TYPE-WRITTEN REPORT

CASE DIGEST

1. CABALLES v. DAR
2. QUA vs. CA
3. LASTIMOZA vs. BLANCO
4. Cayetano and Tiongson vs CA 5. EPITACIO SIALANA v. MARY Y. AVILA, ET AL.
6. BONIFACIO vs. DIZON
7. STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. JUAN B. AMANTE Et Al.
& JUAN B. AMANTE, Et Al v. LUIS YULO, Et Al., 8. FIL-
ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., v. PAULINO REYES et al.
PAULINO REYES et al. v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC.
NOLITO G. DEL MUNDO et al. v. THE MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC.

SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS

The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997

Republic Act No. 1199 | SHARE TENANCY

A. Elements of Tenancy Relationship

1. CABALLES v. DAR

(Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon Ponente:
Sarmiento)

Facts:

The landholding subject of the controversy is consisting of 60 sqm and was acquired by spouses
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes.
This land is situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes,
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the land, paying monthly rental to
Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the
produce thereon would be shared by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on the land
and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house and they persuaded Abajon to transfer his
dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay rental to the new owners,
but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate. Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be
interpreted as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation; and 6. There is
sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500 square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone. At that, tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of
this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed
by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of
some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an
agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared
as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

Brief Discussion: Requisites of tenancy relationship should be rightly observed in order for the
provisions of RA 3844 could actually be used.

2. QUA vs. CA

This case deals with the issue of whether or not private respondents possess the status of
agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a home lot.

Facts:

Petitioner Lourdes Peña Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against private
respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential land situated at Albay.
Inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all owned by private
respondents. It was said that the respondents stay in the land by mere tolerance and they are
in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land without any agreement between her ( sic),
paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the government.

Private respondent Carmen Carillo alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot]
because she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots
adjoining the lot in question which belongs to petitioner; that as tenants, they could not just be
ejected without cause; that it was not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in
question but the former owner, Leovigildo Peña who permitted the construction of the auto
repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent qualifies as an agricultural tenant.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be
considered an agricultural tenant. Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home lot, a
privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, in relation to Section 22
(3) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, only to persons satisfying the qualifications of
agricultural tenants of coconut lands.

It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of private respondents is not derived
from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further supported by private
respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was constructed with the
consent of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served as a driver-
mechanic.

From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is also apparent that making the
same agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or else they should
have immediately replanted coconut trees in place of those that did not survive.

Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards relations between litigants in land cases,
the findings and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, being preliminary in nature,
are not in any way binding on the trial courts which must endeavor to arrive at their own
independent conclusions.
Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine, proceeded to so conduct its own
investigation and examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion would have been
reached, and the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained, particularly when the
circumstances obtaining in this case are examined in the light of the essential requisites set by
law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4)
there is consideration.12 It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on
the land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of
sharing the harvest.

Brief Discussion:

The requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Republic Act No. 3844 | AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD

Parties in Agricultural Leasehold

1. LASTIMOZA vs. BLANCO

Facts:

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N.341 adjudicated in favor of
Silvino Lastimoza and his wife Honorata Gonzales, herein petitioners. An original Certificate of
Title was issued by the Register of Deeds of the province in their names. They were,
subsequently, or on July 29, 1958, placed in possession of the land by writ of possession, the
sheriff of the province ejecting therefrom Perfecto, Rosalina, Encarnacion, Lucila and Lydia, all
surnamed Gallego.

The respondent Nestor Panada, claiming to be a tenant since the start of the 1956-57
agricultural year of Perfecto Gallego, one of those ousted by the writ of possession, filed against
herein petitioners a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations praying, among other things,
that he be maintained as tenant on about 2 hectares of the land in question.

As prayed for in the petition, the Agrarian Court issued an interlocutory order directing the
JAGO officer or his authorized representative to supervise the harvest and threshing of the
palay crops standing on the landholding, and to deposit, after deducting the expenses therefor,
the net produce in a bonded warehouse.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, it being alleged that there was no tenancy relationship between them and respondent
Nestor Panada. The motion was denied and reconsideration of the orders of denial having been
also denied.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in this case.

Held:

No. No tenancy relationship between the parties in this case. Therefore, petitioners are not
legally bound to assume the former landholder's rights and obligations in relation to his tenants.

It is not disputed that respondent Nestor Panada worked on a portion of the land in question by
virtue of a so-called oral contract of tenancy with Perfecto Gallego who was then in possession
of the land.
The latter, however, was ejected from the land after the same had been adjudicated in a land
registration proceeding to herein petitioners by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and title
hereto issued in their names.
In the instant case, there can be no question that there is no privity of contract or alienation in
the sense contemplated by section 9 of the Tenancy Law between Perfecto Gallego, the alleged
former landholder and herein petitioners. Neither can it be pretended that there was a valid
tenancy relation between said Perfecto Gallego and respondent Panada.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder who is either the "owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
land" (sec. 5[b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has
no right to the land subject of the tenancy. Perfecto Gallego, the alleged former
landholder, having been ousted by writ of possession issued by a competent court
and virtually declared a usurper or intruder, respondent Panada, as his tenant, can
have no better right and claim security of tenure, a guarantee afforded only to
tenants de jure. To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent
collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful
landholder. Such anomalous and absurd result certainly could not have been the
intention of Congress.

Brief Discussion: A true and lawful landholder can only create tenancy
relationship.

2. Cayetano and Tiongson vs CA

Facts:

Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34-hectare
land in Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children.
There was no tenant occupying the property at the time of the donation.

Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the
Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent theft and to guard
the property. Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners
needed to take the property, Macaya and his family must vacate, and that he could raise
animals and plant according to his needs, and that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya
and he will use only 3 hectares. These conditions were not put in writing.

The property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land
a capital contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded
for payment of taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay
every year as his contribution. Later, owners requested Macaya to increase his contribution to
20 cavans, Macaya agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that he will contribute 10 cavans only, the
owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya did not deliver palays from
then on.
The owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, etc.
Macaya was informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and was
asked to vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating.
However, after harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even expand his cultivation to 6 hectares
without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling:

Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of
the property also shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except
the one tilled by Macaya.

As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore
contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever
agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from the facts as there
was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at
which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and
during the limited period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the
lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for
the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the sharing of the costs of
fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items.

As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no
intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for agricultural production but only
for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the fourth requisite which is the
purpose was also not present.

There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners
did not get anything from the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating
the land free from any charge or expense.

Brief Discussion: In this case, it was shown that the elements for tenancy relationship must
be strictly construed. The absence of one might be a cause for the invalidation of the alleged
tenancy relationship. Thus, in order a tenancy relationship must be established, the
land must be agricultural land.

3. EPITACIO SIALANA v. MARY Y. AVILA, ET AL.

Facts:

The petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region VII,
Cebu City (Regional DARAB), a complaint against the respondents for the declaration of tenancy
status. He alleged that he and his spouse are tenants over a parcel of land owned by
respondents located at South Poblacion, San Fernando, Cebu; that they had occupied the
property since 1958 and built a house thereon; that they cultivated the land and harvested its
produce; that they gave definite shares in the produce to respondents and their predecessors-
in-interest; and that, as tenants, they enjoy security of tenure.

However, the respondents averred that the petitioners are mere usurpers; that they never
consented to the alleged tenancy; that they never received any share in the produce; and that,
in view of these reasons, petitioner and his spouse should be ejected.

The Regional DARAB rendered a decision in favor of respondents. The Regional DARAB found
that although the petitioner and his spouse occupied the property in question, they failed to
prove by substantial evidence that the landowners had given their prior consent. It was also
found out that the petitioner and his spouse delivered the shares of the produce not to
respondents but to Alfonso Canoy and her mother, a certain Diosdada "Nang Daday" Canoy, the
overseers appointed by respondents; that Alfonso Canoy turned over the shares to his mother
and no other.

The DARAB promulgated its Decision reversing the Regional DARAB. The DARAB held that
Rafael Avila constituted the petitioner and his spouse as tenants sometime in 1958; and that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos v. Vda. De Cerdenola which supposedly provides that an implied
contract of tenancy is created if a landholder, represented by his overseer, permits the tilling of
the land by another for a period of at least six years, applies in the instant case.

The CA rendered a Decision which reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated decision of the
DARAB, Region VII, Cebu City.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural tenant in the landholding owned by respondents.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CA and the Regional DARAB that aside
from his testimony that he was expressly instituted as tenant by Rafael Avila, petitioner was
unable to buttress that claim with other evidence which might obviate the apparent biased
nature of the testimony.

In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove that Diosdada Canoy or her son and
grandson, who took over the overseeing the farmholding, were ever authorized by
[respondents] or their predecessor[s]-in-interest to represent the [respondents].

In order that the tenancy over the farmholding is created, the agent must possess a special
power of attorney showing his authority to do such act. It was not shown that the overseers of
[respondents] have this special power of attorney to create a real right in favor of [the
petitioner or his spouse] over the farmholding.
Additionally, petitioner and his spouse have not shown any evidence that will indicate notice or
knowledge on the part of the [respondents or their predecessors] and the latter's consequent
ratification of the transaction entered into with the overseers. In fact, it was established that
overseer Alfonso Canoy never delivered the supposed share of the landlord to the
[respondents]. Admittedly by Alfonso Canoy, the share[s] were delivered to Diosdada Canoy.

There being no proof that the landowners, herein respondents and their predecessor-in-interest,
Rafael Avila, expressly or impliedly created the tenancy relationship with the petitioner, the
latter therefore cannot be considered a de jure tenant, nor can petitioner claim, with more
reason, any entitlement to security of tenure under agrarian reform laws.

His contentions are factual in nature. In agrarian cases, when the appellate courts confirm that
the findings of fact of the agrarian courts are based on substantial evidence as borne out by the
record, such findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts.\

Brief Discussion: Consent of the parties is one of the most important elements of the tenancy
relationship.

4. BONIFACIO vs. DIZON

Facts:
Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the ejectment
of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated
at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan. The ground was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio granted the ejectment.

Private respondent Pastora San Miguel appealed and that the Court of Appeals modified the
earlier judgment.

The respondent sought relief from the Supreme Court. During the pendency of her petition
Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the
substitution of his heirs was made. The Court En Banc resolved to deny private respondent's
petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

A writ of execution was issued and then the Deputy Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial
Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the house
of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he had delivered the land subject
matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.

Respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon declared null and void.

It was contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in the case can no longer be executed as said
action is purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be
inherited by his heirs.

Issue:
Whether or not the cultivation of agricultural land in the tenancy relationship is personal.

Held:
Yes. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members
evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still
is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be
observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his
immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal
cultivation."

Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 - The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes.

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal
cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to
either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or
lessee's immediate family members.
Brief Discussion: The right of cultivation is personal. Moreover, this right extends to those
possessor of the right immediate family members

5. STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. JUAN B. AMANTE Et Al.

& JUAN B. AMANTE, Et Al v. LUIS YULO, Et Al.,

The disputed land (Canlubang Estate in Laguna) was previously owned by certain Speaker and
Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Sr. Within it, there are two parcels measuring 254.766 hectares and
part of Barangay Casile, subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation (SRRDC), the majority stockholder of C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.

The disputing parties in the land involved in civil suits and administrative proceedings that led to
the filing of G.R. NOS. 112526 and 118838.

Injunction Case Filed by Amante, et al.

Amante, et al., the private respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No.
118838, instituted an action for injunction with damages against Luis Yulo, SRRDC, and
several SRRDC security personnel.
They alleged that they own an area of around 300 hectares which their ancestors occupied
since 1910. However, SRRDC's security people illegally entered the area, fenced it and
destroyed some of the properties in the area. Therefore, Amante, et al. were deprived of
possession and cultivation of their lands. That’s why, they claimed damages, sought the
issuance of permanent injunction and proposed that a right of way be declared.

The defendants SRRDC denied the allegations and disclaimed any control and supervision over
its security personnel. SRRDC alleged that they are the real owner of the property and the one
suffered to the encroachment unto their property.

The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction but later dissolved by the Court of
Appeals.

Trial ensued on the merits and then the trial court ordered Amante, et al. to vacate the
property. According to the trial court, the defendants Luis Yulo and Sta. Rosa Realty are the
owner of the disputed land.

On June 28, 1994, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court in the
injunction case. The defendants-appellees were ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiffsappellants nominal damages.

Nominal damages were awarded by the CA because it found that SRRDC violated Amante, et
al.'s rights as possessors of the subject property.

Amante, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, pointing out the DARAB's decision
placing the property under compulsory acquisition, and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
27234, affirming the same. The CA, however, denied the motion, with the modification that
only SRRDC and the defendants-security guards should be held jointly and severally liable for
the nominal damages awarded. It also made the clarification that the decision should not
preempt any judgment or prejudice the right of any party in the agrarian reform case pending
before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 112526).

Thus, Amante, et al. filed the petition, docketed as G.R. No. 118838.

According to Amante, et al. The CA decided the case contrary to law or applicable Supreme
Court decisions.

One of the reasons were petitioners may not be lawfully evicted from their landholdings
considering that:

- - (a) Petitioners are already the registered owners under the torrens system of the
properties in question since February 26, 1992 by virtue of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law;

- - (b) The Court of Appeals has affirmed the Regional Trial Court of Laguna's dismissal of
the ejectment cases filed by respondent SRRDC against petitioners; andcrala
Ejectment Cases Filed by SRRDC

After the injunction case was filed by Amante, et al., SRRDC filed several complaints for forcible
entry with preliminary injunction and damages against Amante, et al.,

It was alleged that Amante, et al., without their authority and through stealth and strategy,
were clearing, cultivating and planting on the subject property; and that despite requests from
SRRDC's counsel, Amante, et al. refused to vacate the property, prompting them to file the
ejectment cases.

The MTC-Cabuyao rendered its decision in favor of SRRDC. Amante, et al. were ordered to
surrender possession and vacate the subject property. The decision was appealed to the
Regional Trial Court.

On February 18, 1992, the RTC dismissed the ejectment cases on the ground that the subject
property is an agricultural land being tilled by Amante, et al., hence it is the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), which has jurisdiction over the dispute.

The RTC's dismissal of the complaints was brought to the CA via a Petition for Review.

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that SRRDC failed to show any prior physical
possession of the subject property that would have justified the filing of the ejectment cases.
Also, the CA did not sustain the RTC's finding that the subject properties are agricultural lands
and Amante, et al. are tenant/farmers thereof, as the evidence on record does not support such
finding. The parties did not file any motion for reconsideration from the Court of Appeals'
dismissal, hence, it became final and executory.

Administrative Proceedings

While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to SRRDC, informing petitioners that the disputed
properties is scheduled for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).

SRRDC filed its objection with the MARO on the grounds that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes, as it was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above, and that the
occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.

The Court decided in the case G.R. No. 112526, that the farmer beneficiaries together with
the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not
18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural
purposes.

MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory
Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter,
PARO).
PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings valued at
P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

SRRDC protested and addressed its petition to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director,
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution.

Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to
determine just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, Section 16.

The LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the
Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some
deficiencies.

Petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the
aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as
watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.

Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the
Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on
the CACF's, on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the
office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues
before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.

Those two issues were (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the
Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion
of the parcels of land may be granted.

The office of the DAR Secretary resolved on that matter and stated that by virtue of
the issuance of the notice of coverage and notice of acquisition on, the property is
covered under compulsory acquisition. During the consideration of the case by the
Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the
parcels of land in question.

On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve
SRRDC's petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative
valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.

At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B.
Opina was presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of
land subject of the case were classified as "Industrial Park" per Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.

To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries,
on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as
beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of beneficiaries. 24

On December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision, affirming the dismissal of the
protest of SRRDC against the compulsory coverage of the property covered by TCT Nos. 81949
and 84891.

The Board ordered the LBP to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and
SixtyFour centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title mentioned above.

DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong directed the LBP to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC,
for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.

The titles in the name of SRRDC were cancelled and corresponding TCTs were issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines on February 11, 1992, after which
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued in the name of the
farmersbeneficiaries on February 26, 1992.27

SRRDC had filed with the CA a Petition for Review of the DARAB's decision, docketed as but still
the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

And then the SRRDC the petition G.R. No. 112526 on the grounds that the CA acted with
grave abuse of discretion in its RULING THAT THE SRRDC PROPERTIES, DESPITE the fact that
disputed lands were classified as NON-AGRICULTURAL, ARE COVERED BY THE CARP, therefore,
CONTRARY TO THE NATALIA REALTY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS erred IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SRRDC

PROPERTIES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY DECLARED AS
SQUATTERS AND THEREFORE ARE NOT QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES PURSUANT TO THE
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS erred IN HOLDING THAT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION TO PASS
UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SRRDC PROPERTIES ARE SUBJECT TO CARP COVERAGE.

Deciding in the case G.R. No. 112526 the Supreme Court SET ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals and REMANDed the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of
the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries
shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993,
which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.

The SC made a consideration to the argument that the property is part of a watershed, and that
during the hearing at the DARAB, "there was proof that the land may be excluded from the
coverage of the CARP because of its high slopes."

In their Memorandum, Amante, et al. argued that there exist compelling reasons to grant the
second motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision of the Court because

1. Only QUESTIONS OF LAW are admittedly and undeniably at issue; yet the Court
reviewed the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and the DARAB although the case does
not fall into any of the well-recognized exceptions to conduct a factual review.

2. The DARAB and the Court of Appeals already found the land to be CARPable; yet the
Honorable Court remanded the case to DARAB to re-evaluate if the land is CARPable;

XXX

It is undisputed in the Supreme Court that the issues in the case are factual in
nature, which the Court, as a rule, should not have considered in this case. However,
the case fell under its exception as to the circumstance that when the factual
inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different legal
conclusion.

The SC has actually made reference to the findings of the DARAB that the disputed lands are
agricultural and may be the subject of compulsory acquisition for distribution to
farmerbeneficiaries.

“More importantly, subject landholdings are suitable for agriculture. Their

topography is flat to undulating 3-15% slope. (Testimony of Rosalina Jumaquio,
Agricultural Engineer, DAR, TSN, June 21, 1991, DARAB Exhibits "F" and "H").
Though some portions are over 18% slope, nevertheless, clearly visible thereat are
fruitbearing trees, like coconut, coffee, and pineapple plantations, etc. (see
Petitioners Exhibits "A" to "YYY" and DARAB Exhibits "A" to "S", Records). In other
words, they are already productive and fully developed.”

As the landholdings of SRRDC subject of the instant proceedings are already

developed not only as a community but also as an agricultural farm capable of
sustaining daily existence and growth, We find no infirmity in placing said parcels of
land under compulsory coverage. They do not belong to the exempt class of lands.
The claim that the landholding of SRRDC is a watershed; hence, belonging to the
exempt class of lands is literally "throwing punches at the moon" because the DENR
certified that "the only declared watershed in Laguna Province and San Pablo City is
the Caliraya-Lumot Rivers (Petitioner's Exhibit "A"). A sensu contrario, the
landholdings subject herein are not.”

With regards to the issue that the property has already been classified as a "municipal park"
and beyond the scope of CARP, the SC held that the Court recognizes the power of a local
government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance
is approved by the HLURB.

However, it was explained that the issuance did not convert existing agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 of the
Municipality of Cabuyao did not provide for any retroactive application nor did it convert existing
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. Consequently, the
subject property remains agricultural in nature and therefore within the coverage of the CARP.

“This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance
should be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should
not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such lands. ±Ï‰lιbrαrÿ

More so since the municipality of Cabuyao did not even take any step to utilize the
property as a park.”

More significantly however, it is the DAR Secretary that originally declared the
subject property as falling under the coverage of the CARP.

As provided by the law, in order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have been
classified or proclaimed and actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for watershed purposes.

But SRRDC's reliance on the CMU case is flawed. In the CMU case, the subject property from
the very beginning was not alienable and disposable because Proclamation No. 476 issued by
the late President Carlos P. Garcia already reserved the property for the use of the school.
Besides, the subject property in the CMU case was actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for educational purposes.

In the present case, the property is agricultural and was not actually and exclusively used for
watershed purposes. As records show, the subject property was first utilized for the purposes of
the Canlubang Sugar Estate.

The farmer-beneficiaries have already been identified in this case. Also, the DAR
Secretary has already issued Notices of Coverage and Notices of Acquisition
pertaining to the subject property. It behooves the courts to exercise great caution
in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion committed by the administrative agency, which in these cases the Court
finds none.
Brief Discussion:

1. Since ordinance should be given prospective operation only, the subject land here was
not changed to its very nature which is an agricultural land therefore covered with the CARP.

2. Rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above was not to be considered agricultural
land. However, in this case, even though there are portions which slopes are 18%, it has been
justified since what were planted in the said slopes are fruit-bearing trees, like coconut, coffee,
and pineapple plantations and that those are already productive and fully developed.

6. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., v. PAULINO REYES et al.

PAULINO REYES et al. v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC.

NOLITO G. DEL MUNDO et al. v. THE MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, INC.

The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. In carrying out its mandate, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through its Secretary,
may investigate acts that are directed toward the circumvention of the law's objectives. Its
findings are accorded great weight and respect, especially when supported by substantial
evidence.

XXX

So this case involves the consolidated three (3) Petitions for Review on Certiorari involving
Hacienda Looc in Nasugbu, Batangas. Portions of the property had previously been awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award, but these certificates were
canceled on the ground that the lands covered were excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.

For the Petition GR. No. 152797

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao's which declared
70 hectares of the 1,219.0133 hectares of Hacienda Looc as covered land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Meanwhile, for the G.R. No. 189315

The Court of Appeals upheld the Office of the President's Decision affirming the same
Order issued by Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao.

Finally, for the case G.R. No. 200684

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's Decision
upholding the cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award previously
granted to farmer-beneficiaries of Hacienda Looc.

Facts:

The disputed land (Hacienda Looc) here is the more than 8-thousand-hectare property in
Nasugbu, Batangas.

First, the property was owned by Magdalena Estate, Inc.

Then was acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines (Development Bank).

And then, through an Executive Order issued by President Cory Aquino, the certain assets and
liabilities of the DBP was transferred to the government.

The government entered into an agreement with the Asset Privatization Trust, in which the
latter was appointed as trustee of the property.

Asset Privatization Trust, through a Memorandum of Agreement, offered to sell portions of

Hacienda Looc to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

It resulted to the transferring of physical possession of Hacienda Looc to the Department of

Agrarian Reform. Therefore, the DAR was allowed to

(1) identify and segregate areas that were covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program;

(2) purchase the segregated areas; and

(3) return portions of the property that were not covered.

From 1991 to 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform distributed 25 Certificates of Land
Ownership Award covering 3,981.2806 hectares of land.

Then, Bellevue Properties, Inc. (Bellevue), won the public bidding which Asset Privatization
Trust offered to sell its rights and interests in Hacienda Looc.

Bellevue then assigned its right to purchase Hacienda Looc to the Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation (Manila Southcoast).

Accordingly upon the execution of the Deed of Sale of the APT, new certificate of title was
issued in Manila Southcoast's name. Manila Southcoast was able to register portions of
Hacienda Looc in its name.
Del Mundo, et al. questioned the validity of the certificates' cancellation, arguing that it never
attained finality as they were never notified of it. They further argued that their lands are
agriculturally developed and, thus, covered under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. They insisted that while they did not appeal the March 10, 1998 Order of Regional
Adjudicator Minas, they could benefit from the appeal filed by the other farmer-beneficiaries
based on the community of interest principle.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's January
25, 2005 Decision. It ruled that the decision canceling the Certificates of Land Ownership Award
of Del Mundo, et al. had attained finality as to them for their failure to appeal from Regional
Adjudicator Minas' Order.

As to the substantive issues, Fil-Estate essentially asserts that the 10 lots subject of Regional
Adjudicator Arche-Manalang's First Partial Summary Judgment are excluded from the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Fil-Estate insists that the 10 lots are undeveloped and have slopes of 18% or over based on the
certifications issued by the Community Environmental and Natural Resources Office and the
Department of Agriculture.

Issue:

1. whether or not Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao exceeded the scope of his
review by looking into the validity of the cancellation proceeding; and
2. whether or not the lots subject of G.R. Nos. 152797 and 189315 are excluded
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Held:

1. Fil-Estate insists that Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao, in issuing the March 25, 1998
Order, exceeded his jurisdiction. It argues that since the scope of his review was
limited to the exclusion proceedings over the 10 lots, he Erred in looking into
other matters, such as the proceedings involving the cancellation of the Certificates of
Land Ownership Award issued to the Hacienda Looc farmers.

Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, vests the Department of Agrarian
Reform with primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters and over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform.

The Court found that Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao did not exceed the
scope of his jurisdiction in issuing the disputed Order. The Department of
Agrarian Reform, through its Secretary, has primary jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, including the investigation of acts that
 he or she believes are directed toward the circumvention of the objectives of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

In the March 25, 1998 Order, Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao found merit in the
farmer-beneficiaries’ claims on the fraudulent means by which their Certificates of Land
Ownership Award were canceled.

Thus, Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao did not err in considering all the controversies
surrounding Hacienda Looc, especially since there were serious allegation raised by the
farmer-beneficiaries. The cancellation proceedings were allegedly based on "waivers
which are of dubious veracity.

2. In the March 25, 1998 Order, Agrarian Reform Secretary Gariloa found several areas of
Hacienda Looc suitable for agrarian reform. In questioning this finding, Fil-Estate argues
that Nasugbu, Batangas was classified as a tourism zone prior to the enactment and
effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Thus, Nasugbu, Batangas is
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

According to the Court with regards to the argument of Fil-Estate that in light of
Proclamation No. 1520, the 10 lots are excluded from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the
general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural
use.

Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004, came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that

Proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain

areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not
allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for
nonagricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that
otherwise
CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than
agricultural.

There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances,

assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a basis
for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP
coverage.

Brief Discussion: In this case, classifying a land to a tourism zone does not automatically
convert the land into a non-agricultural. There must be a valid reclassification in order to
support the contention of the petitioner that would exempt the land from CARP coverage.
 Salient points of the The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8291

AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1146, AS AMENDED, EXPANDING
AND INCREASING THE COVERAGE AND BENEFITS OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, INSTITUTING REFORMS THEREIN AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

SOURCES OF FUNDS

(SECTION 5)
It is mandatory for the member and the employer to pay the monthly contributions.
“Monthly Compensation Percentage of Monthly Compensation Payable by Member Employer”

Maximum Average Monthly Compensation, (AMC) Limit and Below 9.0% 12.0%

Over the Maximum AMC Limit, Up to the Maximum AMC Limit 9.0% 12.0%

In Excess of the AMC Limit 2.0% 12.0%

“Members of the judiciary and constitutional commissioners shall pay three percent (3%) of
their monthly compensation as personal share, and their employers a corresponding three
percent (3%) share for their life insurance coverage.

The employer shall include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the
contributions indicated above, plus any additional premiums that may be required on account of
the hazards or risks of its employees’ occupation.

It shall be mandatory and compulsory for all employers to include the payment of contributions
in their annual appropriations. Penal sanctions shall be imposed upon employers who fail to
include the payment of contributions in their annual appropriations or otherwise fail to remit the
accurate/exact amount of contributions on time, or delay the remittance of premium
contributions to the GSIS. The heads of offices and agencies shall be administratively liable for
non-remittance or delayed remittance of premium contributions to the GSIS.

BENEFITS

(SECTION 9)

Basic Monthly Pension.

(a) the basic monthly pension is equal to:

“1) thirty-seven and one-half percent (37.5%) of the revalued average monthly compensation;
plus

“2) two and one-half percent (2.5%) of said revalued average monthly compensation for each
year of service in excess of fifteen (15) years: Provided, That the basic monthly pension shall
not exceed ninety percent (90%) of the average monthly compensation.

“(b) The basic monthly pension may be adjusted upon the recommendation of the President
and General Manager of the GSIS and approved by the President of the Philippines in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the GSIS: Provided, however, That the
basic monthly pension shall not be less than One thousand and three hundred pesos
(P1,300.00): Provided, further, That the basic monthly pension for those who have rendered at
least twenty (20) years of service after the effectivity of this Act shall not be less than Two
thousand four hundred pesos (P2,400.00) a month.

COMPUTATION OF SERVICE

(SECTION 10)

The computation of service for the purpose of determining the amount of benefits payable
under this Act shall be from the date of original appointment/election, including periods of
service at different times under one or more employers, those performed overseas under the
authority of the Republic of the Philippines, and those that may be prescribed by the GSIS in
coordination with the Civil Service Commission.

All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which corresponding benefits
have been awarded under this Act or other laws shall be excluded in the computation of service
in case of reinstatement in the service of an employer and subsequent retirement or separation
which is compensable under this Act.

“For the purpose of this section the term service shall include full time service with
compensation: Provided, That part time and other services with compensation may be included
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the GSIS.

RETIREMENT BENEFITS

(SECTION 13)

(a) Retirement benefit shall be:

(1) the lump sum payment as defined in this Act payable at the time of retirement plus an
oldage pension benefit equal to the basic monthly pension payable monthly for life, starting
upon expiration of the five-year (5) guaranteed period covered by the lump sum; or
(2) cash payment equivalent to eighteen (18) months of his basic monthly pension plus
monthly pension for life payable immediately with no five-year (5) guarantee.

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for
an employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service: Provided,
That if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he may be allowed to continue in the
service in accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.

CONDITIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT

(SECTION 13)

A member who retires from the service shall be entitled to the retirement benefits in paragraph
(a) of Section 13 hereof: Provided, That:
(1) he has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) he is at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
(3) he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total disability.

DEATH OF A MEMBER

(SECTION 21)

(a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:

(1) survivorship pension: Provided, That the deceased:

(i) was in the service at the time of his death; or
(ii) if separated from the service, has at least three (3) years of service at the time of his
death and has paid thirty-six (36) monthly contributions within the five-year period
immediately preceding his death; or has paid a total of at least one hundred eighty
(180) monthly contributions prior to his death; or

(2) the survivorship pension plus a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of
his average monthly compensation for every year of service: Provided, That the deceased
was in the service at the time of his death with at least three (3) years of service; or

(3) a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his average monthly
compensation for each year of service he paid contributions, but not less than Twelve
thousand pesos (P12,000.00): Provided, That the deceased has rendered at least three (3)
years of service prior to his death but does not qualify for the benefits under the item (1) or
(2) of this paragraph.

(b) The survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:

(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he/she shall receive the basic
survivorship pension for life or until he/she remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the
basic survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified, plus the dependent
children’s pension equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the basic monthly pension for
every dependent child not exceeding five (5), counted from the youngest and without
substitution;
(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, the
dependent spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he/she
remarries, and the dependent children shall receive the dependent children’s pension
mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph (2) hereof.

(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) the cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of his average
monthly compensation for each year of service he paid contributions, but not less than
Twelve thousand pesos (P12,000): Provided, That the member is in the service at the
time of his death and has at least three (3) years of service; or
 (2) in the absence of secondary beneficiaries, the benefits under this paragraph shall
be paid to his legal heirs.

(d) For purposes of the survivorship benefits, legitimate children shall include legally adopted
and legitimate children.

DEATH OF A PENSIONER

(SECTION 22)

Upon the death of an old-age pensioner or a member receiving the monthly income benefit for
permanent disability, the qualified beneficiaries shall be entitled to the survivorship pension
defined in Section 20 of this Act, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of Section 21
hereof. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship
pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period.

PRESCRIPTION

(SECTION 28)

Claims for benefits under this Act except for life and retirement shall prescribe after four (4)
years from the date of contingency.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

(SECTION 30)

The GSIS shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising under this
Act and any other laws administered by the GSIS.

The Board may designate any member of the Board, or official of the GSIS who is a lawyer, to
act as hearing officer to receive evidence, make findings of fact and submit recommendations
thereon. The hearing officer shall submit his findings and recommendations, together with all
the documentary and testimonial evidence to the Board within thirty (30) working days from the
time the parties have closed their respective evidence and filed their last pleading. The Board
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the hearing officer’s findings
and recommendations. The cases heard directly by the Board shall be decided within thirty (30)
working days from the time they are submitted by the parties for decision.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GSIS

(SECTION 41)

The GSIS shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(a) to formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act, as well as the effective exercise of the
 powers and functions, and the discharge of duties and responsibilities of the GSIS, its
officers and employees;
(b) to adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of receipts and expenditures
including salaries and allowances of the GSIS personnel; to authorize such capital and
operating expenditures and disbursements of the GSIS as may be necessary and proper for
the effective management and operation of the GSIS;
(c) to invest the funds of the GSIS, directly or indirectly, in accordance with the provisions of
this Act;
(d) to acquire, utilize or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law, real or personal property
in the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(e) to conduct continuing actuarial and statistical studies and valuations to determine the
financial condition of the GSIS and taking into consideration such studies and valuations and
the limitations herein provided, re-adjust the benefits, contributions, premium rates, interest
rates or the allocation or re-allocation of the funds to the contingencies covered;
(f) to have the power of succession;
(g) to sue and be sued;
(h) to enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every kind and description with any
person, firm or association or corporation, domestic or foreign;
(i) to carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in pursuance of, or in connection with the
provisions of this Act;
(j) to have one or more offices in and outside of the Philippines, and to conduct its business
and exercise its powers throughout and in any part of the Republic of the Philippines and/or
in any or all foreign countries, states and territories: Provided, That the GSIS shall maintain
a branch office in every province where there exists a minimum of fifteen thousand (15,000)
membership; (k) to borrow funds from any source, private or government, foreign or
domestic, only as an incident in the securitization of housing mortgages of the GSIS and on
account of its receivables from any government or private entity;
(l) to invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any establishment, firm or entity;
(m) to approve appointments in the GSIS except appointments to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature according to the Civil Service
rules and regulations: Provided, That all positions in the GSIS shall be governed by a
compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the
GSIS Board of Trustees based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties
and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to the periodic
review by the Board no more than once every four (4) years without prejudice to yearly
merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability;
(n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or financial assistance for
the purpose of retirement for its own personnel;
(o) to fix and periodically review and adjust the rates of interest and other terms and conditions
for loans and credits extended to members or other persons, whether natural or juridical; (p)
to enter into agreement with the Social Security System or any other entity, enterprise,
corporation or partnership for the benefit of members transferring from one system to
another subject to the provision of Republic Act No. 7699, otherwise known as the Portability
Law; (q) to be able to float proper instrument to liquefy long-term maturity by pooling funds
for shortterm secondary market;
(r) to submit annually, not later than June 30, a public report to the President of the
Philippines and the Congress of the Philippines regarding its activities in the administration and
enforcement of this Act during the preceding year including information and recommendations
on broad policies for the development and perfection of the programs of the GSIS;
(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made by both the GSIS and
its officials and employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and
employees or their heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(t) to approve and adopt guidelines affecting investments, insurance coverage of
government properties, settlement of claims, disposition of acquired assets, privatization or
expansion of subsidiaries, development of housing projects, increased benefit and loan
packages to members, and the enforcement of the provisions of this Act;
(u) any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, to authorize the payment of extra
remuneration to the officials and employees directly involved in the collection and/or remittance
of contributions, loan repayments, and other monies due to the GSIS at such rates and under
such conditions as it may adopt. Provided, That the best interest of the GSIS shall be observed
thereby;
(v) to determine, fix and impose interest upon unpaid premiums due from employers and
employees;
(w) to ensure the collection or recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or accountabilities,
including unpaid premiums or contributions in favor of the GSIS arising from any cause or
source whatsoever, due from all obligors, whether public or private. The Board shall demand
payment or settlement of the obligations referred to herein within thirty (30) days from the date
the obligation becomes due, and in the event of failure or refusal of the obligor or debtor to
comply with the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits,
criminal, civil or administrative or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards,
or bodies of proper jurisdiction within thirty (30) days reckoned from the expiry date of the
period fixed in the demand within which to pay or settle the account;
(x) to design and implement programs that will promote and mobilize savings and provide
additional resources for social security expansion and at the same time afford individual
members appropriate returns on their savings/investments. The programs shall be so designed
as to spur socio-economic take-off and maintain continued growth; and
(y) to exercise such powers and perform such other acts as may be necessary, useful,
incidental or auxiliary to carry out the provisions of this Act, or to attain the purposes and
objectives of this Act.