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    Pangilinan Vs Alvendia

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    Pat P. Monte
    The Supreme Court reversed the decision authorizing the ejectment of tenants from their landholdings. The Court found that [1] the tenants were within their rights to receive assistance from their sons-in-law and grandsons, as the law considers these relatives part of the tenant's "immediate farm household"; [2] even under the old tenancy law, there was nothing prohibiting tenants from working with family assistance; and [3] the tenancy contracts did not expressly prohibit such family assistance. The Court concluded the ejectment action should be dismissed.

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    Pangilinan Vs Alvendia

    Uploaded by

    Pat P. Monte
    30 views3 pages
    The Supreme Court reversed the decision authorizing the ejectment of tenants from their landholdings. The Court found that [1] the tenants were within their rights to receive assistance from their sons-in-law and grandsons, as the law considers these relatives part of the tenant's "immediate farm household"; [2] even under the old tenancy law, there was nothing prohibiting tenants from working with family assistance; and [3] the tenancy contracts did not expressly prohibit such family assistance. The Court concluded the ejectment action should be dismissed.

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    Pangilinan vs Alvendia

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    The Supreme Court reversed the decision authorizing the ejectment of tenants from their landholdings. The Court found that [1] the tenants were within their rights to receive assistance from their sons-in-law and grandsons, as the law considers these relatives part of the tenant's "immediate farm household"; [2] even under the old tenancy law, there was nothing prohibiting tenants from working with family assistance; and [3] the tenancy contracts did not expressly prohibit such family assistance. The Court concluded the ejectment action should be dismissed.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    30 views3 pages

    Pangilinan Vs Alvendia

    Uploaded by

    Pat P. Monte
    The Supreme Court reversed the decision authorizing the ejectment of tenants from their landholdings. The Court found that [1] the tenants were within their rights to receive assistance from their sons-in-law and grandsons, as the law considers these relatives part of the tenant's "immediate farm household"; [2] even under the old tenancy law, there was nothing prohibiting tenants from working with family assistance; and [3] the tenancy contracts did not expressly prohibit such family assistance. The Court concluded the ejectment action should be dismissed.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 3

    [G.R. No. L-10690. June 28, 1957.

    APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., Petitioners, v. FELISA


    ALVENDIA, Respondent.

    Emili P. Cortes and Pacifico L. Santiago, for Petitioners.

    Isidro T. Calma for Respondent.

    SYLLABUS

    1. LANDLORD AND TENANT; WORDS AND PHRASES; SON-IN-LAW AS MEMBERS


    OF IMMEDIATE: FARM HOUSEHOLD. — "Immediate farm household", according to
    Republic Act No. 1199, includes." . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such
    other person or persons whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent
    upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise,"
    and this description includes the son-in-law and grandsons of the tenant. The
    law does not require that these members of the tenant’s family be dependent
    on him for support, such qualification being applicable only to "such other person or
    persons, whether related to the tenant or not."

    DECISION

    REYES, J.:

    This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
    in Case No. 215-Pampanga (later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which
    denied reconsideration of the Industrial Court’s decision) authorizing the ejectment of
    petitioners from their respective landholdings, and their replacement by other tenants
    of their landlord’s choice.

    It appears that petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel


    Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in
    barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida Blanca, Pampanga, under tenancy
    contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July 27, 1954,
    respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the
    ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and
    1954-55, they did not personally perform the principal work of plowing and harrowing
    on their respective landholdings, but entrusted said work to other persons,
    notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the farm work
    themselves. Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondent’s claims, and alleged that
    they were the ones working the land although at times, they were helped by their
    children and sons-in-law; and that respondent filed the ejectment action against them
    because they refused to sign tenancy contracts with her on the 45-55 sharing basis and
    insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.
    After trial, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped either by their
    sons, sons-in-law, or grandsons on their landholdings; held that a contract of tenancy is
    personal in nature and can not be entrusted to a son, son-in-law or grandson,
    especially where there is a specific prohibition in the tenancy contracts against allowing
    third persons to do the principal phases of farming for the tenants; and authorized
    petitioners’ ejectment and replacement by other tenants. The case was later transferred
    to the Court of Agrarian Relations upon its creation where petitioners filed a motion for
    reconsideration of the Industrial Court’s judgment, which was denied. Hence, their
    present appeal.

    The lower court found that the "third persons" referred to by respondent Alvendia to
    whom petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of plowing and harrowing on their
    respective landholdings were either their sons-in-law or grandsons who were not,
    however, dependent upon them for support and were living separately from them. The
    issue, therefore, is whether petitioners violated the law and their tenancy contracts in
    entrusting their farm work to such relatives.

    Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant"
    as:jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

    ". . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
    household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter’s
    consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
    share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
    produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system" ;

    While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act, includes: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

    ". . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons,
    whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who
    usually help him operate the farm enterprise."

    Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, petitioners were
    within their legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or
    grandsons. Such relatives fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the
    tenant" ; and the law does not require that these members of the tenant’s
    family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being applicable
    only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not",
    whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and "usually help him
    operate the farm enterprise", the law considers also part of the tenant’s
    immediate household.

    But respondent Alvendia claims that as her contracts with petitioners were entered
    into when Act 4054, the old Tenancy Act, was still in force, the definition of the word
    "tenant" given in said Act should be applied in this case, to wit:
    jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

    ". . . a farmer or farm laborer who undertakes to work and cultivate land for another or
    a person who furnishes the labor with the consent of the landlord." cralaw virtu a1aw lib rary
    Granting that Act 4054 applies to this case, there is, however, nothing in its above
    definition of "tenant" to prohibit the farmer who undertakes to work and
    cultivate the land of another, from doing such work with the assistance of his
    family, who are under his control and authority. The above definition is, in
    fact, so broad that it even includes the labor of third persons hired by the
    farmer to work on his farm, under the clause "or a person who furnishes the
    labor with the consent of the landlord." It is the hiring of third persons to do the
    farm work for the tenant that the new tenancy law, Republic Act No. 1199, eliminated
    from the old concept of "tenant"
    under Act 4054, thus restricting the meaning of "tenant" to one "who, himself and
    with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
    belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent . . ." Whether under
    the new or the old tenancy law, therefore, the work done by the members of a
    tenant’s family is, in legal contemplation, included in the work that the tenant
    undertakes to perform on the land given to him in tenancy. In the absence of
    clear and categorical imperatives, we will not construe statutes in a sense
    inconsistent with the traditional unity of the Filipino family.

    Respondent Alvendia also contends that her tenancy contract with petitioners, Exhibits
    A, B, C, and D, expressly prohibit the latter from asking for and accepting help in the
    cultivation of their landholdings from their sons-in-law and grandsons, under the
    provision in said contracts that:
    jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph

    "(a) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow and prepare the land to be planted, and
    likewise, he is the one to plant and fence the seedbed. With respect to this work, the
    LANDLORD shall not spend for anything, but she has the power to tell or order the
    TENANT when to plow, harrow, or what to do pertaining the tenant’s work." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

    The above provision contains no prohibition for the tenant to accept assistance
    from the members of his family in the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting,
    or fencing of his landholding. It simply enumerates the exact duties expected
    of the tenant by his landlord; and the tenant is referred to as "the one" to
    perform these duties, only to distinguish his obligations from those of his
    landlord. We see nothing in farming tasks that requires individual specialized skill.
    Besides, it is a fact that petitioners Galang and Santos were already 74 and 64,
    respectively, when respondent signed the tenancy contracts with them in 1953.
    Respondent’s having accepted petitioners Galang and Santos as her tenants in spite of
    their advanced age not only disproves her claim that they are already too old to
    perform their duties as tenants, but proves that she had impliedly agreed that these
    petitioners would be helped by their families in their farm work, since respondent must
    have realized that at their advanced age, these petitioners could not by themselves
    alone perform all the farm work without family assistance.

    The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the ejectment action filed by
    respondent against petitioners dismissed, with costs against respondent Felisa Alvendia.
    So ordered.

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