Definition and Nature of Agricultural Tenancy: Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992)
Definition and Nature of Agricultural Tenancy: Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992)
Definition and Nature of Agricultural Tenancy: Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992)
Castillo vs. CA
205 SCRA 529 (1992)
Facts:
Alberto Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against Castillo alleging that he is the
agricultural tenant of the latter. He claims that Castillo allowed him to construct a rest house
in the property and that, thereafter, Castillo started cutting fruit-bearing trees on the land
and filled with adobe stones the area intended for vegetables. On the other hand, Castillo
denied that Ignacio was his tenant but that the latter was only a "magsisiga" of the
landholding and that he did not ask permission from Ignacio when he constructed his rest
house. The trial court found no tenancy relationship between the parties but this was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The element of personal cultivation is absent in this case. The alleged tenant "is a
businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of income. He manufactures
hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry farm as well as a hardware store on the land
adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis
Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of the respondent as a businessman and his
other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations of a real tenant.
This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally
perform the work of a smudger because on 22 October 1986, the respondent hired some 20
people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the
subject land." (at 535-536).
An owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation of the
law (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194 (1990).
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., 280 SCRA 235 (1997), certifications of tenancy/non-tenancy issued
by DAR are not conclusive.
"The certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a
tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as ruled by this Court in Cuaño vs.
Court of Appeals, citing Puertollano vs. IAC. Secondly, it is well-settled that the "findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in
a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties is merely preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts."
(at 246)
Landholder-lessor
A landholder-lessor is defined as "any person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said
property for purposes of agricultural production and for a price certain or ascertainable either
in an amount of money or produce." (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 42). Thus, consent need
not be necessarily given personally by the registered owner as long as the person giving the
consent is the lawful landholder as defined by law.
Bernas vs. Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119 (1993)
Facts: Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her
brother, Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children's
education in Manila. The property was leased by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing
arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad played no part in this
arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the owners
sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming
that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for
recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently
reversed by the CA.
Issue: Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner, sufficient to
create tenancy relationship?
Held: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter
into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants him, as legal
possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property
he legally possessed." (at 125-126)
Subject is agricultural land
For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land.
RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." (see discussion on scope of CARP, Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers
to land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds,
idle land and abandoned land.
The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should
cultivate the entire area leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the
award that may be given to the agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consent by landholder
As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the
property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy
relation does not exist where a usurper cultivates the land.
Facts:
Primero owns a tenanted riceland in Cavite. Because of his desire to let the property to one
Porfirio Potente, he notified his tenant advising the latter to vacate the land. The tenant
refused. Primero filed a case with CAR which subsequently dismissed the same. On appeal,
Primero assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 9 and 50 of RA 1199 claiming that said
provisions are limitations on freedom of contract, a denial of equal protection of law, and an
impairment of, or limitation on, property rights.
Held:
The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the right of the landowner to
dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they
only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure
the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the
transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic Act 1199 is
unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of
the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to promote the
commonwealth. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our
lawmaking body, was passed by congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates
that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State" (Art II, sec. 5) and that "the state shall regulate
the relations between landlord and tenant in agriculture" (Art. XIV, sec. 6). (at 680).
In Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967), the Supreme Court also held:
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as amended, enunciates the
principle of security of tenure of the tenants, such that it prescribes that the relationship of
landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. The principle is
epitomized by the axiom on land tenure that once a tenant, always a tenant. Attacks on the
constitutionality of this guarantee have centered on the contention that it is a limitation on
freedom of contract, a denial of the equal protection of the law, and an impairment of or a
limitation on property rights. The assault is without reason. The law simply provides that the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order to
insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the
land. Its termination can take place only for causes and reasons provided in the law. It was
established pursuant to the social justice precept of the State to promote the common
weal. (Primero vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-10594, May 29, 1957) (at 1456).
Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties
Rights and responsibilities of lessee
The lessee shall have the following rights:
a) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
b) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest
which conform to the proven farm practices;
c) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
d) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and
warehouse receipts of the produce due him/her;
e) To continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any homelot the lessee may
have occupied upon the effectivity of RA 3844;
f) To be indemnified for the costs and expenses incurred in the cultivation and for other
expenses incidental to the improvement of the crop in case the lessee surrenders, abandons
or is ejected from the landholding;
g) To have the right of pre-emption and redemption; and
h) To be paid disturbance compensation in case the conversion of the farmholding has
been approved (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 23, 24, 25, 11, 12, 36)
On the other hand, the lessee shall have the following responsibilities under Sec. 26 of RA
3844:
a) Cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on the
land and perform all the work therein in accordance with proven farm practices;
b) Inform the lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed by third persons
on the farm, without prejudice to his/her direct action against the trespasser;
c) Take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him/her
by the lessor and see to it that they are not used for purposes other than those intended, or
used by another without the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
d) Keep the farm and growing crops attended to during the work season; and
e) To pay the lease rental to the lessor when it falls due.
One of the rights of a lessee is to be entitled to a homelot. But only the tenant-lessee has this
right and that members of the immediate family of the tenants are not entitled to a homelot.
After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests, the final rental shall be based on the
average normal harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural years.