Marketing in the Era of Accountability Based on a sample of 880 campaigns this practical report from the IPA reveals

the factors that

make marketing profitable as well as exposing the practices and myths that lead to waste and inefficiency. Order now.

Institute of Practitioners in Advertising

IPA Effectiveness Awards, 1992

www.ipa.co.uk

Agency: Leo Burnett Author: Carole Lee

The Rejuvenation of Kellogg's All-Bran

INTRODUCTION

This is a classic study of advertising copy effectiveness. After several years of rapid sales decline, a new campaign which completely
repositioned the brand was developed. Sales responded immediately, with an equally rapid increase, whilst all other factors, such as price
and distribution, remained essentially the same.

BACKGROUND

Kellogg's All-Bran was launched in the UK in 1922. In its early years the brand was supported by press advertising, positioning it as an aid
to regularity and a cure for constipation. Whilst this has given the brand a tremendous heritage, it also explains some of the negative
imagery associated with All-Bran. Words such as 'old-fashioned', 'geriatric' and 'medicinal' come to mind, whilst a typical comment from
projective techniques would be: 'an elderly librarian with a stringy bun'.

From the early 1970s, sales of the brand took off in line with healthier eating habits, finally peaking in 1983, after the launch of the F-Plan
diet, which specifically mentioned All-Bran in its recipes.

For the next three years (19841986), sales were slightly down, but still remained buoyant. However, in 1987, sales declined by 11% and
then continued to fall, by 7% in 1988 and by 10% in 1989 (see Figure 1).

It was clear that the brand was in serious trouble and a major analysis and strategic development programme was put in hand, in order to
stem the decline in sales.

THE PROBLEM

Kellogg's All-Bran is a type of cereal known as a 'shredded bran'. While there are no branded direct competitors, most of the multiples have
an own label copy of the product.

However, from a consumer point of view, All-Bran competes with all the bran and fibre cereals in the market of which there are many
including Kellogg's Bran Flakes, Bran Buds, Sultana Bran and Fruit 'n' Fibre (launched 1984), as well as Weetabix Farmhouse Bran (since
replaced by Oat and Bran Flakes) and the own label variants of these cereals.

In addition, other cereals such as muesli, Weetabix and especially Shredded Wheat (because of its fibrous texture) are seen by consumers
as good sources of fibre.

Additionally, outside the breakfast category, as healthy eating continued to increase in importance, the number of foods within
supermarkets labelled as 'high fibre' or 'higher fibre' continued to grow.

On the one hand, therefore, All-Bran had been helped by the drive towards healthier foods, but, on the other, this trend had also led to
increasing competition both from the development of additional competitive brands and from existing fibre foods, upweighting their support
behind a stronger 'health/fibre' positioning.

This is seen very clearly by looking at the bran/fibre cereal market, as a whole (see Figure 2).

Whilst the total bran/fibre cereal market grew from 1981 to 1989, All-Bran's share declined steadily from 1986 onwards. This was partly
due to an increase in sales of own label shredded brans, but the biggest effect came from the increase in sales of Kellogg's Bran Flakes and
Fruit 'n' Fibre.
This also coincided with an increasing consumption of other foods which people perceived as being high in fibre such as brown or
wholemeal bread.

TABLE 1: CONSUMPTION OF WHITE/BROWN BREAD

(oz per person per week)
1981 1989
% %
White 21.85 80 15.32 66
Brown/wholemeal 5.56 20 7.77 34
Total 27.41 100 23.09 100

Source: NFS

It appeared that the problem was not one of declining interest in fibre. Consumers were eating more bran/fibre cereals than ever, as well
as more of the foods that are seen to be high in fibre such as brown and wholemeal bread.

So why were our increasingly fibre-conscious consumers not choosing Kellogg's All-Bran to satisfy their requirements? To answer this
question we needed to look in detail at our consumers.

THE CONSUMER

The data bore out our image of the typical All-Bran eater. Approximately two-thirds of the volume was eaten by women and half the
volume was eaten by those over 60. Additionally All-Bran is relatively more important in AB and E households.

TABLE 2: PROFILE OF KELLOGG'S ALL-BRAN

VOLUME BASED ON HELPINGS
1986 1989
% %
Male 30 37
Female 70 63

Under 21 6 5
2134 13 11
3544 10 10
4559 23 24
60+ 48 49
Total 100 100

Source: RBL Consumption Study

TABLE 3: VOLUME OF KELLOGG'S ALL-BRAN INDEXED TO VOLUME OF ALL READY-TO-EAT CEREALS PURCHASED BY
HOUSEHOLDS
1986 1989
AB 107 111
C1 112 100
C2 82 79
D 92 91
E 122 137

Source: AGB (TCA)

Our hypothesis was that during and after the F-Plan period (19831986), a different type of user was attracted to All-Bran. This user was
younger, female and C1C2.

The comparison of 1989 with 1986 in Tables 2 and 3 does support this hypothesis. It appears that, as the excitement associated with the F-
Plan diet calmed down, the brand reverted back to its older (E) profile, and the ratio of female to male eaters declined slightly.

As Table 4 shows, the decline in sales between 1986 and 1989 coincided with a decrease in penetration and a worrying decline in the
number of 'heavy' and 'medium' buying homes.
This pattern can be explained in two ways: firstlt by a general trading down to fewer packets, with some of the light users dropping out of
the brand and, secondly by heavy and medium users switching away completely from All-Bran to other brands.

The decline in heavy users (either because of trading down or because they had switched completely to other brands) suggests that even
committed users of the brand were switching to other fibre foods to supply their fibre needs.

TABLE 4: PENETRATION AND WEIGHT OF PURCHASE

1986 1989
Cumulative penetration (%) 18.9 13.6
Average number of
purchases per buying home 4.9 4.3
Profile of buying homes by purchase level
Heavy (16+) 6.2 4.6
Medium (715) 18.0 16.5
Light (16) 75.8 78.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Profile of volume in buying homes
Heavy (16+) 30.5 24.1
Medium (715) 37.7 41.9
Light (16) 31.7 34.0
Total 100.0 100.0

Source: AGB (TCA)

Finally, in 1989, a programme of group discussions with consumers and potential consumers of all ages, helped to throw light on how All-
Bran was viewed. It was clear that the majority of people who are interested in healthy eating believe they are personally eating enough
fibre. Respondents were very satisfied even complacent that their habitual cereal, plus fresh fruit and vegetables and some other 'whole'
food in the day (eg bread or jacket potatoes) gave them ample fibre.

Not only were consumers, typically, well-satisfied with the level of fibre in their diet, they also believed that all bran cereals and indeed all
'healthy' cereals including muesli, Weetabix and Shredded Wheat were equally good sources of fibre.

For all their knowledge about the ground rules of diet, specific information was far shakier or absent, and only the few All-
Bran loyalists were aware of differing fibre ratios between 'bran' cereals.

Source: Nidus Research

This meant of course that, since consumers felt that all bran cereals gave more or less the same level of fibre (and, in any case, the fibre
level in their diet was already high thanks to their switch to brown bread and inclusion of more fruit and vegetables in the diet), they were
turning to the tastier cereal options.

Consequently, products which disguised or dressed up the bran were very much preferred, accounting for the relative
popularity of Bran Flakes and Fruit 'n' Fibre.

Source: Nidus Research

There was no question of consumers no longer wanting fibre or seeing it as important. This was also confirmed quantitatively by the
National Health Survey (Q3, 1989) where fibre, as an important component of healthy food, was rated 4.65 (on a 5-point scale), second
only to vitamins at 4.69. This meant that there was no need to educate consumers as to the benefits of fibre, since they already
appreciated its role in regularity and general health and well-being. (In fact, when we pushed more benefit-orientated roles in research,
such as disease prevention, these were rejected as over-claims for a breakfast cereal.)

THE ADVERTISING

All-Bran advertising in the 1980s associated All-Bran with fibre, rather than differentiating it from other 'fibre' foods.

This worked during the early 1980s when the fibre craze was at its height, but, after 1986, when people were choosing tastier fibre
alternatives, the benefits such as 'keeping you fit on the inside', 'making up the one-third of fibre missing from the average person's diet'
and the attempt to associate the fibre in All-Bran with a general positive outlook on life (eg the 'Granny' commercial in 1988) were too
generic to give consumers reasons to choose All-Bran versus other fibre foods.
SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM

From the mid-1980s, although consumers still wanted the benefits of fibre, they were switching from All-Bran to other foods which they felt
contained as much fibre as All-Bran, but were a lot tastier.

THE NEW STRATEGY FOR ALL-BRAN

When Leo Burnett began working on the brand in 1989 the planning process that was set in motion quickly established one key fact about
All-Bran, which had not been used strategically before in television advertising:

All-Bran contains a lot more fibre than most of the other foods which people perceive as being high in fibre.

Tables of comparison were drawn up giving examples, such as the fact that to get as much fibre as in a single bowl of All-Bran, you would
have to eat:

● nine slices of brown bread

● eight bananas
● 21 new potatoes, etc

When tested in research this strategy generated tremendous interest. The new information that it contained explained All-Bran's superiority
and gave respondents a rational reason to choose the brand instead of other perceived 'high fibre' foods, even if they actually preferred
the taste of these foods. The rational reason was, importantly, complemented by a tone of voice, which normalised All-Bran, by positioning
it in the context of other everyday foods:

It was flattering to its loyalists, as not being freaky, sick or old.

It makes it seem familiar.

Nothing peculiar in that lot.

Source: Nidus Research

The new strategy made people rethink their view of the brand. In this case, we communicated that All-Bran contains a lot more fibre than
most other perceived high fibre foods.

Firstly, whatever they personally believed was the benefit of fibre, All-Bran could deliver that benefit.

Secondly, this route highlighted the extreme convenience of All-Bran as a fibre provider.

Thirdly, it threw into relief their lack of real knowledge about fibre intake, the comparative lack of fibre in many foods and, consequently,
their own mistaken complacency regarding the amount of fibre that they obtained from their diet.

I thought I knew everything about diet it's shaken me.

Source: Nidus Research

The results for this route from the strategic research (which also examined a number of other possible strategic options) were so positive
that we proceeded to a creative brief.

CREATIVE BRIEF

Role of advertising

Principally to attract new and lapsed users to the brand, by positioning All-Bran as the 'Gold Standard' in fibre provision.

Target market

All adults who believe that fibre is important in the diet, but who currently obtain their fibre from other sources than All-Bran, such as brown
bread and fresh fruit and vegetables. These people over-estimate the amount of fibre in these foods and are therefore complacent about
the amount of fibre in their diet.

Desired consumer response

I did not realise that All-Bran could give me so much more fibre than the other so-called high fibre foods that I have been eating. I need to
eat All-Bran to make sure I am getting enough fibre.

Consumer proposition

Kellogg's All-Bran contains a lot more fibre than most of the other foods which people perceive as being high in fibre.

Support

There is as much fibre in a bowl of All-Bran as in nine slices of brown bread.

Executional guidelines

Appeal to a broad target audience, all adults 25+.

Initially three executions were developed comparing All-Bran to nine slices of brown bread, eight bananas and 21 new potatoes. Later in
1990, two further ads were made comparing All-Bran with eight bowls of brown rice and five portions of cabbage. In 1991, there were two
new executions, comparing All-Bran with eight carrots and six brown bread rolls.

MEDIA

Television was chosen for its impact and its ability to reach a broad target market (in this case, all adults 25+).

All executions are 20 seconds in lengths and each burst generally rotates three commercials, in order to help show that All-Bran is a
superior source of fibre compared to many everyday 'high fibre' foods. Comparing 1990/1991 with 1989 (Table 5) we see:

● A different campaign/copy strategy;

● 20-second instead of 30-second commercials;
● Rotation of commercials instead of one per burst;
● A change of buying strategy (all adults 25+ versus women over 45);
● Absolute TVRs up 30% to 40%.

However, 30-second TVR equivalents were up only about 5% to 11%, so the success of the new campaign cannot be explained simply by
an increased media weight argument.

TABLE 5: KELLOGG'S ALL-BRAN MEDIA

Women 30-second equivalent TV Press
over 45 women over 45 spend spend
TVRs TVRs £000 £000
1989 2,313 2,313 2,519 415
Adults 25+ 30-second equivalent
TVRs adult 25+ TVRs
1990 3,223 2,578 3,520 -
1991 2,972 2,437 3,483 -

The campaign is planned nationally on equal impacts by region. Our evaluation of its effectiveness is therefore based on its overall national
performance.

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADVERTISING

At the time of writing (April 1992), the campaign has been running for two years and three months.

SALES

In simple terms, the oil tanker has been made to perform a U-turn. Volume which was declining at the rate of around 10% per annum,
increased by 8% in 1990 and by 14% in 1991. (see Figure 3).

The success continues into 1992, with sales for Q1 holding at similar levels to those for Q1 1991. In share terms, All-Bran's volume share
has increased from 3.2% of all ready-to-eat cereal at the end of 1989 to 3.8% at the end of 1991, indicating that it is growing well ahead of
the market (see Figure 4)

All-Bran has gained volume, firstly at the expense of own label bran shreds (see Figure 5).
THE CONSUMER

In developing our new strategy, we were keen to attract younger people (under 60) to the brand.

The data that we have from our consumption study suggest that overall penetration has increased.

TABLE 6: CHANGES IN MARKET PENETRATION

OCTOBER 1987 TO SEPTEMBER 1991
Oct 1987 Oct 1988 Oct 1989 Oct 1990
Sept 1988 Sept 1989 Sept 1990 Sept 1991
% of households
with brand in stock
during week 13 12 12 13
% of total who are
All-Bran eaters
during week 2.5 3.0 2.7 3.3
% of 2134s who are
All-Bran eaters 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.8
% of 3559s who are
All-Bran eaters 2.9 3.8 2.8 3.6
% of 60+s who are
All-Bran eaters 5.2 6.0 5.6 6.2

Source: Kellogg RI Consumption Study

The period Oct 1990Sept 1991 of the consumption study was the first period on the study where the campaign was running for a full year.
This shows in Table 6 that the proportion eating All-Bran in an average week has increased significantly since the campaign began. This
increase is particularly marked for 2134s. The data in Figure 6 also show marked increases in per capita consumption amongst the 2154 age
groups.

The campaign had attracted younger consumers to the brand and encouraged those who were eating All-Bran to eat more of it.

Our regular All-Bran users were not the principal focus of the advertising, but they obviously constitute an important secondary target. It is
clear from the data that although the increase in sales has come mainly from new users, the campaign has maintained usage amongst our
previous loyalists. This we would expect, as these people already appreciate the benefits of the brand and its superior fibre provision.
Comparing the volume consumed in 1991 with that in 1989, it is up 54% amongst 2134s, 45% amongst 3554s and 10% amongst those
over 55 (Source: RI Consumption Study and Kellogg estimates).

In order to find out exactly how the campaign was working, a number of research studies were conducted.

A quantitative tracking study showed that the calibration was clearly being communicated. On average, across the total sample, people
believe that more of the alternative 'high fibre' food is now required to equal the fibre found in a bowl of All-Bran.

TABLE 7: AWARENESS OF FIBRE CONTENT OF ALL-BRAN

Pre-advertising Post-advertising
Jan 1990 Mar 1991
Amount with equivalent
fibre to a bowl
of All-Bran:
Slices of brown bread 3.1 5.4
New potatoes 4.1 7.2
Bananas 2.9 4.3

Source: NOP Omnibus

Group discussions carried out by Linda Jones in May 1991 concluded that the campaign potentially worked in a number of ways:

1. Awareness: The campaign acted as a reminder about fibre generally, and All-Bran in particular.
2. Positions All-Bran as the gold standard for fibre: it dramatises All-Bran's superiority as a fibre provider, differentiating it from other
fibre foods. In this way, it can challenge consumers' complacency regarding the fibre spectrum and the foods that they are eating.
3. Suggests other benefits for All-Bran: these are notably, convenience and the possibility of it having a role in slimming.
 4. Imagery: consumers recognise that this advertising is not directed at the old, nor does it have an old-fashioned feel.

Importantly, it is seen to be an essential adjunct to health generally rather than simply an aid to regular bowel function. It also positions
All-Bran alongside other foods, as a brand for sensible eating, rather than a medical solution.

There is thus plenty of feedback from our data on consumers and the research that we have conducted with them to believe our campaign
is working. This is supported by the remarkable turn-around in sales coinciding with the start of the campaign. However, we now need to
look at all other possible factors which could have influenced the result.

The marketplace

Throughout the period in question (19861991), sales of all ready-to-eat cereals grew consistently at an average 3% per annum. All-Bran's
sales pattern of sharp decline, followed by sharp upturn, was clearly out of line with this. Its sales pattern is not in line with the market.

Similarly, if we focus on the bran and fibre sector of the market (as in Figures 2 and 4) there has been a steady increase in sales, whilst
All-Bran's share has rapidly declined and then increased. Finally, amongst the direct own label competitive 'bran shreds' there has been no
withdrawal of brands which would help to account for All-Bran's sales bouncing back.

The product

Kellogg is always striving to improve the quality of its brands and small changes are constantly made to upgrade its products. However, it is
fair to say that All-Bran as a product has remained essentially unchanged.

Packaging

Again, Kellogg constantly reviews the packaging for each brand, and the All-Bran pack front did undergo minor revisions in 1990. (Back
and side panels are always changing, depending on which promotions are on offer.) However, again it is difficult to believe that this has
significantly affected sales.

Price and distribution

Kellogg's All-Bran is a relatively cheap cereal. Its price indexed to the price of all ready-to-eat cereals stands at about 80.

During the campaign, All-Bran's price relative to both all ready-to-eat cereals and specifically to own label 'bran shreds' has increased. This
indicates that the sales effect has not been achieved by dropping the price. The campaign appears to be adding value to All-Bran so that
sales are increasing despite the relative price rising.

All-Bran has always had high distribution, with little variation.

On commonsense grounds, therefore, price and distribution changes cannot explain the recovery of the brand.

Consumer brand equity

Consumer brand equity was explained by Simon Broadbent in 'Using data better' in Admap, January 1992.

It is the sales share the brand would have had if its price and distribution had been average (and its elasticities were also average). In
other words, it shows how consumers value the brand over and above price and distribution effects:

Equity = Share/(Price effect and distribution effect)

The plot of equity in Figure 7 is very like that of All-Bran volume share. It confirms that an upturn started in the first quarter of 1990, with
our first burst, and the trend is now upwards.

It is concluded that the recovery of All-Bran can be attributed only to the new advertising, which resulted in extra value being added to
brand.

Trade promotions

Kellogg regularly organises focus periods for its brands with the trade, in which extra in-store display and prominence is achieved. For All-
Bran there was in fact no focus period in 1990. Thus focus periods do not explain the sales improvement that we have seen.

Consumer promotions

A consideration of the sales promotions run in 1988 and 1989, with those run in 1990 and 1991, suggests no significant effects due to
consumer promotions, as they were of a similar level and quality before and after.

In any case, the main effect of non-advertised promotions is to encourage regular eating amongst users and to help protect the brand from
own label shredded brans. It is unlikely that promotions could generate the increased penetration amongst younger consumers that we
have seen for the brand.
Regionality and seasonality

As a national brand, eaten (and advertised) all year round, there are no significant regional or seasonal effects which can be related back
to advertising activity.

CONCLUSION

This case history demonstrates that it is not advertising per se which is effective, but specific strategic, creative and media solutions.

In summary, we can show that a change of All-Bran campaign has led to a radical upturn in sales for a brand that was in long-term decline.

No other significant changes took place at this time, either within the marketplace or within the marketing of the brand itself.

In developing the new campaign, our strategy required us to attract younger consumers to the brand, who were either non-users or lapsed
users. The increase in penetration of All-Bran amongst younger age groups confirms our success in adopting this strategy. At the same
time, in research, the consumers themselves tell us that the advertising works as we wanted it to. Rationally, it presents All-Bran as the
superior fibre provider, challenging their complacency about the level of fibre provided by other foods in their diet. Emotionally, it positions
All-Bran as younger, and an everyday food (rather than an old-fashioned medical problem-solver).

The campaign not only attracted younger consumers; regular All-Bran users also remained with the brand.

Finally, in terms of profit for the Kellogg Company, All-Bran was able to contribute a greater percentage in 1991 than in 1989, confirming
the value of the new campaign in supporting the brand.

NOTES & EXHIBITS

FIGURE 1: ALL-BRAN VOLUME 1945–89

Source: Kellogg

FIGURE 2: BRAN/FIBRE SECTOR 1981–89

 Source: Kellogg

FIGURE 3: ALL-BRAN VOLUME 1945–91

Source: Kellogg

FIGURE 4: BRAN/FIBRE SECTOR 1981–91

Source: Kellogg
FIGURE 5: NMRA VOLUME SHARE – TOTAL MARKET KELLOGG'S ALL-BRAN WITHIN BRAN SHREDS SECTOR

Note: NMRA designates 13 four-weekly preiods L1 to L14 each year

FIGURE 6: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION BY AGE (ALL-BRAN)

Source: Kellogg

FIGURE 7: ALL-BRAN CONSUMER BRAND EQUITY

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