Doing The Right Thing: Measuring Wellbeing For Public Policy

Forgeard, M. J. C., Jayawickreme, E., Kern, M. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2011).
Doing the right thing:

Measuring wellbeing for public policy. International Journal of Wellbeing, 1(1), 79-106.
doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i1.15
ARTICLE
Doing the right thing:

Measuring wellbeing for public policy
Marie J. C. Forgeard · Eranda Jayawickreme · Margaret L. Kern ·
Martin E. P. Seligman
Abstract: Many experts now recognize that income is not a measure that alone captures the
wellbeing of individuals, and governments around the world are starting to rethink the ways in
which they measure the welfare of their citizens. Wellbeing is best understood as a multifaceted
phenomenon that can be assessed by measuring a wide array of subjective and objective
constructs. This review summarizes the state of research on the various domains of wellbeing
measured by psychologists and social scientists, and provides an overview of the main
theoretical perspectives that integrate these domains. Among these theoretical perspectives, we
highlight Well-being Theory, which decomposes the wellbeing construct into five domains:
Positive emotion, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning, and Accomplishment (PERMA). We
conclude by formulating recommendations for future research on the measurement of wellbeing.
These recommendations include the need to combine both objective and subjective indicators,
and the use of a dashboard approach to measurement. This approach conveys the multifaceted
nature of wellbeing and will help policy-makers and citizens understand which domains of
wellbeing should constitute priorities for public policy.
Keywords: well-being, wellbeing, public policy, measurement, wellbeing theory
1. Introduction
‚What you measure affects what you do. If you don’t measure the right thing, you don’t do the
right thing.‛ The words of Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (as cited by
Goodman, 2009, para. 3) capture the growing discontentment of citizens, academics, and
policy-makers toward the way most governments define and measure progress – namely, by
emphasizing economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (e.g., Abramovitz,
Scitovsky, & Inkeles, 1973; Layard, 2005; Zencey, 2009). Among others, Layard (2010) recently
challenged policy-makers to think about what ‘progress’ really is and how it can best be
measured. From its beginnings in the 1930s, the history of national accounts in the United
States shows that the wellbeing of citizens, not the wellbeing of their bank accounts, was
considered to be the end goal of government (Perlman & Marietta, 2005). The economist Simon
Kuznets (1933), the first promoter of national accounts in the United States, argued that the goal
of collecting economic information (e.g., income distribution, growth, productivity) was to
examine how those indicators influence the welfare of the nation. Kuznets however also
acknowledged that economic indicators were but one piece of the puzzle of citizens’ wellbeing,
and that ‚the welfare of a nation can *<+ scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national
income‛ (Kuznets, 1934, p. 7). After the Second World War, Kuznets (1948) denounced the
Martin E. P. Seligman 79
University of Pennsylvania
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Doing the right thing: Measuring wellbeing for public policy
Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern & Seligman
resulting increase in focus of national accounts on economic production, to the detriment of

other measures of welfare. In spite of his critique, the use of economic indicators as proxies for
wellbeing became conventional practice for the rest of the twentieth century. As pointed out by
the economist Partha Dasgupta (2001), ‚GNP per capita continues to be regarded as the
quintessential indicator of a country’s living standard‛ (p. 53).
Recent years have seen renewed interest in the idea that money and economic growth are
both insufficient and inadequate indicators of progress, especially in developed countries.
Nations have become increasingly prosperous over the past five decades, yet wealth has
become an increasingly inadequate indicator of how a society is doing. As a result, there are
now ‚distressingly large, measurable slippages between economic indicators and well-being‛
(Diener & Seligman, 2004, p. 1). For illustration, even though GDP has tripled over the past 50
years in the United States, life satisfaction has remained unchanged (Diener & Seligman, 2004).
In contrast, rates of depression and anxiety have increased dramatically (Klerman et al., 1985;
Robins et al., 1984; Twenge, 2000). The overabundance of goods and services available in
developed nations therefore does not reflect the subjective wellbeing of their citizens, a
situation that has been described as ‚the progress paradox‛ (Easterbrook, 2003).
Even the manner in which GDP is calculated makes it an inappropriate measure of
wellbeing. Indeed, GDP is inflated by ‚regrettables‛ (Diener & Seligman, 2004), i.e., economic
transactions that create wealth but decrease wellbeing. To illustrate, the GDP of a nation
increases with each sale of antidepressant medication, with each divorce pronounced, and with
each prison built. U.S. presidential candidate Robert Kennedy (1968, para. 22) perhaps best
summed up the inadequacy of economic growth as a surrogate for wellbeing:
The Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and
ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our
doors and the jails for the people who break them *<+ It counts the destruction
of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl *<+ Yet the
GNP does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education,
or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the
strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of
our public officials *<+ it measures everything, in short, except that which
makes life worthwhile.
Spearheading the movement to reform the way in which governments measure progress,
the UK-based New Economics Foundation recently proposed the National Accounts of Well-
Being initiative (Michaelson, Abdallah, Steuer, Thompson, & Marks, 2009). Referring to
Kuznets’ unfinished endeavor (Kuznets, 1933; Perlman & Marietta, 2005) and highlighting the
fact that the end goal of national accounts should be citizens’ wellbeing (not the size of their
wallets), the creators of the National Accounts of Well-Being explained that their initiative
represents ‚a return to the original intent for modern national accounting systems‛
(Michaelson et al., 2009, p. 11). A poll conducted in the United Kingdom revealed that 81% of
respondents believed the government’s primary goal should be the ‚greatest happiness‛ rather
than the ‚greatest wealth‛ (Easton, 2006). In France, the report of the Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP) initiated by French
president Nicolas Sarkozy stated that ‚the time is ripe for our measurement system to shift in
emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people’s well-being. *<+
Emphasizing well-being is important because there appears to be an increasing gap between
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 80
the information contained in aggregate GDP data and what counts for common people’s well-
being‛ (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009, p. 12). Thus, there is a growing consensus around the
need to measure wellbeing at a national level and to have this construct serve as an end goal of
national public policy (Sketekee, 2011; Wardell, 2010).
While there is a growing agreement that measures of wellbeing should be included, the
issue of how wellbeing should be defined and measured remains unresolved (Smith, Fleeson,
Geiselmann, Settersten, & Kunzmann, 2001). As a result, a large diversity of definitions exist
(Gasper, 2010). Most researchers now agree that wellbeing is a multifaceted construct (e.g.,
Diener, 2009; Michaelson, et al., 2009; Stiglitz, et al., 2009), including emotional, social, and
functional components, yet disagreements persist as to which components should be included
in a valid theory and measure of wellbeing (Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2003). Diener and
Seligman (2004) pointed out that a more systematic approach is needed, as the ‚current
measurement of well-being is haphazard, with different studies assessing different concepts in
different ways‛ (p. 2). The multiplicity of approaches in the study of wellbeing has given rise to
blurred and overly broad definitions of wellbeing, with researchers using the construct of
‘wellbeing’ synonymously with ‘happiness,’ ‘quality of life,’ or ‘life satisfaction.’ Furthermore,
some researchers have preferred to ignore the multifaceted nature of wellbeing and equate it
with one construct (often life satisfaction), leading to the unfortunate omission of other
important aspects of wellbeing. As a result, Gasper (2004) argued that new measures need to
respect the diversity of wellbeing.
The present review summarizes the state of research on the measurement of wellbeing and
highlights potential opportunities and pitfalls in the development of new instruments and
theoretical approaches. In Section 2, we provide an overview of tools that have been used to
measure subjective facets of wellbeing (e.g. positive emotion, engagement, meaning, life
satisfaction, relationships/social support, and accomplishment/competence). In Section 3, we
discuss objective theories and social indicators of wellbeing, as well as the debate surrounding
the need to integrate subjective and objective measures of wellbeing. Section 4 examines how
current measures fit with existing psychological theories, including Well-being Theory
(Seligman, 2011), and ends with a proposal for a new approach to the measurement of
wellbeing: the dashboard approach.
2. Subjective measures of wellbeing

We begin with a brief overview of the main instruments used by researchers to measure
subjective facets of wellbeing, to lay a foundation for the theories detailed in Section 4. This
non-exhaustive summary highlights the constructs that have received the most attention in the
literature and therefore does not include all possible aspects of wellbeing that researchers have
considered (see Gasper, 2010; and Jayawickreme & Seligman, 2010 for more comprehensive
reviews). In addition, we note that we are not recommending a particular measure; some of the
most common measures have received strong criticism, and researchers should carefully
consider relevant literature in choosing to use one or more measure.
2.1 Happiness
A rather straightforward and therefore intuitively appealing measurement of wellbeing
consists of simply asking people whether they are ‚happy.‛ Fordyce’s Happiness Measures
(Fordyce, 1988) for instance asks respondents to answer the question ‚In general, how happy or
unhappy do you usually feel?‛ using an 11-point Likert scale. The measure also asks
participants to indicate the percentage of time they usually feel happy, unhappy, and neutral
(neither happy nor unhappy). Similarly, Lyubomirsky and Lepper’s Subjective Happiness Scale
(SHS; 1999) asks respondents to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale if they generally consider
themselves to be ‚not a very happy person / a very happy person.‛ The SHS also asks
respondents to compare themselves to others in terms of happiness (e.g., ‚compared to most of
my peers, I consider myself: less happy / more happy‛). While directly asking individuals
about their happiness certainly has face validity, it remains unclear what information
respondents use to determine whether or not they are happy. Happiness is therefore an
unwieldy construct for scientific research (Seligman, 2011), and researchers have devoted their
efforts to decomposing this vague notion of ‚happiness‛ into more basic and quantifiable,
building blocks.
2.2 Positive emotion

Positive emotion is one of the most studied facets of wellbeing, perhaps because it possesses
high face validity, offers a conceptual complement to the large literature on negative emotion,
and has high intuitive appeal. The intuitive correspondence most people establish between
positive emotion and wellbeing is partially derived from the philosophy of hedonism, which
suggested that pleasure is the only thing that is good for us, whereas pain is the only thing that
is bad (Bentham, 1789/1996) – a view which has been referred to as ‚narrow hedonism‛ (Parfit,
1984). Empirically, researchers interested in the measurement of positive emotion have
included a broader and more nuanced range of positive and negative emotional states besides
pleasure and pain. For instance, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), one of the most widely-used measures of positive and negative
emotions, asks respondents to rate how much they are feeling 10 positive emotions (e.g.,
‚excited,‛ or ‚alert‛) and 10 negative emotions (e.g., ‚upset,‛ or ‚ashamed‛) in a timeframe
specified by experimenters (e.g., ‚in general,‛ ‚during the past two weeks‛). Similarly,
Bradburn’s Affect Balance Scale (1969) assesses individuals’ level of positive and negative
emotions. This 10-item self-report scale asks respondents to answer 10 questions about ways
they may have felt over the past week (e.g, ‚during the past week, did you ever feel pleased
about having accomplished something?‛ and ‚during the past week, did you ever feel upset
because someone criticized you?‛).
Recently, Diener and colleagues developed the Scale of Positive and Negative Experience
(SPANE; Diener et al., 2010), designed to address some of the flaws in previous measures of
positive and negative emotions. The SPANE is a 12-item self-report measure that asks
respondents to indicate how much they have experienced 12 general feelings (e.g., ‚pleasant,‛
‚joyful‛) as opposed to the more narrow feelings described by the PANAS or Bradburn’s Affect
Balance Scale. Specific feelings used in other scales may bias results if they do not correspond
to the particular states experienced by respondents, if respondents have difficulty labeling
specific feelings, or if some of the feelings valued by other cultures are omitted in the scale. The
PANAS has been criticized for only including high arousal emotions; the SPANE therefore
includes both low and high arousal emotions. Finally, the SPANE asks respondents to indicate
how much of the time they experienced particular feelings (as opposed to how intensely they
experienced them), a question which is more highly correlated with other facets of wellbeing
such as life satisfaction (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991).
One problem with retrospective self-report instruments used to assess positive emotions is
that individuals may use the way they feel at the moment they are answering to determine how
they have felt over a longer period of time (especially if the questionnaire calls for a longer
timeframe). Respondents may also be subject to memory biases, such as the tendency to recall
the most salient and last experience best (Kahneman, 1999). Researchers interested in
measuring positive emotion as accurately as possible have therefore developed methods other
than the standard self-report questionnaires. One example is the Day Reconstruction Method
(DRM), used to measure the frequency and intensity of a variety of positive and negative
emotions over time (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). With the DRM,
individuals are asked to list all of the activities they engaged in during a period of 24 hours,
and then rate those activities according to the positive and negative emotions they afforded.
While the DRM remains a retrospective method, it allows for more fine-grained data regarding
individuals’ sum-total of positive and negative emotions. Researchers can calculate individuals’
levels of positive emotion by adding up the total of those momentary positive emotions and
subtracting the total momentary negative emotions (Kahneman, 1999).
In addition to the DRM, researchers have also used the Experience Sampling Method (ESM;
Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977; for reviews, see Hektner, Schmidt, &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2007; Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2007) to improve accuracy in reports of
positive and negative emotions. In ESM, respondents are signaled (‘beeped’) via electronic
devices (e.g., pager, mobile phone) at random intervals during the day and are asked to answer
questions regarding how they are feeling right at that moment. A typical ESM study lasts one
to two weeks, with individuals responding to around two to twelve signals per week (Fleeson,
2007; Reis & Gable, 2000). ESM has a number of advantages (Furr, 2009; Scollon, et al., 2007).
First, ESM has high ecological validity because it allows individuals to answer questions while
involved in real-life situations. Second, it prevents the memory biases associated with
retrospective methods by asking respondents to describe their emotions on the spot. Third, it
allows for better examination of within-person fluctuations in emotions. Finally, even though
ESM started as a costly and time-consuming method, the advent of new technologies has made
it increasingly easy to use and increasingly cost-effective. For example, ESM can now be
implemented using applications for cellular phones.
ESM however also has a number of drawbacks (Scollon et al., 2007). First, the time
commitment required from participants may encourage self-selection and attrition issues.
Typical ESM participants may therefore be more motivated, conscientious, and agreeable than
average. Second, the technology involved may prevent certain groups with low familiarity or
resources to participate. Third, participants may decide not to respond during particular
activities, thus impinging on the randomness of sampling. Fourth, participants may react to the
measure, changing the phenomenon studied (Wheeler & Reis, 1991). The issue of reactivity is
inherent to ESM, as this technique interrupts participants’ experiences (‚I was feeling good
until they beeped me‛), and may make them more aware of how they tend to respond (‚I guess
I must be a sad person‛). Finally, ESM generates massive amounts of data that researchers must
be prepared to aggregate and analyze in meaningful ways, as the basic data management and
statistical techniques that are typically used in psychological studies may be insufficient. This
issue is more of a challenge than a real drawback for researchers, given the richness of the data
provided by ESM.
The DRM and ESM are techniques that allow for richer data than can be provided by
ordinary self-report questionnaires administered at one or two points in time. Both methods
have been used to assess positive emotions, but they need not be limited to this construct. ESM,
for instance, was originally developed to measure engagement, the next facet of wellbeing that
we discuss.
Research on the measurement of positive emotion has therefore yielded several useful
instruments and methods. However, the question of the role that positive emotion should play
in a valid measure of wellbeing remains debated. Some theories (reviewed in Section 4) view
positive emotion as central to wellbeing, whereas other approaches (such as eudaimonic
accounts of wellbeing) dismiss it. One important consideration is that individuals are not
equally endowed with the ability to experience positive emotion. Introverts, for instance, are
much less likely than extraverts to experience positive emotion (Hills & Argyle, 2001). As a
result, interventions that are designed to boost positive emotion will do so more easily in
extraverts, and measurements of positive emotion will favor extraverts over introverts. Policy-
makers may therefore end up unintentionally over-counting what works for extraverts and
discounting what works for introverts. The fairness of using positive emotion as a main metric
for wellbeing is therefore disputable, and it might be more fruitful to focus on the measurement
and cultivation of other facets of wellbeing (Seligman, 2011).
2.3 Engagement
Engagement refers to a psychological state in which individuals report being absorbed by and
focused on what they are doing. At its high end, engagement has been referred to as ‚flow‛
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), or the overall feeling referred to as ‚being in the zone.‛ According to
Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 1975), high levels of engagement are characterized by the following
characteristics: the individual has clear goals and is intrinsically interested in the task at hand;
the task presents challenges that meet the skill level of the individual; the task provides direct
and immediate feedback to the individual; the individual retains a sense of personal control
over the activity; and action and awareness become merged, such that the individual becomes
completely immersed in what he or she is doing.
Few measures of engagement exist, and this construct is not usually represented in large-
scale surveys of wellbeing. As previously mentioned, the Experience Sampling Method (ESM)
was used by Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues to examine instances of flow as closely as
possible to the time they occurred (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen, 1997; Larson &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). When signaled, participants were typically asked to fill out a
questionnaire describing (among other things) what they were doing, and why they were
doing it (e.g., ‚I had to,‛ ‚I wanted to‛). Participants were also asked to rate their activity on
various dimensions of flow (e.g., concentration, self-awareness, sense of control, challenges and
skills, intrinsic interest). This methodology allowed the researchers to look at the experience of
engagement and flow in relation to the development of talent in adolescent populations. Aside
from ESM, the Flow Scale (Csikszenmihalyi & Csikszenmihalyi, 1988; Mayers, 1978) has also
been used to assess the level of engagement experienced during various activities. This scale is
an 11-item self-report measure in which respondents rate statements in relationship to a
specific situation (e.g., ‚I feel I can handle the demands of the situation,‛ ‚I clearly know what I
am supposed to do‛). The administration of this questionnaire is often preceded by having
participants read three statements describing the kinds of experience people report when they
are in flow, so that they can familiarize themselves with this concept (e.g., ‚I am so involved in
what I am doing, I don’t see myself as separate from what I am doing.‛) (Csikszentmihalyi,
1975). Apart from flow experiences, alternative measures of engagement are lacking.
2.4 Meaning and purpose

Meaning has been defined in various ways: as ‚the ontological significance of life from the
point of view of the experiencing individual‛ (Crumbauch & Maholick, 1964, p. 201), as the
‚feeling of belonging and serving something larger than the self‛ (Seligman, 2011), or simply as
the response to the question ‚what does my life mean?‛ (e.g., Baumeister, 1992).
The study of meaning was prevalent in early humanistic tradition (Frankl, 1959; Maslow,
1968; Yalom, 1980) but was largely ignored in psychology over the past fifty years due to lack
of empirical evidence. Psychologists have however returned to the topic in recent years
(Baumeister, 1992; King, Hicks, Krull, & Gaiso, 2006; Park, 2010; Ryff, 1989; Seligman, 2002),
partially through the advent of positive psychology. In particular, meaning is now viewed as
an essential contributor to overall wellbeing that is separate from, but positively correlated
with, other facets of wellbeing (Chamberlain & Zika, 1992; King, et al., 2006; Locke & Latham,
2002; Seligman, 2002). For example, social activists high in moral excellence report high levels
of meaning stemming from their work (Colby & Damon, 1992). In keeping with this
conceptualization, McGregor and Little (1989), in a factor analysis of wellbeing measures,
found that meaning and happiness are distinct constructs. For example, having children may
decrease happiness among parents, but contributes very significantly to their levels of meaning
(Baumeister, 1992). Nussbaum (2007) also presented the case of the misanthropic Northern Irish
politician David Trimble (who shared the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize) as an example illustrating
the possibility of having a meaning-rich life that is not necessarily filled with positive emotion.
In spite of the recent resurgence of interest in the construct of meaning, there are few
instruments to measure it. Steger, Frazier, Oishi, and Kaler’s (2006) Meaning in Life
Questionnaire measures both the subjective presence of meaning and the subjective search for
meaning. Respondents are asked to rate ten statements on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., ‚My life
has a clear sense of purpose;‛ ‚I am searching for meaning in my life‛). In addition, measures
of spirituality and/or religious faith (e.g., Seidlitz et al., 2002; Worthington et al., 2003) may tap
into the construct of meaning in life as they connect individuals with higher purposes.
2.5 Life satisfaction

Perhaps the most widely used type of measures to assess wellbeing are measures of life
satisfaction, in which participants are asked to answer the question ‚How satisfied are you
with your life?‛ This type of question is different from asking individuals how they are
‚feeling‛ because it tries to appeal to more reflective and evaluative aspects in considering
one’s life. Shin and Johnson (1978) defined life satisfaction as ‚a global assessment of a person’s
quality of life according to his chosen criteria‛ (p. 478). Life satisfaction judgments therefore
depend on the standards individuals have set for themselves. Individuals with similar objective
circumstances may judge their lives to be more or less satisfying, a problem that has led many
to advocate for the use of more objective measures of wellbeing.
Life satisfaction questions have been included in many large-scale international surveys,
but often use only one question in order to assess citizens’ wellbeing. This is for example the
case of the Household Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA; Watson,
2005), the British Household Panel Study (BHPS; University of Essex, 2008), and the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP; German Institute for Economic Research, 2008), among
other surveys. One-item measures are problematic, as any response to a question contains some
amount of error. By using multiple items, the size of this error can be reduced and the
measurement made more reliable. In order to address this problem, the National Accounts of
Well-Being (Michaelson, et al., 2009) include four items pertaining to life satisfaction. In
addition, Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin developed the Satisfaction with Life Scale
(SWLS; 1985), a self-report questionnaire that asks respondents to rate five statements
concerning their present satisfaction with life (e.g., ‚So far, I have gotten the important things I
want in life‛) on a 7-point scale. Another version of the SWLS, the Temporal Satisfaction with
Life Scale (Pavot, Diener, & Suh, 1998), assesses respondents’ past, present, and future life
satisfaction by asking them to rate 15 statements.
The use of life satisfaction measures as a surrogate for wellbeing has been criticized on
various grounds (for a review, see Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). Paralleling critiques of positive
emotion, some researchers have criticized measures of life satisfaction because respondents
may often use how good they feel at the moment they are asked as the basis for the judgment
they are making. Measures of life satisfaction may therefore be contaminated by mood
(Schwarz & Strack, 1999). In addition, the order and context in which questions are presented
may have important effects on results. For example, in a study by Strack and colleagues (Strack,
Martin, & Schwarz, 1988), the relation between the number of dates a student had in the past
month and his or her life satisfaction was significant only when the dating question was asked
before the life satisfaction question, indicating a priming effect.
These and other similar results (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) suggest that answers to life
satisfaction questions may be constructed by respondents based on different pieces of
information, including immediate context (Schwarz & Strack, 1999), as well as conventional
indicators of one’s achievements, such as income (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, &
Stone, 2006). In response to these findings, some researchers have sought to determine under
which conditions life satisfaction may be affected by mood and other contextual effects. Pavot
and Diener (1993) for instance found that the contamination of life satisfaction judgments by
mood occurs mostly for single-item measures, but not for multiple-item instruments such as the
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS).
Another criticism of life satisfaction measures is that they may be biased by respondents’
social desirability (Carstensen & Cone, 1983). Social desirability however probably constitutes a
personality characteristic that enhances wellbeing. Research by Diener and colleagues has
shown that important information is lost when social desirability is removed from life
satisfaction measures (Diener, Sandvik, Pavot, & Gallagher, 1991). There is therefore danger in
changing the construct of interest by controlling for personality-type characteristics.
Perhaps the biggest problem with life satisfaction measures is that this construct has too
often been equated to overall wellbeing, leading researchers to ignore other facets. As noted by
Michaelson and colleagues, ‚it is all very well knowing that someone is satisfied with their life,
but the interesting question is why‛ (2009, p. 56). The only way to answer this question is to
look at other facets of wellbeing as well.
Other researchers have also advocated for the use of both life satisfaction and emotion
information to assess overall subjective wellbeing. These researchers argued that a more
complete assessment of an individual’s life incorporates both life satisfaction along with
momentary feelings (Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2006). Such evaluative accounts incorporate
both our hedonic experiences (momentary emotions) alongside our cognitive assessments of
how well life is going more generally. Since both of these elements are subjective, this kind of
account is termed subjective wellbeing (SWB), an umbrella term combining how we think plus
how we feel about our lives (Diener et al., 1999).
2.6 Relationships and social support

Social support—the belief that one is cared for, loved, esteemed and valued—has been
recognized as one of the most (if not the most) influential determinants of wellbeing for people
of all ages and cultures (Reis & Gable, 2003). Numerous measures of social support and
positive relationships have been developed as a result, and most large-scale surveys examining
wellbeing integrate questions on this topic. For instance, the World Health Organization 100
survey (WHOQOL-100; Bonomi, Patrick, Bushnell, & Martin, 2000) asks an array of questions
such as ‚How satisfied are you with the support you get from your friends?‛ and ‚Do you feel
happy about your relationships with your family members?‛ The Oxford Poverty and Human
Development Initiative’s Missing Dimensions of Poverty Relatedness module (Samman, 2007)
similarly asks participants to rate three statements pertaining to social support (e.g., ‚People in
my life care about me‛). The New Economics Foundation’s National Accounts of Well-Being
(Michaelson, et al., 2009) also has two sections related to social support: Supportive
Relationships (e.g., ‚Do you have anyone with whom you can discuss intimate and personal
matters‛) and Trust and Belonging (e.g., ‚To what extent do you feel like people in your area
help one another?‛).
An exhaustive review of all existing psychological measures of relationships and social
support is beyond the scope of this article (for reviews, see Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb,
2000; Gottlieb & Bergen, 2010; Orth-Gomér & Undén, 1987), although a few instruments are
worth mentioning to illustrate various approaches to measuring social support. Three measures
in particular have been used in a large number of studies and have been recommended by
other authors for their robust psychometric properties (Gottlieb & Bergen, 2010). First, the
ENRICHD Social Support Inventory (ESSI; Mitchell et al., 2003) is a 7-item measure assessing
the availability of a network member to provide emotional, informational, as well as practical
support. The ESSI was originally designed for use with a medical population (i.e., patients
recovering from myocardial infarction). Second, the Social Provisions Scale (SPS; Cutrona &
Russell, 1987) is a 24-item measure of perceived support divided into three assistance-related
(i.e., reassurance of worth, guidance, reliable alliance) and three non-assistance related (i.e.,
opportunity for nurturance, attachment, and social integration) functions. Finally, the
Inventory of Socially Supportive Behaviors (ISSB; Barrera, Sandler, & Ramsay, 1981) is a 40-
item measure of support that asks respondents to indicate how often they were at the receiving
end of socially supportive behaviors during the preceding month, using a 5-point Likert scale
(e.g., ‚Did some activity together to help you get your mind off things,‛ ‚Let you know that
you did something well‛). By asking about actual events (as opposed to perceived support), the
ISSB intends to be more objective, although some authors have argued that objective received
support may improve wellbeing only insofar as it contributes to perceived support (for a
review of the relationship between received and perceived support, see Haber, Cohen, Lucas, &
Baltes, 2007). The ISSB nevertheless illustrates the question of whether subjective measures
should be complemented with objective measures when possible, which we address in Section
3.
2.7 Accomplishment and competence

Accomplishment can be defined in terms of achievement, success, or mastery at the highest
level possible within a particular domain (Ericsson, 2002). In some domains such as sports,
business, or education, accomplishment is measured through agreed-upon standards, such as
competitions (e.g., gold medals at the Olympics), honors and awards (e.g., winning the Nobel
Peace Prize), scholastic achievement tests (e.g., performance on the SAT), or reaching a
particular level (e.g., president or CEO of an organization). At the individual level,
accomplishment can be defined in terms of reaching a desired state and progress toward
prestated goals (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schultz, 2010; Negru, 2008). Competence, a closely
related construct, has been defined as the sense of efficacy individuals have regarding their
internal and external environments (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008), and is one of the three basic
psychological needs posited by Deci and Ryan’s (2000) Self-Determination Theory (detailed in
Section 4).
As a result of the growing recognition of the human need for accomplishment (Seligman,
2011), some large-scale surveys of wellbeing have incorporated items tapping accomplishment
and competence. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s Missing
Dimensions of Poverty Competence module (Samman, 2007) asks participants to rate three
statements related to competence (e.g., ‚Most of the time I feel a sense of accomplishment from
what I do‛ and ‚I generally feel very capable‛). The New Economics Foundation’s National
Accounts of Well-Being (Michaelson, et al., 2009) also has two questions (‚Most days I feel a
sense of accomplishment from what I do‛ and ‚In my daily life I get very little chance to show
how capable I am‛). Finally, the Purpose in Life subscale of Ryff’s Psychological Well-Being
Scales (Ryff, 1989) includes items relevant to accomplishment and competence (e.g., ‚I enjoy
making plans for the future and working to make them a reality‛).
3. Objective measures of wellbeing

As a result of the large body of research that has accumulated on how to measure wellbeing
and in conjunction with the growing discontentment that surrounds the use of economic
growth as our main metric for progress, many researchers and policy-makers have called for
the development of national indicators of wellbeing that will achieve the conceptual and
methodological sophistication of national economic indicators. Several conceptual issues
described here underlie the enterprise of creating such indices. To assist researchers in
developing national indicators of wellbeing, Diener (2006) proposed guidelines for their
creation. He recommended that (1) the various facets of wellbeing be measured separately; (2)
instruments sensitive to fluctuation in wellbeing resulting from changes in circumstances be
utilized; (3) short-term and long-term changes in wellbeing be assessed separately; and (4)
instruments measuring wellbeing be psychometrically valid (that is, that they consistently
measure what they are supposed to be measuring). Diener also pointed out that current
instruments, although comparatively imperfect, can still provide information to policy-makers
that standard economic indicators cannot offer.
3.1 Objective theories of wellbeing

Several ‚objective-lists‛ or ‚needing‛ accounts have been advocated over the last sixty years
(Ranis, Stewart, & Samman, 2006). These accounts propose that wellbeing should be measured
using lists of objective indicators, and the crucial issue is how to choose which indicators
should be included. In a review of the literature, Alkire (2002) noted 39 different attempts at
defining what makes a ‘good’ or ‘flourishing’ life between 1938 and 2000. While a detailed
review of this literature will not be attempted here, Ranis and colleagues (2006) summarized
several accounts worth mentioning, each of which adopts a different conceptual approach and
justification.
First, Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach, perhaps the best-known needs-based
account of wellbeing in the social sciences, posited a framework that focuses on the extent to
which individuals can function successfully with the goods that they have at hand. In setting
up this framework, Sen distinguished between ‘functionings’ and ‘capability’ (Sen, 1999).
‘Functionings’ (the core notion in his account) refer to the various activities that an individual
may value doing, while that individual’s ‘capability’ consists of ‚the alternative combinations
of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve‛ (p. 75). One’s capability is therefore a form
of freedom, as it affords the opportunity to achieve multiple combinations of functionings.
Related to Sen’s theory, Nussbaum (2000) spelled out a substantive list of ten capabilities (life,
bodily health and integrity, senses/imagination/thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation,
living in relation with other species, play, and control over one’s environment) which, while
non-exhaustive, are non-negotiable in their equal worth, as they are together constitutive of
what it means to achieve ‚truly human functioning‛ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 71).
Second, Rawls (1971/1999) identified a set of primary goods that ‚are in general necessary
for the framing and execution of a rational plan of life‛ (p. 359): rights, liberties, opportunities,
income and wealth, as well as the social bases of self-respect. Rawls identified these goods
through a process of deliberative rationality, defined as ‚a careful consideration of the relevant
facts and after a careful consideration of the consequences‛ (p. 380). Finnis and colleagues
(Finnis, 1980; Finnis, Boyle, & Grisez, 1987) used an approach similar to Rawls’ to define a list
of goods (i.e., life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability and friendship, practical
reasonableness, and religion). Unlike Rawls’ approach, which sees primary goods as necessary
requirements for the good life, Finnis described his goods as constitutive elements of a
flourishing existence, such that wellbeing is defined in terms of these goods.
Third, Doyal and Gough’s (1991) Basic Needs Approach is founded on the negative principle
of ‚do no harm,‛ where harm is defined as factors that prevent individuals from realizing
activities central to their life plan. Doyal and Gough suggested that health and autonomy
constitute the most basic needs for individuals of all cultures, and proposed the following
second-order needs in order to achieve health and autonomy: nutritional food and clean water,
adequate housing, a safe work environment, health care, security in childhood, close
relationships, physical security, economic security, education, as well as safe birth control and
childbearing.
Among other approaches worth mentioning is Narayan-Parker’s (2000) Voices of the Poor
analysis, which lists needs identified by the poor. These needs have been collected through
focus groups with individuals in the developing world. Finally, Camfield’s (2005) Economic
and Social Research Council Research Group of Well-Being in Developing Countries attempts
to collect information on how individuals perceive wellbeing in four separate nations.
The need-based theories described here catalogue the objective list of goods required for
‘wellbeing,’ or a ‘happy’ life. Dolan and colleagues (2006) argued that objective list accounts do
not provide a formal theory of wellbeing; rather, they offer a list of attributes and
characteristics which are taken to constitute wellbeing. The contents of the lists vary but tend to
include items such as economic resources, political freedom, good health, and the ability to
read. Needing accounts may therefore not provide complete theories of wellbeing, but they
suggest what the essential means for increasing wellbeing might be.
Dolan and colleagues (2006) also argued that the presence or absence of certain objective
attributes may lead to more subjective satisfaction for individuals, but the value of these
objective attributes should be independent of these consequent effects. Therefore, the judgment
about the contribution of various needs (e.g., education, health, etc.) towards wellbeing does
not come from the individual, but draws on theoretical and intuitive accounts of what societies
value. Thus, this approach holds that ‚certain things are good or bad for beings, independently
in at least some cases of whether they are desired or whether they give rise to pleasurable
experiences‛ (Chappell & Crisp, 1998, p. 553).
While some of these objective standards may be confirmed using a subjective perspective
(i.e., do individuals report that an objective condition has increased or decreased their
wellbeing?), their validity for wellbeing should be determined externally. This approach was
grand-fathered by Aristotle’s flourishing account of wellbeing. Aristotle proposed a
perfectionist version of wellbeing, in which the wellbeing of an individual is judged by

considering how close they are to reaching the potential of humankind. Aristotle’s term for this,
‚eudaimonia,‛ has been translated into various terms, including ‚flourishing,‛ ‚happiness,‛ or
‚wellbeing.‛ To help human beings flourish (i.e., realize their potential) is the Aristotelian
justification for the items on the objective list.
3.2 Objective social indicators

Many scientists in fields other than psychology have conceptualized wellbeing as a set of
objective conditions. Starting in the 1960s, social scientists began to think about the objective
standards by which people’s quality of life, other than economic growth, can be evaluated, as
such standards ‚assess where we stand and are going with respect to our values and goals‛
(Bauer, 1966, p.1, as cited by Land, 1996). Social indicators therefore attempt to track and
evaluate objective aspects of citizens’ wellbeing in target societies (Diener, Lucas, Schimmack,
& Helliwell, 2009; Gasper, 2010) and provide guidance on how to improve. These social
indicators are often also referred to as quality-of-life indicators or key national indicators (Diener et
al., 2009). The working assumption behind social indicators is that a comprehensive set of
indicators can be identified that captures an objective conception of wellbeing (Dolan & White,
2007).
One example of an indicator set is the list of Key National Indicators proposed by the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO, 2003), which comprises ten indicators in each
of eight different domains. Examples of domains assessed include social indicators related to
the community (e.g., rates of volunteering or homelessness), education (e.g., percentage of
adults having completed postsecondary education), health (e.g., life expectancy, physical
activity), and social support (e.g., percentage of elderly individuals living alone and in
poverty).
Another well-known set of social indicators used to measure wellbeing is the Human
Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP,
2010). The HDI is based on Amartya Sen’s (1999) theoretical work on important capabilities
required for an individual to achieve optimal functioning. In its most recent version (UNDP,
2010), the HDI operationalizes wellbeing using three main dimensions: longevity and health
(i.e., life expectancy at birth), access to knowledge (i.e., mean years of schooling and expected
years of schooling) and a decent standard of living (i.e., Gross National Income per capita,
adjusted for purchasing power). A national version of the HDI has also been created for the
United States (Lewis & Burd-Sharps, 2010).
3.3 Concerns about objective wellbeing measures

Wellbeing researchers have identified a number of concerns about using objective indicators as
sole measures of wellbeing (Diener, Lucas, Schimmack, & Helliwell, 2009). First, it is not
intuitively obvious which items should be included in a finite set of domains that contribute to,
or constitute, wellbeing. It is not clear whether domains included on existing lists are
necessarily important for overall wellbeing. Diener et al. (2009) noted the example of number of
hobbies, included in the Living Conditions Index of the Netherlands (Boelhouwer & Stoop,
1999), speculating that many people engage in a variety of meaningful activities that they do
not call hobbies. Conversely, important items that should reasonably be included on any
exhaustive list may end up being omitted. For example, child mortality may be included on a
list whereas care for the elderly may not.
Second, it is questionable how to best operationalize objective domains of flourishing. We

may be interested in measuring engagement with culture, but does that entail giving equal
status to attendance at the opera and at professional wrestling matches? Who should decide
which activities are included? Such subjective decision-making may compromise the ostensibly
objective nature of the indicators. Moreover, Gasper (2004, 2010) noted that objective measures
of wellbeing such as social indicators are necessarily rooted in values, highlighting the fact that
any list of indicators reflects to some degree the values of the list’s compilers, as well as the
values of the communities under assessment. As Phillips (2006, as cited by Gasper, 2010)
suggested, we might be better off calling these supposedly objective measures ‚collectively
subjective measures‛ (p. 33). As a result, Diener (1995) proposed a values-based approach for
identifying social indicators that are prized within particular societies, so that progress in
valued domains can be accurately tracked (Diener et al., 2009). According to Diener, using
values as the basis for inclusion of particular indicators may help solve the problem that
indicators have tended to be selected in a rather unsystematic manner. In keeping with this
approach, Diener developed new measures of quality of life (the Basic and Advanced Quality
of Life indices) based on the universal values previously described by Schwartz (1992).
Third, the accuracy of objective measures needs to be considered. One argument that is
frequently deployed in favor of objective measures of wellbeing is that they can be clearly
observed and empirically verified (Diener et al., 2009). While this should be true in principle,
the objective data that is frequently cited may not always be accurate. For example, variations
in cultural norms about the appropriateness of suicide may lead to the underreporting of
suicide-related deaths (Diener et al., 2009; Rockett & Thomas, 1999). Additionally, the specific
meaning of objective indicators may vary across nations and cultures. For example, ten years of
schooling in one country may not mean the same or be comparable as ten years in another
country. More broadly, the needs of a particular target individual may not always match the
standards and criteria of an observer (Smith et al., 2001). Such differences limit the value of
cross-national comparisons. Diener and colleagues (2009) also noted that similar scores on a
specific indicator could reflect different levels of wellbeing. For example, a strong police force
in an area may reflect either high drug use, or a well-functioning government, or an
overbearing commitment to law and order.
A fourth issue involves identifying the optimal levels of specific indicators (for example,
should additional resources be allocated to increase life expectancy, even if it means prolonging
the lives of people in extremely poor health?) and the sensitivity of such indicators across the
range of measurement units, given that useful indicators should reveal movement when
societal progress has been made (Diener et al., 2009). One problem with measures such as the
Human Development Index (which measures longevity, education and income) is that all the
industrialized nations cluster relatively closely together with little real difference between
them. Even if these countries do not differ on longevity, education and income, they may
however still differ significantly on other important indicators.
A final issue involves the integration of these indicators and the appropriate weights to be
used. Which of the indicators should be weighted more heavily? Who decides which ones are
more important? How does one weigh education against health care? Such issues are
unavoidable, and have not to date been resolved satisfactorily (Diener et al., 2009).
3.4 Combining objective and subjective wellbeing measures

While objective approaches share a common general goal with subjective approaches – a richer
understanding of what it means to live well – Comim (2005), writing specifically of the links
between the subjective and objective approaches (in particular, the capabilities approach),
noted that the ‚seemingly obvious overlap in their object of research does not seem to be
accompanied by any considerable acknowledgement of the vast work that has been produced
in the two fields‛ (p. 162). With regards to similarities between objective and subjective
measurement of wellbeing, Comin (2005) identified a number of prominent similarities
between the objective capabilities approach and subjective accounts.
First, both accounts have a similar core objective – an investigation of wellbeing and how
people evaluate their lives. Diener (2000), Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2006, 2000) made similar
claims, and the two approaches can be seen as constituting distinctive informational spaces
within the study of wellbeing. Second, both approaches rely (directly or indirectly) on
individuals’ own evaluation of their own wellbeing. While this is fundamentally constitutive of
the subjective approach, Sen (1999, 2004) emphasized the importance of public deliberation in
discussing the relevant capabilities or objective needs, while Nussbaum’s later work (2000,
2006) emphasized the value of pluralism and consensus in how her capabilities are understood.
Third, both approaches distinguish between means and ends, and give priority to a direct
assessment of ends. While this is a hallmark of the capabilities approach, Diener and Seligman
(2004) also made the Aristotelian claim that ‚money *<+ is a means to an end, and that end is
well-being.‛ As a result, they concluded ‚After all, if economic and other policies are important
because they will in the end increase well-being, why not assess well-being directly?‛ (p. 2).
Fourth, both the objective and subjective approaches attack and offer themselves as
alternatives to simple resource-based and preference-based accounts of wellbeing. Fifth, both
the objective and subjective approaches value democratic participation. Sen (1999) saw this as a
valuable end in itself, while subjective wellbeing researchers place more emphasis on its
instrumental effect on wellbeing. Sixth, both approaches emphasize the importance of
autonomy and self-determination. Nussbaum (2006) noted that the capabilities approach
‚stresses the animal and material underpinnings of human freedom, and it also recognizes a
wider range of types of beings who can be free‛ (p. 88). For Sen (1999), having positive
freedoms is constitutive of development. Subjective wellbeing researchers (and positive
psychologists in general) have stressed the importance of autonomy and control. As Ryan and
Deci (2006) noted: ‚Autonomy is a salient issue across development, life concerns, and cultures,
and is of central importance for personality functioning and wellness‛ (p. 1580).
Seventh, both approaches consider the role of emotions in assessing wellbeing. Positive and
negative emotions are constitutive of the subjective approach (Diener, 2006; Diener, Oishi, &
Lucas, 2003), while Nussbaum (2000, 2001) has argued that emotions play an important role in
shaping individuals’ choices. Eighth, both advocate for methodological pluralism. Diener
(2006) for instance has argued for measuring multiple aspects of subjective wellbeing. Similarly,
a hallmark of a number of objective approaches is their focus on multiple informational spaces.
Ninth, both approaches recognize the dangers of adaptive preferences, which could potentially
bias individuals’ evaluation of their own wellbeing. Nussbaum (1997) characterizes adaptation
as ‚a phenomenon in which an individual shapes her preferences to accord with the (frequently
narrow) set of opportunities she actually has‛ (p. 218). Capability advocates have used this
argument as evidence against the subjective wellbeing approach, and Diener (2000; 2003) has
acknowledged that self-report measures of wellbeing can be tainted by this problem. As a
result, Diener and colleagues (2003) advocated for the development of other, more accurate
measures to measure mood states.
One obvious issue in attempting to reconcile these approaches is that subjective approaches
focus on mental states, while objective indicators of wellbeing do not. In fact, many positive
psychologists have acknowledged that subjective reports of wellbeing are susceptible to

adaptive preferences, and that ‚we probably need to take into account more objective bases for
judging the attainment of the good life *such as Nussbaum and Sen’s work+‛ (Peterson, 2006, p.
312).1
Individuals’ subjective preferences may, however, not necessarily contradict objective
conceptions of wellbeing. Sen (1993) argued that this would be the case as long as positional
parameters (that is, individual characteristics of a person and his position in the world that
impacts his observations) that affect individuals’ cognitions are accounted for, so that particular
types of ‚special mental tendencies‛ (p. 137) can be excluded. Similarly, Nussbaum (2000)
advocated for what she calls an ‚intelligently normative proceduralism‛ (p. 159), in which
preferences are evaluated with a view towards discarding those that are mistaken or
illegitimate. She later noted: ‚Convergence between the best informed desire approach and the
capabilities approach should give us confidence that we are on the right track‛ (Nussbaum,
2006, p. 81).
Rawls (1971/1999; 2001) similarly explained that happiness has two aspects: the successful
execution of a rational life plan, and that individual’s state of mind. Happiness can therefore be
defined either objectively or subjectively. Objectively, happiness involves ‚a certain
achievement in action and a rational assurance about the outcome,‛ whereas subjectively it
involves the belief that the plan is being successfully executed (p. 481). For Rawls, a complete
life plan includes multiple ends, as well as due considerations of rights and justice (p. 482), and
‚happiness is an inclusive end, meaning that the plan itself, the realization of which makes one
happy, includes and orders a plurality of aims, whatever they are‛ (p. 484-485). Whereas
Rawls’ account of the good life is strongly normative, his claim that happiness entails a
plurality of aims appeals to both subjective and objective accounts (Comim, 2005).
4. Psychological theories of wellbeing

Some researchers (e.g., Layard, 2005; Veenhoven, 2004) have argued that the improvement of
single constructs such as happiness or life satisfaction can be a valuable end for governments to
pursue, and that it can in some instances be justified as the ultimate end of public policy. We
note however that while subjective measures can provide important information that can
inform policy decisions, they are not meant to override other sources of information, such as
objective measures of wellbeing and standard economic indicators. We therefore recognize the
value of multiple informational spaces in assessing wellbeing, an insight that is shared by a
number of theoretical approaches in psychology outlined below. As an exhaustive description
of existing theories of wellbeing is beyond the scope of this review, we focus on a subset of
approaches that aptly explain how particular combinations of wellbeing facets can guide our
understanding and measurement of wellbeing as a whole, and ultimately, interventions to
increase it.
4.1 The psychological wellbeing tradition

The Psychological Wellbeing Tradition (PWB; Ryff, 1989, 1995; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff &
Singer, 1998, 2002) arose as a complementary approach to the subjective wellbeing (SWB)
perspective. While the SWB perspective does not specify a single conception of wellbeing—
preferring instead to leave such matters to the individual—the PWB perspective adopts a more
1However, individuals do not completely adapt their preferences in response to certain life events, such as
disabilities (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004).
theory-guided approach to wellbeing, arguing that focusing solely on affect and life satisfaction
neglects important aspects of positive psychological functioning (Ryff, 1989).
Ryff’s (1989) definition of psychological wellbeing combines insight from three domains of
psychological theory: personal growth models, life-span development perspectives, and
positive mental health. First, personal growth models include Jung’s (1933) notion of
individuation, Allport’s (1961) conception of maturity, Rogers’ (1962) theory of the fully-
functioning individual, as well as Maslow’s (1968) notion of self-actualization. Second, life-span
development perspectives include Bühler’s (1935) basic life tendencies towards life-fulfillment,
Erikson’s (1959) psychosocial stage model, and Neugarten’s (1968, 1973) perspectives on
personality change in adulthood and old age. Finally, Jahoda’s (1958) positive mental health
model provided a detailed description of what constitutes psychological health, which is
characterized by efficient self-perception, realistic self-esteem and acceptance, control over
behavior, accurate perception of the world, sustained relationships, and self-direction.
Ryff’s resulting PWB perspective was intended to provide a parsimonious and empirically
robust conception of wellbeing derived from the theoretical perspectives noted above. This
conception contains six dimensions: (1) self-acceptance, manifested by holding positive attitudes
towards oneself and one’s past life; (2) positive relations with others that are warm and trusting;
(3) autonomy, which is reflected by qualities such as self-determination, independence, self-
regulation of behavior, and an internal locus of evaluation; (4) environmental mastery, defined as
the ability to choose and/or create environments suitable to one’s psychic condition; (5) purpose
in life, or having beliefs that give the individual the feeling that there is purpose in and meaning
to life; and (6) personal growth, manifested as developing one’s potential, as well as growing and
expanding as a person. These six dimensions can be assessed using the Psychological Well-
Being Scales (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). The PWB account differs from the SWB account primarily in
its focus on eudaimonic facets of wellbeing and its omission of hedonic components such as
positive emotion. According to the PWB perspective, human flourishing is characterized by
‚doing and living well‛ rather than ‚feeling good.‛
A large body of research has examined the psychosocial, socio-demographic and biological
correlates of PWB. For example, Helson and Srivastava (2001) utilized the domains of personal
growth (PG) and environmental mastery (EM) to identify three configurations of positive
human development: Achievers (high on PG and EM), Conservers (high on EM, low on PG),
and Seekers (high on PG, low on EM). Other research programs have focused on the relation
between PWB and psychological constructs such as personality traits (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus,
2003), coping strategies (Kling, Seltzer, & Ryff, 1997), personal goals (Riediger & Freund, 2004)
and self-enhancing cognitions (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). Ryff and
Singer (1996) also found significant age differences in profiles of positive functioning in cross-
sectional studies. Specifically, environmental mastery and autonomy showed incremental
patterns from young adulthood to midlife, whereas personal growth and purpose in life
presented a decremental pattern from midlife to old age. Positive relations and self-acceptance,
on the other hand, did not show significant changes across the lifespan. In addition, Ryff and
Singer (1998) have used the PWB account as the basis of a research program assessing the
physiological substrates of the dimensions of wellbeing. According to Ryff and Singer, this
approach constitutes the greatest hope for understanding the biology of what they term positive
human health, as well as the processes that sustain resilience in the face of illness and disease.
Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) argued that while PWB and SWB dimensions are related
to each other, they remain empirically distinct. Specifically, they found that in a sample drawn
for the national Midlife in the U.S. (MIDUS) survey, the best fitting model was one that posited
SWB and PWB as two correlated latent constructs. This view ties in with lay conceptions of
happiness (which is part of SWB) and meaning (which is part of PWB) as separate components
of the good life (King & Napa, 1998). Keyes and colleagues (2002) also found that the
probability of achieving high levels of both SWB and PWB increased as age, education,
extraversion, and conscientiousness increased and as neuroticism decreased. When compared
with adults who had higher levels of SWB than PWB, adults with higher levels of PWB were
younger, had more education, and showed more openness to experience.
4.2 Need satisfaction and self-determination theory

While the ideals described above define wellbeing from a PWB perspective, Ryan and Deci’s
(2000) Self Determination Theory (SDT) defines three psychological needs that are principal
predictors of wellbeing: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The need for autonomy refers
to a feeling of choice and volition in the regulation of behavior. The need for relatedness refers
to the importance of feeling cared for and closely connected to others. The need for competence
refers to the sense of efficacy individuals hold with regards to internal and external
environments (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008). These needs have been shown to be cross-culturally
valued (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim & Kasser, 2001) and relate to measures of subjective wellbeing
(Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996).
SDT has its origins in Deci and Ryan’s (1980) work on intrinsic motivation – the pursuit of an
activity for its own sake, interest, and rewards. Intrinsic motivation is contrasted with extrinsic
motivation, which refers to the pursuit of activities for instrumental ends. Deci and Ryan (1985)
described the process through which extrinsic goals come to be assimilated and
accommodated, or internalized. By examining the determinants and consequences of pursuing
various goals, they established directions between aspirations based on their content. Kasser
and Ryan (1996) for instance found that life goals could be differentiated into those relating to
intrinsic aspirations (including growth, affiliation, community contributions, and health) and
those relating to extrinsic aspirations (wealth, fame, image, etc.). Their study built on earlier
research showing that individuals who had strong aspirations for financial success had lower
levels of wellbeing, compared to individuals who had strong aspirations for relationship
growth and community (Kasser & Ryan, 1993). These findings led Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser and
Deci (1996) to posit that the key difference between intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations is their
ability to fulfill basic psychological needs.
One distinctive claim made by self-determination theorists is that these three basic
psychological needs are related to intrinsic values that are an essential part of human nature.
(They are careful however to point out that this short list is not exhaustive). These three needs
are nonetheless essential for the development of intrinsic aspirations and psychological
wellbeing (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). Moreover, SDT hypothesizes that attaining intrinsic goals will
lead to the satisfaction of these psychological needs. Cultivating, pursuing, and reaching such
goals therefore constitutes a privileged path to increase wellbeing. According to SDT, the
satisfaction of the basic psychological needs of autonomy, relatedness, and competence
therefore mediates the relation between intrinsic goal attainment and wellbeing (Ryan, Huta, &
Deci, 2008).
In addition to examining the content and nature of individuals’ goals, self-determination
theorists have stressed the importance of understanding the reasons why individuals pursue
important goals (Ryan & Deci, 2000). A sub-theory of SDT, organismic integration theory (OIT;
Deci & Ryan, 1985) distinguished between intrinsic motivation (the most autonomous form of
regulation, as described above), amotivation (the state of lacking the intention to act) and
different forms of extrinsic motivation, which differ in the extent to which regulation is
autonomous. On this account, the most heteronomous form of regulation is external regulation.
An example of such regulation would be an individual acting to avoid pain or gain a reward. A
second form of external motivation is introjected regulation. This involves accepting a motivation
but not completely seeing it as one’s own. In other words, one may retain an externally
perceived locus of causality, although the motivation may be internally driven. In this form of
regulation, behavior is performed for the purpose of avoiding guilt or anxiety, or to attain
feelings of pride or self-esteem. A third and significantly more self-determined form of extrinsic
motivation is identified motivation, which involves the conscious and explicit valuing of a
behavioral goal or regulation, leading to that goal being seen as personally important. The
fourth and most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is integrated motivation, where
identified regulations are fully assimilated and brought to congruence with an individual’s
other values.
The relative autonomy of goals (including extrinsic goals) appears to have effects that are
independent of the content of the goal on wellbeing (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004). For
example, Ryan and Connell (1989) found that, in a sample of schoolchildren, identified
regulation was related to higher levels of interest and enjoyment, greater levels of effort, and
more positive coping styles, than less autonomous forms of regulation. Subsequent studies
have linked autonomous forms of motivation to a range of good outcomes including increased
levels of physical activity, political activity, behavioural effectiveness, volitional persistence,
and subjective well-being, and greater assimilation within a social group (Chatzisarantis,
Biddle, & Meek, 1997; Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996; Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997;
Williams, Rodin, Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci, 1998). The OIT sub-theory also proposes that the basic
psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness are important for the nurturing
of internalization and integration. For example, with regards to the role of relatedness, Ryan,
Stiller, and Lynch (1994) found that children who were securely connected to and cared for by
their teachers and parents had more fully internalized the regulation for positive school-related
behaviors. Thus, these needs are believed to play an important role in the successful regulation
and integration of behavior, and thwarting these needs may be psychologically harmful.
4.3 Well-being Theory and the dashboard approach to measurement

According to Seligman (2011), the notion of ‘happiness’ is an unwieldy construct that hides the
true multifaceted nature of human flourishing. Happiness may constitute the overarching goal
of positive psychology, but it does not play any part in a valid and useful theory of human
wellbeing. In the first version of his theory, Seligman (2002) claimed that ‘happiness’ was
composed of three subjective facets: positive emotion, engagement, and meaning. Happiness
was therefore achievable by pursuing one or more of these facets. As a result, individuals low
in one aspect could still be ‘happy’ if they nurtured other components. Individuals low in
positive emotions could, for instance, flourish by being highly engaged in their lives, or by
cultivating a rich sense of meaning.
Seligman (2011) recently revised his original theory by adding two facets to his original
account: positive relationships and accomplishment. In addition, Seligman redefined the
endpoint of his theory as ‚well-being‛ rather than ‚happiness‛ in order to stress the
multifaceted nature of human flourishing, and to prevent the usual confusion that is often
made between ‘happiness’ and ‘cheerfulness.’ Seligman’s new theory therefore posits that
wellbeing consists of the nurturing of one or more of the five following elements: Positive
emotion, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning, and Accomplishment (abbreviated as the
acronym PERMA). These five elements are the best approximation of what humans pursue for
their own sake, which is why they have a place in Well-being Theory. Although individuals may
sometimes pursue these elements for other ends (e.g., they may for instance think that
accomplishment will bring positive emotion), many choose to do so because these elements are
intrinsically motivating by themselves.
Seligman’s theory also reconciles differing perspectives on the theory and measurement of
wellbeing by including both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of wellbeing, and by allowing for
(and encouraging) the measurement of each element using both objective and subjective
approaches. Such measures are currently being developed. In addition, measurements of
PERMA need to examine how the various facets of wellbeing need to be weighted if
researchers or policy-makers want to be able to come up with a single summary measure.
The issue of how to integrate various measures of wellbeing facets into an overall
composite index of wellbeing is an engaging one for researchers. An examination of this
question however leads us to propose that such an index may not be as useful as it seems, in
spite of its intuitive appeal. Why do we want one number to summarize the wellbeing of an
individual, a family, or community, or a nation? Perhaps it is because a single number satisfies
our craving for simple findings and conclusions, in spite of the complexity of the phenomena
being studied. Being able to say that one country has the highest level of wellbeing in the world
does make for an appealing headline, but it also provides a poor description of the nature of
this country’s flourishing. Just as we do not have a single indicator telling us how our car is
performing (instead, we have an odometer, a speedometer, a gas gauge, etc.), we suggest that
we do not want just one indicator of how well people are doing. We want to be able to look at a
‘dashboard’ of measures and indicators that can help us understand our strengths, as well as
the particular areas in which we may not be fulfilling our potential for flourishing.
Thus, we recommend that future measures of wellbeing present their results in a way that
takes advantage of the variety of constructs that are measured. This approach can further be
enhanced through visualization tools, making such a measure intuitively understandable.
Rather than making decisions based on averages on a single measure, functioning across
multiple domains can be charted. Research studies can empirically examine what types of
profiles lead to different outcomes. Decision makers can visually examine different profiles and
determine what areas are doing well and what areas should be targeted, based on cultural
values, thus allowing for cultural variation informed by universal measures. Such efforts are
already underway, as seen in the New Economics Foundation National Accounts of Well-Being
(Michaelson et al., 2009), which used data from the European Social Survey’s Personal and
Social Well-Being Module (Huppert et al., 2006). The module was administered to around
43,000 adults (above 16 years old) in twenty-three countries of the European Union. Wellbeing
was decomposed into nine components (positive feelings, absence of negative feelings, life
satisfaction, vitality, resilience and self-esteem, positive functioning, supportive relationships,
as well as trust and belonging), and the researchers then visually represented the performance
of various European countries on these facets of wellbeing using multi-axis plots (spiderweb
plots), thus presenting the data in all of its richness. The module included both how people feel
and how they function, thus drawing upon both the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives on
wellbeing. Following collection of the data, Huppert and So (2009) derived an empirical
definition of flourishing by looking at the percentage of respondents of the United Kingdom
who endorsed the three core facets of wellbeing (positive emotion, engagement, meaning) as
well as any three additional facets (any combination of self-esteem, resilience, positive
relationships, and optimism). There were widely varying rates of flourishing throughout
Europe, with the highest rate found in Denmark (33%) and northern Europe in general, and the
lowest rates found in Russia (6%), and Eastern Europe in general. Aside from between-nations
differences, higher flourishing was associated with higher education levels, higher income,
general health, and being married. Flourishing was found to decline with age, although not
linearly so. Indeed, people over sixty-five years of age in certain countries (for instance, Ireland)
show the highest rates of flourishing, whereas middle-aged people showed the lowest rates. In
addition, flourishing correlated with life satisfaction only modestly (r = .32), providing support
to the notion that measures of life satisfaction (a unitary construct) are not adequate to assess
wellbeing (a multifaceted construct).
5. Conclusions and future directions

The present review summarized the state of research on the measurement of wellbeing, as well
as the theories that underlie differing approaches to measurement. Section 2 reviewed the ways
in which scientists have operationalized wellbeing, namely in terms of happiness, positive
emotion, engagement, meaning/purpose, life satisfaction, relationships/social support, and
accomplishment/competence. Section 3 discussed theories and indices attempting to objectively
assess wellbeing, highlighting the question of accuracy and both the advantages and challenges
presented by the possibility of combining both subjective and objective measures of wellbeing.
Section 4 presented the main theories of wellbeing, which propose different ways to combine
facets of wellbeing in order to best capture human flourishing.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this review is that numerous advances have
already been made in the measurement of wellbeing, and scientists are well on their way to
constructing useful measures that are solidly grounded in theory. Among these advances is the
work of Huppert and colleagues (Huppert et al., 2008; Huppert and So, 2009; Michaelson et al.,
2009), who proposed a promising approach to measure various facets of wellbeing, as well as to
present data in a way that allows for a nuanced understanding of the complex nature of
wellbeing. According to this group of researchers, wellbeing can be defined as a ‚dynamic
process that gives people a sense of how their lives are going through the interaction between
their circumstances, activities, and psychological resources‛ (Michaelson et al., 2009, p. 3). The
work of Lyubomirsky and colleagues (Luybomirsky, 2008; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade,
2005) suggests that intentional activities (i.e., active efforts by individuals) account for 40% of
the variance in wellbeing in developed countries, approximately four times as much as external
circumstances do. These findings support conceptualizing wellbeing as an active process.
Another promising avenue of research for scientists who are interested in the measurement
of wellbeing involves the harnessing of new technologies. Information found on the internet,
including websites fostering communication and personal expression (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
etc.) constitute goldmines of information on citizens’ subjective feelings, and the years ahead
will probably see a surge of scientific research on how to best exploit these data.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from this review is that future research on the
measurement of wellbeing should strive to capture the multifaceted and dynamic nature of
wellbeing. We suggest that future assessments should combine both objective and subjective
measures of wellbeing, in order to provide the full picture of human flourishing. Subjective
measures appear to be indispensable insofar as the presence of objective conditions of
wellbeing may not always be accompanied with subjective feelings of wellbeing (as pointed out
by the high rates of Major Depressive Disorders in developed countries). Yet subjective
measures are insufficient; objective measures provide essential additional information by
conveying the circumstances in which individuals live and develop. Furthermore, the question
of whether wellbeing should be conceptualized and measured as a subjective or objective

phenomenon should be solved by thinking about the following question outlined by Layard
(2010): what is progress; how do we want our societies to improve; and what life do we
envision for our citizens? The answer is clear: we want citizens to have both decent objective
standards of living and feel subjectively satisfied with their lives. Researchers should therefore
concentrate their efforts on the methods needed to collect and combine both objective and
subjective data, rather than striving to establish the superiority of one type of data over the
other.
We propose that a useful way to convey information on a wide array of subjective and
objective indicators is to adopt a ‘dashboard approach’ to measurement. This approach does
not attempt to reduce wellbeing to one number, but instead encourages researchers to find
ways to present information on a variety of objective and subjective facets of wellbeing in an
appealing and useful manner. Using such an approach will help educate both the public and
policy-makers about what wellbeing really is, and about the multiple ways in which it can be
cultivated.
It is an exciting time to be conducting research on the measurement of wellbeing. Advances
made in the field over the past decades have brought about both a better understanding of
what wellbeing is, and how it can be nurtured. As Robert Kennedy pointed out, we must
continue to strive to measure ‚that which makes life worthwhile‛ (Kennedy, 1968, para. 22),
and thus provide crucial information for policy-makers interested in fostering the welfare of
citizens. Following Stiglitz’s advice, scientists can help governments ‚do the right thing‛ by
assisting them in measuring the right thing.
Acknowledgements
Funding for this project was generously provided by Eva Kedar, Ph.D.
Authors
Marie J. C. Forgeard
Eranda Jayawickreme
University of Pennsylvania & Wake Forest University
Margaret L. Kern
Martin E. P. Seligman
[email protected]
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Doing The Right Thing: Measuring Wellbeing For Public Policy

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Forgeard, M. J. C., Jayawickreme, E., Kern, M. & Seligman, M. E. P. (2011).

Doing the right thing:

Doing the right thing:

Keywords: well-being, wellbeing, public policy, measurement, wellbeing theory

resulting increase in focus of national accounts on economic production, to the detriment of

2. Subjective measures of wellbeing

2.2 Positive emotion

2.4 Meaning and purpose

2.5 Life satisfaction

2.6 Relationships and social support

2.7 Accomplishment and competence

3. Objective measures of wellbeing

3.1 Objective theories of wellbeing

perfectionist version of wellbeing, in which the wellbeing of an individual is judged by

3.2 Objective social indicators

3.3 Concerns about objective wellbeing measures

Second, it is questionable how to best operationalize objective domains of flourishing. We

3.4 Combining objective and subjective wellbeing measures

psychologists have acknowledged that subjective reports of wellbeing are susceptible to

4. Psychological theories of wellbeing

4.1 The psychological wellbeing tradition

4.2 Need satisfaction and self-determination theory

4.3 Well-being Theory and the dashboard approach to measurement

5. Conclusions and future directions

of whether wellbeing should be conceptualized and measured as a subjective or objective

Baumeister, R. (1992). Meanings in life. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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