Definition and nature of agricultural tenancy

Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person of land devoted to

agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, whether in produce or in money, or both."
Agricultural tenancy is not a purely factual relationship. The written agreement of the
parties is far more important as long it is complied with and not contrary to law.

Gelos vs. Court of Appeals 208 SCRA 608 (1992)

Facts: Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a
25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired laborer
Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the
termination of his services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued
working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court found Gelos
as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision was reversed by
the Court of Appeals.

Issue: What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?

Held: The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The
agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow
the agreement, but his protestations are less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is
illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that
they were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty.
Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of
the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it himself
before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and
suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work
specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer
working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the
work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them.
As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important."
Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Facts: Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm
fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was
entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon
request was extended for another year. Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint
claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon
opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was
originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant
wanted, subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and
that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he
could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally. Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court
shall take cognizance of the case. It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting
fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who
is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an
engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the
fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the
present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between
the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial
court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199.
Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil
lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the
cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD: Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property.
As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate
farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce
or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199.
He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied
with. The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the
third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such
other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate
farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant
within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status,
rights, and privileges of one.
Bejasa v CA
Facts: On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her
attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984,
Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime’s wife
with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,
000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of
one year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria’s demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas
continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of
rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery
of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, amd the trial court ruled in favour of
the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas
Held: The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and
the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave
her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land
to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.

Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez G.R. No.
110012 (March 28, 2001)
Facts: Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the
fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez,
respectively entered into a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen,
Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed,
albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but adopting the terms and conditions of the
original contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly asked
petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for
ejectment was filed by respondent against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial
court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision
holding that the lease contract is a civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate
the fishpond in question and surrender peaceful possession thereof. Petitioner having been
rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that
the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds that the agreement entered into by
the parties is a civil law contract of lease and not one under the agricultural leasehold system as
expressly termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus
entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over
the subject premises ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease?

Held: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235
[1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of Appeals,
246 SCRA 223 [1995).

Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and
private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as
a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the spring
cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the sharing of
the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for existence of
tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this
fact has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence,
was for the petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment
of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share
in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time.

Elements of Tenancy Relations:

Teodoro vs. Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7 (1969)
Facts: Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years
when he was advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be given to another
tenant. Thereafter, a new tenant was installed who forbade Macaraeg from working on the
riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he
had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland under civil lease. He further claimed that after
the expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter did not anymore renew
his contract.
Held: The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a leasehold
tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to
agricultural production. More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall
be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the
farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the
rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural year . . . must be of the same
variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only four
and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by
the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his immediate farm household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the
LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg
personally work the land, which he did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant
case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro)
for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual rental." (italics supplied)
Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in dispute.
Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland. Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and
he delivered the possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid
in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision
that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per hectare — is an unmistakable
earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter into a leasehold
tenancy relation

VALENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Facts: The property in dispute involves two (2) parcels of land situated in Canlaon City in Negros
Oriental. On 7 May 1957 Valencia acquired the first parcel from Bonifacio Supnet, on 22 October
1962 Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease agreement over his two (2) parcels of
land with Henson. Before the ten (10)-year lease expired, without objection from Henson,
Valencia leased the property for five (5) years to Fr. Flores under a civil law lease concept
beginning 21 August 1970 or until 30 June 1975 after which the lease was cancelled. The lease
agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering the land without Valencia's written consent.

During the period of lease, Henson instituted Cresenciano and Marciano Frias to work on the
property, also during the lease of Fr. Flores he designated 13 persons as overseer and when the
lease agreement between the Petitioner and Fr. Flores expired, Petitioner demanded to vacate
the property and instead the private respondents continued cultivating the premises and refused
to comply. On March 20, 1976, Valencia filed a letter to protest to DAR Regional Office in Cebu
City, while the private respondents without the knowledge of the Petitioner, applied for the
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant
to PD No. 27 claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property. Upon issuance of the
Certificate of Land Transfer to the private respondents, the Petitioner instituted the filing of the
second letter contending the cancellation of CLTs.
Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibits a civil law lessee from employing a
tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement? Otherwise stated, can petitioner's
civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to do
so under Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing
so, as in the instant case?

Held: Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended,
does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the
landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically
a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec.
6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant
thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person
who wants to be a tenant and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a
third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would
technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant would
then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This
is most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease
agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his
property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee. On the other hand, under the
express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the
consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only
is there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or
encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do
so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit
a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An
extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as
amended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.

When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who
furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already an existing
agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The
epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which
assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not until then.
Leopoldo Jeremias v. Estate of Mariano G.R. No. 174649. September 26, 2008 Chico-Nazario,
J.
Facts: Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land located at Barangay Balatas,
Naga City, Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the
2 parcels of land were placed under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27. The tenanted portion of the landholdings were subdivided among
identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan was made. Santiago Jeremias (father of
petitioner Leopoldo) was one the 40 tenant-beneficiaries. On June 26, 1988, Irene died intestate
who was succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M. Villanueva. On 14 May
1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's wife, allegedly instituted Ruben Viñ as (Ruben) as a tenant, through
an unsigned handwritten letter, despite the estate of the late Irene still unpartitioned and under
intestate proceedings. In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the estate of
Irene Mariano. He lodged before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate
complaints of ejectment and damages against both Ruben Viñ as and Leopoldo Jeremias for their
refusal to vacate despite oral and formal demands. Ruben's basis for saying he was a tenant is
the unsigned letter by Helen Mariano, while on the other hand, Leopoldo claims that by virtue of
succession, he lawfully acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his father Santiago
Jeremias.

Issue: Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and Ruben Viñ as are tenants of the lands belonging to
the late Irene Mariano which entitles them to security of tenure.

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that they are not considered tenants entitle to security of tenure
under the law. Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are present:
1)that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2)that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3)that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4)that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5)that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)that the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Claims by one of the existence tenancy do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. In this
case, there is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the owner of the lots
in question as agricultural tenants on the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the
petitioners shared with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from the landholding. Hence,
the Court reinstated the decision of the PARAD.
CENEZE VS. RAMOS
Facts: Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of
agricultural land owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos, alleging that in 1981, Julian Ceneze, Sr.
(Julian, Sr.), petitioners father, transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to him with
the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual and
peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly entered
and cultivated the land for the purpose of dispossessing petitioner of his right as tenant.
Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed, arguing that she had never instituted
petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in
possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the tenant of the
landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to USA in 1985, respondent allowed Julian, Sr.’s wife to
cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to the USA in June 1988. Respondent later allowed
Julian, Sr.’s son, Julian Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he likewise
migrated to the USA in 1991 without informing respondent. From then on, she took possession
of the landholding, cultivated it and appropriated for herself the harvest therefrom. Provincial
Adjudicator Ruling: Decision in favor of petitioner, declaring Ceneze a bona fide tenant of the
subject landholding. DARAB Ruling: Affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s ruling. CA Ruling:
Resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioners complaint. MR
denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to establish that he had a tenancy relationship with
respondent

Held: Yes. Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. There must be evidence to prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to
wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there
is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. The absence of one element does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant. Petitioner submitted a
Certification issued by the BARC Chairman attesting that the former is a tenant of the
landholding, but such certification is not binding on this Court. The certification or findings of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized representative) concerning the presence or the
absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely preliminary or
provisional in character. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr.
and of the tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do
not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.
To establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr.However, the
affidavit which was not notarized cannot be given credence considering that it was not
authenticated. The other tenants’ Joint Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove that petitioner is a
tenant, more particularly, that there was personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. In this
affidavit, the affiants stated that they helped hand in hand with [petitioner] in harvesting and
threshing our palay products and helped him in delivering the share of [respondent] every
year. The affidavit is ambiguously worded, considering that the affiants are also tenant-lessees
of respondent and they could be referring to their own harvest. The fact alone of working on a
landholding does not give rise to a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-serving
statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondents
share in the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of harvest.

Zamoras vs Su, Jr. ,184 SCRA 248 , 1990

Facts: Victoriano Zamoras, was hired Roque Su, Jr., as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan. He
was made to supervise the coconut plantation and the sale of copra. He was paid a salary plus
1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Another one-third of the proceeds went to the
tenants and the other third to Su. Sometime in 1981, Su entered into a loan with a certain Anito
and authorized her to harvest coconuts from his property while his loan was outstanding.
Zamoras was then laid-off temporarily until Su could obtain a loan from the Development Bank
of the Philippines with which to pay Anita. He was no longer allowed to work as overseer of the
plantation and without his knowledge and consent, Anita, harvested the coconuts without giving
him his one-third share of the copra sales. Zamoras filed a complaint against Su, and Anita for
illegal termination and breach of contract with damages with the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Zamboanga City. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
holding that Zamoras, as overseer of the respondent's plantation, was a regular employee whose
services were necessary and desirable to the usual trade or business of his employer and was
thus illegally dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed.
It held that the relationship between the parties was that of a landlord-tenant, hence, jurisdiction
over the case rests with the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Issue: WON Zamoras is an employee of Su, Jr. and thus jurisdiction of the case is with the NLRC.

Ruling: Since Zamoras is an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian
Relations,that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras’ complaint for illegal dismissalThe
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are not present. Rather those of an employer-
employee relationship exists between them. These are the following: 1. Zamoras was selected
and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation; 2. His duties were specified by Su; 3. Su
controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras
should sell the copra produced from the plantation. And 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400
per month plus one-third of the copra sales every two months as compensation for managing the
plantation.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119 (1993)

Facts: Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
alleging that he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land previously
owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas, and that the spouses Hilario have been threatening him from
entering and cultivating the land. Baltazar claims that he became the tenant of Soccoro’s 2
hectare land by virtue of a “Kasunduan” executed between them, stating that he built his own
house on such land and planted “halaman”, the produce of which was divided 70-30 and 50-50
in his favor. When Socorro died, Baltazar claims that he gave the share pertaining to the
landowner to her daughter, Corazon Pengson. On the other hand, Petitioners aver that they
acquired the land from PNB after it was foreclosed. Former owner, Corazon Pengson, testified
that at the time of partition, she declared the property for classification purposes as “bakuran”
and had no knowledge that there were other things planted except bananas and pomelos. The
CAR ruled that the subject land is not agricultural, but plain bakuran hence, Baltazar is not a
tenant. However, the CA remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings on the
ground that the findings of CAR were not supported by substantial evidence. Eventually, CAR
found no tenancy relationship between Baltazar and Pengson. Baltazar appealed to IAC, and the
IAC reversed the decision of CAR. Hence this instant petition for review filed by the spouses
Hilario.

Issue: Did the IAC erred in not affirming the decision of CAR?

Ruling: Yes. The CAR is correct in ruling that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. The
partition of the subject lot resulted in the termination of the plaintiff’s tenancy relationship with
the previous landowner. Baltazar cannot claim that the landholding in questions is being
cultivated by him under the old contract. The law accords the landholding the right to initially
choose his tenant to work on his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition
or usurpation. So, the mere cultivation of the land by the usurper cannot confer upon him any
legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law.
Therefore, Corazon Pengson had no tenancy relationship with him.
Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts: Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him
and Socorro Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he
relinquished 1.5 ha to certain individuals and what remained under his cultivation was ½-ha
owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death, no new contract was executed. Sometime in
1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of the property and enjoined Baltazar
from entering the same. The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding from the
Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand, Corazon Pengzon
explained that she did not get any share from the produce of the land since 1964 and she would
not have accepted it knowing that she did not own the property anymore.
Held: Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson v.
Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the
true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. "So the
mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land
as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law(Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of
Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)." Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who
gave the consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the
agricultural land.

TIONGSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to
the house of Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to live on the Balara property
so that he could at the same time guard the property and prevent the entry of squatters and the
theft of the fruits and produce of the fruit trees planted by the owner. Manotok allowed Macaya
to stay in the property as a guard (bantay) but imposed the conditions that at any time that the
owners of the property needed or wanted to take over the property, Macaya and his family
should vacate the property immediately; that while he could raise animals and plant on the
property, he could do so only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant and raise animals
on the property; and that the owners would have no responsibility or liability for said activities
of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only three (3) hectares. On December 5, 1950, the
property-owners organized themselves into a corporation. Sometime in 1974, Macaya was
informed by the Manotoks that they needed the property to construct their houses thereon.
Macaya agreed but pleaded that he be allowed to harvest first the planted rice before vacating
the property. However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and instead
expanded the area he was working on. As he was being compelled to vacate the property,
Macaya brought the matter to the Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms.

Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties

Held: There was no tenancy relationship. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that Macaya is
not and has never been a share or leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok nor of his successors-
in-interest over the property or any portion or portions thereof but has only been hired as a
watchman or guard (bantay) over the same. The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are:
1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code
of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As xxx All these requisites are necessary in
order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contradistinguished from a jure
tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws.

ENDAYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land
consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted to rice
and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant
of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San
Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This fact, petitioners do not dispute. On
January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00.
The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate of Title
was duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm the land although
petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately after the sale to vacate the land.
Due to petitioners’ persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land, private
respondent filed in April 1985 a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas
praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship between original owner and Pedro
Fideli was already terminated.

Held: No, R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law
governing the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and
established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave
agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold
relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working
on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner entered into a
civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the
farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the
extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. On the contrary, Section 10 of the law
provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — the
agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which agricultural leasehold subsists
resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not
terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such
rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest.

Reyes vs Joson
Facts of the Case: In 1962, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes as caretaker/ watcher of a
fishpond and lot 1482 in Doña Francisca, Balanga, Bataan which he leased from Apolonio Aguire.
The contract of lease between Caragay and Aguire expired in 1973. Later on, Tomas Aguire, son
of Apolonio leased to Honorio Joson the same fishpond until it expires in 1982.
Tomas Aguire appointed Joson as administrator while Loreto Reyes continued to work as
fishpond/watcher. Joson as administrator leased the fishpond to Felizardo Maliboran for five
years. Reyes as bantay palaisdaan signed the contract as witness. Soon enough, same contract of
lease, expired. Joson reverted to the possession of the fishpond. In November 1989, Caragay, the
former lessee, re-entered the fishpond and proceed to harvest bangus and prawn with the
assistance of Reyes. Joson requested Caragay to vacate the premise, but Caragay refused to that
prompted Joson to file forcible entry in MTC Balanga Bataan. They entered in a compromise
agreement approved by the MTC that Caragay and workers will vacate the property but Caragay
failed to comply. MTC issued writ of execution. With this, Reyes filed TRO in RTC Brach 3, Balanga,
Bataan enjoining MTC from implementing the writ. RTC dismissed the petition for injunction for
lack of jurisdiction and conferring upon the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
Agrarian Reform matters. MTC issued writ of execution, ejectment of petitioner. On October 1,
1990, Reyes filed in PARAB-San Fernando, Pampanga complaint for maintenance of peaceful
possession. Reyes alleged that he is agricultural tenant on the fishpond, entitled to security of
tenure and cannot be summarily ejected from property. Additionally, he invoked that Caragay
hired him as fishpond cultivator and he is an industial partner, hence his share consist of 50% of
the harvest. He also raised that when Caragay’s contract of lease expired, Thomas Aguire hired
him as caretaker-industrial partner and that his status for 14 years ripened into bona fide tenant
by operation of law. But Joson, denied the allegations and according to him, Reyes is a mere
fishpond watcher.
On August 18, 1992, PARAB rendered its decision, that Reyes is lawful owner the TRO is
permanent and awarded peaceful possession and actual occupation to Reyes. Joson appealed in
DARAB but of no avail. On November 2, 1996, DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAB and
reinstate back Reyes as tenant-tiller to the fishpond in question immediately without further
delay. The motion for reconsideration of Joson was denied. The case was elevate to CA and
disposed the case saying that DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural tenant. On
March 20, 2000, CA granted Joson’s petition, set aside DARAB’s decision and conculsed that
circumstances contradicted by Reyes’ own averments in the complaints he filed with PARAD but
also incompatible with his act of signing the Malibaran lease contract in his capacity as fishpond
watcher and not as tenant. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Reyes is an agricultural tenant and therefore enjoys security of tenure.

Held: No, Reyes is not and agricultural tenant. Intent is the principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists. Tenancy Relationship is not purely factual relationship but
legal relationship. The requisites to establish tenancy relationship are the following: (1) that the
parties are landowner and tenant and agricultural lessee (2) subject matter of relationship is
agricultural land (3) consent between parties to relationship (4) purpose of relationship is to bring
about agricultural production (5) personal cultivation on the part of the tenant/agricultural lessee
(6) harvest is shared between the landowner and tenant/agricultural lessee. Absence of one
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a de jure tenant, only when established, he is
entitled to security of tenure. Consent of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly
absent. No proof that Aguirre hired petitioner as tenant. Crop sharing is not enough to establish
tenancy as it is unusual for the landowner to receive the production of the land from caretaker
who sows. Mere occupation of an agrarian landowner does not automatically convert a tiller or
farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under the agrarian law. Tenancy status only
arises if an occupant has been given possession of an agricultural landholding for primary purpose
of agricultural production.

Adriano vs Tanco
FACTS: Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares
located in Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned
among the respondents (Alice and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick),
each receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare. Controversy arose when
Alice sent letter to petitioner Vicente informing him that subject landholding is not covered by
CARP and asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible. Seeing the letter as a threat to
his peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant,
Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession. He averred that in 1970, the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of
the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such
as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided
equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his home
at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he
is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the land. Respondents denied having
instituted any tenant on their property. Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that
Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker. PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of
Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was performing functions more than just a mere caretaker
and was even allowed to live in subject landholding with his family, he is therefore a tenant. Thus,
respondents appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since
the landholding is an agricultural land, that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the
mango trees, and that they divided the fruits equally between them, then an implied tenancy
was created. The case was then elevated to CA via a Petition for Review. They contended, among
others, that the essential elements of tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant
controversy. They claimed that their property is not an agricultural land, but lies within a
mineralized area; Alice hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their
relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties
share in the harvest. The CA rendered a Decision in respondents’ favor. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a bonafide tenant-farmer.

HELD: Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are
not only meant to favor the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those
who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection
from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them. The
findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not supported by substantial
evidence.

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the
landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on
and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and
allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy
relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between
the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must
concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or
more requisites is fatal. After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the
findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Facts: Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner. Abajon
was also allowed to plant on a portion of the land and that the produce thereof would be shared
by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new owners took over, they told Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they would be building a poultry near
Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed the property.
Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon dutifully gave her
50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.

Held: The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker
who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to
have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that
the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently,
Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.

ANTONIO EVANGELISTA Y LISING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUZ CASTAÑEDA and
HEIRS OF BENEDICTO SANCHEZ, Respondent.

1. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; AGRICULTURAL LESSEE DISTINGUISHED FROM

CIVIL LESSEE. — A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee
(under Rep. Act No. 3844) is entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he
works at. Not even the expiration of any term or period fixed in the leasehold contract,
in the case of an agricultural lessee, will cause the lessee’s ejectment from the land.
On the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of civil lease, does not enjoy security
of tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee can be ejected from the
land after the expiration of the term provided for in the contract.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,

GENERALLY FINDING AND CONCLUSIVE. — The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
that the petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land in question, which
are based on the evidence on record, is final and conclusive. The salient characteristic
which would make the relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez one of
agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by the petitioner and the
immediate members of his farm household, is absent in the case at bar. As cited in the
decision of the respondent court, petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted
that petitioner used to hire many plowers, harrowers and planters as well as farm
 laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang) helped the appellee
work on the land for 3 years. This Court is aware of the practice of many
landowners, as a way of evading the provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants
sign contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their
relationship. But in the case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of the respondent
court indicate that the contracts entered into were bona fide civil lease in nature, and
that they were entered into by the petitioner voluntarily.

3. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; TENANCY; PERSONAL CULTIVATION,

INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. — As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, absent the
requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can be
said to exist between him and the landowner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to
be an agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by his farm household, cultivated
the land in question.

4. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; LEASE; LESSEE WHO ENTERED INTO THREE CONTRACTS OF
LEASE CANNOT LATER BE HEARD TO CLAIM THAT HE IS AN AGRICULTURAL LESSEE. — A
person who signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease (Kasulatang Option
and Kasulatan ng Buwisan), with the intent of establishing a civil lease contract,
cannot later be heard to claim that he is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.

The only issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Rep. Act
No. 3844, and therefore entitled to security of tenure over the landholding, in question, or a
mere civil law lessee, who does not enjoy security of tenure in the sense that he may he ejected
from the landholding upon the expiration of the term provided in the contract of lease.

A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act No. 3844) is
entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at. Not even the expiration of any
term or period fixed in the leasehold contract, in the case of an agricultural lessee, will cause the
lessee’s ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of civil lease,
11 does not enjoy security of tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee can be
ejected from the land after the expiration of the term provided for in the contract.

The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer
on the land in question, which are based on the evidence on record, is final and conclusive. 12
The salient characteristic which would make the relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez
one of agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by the petitioner and the
immediate members of his farm household, is absent in the case at bar. As cited in the decision
of the respondent court, petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that petitioner
used to hire many plowers, harrowers and planters as well as farm laborers, who were paid by
him, and that he himself (Maclang) helped the appellee work on the land for 3 years. Even the
decision of the trial court showed that petitioner did not personally cultivate the land in question.
As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, 14 absent the requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged
tenant, no tenancy relationship can be said to exist between him and the landowner. Hence, the
petitioner cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by his farm
household, cultivated the land in question.

The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the land holding
should be personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm
household, indicates the intent of the parties to establish only a civil lease relationship.

De Jesus vs IAC: Absent the requisite of personal cultivation, petitioner de Jesus cannot be
considered an agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by his farm
household cultivated the land in question. Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that petitioner is
cultivating an adjacent fishpond with a size of 11-1/2 hectares which further proves that he is not
a small farmer but a businessman. De Jesus is not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider
him an agricultural lessee despite the fact that he is cultivating another fishpond with an area of
11-1/2 hectares, and furthermore despite the fact that he does not cultivate the fishpond
personally and/ or with the help of his immediate farm household as defined by law, would
render nugatory the letter and intent of the Agricultural Reform Code.

Rosalinda Bonifacio et. al., v. Judge Dizon

FACTS: Olimpio Bonifacio as the owner of a land which the private respondent, Pastora San
Miguel, was an agricultural lessee. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the
ejectment of private respondent from Bonifacio’s 2-hectare agricultural land. The CAR granted
the ejectment of Pastora San Miguel. On appeal by the private respondent, the CA modified the
judgement with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio to pay her in P1,376.00. Still
dissatisfied, private respondent sought relief to SC. During the pendency of the case, Olimpio
died andwas succeeded by his heirs. However, no notice of such death was given to the Court,
hence no order of substitution of his heirs was made. SC resolved to deny the petition of the
private respondent for lack of merit, SC affirmed the decision of CA. Subsequently, petitioners
(heirs of Olimpio) moved for the execution of the decision by RTC of Bulacan. The Deputy Sheriff
submitted his report stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the private
respondent which the latter refused the vacate. Private respondent moved to quash the
execution. RTC held the decision of the sheriff to be null and void, and that the motion for
demolition was denied. Petitioners conteded that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
They assert that the CAR case, being an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Private
respondent, on the other hand, stress on the fact that the action is not an ordiary ejectment but
an agrarian case for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee.

ISSUE: Won, the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent,
thereby vesting to the former, all rights conferred by the judgment to the decedent.
RULING: Petition is granted. SC reads Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844, which provides, for the continuation
in the enjoyment and possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory. Under
such provision, the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the
landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate
family so desired. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner’s immediate family
members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was
(and still) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. Whether used in
reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term “personal cultivation” cannot be given
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either the lessor or lessee. In
either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family. The
CAR case not being a purely personal right, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and
successors-in-interest.

Oarde vs CA: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical relationship of tenancy

Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of personal cultivation. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the land,
nor did her immediate family or farm household. Instead, she hired other people to do all phases
of farm work. Even her co-petitioner testified that she did not actually till the land and that she
merely paid laborers to perform such task. The trial court noted that Presentacion made
inconsistent answers when asked when she began tilling the land, before she finally declared that
she started tilling the property way back in 1965. However, the element of personal cultivation
is essential for an agricultural leasehold; that is, that there should be personal cultivation by the
tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other
persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities
(Evangelista v. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate
family to work the land (Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many
persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus v.IAC, 175 SCRA 559).

In this case, Zacarias Oarde, testifying for Presentacion Molar, (tsn, May 16, 1989) declared that
Presentacion does not actually till the land but she pays laborers to till the land; she is single,
owns no working animals, nor farm implements. Presentacion herself admitted that she has the
property tenanted on pakyaw basis meaning that she hires different persons for harrowing, for
plowing, and for harvesting and that she did not actually till the land, but merely pays others
because (I) am a woman; she owns a small store. We agree with the trial court that We cannot
have a case where a landlord is divested of his landholding and somebody else is installed to
become a new landlord. (Underscoring supplied.) We stress that both the respondent
appellate court and the trial court found that Petitioner Molar was not a tenant of Private
Respondent Wilfredo Guerrero.

Matienzo vs Servidad: It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant,
not a tenant. lt was likewise expressly stipulated therein that "the conditions for clearing the land
are these: With respect to all your plants we will share no percentage for the land." And again,
"all those (coconuts) that we are to plant no share will be taken for the land. The basic element
of sharing in agricultural tenancy, therefore, is absent. The one-third share plaintiff received from
copra-making constituted payments for the processing of copra. These are evidenced by receipts.
Plaintiff also got paid for clearing the coconuts as shown by Exhibits 7 and 7-A. as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system. From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing
arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired
was that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to supervise applications
for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to build his house thereon and to plant
specified plants without being compensated he was free to clear and plant the land as long as he
wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and he was not obligated
to pay any price certain to, nor share the produce with, the latter. Although Exhibit 6 states that
plaintiff and his wife were made "caretakers" of the land, there is a definite provision in both
Exhibits C and 6 that defendant would not share in the produce of plaintiff's plants. Because of
this aspect, the ruling in Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88 (1966), which holds that a I caretaker of an
agricultural land is also considered cultivator of the land", finds no applicability.

Isidro vs CA
Facts: Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985,
Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said land
was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner
occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990,
private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but
the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort
and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian
dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC which
affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts

Held: No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian
dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does
not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for
conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one
of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial
arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement
may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Cornea vs Leal Realty: Petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony
of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA
and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof the subject landholding was indeed
not tenanted, and that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest were hired laborers of JOSEFINA.
Such type of occupation on the subject landholding does not create a presumption of tenancy in
petitioners' favor. Clearly, the fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of
this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship
between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is
illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence
must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the claimed
sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests
was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to
have existed on the basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes's claim. It is self-serving and is
without evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof
must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. The element of consent in the creation of the tenancy relationship was sorely
missing. As was seen earlier, even petitioners' predecessors-in-interest were unequivocal in their
admission that they worked as hired laborers on the subject landholding. The intent, if any, to
institute them as tenants of the landholdings was debunked by their very admission. All the
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites is fatal to petitioners' cause. It cannot even make the alleged
tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless
a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor
is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary
Facts: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform
Program. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of RA 6657
regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it requires
the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment of just
compensation by means of LBP Bonds, Shares of Stocks in government-owned or controlled
corporations, and tax credits.
Issue: Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is allowed
Held: It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Agrarian Reform
program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the
vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact
not even fully available at this time. It is assumed that the framers of the Constitution were aware
of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government.
It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed,
they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method.

Notice of Coverage

Vinson-Magana vs Estrella: Mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely
evidences the government’s recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the
statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided
under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus,
failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals
or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or
agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer (Section 2, P.D. No.
816). This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the prescribed conditions
which entitles the farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested
right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to
compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of
ownership over the land holding
Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA
Facts: Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to
sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was denied. Thereafter,
petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use but the
petition was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process

Held: For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties; and (2) the
Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps
designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking
contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL was not
intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent
domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

DAR vs Sarangani
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10
year comprehensive development plan of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998,
pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the
development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No.
98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land
Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Later, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the “Resolution Adopting the Ten-
Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use
Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution
No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.” A
portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARP commercial
farms deferment scheme. The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning
and Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’ properties located at Barangay
Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to
residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use
plan of Alabel.
The respondent then field an application for land use conversion of certain parcels of land.
Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI)
sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed
by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights,
considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the
PLUTC agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which was still viable for
agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to the submission of certain requirements.
Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. On November 9, 2000,
DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. SACI
appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and
affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
denied, so they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same
issues. The CA granted the petition and ordred DAR to issue a conversion order. As to the
deferred portion, DAR was directed to expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioner’s
application.

Issue: WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for the acquisition of land

Held: No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement
before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a
deferment period under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon
its effectivity on June 15, 1998

DAR vs Woodland
FACTS: Woodland owns a parcel of land covered under TCT-113207 with an area of 10.0680
hectares located at Subasta, Calinan, Davao City. On 11 December 2003, the DAR issued a Notice
of Coverage (NOC) placing 5.0680 hectares under the coverage of the CARL for having exceeded
the retention limit provided by law. To this effect, TCT-113207 was cancelled and a new
Certificate of Ownership was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Woodland filed with the RTC a Complaint for "Declaratory Relief, Annulment of the Notice of
Coverage under R.A. 6657, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction." under the following contentions:
1.That the issuance of the NOC was illegal, because R.A. 6657 had already expired on 15 June
1998.
2. That pursuant to Section 5 of the law, the agency had a period of ten (10) years to implement
the CARP from the time of its effectivity on 15 June 1988.
3.That the CARL's amendatory law, R.A. 8532, did not extend the DAR's authority to acquire
agrarian lands for distribution.
4.That the budget augmentations legislated in R.A. 8532 pertained only to the funding
requirements of the other facets of the CARP implementation and excluded the acquisition of
private agricultural lands.
DAR, in its answer through its then DOJ Secretary Teofisto Guingona,Jr. opined that Section 5 was
merely directory in character; hat the 10-year period of implementation was only a time frame
given to the DAR for the acquisition and distribution of public and private agricultural lands
covered by R.A. 6657. It was only meant to serve as a guide to DAR and not to limit its authority.
The RTC ruled that the issuance of NOC of DAR was already a breach of RA 6657, since the NOC
was issued beyond the 10-year implementation period provided by law. Further, that RA 8532
merely amended the funding sources portion of RA 6657, and not its entirety.

ISSUE: Whether the DAR still has authority to issue Notice of Coverage even after June 15, 1998.

RULING: YES. Article XIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution encapsulates the people's yearning
for genuine agrarian reform. The provision states: The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as
the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.

Further, regarding the amendments by RA 8532, Originally, the first paragraph of Section 63
reads: SECTION 63. Funding Source. - The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the
period of ten (10) years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund
created under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 229. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by R.A. 8532, the first paragraph of Section 63 stated: SECTION 63. Funding Source.
- The amount needed to implement this Act until the year 2008 shall be funded from the Agrarian
Reform Fund. The phrase “until the year 2008” stated that RA 8532 din not merely amended the
Funding Source, but RA 6657 in its entirety. Thus, RA 8532 unmistakably extends the DAR's
authority to issue NOCs for purposes of acquiring and distributing private agricultural lands.
 Retention
Alita v CA
Facts: Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands through
homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents
herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying
on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents instituted a
complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General
Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained through homestead law.
The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is not
applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the RTC was sustained.

Issue: Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP

Held: Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social
legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the
enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine Constitution
likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Daez v CA
Facts: Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad,
Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended
by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the
respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for
the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for
the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was
denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied
her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under
R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR
Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President which ruled in her
favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the Office of the
President.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an
application for retention under RA 6657

Held: The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those
for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention
are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not
preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to
the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland,
even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final
and executory.

Santiago vs Ortiz-Luz: The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution,
balances the effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose
the area to be retained subject to legislative standards. Section 6. Retention Limits. - Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own, or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined
by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided,
That landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, Provided further, That the original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain
to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the
landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or
be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and
shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary
in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time
the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention. (underscoring supplied)

Section 6 implies that the sole requirement in the exercise of retention rights is that the area
chosen by the landowner must be compact or contiguous. A landowner's retention rights under
R.A. 6657 are restricted by the conditions set forth in Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 issued
on October 21, 1976 which states that "To place under the Land Transfer Program of the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of
seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than
seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families.”

IRR of LOI No. 474: Tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less shall be
covered by Operation Land Transfer if those lands belong to the following landowners:
a.) Landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate
areas, whether tenanted or not, cultivated or not, and regardless of the income derived
therefrom; b.) Landowners who own lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes from which they derive an annual gross income of at least five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos.

In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the
Court held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No.
27 are entitled to "new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657. In Heirs of Aurelio
Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that the limitations under LOI No. 474 still apply to
a landowner who filed an application under R.A. 6657.

Amada is thus not entitled to retention rights. As noted by the PARO in recommending denial of
her application which was eventually heeded in the Pangandaman Order, while Spouses Ortiz
Luis owned aggregate landholdings equivalent to 178.8092 hectares, only a portion thereof
88.5413 hectares were placed under OLT. A Certification dated May 7, 2001 issued by the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) affirms that as of even date, Spouses Ortiz Luis still
owned 162.1584 hectares of land in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474
amended P.D. No. 27 by removing "any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial
or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families." Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of Appeals in
part anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by LOI No. 474, insofar
as it removed the limitations to a landowner's retention rights.

Heirs of Romulo D. Sandueta vs Domingo Robles et al

Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of Romulo and Isabel Sandueta (Sps. Sandueta) who died intestate
in 1987 and 1996, respectively, and accordingly inherited several agricultural lands situated in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte, with a total land area of 18.7433 hectares (has.). One of these
parcels of land is Lot No. 3419, with an area of 13.7554 has. covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-5988.The 4.6523-hectare riceland portion (subject portion) of the foregoing lot
was tenanted by Eufrecena Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and Domingo Pableo(tenants) who were
instituted as such by the original owner, Diosdado Jasmin, prior to its sale to Sps. Sandueta.
The subject portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 and consequently awarded to the above-named
tenants who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents (EPs). Petitioners are the heirs
of Romulo and Isabel Sandueta (Sps. Sandueta) who died intestate in 1987 and 1996,
respectively, and accordingly inherited several agricultural lands situated in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte, with a total land area of 18.7433 hectares (has.). One of these parcels of
land is Lot No. 3419, with an area of 13.7554 has. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-5988. The 4.6523-hectare riceland portion (subject portion) of the foregoing lot was
tenanted by Eufrecena Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and Domingo Pableo(tenants) who were instituted
as such by the original owner, Diosdado Jasmin, prior to its sale to Sps. Sandueta.
The subject portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 and consequently awarded to the above-named
tenants who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents (EPs).

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to avail of any retention right under Section 6 of
RA 6657.

HELD: No. The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to
be retained subject to legislative standards. Necessarily, since the said right is granted to limit
the effects of compulsory land acquisition against the landowner, it is a prerequisite that the
land falls under the coverage of the OLT Program of the government. If the land is beyond the
ambit of the OLT Program, the landowner need not – as he should not – apply for retention
since the appropriate remedy would be for him to apply for exemption. As explained in the case
of Daez v. CA: Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No.
27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or
corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-
tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption.
If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner
need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and
undisturbed.

If the land is covered by the OLT Program which hence, renders the right of retention operable,
PD 27 – issued on October 21, 1972 – confers in favor of covered landowners who cultivate or
intend to cultivate an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain an area of not
more than seven (7) has. thereof. Subsequently, or on June 10, 1998, Congress passed RA 6657
which modified the retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA 6657 states that
covered landowners are allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted agricultural land not,
however, to exceed an area of five (5) has. and, further thereto, provides that an additional
three (3) has. may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling
the land or directly managing the farm.
In this case, records reveal that aside from the 4.6523-hectare tenanted riceland covered by the
OLT Program, i.e. the subject portion, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Sandueta, own
other agricultural lands with a total area of 14.0910 has. which therefore triggers the application
of the first disqualifying condition under LOI 474 as above-highlighted. As such, petitioners, being
mere successors-in-interest, cannot be said to have acquired any retention right to the subject
portion. Accordingly, the subject portion would fall under the complete coverage of the OL T
Program hence, the 5 and 3-hectare retention limits as well as the landowner s right to choose
the area to be retained under Section 6 of RA 6657 would not apply altogether.

Exemption/Exclusion

Luz Farms v DAR Secretary

Facts: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands
to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 11 thereof. Petitioner prayed that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. It argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate
of the Constitution in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.

Issue: Whether or not lands devoted to livestock and poultry business are included in the
coverage of CARL

Held: From the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which
includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising in
the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Sections 3(b),
11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.
Natalia Realty vs DAR: The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in
any language be considered as “agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation. Lands previously
converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of the CARL, were outside the coverage of the law.

DAR vs Delia T Sutton et al

FACTS: Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its
coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision
in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of
1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL but applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O.
No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding
should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DAR
A.O. No. 9 be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a
maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?

HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. . The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine
and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture”
or “agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner
DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian
reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution
DAR vs DECs
FACTS: Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to
respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education). Consequently, titles thereto were transferred
in the name of respondent DECS . Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994. The contract of lease
was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years or until 2005. On June 10, 1993,
Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the
subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R.
Piñosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now
covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.
The recommendation for coverage was approved by DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres
approved the r, the dispositive portion of which reads: Respondent DECS appealed the case to
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Respondent
DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).

HELD: No. While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all
the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of
schools in the nearby locality, the court is inclined with the petitioner’s argument that the lands
subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the
income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from
the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those “lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, …, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.” Clearly, a reading of the
paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for school sites
and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes."
Central Mindanao University vs DARAB
Facts: On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In
1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were
leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist
faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training
and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The
agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and
the CMU. When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB,
ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP.
The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not
meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for
educational purposes.

Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use
by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for
the purpose for which they are reserved?

Held: The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the
question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the
DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court
stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently,
actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program
with its present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor
of growth of the university in the years to come.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Petitioner passed Resolution
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to
dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The
trial court denied the motion and authorized the Petitioner to take possession of the property
upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court, The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order
dated January18, 1990. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the
Petitioner to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990. San Joaquins petitioned
before the Court of Appeals, In its answer to the petition, the Petitioner claimed that it has the
authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. The Solicitor General
stated there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Petitioner of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view
that the Petitioner must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The Court of Appeals set
aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the
Petitioner shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.

Issue: Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use?

Held: Yes, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose”
or “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. Under the new
concept, “public use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute
to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for
tourists or housing project. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure
to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once
operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and
technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

Pag-asa Fishpond Corporation vs Jimenez

Facts: Petitioner PAG-ASA Fishpond Corporation is the owner of a 95.6123-hectare fishpond
and salt bed situated at the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales. Petitioner leased
the subject fishpond to David Jimenez and Noel Hilario. It is an important sense of the agreement
that the fishpond will be managed by the two lessees (Jimenez and Hilario) jointly. Jimenez was
charged with the management of a 40-hectare portion of the fishpond The remaining portions of
petitioners landholding were to be managed by Hilario. In the meantime, the Philippine Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The social
legislation was founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. On September 26, 1989, petitioner, through its president
Segundo Seangio, applied for exemption from the coverage of the agrarian reform program of
which the said application was favorably acted upon. The DAR advised the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Masinloc to observe the status quo and defer the inclusion of
petitioner’s fishpond in the compulsory acquisition program. Jimenez hired respondents, namely:
Bernardo Jimenez, Robert Belenbough, Leonard Mijares, Eduardo Jimenez, Jose Cruz, Elizalde
Edquibal, Dominador Elgincolin and Geronimo Darilag, to work as farmworkers in the fishpond.
As farmworkers, respondents each received a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from David
Jimenez, as well as 50% of the fishponds net proceeds from the total fish harvests, which they
divided equally among themselves. In April 1994, they were required by David Jimenez to vacate
the fishpond on or before May 1, 1994. The demand to vacate was made due to the impending
expiration of Jimenez’s civil law lease over the property with petitioner. Respondents were not
agreeable to the demand to vacate. they filed a complaint directly against petitioner for
maintenance of possession before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD).
In their complaint, they contended, inter alia, that they are entitled to security of tenure; and
that the fishpond is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under R.A.
No. 6657. They prayed that the entire fishpond of petitioner be placed under the coverage of the
CARP; that they be considered as farmer beneficiaries who are entitled to be awarded the
fishpond; and that they be allowed to remain in possession of the fishpond. the PARAD ruled in
favor of petitioner (defendant) and against respondents (plaintiffs), dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. On appeal to the DARAB, the PARADs decision was reversed and set aside. The
DARAB ruled that respondents are agricultural leasehold tenants of the subject property who
deserve the protective mantle of the law despite the fact that only the civil law lessee installed
them as such. On appeal, CA affirmed the DARAB decision.

Issue: WON there is a leasehold tenancy relation between David Jimenez and the respondents.

Held: NO. The DARAB finding of agricultural leasehold tenancy relations between petitioners civil
law lessee David Jimenez and respondents have no basis in law. The rule is well-entrenched in
this jurisdiction that for tenancy relations to exist, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
parties are the landholder and the tenant; (b) the subject is agricultural land; (c) there is consent;
(d) the purpose is agricultural production; and (e) there is consideration.

The absence of one element makes an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon outside the scope of the CARL. Nor can such occupant, cultivator or planter be
classified as a de jure agricultural tenant for purposes of agrarian reform law. And unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing agrarian reform laws. In
the case under review, the subject fishpond is not an agricultural land subject to compulsory
CARP coverage. Neither was there a sharing of the harvests between petitioner and
respondents. That respondents shared the harvests of the fishpond only with the civil law lessee
David Jimenez is uncontroverted. Evidently, there is no agrarian tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents.
 Land Valuation
LBP vs Pascual
Gabatin vs CA
LBP vs Natividad
Meneses vs DAR
Lubrica vs LBP
Apo Fruits vs LBP