (signals and points), track repeaters may be given special
names such as A (approach track) and F (first track past signal). Point ends of
crossovers are specially labelled A & B or P & Q, in order to identify the track
sections and also the normal routes through each point end. A consistent
method should be adopted for each geographical system and, in addition, the
actual names of the track sections should be clearly displayed on each set.
8 Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems are generally acceptable (e.g. points mechanically operated from
a lever frame with other functions controlled from an IFS panel), but for novel
combinations it should be demonstrated that risks are controlled so far as is
reasonably practicable.
Any combination of interlocking types may be controlled from a single signal box,
subject to the constraints given in this Guidance Note.
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Appendix F1:
Lever Frame Interlocking
Guidelines
F1:1 Introduction
This appendix describes the design of specific types of lever frames and
associated interlocking.
The design details required for a mechanical interlocking are described in Part N
of GK/RC0701. Examples relating to the typical layout shown in Figure F1:10
are given in Figures F1:11 to F1:14.
Most of the locking terms used in this Appendix are illustrated in the figures.
Where other former regional terms are found describing these items, care
should be taken to avoid ambiguity. For instance, locks and notches are also
known as nibs (or wedges) and ports. Tappets can be known as swords, irons
or blades. Locking bars can be referred to as bridles, and studs as drivers.
Note that imperial dimensions are used in this appendix, viz:
1 inch (") = 25.40mm;

12" = 1 foot (');
3' = 1 yard.
F1:2 Lever Frames

The main development of the mechanical locking frame was from the 1860s to
the 1920s, but installation and reconditioning of lever frames has continued,
albeit at a decreasing rate, until modern times. Currently in the region of seven
hundred mechanical frames remain in use on Railtrack controlled infrastructure,
comprising some fifty distinct types. These are listed in Figure F1:1 and some of
the most common are illustrated in Figures F1:2 to F1:9. Their life expectancy
can be seen from the fact that many of the frames in use today are over a
hundred years old. There is no prohibition on the introduction of new or
reconditioned mechanical locking frames, provided the necessary risk
assessment is undertaken in accordance with Section 2.2.
The signaller's control device is a lever connected to mechanical and/or electrical

interlocking that prevents movement of levers, depending on the position of
other levers. The levers may be connected to trackside signalling equipment
which they operate mechanically (using wires for functions requiring pull only with
the return usually being self-acting, e.g. signals, and rodding where both pull and
push forces need to be transmitted, e.g. points), or electrically as described in
Section 5.
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Commonly Lever Method of

Type of Frame Found in Centres Operation/ Type of Illustrated
Areas (inches) Actuation Locking
British Power (power slide frame) ABP 2 or 2½ lever (r/t) tappet Fig F1:9(c)
Cheshire Lines Committee (similar to Stevens Tappet) 5 lever (d/a) tappet
Dutton 1893 4 or 4½ catch handle tappet
Dutton Combination 4½ c/h & lever tappet
Evans O’Donnell 4 catch handle tappet
Gloucester Wagon Company 5 lever tappet (r/l)
Great Central (similar to RSCo LNER Standard) GCR 4½ lever (d/a) tappet
Great Northern - East Lincolnshire 4¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Great Northern Duplex (aka McK & Holland No.26) sim to S&F 1905 4 c/h & lever tappet
Great Western 3 Bar Horizontal Tappet GWR 4 lever (r/t) tappet Fig F1:2(a)
Great Western 3 Bar Horizontal Tappet GWR 5¼ or 5½ lever (r/t) tappet
Great Western 3 Bar Vertical Tappet GWR 4 lever (r/t) tappet Fig F1:2(b)
Great Western 5 Bar Vertical Tappet GWR 4 lever (r/t) tappet
Great Western Double Twist GWR 5¼ lever tappet (r/l)
Great Western Stud (mostly relocked) GWR 4 or 5¼ lever (grad) LLB/DN
Lancashire & Yorkshire (v sim to Railway Signal Company Tappet) L&YR 5½ lever (d/a) tappet
London & North Western Tappet LNWR 5½ catch handle tappet
London & North Western Tumbler 1876 (Bar & Stud) LNWR 5½ lever (esc) LLB/BC Fig F1:3
London Midland 1943 LMR 4½ or 6 catch handle tappet Fig F1:4(b)
London Midland & Scottish 1938 (development of LNW Tappet) 4½ catch handle tappet
London, Brighton & South Coast 1880 (similar to S&F 1874) LBSCR 5 lever (d/a) tappet
London, Brighton & South Coast 1905 LBSCR 5 lever (d/a) tappet
London, Brighton & South Coast Bosham Pattern 5 lever (d/a) tappet
London, Chatham & Dover 4¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire 6 lever (d/a) tappet (r/l)
McKenzie & Holland 1873 Hook, Cam & Soldier LMR 5 or 6 lever (esc) LRS
McKenzie & Holland No.11 (5”) / No.12 (4”) 1886 T-Bar ER, NER 4 or 5 lever (esc) LRS Fig F1:5
McKenzie & Holland Cam & Tappet 4 lever (r/t) tappet
McKenzie & Holland / Westinghouse No.16 (5”) / No.17 (4”) NER 4 or 5 lever (d/a) tappet Fig F1:6
McKenzie & Holland / Westinghouse No.17A (deep locking boxes) ER 4 lever (d/a) tappet
McKenzie & Holland No.21 (aka Brettell Duplex Tappet) 4 lever (d/a) tappet
Midland Tappet MR 6 catch handle tappet
Midland Tumbler MR 6 catch handle LLB/TRS Fig F1:4(a)
North London Tappet (similar to Stevens Tappet) 5½ lever (d/a) tappet
Railway Executive Committee LMSR 4½ catch handle tappet
Railway Signal Company / Edwards 1877 (Bar & Stud) 5½ lever tappet (r/l)
Railway Signal Company Tappet ER, LMR 5½ lever (d/a) tappet Fig F1:7(a)
Railway Signal Company London & North Eastern Standard 4 or 4½ lever (d/a) tappet
Railway Signal Company Great North of Ireland ER 4 lever (d/a) tappet
Saxby & Farmer 1874 Rocker & Gridiron (mostly relocked) ER, SR 4 or 5 catch handle LLB/TRS
Saxby & Farmer 1888 Duplex ER, SR 4 c/h & lever tappet
Saxby & Farmer 1905 Duplex ER, SR 4 or 4½ c/h & lever tappet Fig F1:7(b)
South Eastern Cam / Brady 5 lever (d/a) tappet (r/l)
South Eastern Tappet (Old Pattern) SER 4½ lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens Knee Frame SR, ScR 4#/& lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens Tappet ER, SR 4 to 5¼ lever (d/a) tappet Fig F1:8(a)
Stevens / Caledonian (similar to Glasgow New Pattern) ScR 4¼ or 5¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens Glasgow (Old Pattern) ScR 4¼ or 5¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens Glasgow (New Pattern) ScR 4¼ or 5¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens / Glasgow & South Western (New Pattern) ScR 4¼ lever (d/a) tappet
Stevens / McKenzie & Holland No.28 (similar to No.17 & Stev Tap) 4 lever (d/a) tappet
Sykes & Hallam (aka South Eastern & Chatham New Pattern) 4½ lever (r/t) tappet
Tyer Direct Tappet 4 lever (d/a) tappet
Tyer Knee Frame 5½ lever (d/a) tappet
Westinghouse 1924 Type A2 / 1948 Type A3 ER, SR 4 catch handle tappet Fig F1:8(b)
Westinghouse Style K / Style N (miniature lever power frame) LT 2½ lever (vert) LLB/TRS Fig F1:9(a)
Westinghouse Style L (miniature lever power frame) SR 2½ electrical electric Fig F1:9(b)
Figure F1:1 Existing Types of Lever Frame continued (notes)...
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Notes Method of Actuation:- Type of Locking (non-tappet):-

Lever Locking: d/a = direct action LRS = longitudinal rotating shafts; or
r/t = reduced travel LLB = longitudinal locking bars
(non-tappet) esc = escapement gives initial & final motion with motion transmitted by:
grad = gradual motion gives early lock & late release BC = bell cranks;
vert = vertical shaft DN = diagonal notches; or
TRS = transverse rotating shafts.
Duplex Locking: c/h & lever = catch handle and lever locking r/l = all surviving examples relocked with
tappet locking
Longitudinal means running parallel to the length of the frame.
Transverse means in the plane that the lever moves and at right angles to the length of the frame.
Ground frames are not included in the table.
Some frames were made by different manufacturers and the parts are not necessarily interchangeable, e.g. parts for the McK&H No16/17
frames made by Butterworth & Dickinson.
Figure F1:1 Existing Types of Lever Frame
The levers should be arranged in a frame, so as to give the signaller a clear view
of the line and as much of the trackside signalling equipment being controlled as
reasonably practicable. Indicators should be provided for any equipment that is
not clearly visible to the signaller, or where electrical proving is provided for other
purposes. Except where track circuit block is provided to all adjacent signal
boxes, the frame should be arranged to give the signaller ready access to the
signal box windows.
The frame is generally elevated to permit the mechanical locking and other
apparatus to be situated within the space below the operating floor. The frame
should be adequately supported. Alternatively, ground frames may be provided,
as described in Section F1:8.
F1:2.1 Actuation of Locking

The locking apparatus is generally actuated as follows:
a) by the motion of the lever (direct action or lever locking) with the locking
acting on the lever (see Figure F1:14, for example);
b) by moving the catch handle (catch handle locking) with the locking acting on
the catch handle, e.g. Figure F1:8(b); or
c) by some combination or permutation of the above, e.g. duplex locking, which

may have one set of tappets connected to the lever and another to the catch
handle. See Figure F1:7(b).
F1:2.2 Prevention of Confliction

The locking should generally be effected at or before the start of each stroke
and should release only at or after the end of each stroke. Additionally, it
should not give rise to confliction during the travel. This may be achieved by one
of the following means:
a) by the use of catch handle locking, where the catch handle operates a rocker
that is attached to the locking, e.g. Figure F1:4(b);
b) by incorporating a reduced travel mechanism, such as a cam, into lever

locking, so as to give escapement with initial and final motion, as shown in
Figure F1:2(a); or
c) in the case of direct action lever locking tappet frames (i.e. where the tappet
stroke is directly related to the motion of the lever), by taking special
precautions to avoid conflicting notches (see Section F1:5.1).
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Cam Plate
Roller
Locking
Boxes
Drive Bar
Locking
Boxes
3 Bar Horizontal 3 Bar Vertical 5 Bar Vertical

Locking Bars
1 2 Lock (various profiles)

1 1
3 2 3
2 4
5
3
Locking Box
(a) GW Horizontal Tappet Frame (b) GW Vertical Tappet Frame
Figure F1:2 Great Western Tappet
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Tumbler
Lever Tail
Counter-
balance Bell
Weigh Cranks
ell
Back Locking
Tail Bars
Hook
Rack
Rocker
Lever (to
balance
weight)
Point
Connections
Signal
Connections
Figure F1:3 London and North Western Tumbler Frame (non-tappet locking)
See Section F1:3.2 for details
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Locking Run Identification

( 5 bars per run)
Nibs
Lever Pin to engage
(rear view)
in tumbler pocket
Tumbler (standard E D C B A Cover Plate

tumblers have 4, 7,
10, or 13 nibs - Pocket
not 6 as shown)
Tumbler (right
hand locking
tumbler shown)
Catch Handle Stud

for tumbler actuation
Drive Rod
(a) Midland Tumbler Frame (non-tappet locking)

Locking Bar Notation

T B
5 4
3 2
Bars 1
Towards
Levr
Lock
Studs Rivets X = Top Bars

(sliding) (fixed) o = Bottom Bars
Two 4 Channel Locking Boxes

(with identification letters)
Cover Plate
Contact Box HG FE DC BA Rocker
Floor Level
(b) London Midland 1943 Frame (catch handle locking)

Figure F1:4 Midland Type Frames
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Cam
T-Bar
with
lock
notches
Cam
Shaft
Drive
Link to
Operate Rotating
Soldiers Soldier
and Lock
Shafts
Two Tiers of Locking are shown here
Figure F1:5 McKenzie & Holland 1886 T-Bar Frame (non-tappet locking)
F108 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page F109 of 191
Arrangement with 8 Two Channel Locking Boxes
Catch
Handle
Catch Handle
Spring Box Quadrant (or
Floor Plate)
Tappets
Locking Box
Electric Lock
A B Identification
(SGE type)
C D
Lock E F
Slide
(showing
notches
cut for
lock)
Economiser
(showing roller
that locates in
small notches
on lock slide)
Circuit Controller
(rotary type)
Figure F1:6 McKenzie & Holland/Westinghouse No. 16/17 Frame (lever locking)
RAILTRACK F109
Withdrawn Document
GK/GN0600
Page F110 of 191
Spring
Drop Catch
Box Box
Notch for
Drop Box
Catch Handle
Actuated
Tappet
Tappet
Locking
Box
Lever
Actuated
Tappet
Figure F1:7(a) Railway Signal Co Tappet Frame Figure F1:7(b) Saxby & Farmer 1905 Frame
(lever locking) (duplex locking)
F110 RAILTRACK
Withdrawn Document
GK/GN0600
Page F111 of 191
Curved Tappets
Locks
Locking Bar Notation
Alternative Arrangement
Ten Channel Locking Tray
(with identification letters)
Two Channel
Locking Box
Figure F1:8(a) Stevens Tappet Frame (lever locking)
T B
1
Bars 2
3
Lock 4
Rivets Studs Towards

(fixed) (sliding) Lever
Lever Normal Lever Normal Lever Reverse Lever Reverse

Catch Handle Catch Handle Catch Handle Catch Handle
Raised Lowered
Figure F1:8(b) Westinghouse A2 Frame (catch handle locking)
RAILTRACK F111
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GK/GN0600
Page F112 of 191
Signaller’s
Lock Slide Miniature
Indications
Lever moves
through 60º
Selection
Lock
Selection
Mechanical Bevel
Lock
Locking Gearing
Interlocking rotating
Lock contact
Square shaft
Lever (sealed)
Vertical through
Contact Shaft Locking
Shafts 120º
Bars
Toothed Lever
Segment Contacts
Cross Lock Lock
(a) Westinghouse N Frame (b) Westinghouse L Frame

(similar to the K Frame)
Free
Lamp
Latch Cam Plate Even
Levers
Circuit
Controller Odd
Levers
Indication
Magnet
(actuates
check
locking)
Safety
Magnet
Vertical
Tappet
Locking
(c) British Power Slide Frame

Figure F1:19 Miniature Lever Frames
F112 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Telecommunications Design: Issue Two
Page F113 of 191
Basic Requirements
Mechanical locking frames should have the following attributes, as far as
reasonably practicable:
a) simple construction;
b) minimising the number of pins or links between the lever or catch handle and
the locks, so as to reduce the risk of slack locking;
c) strong and effective locks;
d) broad wearing surfaces for wearing parts;
e) accessibility of locking for maintenance and alteration;
f) arrangement of the frame to allow for easy extension and replacement of

parts;
g) locking design not to limit the size of frame that can be conveniently
constructed.
F1:3 Mechanical Interlocking

Levers are generally interlocked by one of the following methods:
a) longitudinal shafts that rotate as the lever moves, e.g. Figure F1:5;
b) longitudinal locking bars. In this case, motion is transmitted from the plane of
the levers by means of:
i. diagonal notches (see Section F1:3.1);

ii. bell cranks (see Section F1:3.2); or
iii. transverse rotating shafts (see Section F1:3.3).
The mechanical locking should be sufficiently robust to withstand a signaller’s

pulling of a locked lever, or, in the case of catch handle locking, a signaller’s
grasping of a locked catch handle (a lesser force).
All components of the locking mechanism (tappets, locks, lock bars, steadies
and holding down bars, etc.) should be uniquely identified with a suitable
marking, so as to avoid confusion and comply with GK/RT0009. The orientation
of each loose component should be defined by the orientation of the marking.
The rationale of the identification system should be recorded on the locking
chart, as shown on Figure F1:14.
Mechanical locking is generally reciprocal and special arrangements have to be

made when this feature is not required (see Section F1:5). It is generally easier
to provide non-reciprocal locking electrically, as explained in Section F1:4.
F1:3.1 Tappet Locking

The most common type of locking is known as tappet locking, whereby each
lever is connected to a tappet that passes through a locking box. The tappets
have diagonal notches cut from them which bear on locking pieces with diagonal
bevels. These locking pieces, known as locks, are connected to longitudinal
locking bars that slide in channels in the locking box, in order to effect the
interlocking.
Generally, several locking boxes extending the length of the frame are arranged
in tiers and supported on brackets attached to the frame standards. Locking
boxes for direct acting frames usually contain two channels. A maximum of two
or three locking bars are located above and below the tappets in each channel.
RAILTRACK F113
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GK/GN0600
IssueTwo Telecommunications Design:
Page F114 of 191
Alternatively, particularly on reduced travel frames, a wide locking tray, often

inclined at an angle for accessibility, may contain a large number of locking bars
in close proximity.
Figure F1:8 illustrates both arrangements. See Figure F1:14 for a typical locking
chart and detail drawing. Further details of tappet locking are given in
Section F:1.5.
F1:3.2 London & North Western Tumbler Locking

The most widely found design of non-tappet locking is Webb’s London & North
Western Tumbler frame of 1876. A rocking piece, known as a tumbler (widely
replaced now by a more recent method of actuation), is pivoted on the lever
below the floorplate, such that, when the lever is pulled, it raises a hook rack
coupled to it. The shape of the tumbler and the lugs that it rides over effects a
partial movement of the hook rack at the beginning and end of each stroke, thus
providing reduced travel for the locking.
The bar and stud interlocking is arranged with horizontal locking bars crossing in
front of the vertical hook racks for each lever. The hook racks have a series of
ports cut at 2 inch centres into which riveted studs on the locking bars engage to
perform the locking. Motion is transferred from the hook racks to the locking
bars, as necessary, by means of bell cranks bolted to the structure of the frame.
One end of each crank is permanently engaged in a port in a hook rack, whilst
the other end locates around a stud riveted to one of the locking bars.
The general arrangement is illustrated in Figure F1:3. See Figure F1:15 for a
typical locking chart and detail drawing.
F1:3.3 Midland Tumbler Locking

A very different form of non-tappet locking is known as Midland Tumbler. This
consists of two horizontal transverse rotating shafts, also known as tumblers, for
each lever. (These tumblers bear no similarity with the LNW tumblers.) The
tumblers are able to tilt to the left or to the right, one located on either side of the
lever beneath cover plates on the operating floor.
At the rear of the frame, appropriate lengths of locking bars are directly
connected between vertical projections, known as nibs, on the top and bottom of
the tumblers, in order to provide the necessary interlocking between levers. The
locking bars are connected to the top to move one way or to the bottom to move
the other way. When each lever is normal, a pin holds its left hand tumbler in
the left hand position and, when reverse, holds its right hand tumbler in the right
hand position. (The right hand tumbler is free when the lever is normal, and the
left hand is free when the lever is reversed.)
The locking is actuated by the catch handle. To raise the catch handle with the
lever normal, the right hand tumbler must be free to rotate to the right, which
then occurs, and conversely, to raise the catch handle with the lever reversed,
the left hand tumbler, if free, is rotated to the left. In this way the right hand
tumbler effects the locking; and the left hand tumbler the releasing. Levers that
are not released do not require a left hand tumbler.
The general arrangement is illustrated in Figure F1:4(a). See Figure F1:16 for a
typical locking chart and detail drawings.
F1:3.4 Miniature Lever Frame Mechanical Locking

Finally, a more modern type of non-tappet locking is found with mechanically
locked miniature lever frames (e.g. Westinghouse Style K or N). Here the
vertical locking box, which is integral to the frame at the front, contains horizontal
locking bars and vertical square shafts, each of which is rotated by means of a
bevel gear when its miniature lever is pulled. Where necessary, a toothed
segment is provided on the square shaft to engage in a ratchet on the bar, so as
F114 RAILTRACK
Withdrawn Document
GK/GN0600
Telecommunications Design: Issue Two
Page F115 of 191
to slide the bar to the right as the lever is reversed. The locking is effected by
vertically sliding bars, known as cross locks, in which notches are cut.
The general arrangement is illustrated in Figure F1:9(a).
F1:4 Electrical Interlocking

As an alternative to mechanical locking, levers may be interlocked electrically
using lever locks energised by circuit controller contact bands in the appropriate
positions (see Section F1:7). Such locking is non-reciprocal, i.e. requires the
converses to be separately provided. Counter conditional locking, to prevent
conditions from changing, is also often required to be separately provided.
Electrical interlocking is particularly common on miniature lever frames, although

any frame may be relocked with electrical locking. Separate interlocking and
selection locks should be provided as described in Section 6.8.
Further details are given in Section 6. An all-electric miniature lever frame

(Westinghouse Style L) is illustrated in Figure F1:9(b).
F1:5 Locking Requirements

Mechanical locking tables for a typical layout are given in Figure F1:11. The
following locking requirements are distinguishable:
a) dead locking (one lever locking another);
b) releasing (one lever released by another);
c) both-way (B/W) locking (one lever locking another in either position);
d) conditional locking (or special locking); and
e) sequential locking (non-reciprocal, restoration or rotation locking).
Mechanical locking charts showing how these locking requirements may be

accomplished for different types of mechanical interlocking are given in Figures
F1:14 to F1:16.
The design of mechanical locking charts requires certain knowledge about the
type and manufacture of the mechanical interlocking concerned.
F1:5.1 Conflicting Notches

In the case of tappet locking, the travel of the tappet affects the arrangement of
locking boxes, in order to avoid notches that are cut for use in one channel from
conflicting with an adjacent channel as the tappet is moved. With direct acting
lever locking the travel is around 9” to 18” and the number of channels is
generally limited to two per set of tappets. This problem is less prevalent with
reduced travel locking because the stroke is reduced to between 1” and 2½”.
Consequently, a locking tray can be used consisting of a number of channels
(perhaps ranging from 4 to 18). Conflicting notches only occur if the travel is
equal to or exceeds the pitch of the channels. On some frames the travel
equals the pitch of the channels, allowing a notch to perform locking in two
adjacent channels. The locks and notches on such frames are nose shaped
with two diagonal faces, i.e. double bevel, although various sizes of nose may be
found.
On frames where conflicting notches are a problem (generally between adjacent

channels), there should be a technique for overcoming it, such as selecting locks
and notches with large or small noses (or other mutually exclusive
configurations), or riveting pieces with separate notches to the top of tappets
and using locking pieces with high and low noses (i.e. normal and inverted).
RAILTRACK F115
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GK/GN0600
IssueTwo Telecommunications Design:
Page F116 of 191
The general rules for avoiding conflicting notches on direct acting lever locking
frames with two channel locking boxes are as follows:
a) locks in the channel nearest the rear of the frame to have small notches;
b) locks in the channel nearest the front of the frame to have large notches;
c) wherever practicable, releases to be in the rear channel and have large

notches;
d) where unavoidable, releases may be placed in the front channel and should
have small notches, but in such cases only another release (with a large
notch) can be placed in the rear channel;
e) both-way locks (in either channel) to be double bevel with small notches;
f) two both-way locks cannot be used on the same edge of a tappet;
g) where used in combination with a release, the both-way lock to be in the

front channel and the release (with a large notch) in the rear; and
h) where used in combination with a lock, the both-way lock to be in the rear
channel and the lock (with a large notch) in the front.
F116 RAILTRACK
49 1 A 53
AB AC AD
GZ AA 11A 11B DOWN FAST
BH BF BE 12A 12B BC BB
13B UP FAST BA
52 CP CP BD 58
15 9 SPAD 9 54 37 38 A
8 10
13A CP CP 205
9/10G CD CE CF DOWN SLOW
JZ CA CB RPOL 46m CC 7B 16A

X 33G 511
DJ 27 28 DG DF 14 DE 18 19A 16B DD ROL 91m DC DB DA
32G 19B 16C UP SLOW KZ
DH 26 17
POL 30 19C 31
210 183m FC 29 32
2 EL UP SIDING FA NECK 33
24A 24B
3 20
25
4
7A 23 Opposing Locking Omitted
6
5R 3BR FD Extract of Signal Box Notes:
5 EK
FE TANNER ROW Elevated lever frame: 38 levers.
EJ Spare levers: 21, 22, 34, 35, 36.
’TW’
EG EH DOWN BRANCH
Track circuit block with train describers to adjacent signal boxes.
UP BRANCH
Signals working auto when lever reverse and switch operated: 1, 38.
FG FF
110 Machine operated points: 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19.
Telephones provided at all main signals, and at shunt signals: 20, 25.
Figure F1:10 Signalling Layout Plan to Illustrate Examples (not to scale)
Released By No. Locks Released By No. Locks

B
1 12 20 (16, 18 w 19R), (23 w 19R, 24), (23 w 19, 24R), 19 /W
6, 7, 11 2 21 SPARE
Withdrawn Document
6, 7 3 13, 16 22 SPARE
B B
6, 7, 16 4 (33 w 19), 19 /W 23 25, 26, 29, (14, 27 w 24), (20 w 19R, 24 ), (20 w 19, 24R),(31 w 27), 24 /W
6 5 24 26, 29, (31, 37 w 27)

B
6 7 /W 24 25 23
7 9, 10, 15, 27 28 26 23, 24, 27, 29
8 27 7, 26, 29, (23 w 24)
B
9 7, 13, 16 28 27 /W
11 10 7 28 29 23, 24, 26, 27
12 11 27, 28 30
13 12 1 28 31 14, 16, 18, 19, (23, 24 w 27)
13 3, 9, 16, 38 32 16, 18, 19, 33
12 14 19, 31, (23 w 24) 33 32, (4, 15, 18 w 19)
B
16 15 7, (33 w 19), 19 /W 34 SPARE
16 3, 9, 13, 18, 31, 32, (20 w 19R) 35 SPARE
17 19 36 SPARE
B
18 16, 31, 32, (20 w 19R), (33 w 19), 19 /W 14, 28 37 (24 w 27)
19 14, 17, 31, 32 38 13
Figure F1:11 Mechanical Locking Tables

Requires (B) Lock
Lever Route To Route Function Signal Ahead Train Detection Points & GFs Detected Route Requires Locked when Signal Off until Re- Lever
No. Indic- Arm or Aspect Track Circuits/ Lock- Track Track Ccts Or marks No.
ation Aspect Alight Treadles Track Circuits Clear Normal Reverse ing Circuits Signal On Occ & After Time
Alight Occupied Clear Clear Occ $46
1 53 Y R 53 AA$7 AB, AC, AD$16 11A/B AB 1 AB AC 120 $1 1
G Y OR G
2 53 POS Y R 53 EK$7 EL, DH, CC, CD, BE, AC, 27 6, 7A/B, 13A/B, EL, DH, 2/3/4, 3BR EL DH 120 2
1 G Y OR G AD$16, (CE OR 14R) 12A/B, 11A/B CC
3 205 Y R 205 EK$7 EL, DH, CC, CD, CE, 13A/B, 16A/B/C, 6, 7A/B EL, DH, 2/3/4, 3BR EL DH 120 3
G Y OR G CF$16 27 CC
3BR Y OR G 2/3 EK
4 511 ‘X’$25 PL 511 EK EL, DH, CC, CD, CE, DD, 13A/B, 19A/B/C, 6, 7A/B , 16A/B/C EL, DH, CC 2/3/4, 3BR EL DH 120 4
DC, DB 27 OR
NECK ‘N’$25 PL EK EL, DH, CC, CD, CE, DD, 13A/B, 27 6, 7A/B, 16A/B/C,
FA 19A/B/C
5 2/3/4 Y R 2/3 EG$7 EH, EJ, EK$16, EL, (27 OR 7N$37), 6, 5, 5R EH EJ 120 5
3BR (DH OR 7N) (7A/B OR 7A/B)
G Y OR G 2/3
3BR OFF
5R Y OR G 5 EG
6 (E) LOCK EL 6
7 (AE) LOCK CC, EL, DH (8 LEVER OR #4) 7
8 9/10/15 (A) LOCK (7 LEVER OR #4) 8 CA CB 120 8
Y#4 R, Y OR G 9/10 JZ FOR 15 ($46) CA, CB$16
Y#5 R 9/10 JZ$7 CA, CB$16, CC 7A/B
G#5 Y OR G
9 205 Y R 205 CB$7 CC, CD, CE, CF$16 7A/B, 13A/B CC 9/10/15 CC CD 120 9
G Y OR G
Withdrawn Document
SPAD 9 (X OR 9/10/15
USED)
10 53 POS Y R 53 CB$7 CC, CD, BE, AC, AD$16, 7A/B 13A/B, 12A/B, CC 9/10/15 CC CD 120 10
1 G Y OR G 53 CB (CE OR 14R) 11A/B
11 (AE) LOCK AC, BE, CD 11
12 (AE) LOCK BE 12
13 (AE) LOCK BD, BE, CD, CE 13
14 (AE) LOCK DE, CE #6 14
15 511 ‘X’$25 PL 511 CB CC, CD, CE, DD, DC, DB 7A/B, 13A/B, 16A/B/C CC 9/10/15 CC CD 120 15
19A/B/C OR
NECK ‘N’$25 PL CB CC, CD, CE, DD, FA 7A/B, 13A/B 16A/B/C, 19A/B/C
16 (AE) LOCK CE, DD, CD #7 16
17 NECK PL FA#1 19A/B/C 17 FA#2 17
511 PL 511 (DD, DC)$40, DB 19A/B/C, 16A/B/C OR 18 DD DC 30 (DE,
18 18
NECK PL (DD, FA)$40 16A/B/C 19A/B/C 18 DD FA 30 DD)#3
19 (AE) LOCK FA, DD, (CD, CE OR 16N) #8 19
UP SDG PL FA#1 19A/B/C OR 20 FA#2 30
20 20
26/29/30 PL 26/30 (FA, DD, DE)$40, DF$16, 16A/B/C, 14 19A/B/C FA, DD 20 FA DD 30 FA#3
(CE OR 13N)
Figure F1:12 Electrical Locking Tables continued …

Requires (B) Lock
Lever Route To Route Function Signal Ahead Train Detection Points & GFs Detected Route Requires Locked when Signal Off until Re- Lever
No. Indic- Arm or Aspect Track Circuits/ Lock- Track Track Ccts Or marks No.
ation Aspect Alight Treadles Track Circuits Clear Normal Reverse ing Circuits Signal On Occ & After Time
Alight Occupied Clear Clear Occ $46
23 18 PL (FC, DG, DF)$40, DE, 24A/B, 27, 14 FC, DG 23 FC DG 30 (FD, 23
(DH OR 7R), (CE OR 13N) OR FC)#3
UP SDG PL FC$40 24A/B 23 FC#2 30
24 (AE) LOCK FC, (DG OR 27R) (#8 OR 24
27R
$37)
25 110 PL 110 FC$40, (DG OR 27R) 24A/B 25 FC FD 30 FC#3 25
26 110 (A) LOCK FD, FE 26/29/30 DG FC 120 (DF, 26
POS Y R 110 DF$7 (DG, FC, FD)$40, FE$16, 27, 24A/B 28 DG)#3
1 G Y OR G 110 (DE OR DF) FF, (DH OR 7R)
27 (A) LOCK DG, DH, (FC OR 24R) 27
(E) LOCK DG, DH, (FC OR 24R) (24A/B w 31 OR 37
USED)#8
28 (E) LOCK DG 28
29 110 (A) LOCK (FD OR FE) 26/29/30 DG FC 120 (DF, 29
‘B’$25 PL DF, (DG, FC)$40, (DH OR 7R) 27, 24A/B 28 DG)#3
(FD OR FE)$10
30 210 Y R 210 DF$7 DG, DH, DJ$16, 7 27, 28 26/29/30 DG DH 120 30
G Y OR G (FC OR 24R)
31 26/29/30 Y R 26/30 DB$7 DC, DD, DE, DF$16, DG, 16A/B/C, 19A/B/C, 28, DC, DD 31 DC DD 120 31
(CE OR 13N), (DH OR 7R), 14, (7 OR 27N$37),
G Y OR G (FC OR 24R) (24A/B OR27R$37),
(27 OR 27)
32 31 (A) LOCK #9 32/33 DA DB 120 32
Y R 31 KZ$7 DA, DB$16, DC, DD 16A/B/C, 19A/B/C
Withdrawn Document
G Y OR G
33 31 (A) LOCK #9 32/33 DA DB 120 33
Y R, Y OR G 31 KZ FOR 15 ($46) DA, DB$16, DC

37 26/29/30 POS Y R 26/30 BB$7 BC, BD, CE, DE, DF$16, (24A/B OR27R$37), 13A/B, 14, 28, BC, BD, 37/38 BC BD 120 37
DG, (DH OR 7R), (7 OR 27N$37), CE
1 G Y OR G 26/30 BB (FC OR 24R) 19A/B/C, (27 OR 27)
38 54 Y R 54 BB$7 BC, BD, BE, BF$16 13A/B, 12A/B BC 37/38 BC BD 120 $1 38
G Y OR G
References Route Locking
$1 Provision for automatic working. After Route Locking Released by
$7 Temporary approach control. Reference Signal Signal On and Track Circuits
$10 At time of clearing. Used Clear Occ Time
$16 Signal ahead approach control TPR proved energised. $46
$25 Route indication NOT proved alight in signal controls. #6 (23 OR 24R$37) FC, DG, DF
$37 Points set and detected. #7 32 DA (DB OR DB 20)
$40 Required clear for proceed aspect; replaces signal except under last-wheel or other special replacement conditions. #8 31, 37 DE (DF OR DF 20)
$46 Time in seconds; timing tolerance of 0% to +20%, or 0 secs to +3 secs, whichever is greater. #9 (4, 15 OR 19R$37) CD, CE, DD, DC, DB
#1 Automatic replacement and signal stick inhibited when opposing route set.
#2 Occupied for 15 ($46) and clear. #4 No.8 main/warning switch operated to warning.
#3 Track circuits occupied for $40 to inhibit replacement. #5 No.8 main/warning switch operated to main.
Figure F1:12 Electrical Locking Tables See Figure F1:10 for Layout Plan; Figure F1:11 for Mechanical Locking
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN FP LOCK DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN UP FAST DOWN UP DOWN UP SHUNT SHUNT UP
FAST BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH FOR BRANCH SLOW SLOW SLOW FAST SWITCH SLOW SLOW SLOW SLOW UP BACK SLOW
TO TO TO SHUNT TO No.7 - TO No.9 TO TO TRAILING DIAMOND - TRAILING SHUNT - SIDING ALONG -
No.53 DOWN DOWN TO UP No.3 TRAPS DOWN SIGNAL No.205 DOWN POINTS UP FAST POINTS TO UP DOWN TO UP UP
SIGNAL FAST SLOW SLOW SIGNAL SLOW SIGNAL FAST AND FACING SLOW SLOW NECK SLOW SIDING
AND UN- POINTS SWING
13 POINTS CROSS- CROSS-
16 13
DISTANT LOCKED AND NOSE OVER NIL OVER
13 7 7 - TRAPS
13 12 16 AND AND
12 6 6 LOCKED 12 SLIPS SLIPS
OR 6 13 OR OR
11 11 UP
NECK 12 NECK
7 OR SLOW
19 TO
6
16 19 NECK
7 7 16
6 6 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
SHUNT SPARE SPARE SHUNT UP SHUNT UP UP FP LOCK UP UP UP UP UP SPARE SPARE SPARE UP FAST UP FAST
NECK UP SIDING UP SLOW SLOW FOR SLOW SLOW SLOW SLOW SLOW TO UP TO No.54
TO UP BRANCH - SIDING TO UP - No.27 CALL-ON TO TO No.30 TO No.31 TO No.31 SLOW SIGNAL
Withdrawn Document
SIDING TO UP UP TO UP BRANCH UP POINTS TO UP No.210 SIGNAL SIGNAL SIGNAL

SLOW BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH SIGNAL WARNING
NIL POINTS FACING UN-

13
28 28
NIL AND POINTS LOCKED 12
OR UP TRAPS
24 -
28 27
14
SLOW OR UP LOCKED 28
28
SIDING
19
24
Lever Painting Key red

white yellow
Figure F1:13 Typical Lever Nomenclature Plates black blue
See Figure F1:10 for Layout Plan; Figure F1:11 for Mechanical Locking Tables
Withdrawn Document
Examples of locking component identity: Lock #1 = 4DR

Locking bar #2 = 4/18 D3
Figure F1:14 Example of Mechanical Locking Chart: Direct Action Tappet Locking
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Note: Double conditional locking not illustrated. For this purpose,

tappets (acting through supplementary horizontal locking boxes) may
be connected, by means of cranks, to the bottom of the hook racks.
Hook Racks raised by levers KEY

Hook
Rack 1 2 3 4 5
Withdrawn Document
Half Bell Crank

Bell Locking Example: Dart

Crank Lock
(conditional)
4 locks 1 both ways Full Lock
Locking
Bar 1 released by 2 Full Lock
Full Lock (release) Half Bell
2 locks 3 Crank
(Release
5 locks 1 when 2 Half Lock (conditional)
Position)
normal (both ways)
Notch Shell Lock Locking Bar

Full Lock (Lock Position) Dart (conditional Hook Rack
backlock)
VERTICAL
CROSS SECTION ELEVATION
Figure F1:15 Example of Mechanical Locking Chart: London and North Western Tumbler Locking
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
T B
5
4
F 3
2
1
T B
5
4
E 3
2
1
T B
5
4
D 3
2
1
T B
5
4
C 3
2
1
Withdrawn Document
T B
5
4
B 3
2
1
T B
5
4
A 3
2
1
Figure F1:16(a) Example of Mechanical Locking Chart: Midland Tumbler Locking

See Figure F16(b) for Key and Drawings; F1:10 for Layout Plan; Figure F1:11 for Mechanical Locking Tables
Y X SECTION AT X
ELEVATION Holding Down SECTION AT Y
Strap Lever Lever Positions
Reverse 1 2 3 Lever Positions
Normal
1 2 3
Locking Runs
Lever
C B A RH LH RH LH RH
Pin Trigger Run
Top (T)
centres to
pivot
Bottom (B) vertical links
Bars
1 Locks 2 2 Locks 3 Both Ways
Tumbler Pocket 2 Released by Anchored to Frame
PLAN Nibs Operating Pins Lever (locates lever pin)
3 Typical Locking Bars Special Locking
Locking Tumblers
(Right Hand)
Release Tumblers
Lever
(Left Hand) 3
Top and Bottom Links
Special Locking: Trigger Run Vertical Links

Lever RH
2 Tumbler
Catch Handle Stud
(for actuating tumblers)
Withdrawn Document
KEY TO LOCKING CHART LH

Tumbler
Trigger Run RH
(Low Centre Bar) Trigger Tumbler
Anchored to Run
Frame
LH
Locking Bars Tumbler
Straight Tumblers
Swan Neck Right Hand
(Locking) Special Locking (Both Ways)
Left Hand (Release)
(Release)
Figure F1:16(b) Example of Mechanical Locking: Midland Tumbler Locking

See Figure F1:16(a) for Locking Chart
Withdrawn Document
Signalling and Operational Railway Group Guidance Note
GK/GN0600
Page F125 of 191
F1:5.2 Design Techniques

The configuration and number of channels within locking boxes varies between
types of frame. A common configuration is to have two locking bars in the
channel below the tappets and two or three in the channel above them. The
locks take the full width of the trough, level with the tappets, and may be
attaches to any one, or more than one, of the locking bars. Diagrammatically,
the locking bars are represented by straight lines with the top and bottom
identification (numbered from the lever) shown on the end of the locking chart as
illustrated in Figure F1:14.
Locks may be fixed directly to the bars with rivets (or set-screws), or indirectly by
means of studs, so they can slide. Studs are used where not all the locks
acting on a single bar are required to move at the same time. Those connected
by studs are only moved by the bar when it is in compression. Studs also have
to be used when more than one bar is driven by a single lock. (Locks should not
be riveted to more than one bar, except where a lock acts as a bar connector).
Rivets are generally represented by a solid dot and studs by a solid rectangle, or
a dot in an open rectangle. Different symbols may be used for top and bottom
bars. The symbols used should be defined on the chart. Two examples are
given in Figures F1:4(b) and F1:8(b).
Where levers perform common locking but also lock each other, it is convenient
to cut the locking bar and provide a butt joint, so that the locking is only effective
when the bar is in compression. Generally butts and short bars should be
located in the bottom channel, or otherwise supported. Top bars should be
riveted to a lock or steady (i.e. lock without a nose) within 2 levers of the butt,
except where the butt is provided immediately above a tappet and all bar
positions in that level of the channel are occupied. Butts may be marked ‘B’ on
charts, or identified with a short arrow.
A wide locking piece, known as a double lock, can be used to lock, can be used
to lock adjacent levers without using a bar. Double locks can be split where
required to be driven in opposite directions simultaneously. Other special
shapes should be avoided as far as practicable for new work.
a) Appropriate measures (depending on the frame) should be taken to maintain

the integrity of the locking, including the following:
b) Where a bar in compression runs for more than 10 levers, it should be

riveted to a lock or steady, except where there is an intervening tappet and
all bar positions in the level of the channel are occupied.
c) Bars with studs should be packed, unless all bar position in that level of the
channel are occupied. A packing bar may be riveted to a steady at each
end, or have ends bent around the locks.
d) Loose locks should be retained in place by some means, such as riveting

them to a short length of bar, unless there are at least two bars above them.
e) Provision should be made to ensure lids are secure to locking boxes.
F1:5.3 Conditional and Special Locking

Special arrangements, dependent on the type of frame, are required for
conditional locking. Examples include:
a) Narrow swinging tappets (may be marked ‘S’, ‘ST’, or ‘MT’ on charts, with the
direction of swing shown). Only tappets with no dead locking can swing,
which makes them unsuitable for use with frames that have single locking
boxes.
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Railway Group Guidance Note Signalling and Operational
GK/GN0600
Page F126 of 191
b) A slider (short) or swinger (long or short) fixed to the top of the tappet in
contact with locks on each side that operate it. This requires a deep locking
box and its use its use is illustrated in Figure F1:14.
c) Stowell locks incorporate a diamond shaped piece and extend across the
width of two adjacent troughs. These were originally developed on the
LSWR, but can be used on many frames.
d) Non-tappet frames can have some tappet locking fitted, for instance Midland
Tumbler frames can have boxes for sliders cast on certain lock tumblers for
conditional locking, or miniature tappet boxes for sequential locking worked
from the tumblers. LNW Tumbler frames can have supplementary tappets
and locking boxes fitted (see Figure F1:15).
Sequential locking can be provided by ramps and tapered locks, or other

devices. Springs are non-preferred because of their non-fail-safe failure mode.
However, where the necessary locks and controllers are fitted, sequential
locking should be provided electrically by means of the selection lock because
electrical locking is, by nature, non-reciprocal.
It should be clearly shown on the control tables whether the sequential locking is
provided electrically or mechanically.
F1:6 Levers and Connections to Operate Trackside Equipment

The lever stroke, measured at the top of the handle, is generally in the region of
2’6" to 3’9". The slots in which the levers travel are formed by quadrants at floor
level, which may also feature a raised rib with notches at each end. (This does
not apply to frames that are mounted at floor level, such as Midland type frames,
as shown in Figure 1:4). The notches are to locate a sprung, or gravity
operated, catch block that is attached to the catch handle and they allow the
handle to be released at each end of the stroke.
Levers should be designed to provide a mechanical advantage in the pulling of

signal wires and point rodding. They generally extend above the operating floor
by around 3’ to 4’ for ergonomic reasons. The shaft on which the levers are
pivoted should be adequately supported. At the bottom of the lever a tail
extends back at right angles for fixing the signal and point connections, as
shown in Figure F1:3, for example. The tail should be designed ideally to apply a
movement of 17î" to a signal wire, or 6î" to point rodding. On ground frames,
the wire or rodding is usually connected above the lever pivot.
Lengths of point rodding, including the rod from the lever tail to the vertical
crank, should be supported intermediately at intervals not exceeding 9’ to
prevent buckling.
Where the lever tail is not long enough to provide the necessary stroke to
operate a signal, a draught wheel should be fitted in order to double the travel of
the wire. Devices to increase the stroke should not be provided within long wire
runs because of the risk of wire contraction being amplified. For signals situated
more than 250 yards (230m) from the signal box, the signal wire should be
extended back from the draught wheel to a wire adjuster located on the
operating floor, to allow the signaller to compensate for extremes of
temperature.
Signals that are backlocked should be adjusted so that the arm returns to the on
position when the lever is in the backlocked position.
Wire runs containing mechanical detection should not be compensated, i.e.

mechanical detection should not be used where signals are 230m or more from
the signal box. Further details are given in Parts S and P.
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Where necessary, a backtail, or other arrangement, should be provided on the

other side of the lever tail, to which a counterbalance or back weight can be
attached to ease heavy pulls, such as signals more than 400 yards (365m) from
the signal box, or mechanically detecting more than one point end. (Course
adjustment is obtained by varying the size of the back weights and fine
adjustment by varying the distance from the fulcrum). Calculations are required
to provide the correct sized back weight, so as to:
a) ensure signal wires are never taut with the lever normal and the signal on;
b) ensure the signal balance lever (see Part S) returns to the fully on position;
c) minimise lever return push forces (the force required to pull the lever should
generally exceed the force required to push it); and
d) minimise risk of injury in the event of a mechanical breakage.
Lever frames, such as ground frames, that are not equipped with
counterbalancing should be limited to operating loads that can managed without
such assistance.
F1:7 Ancillary Apparatus

F1:7.1 Electric Lever Locks
Electric lever locks comprise an electro-magnet which attracts an armature
connected to a locking piece so as to withdraw it from a notch cut in the lock
slide. The locking piece should be arranged to enter the notch when the electro-
magnet is de-energised.
a) Electric locks are available which may be mounted horizontally (gravity or

forced drop) or vertically (forced drop only), with the lock slide normally in or
normally out, as follows:
b) on the operating floor behind the lever frame, with horizontal lock slide
(normally in) connected directly to the upper part of the lever (not for new
work);
c) beneath the operating floor, with horizontal lock slide connected directly to
the lower part of the lever (see Figure F1:6);
d) beneath one of the lever tails, with vertical lock slide connected directly to the
lever tail; or
e) in some other position connected by linkage, such as rods and/or cranks.
Electric locks should be positioned so as to be accessible for maintenance

purposes and their fixing should be sufficiently robust to withstand a signaller’s
pulling of a locked lever.
Miniature lever frames incorporate the locks on a horizontal lock slide (with a
travel of 3") that is integral to the frame. Generally both a sealed interlocking
lock (in the case of electrical interlocking) and a selection lock are provided as
standard.
The covers of locks should be clearly identified with the lever number, to avoid
confusion. Covers should be secured by means of padlock to prevent
unauthorised access. The covers of any locks used for interlocking purposes
(see Section F1:4) should be painted red.
Typical positions of the lever stroke in which notches may be cut are given in
Figure F1:17, using the notation given in GK/RT0205.
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Lock Selection Electrical Interlocking (where provided)

NR tight lock: for track locking mechanically operated
points that are not fitted with an FPL;
AE for locking points normal or reverse; interlocking that locks a lever in either position ( B W );
ABDE (or NBDR) for points equipped with indication
locking, the (B) and (D) locks preventing the lever
from completing the stroke until detection is made;
A for locking signals normal with no backlock interlocking that locks another lever normal, i.e. where
(mechanically operated signals should be adjusted one lever locks another, is released by another, is
to be on and the wire relaxed, with the lever in this locked by another between stroke (converse of B W ),
position), or FPLs that stand normally in; counter conditional, or sequential locking;
AB for signals or releases requiring a backlock
(mechanically operated signals should be adjusted
to be on and the wire relaxed, with the lever in the
B position),
E for locking FPLs reverse that stand normally out. Interlocking that locks a lever reverse, i.e. where one
lever releases another (converse of released by), or
counter conditional locking.
Figure F1:17 Typical Lock Positions
The operating voltage should be chosen from the following considerations:

Locks operating at up to 24V d.c. may be battery backed. Locks may be
operated at 110V a.c. where a secure power supply is provided. D.C. locks may
be fitted with magnetic shunts to provide immunity in a.c. electrified areas.
Dedicated power supplies should be provided for lever locks, which should be
equipped with earth fault detection (see Part C).
New and reconditioned lever locks should be fitted with a forced drop or force
down feature. In such cases, proving the lever normal or reverse with a fine N
or R contact also proves the lock effective.
The force down feature consists of studs on the lock slide placed such that, as
the lock slide approaches a lock position, the studs engage with a ramp on the
locking piece and force it into the notch. On reaching the fully locked position
the lock slide clears the force drop, allowing the locking piece to lift from the
notch when the solenoid is next energised.
Lock proving contacts should be utilised only on existing locks where there is no
force down feature. Where such locks are cut for more than one position, it is
necessary to include a lever contact in series with the proving contact to prove
the lock effective in the required position.
Tight locks that are required to be operative in the fully normal or fully reversed
positions (limited to track locking mechanically operated points that are not fitted
with an FPL) cannot be fitted with a force down feature or with economiser
contacts. (One of the last two options in Section F1:7.2 should be used).
Free indication lamps may be provided, generally energised via the same circuit
as the lock, to avoid the need for the signaller to try the lock.
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F1:7.2 Economisers
The energisation of electric lever locks should be economised by one of the
following methods:
a) economiser mounted on the lever lock, operated by a roller that breaks the
contact when located in small notches cut in the lock slide in the fully normal
and fully reverse positions (see Figure F1:6);
b) economiser contacts integral to a combined lock and circuit controller, which

break in the fully normal and reverse positions;
c) circuit controller contacts that make as the lever approaches the appropriate
lock position (not suitable for N or R locks);
d) contacts that make on operation of the catch handle; or
e) economiser contacts that make on operation of an independent device, e.g.

a hand plunger (for normal locks only), or foot plunger.
F1:7.3 Independent Circuit Controllers

Circuit controllers generally consist of contact bands mounted on insulated
carriers that are adjustable in relation to a rotating shaft and fixed by locating
pins. Adjustable contact springs are mounted on fixed insulated terminal blocks.
Circuits controllers generally consist of 2, 4, 6 or 8 way units. Circuit controllers
with a drive slide movement are also available. The London Midland 1943 frame
has provision for contact boxes at the rear of the frame, behind the locking,
worked directly form the tappet (see Figure F1:4 (b).
Miniature lever frames incorporate contact shafts that are integral to the frame.
On Westinghouse frames, sealed interlocking contacts at the front (in the case
of electrical interlocking) and contacts for control and indication circuits at the
rear are provided as standard. Each shaft has a capacity of four 9 way contact
units. The movement to the rear contact shaft is transmitted by means of the
lock slide. The 60° motion of the lever rotates the contact shafts by 120°
through bevel gears at the front and rear.
Typical positions of circuit controller contacts are given in Figure F1:18, using the
notation given in GK/RT0205.
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Contact Selection Electrical Interlocking (where provided)

N contact proves lever normal beyond the (A) lock contact proves lever normal beyond the (A) lock
position, used in block circuits (the fine contact position (the fine contact proves the forced drop
proves a forced drop lock effective); lock effective);
NA contact proves lever normal beyond the (B) lock
position, as used in selection circuits, e.g. to prove
signal normal in signal stick and route stick circuits,
to call points normal, for correspondence proving,
or a free light for an (A) lock;
NX proves lever normal beyond the (B) lock position, to
call points normal (miniature lever frames only);
NB contact proves lever normal beyond the (C) lock
position, to call points normal in connection with
indication locking;
A contact made as lever being reversed approaches contact made as lever approaches the (A) lock
the (A) lock position, to economise the (A) lock; position, to economise the (A) lock;
BC, or contact made as lever being normalised
BD approaches the (B) lock position, to initiate
backlock timers and economise the (B) lock, or free
light for a (B) lock;
DC contact made as lever being reversed approaches
the (D) lock position, to economise the (D) lock;
E contact made as lever being normalised contact made as lever approaches the (E) lock
approaches the (E) lock position, to economise the position, to economise the (E) lock;
(E) lock;
AE contact made as lever approaches the (A) or (E) made as lever approaches the (A) or (E) lock
lock positions, to economise the (AE) lock; positions, to economise the (AE) lock;
RB contact proves lever has not passed the (B) lock
position, used in simplified backlock stick circuits
(not for new work);
RD contact proves lever reverse beyond the (C) lock
position, to call points reverse in connection with
indication locking;
RY proves lever reverse beyond the (D) lock position,
to call points reverse (miniature lever frames only);
RE contact proves lever reverse beyond the (D) lock
position, as used in selection circuits, e.g. to call
points reverse, or for correspondence proving;
R contact proves lever reverse beyond the (E) lock contact proves lever reverse beyond the (E) lock
position, used for signal operation. position (the fine contact proves the forced drop
lock effective).
Figure F1:18 Typical Circuit Controller Contact Positions
Different types of controller should not be mixed at any one installation, so as to

avoid bands of different rotational dimensions being inadvertently exchanged.
Circuit controllers should be securely mounted on a framework that is sufficiently

robust, capable of maintaining a constant distance between the controller and
the lever frame, and accessible for maintenance purposes, as follows (see
example in Figure F1:6):
a) beneath the operating floor, with horizontal drive slide connected directly to
the lower part of the lever;
b) beneath one of the lever tails, with vertical drive slide connected directly to
the lever tail; or
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c) in some position beneath the operating floor with an adjustable connecting

rod linking to a crank on a rotary actuated controller. The linkage between
the controller and the lever should be arranged to give the precise angular
travel required by the controller.
Controllers should generally be mounted so that, in the event of breakage or

disconnection of the drive mechanism, only a right side failure would occur.
Where this is not practicable, and an R contact is used to drive signalling
equipment, and such a failure would result in the R contact being made, special
precautions should be taken to prevent a wrong side failure. These may include
the provision of a duplicate controller, wired in series.
F1:7.4 Combined Lever Locks and Circuit Controllers

Combined locks and controllers are preferred for new work. They have integral
economisers and force down features and may be mounted vertically or
horizontally. Controllers may be 4,8,12 or 16 way, as available. In order to
minimise the requirement for bands, the use of repeat relays should be
considered.
Shaft rotation is effected directly from the lock slide by means of a toothed rack
or peg in a diagonal slot. Contact springs are not individually adjustable, so
there are a greater variety of band dimensions, for instance the Westinghouse L
type has some 17 sizes which are reversible, each stamped with the applicable
contact arrangements(s). The SGE type GA has 4 sizes which cater for all
arrangements: 195°, 220°, 240° and 280°. The Tyres type may also be found.
Fixing positions should generally be as given for independent controllers in

Section F1:7.3, but should also comply with the requirements for lever locks
(Section F1:7.1). The stroke of a combined lock and controller is generally 8",
with tolerance of + 1 8 ", - 1 4 ".
F1:7.5 Annetts Lock

Annetts keys provide a portable means of interlocking, by which a key can only
be withdrawn from an Annetts lock in order to manually release some remote
function, when a lever is in a pre-determined positioned.
This may be effected by a lock fixed to a release lever in the signal box in such a
way that the key cannot be withdrawn from it until the lever is reversed. In this
position, the tongue of the lock locates in a slot cut in the quadrant, thus
preventing the lever from being normalised until the key is returned. The
opposite arrangement can be provided at a remote control point, such that,
when the Annetts key is inserted and turned, a release lever can be reversed,
maintaining the key captive until the lever is normalised.
Another means of achieving the locking is for an Annetts lock to drive an

independent tappet in the locking box, either directly, or via a linkage.
Other arrangements are also possible.
These locks have many applications, the most common being ground frame
releasing. Care should be taken to ensure that the lock has a different
configuration from any other in the vicinity. Alternatively an Annetts key may be
attached to a train staff and configured to release level crossing gates or in-
section ground frames on a single line section.
F1:7.6 Electric Token Single Line Apparatus

A token lock may be affected to an in-section ground frame release lever in the
same way as described in the previous section.
Key tokens and electric train staffs are considered further in Part K.
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F1:7.7 Interlocking of Hand Operated Gates

A gate key lock is similar to those devices described in the previous two
sections, except it is designed to release level crossing gates adjacent to a
signal box or gate box to allow hand operation, thus dispensing with the gate
operating mechanism. The locks (one per gate) are attached to the gate lock
lever, which, when reversed, allows the keys to be withdrawn to unlock the
gates. Whilst the gates are unlocked, the keys should be captive in the gate
locks. The lever should be locked reversed until the last key is turned in its lock.
‘C’ locks are similar, but are attached directly to the locking box to interlock
signals without the need for a gate lock lever.
Another type of lock is the Blacks lock, which is a bolt-driven rod-worked lock for
hand operated gates. Reversing the gate lock lever releases the bolts on the
gates and, conversely, when the operator bolts the gates across the road the
gate lock lever can be restored.
F1:7.8 Gate Wheel Interlocking

One method of providing direct interlocking between level crossing gates
operated by a gate wheel and the lever frame is by means of a miniature lever
situated on the gate crab that is connected by a rod to its own tappet in the
locking box. Reversing the gate stop lever in the lever frame releases the
miniature lever and, when reversed, the miniature lever releases the plunger that
locks the gate wheel. The miniature lever should be backlocked until the gates
are restored. It should not be possible to fully normalise the gate stop lever or
release the protecting signals until the gates are locked across the roadway.
Other methods should provide equivalent functionally.
F1:8 Ground Frames

A ground mounted frame may be provided in place of an elevated frame where
the interlocking required is sufficiently simple to allow the locking apparatus to be
accommodated behind the levers, or in a pit under the frame.
However, the GK/RT0002 definition of a ground frame relates to its function,

rather than its elevation, and includes the following categories:
a) an elevated frame (as listed in Figure F1:1) acting as a shunting frame or

other non-block post (a signal box in appearance);
b) a particular pattern of and elevated frame suitable for mounting at ground

level (e.g. floor mounted Midland type frame);
c) a knee frame for use in small ground level signal boxes, or larger ground
frames (e.g. Stevens or Tyers knee frames);
d) a purpose designed frame for ground mounting (e.g. Westinghouse Type E

or LNWR sketch SK446); and
e) a switch panel (see Appendix F2:10).
General requirements are given in GK/RT0061. See Section 3.6 for ground
frame controls.
At least 30 patterns of ground mounted frame may be found. Standard

mechanical equipment drawings, BRS-SM451, are available for the BRB 4"
centres ground frame.
Ground frames may be housed in a building. Otherwise, locks and controllers,

and other vulnerable equipment, should be suitably weatherproofed.
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Ground frames levers, having less mechanical advantage due to their reduced
length, should be limited to operating loads that can be safely managed.
Generally, the mechanical operation of points should be limited to approximately
100 yards.
Most ground frames have tappet locking. Some two lever frames have a bar
riveted to the front of the release lever, requiring it to be pulled first, (but this
does not lock levers securely in the normal or reverse positions).
Some LNWR ground frames (type SK446) on lightly used lines are equipped
with key interlocking, whereby the most convenient functions, often signals, are
operated from the ground frame, but points and level crossing gates are
operated by differently configured keys that are withdrawn from the locking at
the back of the ground frame. Points controlled in this way are operated by a
single lever (SK80) that is adjacent to the points and fitted with an Annetts lock.
See Sections F1:7.5 and F1:7.7 for the concept of key locking.
F1:9 Earthing and Electrified Areas

Lever frames, relay racks and similar extraneous conductive parts should be
earthed to protect personnel from indirect contact with live parts and from
dangerous touch potentials. Series or spur bonding (of minimum size 10mm²) to
the main earthing terminal should be provided, in order to comply with BS7671.
See Part J for further details.
In electrified areas, the bottom joint on down rods leading away from the signal
box should be insulted and wire insulators should be provided in signal wires.
This is necessary to separate the traction return system from true earth and
protect the lever frame the danger of a traction fault. Measures should be taken
to protect against dangerous touch potentials across the insulation, such as one
of the following:
a) displaying warning notices;
b) making the metalwork inaccessible; or
c) providing two insulations a minimum of 2m apart.
Care should be taken, whilst being handling lengths of rodding or locking bar,
that they do not make contact with live rails, wires, or other conductive parts.
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Appendix F2
Free-Wired Relay Route
Guidelines
F2:1 Introduction
Unless otherwise stated, these notes are generally applicable to the Railtrack
route relay interlocking typical circuits and their predecessor, BRS-SW67. The
control table notation used is in accordance with GK/RT0202 and relay notation
with GK/RT0205.
Section 3 laid down the requirements for interlocking controls and specified their
tabulation in control tables. This appendix demonstrates how those controls may
be provided by the use of free-wired circuitry. Figures F2:1 and F2:2 identify
how the standard controls are applied to free-wired interlocking and enables a
comparison with the other interlocking systems.
Other relay configurations are possible, particularly where it is not necessary to

store the state of interlocking functions in the event of a power failure, in which
case lock relays can be dispensed with altogether. Examples are given in
Figures F21 and F3:10.
F2:2 Route Setting

F2:2.1 Route Initiation
The signaller interface is performed by one of the means described in Section 3.1.
Route setting in the actual interlocking commences, for entrance-exit control

systems, with contacts of the start and destination relays, (S)R and (D)R, on the
return side of the route lock circuit. Equivalent contacts are used for other
control systems. Any control panel or non-safety contacts should be arranged
at the negative supply end of the circuit, as explained in Part D.
F2:2.2 Route Availability

The requirements for route controls are given in Section 3.2.
Route lock relays are similar to the signal lock relays described in Section 6.2,
except that one is required for every route from a signal. Anti-preselection may
be provided in the operation of the reverse route relay by means of a stick circuit
as follows:
a) control systems using switches: by providing the interlocking conditions

present and switch normal, prior to the switch being reversed; or
b) other systems: by applying the call for a limited period and sticking it out
by a contact of the reverse route relay.
F134 RAILTRACK
R Points Set or Free T rack Routes and Sectional Sectional Route Locking Released by Track Circuits Time Special R
O Normal Reverse Circuit Route Locking Normal Clear OR Occupied $46 Controls/Remarks O
U NZLPR (proves NLR or W ZR up) RZLPR (proves RLR or WZR up) TPR of NLR of opposing routes Route NR and ALSR up to latch its TJPR of In the route RLR, as U
T for each set of points in the route for each set of points in the route per- in the route RLR, plus NLR, plus USRs repicked to release the permissive appropriate. T
E E
RLR. RLR. missive first opposing USR up. route locking. track to repick
track to
R permissive R
pick up
E appro- track USR. E
Q priate Q
U route U
I RLR. I
R Route Disable R
E Control Provided E
S S
S Points Set and Locked and Detected Points Set & Track Circuits Clear Track Circuits S
I Normal Reverse Detected N or R Occupied I
G NKLPR (proves detection, including RKLPR (proves detection, including (NWKR or RWKR) TPRs in the GR. TPR or timer in the GR G
N NLR up, and W ZR down) in the RLR up, and WZR down) in the to pick up the GR, in series with the N
A A
GR. GR. or OSR to hold it up appropriate route RLR.
L L
while points swing.
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
S Track Circuits Stick Control A Route Aspect Next Main Signal: Track S
Signals Occupied for $40 to Inhibit Applied W hen Signal Off Special S Indication to be Route Banner Circuits
R Alight Replacement & Track Circuit Occupied Controls/Remarks P Alight Shown Aspect Set Aspect Occupied R
E ECPR in GSR in the GR. In the GR. E
Q the GR. S UHR and As above. Q
U E UECR in Meshed circuit. U
I Aspect Disable Automatic W orking A A Q the HR. I
Withdrawn Document
R Control/Link Provided Facility Provided W Permanent Magnet W R

E S Electro-Inductor S E
A Approach Locking Applied W hen Signal Clears Signals ON Approach Locking Released by Signal ON TORR Requires Approach Locking Free and T racks
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special NR in the NLR pick up.
P Indication) Unless T rack Circuits are Clear Approach Locking Track Circuits OR $46 Controls/Remarks
R The TAR proves tracks clear back to the TASR and the first track TPR clear in AJR to T T
O signal in rear. series in the ALSR. repick O O
A R R
The ATSR combines TARs for the sections the
C R R
H in rear. ALSR.
L
K
G.
Figure F2:1 Free-Wired Interlocking - Signal Route & Aspect Controls

Requires Track Set by Routes or Ground Requires Routes & Sectional Route Locking Released by Swinging Overlap Requires
Circuits Clear Frame Sectional Route Locking Track Circuit Time Routes &
Normal or Points/GF Track Circuits Clear OR Occupied $46 Track Circuits Clear AND Points Set or Free OR Sectional Route Locking Normal
N > R Disable
Control Provided
P
O TPRs in the point Route RLRs in parallel Route NLRs in series Point track USRs in the N > R TJPR of TPRs in series in NZLPR or RZLPR up Overlap route OCZR up in
I lock circuit (B50 in the point lock circuit in the N > R leg of the leg of the point lock circuit destination ROAR. in ROAR. ROAR.
N
side). (N50 side), or via a point lock circuit (B50 (B50 side). signal The ROAR forms part
T
S RCUR. side). berth track of one leg of those
to repick points’ NCUR or
C (O/L)USR. RCUR.
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
As above. Route RLRs in parallel Route NLRs in series Point track USRs in the R > N As above. TPRs in series in NZLPR or RZLPR up Overlap route OCZR up in
P in the point lock circuit in the R > N leg of the leg of the point lock circuit NOAR. in NOAR. NOAR.
O
(N50 side), or via a point lock circuit (B50 (B50 side). The NOAR forms part
I
N NCUR. side). of one leg of those
T points’ NCUR or
S RCUR.
C
A
L
L
E
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D
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
W hen Routes Used R Tracks Clear or Tracks Occupied $8 Secs

TIME OF EFFECTIVE Applies a control: E
OPERATION (O/L USR up, - - - L - - - OR berth track clear, - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR occupied - - - - - - - for a time)
LOCKING
to the common leg of the point lock circuit.
B
Y
Figure F2:2 Free-Wired Interlocking - Point Controls

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In a typical free-wired interlocking, each route has a normal and reverse pair of
interlocking relays (NLR & RLR). The NLR is latched, but the RLR is ordinary
acting. On the supply side of the relay coils are the locking conditions required
for the route to set, and on the return side are the setting conditions, the
equivalent of the entrance and exit buttons (Section F2:2.1). The locking
conditions are defined on the "route requires" section of the Signal Route &
Aspect control table sheet (Figure F2:1), in particular the "points set or free" and
the "routes and sectional route locking normal" entries. In the circuit these are
represented by the point normal or reverse ZLPRs (free or appropriately locked
repeater relays) and the opposing route NLRs, respectively. Opposing routes
includes both directly opposing routes and different class routes from the same
signal. In addition, a front contact of certain opposing route stick relays (USRs)
should be included here (see Section F2:2.4). (ZLPRs are energised by the
points free relay in parallel with the appropriate point lock relay.)
Where sectional route locking comprehensively locks all track sections, the
opposing route NLRs are not strictly necessary, so long as a USR is included
that is cascaded from the NLR (or ALSR where there are no NLRs) and will
perform the same function. However, these USRs should not be released in the
event of track section failure.
Track sections are not proved when setting a route except those that distinguish
between different classes of route, i.e. call-on (C) or main (M). (These appear
in the "track circuit" entry.) When this is done it is necessary to stick out this
control with an RLR front contact, to prevent the route unsetting itself when the
track condition is removed. This may be achieved most conveniently by
including the track section concerned in the return side of the circuit in addition to
the button proving contacts.
Any special signal route controls, or other route controls summarised in

Figure F3 (Section 3.2.2), should also be included in this route lock circuit.
The NLR is released preventing conflicting routes or points from setting, and the
RLR is energised thus proving that the registered route is available and initiating
point setting (see Section F2:6.2).
The NLR latched relay should be down proved (as required in Part D) and this is
achieved by proving the NLR released before the RLR can energise, although
the converse is not required where the RLR is an ordinary acting relay.
F2:2.3 Alternative Free-Wired Systems

In systems where the route relay (RLR or UR) is a latched relay, the signaller’s
route cancel function (e.g. OCS route switch reverse) should be additionally
included in the signal aspect controls, to allow manual replacement.
In systems where the integrity of latched relays is such that they can only be
thrown down by operation to the opposite position, a single latched relay may be
used, instead of a separate NLR and RLR. This does not require down proving
before being called to the opposite state, as it only has normal and reverse
states. This also applies to magnetic stick relays (as used in the E10k system).
In systems (such as E10k, AEI-GRS and ScR geographical) where the state of
the interlocking is not required to be stored during power supply failure, an
ordinary acting route relay (UR) may be provided instead of latched route relays.
This is used to initiate point setting and is proved down in conflicting routes. In
such systems the route stick relays (Section F2:2.4) are de-energised by the
ALSR when the signal becomes approach locked. In the event of a power
failure, all signals require a timed release of approach locking, because there is
no NLR path to re-energise the ALSR.
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F2:2.4 Route Locking

The requirements for sectional route locking are given in Section 3.5.8. For the
design of the USR chain see Section F2:3.
When the route is set, releasing the NLR de-energises the route stick relays
(USRs) in the route. The points that have been called by the route setting are
locked (point NLR or RLR prevented from being released) by the de-energisation
of the last route stick relay over the points.
In some systems (e.g. E10k and AEI-GRS), there is no NLR, but the route stick
relays are de-energised by the route relay (UR) energising and are maintained
de-energised until the approach locking is released (ALSR re-energised).
The extent of this route locking is covered by the "sectional route locking
released by track circuits" entries on the Signal Route & Aspect control table
sheet. These specify the conditions for releasing the controls applied under the
"routes and sectional route locking normal" entry, after those routes have been
normalised. There are two additional requirements for the route RLR locking
conditions to provide route locking of opposing routes:
a) A front contact of the opposing route stick relay (USR) for the first track
section past the signal should be included in the common path of all routes
from that signal.
b) Wherever the route passes a signal reading in the opposite direction, a front
contact of the opposing direction USR should be included for the last track
section of the route leading up to the opposing signal.
The use of sectional route locking, as described above, will maintain indirect
locking of opposing conflicting routes for their entire length, as described in
Section 3.5.9. Where sectional route locking is not used, or where route locking
is only provided for points, additional route holding should be provided where
necessary to maintain indirectly opposing routes locked for their entire length.
F2:3 Route Stick Relay Chain

The following rules should be applied when designing route locking:
a) With sectional route locking, every route should drive a USR chain from the
first track section past the signal to the extent of the overlap.
b) To avoid potential problems with sectional route locking, every track section
should be provided with a separate USR. Where basic route locking is used,
it is only necessary to provide route stick relays for the points and opposing
locking actually required.
c) The first USR past a signal should prove all routes from that signal normal
before it can energise.
d) Each subsequent USR should prove the previous USR has energised and its
own track section is clear, before it can energise in ordinary operation.
When a USPR is generated, the cascade should be controlled by the last
USPR and not the USR.
e) Each USR which performs a locking function or releases a chain in which any
USR performs a locking function should be a slow acting relay. Any which
are only produced to indicate the extent of sectional route locking, where the
chain ahead is purely used for indications also, may be ordinary acting
relays, called UKRs. (USPRs need not provide for any additional delay.)
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f) Where there is a particular risk of route locking being released under a train,
additional precautions should be applied in accordance with Section 3.7.4.
The additional time delay may be achieved by the provision of a 15 second
track clear timer front contact in series with the TPR contact in the USR, and
a back contact of the TPR in advance in parallel with the timer contact.
g) Selection of the USR chain direction at diverging junctions is achieved by

point lock relays to condition out the cascade in the USR for the track section
immediately beyond the points concerned. (Use of the third, or later, point
lock repeat relays, NL3PR or RL3PR, to achieve USR chain selection should
be avoided, as this can result in a flash of white lights when the route is set.)
h) With BRS-SW67 free-wired circuits, where a USR is included in a point lock

circuit, to apply route locking, the WZR of those points should be used to
hold up the USR until the points are locked, due to a timing problem. (Where
both USRs over a set of points are included in the point lock circuit it may
only be necessary to include the WZR in the first USR, unless the USR can
be released by more than one route.)
(The explanation is as follows: In a standard point lock circuit a front contact

of the USR for the track section over the points is placed in the common leg,
so if the USR is de-energised the points are locked. The USR chain is, as
previously described, released when the route NLR is released, i.e. when its
front contacts open. The points however are not called to move until the
route RLR is energised and this relay will not energise until the signal NLR’s
back contacts have made. From this it can be seen that the USR will release
before the point lock circuit has changed state. This is solved by including a
contact of the point WZR in the USR as an alternative hold up path This in
turn means that the USR will not release until the points become locked, but
the points will not become locked until the USR is released. To overcome
this argument, a contact of the NLR of the route which reads over the points
is included in the point circuit, applying a lock to the points as soon as they
have moved to the correct lie. This in turn then releases the USR, because
the WZR has released. Thus route locking is applied to the points.)
For timed release of route stick relays see Section F2:5.3.
F2:4 Signal Relay (Route Proving)

The requirements for signal controls are given in Section 3.2.
The signal control (GR) circuit allows the signal to clear to a proceed, or less
restrictive, aspect. The actual aspect is dependent on signal ahead conditions to
achieve correct aspect sequencing. Details of the signal aspect relays, generally
situated in the lineside location adjacent to the signal, are given in Part S.
The controls required in the GR (which represents the aspect level of the
interlocking) are defined on the "signal controls require" section of the Signal
Route & Aspect control table sheet.
F2:4.1 Meshed Circuit

Each signal has a single GR built up of safety critical proving conditions, which
are track sections (clear or occupied), points, lamp proving, route set, etc. All
these conditions can be read directly from the control tables, e.g. if a track
section is specified as required clear then a front contact of a track repeat relay
is included; if points are specified as locked and detected normal, then an
NKLPR (normal detection and lock repeating relay) for the specified points is
required. (KLPRs are energised by a back contact of the WZR, which proves
the points not free, i.e. locked, and a front contact of the appropriate WKR.) It is
essential to prove the points locked in the aspect circuit, because the route RLR
only proves them available.
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In systems where the route relay is latched, a contact of the signaller’s route
cancel device should be included in the GR circuit, as well as the route relay, to
allow manual replacement.
Where the signal has more than one route, the GR will have a separate path of
operation for each route from the signal. It is usual practice to mesh these paths
of diverging routes to avoid duplicated circuitry.
Converging routes, however, should generally not be meshed, due to the

dangers of complex meshed circuitry. See Part D.
A typical meshed GR might start at the feed end of the ‘A’ route with the signal
head lamp proving; then coming back along the line of route toward the signal
concerned, including each function in turn, e.g. points and tracks, until the signal
is reached. It is then a requirement to include a back contact of the last USR
which is released when the route is set (or last (OL)USR if the route contains a
locked overlap). This ensures the route locking is correctly applied before the
signal clears and prevents the momentary clearance of opposing signals. It is
easiest to include it next to the front contact of the same track section TPR
contact. The ‘B’ route path would be similarly designed up to a point where the
same conditions are required. Here the paths can be joined, but should be
selected over mutually exclusive functions, generally the normal and reverse
KLPRs of the diverging points. See Part D concerning the prevention of
feedback.
The circuit continues with the approach control requirements (Section F2:4.2)
and the signal stick (Section F2:4.3), together with any special replacement
conditions (Section F2:4.4).
Any special signal aspect controls, or other signal controls summarised in

Figure F3, should also be included in the GR circuit. Controls that are only
required at time of signal clearance, such as the detection of flank points (see
Section 3.4.4), should be provided with a GR stick contact in parallel.
Finally, any ALSR release timer which requires down proving (see Part D) should
have a back contact added, generally on the return side of the relay coil.
Alternatively, separate GRs may be provided for each route. This may simplify
some features of the circuit, such as last wheel replacement or permissive
controls, but would require additional repeat relays for duplicate contacts. Each
GR should be down proved in the ALSR.
F2:4.2 Track Section Releases and Approach Control

The requirements for approach release timers are given in Section 3.3.4.
Track section timers (TJRs) generally require down proving and should have a
back contact added adjacent to the respective TPR contact in every GR circuit
that requires that track section clear. If it is necessary to down prove a track
section timer in more than one signal GR in rear, a back repeater may be
generated to obviate the need for complex meshing. Other functions common to
these GRs may also be included in this relay circuit, or perhaps just a front
contact of the TPR and back of the TJR. In cases of difficulty, timer relays
releasing the aspect of a position light signal need not be proved down in the
controls of the signal in rear, provided that a back contact of the relevant TPR is
included in the aspect circuit of the forward signal together with the time
operated contact of the TJR. (See Part D for timers that do not require down
proving, the repeating of back contacts and timers that have non-safety
contacts.)
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Track sections required occupied (or occupied for a time) allow for approach
control (and temporary approach control). The relay which applies the approach
control, or temporary approach control, should be proved energised in the signal
in rear. This proving is often referred to as "Raynes Park control" after a
derailment on 3rd July 1964 that was caused by separate TPRs for approach
control and signal in rear, fed each way from the TR. The accident occurred
when the former TPR failed to energise, making the approach control ineffective.
The simplest solution is to use a T2PR in the signal in rear, fed from the TPR
which applies the approach control. See Part D for the correct use of repeat
relays.
Temporary approach control, when a disconnection link (TACL) is added in

parallel with the back contact, is provided in accordance with Section 3.11.6.
The selection of different approach control for different routes from a signal is
made by the route RLRs, which also control the junction indicators via the UHRs.
Route disconnection links are added at this point.
F2:4.3 Signal Stick Relay

A contact of the signal stick relay (GSR) is then included in the GR circuit. (This
is omitted in the case of automatic signals, which do not have a GSR.) The
GSR disengages the signal and prevents it from clearing again, once the train
has passed the signal displaying a proceed aspect, until the route has been
normalised and the GSR reset. (Route normalisation may either be manual or
by TORR.) The stick circuit used to achieve this is dependent on the system in
use.
In a typical free-wired interlocking, the stick path that holds up the GSR includes,
in parallel, contacts of the red signal repeating relay (RGPR) and the two track
sections in the control table entry "stick control applied when signal off and track
circuit occupied" (invariably the berth track section and first track section past
the signal). These three front contacts have to be broken at the same time to
de-energise the GSR. It is important that the track repeats used in the GSR are
no later repeats than those used in the GR. (The first track section past the
signal has contacts in both the GR and GSR, so if the contact in the GSR is of a
later repeat than that in the GR and that later repeat fails to energise, the signal
would show a proceed aspect until the train reaches the berth track section. At
this time the GSR would be released, replacing the signal to danger in front of
the train.) See Part D for the correct use of repeat relays.
If the signal stick relay is additionally to be used for train-in-section proving, it

should be arranged in converse configuration, i.e. energised when the train
passes the signal until the route is restored and the ALSR repicked. A back
contact should then be used in the GR circuit. (This is acceptable because a
front contact of the first track TPR is separately included in the GR.) See the
circuit in Figure F19(a).
F2:4.4 Special Replacement Conditions

The requirements for signal replacement are given in Section 3.7.1.
The basic GR circuit, so far described, will suffice for a running signal with first
wheel replacement. However, for shunt signals, a general note appears at the
front of control tables, as follows:
TRACK CIRCUIT CONTROLLED SHUNTS
Track circuit controls bypassed when train passes signal until

replacement conditions are satisfied.
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This results in a circuit basically built up in the same manner as previously

described, but split into two different portions. Nearest the supply are the
conditions which will always put the signal to danger, wherever a train is in
relation to the route, such as point detection, foul track sections, and any other
control that does not constitute an in-line-of-route track section. The in-line-of-
route track sections are included nearest the relay coil next to the GSR contact,
where they are bridged out by a GR stick contact in series with back contacts of
the track sections specified in the control table entry: "track circuits required
occupied for $40 to inhibit replacement".
For this last wheel replacement circuit to function correctly, the GR should be
slow to release, holding up whilst the TPR of the first track past the signal breaks
its front contact and makes its back contact. See Part D for the circuit
techniques involved.
F2:5 Route Releasing

F2:5.1 Approach Lock Circuits
The requirements for approach lock releasing are given in Section 3.7.2.
The relay which controls route releasing is the approach lock stick relay (ALSR),
and the control tables specify the three ways in which this relay may be
energised under ordinary operating conditions. This is covered by the "approach
locking released by signal ON and track circuits OR time" entries on the Signal
Route & Aspect control table sheet.
The approach lock is set by the “controls off” which is achieved by including a
back contact of the GR in the ALSR. This is required in addition to a front
contact of the RGPR, because any delay in its de-energisation would create a
vulnerable situation. For sequence proving see Part D.
The first release condition is the entry for the time release, specifying the delay
to which the ALSR release timer is set.
The entry headed "Approach locking released by track circuits" shows the
second situation which is the ordinary release condition when a train has entered
the route. This is a sequential operation of track sections, usually one clear and
another occupied after both occupied simultaneously. The stick circuits used to
achieve the train-in-section proving are dependent on the system in use.
In a typical free-wired interlocking, both track sections occupied will be included

in the train approach stick relay (TASR), with the one shown as becoming clear
stuck out by a contact of the TASR. By including front contacts of both the
TASR relay, and the track section required clear, in one path of the ALSR,
sequential track section operation has been proved.
Alternatively to the provision of a TASR, the signal stick relay may be used for
train-in-section proving, as described in Section F2:4.3.
The entries headed "Approach locking applied when signal clears" and "Signals
on and free of approach locking" relate to the circuitry required for
comprehensive approach locking. If these are left blank, the signal is to be
approached locked immediately it clears, and is only released by either of the
two methods previously mentioned, hence no additional circuitry is required. If
comprehensive approach locking is required, then look-back circuits are
provided. The stick circuits used to achieve look-back are dependent on the
system in use.
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In a typical free-wired interlocking, TAR and ATSR relays are generated for
running signals, or a TAR relay only for shunt signals. The TAR can be directly
related to the entry labelled “approach locking applied when signal clears...
unless track circuits are clear”. It contains the track sections back to the signal
in rear selected on the point conditions specified.
The ATSR amalgamates all the TARs associated with the signals in rear. The
entry "signals on and free of approach locking" implies each signal's ALSR in
parallel with its TAR. The control tables, whilst listing the signals to be included
in the ATSR, do not give any real guidance for the selection circuits involved.
Basically, each signal's TAR/ALSR should be selected by point lock relay
contacts for any converging points, as it is essential that only one TAR is
considered at any one time. Note that back contacts of N/RLPRs should not be
used for this purpose. See Part D for the correct use of repeat relays.
The ALSR should be down proved in the outgoing signal control circuit (see
Part S).
F2:5.2 Train Operated Route Release (TORR)

The requirements for TORR are given in Section 3.7.3.
The "TORR requires approach locking free and tracks" entry generally contains
the note $15 (track sections, etc. as when approached locked) for running
signals and shunt signals with berth track sections.
The circuit is then simply an additional line in the normalising relay (NR), to
ensure the look-back conditions are free and the signal was off when passed.
Other conditions are achievable by adding them to this TORR line in the NR.
F2:5.3 Timing Off a Route Stick Relay

The requirements for sectional route releasing are given in Section 3.7.4.
There are two basic situations in which it is necessary to bypass the standard
release controls of a USR by the operation of a track section timer. The first is
for timing off opposing locking, in order that a permissive move can be made in
the opposite direction. This will involve releasing a USR and removing the route
locking “under a train”. This control is represented on the Signal Route & Aspect
control table sheet in the "sectional route locking released by track circuits"
entry, where the track section that will be proved and the length of time it will be
occupied before the route locking can be released is specified.
Examples are given in Section 3.7.4. The control is generally applied to the
operation of the permissive track section USR directly (DF USR in the example),
by including a front contact of DD USR in the timer operated proving path, i.e. it
does not time until the back of the train has cleared DD track section. This will
ensure that a failure of DF track section in the occupied state does not result in
premature timing off.
On permissive lines the controls should be arranged to ensure that a second

train, travelling in the same direction, has come to a stand at the signal before
the opposing locking is released.
The second situation is where an overlap is required to be released. Usually this

control is applied to a set of trailing points in an overlap, and the route locking
conditions are specified in the "sectional route locking released by" column of the
Point Controls sheet. In this case, the locking is to be released ahead of the
train. Hence the timing release path is applied to the overlap USR only.
Note that where both opposing locking and overlap locking are to be released,
separate timer proving path conditions may well be required for each.
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F2:6 Point Circuits

The requirements for point controls are given in Section 3.5. Details of the
contactor and point operating relays, generally situated in the lineside location
adjacent to the points, are given in Appendix P2. Point detection circuits are
also described in Part P.Point lock relays for route setting systems are different
from those used in non-route setting systems, because both normal and reverse
lock relays thrown down no longer represent points in mid stroke, but now mean
points free to move, creating a third quiescent state. A points free relay (WZR)
may be generated for this purpose and, if slow to release, it can also prevent
preselection. The WZR identifies that the points are free of locking immediately
before they are called, and the provision of a CR contact (signaller’s control
device in centre position), on the return side of the relay coil, prevents
preselection by a point key.
In a typical free-wired interlocking, the following relays are generally associated

with every point number:
a) repeaters of the signaller’s individual control device (NR, RR, CR);
b) point lock relays (NLR, RLR), which feed the external operating relays;
c) points free relay (WZR);
d) points free or appropriately locked repeater relays (NZLPR, RZLPR); and
e) detection and lock repeating relays (NKLPR, RKLPR).
The point lock circuit which contains the NLR, RLR and WZR, is where the
checking is done to ensure that any applied call may be acted upon, and the
points moved. The circuit is divided into two portions:
i. the calling and individual control device proving, which are generally
placed on the return side of the relay coils (because the calling may
involve non-safety contacts associated with the signaller’s control device);
and
ii. the locking which is generally applied to the supply side.
F2:6.1 Locking
The locking can be further subdivided into three parts, namely:
a) dead locking;
b) normal to reverse (N>R) locking; and
c) reverse to normal (R>N) locking.
The Point Controls sheet of the control tables is divided into two sections: N>R
locking and R>N locking. Conditions which appear in both sections are referred
to as dead locking and prevent any movement of the points. These should be
shown in the common leg of the circuit so they are wired only once.
The locking of points when certain track sections are occupied is known as track
locking. The track sections in which the points are situated are always included
as dead locking. Additional conditioned track sections to prove a previous train
movement is clear of movements over the points in the opposite lie (i.e. foul
track sections), may be required in the N>R or R>N portions.
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The route locking listed in the column headed “requires routes and sectional
route locking normal” indicates that a contact of the relative route NLR should be
included in the point lock circuit in the N>R or R>N leg as required. Note that a
route will not lock a set of points normal and reverse at the same time, so the
route NLR contacts never appear in the common leg.
The column headed "sectional route locking released by" indicates the USRs to
be included in the point lock circuit and any special releases which may need to
be applied to the USRs (see Section F2:3). Unlike the route NLRs, a USR may
be included in the common part of the circuit. In fact, any USR for the track
sections directly over the points should lock the points for making any
movement. The route locking will therefore follow the dead locking, so,
wherever a track repeat contact is included, a USR for that track section should
also be included. This is also true for the conditioned track sections, but these
are likely to only require the USR for one direction.
F2:6.2 Calling
The routes listed in the "set by routes" column call the points to a particular lie.
Contacts of the required route RLR are wired in parallel, in series with the centre
position of the signaller’s point control device, and in parallel with the normal or
reverse control device positions, in the respective return leg of the point lock
circuit. It should be checked that no route is required to call the points normal
and reverse at the same time. The route calling contacts should be a direct
converse of the point locking contacts mentioned in Section F2:6.1. If, for
example, a route RLR contact is included in the NLR calling path of the point lock
circuit, then a contact of the same route NLR should be included in the RLR
path.
The route RLRs may be combined (in parallel) in normal or reverse route calling
relays (NCUR or RCUR) with contacts in the appropriate point lock relay calling
path.
F2:6.3 Features of Point Control Circuits

The following features should be incorporated into all systems:
a) Anti-Preselection
Methods of preventing preselection (see Section 3.5.5) should prove the

control device in the centre position immediately before the points are called.
This may be achieved by making certain point control relays slow to release
and providing a stick contact around the control device centre position.
b) Proving
Where necessary to ensure correct operation, point control circuits should be

proved, in accordance with Part D. The following are generally required:
i. down proving of latched relays to ensure correct release, by cross

proving each released before the other can energise, or the use of
latched relays or magnetic stick relays with mutually exclusive normal and
reverse states;
ii. standard form of cross proving, where necessary to avoid transient
problems with other complementary pairs of relays; and
iii. the use of a polarised circuit from interlocking to lineside location.
The circuits and the proving should be designed, so far as is reasonably

practicable, such that no failure mode can result in a change of state. The
alternative form of cross proving described in Part D should not be used
where a failure could result in both operating relays being de-energised and
the points left in mid-stroke.
RAILTRACK F145
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Note that a style 935 latched relay (see GK/RT0330) should not be economised
by placing a back contact of itself in its own operate path, because not all
manufactures’ relays are capable of operating in this configuration.
c) Operating Circuit
It should be ensured that both point control relays energised at the same time
cannot result in an unsafe state. This may be achieved by preventing point
movement except when the control and the detection are out of
correspondence.
d) Track Locking
All point control systems should be arranged to prevent point movement

when the track locking is effective, but allow any movement in progress to be
completed. This may be accomplished either:
i. typically, by arranging the point control circuit to operate in the direction

set by the point lock relays, until the appropriate detection is obtained; or
ii. by the use of special stick relays, such as a WSR, where the armature is
held up by the point operating current flowing through a separate winding
(non-preferred).
e) Timed Cut-Out
A time delay should be incorporated into the point operating circuit to

disconnect the feed if the point movement is not completed within an allotted
time (generally 7s to 9s.). Any time delay unit provided should be wired to
the same overcurrent protective device as the operating circuit in which it is
used. (Where the timed contact is non-safety, it should be situated at one
extremity of the circuit.)
F2:6.4 Alternative Free-Wired Systems

Where sectional route locking comprehensively locks all points (e.g. in the AEI-
GRS geographical system), the direct locking with route NLRs may be omitted,
so long as a USR is included that is cascaded from the NLR (or ALSR where
there are no NLRs) and will perform the same function. However, these USRs
should not be released in the event of track section failure.
Where route holding is provided by extended backlocks, i.e. preventing the route
from normalising until all track sections between the signal and the points are
clear (by adding TPR contacts to the route NLR operating circuit), it is essential
that route NLRs are included in the point lock circuit.
In systems where the integrity of latched relays is such that they can only be
thrown down by operation to the opposite position, a single latched relay may be
used, instead of a separate NLR and RLR. This does not require down proving
before being called to the opposite state, as it only has normal and reverse
states. This also applies to magnetic stick relays (as used in the E10k system).
In some systems (e.g. AEI-GRS and E10k) a common lock relay (LR), instead of
a WZR, is used to prove points free, including the track locking tracks, all
associated USRs and the centre position of the signaller’s control device.
Contacts of this relay are included in a normal and a reverse point control relay
(NWZR/RWZR), each of which are called by the appropriate route relays, as
described in Section F2:6.2. The LR is held up until the points have completed
their movement.
F146 RAILTRACK
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In some other systems (e.g. SGE) separate NZLPR/RZLPRs (also known as

NLKR/RLKRs or RUPR/NUPRs), comprising the track locking tracks, associated
USRs and the control device centre position, in parallel with a contact of the
appropriate point control relay, are used to prove points free or appropriately
locked. Contacts of these relays are included to provide the locking in the
respective point control relay circuits.
An alternative method, using conventional stick relays, is shown in Figure F21.
F2:6.5 Self Restoration

The requirements for the normalisation of trap points are given in Section 3.4.5.
Where self restoration of trap points is provided, an (N)R is included in the calling
path. This is energised with the points reverse (RLPR), five to ten seconds after
they become free (WZR). The time delay is produced by a slow to operate
(N)JR. The RLPR or a later repeater has to be used, because the (N)R picking
drives down the RLR which would otherwise cut off the feed to the (N)R before
the NLR had operated.
The time delay should be overridden if the points are called normal by the setting
of a route or the individual point control device. The self restoration should be
inhibited when the points are locked reverse by the individual control device.
A signaller’s reminder alarm circuit should be provided as described in Part L.
F2:7 Swinging Overlaps

The requirements for points in overlaps are given in Section 3.4.2. The circuits
used to achieve swinging overlaps are dependent on the system in use. The
following description applies to a typical free-wired interlocking.
In the simple case of single ended facing points in the overlap, no locking is
provided between the points and the signal in rear of the junction signal. Point
detection (either way) is provided in the aspect level of the signal, bridged out by
a contact of an overlap swinging relay (OSR) which energises when a call is
applied to the points if they are free (or locked by another overlap which can
swing away) and releases five seconds later, by which time their movement
should have been completed. A one shot feature is provided by a slow to
release WKLJR which is de-energised when the call is applied.
Where overlaps from different signals are interlaced, a route may need to be set
through a set of points which are locked in opposition to that route. This is
accomplished by the provision of a bridge path around the point locking
conditions in the route RLR, using overlap available relays (NOARs and
ROARs). It is allowed on the assumption that, if the new overlap is available, the
points will become free and move to the new position when the route is set.
However, under certain right side failure modes this may not happen. If the
points fail to move, the bridge path should be removed, otherwise the route
could be maintained out of correspondence with the points, and indeed an
aspect could be obtained with the points wrongly set. Consequently, the bridge
path should be proved to have been removed before the next level of locking
can be achieved. The most convenient way of doing this is to down prove a
function from the bridge path in the aspect level, i.e. the GR. If necessary it is
perfectly acceptable to introduce a contact, such as a USR, into the bridge path
purely for this purpose. For further details of bridge paths, see Part D.
In the point lock circuit, overlap locking which is only applicable when an
alternative overlap is unavailable is bridged out by N/ROAR contacts. However,
to prevent a timing problem, whereby the N/ROAR could release before the
WZR has energised, the NOARs and ROARs should be one second slow to
release.
RAILTRACK F147
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Complex overlaps are provided with a latched (OL)RLR. As it has no

corresponding NLR, it is usually down proved in the (OL)USR.
If however the (OL)USR is released by time operation, the back proving could be
bypassed. The ordinary operation of the (OL)RLR is via a front contact of the
berth track section USR, so the required down proving can be included there.
Another solution is to include the (OL)RLR down proving in the time release path
of the (OL)USR and so release the (OL)RLR by the operation of the timer. For
down proving requirements, see Part D.
Particular precautions are required to guard against the preselection of overlap

points. If it is possible for a set of points to be called by an overlap to lie in one
position, whilst called to another position by the simultaneous operation of the
point key or setting of a route, it is important that the points should not be
preselected, i.e. move to the position required by the overlap when the route
call is removed, or the point key is returned to the centre position. This is
prevented by the provision of a CUPZR.
The CUPZR is a slow to release relay which releases after a call is applied to the
points and is energised over back contacts of the NCUR or RCUR, or both in
series. The latter gives a combined CUPZR which should be used where the
NCUR and RCUR are cross proved for overlap selection. However, separate
NCUPZRs and RCUPZRs should be provided where the points are locked one
way, immediately before being called the other way by the overlap attempting to
swing. In this case the NCUR and RCUR cannot be cross proved. Preselection
is prevented by contacts of the CUPZR relays in the WZR circuit in series with
the CR contact.
Where a combined CUPZR is used, an additional precaution of maintaining the

overlap call is necessary to avoid both NCUR and RCUR releasing together and
allowing the CUPZR to re-energise and again permit preselection.
Where an overlap call on one set of points gives rise to a call on a second set, a
contact of the CUPZR in series with its N/RCUR in the second N/RCUR circuit
will prevent preselection there also.
For anti-preselection requirements, see Section 3.5.5.
F2:8 Pre-set Shunt Signals

The requirements for pre-set shunts are given in Section 3.2.11.
Any main (or shunt) signal which pre-sets a shunt signal requires special aspect
controls. The shunt signal pre-set class route is called by the main route, which
releases its (PS)NLR. The pre-set signal is proved off, using a (PS)GR, which
allows the main aspect to clear. The pre-set aspect control is meshed with the
main route, proving all the track sections and points required by the whole route
in its GR. However, once the pre-set has cleared, the conditions between the
two signals are bridged out of the pre-set aspect control by the (PS)GR, to avoid
premature replacement. This sticks up until the train has passed the pre-set
signal.
Pulling either signal button, before the train passes the main signal, replaces
both signals in the usual way, but, once the train has passed and replaced the
main signal, pulling the button at the pre-set signal de-energises a (PS)ENR,
which acts as an emergency replacement on the shunt signal.
F148 RAILTRACK
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Page F149 of 191
F2:9 Remote Control Override

The requirements for override are given in Section 3.10.3.
The auto (O/R AUTO SR) and normal (O/R NOR SR) relays are used to disable
those functions which are required normal in override and enable those that are
required to work automatically.
Alternative routes are transmitted by a single function, the (AUTO)R, for each
route, which is generated at the signal box and includes cross proving of
conflicting alternative routes. At the interlocking a contact of the (AUTO)PR is
provided in parallel with the (D)R and (S)R in the route setting path of the signal
NLR/RLR. A route set indication is transmitted back to the signal box to light the
push button lamp. This may also prove the points locked and detected, where
required by the signaller.
If train operated route release (TORR) is required, additional paths are provided
for the NR in the interlocking and the NR is transmitted back to the signal box to
disengage the (AUTO)R. As the signaller is unaware of the exact position of the
train, it may be necessary to store a route request until it becomes available. To
counter the effects of preselection, a five second timer should be used. This is
achieved by energising a (PS)R over a back contact of the (AUTO)R, if any
conflicting route is set. The (PS)R flashes the push button indication lamp.
When the conflicting routes are restored, the timer runs and a timed contact in
parallel with a back contact of the (PS)R is included in the (AUTO)R.
F2:10 Ground Frames

General requirements are given in GK/RT0061. See Section 3.6 for ground
frame controls and proving.
Where a ground frame release is interlocked with other functions at the signal
box, interlocking circuitry should be provided for the release as if it were a set of
points, in accordance with Section F2:6. Such a release should be transmitted
to the ground frame in a safety-critical manner, as described in
Section 3.10.2(a).
However, for remote ground frames (as described in Section 3.6.2, e.g.
protection by semi-automatic signals), the signaller’s release may be transmitted
in accordance with Section 3.10.2(c). One of the following arrangements should
be used:
a) Where the protecting signals have a signaller’s replacement facility in

accordance with Section 3.2.3(b), operation of the signaller’s ground frame
release device replaces the signals, initiates an approach lock release timer
and, when the signals are proved on and free of approach locking, transmits
the release to the ground frame in a safety-critical manner.
b) Where a safety-critical transmission system is not available to the ground

frame, operation of the signaller’s ground frame release device simply
transmits the release to the ground frame. At the ground frame, the
signaller’s release replaces the protecting signals and initiates an approach
lock release timer. The local release circuit proves the signals on and free of
approach locking.
Arrangements for slotted signals are given in Section 3.2.9. An electrically

slotted signal should be provided with approach locking (see Section F2:5.1),
generally by means of an ALSR circuit associated with the slot at the signal box.
A slotted signal should not generally become approach locked until it is ready to
clear (i.e. both the signal box slot is given and the ground frame control is
operated). However, the signal should be proved on in both the approach lock
circuit at the signal box and in the signal backlock (or equivalent) at the ground
frame.
RAILTRACK F149
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F2:10.1 Lever Frames

The mechanical arrangements are described in Section F1:8.
The circuits should generally follow the requirements for electro-mechanical

interlockings given in Section 5.
Where necessary (see Section 3.6.1(e)), ground frame points should be

detected normal in the backlock of the release lever.
F2:10.2 Switch Panels

The local interlocking and operator’s controls should generally follow the
requirements for IFS systems given in Section 6, or, alternatively, plungers may
be provided.
The ground frame normal proving requires:
a) relevant points detected normal;
b) point contactors down proved;
c) points free relay down proved; and
d) ground frame release normalised, e.g. ground frame closed plunger

operated. Where two latched relays are provided for the release, the closed
lock relay should be energised; where only one is provided (the reverse lock
relay), it should be de-energised.
F150 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
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Appendix F3
Geographical Relay
Interlocking Guidelines
F3:1 Introduction
This appendix describes the parameters to be considered in the design or
selection of a geographical relay interlocking system.
be provided by the use of geographical relay systems. Figures F3:1 to F3:6
identify how the standard controls are applied to some common geographical
interlockings and enable a comparison with the other interlocking systems.
F3:2 General Description

A geographical relay interlocking (GRI) is a system for the control and
interlocking of railway signalling functions by means of relays packaged in sets or
units that are associated with specific signalling functions, such as points and
signals, and to which connections are made in a systematic manner. The
system should be adaptable for the signalling of layouts of a wide range of size
and complexity. This may be accomplished by the use of a variety of sub-sets
that may be connected in different configurations to form a customised signal set
or point set, and thus reduce the number of relays required.
The wiring within the relay sets may be contained and sealed so as to be
inaccessible to a maintainer, provided that suitable access is given to change
relays, make inter-set connections and perform tests to identify failures. Such
relay sets should be regarded as unalterable.
Relay sets should be identified with a code number. Sets that are regarded as
unalterable should also bear a modification state. All such sets of a particular
code number and modification state should be identical. If a set is required to
have different relay pin codes, e.g. for timing purposes, this should be identified
with a different code number.
Much common circuitry may be provided within the system and certain relays in
some sets may not require to be used. Blanking plates should only bear the
same pin code as the relay for which they are substituted if they contain closed
circuit straps in lieu of back contacts and all front contacts remain open circuit.
Although relays with non-safety contacts may be used for purposes that are not
safety-critical, it is preferable for relays with safety contacts to be used wherever
practicable.
RAILTRACK F151
R Points Set or Free Track Routes and Sectional Sectional Route Locking Released by Track Circuits Time Special R
U Proves NZLPR * up (no reverse Proves RZLPR * up (no normal TPR of UNR proves opposing Route APR up and UR down, plus Free-wired In the route (M) or (S) UNR, as U
T call) in the exit signal (M) or (S) call) in the exit signal (M) or (S) per- route stick (SR) up in SRs repicked to release the route TJPR of appropriate. T
E missive E
UNR (initiation level). UNR (initiation level). each unit (no opposing locking. permissive
track to
R route set). track to repick R
pick up
E appro- permissive E
Q priate track SR. Q
U UNR in U
I exit set. I
R Route Disable R
S S
G NWCR (proves detection, LR RWCR (proves detection, LR (NWKR or RWKR) TPRs in the HR line (proving level). TPR or timer in the G
N down and contactors down) in the down and contactors down) in the to pick up the HR, HR, chosen by N
A A
HR. HR. with free-wiring to appropriate straps or
L L
hold it up while free-wiring in the
C points swing. entrance set, C
O conditioned by the O
N appropriate UR. N
T T
R R
O O
L L
Signals Occupied for $40 to Inhibit Applied When Signal Off Special S Indication to be Route Banner Circuits
E ECPR in SR in the HR line Free-wired as appropriate. Fed via E
Q the HR (entrance set). S UR(2) and Free- wired As above. Q
U line. E UECR in meshed circuit. U
I Aspect Disable Automatic Working A A Q the I
R Control/Link Provided Facility Provided W Permanent Magnet W entrance R
E S Electro-Inductor S set. E
Withdrawn Document
A Approach Locking Applied When Signal Clears Signals ON Approach Locking Released by Signal ON TORR Requires Approach Locking Free and Tracks
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special Not provided.
P Indication) Unless Track Circuits are Clear Approach Locking Track Circuits OR $46 Controls/Remarks
R Approach locked when signal clears. Options selected in the entrance set, JR in T T
O using stored conditions in ASR, and the en- O O
A R R
proving signal SR down, to pick APR. trance
C R R
H set.
L
K
G.
Figure F3:1 AEI-GRS/ScR Geographical Interlocking System - Signal Route & Aspect Controls
* the NZLPR was named RUPR and the RZLPR was named NUPR in the AEI-GRS system
N > R Disable
Control Provided
P
O Set TPRs in the NWUR(s), energised The LR requires all Route sticks latching up after Free-wired Free-wired TPRs cut Free-wiring cut into the The (M)UNR in the exit set
I LR. at the completion route sticks (UP and signal on and set TPR clear. berth into the ZUR. ZUR. extends the completion level
N Foul track circuits level, pick the NWR. DN SRs) and LZRs TJPR. feed to pick the ZUR.
T
S
need additional Overlap setting uses (overlap route sticks)
wiring between the ZUR. in the point set
C point sets. energised.
A These are de-
L energised at the
L locking level of the
E
opposing route.
D
N
>
R
As above. The RWUR, energised As above. As above. As above. As above. As above. As above.
P at the completion
O
level, picks the RWR.
I
N
T
S
C
A
L
Withdrawn Document
L
E
D
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided

OPERATION (overlap route normal, - - - L - - - OR berth track clear, - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR occupied - - - - - - - for a time)
LOCKING
B
Y
Figure F3:2 AEI-GRS/ScR Geographical Interlocking System - Point Controls

U NSAR up in the point set cut into RSAR up in the point set cut into B TPR NLR up in the NLR up in the entrance set, plus USRs Free-wired as appropriate. U
T the selection level. the selection level. in the entrance set. in the point sets. T
E E
Flank points cut into the NSAR. Flank points cut into the RSAR. exit XLR up in the exit set. LCR in the countermove set.
R set R
(ZXR USRs up in the point
E E
or sets.
Q Q
U CXR). Set URs cross proved U
I in the entrance set for I
R different class routes Route Disable R
E normal. Control Provided E
S S
G NWCR and NUCR in the first and RWCR and RUCR in the first and OCR in the exit set Set TPRs cut into the GR lines, i.e. A1 line (first aspect line). TPR or timer in the G
N second aspect lines in the point second aspect lines in the point cut into the first Flank tracks are free-wired to the set links. first aspect line. N
A A
set. set. and second aspect
L L
lines.
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E Set ECPR SR in the GR lines Free-wired as appropriate. Fed via set E
Q in the first (entrance set). S URs and Free- wired As above. Q
U and E UECR. meshed circuit. U
Withdrawn Document
I second Aspect Disable Automatic WorkingA A Q I

R aspect Control/Link Provided Facility Provided
W Permanent Magnet W R
E lines. S Electro-Inductor S E
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special NSR in the ULCR feed path and the NLR pick up.
R Free-wired ATSR circuit (equivalent to ALZR (equivalent to TASR) and the ALJR T T
O TAR). first track clear in series in the in the O O
A R R
Compound circuit for sections in rear entrance set ALSR. en-
C R R
H ATSRs conditioned on point lock relays. trance
L set.
K
G.
Figure F3:3 AGS/SGE/GEC Geographical Interlocking System - Signal Route & Aspect Controls
Normal or Points/GF Track Circuits Clear OR Occupied $46 T rack Circuits Clear AND Points Set or Free OR Sectional Route Locking Normal
N > R Disable
Control Provided
P
O Set TPRs in the RUSMR in the point Route normal is USR latching up after set TPR Berth Free-wired TPRs cut ROSAR driven by free- The ORELR in the exit set
I RSAR. lock path. inherent in the route clear for single ended points. TJPR. into the RSAR in series wired overlap point picks via a wrong direction feed
N
Foul track circuits locking, i.e. the system A USR and B USR latching up with ROSAR contact. N/RSAR and N/RLRs. along the LL line generated as
T
S are free-wired. requires no route after set TPRs clear for double Conditioned out by the the EAS normalises.
normal contacts in the ended points. set FO(SL)R when The OLR then picks via the
C point lock. overlap not in use. ORELR up and free-wired B
A TJPR and feeds out overlap
L LLR.
L
E
D
N
>
R
Set TPRs in the NUSMR in the point As above. As above. As above. Free-wired TPRs cut NOSAR driven by free- As above.
P NSAR. lock path. into the NSAR in series wired overlap point
O
Foul track circuits with NOSAR contact. N/RSAR and N/RLRs.
I
N are free-wired. Conditioned out by the
T set FO(SL)R when
S overlap not in use.
C
A
L
Withdrawn Document
L
E
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
W hen Routes Used R T racks Clear or Tracks Occupied $8 Secs

OPERAT ION (overlap route normal, - - - L - - - OR berth track clear, - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR occupied - - - - - - - for a time)
LOCKING to the common leg of the point lock circuit.
B
Y
Figure F3:4 AGS/SGE/GEC Geographical Interlocking System - Point Controls

U NLR in parallel with the WZR in RLR in parallel with the WZR in TPR in NUPR in the entrance Route NR and ALSR up to latch its In simple Controls in the A1 line links of U
T the point set (A1 line). the point set (A1 line). the set plus CLCSRs in LUR, plus CLCSRs repicked to release cases a CULR a set in line of route. T
E E
Flank points to be free-wired to the Flank points to be free-wired to the exit the LUR pick up. the route locking. is created.
R set links. set links. set UFZPR in the exit set Overlap R
E (C)UF UFR for different class locking is E
Q R. routes normal. released by an Q
U OJPR in a U
I GO-1 unit. I
R Route Disable R
S S
G NKLZPR in the UCR. RKLZPR in the UCR. (NKLR or RKLR) in Set TPRs in either the (M), (C), or (S) UCR (positive leg), i.e A7, A8, or A9 lines. TPR or timer in the G
N Return in the point set (A0 line). Return in the point set (A0 line). the (O)UCR (A6 Flank tracks are free-wired to the set links. UCR return (A0 line). N
A line). A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E ECPR in GSR in the positive leg Free-wired in the UCR set links. E
Q the of the UCR (entrance S UHR and Free- wired As above. Q
positive
U leg of the set). E UECR in meshed circuit. U
Aspect Disable Automatic Working A A I
Withdrawn Document
I UCR(exit Q the HR.

R set) Control/Link Provided Facility Provided W Permanent Magnet W R
E S Electro-Inductor S E
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special NR in the CUR release and the LUR pick up.
R TAR in the entrance set proves tracks TASR and the first track TPR clear in AJR in T T
O clear back to the signal in rear. series in the entrance set ALSR. the en- O O
A R R
ATSR in the entrance set for sections in trance
C R R
H rear (fed via a free-wired circuit). set.
L
K
G.
Figure F3:5 Westpac Geographical Interlocking System - Signal Route & Aspect Controls
N > R Disable
Control Provided
P
O Set TPRs in the RCULPR in the point Route normal is NCLCSR or OJPR or WLNR which monitors OTR which is a free- LUR pick up path fed from a
I point lock circuit lock circuit (N50 side). inherent in the route PNCLCSR/QNCLCSR in the CULR. the LNR line and is cut wired double wound GO-1 unit via the CUR release
N (B50 side). locking, i.e. the system N>R leg of the point lock into the OTR. relay that monitors the to the next unit.
T
S
requires no route circuit (B50 side). The hinge points have A1 line to the extent of CURCR is sent back and OER
normal contacts in the tracks cut into the the overlap. released.
C point lock. point lock circuit with
A the WLNR.
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
As above. NCULPR or As above. RCLCSR in the R>N leg of the As above. As above. As above. As above.
P PNCULPR/QNCULPR point lock circuit (B50 side).
O
in the point lock circuit
I
N (N50 side).
T
S
C
A
L
Withdrawn Document
L
E
D
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided

OPERATION (overlap route normal, - - - L - - - OR berth track clear, - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR occupied - - - - - - - for a time)
LOCKING
B
Y
Figure F3:6 Westpac Geographical Interlocking System - Point Controls

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Page F158 of 191
F3:2.1 Geographical Sets or Units

Figure F3:7 gives examples of relay sets used in some common GRI systems,
although these sets are not generally available for new work.
System AEI-GRS/ScR AGS/SGE/GEC Westpac

Purpose Type Size Type Size Type Size
Panel Interface not required CCS 3x4 PBI 5x3
Signal (main & sub, with overlap) 15 9x4 use EAS or EXAS GO (with O) 5x8
Signal (main & sub, without o/l) use 15 use EAS or EXAS GM 5x8
Signal (main) 13 or 14 (+RI) 9x4 EAS (with XS) 3x4 SGM (no o/l) 5x6
Signal (shunt) 11 9x2 EXAS 3x4 use SGM
Signal (additional class) not required AAS (with EAS) 3x2 not required
Signal (3 routes, countermove) not required CUS (with EAS) 3x2 not required
Signal (5 additional routes) not required AUS (with EAS) 3x2 not required
Signal (exit only) use 11 or 13 XS (2 class) 3x2 DN 5x3
XS (4 class) 3x4
Signal (pre-set) 12 9x4 APS(withEXAS) 3x2 PGM 5x8
Alternative Routes free-wired ALS 3x2 not required
Overlap Locking not required OPS 3x2 O 5x3
Opposing Route Release not required RRS 3x2 not required
Points (single ended) 1 9x4 PIS (SE) 3x4 WS-1 5x6
Points (double ended) 5 9x4 PIS (DE) 3x4 WX 5x8
Points (detection & flank prot’n) not required PCS (with PIS) 3x2 not required
Points (separated double ends) use two of 1 CXS 3x4 WS-2 5x6
(with WS-1)
Diamond Crossing 9 or 10 (double) 9x2 DXS 3x4 TX 5x6
Switch Diamonds use two 1 or 5 XDS(with DXS) 3x2 WTX 5x6
Ground Frame 18 9x2 GFS (SE) 3x2 GFS 5x3
Ground Frame (crossover) use 18 GFS (DE) 3x4 GFX 5x6
Additional Track Sections free-wired TS 3x2 TS or TD (two) 5x3
Types of Set Available 10 (Indirect Fed) 300 (Sub-Sets) 16
Figure F3:7 Geographical Relay Sets
The details given here are for comparison only, as different versions of each
system may be found in use and the details vary. The AEI-GRS sets were
available as direct fed (not shown) or indirect fed types. The GEC sets include 4
different circuit systems (see Section F3:5.6) which are not interchangeable,
although they are distinguished by different code numbers.
Sizes are given in terms of standard relay bases, height x width.
F3:2.2 Geographical Set Inter-Connections

The systematic connections between relay sets may be free-wired, or use
dedicated multicores terminated on plug-couplers, depending on the system.
An example of the use of dedicated multicores is given in Figure F3:8.
F158 RAILTRACK
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Core Function Core Function Core Function

Geographical Cable Entrance Ring Cable Exit Ring Cable
1 route selection level (out) 1 main aspect class ring 1 primary main or call-on ring
2 route select’n level release (out) 2 warning aspect class ring 2 primary warning class ring
3 locking level (out) 3 call-on aspect class ring 3 primary sub class ring
4 locking level release (out) 4 shunt aspect class ring 4 secondary main class ring
5 locking level release (back) 5 sub entrance registered ring 5 secondary warning class ring
6 locking level (back) 6 main entrance registered ring 6 secondary call-on class ring
7 route selection level release (back) 7 common entrance ring 7 secondary sub class ring
8 route selection level (back) 8 normal proving ring(entrances) 8 sub exit registered ring
Overlap Cable Route Control Cable 9 main exit registered ring
1 overlap selection level (out) 1 UR ring 1 10 normal proving ring (exits)
2 overlap points available (back) 2 UR ring 2 11 exit ring N50
3 overlap proved available(back) 3 UR ring 3 12 exit ring B50
4 overlap lock level (out) Aspect Level Cable Flank Protection Cable
5 overlap locking proved (back) 1 1st aspect level (main controls) 1 demand (out)
6 B50 (back) 2 2ndaspect level(shunt controls) 2 drive (out)
7 overlap proving level (back) 3 3rd aspect level (HHR) 3 detection (back)
8 overlap lock level release (out) 4 4th aspect level (DR) 4 availability (back)
Figure F3:8 Geographical Multicores (based on AGS/SGE/GEC system)
In the GEC system (formerly AGS or SGE), the geographical and aspect level
cables run between relay sets in the line of route. On bi-directional lines, the
provision of countermove sets (CUS) allows these cables to be used for
movements in both directions. The route control ring cable connects entrance
sets (ES) with their respective range of exit sets (XS) and identifies the correct
route indicator to be displayed. The entrance and exit rings connect each
entrance or exit set, respectively, with the common control set (CCS). Overlap
and flank protection cables are used, where required, to connect the overlap
point set (OPS), or point control sets (PCS), respectively.
F3:2.3 Typical Geographical Layout

The layout of relay sets necessary to signal the example shown in Appendix F5,
using the Westpac system, is given in Figure F3:9. Here the 37 core
geographical cables are shown, which provide all functions, generally bi-
directional, except for those associated with the push button interlocking. The
latter are carried in 14 core supplementary ring cables, which link all signal sets
(including DN destination sets) with the push button interlocking set (PBI) in a
ring configuration.
F3:3 Signaller’s Interface

GRI systems should be configured to operate from signaller’s control inputs
specified by the infrastructure controller. See Section 3.1 for the various
options.
RAILTRACK F159
51 AB 712 53
SGM1 TS-1 WS-1 DN-1
B R
R B R B R
+ 711 +
WTX-1
R
Y
54 709B BC 56
DN-1 WS-2 TS-1 SGM1
B G
R G Y B R B R
- 709A -
WS-1
Y
Y
CE
TX-1
R
R
201 CB 203 708 CC 713 205

SGM1 TS-1 GO-1 WS-1 O-1 WX-1 DN-1
B R R B
R B R B R B R B B G R
+ R B +
+ +
DH
DH (Y) 710
TX-1 O-1 WS-1
R Y
R B
Y Y
+
DH
Withdrawn Document
210 (X) 707 212 507 DD 714 DC 214 DB 511 216

DN-1 O-1 WS-1 GO-1 SGM1 O-1 WX-1 TS-1 GO-1 TS-1 SGM1 SGM1
R B R Y R R B R B B R R B B R
B G B R B R B R B R
- R B + G Y
- - - - + -
105 EL
GO-1 TS-1
R B R B
Y NOTE:
+
705 TRAP POINTS ARE OPERATED BY FREE-WIRING
706 ASSOCIATED WITH EL TS-1 UNIT.
WS-1
KEY
B
505 FC B
506 509 510
+, - = ORIENTATION OF UNITS
B = BLUE
SGM1 O-1 SGM1 SGM1 SGM1 G = GREEN
R B B R B R R B B R R = RED
+ - R Y - G Y - Y = YELLOW
+
Figure F3:9 Geographical Interlocking Block Schematic (based on Westpac system)

See Figure F3:7 for Unit Identification; Figure F5:10 for Layout Plan
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Date April 1999
Technical Guidance Page F161 of 191
The area to be signalled should be capable of division into signaller’s control

areas. Where necessary to give availability, the signaller’s control areas may be
further divided into separate interface systems. The boundaries of the signaller’s
control areas and interface systems should be selected from operating
considerations. Alternatively, a direct interface may be provided to the signal
sets that does not require the use of common route setting equipment.
The degree of anti-preselection provided in the route setting equipment should

be commensurate with the risks involved. See Section 3.5.5.
F3:4 Interlocking
The interlocking should comply with Section 3, and the circuits should generally
comply with Appendix F2 where appropriate.
The GRI should provide the standard controls and facilities listed in Figures F3
and F4 (Section 3.2.2) within the relay sets. The selection of the alternatives
may be done by strapping external connections where necessary without the
provision of external relays except where indicated below. The special controls
and facilities listed in Figures F3 and F4, that are only required occasionally or do
not have a standard geographical set, e.g. proving of lockout devices, movable
bridges and level crossings, or special aspect controls for delayed clearance or
tunnel controls, should be provided by free wiring as specified in the control
tables for each individual case. Similarly, it may be necessary to free-wire
certain inputs to geographical sets, e.g. detection of train operated points,
hazard detectors proved normal, line clear release, or all-signals-on switch not
operated. Other controls, such as route indicator proved alight, may be provided
in lineside location cases for indirect fed signals. There is no longer any need to
cater for direct fed signals within the interlocking, as these are non-preferred for
new work.
Modifications of the internal wiring of relay sets to cater for particular

circumstances should not be done without the change being approved by the
infrastructure controller. All examples of a particular code of relay set of a
particular modification state should be identical and interchangeable.
F3:4.1 Controls and Facilities Provided Within Relay Sets

Generally, facilities should be provided for four classes of route (M), (W), (C)
and (S) to be available for bi-directional working through each relay set (including
ground frame sets with ground frame points reverse). However, where the size
of sets may be reduced by not catering for certain functional requirements,
simplified sets may be provided with fewer facilities than the full sets.
Overlap setting and proving should be provided within the GRI system, but
swinging overlap circuitry may be free-wired.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, facilities should be provided for

the operation and proving of one or more pre-set shunts by all classes of routes
from a main signal.
The variety and size of functional sets available within a system should be
governed by balancing:
a) the need to minimise the number of relays in each set; and
b) the need to minimise the spares holding for the system as a whole.
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F3:4.2 Alternatives Provided Within Relay Sets

The following options should be provided for within the GRI system and should
be selected by an appropriate arrangement of strapping on the plug-couplers
and, where necessary, a minimum degree of free-wiring:
a) determination of different classes of route;
b) approach release of aspects;
c) different types of signal replacement;
d) application of approach locking;
e) different types of approach lock release;
f) time release on opposing route locking;
g) automatic working of controlled signals;
h) selection of preferred route;
i) inhibition of non-existent routes, or classes of route;
j) selection of override facilities, where required by infrastructure controller;
k) whether direct fed or indirect fed, where required by infrastructure controller;
l) adaption of a signal set to allow for an entrance and exit in opposite

directions;
m) interlinking of duplicate TPRs between adjacent sets (see Section F3:5.2);

and
n) the means of orientating sets (see Section F3:5.6).
F3:4.3 Free Wiring Associated with Relay Sets

Certain complex functions may be provided by free-wiring, where they are not
required in every set and a reduction in the number of relays in the set results.
Suitable facilities should be provided to permit the necessary free-wired
connections or strapping, including circuit access and spare voltage-free
contacts on the plug-couplers.
The following facilities need not be provided within the GRI relay sets, but may
be accomplished by free-wiring:
a) comprehensive flank protection;
b) swinging overlap circuitry;
c) restricted overlaps;
d) self restoration of trap points; and
e) omission of opposing locking on shunt signals.
F3:4.4 Simplified GRI Systems

Where a simplified GRI system is required by the infrastructure controller, the
following facilities may also be omitted from GRI relay sets, although provision
should be made for free-wiring on an individual basis:
F162 RAILTRACK
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a) comprehensive approach locking;
b) override facilities;
c) ground frame release;
d) pre-setting of shunt signals; and
e) facilities for direct fed signals, such as aspect sequence lines.
F3:4.5 Incoming and Outgoing Circuits

External incoming circuits should be capable of being jumpered directly into relay
sets by the provision of a.c. immune relays.
Facilities should be provided for the connection of power supply feeds to

outgoing circuits. On any set there should be provision for connecting internal or
external supplies. The external supply may be one of a number of d.c. supplies
or an a.c. supply and sets should have provision for two external supplies
independent of each other as well as the internal supplies.
F3:4.6 Miscellaneous Circuitry

Auxiliary feeds from the sets should be provided to operate train describer,
automatic route setting equipment and other ancillary systems, as necessary.
F3:5 Geographical Circuit Techniques

See Part D for general circuit requirements. Because of the packaging of the
circuitry into functional sets, special circuit techniques are necessary.
F3:5.1 Levels of Geographical Circuitry

GRI systems are generally arranged in levels, as described in Section 7.3. Each
level comprises one or more through circuit lines. See Section F3:2.2 for an
example of one such system.
See Figure F3:10 for a detailed example of another system, based on AEI-GRS
and ScR circuitry. This relates to part of the layout given in Appendix F5.
F3:5.2 Information Sharing

To enable information to be shared between sets, cascaded or duplicated
incoming relays may be necessary, e.g. TPRs. The rules for repeat relays and
back contacts given in Part D should be followed, so as to ensure that the failure
of a repeat relay to energise does not result in a hazardous situation. The
following safeguards will ensure that no timing problems result:
a) When a track circuit is used to control any signalling function the first TPR
within the interlocking should be of the slow to operate type. This should
control the subsequent TPRs within the relay sets.
RAILTRACK F163
212G 710W 507G 713W 714W 214G
W(MK)R RZLPR NZLPR
214 UN
I(M) (DN)USR W(MK)R W(MK)R
212 PB (S)UNR 56A R
I(OL)
F (M)UNR
NZLPR NZLPR (DN)USR
I(M) (DN)USR W(MK)R
UNR UR
(M)UNR W(MK)R I(S)

UNR UR NZLPR (DN)USR
(S)UNR
I(S) (DN)USR W(MK)R
(M)UNR
RCUR
(S)UNR C NCUR
(S)UNR NCUR
B/C NCUR
C W(MK)R
RCUR RCUR
C(OL) RCUR NCUR
B/C NCUR
W(MK)R RCUR
(M)UNR 56A
W(MK)R B/C NCUR A NCUR UR
(UP)USPR (M)UNR NCUR
NCUR RWR
(UP)USPR
RCUR
(UP)USR
L(OL) (UP)USPR LR
(UP)USPR (UP)USR (UP)USR ALSR
56A UR
(UP)USR (UP)USR (UP)USPR (UP)USR
(UP)USR
(UP)USR L TPR LR
TJPR TPR (UP)USR (UP)USR
(UP)USR
L (UP)USR
(UP)USR NWR
TPR LR
(UP)USR
A TPR LR 105C/D
P(OL) RKLPR 203C/D RKLPR
(UP)USR (UP)USR (UP)USR
P(M) 56A P(M)

(M)UNR ECPR F TPR A TPR (DN)USR TPR NKLPR UR NKLPR TPR (DN)USR (DN)USR TPR NKLPR (DN)USR F TPR GSR UR A TPR
P(S) P(S) GR
(S)UNR (UP)USR NKLPR UR NKLPR (UP)USR (UP)USR NKLPR UR
UR (DN)USR UNR (DN)USR (DN)USR
505A 509 PB
UR GSR
F RZLPR (DN)USR
GR
I(S) R
UNR NZLPR
Withdrawn Document
UNR
A NCUR
NOTES C
UNR W(MK)R RCUR UR
Relevant circuits are shown for up direction routes only. (The proving level operates in
both directions.) Bold arrows indicate geographical connections to other relay sets. NCUR
The example illustrates the omission of track controls from shunt routes (not current (UP)USR ALSR UR
practice). Shunt signals 509 and 510 have opposing locking omitted. (UP)USR
TPR
Levels are shown as follows: L (UP)USR
(UP)USR
I = Initiation (Main or Shunt)
(UP)USR
C = Completion TPR LR
L = Locking (UP)USR
RWR
P = Proving (Main or Shunt)
UNR RKLPR (DN)USR (DN)USR GSR UR
(OL) = Overlap extension of main level UR
P(S) NKLPR GR
Modern relay names are shown in this diagram, but the following special names are also
used: UR UNR
UR GSR
P(S) NKLPR
UNR = Route Switch Relay (Main or Shunt)
W(MK)R = Points Marker Relay GR
PB = Exit Push Button
509G 510G
Figure F3:10 Levels of Geographical Circuitry (based on AEI-GRS/ScR system with “turn-push” panel)
See Section 7.3 for a description of the levels; Figure F21© for the basic circuit; Appendix F5 for Layout Plan and Control Tables
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Page F165 of 191
b) The circuitry of the sets controlling movable infrastructure should be so

designed that, after the controls holding the points (or other function) have
become free, a slow to operate relay should operate before the points (or
other function) are effectively able to be operated and before route locking
releases are passed to adjacent track functions or other sets.
Note that the effect of these requirements is that a minimum of approximately

800ms will elapse between a track relay (TR) making its front contacts and the
setting of a route over the track function being possible.
Track occupied timers should generally be controlled by the first TPR within the
interlocking and down proved in the feed to the subsequent TPRs.
If parallel TPR repeats are used within relay sets, then each should make a
contribution to the signaller’s display.
F3:5.3 GRI Through Circuit Lines

Special techniques are necessary to enable certain GRI through circuits to
perform an operation within sets that they pass through. The latter may include
testing for certain conditions before performing the operation and not permitting
the circuit to continue if those tests are not proven.
The simplest technique is for a circuit to energise an intermediate relay and use
a front contact of that relay to pass the circuit to the next set. More
sophisticated systems may use latched relays in a similar manner.
A latched relay may be used in series in a circuit, if when operated it shorts out
its own coil (with a parallel front contact), so as to permit the next relay in the
adjacent set to operate in turn, and so on by cascade throughout the circuit.
Double wound relays may be used to enable two separate lines (e.g. for
different class routes, or for different directions) to operate the relay without any
danger of a backfeed between the two circuits.
Means should be employed to achieve a high standard of reliability in ring and

similar circuits incorporating large numbers of contacts. The number of series
contacts (or coils) in a circuit should be checked to ensure that the resistance of
the circuit is not increased, such that the voltage on the final coil could, after a
period of time, become insufficient to operate it, as described in Part D.
It should be ensured that no eventuality could result in a circuit being fed from
more than one overcurrent protective device at the same time.
F3:5.4 Meshing
Both converging and diverging meshing are generally necessary in order to
minimise and standardise the number of circuits (or lines) passing through each
set. This complex meshing is permissible because of the standardisation which
reduces the opportunity for design errors, and the pre-wiring of sets that allows
a certain amount of factory testing.
Measures should be taken to prevent feedback within meshed circuits in

accordance with Part D. Diodes may be used to prevent feedback in circuits
that are not safety-critical. (Diodes should not be used where a.c. immunity is
required.)
F3:5.5 Bi-Directional Circuits

Certain through circuit lines may be used for routes reading in opposite
directions, e.g. the aspect proving line. The relays used to separate the circuits
at each end of the bi-directional portion of the circuit should comply with the
requirements for polarised circuits given in Part D.
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F3:5.6 Orientation of Sets

In some systems it is necessary to orientate a set or a circuit, depending on the
direction of the route, or whether points are facing or trailing. This may be
achieved by the use of positive or negative feeds, as shown in Figure F3:9.
F3:6 General Arrangement

F3:6.1 Nomenclature
Wherever reasonably practicable, the standard nomenclature for relay names
given in GK/RT0205 should be used, as interpreted within Appendix F2.
Geographical systems have to be based on the orientation of each individual

set, as described above. As the sets are generally named after the main
function (signals and points), track repeaters may be given special names such
as A (approach track section) and F (first track section past signal). Point ends
of crossovers are specially labelled A & B or P & Q, in order to identify the track
sections and also the normal routes through each point end. A consistent
method should be adopted for each geographical system and, in addition, the
actual names of the track sections should be clearly displayed on each set.
F3:6.2 Relay Set Terminal Numbering

Terminal numbering on GRI relay sets should be systematic and should be
approved by the infrastructure controller. Generally the terminal number should
include an alphanumeric character which identifies the geographic direction to
which the circuit leaving or entering the set is appropriate. Where a connection
has no geographic significance (e.g. on a ring circuit) the corresponding
alphanumeric character should be common to all such connections except that
power supply connections should be further differentiated.
Other alphanumeric characters should be used to identify individual connections

within a particular geographic or non-geographic group. Such alphanumeric
characters should be allocated systematically. For example the terminal by
which a particular circuit enters all relay sets should be identified by the same
alphanumeric characters except for the initial character indicating the geographic
or non-geographic significance of the group of connections.
F3:6.3 Relay Rack Arrangement

This should generally comply with Part G of this Guidance Note.
Free-wired relays should be mounted on modules of the same design as the

geographical sets. These free-wired sets should be mounted on the same racks
as the geographical sets to which they are applicable, as close as possible
thereto.
Adequate spare positions should be allowed in the layout of the geographical

sets and free-wired sections, as specified by the infrastructure controller.
F3:6.4 Interlocking Internal Cabling

All cables, wires and terminals should generally comply with Part J of this
Guidance Note.
Inter-set wiring may be achieved either:
a) by free-wiring; or
b) by use of standard multicore cables.
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Where standard multicore cables are used, they should, as far as practicable, be
terminated on individual plug-couplers at each end. Specifically, plug-couplers
should be used on common circuitry ring cables and other cable connections of
a geographical nature. Plug-couplers should be configured in a consistent
manner, in accordance with GK/RT0330, with means to prevent incorrect
coupling.
F3:7 Maintainer’s Facilities

These should generally comply with Section 3.11.
A temporary approach control link should be provided for each controlled signal
and should be mounted on a relay set associated with the signal.
Aspect disconnection links should be provided on each set containing a track

repeat relay. One link should be provided:
a) in a track circuit set;
b) for each lie of single ended points;
c) for the normal setting of each end of a crossover and for the reverse setting,
i.e., three links; and
d) for each line over a diamond crossing.
More complex point layouts should be treated in a similar manner.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, a test set appropriate to the type
of GRI system should be provided for monitoring purposes. Where applicable,
this may enable the voltage to be checked at the set connections by which
entrance and exit push button normal proving rings enter and leave the sets.
(This may be achieved within the test set by provision of a voltmeter and a
means for selecting the point at which the voltage is to be checked.) Test sets
should incorporate safeguards against false operation of relays of the working
system in the event of a failure of the means of monitoring.
F3:8 Power Supplies

These should generally comply with Part C of this Guidance Note.
The following supplies should be available on each section of relay rack housing
geographical relay sets:
a) internal relay supply;
b) external relay supply;
c) external equipment supply (for signal lighting, point operation, etc.) as

required;
d) control panel indication supply; and
e) TDM and/or ARS supplies, as applicable.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, power supplies should be fused

on the relay rack by alarm type fuses whose operation is readily visible. When
operated, the fuses should be capable of feeding a local indication lamp and a
circuit controlling indirectly a master alarm lamp. The detailed arrangement
should be specified by the infrastructure controller for each installation.
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Appendix F4
Electronic Interlocking
Guidelines
F4:1 Introduction
This appendix describes the factors for consideration in the design and selection
of electronic interlocking systems.
be provided by the use of electronic data.
F4:2 Electronic Systems

All new systems must be approved in accordance with GI/RT7002 and comply
with the safety requirements given in GK/RT0206. These requirements include:
a) Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate safety principles;
b) demonstration of an acceptable level of safety, with assurance of system

safety under all failure conditions, including power failure;
c) an acceptable level of dependability;
d) compatible interfaces between hardware, software and other systems,

including electro-magnetic compatibility;
e) testability, including the ability to validate individual sub-systems separately,

e.g. by disconnecting output comparators; and
f) the occupational safety of personnel working on the system.
These requirements may be achieved by the use of commercially available

programmable logic controllers of an appropriate safety integrity level.
MPM 1 Processor 1
MPM 2 Decider Comparator
MPM 3 Processor 2
SSI Arrangement
Processor
Processor 1 Monitor
Processor 1
Monitor Decider Software v.1
Decider
Processor 2 Processor 2
Software v.2
Figure F4.1 Examples of Electronic Interlocking Architecture
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A balance of diversity and redundancy should be used in developing the system

architecture, so as to achieve the required safety and availability. If necessary,
graceful degradation should be used to maintain availability with reduced
functionality in the event of system failure. Some examples of system
architecture are given in Figure F4:1.
Whole life-cycle management, including verification and validation, should be

provided for each phase of design, in accordance with prENV 50129. Software
requirements are given in prEN 50128 and dependability requirements in
prEN 50126.
The requirements for configuration control of data driven systems are laid down
in GK/RT0201.
For the protection of programmable electronic systems against interference see

Part D of this Guidance Note.
F4:2.1 Ladder Logic for Programmable Logic Controllers

The data is usually written in the form of ladder logic, which is a series of logic
equations generally evaluated in sequence during each cycle of the processor.
The logic enables an output to be determined for a given range of inputs. This
can be illustrated by means of a truth table, as shown in Figure F4:2.
The logic equations with series and parallel logic elements can be almost directly
related to relay logic, including the use of latches for stick relays.
Rules should be developed for the preparation of data for use in programmable
logic controllers to ensure safe, consistent and stable outputs. These should
ensure that:
a) equations are kept as simple as practicable to ensure that no unintended

paths are present;
b) stability is achieved, e.g. by logic equations only containing elements that

have already been evaluated on a previous “rung of the ladder”;
c) cycle times are minimised, e.g. by arranging equations with the main
switching elements at the beginning, so that elements beyond the first “false”
element do not have to be evaluated; and
d) consistent names (or mnemonics) are used for the internal elements, as
described in GK/RC0701.
A typical logic equation (or “ladder rung“) is depicted in Figure F4:2.
51 A 51 51 AA 51
G A OFF G TP OF
TP F
0 0 0
RUNG 1 0 1 0
evaluated evaluated result 1 0 1
when 51 G when AA TP
is true is false 1 1 0
Figure F4:2 Ladder Logic and Truth Table
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Various logic features, such as timers and latches can be incorporated. An

internal timer should comprise both a start condition logic element and an end
condition logic element, such that the end condition becomes true a
predetermined time after the start condition becomes true. The timer can be
reset at any time by making the start condition false.
Data preparation tools should have a safety integrity level commensurate with
their application. Guidance is given in GK/RC0701.
F4:3 Solid State Interlocking (SSI)

The Solid State Interlocking developed by GEC-GS, WBS and BRB is one
example of an electronic interlocking system.
This section describes some of the concepts upon which SSI is based to allow
comparison with other interlocking systems and demonstrate compliance with
the design requirements in Section 3. It does not lay down design requirements
which are given in the SSI applications manual.
Figures F4:3 and F4:4 identify how the standard controls are applied to SSI and
provide a comparison with the other interlocking systems.
F4:3.1 General Description

The standard SSI interlocking cubicle contains the following modules in a single
rack, the dimensions complying with BS 5954:
a) three interlocking multi-processor modules (MPMs) to specification BR 1905;
b) duplicated panel processor modules (PPMs) to BR 1908 that communicate

with a signalling display system (SDS) or panel multiplexer (as described in
BR 1921), transmitting safety-related controls and indications over a link that
is not safety critical;
c) a diagnostic multi-processor module to BR 1905;
d) two data link modules (DLMs) to BR 1904 or long distance terminals (LDTs)
to BR 1906 that transmit operating commands and receive proving
information from trackside functional modules (TFMs) to BR 1901 (points
modules) or BR 1902 (signal modules), in a safety critical manner over two
diverse data links; and
e) power supply units.
Each such interlocking can control 40 to 80 signals and 20 to 40 sets of points,

depending on data complexity, and can address a maximum of 63 TFMs. It
consumes approximately 375W at 110V a.c.
Each module uses multi-way connectors with coding straps, one of which on the
MPMs identifies the interlocking and version to give a unique address within the
system. Each MPM and PPM is fitted with an interchangeable memory module
to specification BR 1911, containing the appropriate system program and
geographical data in the form of erasable programmable read only memory
(EPROMs). Random access memory (RAM) is also available within each
memory module to hold the variable data that records the state of each signalling
function.
F170 RAILTRACK
U Written in the test statement of the Written in the test statement of the The Proof of route normal is The last subroute is proved free in the Timers Written in the test statement of U
T PRR file, as “if P** cnf”. This is PRR file, as “if P** crf”. This is PRR not required. PRR file. bypass the PRR file. T
E proved before calling the route. proved before calling the route. file the sub- E
tests route
R whether proving. R
E the They do E
Q track is not free Q
U clear the sub- U
I before route. I
R calling Route Disable R
E the Control Provided E
S route. S
G Points locked is actioned from the Points locked is actioned from the Hinge point Written in the ascon data of the OPT special, as “T** c”. Shown as “T** o” in G
N command list in the PRR file, in the command list in the PRR file, in the detection is in the either the route N
A A
form “P** cn”. form “P** cr”. ascon data of the indicator (RI) or the
L L
Detection appears as “P** cdn” in Detection appears as “P** cdr” in OPT special, and is aspect sequence
C the aspect control (ascon) data of the aspect control (ascon) data of covered by an statements of the OPT C
O the special in the OPT file. the special in the OPT file. elapsed timer. special. O
N It appears in the N
T form “EP** < 7”. T
R R
O O
L L
E Sig ahead Two track # condition in In the ascon data of the OPT special. RI data E
Q set “lp” the second statement of S in the OPT Aspect sequence As above. Q
U in the ascon the OPT special. E special. data in the OPT U
I data of Aspect Disable Automatic W orking A A Q special. I
R the OPT Control/Link Provided Facility Provided W Permanent Magnet W R
E special. S Electro-Inductor S E
Withdrawn Document
A Approach Locking Applied W hen Signal Clears Signals ON Approach Locking Released by Signal ON TORR Requires Approach Locking Free and Tracks
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special The last statement in the OPT special, written with a start
P Indication) Unless Track Circuits are Clear Approach Locking Track Circuits OR $46 Controls/Remarks and end label relating to the MAP data.
R MAP data searches back through the Two track # condition in the first Written T T
O interlocking and, for each route concerned, statement of the OPT special. in the O O
A form R R
a start and end label is quoted in the
C “alt > R R
H
approach lock release (ALR) data of the
240” in
OPT special. the ALR
L data of
K the
G. OPT
special.
Figure F4:1 Solid State Interlocking System - Signal Route & Aspect Controls
Normal or Points/GF Track Circuits Clear OR Occupied $46 T rack Circuits Clear AND Points Set or Free OR Sectional Route Locking Normal
N > R Disable
Control Provided
P Written as a conditional statement in the PFM file, e.g.
O Tracks clear “T** c” Points set in the Proof of route normal is The last subroute over the (alternative OL track trailing points set, or OR last suboverlap free.)
I written in the points command data of the not required. points is proved free in the PFM clear, free, Proof of route normal is not
N
free to move PRR file for each route file. See SSI 8003-65. required.
T
S reverse data of the request, as
PFM file. “P** cr”.
C
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
Tracks clear “T** c” Points set in the As above. As above. As above. As above. As above.
P written in the points command data of the
O
free to move PRR file for each route
I
N normal data of the request, as
T PFM file. “P** cn”.
S
C
A
L
Withdrawn Document
L
E
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
W hen Routes Used R T racks Clear or Tracks Occupied $8 Secs

TIME OF EFFECTIVE Written as a conditional statement in the PRR file, as: E
OPERAT ION (opposing subroute locked, - - - L - - - OR berth track clear, - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR occupied - - - - - - - for a time).
LOCKING
B
Y
Figure F4:2 Solid State Interlocking System - Point Controls

Withdrawn Document
GK/GN0600
Page F173 of 191
Several interlockings within a control centre can be connected by duplicated

internal safety critical data links, in order to enlarge the control area. A
maintainer’s terminal is provided to diagnose faults, monitor and log all changes
of state, and enable special controls to be applied. It communicates primarily
with the diagnostic processor modules (in up to six interlockings), but also with
the PPMs.
Alternative configurations, interfaces, or novel solutions may be used, provided

they are approved for each application in accordance with GK/RT0201.
Examples include distributed central interlockings remote from the signal box (to
allow for relocation of the control point), or TFMs placed at the central
interlocking with direct wire communication to trackside equipment (to avoid
renewing existing lineside locations).
F4:3.2 Redundancy of Interlocking Multi-Processor Modules

The interlocking uses a technique known as triple modular redundancy. The
three interlocking MPMs are identical and run the same program, in the course
of which each checks itself against both its partners, comparing output states
and RAM contents in a continuous cycle. Each MPM includes a redundancy
management device that provides a redundant and testable mechanism for
disconnecting a module in the event of a majority vote against it, and enforcing
safe output states if no majority opinion exists. This takes the form of a security
fuse circuit that supplies the current to the outputs of the module, so that, if the
fuse is ruptured, there is no output. Each module is able to trigger its own
security circuit and also co-operate with either partner to trigger the security
circuit in the third. The remaining two modules continue to operate as a two-out-
of-two redundant system with no reduction in the level of safety. In the event of
a second fault occurring before replacement of the failed MPM, the remaining
modules would isolate themselves causing the interlocking to safely shut down.
F4:3.3 Interlocking System Programs

The following programs are located in the interlocking MPMs:
i. initialisation program (in the memory module);

ii. redundancy management program (in the memory module) see
Section F4:3.2;
iii. interlocking functional program (in the memory module);
iv. interface program with PPMs and communications processors (in the
memory module);
v. trackside communications programs (on 2 dedicated processors); and
vi. internal communications program (on a dedicated processor).
The first four programs are run on the main MPM processor.
a) Initialisation Programme
Typically, on powering up, the initialisation program ascertains whether two

or three MPMs are present and whether the state of the railway retained in
RAM is still valid (in the case of a power loss of less than 6ms).
It then starts the module in the appropriate mode and, if necessary, resets
the variable data to its most restrictive state. A newly powered module is not
allowed on line until its data has been updated to agree with the other
modules. (See SSI documentation for full details.)
b) Interlocking Programme
The interlocking functional program is then executed and it cycles,

addressing the diagnostic MPM and the 63 TFMs, in turn, before repeating
itself. The average duration of this major cycle is 850ms, consisting of 64
minor cycles of a minimum of 9.5ms each. During each minor cycle the
following activities are programmed:
RAILTRACK F173
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GK/GN0600
Page F174 of 191
i. run interface program to exchange variable data with internal and

external data links (one TFM addressed in each minor cycle) and
PPMs;
ii. process diagnostic information and maintainer’s controls (addressed in
first minor cycle only);
iii. process geographical data files relating to inputs received;
iv. process geographical data files relating to outputs to be sent;
v. update variable data;
vi. repeat minor cycle for the next address.
c) Redundancy Management Program
The redundancy management program, which runs continuously,

synchronises with the other MPMs, compares the variable data and tests the
security circuits.
F4:3.4 Variable Data

The variable data that records the state of each signalling function on the railway
is held within the RAM of the interlocking MPMs. Each function has two or three
possible states, e.g. clear, occupied and undefined (c, o & x), set and not set (s
& xs), or free and locked (f & l). The signalling functions that are allocated RAM
are identified by lists held in identity files in the geographical data. Unlike relay
nomenclature, the data identities are prefixed by the function type. The identity
files are listed in Figure F4:5 and carry the extension “.id”.
Filename Signalling Functions Listed Data

Prefix
TCS track circuits T
SIG signals S
PTS points P
ROU routes R
FLG flags (miscellaneous functions)
ELT elapsed timers E
QST panel requests Q
BUT signaller’s control devices B
IND signaller’s indications I
Figure F4:5 SSI Identity Files
Flags include subroutes, suboverlaps and latches (prefixed U, O, L respectively).

Panel requests are qualified, hence QR = route request, QXAUTO = auto button
pulled request, etc.
Typical subroutes and suboverlaps for the layout in Appendix F5 are shown in
Figure F4:7.
This variable data is updated by:
a) inputs from the trackside data link (e.g. lamp proving, track sections, point
detection);
b) inputs from other interlockings;
c) inputs from PPMs (signaller's control devices operated);
d) commands from processed geographical data files (e.g. set signal aspect,
call points, set route, unset subroute, start timer); or
e) maintainer's controls (e.g. temporary approach control).
F174 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page F175 of 191
F4:3.5 Geographical Data Files

The geographical data customises an SSI for a particular installation and is
equivalent to the interlocking circuitry in a conventional system. The source data
is prepared in a near English format on a design workstation. A single set of
data files is then compiled to generate the machine code required by the MPMs
and PPMs, from which the EPROMs are blown. The geographical data files
listed in Figure F4:6 are required for processing within the functional programs of
the MPMs and PPMs, respectively, and carry the extension “.dat”.
The PPM data files are not required when communicating with an IECC, as they
are catered for within the signalling display system.
Filename Processed by Interlocking MPM

IPT Input Telegram: directs proving information to
update variable data in the RAM.
OPT Output Telegram: prepares operating
information for transmission to TFMs and other
interlockings.
FOP Flag Operations: specifies the processing of
flags, such as subroute and suboverlap
releasing.
PRR Panel Route Requests: including availability
testing, commands required to set and lock each
route and point key requests.
PFM Points Free to Move: defines for each set of
points the conditions to allow them to move
normal and move reverse.
MAP Map: a data map used to search for trains in
connection with comprehensive approach lock
release and TORR facilities.
Filename Processed by PPM

PSD panel display data
PPD panel points data
PTD panel track data
POD panel other data
PBK panel button & keyswitch
Figure F4:6 SSI Geographical Data Files
RAILTRACK F175
AB-BA AC-CA AD-BA
51 53
AC-BA
AA AB AC A AD
B A C B A
A B
BE-BD BD-AC
BH BF-AB BC-AB
D C A A
B A B B
BF BE BC
BE-CA
54 BD 56
BD-AB
C B
CA-BA CC-CA A A
CB-BA CD-CA
CE-AD
201 CD-CB CE-EB CF-BA
203 CC-BA
CE-EC 205
A E
B A B CB A C CC C CD B CE B B CF A
CA
DD-DA DD
DE-AC D C
B DG-AC A D
A DG 507 DC-BA DB-BA
DD-CA
DJ-AB DF-BA DE-CB 511 DA
B A D B C DG-BA A DD-DB B DC A B DB B A
DD-CB
DJ B DF A C DE B A A
DH-BD C 214 KZ
A DF-AB DE-BC DD-AC B DB-AB
210 DH-CA A B DG-AB 212 C AB-BA DA-AB
DH DD-BC 216
C FC-AC FA-CA
FC-CA B 509
EL B A
B C 506 FA FA-AC 510
FC-CB
A
FC-BC FA-AB
Withdrawn Document
505 FC FA-BA
EL-CB
105
C FD-AB
FD1
EK2
FD2
KEY
B
A Sub-Route
B Sub-Overlap
110
FF
Figure F4:7 Typical Subroutes and Suboverlaps (relating to Figure F5:10)

Withdrawn Document
GK/GN0600
Page F177 of 191
Examples of data constructs for processing by the interlocking functional

program are given in Figures F4:8 to F4:11 for interlocking AA, based on the
layout given in Appendix F5. The interpretation is given on the right of the
figures. See the SSI applications manual for full details of the data preparation.
The following data abbreviations are used, but the meanings are dependent on
the data context:
a available (not barred by maintainer)

alt approach locking timer
auto automatic mode
bpull button pulled
c clear
cdn controlled and detected normal
cnf controlled normal or free to go normal
f free
foal free of approach locking
k key switch
l locked
lp lamp proving
o occupied
s route set
seq aspect sequencing
x not (points), or undefined (tracks)
ascon aspect control

g green aspect
fyy flashing double yellow aspect
yy double yellow aspect
fy flashing yellow aspect
y yellow aspect
s subsidiary or independent PLS proceed aspect
r red aspect
c< “n” clear for less than n seconds

o> “n” occupied for at least n seconds
=0 set timer to zero
* label
\ statement terminator
‘ start special (OPT)
" start special (IPT)
. end marker
$ end of special
% track circuit combination
# reference required by a procedure
@ carry out tests or commands and return
RAILTRACK F177
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GK/GN0600
Page F178 of 191
Points 709 free to move normal requires:

*P709N TBD c , TBE c , TCD c , TCE c tracks BD, BE, CD, CE clear;
UBD-AB f , UCD-CA f subroutes BD (A to B), CD (C to A) free;
(TDE c or P710 cdn) \
(track DE clear or points 710 controlled to and
detected normal).
Points 709 free to move reverse requires:

*P709R TBD c , TBE c , TCD c , TCE c tracks BD, BE, CD, CE clear;
UBD-AC f , UCD-CB f \ subroutes BD (A to C), CD (C to B) free.
Figure F4:8 Extract of Points Free to Move File: PFM. dat
Request for route 56B:

*QR56B if R56B a , P709 cnf , P711 cnf IF route 56B available, points 709, 711 and 712
P712 cnf controlled to normal or free;
then R56B s , P709 cn , P711 cn
THEN set route bit 56B, set points 709, 711
P712 cn , UBC-AB l
UBD-AC l , UBE-BD l and 712 control bits normal, lock subroutes
UBF-AB l , S56 clear bpull \ BC (A to B), BD (A to C), BE (B to D) and BF
(A to B), and clear button pulled memory.
Figure F4:9 Extract of Panel Route Request File: PRR.dat
UBC-AB f if R56A xs , R56B xs , TBC c \ . These are the conditions for releasing some of
the subroutes behind a train.
UBD-AC f if UBC-AB f , TBD c \ .
The data should also delay the release by 15s
UBE-BD f if UBD-AC f , TBE c \ . (or next track occupied) where ARS is provided.
UBF-AB f if UBE-BD f , TBF c \ .
UBD-AB f if UBC-AB f , TBD c \ .

Figure F4:10 Extract of Flag Operations File: FOP.dat
F4:3.6 Trackside Functional Modules (TFMs)

Trackside signalling equipment is operated directly from TFMs which are
connected to the interlocking by means of a safety critical data link. The
interlocking MPMs exchange operating and proving information (in the OPT and
IPT files) with the TFMs by means of output and input telegrams.
A typical data link schematic and TFM allocation is shown in Figure F4:12.
Arrangements at lineside locations, including the use of interface relays, are

described in other Parts of this Guidance Note.
F178 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page F179 of 191
Special data constructs are available for points and signals to avoid repetition. This signal special has 10 elements.
Address 19 (signal 56 TFM):

*019 ’S56 Start signal 56 special:
R56A s , @R56A If route 56A set, go to sub routine R56A;
R56B s , @R56B
if route 56B set, go to sub routine R56B;
G s 7.
$. if no route set, send telegram "set TFM bit 7"
(signal 56 red aspect). End of special.
Sub routine R56B:
*R56B #TBC #TBD . Approach lock release requires track BC
occupied & clear and BD occupied.
#TBB #TBC . Signal stick unsetting requires tracks BB & BC
occupied with signal off.
if R216(M) a , S216 set ascon+foal+r Requirement for stepping up from warning to
S214 set stick , R214 s , TDD c main route (not applicable to 56 signal, so
then R216(M) s , R216(W) xs example shows 216 signal instead).
ODD-AC l \ .
Signal 56 aspect control bit requires signal
if S56 set stick , TBC c , TBD c stick set, tracks in route and overlap clear,
TBE c , TBF c , P709 cdn points 709, 711 & 712 controlled to and
P711 cdn , P712 cdn
detected normal, (flank track CE clear or points
(TCE c or P710 cdn)
S54 set lp \ . 710 controlled to and detected normal), and
signal 54 ahead proved alight.
Temporary approach control requires berth
if TBB o \ . track BB occupied.
Route indicator proved alight after BB track has
if TBB o> 10 \ G s 3 . been occupied for 10s (not applicable to 56B
route; example shows 56A route instead).
Gs7\ Aspect sequencing: telegram "set TFM bit 7"
S54 seq 4 , G s 7654 . sets to red; signal 54 ahead is 4 aspect;
telegram setting TFM bits 7, 6, 5, 4 is required
for R, Y, YY, G respectively.
The program calculates the correct aspect.
if TBB o \ G s 2 . AWS: telegram "set TFM bit 2" sets AWS
inductor, economised by track BB occupied.
The program requires signal at green and alight
to send this telegram.
S56 alt> 120 . Set approach lock timer at 120s. The program
examines button pulled bit, aspect control bit,
approach lock release bit, and state of timer to
determine actions such as freeing approach
locking, resetting the release, and starting and
stopping the timer. Comprehensive approach
locking conditions can be added here, where
required.
R56B xs . The route is released by entrance button pulled
and approach locking free.
The program also sets the signal stick and
cancels auto mode when the entrance button is
pulled. TORR conditions can be added here,
where required.
Figure F4:11 Extract of Output Telegram File: OPT.dat
RAILTRACK F179
LOC 173/73 LOC 174/75 LOC 175/57 LOC 175/50
TO TOFT
GREEN RR
DLM D M DLM DLM DLM DLM DLM DLM

A B A B A B A B
MOD MOD MOD

01S01 01S02 01S05
MOD
01S03
MOD
01P04
LOC 173/73 LOC 175/57 LOC 175/50
MODULE 01S01 MODULE 01S03 MODULE 01S05

INPUT OUTPUT INPUT OUTPUT INPUT OUTPUT
101 EC 7 101 HGE RR 105 EC 7 105 RGE RR 110 EC 7 110 RGE RR
101 EK 6 101 DGE 105 EK 6 105 HGE 110 EK 6 110 DGE
5 101 I 105 UEC 5 105 DGE 105BR GEC 5 110 I
EJ TP 4 4 105 (PL)GE 105BR GEK 4
EH TP 3 PS 3 105 UGE1 PS FG TP 3 105BR ON RR
2 EL (INT) 2 105 UGE2 FF TP 2 105BR OFF
1 EL TP 1 105 UGE3 EK TP 1 105 I
Withdrawn Document
0 FD2 TP 0 EK2 TP 0
LOC 174/75
MODULE 01S02 MODULE 01P04

INPUT OUTPUT INPUT OUTPUT
103 EC 7 103 RGE RR 705 NWK 7 705 NWR
103 EK 6 103 HGE 705 RWK 6 705 RWR
5 103 DGE 5
4 103 I 4
3 PS 3
2 2 RR = RED RETAINING
1 1
0 705 WCR 0 PS = PROTECTED SOURCE
Figure F4:12 Typical Data Link Schematic and TFM Allocation (see GK/RC0701 for the Location Area Plan)
Withdrawn Document
Signalling and Operational GK/GN0600
Date April 1999
Appendix F5
Layout and Control
Tables to Illustrate
Examples
The signalling layout shown in Figure F5:10 is used as an illustration throughout
this Guidance Note. It is placed at the end for easy reference.
The control tables provided for this layout illustrate the controls in a route setting
system for the following features:
a) main route associated with a call-on route (Figure F5:1);
b) call-on route (Figure F5:2);
c) route with a swinging overlap (Figure F5:3);
d) main route associated with a warning route (Figure F5:4);
e) warning route (Figure F5:5);
f) trap points (Figure F5:6);
g) trailing points in an overlap (Figure F5:7);
h) hinge points for a swinging overlap (Figure F5:8); and
i) points giving flank protection (Figure F5:9).
See Figures F1:10 to F1:12 for the equivalent controls in a non-route setting
system.
RAILTRACK F181
U 707, 706 FD1, 212A(C) U
T FD2 505A FC, DG T
E CLEAR E
R R
E E
Q Q
U U
I I
R Route Disable R
S YES S
G 707, 706A/B (DG, FC, FD1)$40, FD2, DF$7 G
N FF, N
A (DH OR 708R) A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
S Track Circuits Stick Control A Route Aspect Next Main Signal: 110 Track S
Signals Occupied for $40 to Inhibit Applied W hen Signal Off Special S Indication to be Route Banner Circuits
E 110 DF, DG DF, DG POS 1 Y R E
Q S G Y (DE OR Q
U E G G DF) U
I Aspect Disable Automatic Working A A Q I
Withdrawn Document
R Control/Link Provided Facility Provided W Permanent Magnet YES W R

E YES NO S Electro-Inductor YES S E
A Approach Locking Applied W hen Signal Clears Signals ON Approach Locking Released by Signal ON TORR Requires Approach Locking Free and Tracks
P (or Attempts to Clear or to Show a Route OR and Free of and Time Special TORR NOT PROVIDED
R WHEN CLEARED (DG CLEAR, FC OCC) AFTER 120 T T
O (DG OCC, FC OCC) O O
A R R
C R R
H
L
K
G.
References
$7 Temporary approach control. HUDSON STREET
$40 Required clear for proceed aspect; replaces signal except under last-wheel or other special replacement conditions. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
$46 Time in seconds; timing tolerance of 0% to +20%, or 0 secs to +3 secs, whichever is greater.
Route: 212A(M)
Exit: 110
Figure F5:1 Control Tables to Illustrate a Main Route Associated with a Call-On Route
U 707, 706 (FD1, 212A(M) U
T OR 505A FC, DG T
E FD2) E
OCC
R R
E E
Q Q
U U
I I
R Route Disable R
S YES S
G 707, 706A/B (DG, FC)$40, (FD1 OR FD2)$10, G
N FF, DF N
A (DH OR 708R) A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E DF, DG DF, DG ‘B’$25 PL E
Q S Q
U E U
Withdrawn Document

R WHEN CLEARED (DG CLEAR, FC OCC) AFTER 120 T T
O (DG OCC, FC OCC) O O
A R R
C R R
H
L
K
G.
References
$10 At time of clearing. HUDSON STREET
$25 Route indication NOT proved alight in signal controls. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
$40 Required clear for proceed aspect; replaces signal except under last-wheel or other special replacement conditions.
Route: 212A(C)
Exit: 110
Figure F5:2 Control Tables to Illustrate a Call-On Route

U 713, 714, 710, (707 w 706R$31) 507A DD, DC U
T (706 OR 707R), 505A FC, DG, DF, DE T
E (705, 708 OR 707N) E
(707 w 705R$31 OR 708R$31)
R R
E E
Q Q
U U
I I
R Route Disable R
S YES S
G 713A/B/C, 714A/B/C, 710, 707 DC, DD, DE, DF$16, DB$7 G
N (706A/B OR 707R$37) (CE OR 709N), N
A (705, 708$33 OR 707N$37) DG, (FC OR 706R), (DH OR 708R) A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E 212 DB, DC Y R E
Q S G Y Q
U E G G U
Withdrawn Document
R WHEN CLEARED (DC CLEAR, DD OCC) AFTER 120 T T
O (DC OCC, DD OCC) O O

A R R
C R R
H
L
K
G.
References
$16 Signal ahead approach control TPR proved energised. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
$31 When points locked.
$33 Not detected. Route: 214
$37 Points set and detected.
Exit: 212
Figure F5.3 Control Tables to Illustrate a Route with a Swinging Overlap

U 713, 714 216(W) U
T 507A DD, DC, DB T
E E
R R
E E
Q Q
U U
I I
R Route Disable R
S YES S
G 713A/B/C, 714A/B/C DA, DB$16, KZ$7 G
N DC, DD N
A A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E 214 KZ, DA Y R E
Q S G Y Q
U E G G U
Withdrawn Document
R WHEN CLEARED (DA CLEAR, DB OCC) AFTER 120 T T
O (DA OCC, DB OCC) O O

A R R
C R R
H
L
K
G.
References
$16 Signal ahead approach control TPR proved energised. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
Route: 216(M)
Exit: 214
Figure F5:4 Control Tables to Illustrate a Main Route Associated with a Warning Route
U 105C(S) EL, DH, CC, CD, CE, DD, DC, DB This route will step-up to 216(M) U
T 203C(S) CC, CD, CE, DD, DC, DB if available with 214 set and T
E 216(M) 216(W) not cleared. E
507A DD, DC, DB
R R
E E
Q Q
U U
I I
R Route Disable R
S YES S
G DA, DB$16, KZ FOR 15 ($46) G
N DC N
A A
L L
C C
O O
N N
T T
R R
O O
L L
E 214 KZ, DA Y R E
Q S Y Y Q
U E Y G U
Withdrawn Document
R WHEN CLEARED (DA CLEAR, DB OCC) AFTER 120 T T
O (DA OCC, DB OCC) O O
A R R
C R R
H
L
K
G.
References
$16 Signal ahead approach control TPR proved energised. HUDSON STREET
$40 Required clear for proceed aspect; replaces signal except under last-wheel or other special replacement conditions. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
Route: 216(W)
Exit: 214
Figure F5:5 Control Tables to Illustrate a Warning Route

N > R Disable 105A(M), 105B(M), (56A OR 707N$37) DG, DH, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF OR DF - - - 20)
Control Provided
P YES 105C(S), 105D(S) 201(M) CC, (CA, CB - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR CB - - - 30)
O EL 203A(M), 203B(M), CC
I 203C(S), 203D(S)
N 212B(M) DG, DH
T (214 OR 707N$37) DG, DH, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - OR DF - - - 20)
S
C
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
EL (56A OR 707N$37), 105A(M), 105B(M), EL

P 201(M), 105C(S), 105D(S)
O 203A(M), 203B(M),
I 203C(S), 203D(S),
N 212B(M),
T
S
(214 OR 707N$37),
(505B, 506 w
C 56A OR 214 USED),
A (707 N>R w
L 56A OR 214 USED)
L
E
D
R
> R > N Disable
Withdrawn Document
N Control Provided
YES
When Routes Used R Tracks Clear or Tracks Occupied $8 Secs

TIME OF EFFECTIVE E
OPERATION L
LOCKING
B
Y
References
$8 Automatically delayed release. HUDSON STREET
$37 Points set and detected. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
Point No: 705
Figure F5:6 Control Tables to Illustrate Trap Points (without auto normalisation)
N > R Disable 505B, 506 (56A OR 707R$37) DG, FC, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF OR DF ---- 20)
Control Provided
P YES 212A(M), 212A(C) DG, FC
O FC, (214 OR 707R$37) DG, FC, (DC, DD, DE, DF ----- OR DF ---- 20)
I (DG OR 707R) 505A FC
N
T
S
C
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
FC (56A OR 707R$37), 505B FC

P 212A(M), 212A(C), 506 FC
O (214 OR 707R$37),
I 505A,
N
(105A(M), 105B(M),
T
S
105C(S), 105D(S) w
56A OR 214 USED),
C (707 R>N w
A 56A OR 214 USED)
L
L
E
D
Withdrawn Document
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
YES
TIME OF EFFECTIVE E
OPERATION L
LOCKING
B
Y
References
Point No: 706
(Two ends: A/B)
Figure F5:7 Control Tables to Illustrate Trailing Points in an Overlap (with Trapping Protection)
N > R Disable (56A w 706R$31), 105A(M), 105B(M), EL, DH, CC
Control Provided 212B(M), 105C(S), 105D(S)
P YES (214 w 706R$31), 212A(M), 212A(C) DG
O DG, (505B, 506 w 505A FC, DG
I (CC OR 708N) 56A OR 214 USED) DG, FC, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF OR DF - - - 20) DH 56A
N (FC OR 706R) DG, FC, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - - OR DF - - - 20) DH 214
T
S
C
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
DG, DH 105A(M), 105B(M), (56A OR 706N$28) DG, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF - - - - OR DF - - - 20)
P 105C(S), 105D(S), 212B(M) DG
O 212A(M), 212A(C), (214 OR 706N$28) DG, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - - - - - OR DF - - - 20)
I 505A DG, DH, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF OR DF - - - 20) FC 706N 56A
N DG, DH, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - OR DF - - - 20) FC 706N 214
T
S
C
A
L
L
E
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D
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
YES
TIME OF EFFECTIVE 56A, 214 E (DF OR DF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20)
OPERATION L.
LOCKING
B
Y
References
$28 Set or free to operate. TOFT GREEN INTERLOCKING
$31 W hen points locked.
$33 Not detected.
$37 Points set and detected.
Point No: 707
Figure F5:8 Control Tables to Illustrate Hinge Points for a Swinging Overlap
N > R Disable 105A(M), 105B(M), (56A OR 707N$37) DG, FC, (BC, BD, CE, DE, DF OR DF - - - 20)
Control Provided 105C(S), 105D(S)
P YES 201(M) CC, (CA, CB - - - - - - - - - - - - - OR CB - - - 30)
O CC, 203A(M), 203B(M), CC
I (DG OR 707N) 203C(S), 203D(S),
N 212B(M) DG, DH
T (214 OR 707N$37) DG, FC, (DC, DD, DE, DF - - - - OR DF - - - 20)
S
C
A
L
L
E
D
N
>
R
CC, DH (56A OR 707N$37), 105A(M), 105B(M), EL, DH, CC

P 201(M), 105C(S), 105D(S)
O 203A(M), 203B(M),
I 203C(S), 203D(S),
N 212B(M),
T
S
(214 OR 707N$37),
(505B, 506 w
C 56A OR 214 USED),
A (707 N>R w
L 56A OR 214 USED)
L
E
D
Withdrawn Document
R
> R > N Disable
N Control Provided
YES
TIME OF EFFECTIVE E
OPERATION L
LOCKING
B
Y
References
Point No: 708
Figure F5:9 Control Tables to Illustrate Points that Give Flank Protection
49 51 A 53
AB AC AD
GZ AA 712A 712B DOWN FAST
BH BF BE 711A 711B BC BB
UP FAST BA
52 CP CP 709B 58
SPAD 203 54 BD 56 A
201 203
CP CP 205
CD 709A CE CF DOW N SLOW
JZ CA CB RPOL 46m CC 708 203G 713A
X 511
DJ 707 DG DF 710 DE 507 714A 713B DDROL 91m DC DB DA
DH 714B 713C UP SLOW KZ
POL 706B 212 509 714C 214
210 183m FC 216
EL UP SIDING FA NECK
105 706A 510
506
705 505 Opposing Locking Omitted
RR
105BR FD1
101 103 EK2
TOFT GREEN
EK1 FD2
EH EJ DOW N BRANCH
UP BRANCH
FG FF
110
Figure F5:10 Signalling Layout to Illustrate Examples (not to scale)
Signal Route Letter Destination Aspect RI Type RI Position Special Signal Route Letter Destination Aspect RI Type RI Position
Number & Class Line Name Sig Type JI/SI/MI or Legend Notes Number & Class Line Name Sig Type JI/SI/MI or Legend
51 DOWN FAST 53 M - - Auto facilities 505 A UP SLOW 507 PL - -
56 A UP SLOW 212 M JI Pos 1 B UP SIDING 506 PL - -
Withdrawn Document
B UP FAST 54 M - - Auto facilities 507 A UP SLOW 511 PL - -

105 A(M) DOWN FAST 53 M JI Pos 1 B NECK 510 PL - -

B(M) DOWN SLOW 205 M - - 510 A UP SIDING 509 PL - -
C(S) UP SLOW 511 PL MI ‘X’ B UP SLOW 212 PL - -
D(S) NECK 510 PL MI ‘N’
201 (M) DOWN SLOW 203 M - - Full overlap
(W) DOWN SLOW 203 M - - ROL
203 A(M) DOWN FAST 53 M JI Pos 1
B(M) DOWN SLOW 205 M - -
C(S) UP SLOW 511 PL MI ‘X’
D(S) NECK 510 PL MI ‘N’
212 A(M) UP BRANCH 110 M JI Pos 1 Last wheel replaced
A(C) UP BRANCH 110 PL MI ‘B’
B(M) UP SLOW 210 M - - Last wheel replaced
216 (M) UP SLOW 214 M - - Full overlap
(W) UP SLOW 214 M - - ROL
Figure F5:11 Table of Signal Routes
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GK/GN0600
Page J1 of 18
Part J:
Transmission Systems
(including Cables,
Terminations and Cable
Routes)
1 Introduction
1.1
This Guidance Note applies to the design of Transmission Systems (including
Cables, Terminations and Cable Routes).
1.2
Transmission systems (including cables) are provided as a means of
interconnecting systems, sub-systems or items of equipment. Additionally,
cables (commonly, but not universally single core) are provided as part of the
internal circuitry of individual items of equipment.
1.3
Cables fall into four broad areas of application:
• internal wires within an installation or sub-system (predominantly single core);

• main cables providing external transmission between installations or sub-
systems including power distribution, direct-wired, remote control and
datalink systems;
• tail cables providing connection from lineside equipment housings to
trackside or on-track equipment (sometimes via disconnection boxes),
including track circuit connections and lineside operational telephone cables;
• bonding cables (usually single core) provided for track circuit, earth and
equipotential bonding.
1.4
Terminations are provided as a means of interfacing between differing types
and/or sizes of cable and also in order to provide circuit disconnection and/or
test facilities.
1.5
Cable routes are provided as a means of constraining cables and also protecting
them from their environment.
1.6
This part may not be applicable to the internal wiring of sealed manufactured
units. In this case alternative arrangements should be agreed as part of the
approval process.
1.7
Guidance Note, is an alternative to the risk-based approach described in part B.
However, where the particular application or intended environment for the
system introduces additional risks, these should be subject to separate
assessment.
The Design Principles in Section 2 give the minimum requirements, even when
the risk-based approach is used.
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2 Design Principles
2.1
The choice of transmission systems (including cables) should be appropriate to
the safety integrity level of the systems and circuits which are carried over them.
2.2
The design of transmission(including cable) systems should address the
following potential hazards:
• cable route / cable route systems (both internal and external) -

level of protection
compatibility of cable type and route type
vandalism / rodent protection
access and security arrangements
capacity;
• environment -
route location
atmospheric
ambient temperature
ground conditions / spillage;
• facilities over which there is no direct control (e.g. equipment of a service
provider);
• stress and vibration;
• labelling and marking (identification);
• type of cables -
conductor materials
insulation materials;
• method of interconnecting with other cables and systems / equipment;
• method of running / recovering cable;
• mixing of transmission systems within cables and cable routes;
• screening, earthing and immunisation;
• spare capacity requirement;
• spare capacity requirement;
• screening, earthing and immunisation;
• stress and vibration;
• mixing of transmission systems within cables and cable routes;
• sub-system compatibility;
• type of cables -
conductor materials
insulation materials;
• over-current protection and isolation facilities.
3 Requirements
3.1 General
All transmission systems and cables used for the signalling and operational
telecommunications system should be of approved types.
The choice of cable type/cable route construction should take account of the
minimum bending radii of the cables.
Since the life of a cable is reduced by exposure to high ambient temperatures,

attention should be given to its anticipated environment. Cables should not be
exposed to ambient temperatures in excess of 25°C for any significant period.
The size of conductor should be chosen such that the maximum designed
current which will flow should not exceed the rating of the cable. The required
rating should take account of whether current flow is continuous or intermittent.
Typical Loop resistance and current carrying capacities are given in Appendix
J1. Conductors (including Earth and equipotential bonding) should, where
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practicable, be adequately rated so as to survive beyond fault clearance times.

It may not be practicable to cater for significant traction faults.
The risk of a fault condition causing damage should be addressed by providing

over-current protection.
Transmission systems should be terminated such that the connection is

electrically and mechanically robust.
Design should minimise the number of joints within any cable. Cable joints
should not in any way reduce the ability of the cable to meet the requirements of
this part. Where through joints are provided, the conductors should generally be
connected like-to-like (i.e. core-2 to core-2 or colour to colour). Where this
requirement cannot be met, a cable core plan showing full details of the joint
should be provided.
Spare cores should be provided as specified by the Infrastructure Controller.

The number of spare cores in main cables should be not less than two in cables
exceeding 10 cores and not less than four in cables exceeding 30 cores. There
is no minimum requirement for tail cables.
Consideration should be given to the need to de-rate the current carrying

capacity of cables which are grouped.
The insulation of any cable should be sufficient as to enable the cable to

withstand the applied voltage and any foreseeable transient over-voltages. The
insulation should also be sufficient to withstand the applied voltage within any
other cable with which it comes into direct contact, in particular where mixed with
power cables.
Twisted pair cables should be used where it is a requirement of the technology

of the signalling and operational telecommunications system. Where a twisted
pair cable is used, each circuit should utilise conductors within the same pair.
The feed and return legs of any circuit should be transmitted in the same cable /
system.
The design should avoid the potential for electrochemical effects arising from the
mixing of differing conductor materials where cables interface with other cables
or terminations.
All cables used in railway stations should meet the requirements of GH/ZT0113.
Cables used within apparatus housings should generally be zero halogen, low
smoke (ZHLS). Where it is necessary for non-ZHLS cables to enter an
apparatus housing, only a minimum practicable length should be permitted
before interface is made with the internal cables.
Since ZHLS cable sheaths tend to be less robust than the materials otherwise
used, use of ZHLS cables should be restricted to those applications where that
requirement is necessary.
PVC insulated cables used internally should be run in trunking containing only
PVC insulated cables. This is to avoid the possibility of plasticiser migration
between differing insulation materials.
Buried routes, where permitted, should meet the requirements of GM/RT1103.
Where it is not practicable to retain cables within trunking and there is a risk of
them becoming trapped (e.g. in doors, points or other moving parts), the
cables/conductors should be secured by means of plastic-ties or spiral wrapping.
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Plastic lacing of cables/conductors should not be used. Plastic-ties may be used

only to secure sheathed cables, thus cables without a sheath should not be
used where treeing is likely to take place. This latter requirement does not apply
to PVC insulated cables.
Any work involving communication networks (including cables) should accord

with GK/RT0105.
Screening, earthing and immunisation should comply with BR13422.
3.2 Special Cables

Wiring of certain specific signalling and operational telecommunications system
facilities and equipment requires the use of special cables as designated and
detailed by the manufacturer and equipment/system specification. Such special
cables are dealt with in the part of this standard related to the specific
equipment.
Approval of the cable type and application should be an integral part of the
approval for the related equipment and should when appropriate, detail the
method of segregation from general signalling and operational
telecommunications cables.
3.3 Core Identification

The outer face of core insulation should be identified, either by numbering or
colour coding.
Where identification is by numbering, the sequence should start with number

one for the core at the centre of the cable, with the sequence progressing
towards the outside of the cable such that the highest number is contained
within the outer layer.
Where identification is by colour coding, the identification standard should be as

specified on the design. For two core cables, the identification may be by
colouring the outer face of the insulation of one core red, and the other black.
Telecommunications type cables are commonly constructed in unit twin or

concentric twin form.
In unit twin construction, 5 or 10 pairs are twisted and bound to form a unit.
Units are then combined to form the size of cable required. Thus a 50 pair cable
will have 5 x 10 pair units, arranged either as a single layer of 5 x (10) or a
centre layer of 1 x (10) and an outer layer of 4 x (10).
In concentric twin construction, two or more pairs are combined to form the
centre of the cable. Additional pairs are then laid up around the centre in various
layers to form the required size. Thus a 50 pair cable will have a centre of three
pairs, with succeeding layers of 9, 16 and 22 pairs respectively.
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The colour coding of conductors identifies their position within a unit as in

Figure J1:
1 White Blue
2 White Orange
3 White Green
4 White Brown
5 White Grey
6 Red Blue
7 Red Orange
8 Red Green
9 Red Brown
10 Red Grey
Note: Pairs 1-5 = Sub Unit ;
Pairs 6-10 = Complement Sub Unit;
Pairs 1-10 = Unit
The first stated colour should be used for the A (or positive) leg of a polarity
conscious circuit.
Figure J1 Colour Scheme (Unit Construction)
Coloured tapes are used to identify the layers as in Figure J2:
Unit / Layer 1 2 3 4 5
Colour Blue Orange Green Brown Grey
Unit / Layer 6 7 8 9 10
Colour White Red Black Yellow Violet
Figure J2 Colour of Tape Lappings (Unit Identification)
In the case of three phase power supplies, the conductors should be identified
by the phase colour (red, yellow or blue as appropriate) with the neutral(where
provided) black.
3.4 Colour Identification of cables used for special purposes.

Cables used for certain special purposes should be colour coded.
The colour coding should be provided either by the outer of the cable being self
coloured or by the application of coloured sleeves or tape. Where the
identification is by sleeving or taping, this should be applied at each end of the
cable.
3.4.1 Applications and Colours

Only the colours shown in Figure J3 should be used for the listed applications
and those colours should not be used for any other purpose where there may be
any risk of confusion.
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Application Colour
Earth or equipotential bonding Green/Yellow striped
Testing straps Yellow #
Testing straps providing false Brown
feeds
Temporary jumpers Red #
Jumpering of signalling circuits Red/white (note: yellow/ black
within telecommunications formerly used, but not to be
cables perpetuated)
Negative leg of positive-earth Blue #
battery supplies
# except that red, yellow and blue are also permitted for power supply phase
core identification and other colours for core identification (see Figure J1 and
Figure J2) as in 3.3
Figure J3.
Where there is a requirement under GH/ZT0113, the sheath colour of cables

containing Essential Circuits should comply with that standard.
3.4.2 Stageworks
Temporary Stagework cables (where there is a need to differentiate from the
permanent wiring) should be distinctively coloured to enable it to be readily
distinguished.
4 Application
4.1 Transmission of Signalling and Operational Telecommunications
Functions
4.1.1
Categorisation of Signalling and Operational Telecommunications Functions and
Transmission Systems
The signalling and operational telecommunications function to be transmitted and

the transmission system should both be categorised and the relationship should
be as in figure J4:
FUNCTION Safety-- Safety- Non-Safety-

CODE Critical Related # Related
Highly Coded Minimum Minimum Minimum
restrictions restrictions restrictions
Coded Some Minimum Minimum
Un-Coded Severe Some Minimum
# - but not Safety-Critical
Figure J4
Severe restrictions should require no foreseeable probability of the function

being delivered at an alternative destination (e.g. high quality direct wire with no
intermediate switching).
Minimum restrictions will permit the use direct telecomms bearers and may
permit the use of switched telecomms bearers in some circumstances.
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4.1.2
Safety-critical functions should be transmitted by:
• direct wire, using cable approved for railway signalling use;

• in a safety-critical transmission system, such as vital FDM (frequency division
multiplex) or SSI; or
• telecommunications systems or cables, approved for use with safety-critical
signalling.
4.1.3
Safety-related functions should be transmitted by:
• any transmission system from section 4.1.2;

• direct wire, using signalling, microcore, or telecommunications cable;
• a safety-related system, such as less-vital FDM; or
• duplicated in a non-safety-related system, such as non-vital FDM or TDM.
(The requirement for duplication is satisfied by functions which require two
changes of state to operate, such as signal F and FM buttons, or point key
switches with N, C, R positions.)
4.1.4
Non-safety-related functions may be transmitted by any convenient system.
4.1.5
The length of any line circuit (including FDM and CCTV) should be limited to
ensure that the induced longitudinal voltage from the traction system does not
exceed the limits given in GK/RT0132 under traction fault conditions.
4.1.6
Where return conductors and booster transformers are not employed with the
traction system, isolating transformers should be provided in power supplies, at
intervals not exceeding 3km. Where the signalling and operational
telecommunications supply originates from a traction feeder station, isolating
transformers should be provided at 1.5km from the supply point and , at intervals
not exceeding 3km thereafter.
4.1.7
In a.c. electrified areas, TDM systems should use balanced pairs in cables
approved for use as part of the overall system.
4.2 Utilisation of Signalling Cables

4.2.1
The following may be transmitted in railway signalling cable which accords with
section 5:
• coded safety-critical circuits, such as axle counters and reed systems, but
only where they are carried in twisted pair cable;
• un-coded safety-critical circuits, such as block circuits, interlocking controls
and proving;
• coded safety-related systems, such as TDM, HABD and TD, but only where
they are carried in twisted pair cable;
• un-coded safety-related circuits, such as panel controls and indications;
• coded or un-coded non-safety-related circuits, such as monitoring.
4.2.2
The following functions should not be carried in railway signalling cable which
accords with section 5:
• highly coded safety-critical systems, such as SSI and RETB, except for
specifically designed datalink cables;
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• coded safety-critical and safety-related circuits, except for twisted pair cable;
• safety-related or non-safety-related reed systems, unless the direction of lay
alternates for successive core layers, each system uses a pair of adjacent
conductors in the same layer, and additional systems in the same cable are
separated as far as practicable and do not use a conductor adjacent to
another system;
• more than one track circuit function in a tail cable; nor
• safety-related communication circuits.
4.3 Utilisation of Telecommunications Cables

4.3.1
The following may be transmitted in cables which are installed and maintained to
telecommunications standards:
• highly coded safety-critical systems, such as SSI and RETB;

• coded safety-related systems, such as TDM, HABD and TD;
• un-coded safety-related circuits, such as panel controls and indications
(undesirable);
• certain signalling circuits, such as manual block circuits, and panel controls
and indications, provided it can be shown that there is no risk of cross
connection causing a wrong side failure. (undesirable);
• coded or un-coded non-safety-related circuits, such as monitoring;
4.3.2
The following may be transmitted in cables which are installed and maintained to
telecommunications standards, so long as there is only one such system in the
cable or an additional level of security is provided:
• coded safety-critical circuits, such as axle counters, and any reed system;
• un-coded Level Crossing CCTV system;
• coded Tokenless Block,
thus preventing cross connection from causing a wrong side failure.
4.3.3
The following functions should not be carried directly in cables which are installed
and maintained to telecommunications standards:
• un-coded safety-critical circuits, such as interlocking controls and proving,

signal/point control and indication, track circuit indication;
• un-coded Tokenless Block (Salisbury to Exeter type);
• un-coded Key Token (including No Signalman Key Token) or equivalent
system.
4.4 Utilisation of Telecommunications Transmission Systems

4.4.1
The following may be transmitted in multiplexed systems which are installed and
maintained to telecommunications standards:
• highly coded safety-critical systems, such as SSI and RETB;

• coded safety-related systems, such as TDM, HABD and TD;
• coded or un-coded (undesirable) non-safety-related circuits, such as
monitoring; and
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4.4.2
The following functions should not be carried in multiplexed systems which are
installed and maintained to telecommunications standards, unless an additional
level of security is provided:
• coded safety-critical circuits, such as axle counters, and any reed system;
• un-coded safety-critical circuits, such as block circuits, interlocking controls
and proving; nor
• un-coded safety-related circuits, such as panel controls and indications.
4.5 Track Circuit Bonding

This should be provided in accordance with GK/RT0252.
Selection of the cable and rail connectors should take account of the high levels
of vibration or stress which are likely to be encountered in service.
4.6 Power Supplies

Further requirements specific to power supplies are given in part C
4.7 Earth and Equipotential Bonding

The following should be provided, where applicable:
• connections to electronic equipment requiring protection (see part D

Appendix D2);
• equipotential bonding to ensure occupational safety (see section 9);
• protective earth bonding of electrical equipment (see Part C);
• functional earth jumpering (to telecommunications standards);
• screening.
5 Railway Signalling
Cable
5.1 General
Cables which are installed and maintained to signalling standards should be
utilised for circuits as detailed in section 4.2 and subject to the overriding criterion
of section 4.1.4..
The type of cables selected for use should be determined by the application and
should fall in to one of the following categories:
• Internal type;
• External type;
• On-Track type.
The construction of the cable conductors (e.g. solid, stranded or flexible) should
be chosen to be appropriate to the level of vibration and stress to be
experienced in service and the amount of supplementary support provided.
Except where approved for a specific application, the direction of lay of multicore
cables should alternate for successive core layers.
5.2 Internal Type Cables

5.2.1 Requirements
Internal type cables may be insulated only or have an outer sheath.
Internal type cables should meet the fire safety requirements of GH/ZT0113 in
respect of non-essential circuits (whether or not that standard calls for this
requirement).
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5.2.2 Application
Internal type cables should be restricted to use internally within equipment
housings only. These cables should only be run between adjacent lineside
equipment housings where a separate sealed plastic or plastic coated duct is
provided and the duct is restricted to internal type cable use only. Internal type
cables should not be used between adjacent lineside equipment housings where
the cable is externally routed via non-sealed ducting used by all types of cables
(e.g. surface concrete troughs).
Internal type cables, without sheathing, should be contained only in plastic or

plastic coated trunking.
Internal type cables without sheathing should be contained only in trunking

containing internal type cables.
Internal type cables for use in the harsher internal areas such as signal box
block shelves and lever frames should be suitably sheathed.
5.3 External Cables

5.3.1 Requirements
External type cables should be suitable for use as main cables where there is no
significant vibration and the risk of damage leading to an earth fault is minimised.
Insulation of external type cables should be in the form of individual core

insulation and an overall heavy duty sheath.
External type cables should be suitable for direct burying or support on cable
hangers (see 5.3.2).
The range of external type cables should include a variant which meets the fire
safety requirements of GH/ZT0113 in respect of non-essential circuits. This
variant need not be suitable for burying.
The range of external type cables should include a twisted pair variant.
5.3.2 Application
External type cables should be used as main cables where there is no significant
vibration.
External type cables should be used internally where internal type cables are not
suitable and there is no significant vibration.
External type cables may be used where on-track type cable, which would
otherwise be used, is inappropriate due to space consideration, but only where
special support and protection is afforded.
External type cables should be installed in a suitably constructed cable route

giving protection equivalent to that provided by surface concrete troughing, (e.g.
undertrack/under road crossings, cable bridges, platform tubes).
External type cables may be buried direct into ground trenches provided that
such buried cables are encased in sand before back-filling. Such buried route
should not pass under tracks except by means of an undertrack crossing.
External type cables may be carried on cable hangers where a risk assessment
has identified the associated hazards (e.g. stress and lineside fires) and control
measures have been taken.
External type cables should not be laid unprotected on the ground surface as a
permanent installation.
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The appropriate variant of external type cables should be used where

compliance with the fire safety requirements of GH/ZT0113 in respect of non-
essential circuits applies.
Where it is necessary for external type cables to enter an equipment housings,

they should only enter by the minimum distance practicable to reach the
terminations.
5.4 On-Track Type Cables

5.4.1 Requirements
On-track type cables should be suitable for external use as main and tail cables,
where significant levels of vibration or stress are likely to be encountered.
Insulation of on-track type cables should be in the form of individual core

insulation and an overall extra-heavy duty sheath.
On-track type cables should be suitable for direct burying or support on cable
hangers (see 5.4.2).
The range of on-track type cables should include a variant which meets the fire
safety requirements of GH/ZT0113 in respect of non-essential circuits. This
variant need not be suitable for burying.
The pitch of the lay of two core on-track type cables should not exceed 100mm.
5.4.2 Application
On-track type cables should be used as tail cables and for other applications
where there is significant vibration or protection cannot be provided.
On-track type cables may be buried in suitable ground. Such buried route
should not pass under tracks except by means of an undertrack crossing, but
tail cables may pass under tracks at ground level in a manner that will not leave
them susceptible to damage during the passage of trains or track maintenance
(e.g. enclosed in orange pipes or clipped to sleepers).
Cables with pre-formed terminations should be preferred for applications to on-

track equipment (including track circuit connections) in order to minimise the
risks involved in the replacement of these consumable items.
The appropriate variant of on-track type cables should be used where

compliance with the fire safety requirements of GH/ZT0113 in respect of non-
essential circuits applies.
Where it is necessary for on-track type cables to enter an apparatus housing,

they should only enter by the minimum distance practicable to reach the
terminations.
5.5 Approved Railway Signalling Cable

5.5.1
Cables to GS/ES0872 (Issue: 2, Revision: A, SEP 1993) generally meet the
requirements of 5.1 to 5.4 as shown in Figure J5:
Application
Cable ordinary ZHLS #
Internal type not applicable GS/ES0872 type A
External type GS/ES0872 type B GS/ES0872 type D
On-Track type GS/ES0872 type C GS/ES0872 type E
# also complies with GH/ZT0113

Figure J5
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5.5.2
Other cable types may be approved for use as railway signalling cables subject
to meeting the requirements of 5.1 to 5.4.
6 Terminations
6.1 General
Terminations should meet the following criteria and in addition, where
telecommunications transmission systems or cables are utilised, the
requirements of GK/RT0105 should be met.
Terminations which carry a potential (including possible induced potential)

exceeding 25V a.c. or 60V d.c. should be protected from inadvertent contact
with another conductor or with personnel.
Terminations which are at risk of a short circuit arising due to a falling object
should be protected. This applies particularly to terminations mounted on a
horizontal surface.
6.2 Termination of Conductors

Conductors should be terminated in such a manner that reasonably anticipated
stresses during the lifetime of the installation should not lead to the conductor
becoming free of the termination. This requirement will generally be met by the
use of soldered or crimped connections. Where screw/clamp type connectors
are used, they should be so designed as to prevent nicking of conductors.
No more than two conductors should be connected to any contact or terminal, in

order to facilitate the tracing of wires and assist in wire counting. Crimped
connections in SSI free connectors should each only contain one conductor.
This requirement may be relaxed where approved in the application criteria of a
specific item of equipment.
The terminals should have suitable insulation properties and not be susceptible
to electrochemical effects arising from the environment, contact with different
conductor materials, nor capable of contaminating cable insulation.
In the case of terminations incorporating a disconnection link facility, the link

should not be removed to create binding posts on which separate circuits are
connected, as the inadvertent insertion of a link across the binding posts could
result in a wrong side failure by ‘linking out’ a vital control or the connection of
independent circuits.
Means should be provided to minimise the risk of inadvertent contact with

terminals:
• for personnel safety in accordance with part D section 3.1;

• for system safety, where there is a risk of any conducting component coming
into contact.
6.2.1 Plug Couplers, Pre-formed Terminations etc.

The provision of Plug couplers, fanning strips, pre-formed terminations etc.
should be considered as a means of minimising the risks associated with
inadvertent incorrect reconnection of cables which may need to be disconnected
or renewed with any regularity or under conditions of pressure.
Multiple Plug couplers used in close proximity, should incorporate a coding

feature so that, on any set, each plug coupler should have a unique coding. The
coding means should be so designed and constructed to prevent any circuit
connections being completed, if an attempt is made to incorrectly connect plug
couplers. Coding should also be considered for other applications where, due to
the numbers of plug couplers involved, erroneous transposition is possible.
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The male halves of the plug couplers or connectors should be fixed and be
suitably recessed or shrouded to avoid damage and inadvertent short circuit by
contact with other metal objects. The female halves of the plug couplers should
be attached to cables. The connecting cable should be clamped in such a
manner that in conjunction with the coding feature specified above, it is not
possible to plug in a coupler to the wrong male portion. A means should be
incorporated to securely hold the two portions of the coupler engaged.
The number of connections carried by any one such connector should generally
not exceed 50.
6.3 Termination of External and On-track Cables

6.3.1 General
External and on-track cables should be terminated, at each end, on vertical
columns of terminals, except where an alternative means is approved as part of
the system application criteria.
The terminals should incorporate a circuit disconnection facility whilst leaving the
conductor(s) terminated. This will allow each multicore cable to be disconnected
from all circuits, whilst remaining terminated, in order to facilitate the testing of
cables and internal circuits. This requirement applies to external cable
terminations within buildings, apparatus cases and disconnection boxes, and to
terminations within items of signalling equipment. In the case of existing designs
of signalling equipment, such as signal heads to specification BR 903, or
detectors to BR 998, these designs should comply with this requirement from
their next revision.
For each vertical column of terminations, all external or on-track cables should
be terminated on the same side to allow for internal wiring or jumpering on the
other side. This permits the segregation of cables with differing standards of
insulation and the easy inspection of jumpering. Each cable should be
terminated in a single column wherever practicable, with core one on the highest
available termination in the column, each subsequent core being terminated in
core number order. Only one conductor should be terminated on the external
side of each termination.
Where long on-track cables arise, consideration should be given to the provision
of disconnection boxes to segregate the length most vulnerable to damage.
Where the disconnection box is situated adjacent to a protected cable route, an
interface between on-track type cable and external type cable may be
appropriate. The provision of disconnection boxes is particularly appropriate
where pre-formed on-track type cables are used.
The requirements of section 6.3.1 may be relaxed for short term stagework,
where a risk assessment has shown that the associated risks can be adequately
controlled.
6.3.2 Spare conductors

All spare conductors should generally be terminated in the same manner, so that
they are available for emergency use and are incapable of coming into contact
with other conductors. However, where spare cores are not able to be used, for
example:
• where a main cable is through jointed into a smaller cable; or

• where no spare terminals are available on-trackside equipment;
the ends of those cores affected should be permanently cut back and
insulated at both ends.
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Spare conductors in main multicore cables should not be through connected at

intermediate locations, to avoid induced voltage and also to facilitate the
diversion of circuits due to faulty conductors. (See GK/RT0231.)
6.4 Miscellaneous Cable Terminations

Conductors carrying FDM circuits are to be clearly identified at all access points.
Connections to cable cores should be by through crimps with sleeve type
insulation and not incorporate disconnection links. This measure improves the
insulation properties, reduces the possibility of microphony (the "woodpecker"
vibration effect) and helps to limit cross talk between other FDM systems in the
same cable. (It may be necessary to solder as well as through crimp.)
Terminations on remote control equipment should be standardised so that

connections can be made to such equipment direct, without a distribution frame
being interposed.
Within signalling control panels in which electronic equipment is housed, such as

remote control systems or panel processors, there is a bias towards ribbon
output and input cables. Terminating such cables at the panel end for
distribution to panel components can impose a major space penalty. Specifying
round cables for termination on miniature plug couplers is often a more practical
solution. Round cables are also more resistant to insulation abrasion where this
is a material consideration.
Telecommunications cables may require an alternative means of termination,

providing a high insulation impedance,. Where special techniques are required,
staff should be suitably trained and equipped.
Signalling circuits in telecommunications cables should be identified at all access

points with red markers.
7 Cable Routes
7.1 General
The preferred location of a cable route is in the Green Zone (see the Track
Safety Handbook) at 2m, minimum, from the nearest running rail. The route
should, wherever practicable, pass on the track side of lineside apparatus
housings, signals and other obstructions.
Wiring and cable routes should minimise hazards arising from insulation damage
or deterioration, from mutual circuit interference and from overheating. This
overheating may be exacerbated by high ambient temperatures or the bunching
of cables.
Routes within equipment housings should also be designed to facilitate the

tracing of wires.
7.2 Wiring Routes and Segregation

Where un-sheathed cables are used, adequately sized plastic, or plastic coated,
overhead trunking and/or floor ducting, free from sharp edges (likely to cause
abrasion of the insulation) and provided with covers, should be used, including
electro-mechanical signal boxes. Horizontal and vertical troughing on racks and
in apparatus cases should generally be plastic.
A minimum of at least ten per cent spare capacity should be allowed in new
installations for future requirements. Additionally, in new installations, horizontal
trunking and ducting should be filled to a depth not exceeding 25mm so as to
assist in extracting and tracing cables in the future.
In order to avoid contamination leading to insulation degradation, separate cable

routes should be provided to maintain physical separation between copolymer or
PVC insulated conductors and those with PCP or rubber insulation.
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Note that internal type cables are not permitted in the same wiring route as
external or on-track type cables, nor in unprotected metal trunking.
Segregation may also be required to reduce the heating effect of current flowing,
or to prevent electromagnetic interference.
8 Special Arrangements
8.1 General
All of the foregoing rules should apply except where relaxed in the following
specific cases.
8.2 Inter-case Cables

Circuits between individual apparatus housings within a location group should be
run in external type cable, terminated on terminals with a disconnection facility as
above. If it is desired to use the rules for internal circuits (see Part D), a fully
enclosed protective non-conducting duct should be used. This also applies to
circuits between adjacent buildings and/or apparatus housings and connections
to signal box lever frames. Such cables should not be stripped back to allow
individual cores to be distributed and terminated on separate items of equipment.
8.3 Inter-rack Cables

Internal multicore cables may be used between racks in equipment rooms or
between the block shelf and the lower portion of an electro-mechanical signal
box.
If it is desired to use binding posts for internal cable terminations, measures

should be taken to prevent the insertion of links between adjacent binding posts.
Such internal binding post terminations should not be mounted in the same
column as external cable terminations.
9 Earth and
Equipotential
Bonding Conductors
9.1 Safety Bonding
To protect staff by preventing dangerous touch potentials, the following items
should be radially bonded, either in a star or series configuration, to a single
main earth system at each location. (A ring circuit should not be used, so as to
prevent circulating currents.)
• lever frames;
• ground frames;
• each suite of relay and other equipment or termination racks (each suite of
racks should be insulated from one another and from the equipment room
structure and floor, except by means of the equipotential bonding, to facilitate
the correction of earth faults);
• control panels;
• barrier control pedestals;
• gate wheels;
• metal barrier booms and machine housings;
• CCTV columns;
• class I transformer and other equipment casings (i.e. not double, or
equivalent, insulation);
• exposed metalwork of equipment housing (unless power supply equipment
is class II);
• handrails associated with any of the above; and
• any other accessible structural metalwork.
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All items that can be touched simultaneously (considering equipment housings

with doors in the worst position) should be bonded together. A minimum
separation of 2m or the provision of an insulated barrier to give this equivalent
path length, will generally obviate this requirement.
Where earth systems are provided (see part C), a single main earth terminal or
busbar should be provided at each location, to which the equipotential bonding
should be connected, and any secondary earth systems (such as test earths)
should be shrouded.
Earth and equipotential bonding conductors should be shown on circuit diagrams

and should be so designed that they can be periodically tested for effectiveness
e.g. by the provision of disconnection links. Such conductors should be
adequately rated to survive beyond fault clearance times, following the principles
and values laid down in BS 7671, as far as reasonably practicable.
All terminations and bare conductors which carry a potential (including possible
induced potential) exceeding 25V a.c. or 60V d.c. should be protected from
inadvertent contact.
9.2 A.C. Electrified Areas

In a.c. electrified areas equipotential bonding to the traction return system should
be used to protect against danger from a traction fault. Lineside metalwork and
structures within reach of the traction return rail (or other metalwork bonded to
the traction return) should be bonded to the traction return system instead of to
true earth, in accordance with electrification standards.
Where it is possible for damaged overhead lines to make contact with structural
metalwork, such metalwork should be bonded to the traction return system, in
accordance with electrification standards, irrespective of the distance to the
traction return rail, to facilitate the disconnection of the traction supply. (CCTV
columns may be bonded to earth and connected to the traction return by means
of a spark gap in order to prevent interference from the traction system.) These
structure bonds should be drawn on bonding plans by the signal engineer, but
are the responsibility of the electrification engineer. Care should be taken not to
provide a network of parallel structure bonds which may present a shorter path
back to the substation for the traction return current. All such bonding
conductors should be capable of carrying the normal traction return current.
9.3 Non-Electrified Areas

Similar protection to that described in the previous paragraph should be provided
where overhead power distribution lines cross the railway in non- electrified
areas.
9.4 D.C. Electrified Areas

In d.c. electrified areas, equipment housings should not be bonded to the
traction return, nor should the traction return be bonded to any other earth
system or structures, as this could result in traction current flowing through
earthing bonds or protective conductors in order to find a shorter return path. It
could also result in corrosion damage to structures and pipes (see GM/RT1018
regarding cathodic protection). Other precautions should be taken in equipment
housings containing equipment connected to the traction return rails, as
described in Part D.
9.5 Dual Electrified Areas

Consequently, in dual electrified areas there is a conflict of requirements. The
preferred solution is by physical separation, in order to remove the requirement
for equipotential bonding (see GM/TT0107). This means, for instance, that
equipment housing doors should not be capable of encroaching within 2m of the
traction return rail unless an insulated barrier is provided.
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9.6 All Electrified Areas

Earthing conductors should not be run parallel to the track in order to connect
earth systems together, or to extend an earth system beyond a particular
location. In a.c. electrified areas insulation gaps should also be fitted to all metal
sheathed cables and pipes leaving buildings. Earthing of cable sheaths may be a
means of meeting the requirements of GK/RT0197.
Care should be taken to ensure that metalwork, including circuit protective

conductors, incapable of carrying traction system fault current does not form a
parallel path within the traction return system.
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Appendix J1:
Typical Loop Resistance
and Current Carrying
Capacities
Stranded Maximum Loop Maximum
Copper Conductor Resistance Current Carrying
Size per Km Capacity
2
0.75mm 49.6Ω 9.0A
2
1.00mm # 36.2Ω 13.5A
1.15mm 2 34.6Ω 13.5A
1.5mm 2 24.4Ω 16.5A
2
2.5mm 15.1Ω 23.0A
2
2.5mm (f) 16.4Ω 23.0A
2
4.0mm # 9.22Ω 32.0A
10mm 2 3.68Ω 52.0A
16mm 2 2.32Ω 69.0A
25mm 2 # 1.45Ω 101A
35mm 2 1.06Ω 111A
70mm 2 0.54Ω 168A
95mm 2 0.39Ω 201A
Note: (f) indicates a flexible conductor
# indicates single conductor
Solid Maximum Maximum

Aluminium Loop Resistance Current Carrying
Conductor Size per Km Capacity
16mm 2 3.78Ω 63A
25mm 2 2.40Ω 83A
35mm 2 1.74Ω 100A
2
50mm 1.30Ω 118A
2
70mm 0.88Ω 150A
2
95mm 0.65Ω 181A
The above is based on information from GS/ES0872, BR 880 and BS 7671,

assuming a single 2 core cable enclosed in trunking at an ambient temperature
of 30°C and with an operating temperature of 70°C.
Whilst a good general guide, the values are only true for the particular
specification used.
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Part P
Points
1 Introduction
1.1
This Guidance Note applies, in support of GK/RT0062 and GK/RT0065, to all
technologies of on-track equipment used for the operation and proving of:
• facing and trailing points (combining to form crossovers, tandem points,

single and double slips, etc.);
• swing nose crossings;
• switch diamond crossings (effectively two point ends);
• trap points and catch points;
• train operated points (including spring points);
• hand points;
• derailers; and
• scotch blocks.
1.2
Guidance Note is an alternative to the risk-based approach illustrated in
GK/RT0206. However, where the particular application or intended environment
for the system introduces additional risks, these should be subject to separate
assessment.
The Design Principles in Section 2 give guidance on the minimum requirements

1.3
Guidance Note:
• Guidelines on point equipment are given in GK/RH0771;

• Guidelines on the use of track circuits in point layouts are given in
GK/RH0751;
• Standard drawings for point layouts, fittings and detectors may be used.
They should comply with this Guidance Note.
• Supplementary mechanical information on points and fittings is given in
Appendix P1.
• Typical circuits for point operation and detection may be used. They should
comply with the description given in Appendix P2.
• For SSI installations, see Appendix P3.
2 Design Principles
2.1
For interlocking, route locking, track locking and other controls listed in the
control tables, see Part F.
2.2
The toes of the points should be physically locked in either the normal or reverse
position before a passenger move can be signalled over them in the facing
direction, thus preventing the switches from being forcibly moved.
Such locking should be proved effective in the aspect level at the interlocking.
This section should also be applied to non-passenger movements, except where

omission can be justified by documented risk assessment.
Train operated points should instead comply with GK/RT0065.
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2.3
Both switches should be detected to be in their correct position, corresponding
to the position in which the points are locked, before a passenger move can be
signalled over them in the facing direction.
Such correspondence should be proved in the aspect level at the interlocking.
This section should also be applied to non-passenger movements where

Section 2.2 has been omitted.
Points that are temporarily secured out of use do not require to be detected.
However, the detection of facing points that have been out of use for more than
six months should be subject to risk assessment, considering the method of
securing, the inspection regime and the likely time before removal or
commissioning.
2.4
Locking and detection requirements for movements through points in the trailing
direction should generally comply with Sections 2.2 and 2.3, except where a risk
assessment demonstrates that a proposed relaxation introduces no additional
risk.
A trailing direction run-through of points lying in the wrong position should not
result in a derailment, but should result in loss of detection, where provided.
2.5
In the case of power operation of points, the following features should be
provided to enhance safety and dependability:
• a means of securely fixing the operating mechanism to the track, so as to

prevent its movement relative to the stock rail;
• measures to prevent false operation of the points or a false indication being
given to the interlocking arising from cable damage, microswitch failure,
power supply polarity reversal at an intermediate lineside location, earth
faults, or other electrical interference, such as traction current;
• a means of disconnecting the operating feed to the points when their
movement is complete, and reconnecting it should the detection be lost (the
latter feature may be omitted where no additional risk is thereby created);
• dynamic braking to bring the mechanism to rest at the end of a complete
movement, where appropriate to ensure reliability;
• a means of allowing the points to complete their movement, should the track
locking become effective whilst the points are in mid stroke;
• a means of preventing the mechanism being overloaded by an obstruction
restricting movement of the switch rails;
• any overload cut-out provided should immediately reset and allow the point
movement to be reversed at any time during the cycle;
• a means of preventing moisture or ice affecting the operating characteristics
of the point operating or detection mechanism;
• where necessary to ensure adequate availability, secure power supplies for
point operation;
• a means of securing the points out of use with the point lock in the locked
position and the points in either the normal or reverse position; and
• a means of hand operation under failure conditions that isolates the power
supply from the mechanism and does not reconnect it until manually reset, in
2.6
In the event of a failure of the safety-critical system controlling the point
operation, the safe state to which the system should revert is "locked as last
set".
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2.7
A means of ensuring that the running rails are maintained to gauge at all times
should be provided.
Where switches are sufficiently long to require it, a means of providing a

supplementary drive on one or more stretcher bars along the switch rail should
be provided, so as to ensure that each switch rail when closed is held against its
respective stock rail for the whole of its planed length and the minimum
flangeway clearance is maintained for the length of the open switch.
Supplementary detection should similarly be provided, as necessary, to prove

the correct operation of the supplementary drive.
2.8
Where necessary, a means of preventing point movement being obstructed by
ice and snow should be provided.
2.9
Adequate precautions should be taken to protect staff working on point fittings
and mechanisms from danger due to an electrical fault, in accordance with the
Electricity at Work Regulations 1989.
In electrified areas, measures should be taken to prevent dangerous touch

potentials and other danger arising from point mechanisms, apparatus housings,
lever frames, or running rails being connected to different earth systems.
2.10
On electrified lines equipped with a conductor rail, suitable precautions should be
taken to prevent point fittings and mechanisms making contact with the live rail.
Particular care should be taken in the design of mechanical supplementary
drives. Where there is danger to maintainers working on such equipment,
precautions should be taken to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable.
The following options are in order of effectiveness:
• gapping of the conductor rail;

• fitting of conductor rail protective boarding, or
• providing staff with portable protective shields.
2.11
On track circuited lines, point fittings should be insulated so as not to falsely
shunt track circuits. Any rodding crossing the track should be kept clear of the
rails.
Track circuit bonding at points should be reinforced in accordance with

GK/RT0252. For other train detection and track circuit interrupter requirements,
see Part T.
2.12
Train operated points (including spring points), over which movements are
authorised in the facing direction, should comply with GK/RT0065.
2.13
Catch points, to derail vehicles running away and divert them away from danger,
need only be provided on gradients where:
• unfitted engineering trains are permitted to run; and

• there are no facilities to hold a following train in a place of safety until the
preceding unfitted train has cleared the gradient.
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Train operated (spring) points may be used where no movements are authorised
in the facing direction, but, on bi-directional lines, catch points should be
operated from the signal box.
2.14
Trap points should be provided in accordance with GK/RT0078.
2.15
Points should only be secured out of use as a temporary expedient, pending
commissioning or removal. When required to be retained for maintenance or
emergency working purposes, they should be connected to a control point.
3 Point Operation
3.1 Mechanical Operation
Hand points may be provided where points are not required to be locked (see
Section 2.2). The mechanism, generally a spring loaded toggle, should hold the
points in the position in which they were last set, but should permit trailing
movements in either position. They are worked by a hand lever operated switch
which is secured to two extended timbers at the toe of the points (for either left
hand or right hand working). The handle may be detachable.
Where points are manually operated from a lever frame by means of rodding,
the maximum distance of operation should be governed by a typical person’s
ability to operate the lever and should take into account the number of ends to
be operated and the weight of rail section, but should not in any case exceed
320m.
Details of adjustments and compensation for mechanical operation are given in

Appendix P1:3.
Facing points should be locked (where required in Section 2.2) by means of an

independent facing point lock (FPL), generally operated by a separate lever
interlocked with the point lever, preferably such that the points are unlocked
when the FPL lever is normal in the frame. In the case of ground frames,
however, the points should be locked when the FPL lever is normal in the frame.
See Appendix P1:6 for clearances.
The normal lie of the points should be chosen to provide the maximum degree of
trapping or flank protection, in accordance with GK/RT0078.
Where track circuits are not provided, track locking may be achieved by means
of a facing point lock bar positioned on the approach to facing points and
connected to the FPL. This method is not appropriate for new work. Further
details are given in Appendix P1:7.
3.2 Power Operation

3.2.1 Point Operating Mechanisms
This section does not apply to train operated points, the requirements of which
are given in GK/RT0065.
Points should be power operated as indicated on the signalling plan. The type of
point operating mechanism is generally shown on the location area plan.
Only approved types of point operating mechanism may be used.
The benefits and shortcomings of each basic type given in Table P1 should be
considered in making the choice:
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Mechanism Type Benefits Shortcomings

Clamp lock simple design that fits a susceptible to vibration
confined space without and loss of hydraulic fluid
long timbers
Electric point generally reliable and generally higher power
machine widely available consumption
Electro-pneumatic fast and non-complex requires an air main
Table P1
Generally, one point operating mechanism should be used for each individual
point end, to prevent an unsafe situation arising during hand operation.
However, both ends of a set of switch diamonds, or the two adjacent ends of a
double slip, may, where practicable, be operated from a single mechanism,
provided that any extended operation time does not cause a problem.
All point operating mechanisms should incorporate an independent locking

facility, with the exception of those specifically for use in situations that do not
require locking (see Section 2.2), e.g. trailable points in yards.
Supplementary drives should be provided for the types of switches listed in

Table P2, on the stretcher bars or sleepers shown. A single mechanism should
be used for both the primary drive and the supplementary drive(s). Electro-
hydraulic supplementary drives should only be provided for electro-hydraulic
mechanisms, using a single four port clamp lock power pack. For mechanical
supplementary drives, see Appendix P1:5.
Mechanical Supplementary Drives Hydraulic

on Stretcher Numbers: Supplementary Drives
on Sleeper Nos.:
Rail Flat Bullhead Flat UIC 54B 113A Flat UIC 54B
Section/ Bottom Inclined Bottom Switch/ Bottom Switch/
Switch Inclined Vertical 113A Vertical 113A
Type FBV FBV
Stock Stock
C Nil Nil 3 2 7 7
D 3 4 4 2 8 8
E 4 4 4 3 11 11
F 5 3, 5 2, 3 8, 13 7, 13
SG 4, 6 4, 6 3, 5 9, 15 8, 15
G 4, 6 4, 6 3, 5 10, 17 9, 17
H Not Permitted 9, 17, 25, 30 9, 19, 27
Table P2 Requirement for Supplementary Drives
Where more than one point end is required to operate together (e.g. crossovers,
a plain lead with a swing nose crossing, both ends of switch diamonds, two ends
of single or double slips, both switches of wide to gauge trap points, etc.), each
should be given a common point number as described in Part F. Under certain
circumstances, however, it may be beneficial for them to be operated separately,
in order to improve availability.
Where required by the infrastructure controller, internal heaters should be

provided within the operating mechanism, together with a suitable power supply
wired from a separate overcurrent protective device.
High voltage (generally above 50v) electric point machines should be provided
with dynamic braking (snubbing) to bring the motor to rest at the end of a
complete movement. Where a.c. immunity is a requirement, diodes should not
be used for this purpose.
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EP point machines should be powered from a reservoir of pressurised air

supplied by a main air compressor and should be controlled by electro-magnetic
cut-off valves. (Older types of machine using a continuous air feed may also be
found.) Arrangements should be made to ensure that moisture free air is
delivered to the air mains at working pressure, generally 50 pounds per square
inch. Duplicated electric compressors and standby diesel compressors, with
automatic changeover, should be provided as necessary to give the required
availability.
For immunity in a.c. and dual electrified areas, electric point machines should be
of the permanent magnet type. This should ensure immunity up to 600V a.c.
Elsewhere split-field motors should be used (because a higher starting torque
can be generated with a series field and consequently the armature is designed
to take a lower current). The valves of valve-operated mechanisms (i.e. electro-
hydraulic or EP devices) should be immune up to 600V a.c. Air distribution
systems in a.c. and dual electrified areas should use plastic pipe to BS 3506,
classification D, to prevent the induction of dangerous voltages.
Equipotential bonding or earthing of point fittings and mechanisms should not be

provided because of the danger from traction return currents thereby finding a
shorter or parallel return path. However, all mechanisms should be fed from an
earth-free supply and, as far as reasonably practicable, insulated from earth and
from the traction return system. All newly specified mechanisms should be
double insulated (see Part D).
Point operating mechanisms should be securely mounted with respect to the

track. The type and position/orientation should be shown on the design details.
Clamp locks are bolted to the stock rails, electric point machines are mounted on
two extended sleepers and EP machines on four extended sleepers.
3.2.2 Point Operating Circuits

Point operating circuits should be double cut. See Part D.
Electric and electro-hydraulic point mechanisms should generally be fed over

contacts of contactor(s) situated in a lineside apparatus housing (location)
adjacent to the points. The use of lever contacts alone to control the point
operating current is not permitted. In the case of multiple ended points, the
individual point ends should be operated by contactors fed from a single
operating function.
Alternatively, an approved electronic device that is suitably rated for the required
current may be used to directly drive such point mechanisms without the use of
a contactor, provided it fulfils the other requirements of this Guidance Note.
It should not be possible for the point operating circuit to be disengaged whilst
the points are in mid stroke, but it should be disengaged when detection for the
new lie is fully obtained. If detection is subsequently lost, the points should be
driven again to the correct position. The latter facility may be omitted where no
additional risk is thereby created.
A time delay should be incorporated into the point control, generally at the
lineside location, to disconnect the feed if the point operation is not completed
within an allotted time. The time allotted should be greater than that required for
the point operation under the worst conditions, but less than that which would
allow the mechanism to be damaged by continued unsuccessful operation. Any
time delay unit provided should be wired to the same overcurrent protective
device as the contactor(s).
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Four wire point machine operation should generally be provided, in order to give
high integrity. Electric point machines require a normal and a reverse contactor,
which should be cross proved (both banks of each proved down).
The distance between the contactor(s) and the point operating mechanism
should be restricted to allow for the following factors:
• voltage drop (preferably so as to permit the use of a common return for

motor and valves in clamp lock operation);
• to facilitate testing and maintenance; and
• immunity from induced a.c. interference.
EP point machines do not require contactors and may be fed directly from lever
contacts or lock relays. Both the locking and cut-off EP valves should be
energised until detection is obtained.
The use of point controllers situated adjacent to the points in the red zone
should not be perpetuated for new work, for reasons of staff safety.
Circuit design should limit the level of induced voltage likely to be attained under
traction fault conditions to be commensurate with the degree of immunity of the
point operating mechanism. Note that an a.c. traction fault current of 5,500A for
200ms may be considered as a maximum.
The conductor size throughout this operating circuit should be chosen by

considering the following:
• current carrying capacity;

• voltage drop; and
• the power consumption of the mechanism.
The preferred operating voltage for electric point machines is 120V d.c. The
following options should be considered in order to improve the availability of the
point operating supply and/or spread the load on the main power supply:
• trickle charged secondary cells with sufficient capacity to operate all points in
a given locality for a specified time;
• duplicated power supply units to operate a small group of points from a
secure supply; or
• a single smaller power supply unit, with a secure supply, for each multiple
ended set of points, together with strategically positioned spare units,
preferably with plug couplers to facilitate changeover.
Where a power supply unit is provided to operate a group of points, without

secondary cells to spread the load, consideration should be given to providing
special controls to prevent an excessive number of points being called at the
same time.
Valves for EP machines may be fed at 24V d.c., but, in d.c. and dual electrified
areas, a.c. control circuits should be provided with individual transformer
rectifiers within the valve housing.
Earth fault detection should be provided on all point operating power supplies,
except where separate supplies are provided for each multiple ended set of
points. See Part C for further details.
Further details for relay circuits are given in Appendix P2:1 and for Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) installations in Appendix P3:1.
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4 Point Detection
The permissible types of point detection that will satisfactorily prove a particular
type of point operation in the controls of a particular type of protecting signal are
tabulated in GK/RT0039. When the control point can be closed with the line
remaining open to traffic, the combination of mechanically operated signals and
electrically detected points is prohibited. This is to prevent a detection failure
remaining unnoticed.
4.1 Mechanical Detection

Where electrical detection is not provided, mechanical detection may be used to
prove mechanically operated points in the correct position before a mechanically
operated signal can be cleared. This is generally only practicable when the
points are close to the signal box, and there are a limited number of ends to be
detected. Mechanically operated trailing points need not be detected.
Mechanical detection should not be used on compensated wire runs, i.e. where
signals are 230m or more from the signal box.
The following point blades should be detected:
• left hand switch;

• right hand switch; and
• lock plunger, where FPL provided.
Notches should be cut in the point blades for each signal slide in the following
positions:
• both switches normal, or reverse, or both ways, as required; and

• lock plunger in, where provided.
The use of single blade detection for shunting signals should not be perpetuated
for new work.
The following risks should be addressed in the design of mechanical detection:
• the possibility of a signal failing in the off position, following a point rodding
malfunction;
• the mechanical detector moving with respect to the track; and
• conflicting notches in the point blades where more than one signal slide is
required.
Where a signal is situated between the signal box and the points that are to be
detected, the signal wire from the signal box should be looped via the point
detector(s) before returning to the signal. Where a shunting signal reads both
ways over a set of points and then detects subsequent points, a floating wheel
should be provided to allow the detector at the diverging points to select the
appropriate route. A similar arrangement should be used where two or more
signals are operated by one lever and selected by facing points.
No more than four detectors should be provided on any point end and complex
arrangements should not be considered unless the appropriate skills are
available.
The arrangement of mechanical detection should be shown on design details.
Details of clearances for mechanical detection are given in Appendix P1:8.
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4.2 Electrical Detection

4.2.1 Point Detectors
Electrical detection should be provided for all power operated points, preferably
using a combined operating mechanism and detector. The detection circuit
should prove that the operating mechanism has secured the points closed and
locked.
Individual electric point detectors should be provided, as necessary and where

identified on the signalling plan, for:
• mechanically operated points and/or FPLs;

• hand points and/or FPLs;
• train operated points;
• supplementary detection (on certain stretcher bars, as shown in Table P3);
and
• where it is not practicable to connect the detection rods to the point
machine.
Mechanical Supplementary Drives - Hydraulic

Detectors on Stretcher Numbers: Supplementary Drives
- Detectors on
Stretcher Numbers:
Rail Flat Bullhead Flat UIC 54B 113A Flat UIC 54B
Section/ Bottom Inclined Bottom Switch/ Bottom Switch/
Switch Inclined Vertical 113A Vertical 113A
Type FBV FBV
Stock Stock
C Nil Nil Nil Nil 3 2
D Nil Nil Nil Nil 4 2
E Nil Nil Nil 2 3, 4 2, 3
F Nil 3 2 2, 4, 5 2, 3
SG 4 4 2, 4 3, 5, 6 2, 4, 5
G 4 4 2, 4 3, 5, 6 2, 4, 5
H Not Permitted 5, 7, 9 2, 4, 6
Table P3 Requirement for Supplementary Detection
The following types of individual electric point detector may be used:
• electric point detectors to specification BR 998; or

• other approved types of electric point detector that fulfil the requirements of
this Guidance Note.
Individual two slide detectors should prove the detector rods correctly positioned.
Three slide detectors should additionally prove the lock rod in the detection
circuit. In the case of BR 998 detectors, it is not possible to prove the lock and
detection in separate circuits without providing a second detector. However, in
certain types of detector the lock and detection contacts are independent and
may be separately wired.
To protect against hazardous failures of microswitches, individual detectors

containing microswitches should either be duplicated, or used in conjunction with
some other detection device, such as a combined point machine, unless the
points are mechanically connected to a lever frame. (Supplementary drives do
not require to be considered separately for this purpose.)
Individual detectors that do not require heaters are preferable, but, where
necessary, internal heaters should be provided within the detector, together with
a suitable power supply wired from a separate overcurrent protective device.
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Individual detectors should be securely mounted with respect to the track, either
in the four foot or on the cess side. The type and position/orientation should be
shown on the design details. Methods typically include fixing to the soleplate,
stock rail, sleeper ends, or extended timbers. Detectors on the cess side in
conductor rail areas should be mounted on extended timbers.
4.2.2 Point Detection Circuits

Point detection circuits should be double cut. See Part D.
They should generally use four wire d.c. circuits with biased relays. See below
for details of special arrangements necessary in electrified areas.
The out and back portions of point detection circuits should not share the same
cable between each point detection device, or disconnection box, and an
adjacent apparatus housing, to guard against hazardous failures due to cable
damage. Where an a.c. detection supply is used, no portion of the detection
circuits (except between the supply and the first detector) should share a cable
with a point heater feed, if cable damage could result in a hazardous failure.
Where clamp locks are provided, pre-formed four core cables should be used
between the right hand and left hand mechanisms and between each
mechanism and a standard disconnection box. Elsewhere, pre-formed cables
should be used where practicable.
A separate pair of detection relays should be provided for every point end (with
adjacent ends of double slips counting as one) in an apparatus housing adjacent
to the points. An additional pair of relays should be provided for any
supplementary detection on each point end. This is to simplify testing and
corrective maintenance, reduce hazardous failures, reduce the exposure to risk
of maintainers and facilitate the provision of separate end detection.
The detection function from the lineside location to the interlocking should include
all the point detection relays in series. For contactor operated points, proof that
the heavy duty contactor contacts have not welded in the energised position
should also be included (both banks proved down).
For worked points, correspondence with the appropriate point operating controls
should be proved at the lineside location, unless its omission creates no
additional risk. Correspondence with the state of the interlocking should be
proved at the interlocking.
EP machines should prove the correct position of the EP valve in the detection
circuit.
Train operated points should be detected for facing movements in the normal
position. The detection circuit should prove that the pressurised hydraulic
actuator is exerting sufficient force to hold the switch closed in that position.
To protect against a hazardous failure within an individual point detector in which

the normal and reverse circuits are meshed, such detector(s) should be placed
at the feed end of any detection circuit containing point machines or clamp lock
mechanisms, so that the latter will prove correspondence.
There are only two permissible wiring configurations for the BR 998 detector,
i.e. right hand switch normally closed or left hand switch normally closed. These
assume that the cable entry of the detector is facing the heel of the switches. If,
due to the physical constraints of the layout, the detector is mounted the other
way around, with the cable entry facing the toes of the switches, the opposite
wiring configuration should be used. Consequently, an extract of the layout
showing the orientation of the detectors (with an arrow indicating the cable
entry), should be provided on the design details.
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In electrified areas, the feed and relays for the on-track detection circuits should
be chosen so as to be immune to all traction systems operating in the vicinity.
The following arrangements will ensure immunity from traction current
contamination:
• a.c. electrified areas - a 50V d.c. external supply, in conjunction with biased
a.c. immune relays;
• d.c. electrified areas - a 110V a.c. supply with ’QXR1’ style converters
connected to relays which may be non-immune;
• dual electrified areas - reed dual immune system.
1
The use of 83 / Hz vane relays may be found in dual electrified areas, but are
3
generally not available for new work. For the special requirements see Part D.
Either earth fault detection or separate power supplies should be used for point
detection, unless their omission can be justified by risk assessment. See Part C
for further details.
Further details for relay circuits are given in Appendix P2:2 and for SSI
installations in Appendix P3:2.
5 Point Switch Heaters

At points identified on the signalling plan, point switch heaters should be provided
in accordance with GK/RT0118. They generally consist of electric elements, or
gas burners ignited by a high tension spark. Double insulation of the electric
components and immunisation of track circuits against the heating supply should
be considered. The infrastructure controller may also require other precautions
to be taken.
Unless the switch heater controller is temperature activated, a control circuit

should be provided to permit operation from a control point. This should
generally feature a timing device. Where temperature activated, a manual
override should be provided. Computer aided diagnostic and information links
may be required by the infrastructure controller.
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Appendix P1:
Supplementary
Mechanical Information
for Points and Fittings
P1:1 General Arrangements
Points should generally be fitted with the following connections:
• one drive rod;

• one lock rod, where locking required (see Section 2.2); and
• two detector rods, where detection required (see Section 2.3).
Where necessary, extended timbers or concrete bearers, with extended

soleplates, should be provided for fitting:
• electric or EP point machines;

• certain arrangements of individual detectors; and
• hand lever operated switches.
Insulations should be provided in the rod fittings, stretchers, soleplates and

extended soleplates, so as to keep the rails electrically separate from each other
and from the point mechanisms.
Where standard arrangements for the layouts, fittings, drillings and fixings are
used, the arrangement should be quoted on the design details.
P1:2 Gauge and Switch Opening

The nominal standard track gauge is defined in GC/RT5010.
The nominal standard movement between switches and stock rails at the toes is
108mm, with a tolerance of –6mm +12mm. The movement at crossings is
nominally 85mm for switch diamonds and 65mm for swing nose crossings.
It should be ensured that any detector used is equipped to detect the

appropriate range of movement. Detectors should be adjusted so that an
obstruction of 3.5mm between the stock and switch rails at the back drive will
give detection, but an obstruction of 5mm will not. For clamp locks these
dimensions should be reduced to 2.5mm and 4mm, respectively.
A minimum flangeway clearance of 50mm should be maintained at all times.
P1:3 Mechanical Operation and Adjustments

For mechanical operation, points and FPLs should generally be driven by bolted
sections of channel rodding carried on rollers. Older types of round rodding may
also be found. The rodding run should be adequately supported to ensure that
alignment is maintained. Changes of direction should be effected by means of
cranks, generally connected with forged pin joints bolted to the channel sections.
The following types of cranks are generally available:
• standard (300mm) crank;

• accommodating (300mm) crank, for confined locations;
• adjustable (300mm x 430mm) crank, the final crank at each point end; and
• compensating cranks, mounted in pairs to reverse the throw.
The connection at the lever tail should be made at installation by selecting the
appropriate fulcrum length to suit the required throw. Fine adjustment of throw
should be achieved at the extremity of the rodding run by an adjustable crank.
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Compensation, by which the movement of the rodding is reversed, should be

provided in rodding runs longer than 32m, to avoid the need to adjust points for
changes in temperature. This may be effected either by mean of compensating
cranks, or by using any pair of cranks at a suitably positioned change of
direction, e.g. where the rodding crosses the track. The position should be
calculated such that the expansion or contraction of the rod in tension is
equalised by the expansion or contraction of the rod in compression, so as to
keep the overall length of the rod constant for each point end operated. (The
rodding between adjacent point ends should be treated as a separate run in
calculating compensation.) Portions of rodding under the signal box or timber
decking should be ignored in the calculation. The arrangement, together with
the results of the calculation, should be shown on the design details.
Timber decking should be provided over rodding where necessary to ensure

staff safety.
P1:4 Point Rodding in Electrified Areas

In electrified areas, any rodding crossing the track should be kept clear of the
running rails and conductor rails. Point rodding should be insulated at the entry
to the signal box, in accordance with electrification standards. This is necessary
to separate the traction return system from true earth and protect the lever
frame from the danger of a traction fault. (Lever frames are earthed to protect
staff from indirect contact with live parts.) Measures should be taken to protect
against dangerous touch potentials arising across the insulation in the rodding,
such as one of the following:
• displaying warning notices;

• making the metalwork inaccessible; or
• providing two insulations a minimum of 2m apart.
P1:5 Mechanical Supplementary Drives

On lines fitted with conductor rails, the supplementary drive should generally be
provided in the four foot.
There should be no clearance for excess motion at the drive lug where the
supplementary drive connects to the front stretcher. The motion at the back
drive should be adjusted to give:
• a minimum of 50mm flangeway clearance;

• switch closure such that a 1.5mm gauge can be just inserted into the gap
between the switch and stock rail at the back drive position; and
• a minimum of 15mm excess motion clearance.
Stroke adjustment at installation should be made using the appropriate holes on

the fixed arms of the cranks. The sleeve adjusters should only be used for fine
adjustment.
Supplementary detectors should be adjusted so that an obstruction of 6mm

between the stock and switch rails at the back drive will give detection, but an
obstruction of 8mm will not.
P1:6 Mechanical Facing Point Locks

Mechanical points should be locked (where required in Section 2.2) by an FPL
plunger that locates in lock notch(es) cut in the lock stretcher bar. The notch(es)
should be provided in the normal, reverse, or both positions, as necessary for
facing movements. The plunger should be driven by channel rodding from an
FPL lever.
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The clearance between the notch and the lock plunger should be no more than
3mm, so that an obstruction of 1.5mm between the stock and switch rails will
allow the plunger to enter, but an obstruction of 3.5mm will not. When unlocked
there should be no more than 18mm between the end of the plunger and the
stretcher bar.
The FPL plunger should be protected from obstructions hanging from a train by
the provision of a ramp, effective in the direction(s) of all authorised movements.
P1:7 Facing Point Lock Bars

Each facing point lock bar should be as long as the distance between axles of
any vehicle that is permitted to run over the line concerned. The lock bar should
be supported on pivot arms which are clipped to the stock rail, so that a vehicle
standing above the lock bar will prevent it from rising and the lock plunger from
being withdrawn.
The rodding from the FPL lever should be connected at one end of the facing
point lock bar and the drive to the lock plunger at the other. This ensures that,
should the equipment become disconnected from the lever, the presence of a
vehicle would still prevent the points from moving.
P1:8 Mechanical Detection and Clearances

When a signal slide is fouled by a detector blade, it should not be possible to
move the signal arm by more than 5 degrees from the horizontal under all
climatic conditions.
Mechanical detection should be arranged so that an obstruction of 3.5mm

between the stock and switch rails will allow the signal slide to pass, but an
obstruction of 5mm will not.
Mechanical detectors should be maintained with a clearance of 2.5mm on each

side of the signal slide. The clearance between the notch face of the signal slide
and the nearest blade should not exceed 13mm for any detector at 23m or less
from the signal. This clearance, however, may be increased on detectors at
distance more than 23m from the signal to allow for the effect of temperature
changes in the wire between signal and detector. Where two or more detectors
in a wire run control the same signal, the detector nearest the signal should have
the normal clearance and the other detectors should have clearances
progressively increasing to the maximum of 50mm at the last detector if it is
more than 183m from the signal. The increase of signal slide notch clearance
should be at the rate of not more than 25mm per 92m of wire run.
P1:9 Out of Use Points

Out of use points that are connected to a control point should be detected in
accordance with Section 2.3. When disconnected, pending connection or
removal, they should be secured in accordance with Rule Book Appendix No.15
and any FPL made effective, for example:
• for independent FPLs, by securing the lock plunger to the sleeper;

• by using a pin and padlock with clamp lock mechanisms, or a special locking
rod with early versions; or
• by disconnecting point machine operating circuits and cranking the lock-dog
fully home.
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Appendix P2:
Relay Circuits for Points
P2:1 Typical Relay Circuits for Point Operation
Point operation is fed from contacts of the interlocking lock relays (NLR and
RLR) via a two wire polar circuit to the apparatus housing adjacent to the points,
where a normal or reverse point relay (NWR/NWPR or RWR/RWPR) is
energised. These, in turn, energise the normal or reverse contactors (NWMR or
RWMR), which are de-energised as soon as the appropriate detection is fully
obtained. For details of contactor wiring see Part E.
For clamp locks, a single contactor (WMR) operates the pump motor, whilst the
valves are controlled by the NWR/NWPR or RWR/RWPR.
A time delay unit (WJR) is incorporated into the contactor circuit to disconnect
the feed if the point operation is not completed within the allotted time (7 to 9s.).
(The timed back contact is non-safety and so is situated at one extremity of the
contactor circuit.)
Contactors for each end of a multiple ended set of points may either be housed
in a central lineside location, or in separate lineside locations. In the latter case,
separate WJRs are required at each location.
The maximum length of 120V d.c. circuit to operate point machines and clamp
locks should generally be restricted to 200m, to avoid the need for clamp lock
motor and valves to have separate return conductors, to facilitate testing and
maintenance and to ensure a sufficient degree of a.c. immunity. This feed is run
in 2.5mm2 multicore cable for reasons of voltage drop and current carrying
capacity. Within lineside locations, the operating circuits are wired with two
1.15mm2 conductors in a parallel or ring configuration.
Lower voltage machines may be used, in non-electrified areas, where

particularly expedient and where agreed by the infrastructure controller, subject
to a sufficient size of cable being provided to meet the above requirements for
the increased current.
P2:2 Typical Relay Circuits for Point Detection

Detection is fed back to the interlocking over a two wire polar circuit from
contacts of the normal and reverse detection relays (NKR and RKR) and
includes proof of all contactors de-energised (both banks of each proved down).
The KRs are down proved in the contactor. If there is only one pair of KRs, then
one pair of back contacts in series will both disengage the contactor and down
prove the KRs. Otherwise the contacts are duplicated in two separate legs, as
the NKRs are required in parallel for disengaging and in series for down proving,
and the RKRs likewise.
For worked points, correspondence with the appropriate point operating controls
is proved in the local detection circuit at the lineside location. Correspondence
with the appropriate point lock relay in a route relay interlocking, or point lever
contact at a lever frame, is proved in the incoming detection circuit (NWKR and
RWKR) at the interlocking.
Where the detection circuit is repeated intermediately, it is standard practice to

provide correspondence proving between the control circuits and detection
circuits, in order to protect against an untoward change in the polarity of a
common power supply. See Part D for further details.
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Appendix P3:
SSI Application for
Points
This appendix describes the application of the Guidance Note to SSI
installations. These considerations are additional to those prescribed in
SSI design standards.
P3:1 Point Operation Using SSI

A special trackside functional module (TFM), the point module, is provided in an
apparatus housing adjacent to the points. This is connected to the central
interlocking by a safety-critical transmission system. Each module has two sets
of outputs, each capable of operating two point ends of the same set of points,
or alternatively one triple ended and one single ended set.
The outputs are used directly to drive 120V clamp lock motors and valves, but
for point machines the valve drive outputs are dropped to 50V over a 1,000Ω
resistor to operate contactors. These should be cross proved in the ordinary
way (both banks proved down).
Two microprocessors in the TFM, duplicated for redundancy, perform the

following roles:
• interpretation of telegrams received from the interlocking;

• isolation of the outputs until the points are required to move;
• disengaging the operating feed when the appropriate detection is obtained;
• driving the points again if detection is subsequently lost;
• disengaging the feed if detection is not obtained within the allotted time (8s.);
• isolation of one set of outputs in the event of a non-critical failure; and
• total shut down of the module, with all points locked as last set, in the event
of a microprocessor failure.
Separate 650/140V transformers are used to supply points modules with 140V
a.c. from which the 120V d.c. outputs are derived. Separate earth fault
detection is not required, as the TFM power supplies are isolated.
The maximum length of 120V d.c. circuit to operate point machines and clamp
locks should generally be restricted to 200m, to avoid the need for clamp lock
motor and valves to have separate return conductors, to facilitate testing and
maintenance and to ensure a sufficient degree of a.c. immunity. This feed is run
in 2.5mm2 multicore cable for reasons of voltage drop and current carrying
capacity. Within lineside locations, the operating circuits should be wired with
two 1mm2, pink, conductors in a parallel or ring configuration. (Only a single
0.75mm2 conductor is necessary for clamp lock valves.)
P3:2 Point Detection Using SSI

The detection input to the point module includes all the point detection relays in
series. The pairs of point detection relays should be cross-proved. For new
work, loop inputs to point modules should not be used for point detection without
an interface pair of detection relays.
A second input gives proof of all contactors de-energised (both banks of each
proved down). For new work, this input should be strapped where contactors
are not provided, to standardise the proving data in the interlocking and facilitate
any future change from clamp locks to point machines.
Correspondence between the detection and the interlocking controls is proved at

the interlocking in the aspect of signals reading over the points (controlled and
detected normal or reverse in the OPT file).
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Part S
Signals
1 Introduction
1.1
This Guidance Note applies, in support of GK/RT0031, GK/RT0032, GK/RT0034
and GK/RT0035, to all technologies of trackside equipment used to give, or
restrict, visual movement authorities to train drivers and any associated
supplementary train interactive systems.
1.2
This is a temporary issue to allow the early cancellation of former BRB
documentation. Only the necessary sections are included in this issue.
1.3
Not yet included.
1.4
Guidance Note:
• Typical circuits for signal operation and proving may be used. They should
comply with the description given in Appendix S2.
• For SSI installations, see Appendix S3.
2 Design Principles
2.1
The appearance, meaning and performance of signals and indicators should
conform to GK/RT0031. The colours of signal aspects are defined in
GK/RT0005.
2.2
Signals and indicators should be positioned in accordance with GK/RT0034 and
GK/RT0035. The actual position, profile and alignment should be subject to the
confirmation of a Signal Sighting Committee, as described in GK/RT0037.
2.3
Signals should not clear unless the next signal ahead is displaying a valid aspect,
in accordance with GK/RT0032.
2.4
The remaining design principles are not yet included.
3 Main Signals
Not yet included.
(CLS = colour light signal)
4 Permissive or
Shunting Signals
Not yet included.
(PLS = position light signal)
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5 Junction Signals and

Route Indicators
Not yet included.
(PLJI = position light junction indicator; RI = route indicator)
6 Miscellaneous
Indicators
Not yet included.
7 Electrical
Requirements
7.1 General
De-energisation of the control circuits, or shut down of an electronic control
device, should result in the most restrictive aspect being displayed.
Further details for relay circuits are given in Appendix S2 and for Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) installations in Appendix S3.
7.2 Signal Lamps and Optical Systems

All lights of all aspects and indications displayed at any one signal should appear
to be of similar intensity. Range and angular view for each type of signal and
indicator is specified in GK/RT0031. Wide angle readability at short range is
generally addressed by the provision of close-up lens sectors aligned towards
the track. The standard arrangement is for long range optical units and signals
positioned to the left of the track. Any requirement for short range optical units
(or spreadlight lenses) or signals positioned to the right of the track should be
specified by the Signal Sighting Committee.
Signal lighting should be provided by one of the following means:
• direct optical system using signal lamps (SL) to BS 469;

• direct optical system using lamps to BS 161;
• direct optical system using tungsten halogen lamps;
• fibre optic (FO) system using tungsten halogen lamps;
• light emitting diode (LED) array of suitable colour and intensity;
• other approved arrangement that fulfils the requirements of this Guidance
Note.
The observed colour of light emitted should conform to GK/RT0005. This may
be achieved by means of:
• a self-coloured light source, such as an LED array;

• fixed colour filters or lenses; or
• a searchlight mechanism capable of changing the aspect displayed by a
single lamp.
The lens should provide adequate security for the environment in which the
signal is situated.
The types of lamp generally available are shown in Figure S1.
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Standard Code Rated Rated Type Cap Typical Application

Voltage Wattage
BS 469 SL 1 4V 0.5W single filament MBC semaphore signal (low wattage) #
SL 5 12V 4W single filament 2 pin BC semaphore signal (low wattage)
SL 13 6V 12W single filament BA15s searchlight signal #
SL 17 12/16V 16/12W double-pole 3 pin BC multiple aspect CLS #
SL 18 12V 24W single filament 3 pin BC multiple aspect CLS #, PLJI
SL 21 12/16V 24/12W double-pole 3 pin BC multiple aspect CLS #
SL 22 12/16V 10/6W double-pole 3 pin BC PLJI #
SL 25 6V 6/9W triple-pole 2 pin BC searchlight signal
SL 29 12V 2.4W single filament 2 pin BC repeater
SL 32 12V 12/16W triple-pole 2 pin BC searchlight signal
SL 33 110V 25W single filament 3 pin BC PLJI, loading/unloading indicator
SL 34 12V 16/24W triple-pole 3 pin BC multiple aspect CLS #
SL 35 12V 24/24W triple-pole 3 pin BC semaphore signal (intensified lighting),
multiple aspect CLS, PLJI, banner
BS 161 general 110V 15W single filament 2 pin BC standard RI (multi-lamp)
service (pygmy) or SBC
110V 60W single filament 2 pin BC miniature RI (stencil), banner
rough 110V 40W single filament 2 pin BC PLS, loading/unloading indicator, banner
BRS-SE163 service 110V 35W single filament 2/3 pin BC PLS, loading/unloading indicator, banner
ECE H3 12V 55W tungsten halogen FO RI, FO banner, FO points indicator
Reg. 37 H3 10V 50W tungsten halogen fibre optic PLS, FO RI
GY6.35-13 M89 24V 50W tungsten halogen FO level crossing indicator
Note: # = not generally appropriate for new work
Figure S1 Lamps for Signalling Purposes
7.3 Filament Failure Protection

The main filaments of lamps should have a manufacturer’s design life that is
commensurate with the infrastructure controller’s policy for lamp changing. This
should generally be at least 1000 hours, and for newly specified equipment
should be at least 4000 hours.
Signal lamps with a high degree of reliability are required, because an

extinguished signal presents a hazardous situation. The lamps of the red, first
yellow and green aspects of a colour light signal, or of a route indicator
displaying an indication for any route except the highest speed route, in
particular, have a high integrity requirement.
High integrity aspects and indications may be provided by one of the following
methods, as appropriate for the type of signal or indicator:
• one double-pole lamp (with two filaments lit in parallel), e.g. SL17 lamp (not
appropriate for new work);
• one triple-pole lamp arranged so that the auxiliary filament is energised if the
main filament fails, e.g. SL35 lamp.
• main and auxiliary lamps emitting light through a single aperture, e.g. fibre
optic PLSs; or
• displays using more than one lamp with separate apertures, e.g. PLJIs,
PLSs and multi-lamp route indicators.
The lighting system should run in a degraded or auxiliary mode in the event of a
failure of the main filament, or of a lamp in a multiple-lamp display. For new
work, only those systems are appropriate for running line signals that do not
significantly reduce the intensity of the display in auxiliary mode. Multi-lamp or
position light systems do not achieve an effective auxiliary mode if a display is
presented to the driver that could be confused with one having a different
meaning. The auxiliary mode should be capable of maintaining the display alight
for a sufficient time to allow the fault to be detected and rectified.
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High integrity lighting systems should be proved and monitored in accordance

with Section 8.
7.4 Power Supplies

Power supplies feeding high integrity lighting systems similarly require a high
degree of reliability.
Wherever reasonably practicable, low voltage signal lamps should be fed from a
higher voltage secure a.c. power supply (typically 110V) via a lamp lighting
transformer housed in the signal head, so as to:
• reduce voltage drop;

• improve susceptibility to high resistance feeds;
• allow voltage adjustment within the signal head; and
• give a more stabilised output and consistent intensity of light.
The signal head transformer should be tightly specified, such that its magnetising
current is less than the hold-up current for any filament proving device with
which it is required to operate. The primary and secondary windings should be
provided with a range of tappings to allow fine adjustment of an incoming supply
with a +10%, -20% tolerance. The transformer should be adequately rated to
supply the appropriate signal lamp(s) and any changeover device at 130%
nominal power and 110% nominal input voltage. The transformer and filament
changeover device (see Section 8.4) may be mounted on a common plate. This
assembly may be mounted in the adjacent apparatus housing for signals, such
as electro-mechanical banner repeating signals, that do not have provision within
the head.
The adjustment should allow for under-running of the signal lamp. However,
tungsten halogen lamps should be supplied with precisely their rated voltage, to
prevent darkening of the envelope.
Where the provision of a secure a.c. supply is impracticable, a secure local

power supply should be provided, generally at 12V d.c. Trickle charged
secondary cells, or other local standby arrangements, should be provided which
should generally be capable of operating for 10 hours after a failure of the
normal incoming supply. They should be monitored with power off detection
derived from the secondary side of the battery charger, to prove that the charger
output current exceeds the average load current. In such cases the local power
supply should be suitably regulated to maintain the correct voltage on the lamps,
without using a signal head transformer. Consequently, the adjacent apparatus
housing may need to be closer to the signal due to the more onerous voltage
drop requirements.
The standby supply for both route indicators and associated main signal aspects
should be derived from the same secondary battery, so as to reduce the risk of
displaying a dim junction indicator together with a bright main aspect.
7.5 Terminations and Wiring

All terminations and wiring, including those within trackside equipment, should
conform to Part J.
Note that, even where arrangements of internal wiring and labelling are used as
shown in typical circuits, the internal wiring of signal and indicator heads and
other trackside equipment should be shown in full on design details, as stated in
GK/RT0201. This is particularly important with any non-standard signal head
wiring or labelling caused by an unusual orientation of aspects.
All internal terminals, including those of components, should be labelled in

accordance with the appropriate internal circuits.
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External cable terminations within trackside equipment should incorporate a

circuit disconnection facility. Any jumpering that is necessary to configure the
equipment for a particular application (see Appendices S2 and S3) should be
provided on the external side of the disconnection links, so as not to disturb the
internal wiring. Equipment should be supplied without jumpering to allow
designers to specify the exact requirements.
Where triple-pole lamps (or main and auxiliary lamps) are used, an internal
disconnection point should be provided to disconnect the main filament or lamp
so as to permit the auxiliary mode to be tested. This may take the form of an
insulated push fit connector.
Where it is necessary to use a standard signal head, but blank certain aspects
out of use, the standard internal wiring should be retained intact and a suitable
note added to the design details.
7.6 Trackside Signal Circuits

Signal lamps should generally be fed from a lineside apparatus housing (location)
adjacent to the signal.
The distance between the signal relays (or electronic device) and the signal
head should be restricted to allow for the following factors:
• voltage drop with the maximum number of lamps alight (the limiting factor
often being due to the higher current requirement of an associated route
indicator);
• to facilitate testing and maintenance; and
• immunity from induced a.c. interference.
The conductor size throughout this lighting circuit should be appropriate for the
power consumption of the signal lamps, in the following respects:
• voltage drop; and

• current carrying capacity.
For the maximum length of the trackside signal lighting circuit, see Part D. A
length of 1.5mm2 multicore cable not exceeding 200m will generally satisfy these
constraints, except for signals fed at low voltage d.c. However, the use of
2.5mm2 multicore cable may be necessary to feed junction indicators more than
150m.
Signal lighting circuits generally do not require to be double cut, as partial earth
faults would be insufficient to illuminate a lamp, and a common return may be
used. However, two wire feeds generally are double cut, as this is easily
provided. Circuit design should limit the level of induced voltage likely to be
attained under traction fault conditions such that it is not reasonably possible for
a lamp to be lit. (Note that an a.c. traction fault current of 5,500A for 200ms
may be considered as a maximum.) See Part D for full details.
7.7 Immunisation, Earthing and Bonding

In a.c. and dual electrified areas, signal searchlight and other mechanisms
should be fully immunised against 50Hz. Equipotential bonding of signal
structures (including straight posts) should be provided to protect against
dangerous touch potentials arising from a traction fault. See Part J.
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Otherwise, earthing of signals and indicators should not be provided because of

the danger from traction return currents thereby finding a shorter or parallel
return path. However, all signals and indicators should be fed from an earth-free
supply and, as far as reasonably practicable, insulated from earth. All newly
specified signals and indicators should be double insulated (see Part D).
Earth fault detection is not generally required for signal lighting supplies. See
Part C for further details of secure power supplies.
8 Signal and Lamp

Proving
The mandatory requirements for signal proving are given in GK/RT0060
Any proving required that is not provided as a standard feature for a particular
type of signal or indicator should be stated in the control tables.
8.1 Proving of Main Colour Light Signals

Controlled signals should be proved on in the interlocking before the approach
locking can be released to allow the signal or route to be normalised. This
feature is inherent within electronic control systems. The means of achieving it
in relay-based systems is described in Appendix S2. It is not generally
necessary to prove signals alight to release locking, unless they protect a
significant hazard, such as a controlled level crossing.
All colour light stop and distant signals (including both heads of a splitting distant
showing proceed, or of a co-acting signal) should be proved alight, and
displaying an appropriate aspect, in the aspects of the stop signal(s) in rear.
Wherever practicable this should be in such a way that will facilitate degraded
operation. (For signals leading onto a single or bi-directional line, this control
should be bypassed, for the passage of each train, by operation of a signalman’s
sealed override device.)
Colour light home and distant signals should be proved on and alight in the block
controls in accordance with GK/RT0042.
Distant signals and banner repeating signals should prove a colour light stop
signal ahead alight and displaying a proceed aspect.
Banner repeating signals should be proved (on and alight, or controls off) in the
signal(s) in rear. The signal(s) in rear should not clear to an aspect less
restrictive than single yellow, unless the banner controls are off. Each head of a
splitting banner signal should prove the other alight and displaying the on aspect.
Co-acting pairs of signals should mutually prove each other alight and displaying
the same aspect. If such proving fails, both signals should return to danger
within two seconds.
Junction signals with advance warning of divergence, in the situation where main
aspects are visible before the route indicator becomes readable, should be
approach released from red, unless:
• the flasher unit of the signal in rear is proved operational (and any
approaching train has sufficient sighting of a flashing yellow aspect); or
• the aspects of the splitting distant signal in rear are proved correctly
displayed (and any approaching train has sufficient sighting of the splitting
distant aspects). If such proving fails, the junction signal should return to
danger within two seconds.
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No head of a splitting distant signal should show any aspect less restrictive than
single yellow, unless the other head(s) are proved to be alight and displaying
single yellow.
All position light junction indicators should be proved alight before the associated
signal is allowed to clear.
When an alphanumeric route indicator applies to a route that has a lower speed
than the fastest route(s) from the signal, or has some significantly different
physical characteristic (e.g. reads to a short bay platform), the indication should
be proved alight before the signal is allowed to clear.
In addition, AWS controls should prove the green aspect of a colour light signal
alight (and any banner repeating signal off, situated between the AWS and the
signal), as described in Section 11.
8.2 Proving of Main Semaphore Signals

Requirements for semaphore arm or slot proving should be stated in the control
tables or noted on the signalling/scheme plan. Any abbreviations should
conform to GK/RT0004. Typical requirements are as follows:
• the block controls should prove the home and distant arms on (see
GK/RT0042, or GK/RT0051);
• where sequential locking is required (see Part F) and arm repeaters are
provided, the signal(s) in rear should be locked, unless the stop signal arm is
proved on, (see GK/RT0041, GK/RT0042, or GK/RT0051);
• banner repeating signal controls should prove the related signal arm ahead
off;
• distant signal controls should prove all related power operated stop signal
arms off;
• distant signal controls should prove any power operated stop arm on the
same post off;
• outer distant signal controls should prove a power operated inner distant arm
off;
• the section signal should be locked, unless the arms of any intermediate
block home and distant signals ahead are proved on (see GK/RT0042); and
• AWS controls should prove the distant arm off (as well as any stop arm on
the same post and any inner distant arm), as described in Section 11.
The usual arrangement is for a rotary circuit closer attached to the signal arm, or
slot lever, to operate a polarised circuit, the polarity being dependent on whether
the on or off contact is made. The necessary adjustments are specified in
Appendix S1. The circuit should be de-energised when the circuit closer is in the
centre position. It should operate either a pair of biased relays, or a polar relay
(and/or a needle indicator to specification BR 925).
Generally, the following signals require arm proving:
• all power operated stop and distant signals;

• all mechanically operated distant signals;
• mechanically operated stop signals that are more than 400m from the signal
box, or cannot be readily seen from the signal box;
• banner repeating signals that are more than 400m from the signal box, or
cannot be readily seen from the signal box (generally by means of a circuit
that is combined with the related signal);
• other signals with a colour light signal in rear that can operate automatically;
and
• other signals giving entry to a single or bi-directional line worked by any non-
token system (unless protection by points is assured).
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Where appropriate, a single polarised circuit may be used to prove a

combination of functions, that are applicable to the same line and at the same
location (or a related banner repeating signal), as shown in Figure S2. Any
condition that does not fulfil the on or off proving requirements should result in
the polarised circuit being de-energised and any repeater should indicate
“wrong”. Circuits for proving other permutations are also possible.
Elements: main main diverging divergin banner lamp

PROVING: slot arm slot g arm
Arm & ON (on - - on) ------------- - - -
-
Slot OF off - - - - -
F
Arm & ON - (on - ------------- ------------ ---------- - alight)
- --
Lamp OF - (off - ------------- ------------ ---------- - alight)
F - --
Signal & ON - (on - ------------- ------------ - on) -
-
Banner OF - (off - ------------- ------------ - off *) -
F -
Splitting ON - (on - ------------- - on) - -
-
Stop - (on - ------------- - off) - -
-
Signal OF or (off - ------------- - on)
#1 F -
Splitting ON (on - --- on --- ---- on ---- - on) - -
Distant (off - ------------ ---- on ---- - on) - -
Signal OF or (on - --- on --- - off) -
#2 F
*: or train intervening between banner and associated signal
#1: or Isolated Splitting Distant Signal
#2: with associated stop arm above (also applicable to a slotted Splitting
Stop Signal)
Figure S2 Combined Semaphore Signal Proving and Repeating
Lamp repeating should be provided for all signals that cannot readily be seen by
any signalman in accordance with GK/RT0039. Where provided, intensified
lighting should be proved in the same manner as for a colour light signal, typically
as follows:
• in the AWS controls, as described in Section 11;

• for home and distant signals, in the block controls;
• for intermediate block home and distant signals, in the section signal; and
• for other signals, in the signals (stop, distant and any banner) in rear.
Low wattage semaphore signal lighting is not required to be proved alight in

other signalling functions. A thermal device should be used to prove an oil lamp
alight. More than one signal may be grouped on a common lamp proving circuit.
(See Sections 8.5 and 8.6.)
Where provided, control relays of power-operated signals should be proved de-

energised in the signal lever back lock and energised in the AWS controls.
Where practicable, proving should include correspondence with the signal lever,
or control relay. Where the power supply feeds more than one circuit, all
contacts should be double cut. Earth returns should not be used for new work.
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8.3 Proving of Shunting Signals

Position light shunting signals should be proved on in the interlocking before the
approach locking can be released and the signal or route normalised, as
described in Section 8.1.
Where there is a risk of a shunting signal being passed at danger in the event of
a lamp failure and the potential consequences merit it, the controls of any
signal(s) in rear should prove that a red lamp is alight (or semaphore arm on) in
the signal concerned, unless its controls are off. A high risk may be considered
to be present in the following situations:
• limit of shunt (LOS) indicators;

• any signal acting as a LOS; and
• any signal on a running line that limits the extent of a shunting movement, in
the opposite direction to that of the normal traffic flow.
A shunting signal that precedes one or more signals should be proved off in the
controls of those signals. It is not necessary to prove it alight.
When a miniature route indicator applies to a route that has a lower speed than
the fastest route(s) from the signal, the indication should be proved alight before
the signal is allowed to clear.
8.4 Lamp and Filament Proving

Where a signal lighting system can operate in a degraded or auxiliary mode, as
described in Section 7.3, the main mode of operation should be monitored in
accordance with Section 8.6, but either the main or auxiliary modes will fulfil the
requirements for signal proving in Sections 8.1 to 8.3.
Where the signal proving requires the display alight (either main or auxiliary
mode), this lamp proving should be undertaken in the adjacent apparatus
housing, by detecting current flow in the lighting circuit. This is generally
required for the following signals and indicators:
• colour light signals: red, first yellow or green lamp alight (the second yellow
is required to be separately proved alight in co-acting signals and certain
splitting distant heads);
• signals capable of displaying flashing aspects: cold proving of flasher;
• high risk PLSs defined in Section 8.3: at least one red lamp alight;
• fibre optic banner repeating signal: at least one on aspect lamp alight (a
splitting banner also requires the off aspect lamps proved alight);
• electro-mechanical banner repeating signal: lamp alight;
• all PLJIs: at least three of the five lamps alight (the second lamp failure
should not disengage lamp proving that has already been obtained, but
should inhibit the lamp proving for a subsequent clearance);
• multi-lamp standard route indicators defined in Section 8.1: sufficient lamps
alight that the display is not mutilated;
• fibre optic standard route indicators defined in Section 8.1: lamp alight; and
• miniature route indicators defined in Section 8.3: lamp alight.
The means of detecting the actual current flow to prove that it is sufficient to light
the lamp(s) sufficiently brightly, or that a sufficient number of lamps are alight,
are dependent on the application and are described in Appendices S2 and S3.
In the case of a system using main and auxiliary lamps to emit light through a
single aperture, or a triple-pole lamp with main and auxiliary filaments, a
changeover device should be provided, which should also monitor the main
mode of operation. This may take the form of a current operated relay or a solid
state unit, generally housed in the signal head. However, for d.c. lit signals (and
electro-mechanical banner repeating signals), it may be located in the adjacent
apparatus housing.
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The changeover relay for lamps to BS 469 should be an octal base plug-in relay
operating with a current of 1.75A (a.c. or d.c.) and releasing when it falls below
0.2A. The volt drop across the coil energised at 2A should not be greater than
1.5V. Its contacts should be rated at 3A continuous (at 13V a.c. or d.c.), but be
capable of making and breaking a load of 8A (at 16V a.c. or d.c.).
In the case of flashing aspects, a special changeover device should be used to

remain fully operated during the bright and dim periods of the flashing cycle.
This should comprise a toroidal current transformer, a bridge rectifier, a d.c.
relay and a connecting cable with plug coupler to fit the standard octal relay
base.
For tungsten halogen lamps, an octal base plug-in relay operating with a current
of 4.25A a.c. and releasing when it falls below 0.5A. The volt drop across the
coil energised at 5A should not be greater than 0.6V. Its front contacts should
be rated at 3A continuous. Its back contacts should be rated at 8A continuous
(at 12V a.c.), but be capable of making and breaking a load of 35A (at 15V a.c.).
Alternatively, a solid state changeover device, dissipating not more than 17W of
power, may be used.
8.5 Signalman’s Indications

Generally, where the state of trackside equipment controlled by the signalman is
proved in the operation of other signalling functions, it should also be included in
the appropriate signalman’s indications.
An individual replacement facility from the signal box is required for all automatic
and semi-automatic signals that are not otherwise controlled from the signal box,
as described in Part F. This should include a red indication at the signal box
proving that the signal box replacement has been effective at the signal, the
signal has been replaced to red and is alight. Additionally, any related banner
repeating signals or distant signals should be proved on and alight in the
signalman’s indication.
Arm, slot and light repeating for semaphore signals should be provided as
directed by the Signal Sighting Committee and should be shown on the
signalling/scheme plan. The nomenclature given in GK/RT0004 may be used.
The standard requirements are given in GK/RT0037.
The full requirements for signalman’s indications and signal repeating are
described in Part L.
8.6 Maintainer’s Indications

The full requirements for maintainer’s facilities at interlockings are described in
Part F.
These include, amongst other items:
• signal lamp main filament monitoring; and

• means to apply restrictive controls to signals.
The main filament monitoring indications should be located where an appropriate

maintainer’s response time can be ensured. The indications may be arranged in
groups, each not exceeding six signals. The following signals and indicators are
required to be monitored:
• colour light signal lamps: each main filament alight, when energised; (This
requires a particular wiring arrangement in the signal head, with special
provision for monitoring the second yellow lamp. Consequently, any non-
standard orientation that has a second yellow lamp in any position other than
at the top requires a modification to the internal wiring. The monitoring
circuits are also dependent upon application, but these differences are
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addressed by the provision of external strapping, as described in Appendices

S2 and S3.)
• fibre optic PLS not associated with main signal: one main lamp alight;
• fibre optic PLS associated with main signal: PLS main lamp alight or PLS
controls on;
• conventional single aspect PLS displaying two red lights (LOS): both lamps
alight;
• fibre optic banner repeating signal: both on aspect lamps alight, or off aspect
lamp alight;
• electro-mechanical banner repeating signal (triple-pole lamp type only): main
filament alight;
• SPAD indicator: flasher cold proving and tail cable intact only;
• semaphore signals: where lamp proving provided, lamp alight; and
• d.c. lit signals: power off detection (see Section 7.4).
Means should also be provided to disconnect signals and/or AWS inductors, so

that the route(s) concerned are maintained in their most restrictive state, so as
to facilitate compliance with Section E of the Rule Book. This may be provided in
the apparatus housing adjacent to the equipment concerned, or at the
interlocking, and may consist of:
• disconnection links (preferable); or

• disconnecting, insulating and securing wires.
Where convenient, e.g. for electronic interlockings, the facilities described in this
section (8.6) may be provided through a maintainer’s terminal at the interlocking.
9 Signal Post
Replacement Switch
Wherever an automatic signal is equipped with a signalman’s replacement
facility, as described in Section 8.5, the signal post replacement switch should be
removed, to prevent staff placing reliance on a device which could be
susceptible to hazardous failure.
The possible failure modes of existing switches may render them inappropriate
to give safety-critical protection.
10 Signal Structures
and Physical
Arrangements
Not yet included.
11 Supplementary Train
Interactive Systems
Not yet included.
12 Speed Restrictions
Not yet included.
13 Positioning of
Running Signals
Not yet included.
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Appendix S1:
Supplementary
Information for
Semaphore Signals
Not yet included.
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Appendix S2
Relay Circuits for
Signals
Unless otherwise stated, these notes are generally applicable to the typical
signal operation and proving and AWS circuits
The requirements for line circuits, including polarised circuits, are given in Part D.
S2:1 Signal Control Circuits

Main signal controls should be fed from the interlocking over the signal
controlling relay, the GR, which should also include a back contact of the
approach lock stick relay (ALSR), for down proving. The actual route required, if
more than one, should be selected by the appropriate route relay in route setting
systems, or by some other means, such as point control relays, in non-route
setting systems.
The controls should be transmitted to an apparatus housing (location) adjacent

to the signal by safety-critical means, usually a line circuit. Where there is more
than one route from the signal, a polarised circuit or circuits may be used to
halve the number of cable cores required. These control functions should be
arranged (either at the interlocking or in the location) to distinguish between the
classes of route and any indications of route to be displayed. The control
functions should energise a signal aspect relay (HR) or a position light relay,
(PL)GR, as appropriate, subject to proving the following functions, where
applicable for diverging routes:
• the relay controlling the route indicator (UHR) proved energised; and
• where required in the control tables, a route indicator lamp proving relay
(UECR) energised.
Signalman’s replacement facilities for automatic and semi-automatic signals

should be transmitted by safety-critical means. A replacement request should
de-energise a disengaging relay (YR) in the location, a contact of which should
be included in the HR circuit.
The HR of an automatic (or semi-automatic) signal in rear of a controlled signal

should be fed from the interlocking, so as to facilitate use of the same track
section repeaters (TPRs) used to approach release the controlled signal.
Note that in older installations the (PL)GR is named (S)HR and the YR is named
EGNPR.
S2:2 Signal Proving Circuits

Proving circuits for controlled signals are generally sent back from the location to
the interlocking as follows:
• signal on/off proving (GPR): polarised circuit for signal on (RGPR) proving
the HR, and (PL)GR where provided, de-energised; and signal off (HGPR)
proving the HR energised;
• position light off proving (PL)GPR, where provided, repeating the (PL)GR
energised (where there is no main signal, the RGPR and (PL)GPR should be
paired in a polarised circuit);
• main signal lamp proving (ECPR).
Note that in older installations the HGPR is named H/DGPR and the (PL)GPR is
named S(OFF)GPR.
Relays controlling the better aspects (HHRs and DRs for stop signals), UHRs
and UECRs are not required to be proved.
RAILTRACK S13
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GK/GN0600
Page S14 of 18
Where there is a related banner repeating signal, the signal RGPR should
include the banner on-proving and the HGPR should prove the banner off, or
track section replaced. The signal ECPR should additionally prove lamp alight
(at least one on aspect lamp for a fibre optic banner), or banner controls off,
generated by a GZR.
For a splitting banner, the on-proving requires both heads on, whereas banner
off requires one head off and both alight. The ECPR should include any one
lamp alight. No GZR is required.
Care should be taken, if it is necessary to generate a HPR, that a wrong side

failure could not be caused by its failure to energise. Generally, any function
requiring the actual aspects displayed, such as the AWS (via the DR), signal
aspects in rear, banner repeating signals, or off indicators, should use the relay
that controls the aspects, or a later repeater (front contacts only). The HGPR
and RGPR at the interlocking should be fed from the relay that actually controls
the aspects. See Part D for the correct use of primary function relays and
repeat relays.
An automatic or semi-automatic signal ahead of a controlled signal should send

the ECPR lamp proving circuit back to the interlocking. Otherwise, automatic
and semi-automatic signals should only transmit to the signal box proving that
the signal box replacement has been effective at the signal (YR de-energised)
and the signal has been replaced to red (HR de-energised) and is alight (ECPR).
S2:3 Signal Lighting Circuits and Lamp Proving

The standard lighting circuit in the signal location should be fed over the HR,
HHR and DR aspect relays, together with a series, current operated, lamp
proving relay (ECR). (The ECR does not prove the second yellow aspect.)
Any route indicator should be fed via contacts of UHRs, and lamp proved with
UECRs as necessary. Where there is more than one PLJI, a separate circuit
should be provided for the pivot light.
Lamp proving relays available are listed in Figure S3. Where the current to be
proved is too great for the relay concerned, an external shunt resistance should
be used to divide the current. The value of the external resistance is dependent
upon the coil resistance which varies between relay manufacturers.
When proving multi-lamp route indicators, a separate variable external

resistance should be used for each indication (except where different indications
have the same number of lamps) and adjusted so that the UECR is de-
energised when the number of failed lamps is sufficient to mutilate the display
concerned.
Further details of the relays are given in GK/GN0630.
S14 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page S15 of 18
Relay Operating Coil External Lamp Typical Lamps Proved

Style or Current Resistance Shunt Current
Pin Resistance (see Figure S1 for applications)
Code i2 r2 r3 i1
940 2.2A dc 0.85Ω none 2A @ 12V one 12V 24W signal lamp (d.c. fed)
941 0.25A ac all makes none 0.22A @ one 12V 24W signal lamp (a.c. fed)
110V
35Ω 47Ω 0.5A @ 110V one 12V 55W tungsten halogen lamp (a.c. fed)
18.6Ω 22Ω
31Ω 40Ω
942 1.0A ac 0.76Ω or none 1.1A @ 110V five 12V 24W signal lamps (a.c. fed),
0.69Ω or five 110V 25W signal lamps
0-2Ω var 0.95A to 2.7A many 110V 15W pigmy lamps
pc 077 0.25A dc 14.8Ω pc 020 # 0.55A one 110V 60W lamp
pc 079 0.125A dc 25Ω pc 020 # 0.32A one 110V 35W lamp
Note: # = 18Ω or 51Ω variable resistor and diode bridge rectifier to feed
d.c. relay
Figure S3 Lamp Proving Relays
Where other arrangements are required, the nominal value of the external shunt
resistance may be calculated from the formula:
r3 = (r2 . i2) / (i1 - i2)

S2:4 Filament Proving Circuits
Signal head wiring should be configured for relay-based circuitry by means of
external strapping. Contacts of the signal head filament changeover relays
(EKRs) are generally wired in parallel to prove main filament alight in at least one
lamp.
However, for heads containing a second yellow lamp, the strapping is different
from that required by SSI applications (see Appendix S3). Filament proving for a
standard relay-controlled four aspect signal requires {(red or first yellow) and
(second yellow or controls more restrictive than double yellow)} or green main
filaments alight. This requires a three wire circuit from the signal head to the
location, where a back contact of the HHR is used to prove the restrictive
controls. (Where the HHR is not controlled by the HR, a back contact of the HR
is required in parallel with the HHR.)
S2:5 Aspect Sequences

Aspect sequence lines are generally fed back from the signal ahead, but may,
where complex meshing would be involved, be generated in the interlocking, or
pass through it to pick up controls, such as proving of advance warning of
divergence controls, en route to the signal in rear. The circuits are most easily
visualised from the aspect sequence chart (see GK/RT0201).
Generally, the HR should control the HHR of the signal in rear and the HHR
should control the DR. Up to three relays at a time may be energised from one
fuse and it is standard practice to provide the lamp proving of the signal ahead in
the common path. The ECPR in the HHR and DR line circuits prevents a
transient change of aspects in the event of a lamp failure. Where provision is
made for degraded operation, it will also prevent any aspect better than a single
yellow reading up to a signal that is extinguished. For automatic signals, the HR
may originate from the same fuse as the HHR and DR, and include the track
section controls, but, for controlled signals (and automatic signals in rear of a
controlled signal), the HR originates from the interlocking, as described in
Section S2:1.
RAILTRACK S15
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GK/GN0600
Page S16 of 18
For the standard lighting and AWS circuits to work correctly, the HR of each
signal should control its own HHR and the HHR its DR, for a four aspect signal
(for a three aspect signal, the HR controls its DR). The aspect lines of
converging routes thus require no selection. Diverging route selection should
generally be made over contacts of the signal UHRs in locations, or point control
or detection relays, or route relays, in the interlocking. (Point KRs in locations do
not offer the same degree of integrity as the UHR.) When necessary, a HEGPR
and HHEGPR for the signal ahead may be generated to repeat its HR and HHR,
respectively (and ECPR).
On goods lines without overlaps, the signal HR should be de-energised by a

train passing the signal before the berth track clears, so energising the HR in
rear. Otherwise the signal in rear would momentarily give a false clearance to a
higher aspect.
Where three and four aspect sequences are intermixed, as permitted in

GK/RT0032, a signal may not be required to display a certain aspect, say yellow.
To avoid confusion, the standard aspect relays and circuits should be provided,
but, in this case, the HHR should immediately follow the HR, being energised by
its front contact.
S2:6 Banner Repeating Signals

The control relay (GR) requires the main signal HR (the relay that actually
controls the signal aspects, or a later repeat) and ECPR, together with any
intervening track section TPR. The proving is included in the related signal
proving (see Section S2:2), but is not provided for an automatic signal.
Note that in older installations the GR is named GPR.
The controls of the signal(s) in rear are modified to include the GZR (banner
alight or controls off) in the HR and the GR (banner off) in the higher aspects.
With splitting banners, the HR of the signal in rear has both banner ECPRs in
parallel (the GZR is not required) and the higher aspects include a contact of a
special off-proving relay to prove one head off and both alight.
Electro-mechanical banners require a separate arm proving circuit, as described

in Section 8.2, to energise an (ON)PR or (OFF)PR, proving correspondence with
the GR. These relays are used instead of the GR for proving purposes.
S2:7 Advance Warning of Divergence

Not yet included.
S2:8 AWS
The requirements for AWS are given in GK/RT0016 and GK/RT0364.
AWS controls require green lamp alight and consist of the signal DR and ECR
(and GR or (OFF)PR for an intervening banner). The controls feed the AWS
inductor via an isolating transformer rectifier. (For a stop signal, the AWS
controls should include a HR contact, either directly or via the DR.) An
economiser control, such as berth track occupied, may be added. (As this latter
control is not safety-critical, it does not require double cutting and a repeater
back contact may be used.)
Where permissive moves can be made up to the signal, the inductor should not
be energised with a train standing between the inductor and the replacement
point of the signal, in accordance with GK/RT0016. Hence the TPR of a
separate track section, or a specially generated inductor stick relay (ISR) proving
that no permissive route has been set, should be included in the controls.
S16 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page S17 of 18
The AWS 110/24V transformer rectifier is generally provided in the same

equipment housing as the signal control relays. Consequently the AWS controls,
on the internal side of the transformer rectifier (see Part D), do not require to be
double cut, as the transformer rectifier provides isolation from the track. The
maximum length of 24V d.c. circuit to operate a standard strength 24V AWS
inductor is 500m. The maximum length of circuit to operate a standard strength
24V suppression coil is 300m, the circuit being controlled over a contact of a
separate line circuit from the interlocking, the I(SUPP)R. The maximum lengths
quoted are for example and limit voltage drop to 10% when using 2.5mm2 (f) tail
cables (see Part J).
The I(SUPP)R contains the various controls given on the special AWS control
tables. Some existing circuits use contactors, which should then be down
proved in the aspects of all signals reading up to the signal whose inductor is
being suppressed.
In d.c. electrified areas, extra strength inductors should be used. As the

transformer rectifiers should be situated within 50m of the 60V inductor (this may
be in a fibre glass post mounted case), the control circuit is generally double cut,
originating from the signal location. The maximum length of 110V a.c. circuit in
2.5mm2 multicore cable to operate such a 110V/60V transformer rectifier for an
extra strength AWS inductor, giving a voltage drop of 10%, is 500m. For an
extra strength 100V suppression coil, a 110/110V transformer rectifier should be
housed in a location within 50m of the inductor, the circuit being controlled over a
contact of a separate relay worked from the interlocking.
For back EMF suppression see Part D.
S2:9 Miscellaneous Circuits

Not yet included.
RAILTRACK S17
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GK/GN0600
Page S18 of 18
Appendix S3:
SSI Application for
Signals
Not yet included.
S18 RAILTRACK
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GK/GN0600
Page Ref1 of 1
References
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994
Electricity at Work Regulations 1989
Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 1992
Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992
Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992
EN50121-1 Railway Applications: Electromagnetic Compatibility

EN50121-4 Railway Applications: Emission and Immunity of the Signalling and
Telecommunications Apparatus
EN50126 Railway Applications: Specifications and demonstration of dependability,
reliability, availiability, maintainability and safety (RAMs)
EN50128 Railway Applications: software for railway control and protection systems
EN50129 Railway Applications: Safety-related electronic systems
BS 88 Cartridge fuses for voltages up to and including 1000V a.c. and 1500V d.c.
BS 161 Specification for Tungsten Filament Lamps for Domestic and Similar General
Lighting Purposes - Performance Requirements
BS 469 Specification for Electric Lamps for Railway Signalling
BS 561 Specification for alternating-current line relays double-element 3-position (for
railway signalling)
BS 714 Specification. Cartridge fuse-links for use in railway signalling circuits
BS 1745 Specification for alternating-current relays for railway signalling: track relays
(double-element, 2-position), line relays (single-element, 2-position)
BS 3506 Specification for Unplasticised PVC Pipe for Industrial Uses
BS 7671 Requirements for Electrical Installations (IEE Wiring Regulations)
RAILTRACK Ref1

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This page has been left blank intentionally

Part C not used

Part D Electrical Circuits

Part E not used

Part G not used

Part H not used

Part I not used

Part J Transmission Systems (including Cables, Terminations and Cable Routes)

Part K not used

Part L not used

Part M not used

Part N not used

Part O not used

Part Q not used

Part R not used

Appendix S2 Relay Circuits for Signals S13

Part T not used

Part U not used

Part V not used

Part W not used

Part X not used

Part Y not used

Amended or additional parts of revised pages will be marked by a vertical black

Issue Date Comments

One April 1999 New Document superseding

Health and Safety

• qualifications and competence requirements (see GM/RT2450 and

A glossary of general signalling terms is given in GK/RT0002. Those terms are

Safety terms are defined in GH/ZC0002.

Symbols to be used on plans and sketches are defined in GK/RT0004, on

Acceptable (risk) Associated with a risk that is either:

• Tolerable AND as low as reasonably practicable; or

as defined in Railtrack’s Railway Safety Case.

Acceptance (product or The status given by Railtrack before use is permitted.

Anti-Preselection The prevention of Preselection of a Signalling Function, thus maintaining the

Assessment The undertaking of an investigation in order to arrive at a judgement, based on

Auxiliary (optical system) Duplicate lamp or filament on hot or cold stand-by.

Basic Event See Fundamental Cause.

Bearer An item of steel or concrete of non–standard dimensions used to support the

Otherwise referred to as a 2-position polarised relay.

This plan is generally combined with the Location Area Plan.

Certificate Of Completion Advice that works are ready for inspection.

Certificate Of Compliance A statement of conformity to requirements and standards.

Certificate Of Conformity (plant A statement of compliance with Type Approval.

Change Control See Configuration Control.

Change-Over Contact See Dependent Contact.

Check Rail See figure under Switches And Crossing.

Closure Panel (track) See figure under Switches And Crossings.

Closure Rail See figure under Switches And Crossings.

Also referred to as single rail or traction rail.

Also known as installation.

Contactor A relay with heavy duty contacts.

It is denoted by the addition of a 'c c c' symbol on the bonding plan.

Also known as signal box control area.

Crossing Angle See figure under Switches And Crossings.

Crossing Back See figure under Switches And Crossings.

Crossing Nose See figure under Switches And Crossings.