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Republic v. Jacob
Facts:
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 739, “Establishing as Reservation for the Purpose of the
Exploration, Development, Exploitation and Utilization of Geothermal Energy, Natural Gas and
Methane Gas a Parcel of Land in the Province of Albay, Island of Luzon, Philippines.” The subject
property is covered by said proclamation. Socorro Jacob filed an application for the confirmation and
registration of her alleged title over subject lot. The Republic through OSG opposed the application,
contending that the claim of ownership on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed
of Jacob who failed to file an appropriate application for registration within period of 6 months as
required by PD 892. Also, that the parcel applied for is a portion of the public domain not subject to
private appropriation.
Jacob said that the previous owner of said lot was Sotero Bondal who sold the property to
Macario Monjardin, brother of Jacob’s mother, Josefa. Since Macario was residing in Manila and was
unable to cultivate the property, he asked Josefa to be his encargado. By then, Jacob accompanied
her mother in supervising the planting and harvesting of palay and the improvement of the lot. In 1946,
Macario sold the property and executed a deed of sale in favor of Spouses Igmedio and Josefa Patricio
for P400. Sps. Patricio failed to declare the property for taxation purposes under their names. In 1947,
Josefa died intestate and was survived by Igmedio and Jacob. In 1968, Igmedio died intestate and was
survived by Jacob who executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Adjudication where she declared that as
a sole heir of Sps. Patricio, she was the sole owner of the property. The property was declared for
taxation purposes under her name and paid realty taxes over it. However, during cross-examination,
Jacob admitted that she had no copy of the deed of sale executed by Bondal in favor of Monjardin.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Jacob, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacob has constructive possession over the subject property.
Ruling:
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. Unless,
therefore, the law adds the word “occupation”, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words “continuous”, “exclusive”, and “notorious”, the
word “occupation” seems to highlight the facts that for an applicant to qualify, her possession of the
property must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own property. The applicant is
burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim over the land. While tax
receipts and tax payment receipts themselves do not convincingly prove title to land, there are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession. In this case, however, Jacob failed
to offer in evidence the deed of sale purportedly executed by Bondal in favor of Jacob’s uncle,
Monjardin. Unless and until Jacob offered credible evidence that Monjardin had purchased the property
from Bondal, it cannot be said that the Sps. Patricio acquired the rights and interests of Bondal over
the property through Monjardin. Thus, it cannot be said that the parents of Jacob had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and actual possession of said property.

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Sarmiento v. Lesaca
FACTS: Respondent bought from petitioner two parcels of land; after the sale, respondent tried to take
actual physical possession of the lands but was prevented from doing so by one Martin Deloso who
claims to be the owner thereof; respondent wrote petitioner asking the latter either to change the lands
sold with another of the same kind and class or to return the purchase price together with the expenses
she had incurred in the execution of the sale, plus 6 per cent interest; and that since petitioner did not
agree to this proposition, respondent filed the present action for rescission.

The petitioner argued that execution of the deed of sale in a public document is equivalent to delivery
of possession of the lands.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was able to convey actual possession to the respondent. NO

RATIO: When a contract of sale is executed, the vendor is bound to deliver to the vendee the
thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and possession of the subject-matter of the
contract. However, if the sale is executed by means of a public instrument, the mere execution
of the instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred
from such instrument.

It can be clearly seen from their stipulations that the petitioner intended to place the respondent in
actual possession of the lands immediately as can be inferred from the stipulation of the contract that
the respondent "takes actual possession thereof . . . with full rights to dispose, enjoy and make
use thereof in such manner and form as would be most advantageous to herself." The
possession referred to in the contract evidently refers to actual possession and not merely
symbolical inferable from the mere execution of the document.

Respondent was never able to take possession of the lands due to the insistent refusal of
Martin Deloso to surrender them claiming ownership thereof. And although it is postulated that
the execution of a public document is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds true
when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of
the vendor into those of the vendee.

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Malabanan v. Republic
Facts:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Malabanan presented evidence, a Certification issued by CENTRO-DENR verifying that the land is
A&D. Aristedes Velazco also testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the... manner and for
the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
Ruling:

Malabanan and petitioners cannot avail registration under Section 14(1) of PRD because no
substantive evidence shows that they have been in have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation since June 12 1945 or earlier (superseding the July 14, 1894 of
Sec 48(b)). The earliest Tax Declaration was only dated 1948.

Also, Malabanan and petitioners cannot avail registration under Section 14(2) because even
the property was declared as A&D, no evidence shows that it is no longer for public use, public service
or development of national wealth. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

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Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the manager of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
requested Fructuoso Peñaflor, an assistant cashier, to conduct a bundle count of the cash inside the
vault which should contain a total of P4M. When counted, they discovered a shortage of P150,000. A
total of 4 investigations were initiated by the bank and they all came up with one conclusion: that there
was a shortage of P150,000 and that the person responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, Cristeta
Chua-Burce.
Burce was then terminated from service for being unable to explain the shortage. To recover the
amount, the Bank filed a civil case of Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and
Garnishment against Burce and her husband (Antonio Burce). An Information for Estafa was filed
against Burce as well.
Burce insists that there can be no presumption of misappropriation when there were other
persons who had access to the cash in the vault. On the other hand, the OSG contends that the
petitioner is guilty because (1) she was the cash custodian who was directly responsible and
accountable for the cash-in-vault, (2) the others who had access to the vault never used the duplicate
keys, as shown by the envelopes of such keys which were still sealed and that (3) alterations on the
cash-in-vault summary sheet were done by Burce to cover the shortage.
ISSUE: Is Burce guilty of estafa through conversion or misappropriation [Art. 315 (1)(b), RPC]?
RULING:
No, Burce is not guilty of such crime and must be acquitted. The elements of estafa through conversion
or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any
other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it
or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.

The first element is absent. When the money. goods, or any other personal property is received
by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the
offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case, Burce was a mere cash custodian who
was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. She had no juridical possession over the missing funds.
Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees. In sum, her possession was the possession of the bank.
Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, she cannot be convicted of the crime
of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

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Po Lam v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Lim Kok Chiong sold Lots No. 1557 and 1558 to Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company. However,
Felix Lim, brother of Lim Kok Chiong, filed a complaint with the CFI against his brother and LAHCO to
annul the deeds of sale covering said lots for the sale included 3/12 pro-indiviso portion of the lots which
Felix had inherited from his foster parents. Felix filed a notice of lis pendens over the two lots with the
Register of Deeds. The trial court rendered a decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of
the lots. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. Felix appealed to CA and
during the pendency of appeal in CA- GR No. 44770-R, LAHCO sold the lots to spouses Po Lam.
Certificates of titles were replaced by TCT No. 8102 and 13711 in the name of Spouses Lam. CA
declared Felix Lim could exercise right of redemption over the two lots sold by Kok Chiong to LAHCO.

This case was remanded back to trial court for execution. However, all the motions filed by Felix
such as issuance of writ of execution of CA's resolution and a deed conveyance were denied by the
trial court on the ground that the Spouses Lam were not impleaded as a party litigants in CA- GR No.
44770-R. Felix was given by the RTC the right to institute an action whether or not the acquisition of
the properties in question by spouses Lam were made in good faith or bad faith. Felix filed a complaint
of reconveyance and annulment of sales and titles of the lots with the RTC and also filed a motion to
include the spouses Lam as defendants. Both motions were denied.

One month after the Spouses Lam purchased 2 lots from LAHCO, they leased the commercial
building erected in Lot 1557 to Jose Lee. After the contract expired, Jose Lee continued to pay for the
same but stopped paying rentals informing the spouses that he would deposit the same in court since
Felix had promised to sell the property to him. Spouses Lam filed an unlawful detainer case with the
MTC against Lee. Lee became private respondent on this case as he substituted Felix.

MTC declared spouses Lam to be the lawful owners of Lot. 1557. This was affirmed by the RTC
and CA. Lee filed an appeal in SC. The appellate court declared the decision issued by CA in CA-GR
No. 44770-R null and void because it had become final and executory and ruled that Lim's counsel
should not have filed an MR for the same is a prohibited pleading but this was debunked by SC stating
that it was deemed properly filed.

In the reconveyance case and annulment of sale and titles filed by Felix, the RTC declared the
spouses Lam as transferee pendente lite and not purchaser in good faith and that the spouses are
bound in the decision of CA GR No. 44770-R. This was affirmed by CA as well as by the SC. Spouses
Lam filed an MR alleging that it was error to hold them as purchasers in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Lam are purchasers in good faith

Ruling:

In the case at bar, when the petitioners bought the lot from LAHCO while a notice of lis pendens
was annotated, there was also an existing court order cancelling the same. Hence, spouses Lam cannot
be considered as being aware of the flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing since the
alleged flaw which was the notice of lis pendens was already being ordered cancelled at the time of the
purchased. On this ground alone petitioners can already be considered buyers in good faith.

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SC held that it is erroneous to hold the Spouses Lam are bound by the results of the litigation
and would consider the doctrine of lis pendens as one of implied or constructive notice. While the
doctrine of lis pendens is frequently spoken of as one of implied/ constructive notice, the doctrine is not
founded on any idea of constructive notice, since its true foundation rest on the principles of public
policy and necessity. And since the doctrine of lis pendens rests on public policy, not notice, upon the
cancellation of lis pendens, the Po Lam spouses cannot be considered as having constructive notice
of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make them transferees pendente lite or purchasers in bad
faith. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the cancellations of notices of lis pendens despite its
subsequent cancellation. Therefore, with the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens, the effects of
such notice were terminated, resulting in the Po Lam spouses being not bound thereby.

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Heirs of Cabal v Spouses Cabal

Facts:
Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a 4,234 sqm parcel of land. In August 1954, Marcelo died,
survived by his wife Higinia and his children: Marcelino, Daniel, Cecilio, Natividad, Juan, Margarita,
Lorenzo, Lauro, and Anacleto. In 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino,
to build his house on a portion of Lot G. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon and built his house.
Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves into undivided equal shares and
Certificate of Title was issued in their names. In 1976, the heirs subdivided Lot G into Lot G-1 in favor
of Marcelino and Lot G-2 in favor of other heirs. Lot G-2 was further subdivided and the remaining
portion, the Lot 1, was registered under the names of Higinia, Margarita, Natividad, Lorenzo, Daniel,
Oscar, Cecilio, Carmelita, and Anacleto as co-owners. Lot 1 was subdivided among the co-owners. In
the same deed, Lorenzo bought the shares of Higinia, Margarita, Daniel, and Natividad.
A survey was conducted and the subdivision plan revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied
the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E and not the adjacent lot designated as Lot G-1. So, the Spouses
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal confronted Marcelino which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and
swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, it did not materialize. The
Spouses Cabal filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with damages against Marcelino.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcelino’s possession is in good faith.
Ruling:
It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the
part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief,
the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.
An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest
belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
In the present case, Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief
that Lot G-1 is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is no
evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’
property when he continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected in 1976.
Moreover, the fact in 1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 subject of TCT No. 22656 is not an
indication of bad faith since there is no concrete evidence that he was aware at that time that the
property covered by the title and the one he was occupying were not the same. There is also no
evidence that he introduced improvements on Lot G-1. In fact, the agreement on March 1, 1989 to a
resurvey and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstructing the land titles is substantial proof of
Marcelino’s good faith, sincerity of purpose and lack of intention to hold on to two lots.

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Negrete v. Court of First Instance of Marinduque

Facts: Petitioner Ignacia Negrete filed on January 18, 1967 an action for recovery of ownership of
property against Respondent Igmedio Maderazo alleging that she is the owner of a piece of land of
about nine (9) hectares situated in barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque.

Respondent averred that he bought on August 30, 1954 the northern portion of about 3,5700 square
meters from Tito Oriendo and interposes as special defenses, that the action had been barred by the
statute of limitation for petitioner filed this present action over ten (10) years after he purchased the
property. On October 17, 1968, respondent Igmedio Maderazo died and was substituted on January 4,
1969 by his legal representative, Catalino Maderazo

The sale between respondent and Tito Oriendo is evidenced by a deed of sale, executed and signed
by Tito Oriendo as vendor and respondent Igmedio Maderazo as vendee, notarized on August 30,
1954)

Petitioner argues that the deed of sale in favor of respont clearly describes the land as the "southern
Half (1/2) portion containing approximately 3,700 square meters . . . situated in Barrio Puyog,
Boac, Marinduque," and that this parcel is about 3 kilometers from the poblacion of Boac, while the
parcel of land in question is situated in sitio Puting Buhangin, municipality of Mogpog, far from
the parcel of land sold to Igmedio Maderazo. Respondent could not therefore assert good faith in
possessing the disputed lot; consequently, adverse possession of ten (10) years would not suffice.

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of respondent saying that “the respondent (and his father who
bought the land in 1954) has been in possession of the land since 1954 and therefore even if there was
a flaw in their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription,
having possessed the land in good faith within a period of ten (10) years. There is good faith because
the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale.”

Issue: WON the deed of sale could be considered as a valid basis for good faith and as a just title to
justify the by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only 10 years. NO

Ratio: Ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights thru adverse possession
of ten (10) years, requires possession "in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law".

A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary acquisitive
prescription of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely
possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of the deceased Igmedio Maderazo covers
a parcel of land patently different from the disputed land owned by petitioner as to area, location
and boundary owners.

The disputed parcel contains an area of about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in sitio Puting
Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. It is patent that the land sold by Tito Oriendo to the late Igmedio
Maderazo is distinct from the land of petitioner Ignacia Negrete as to location, boundaries and
area. The land of petitioner is about nine (9) hectares and located in sitio Puting Buhangin,
Mogpog. The lot of respondent is only about 3,700 square meters and situated in barrio
Puyog, Boac (as described in the deed of sale). The two parcels have different boundary owners.
Hence, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo, along with his late father Igmedio Maderazo, could

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not claim good faith in occupying said land of plaintiff-appellant on the basis of the said instrument of
sale.

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NATY BALTAZAR, ET AL. vs. SILVINA CARIDAD, ET AL

G.R. No. L-23509. June 23, 1966

Facts:
The case involves Lot No. 8864 of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) cadastre under the Original
Certificate of Title No. O- 1445 of spouses Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia (conjugal partnership
property). When Julio Baltazar died, his surviving wife filed a motion for writ of possession against
respondents Silvina Caridad and her daughter, Eduarda Caridad, who had been in possession of the
southern portion Lot No. 8864 since 1939.
On January 2, 1962, the order having become final, the sheriff enforced the writ and placed
petitioners in possession of the southern portion of the lot. Baltazar then presented a motion to remove
their respective houses and, in the event of their failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish the
same. But then Caridad again opposed said motion and insists that they as builders in good faith of the
houses in question be accorded with rights under Article 448 of the new Civil Code.

Issue: W/N respondents are builders in good faith of the houses in question, and, as such, be accorded
with rights under Article 448 of the new Civil Code

Ruling:
Caridad cannot be regarded as builders in good faith because they are bound by the 1941
decree of registration that obligated their parents and predecessors-in interest.

Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title
despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in 1959, Caridad demolished and replaced their old house
with new and bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise the rights of
the registered owner to enjoy full possession of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated
by an unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one
from time to time.

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Heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas v CA and Maguesun Mgt. & Dev’t Corp.

Facts

Trinidad sought to set aside a decree of registration of two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay
City granted to Maguesun which was granted. The titles of the lands were awarded to Trinidad and her
heirs (Roxas heirs). The Meycauayan Central Realty Corp. (Meycauyan) filed a Petition for Intervention
alleging that it purchased in good faith from Maguesun three parcels of land which form part of the
property awarded to Trinidad and her heirs and thus must be afforded the opportunity to be heard.

The Court denied the Petition for Intervention. Meycauayan then filed a complaint for reconveyance,
damages and quieting of title against Trinidad and the Roxas heirs which was almost an exact
reproduction of their petition for intervention. The court dismissed Meycauayan’s complaint because it
is now res judicata and because Meycauayan is guilty of forum shopping.

The Roxas heirs then filed a petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan alleging
(1) that they defied the decision of the court and (2) that its act of filing pleadings were aimed to prevent
the execution of the said decision. On the other hand, Meycauayan alleges that the decision may be
enforced against Maguesun but not against Meycauayan which is a stranger to the case. Meycauayan
insists that its rights as a purchaser in good faith and for value cannot be prejudiced by the alleged
fraudulent acquisition by Maguesun of the property.

Issue: WON Meycauayan’s act of filing a complaint for reconveyance, etc. constitutes indirect contempt
(sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civ Pro)?

Ruling: Yes

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity. In this case, Meycauayan’s persistent attempts to raise issues already resolved by
the court constitute defiance of the court’s authority which impedes the speedy administration of justice.
The court already ruled that Maguesun committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
of the properties. This decision binds Meycauayan under the principle of “privity of interest”.

Furthermore, the Roxas family has been in possession of the property through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez who resided in the property. Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than
the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the
rights of the actual purchaser. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man on guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title.

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Victor Benin, et. al., v. Mariano Severo Tuason y Dela Paz and JM Tuason & Co. Inc.
Juan Alcantara, et. al., v. Mariano Severo Tuason y Dela Paz and JM Tuason & Co. Inc.
Diego Pili, et. al., v. Mariano Severo Tuason y Dela Paz and JM Tuason & Co. Inc.

Facts:
There are 3 sets of cases filed for the same allegation. Petitioners alleged that they were the
owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands located in the barrio of La Loma (now
barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of
approximately 278,928 square meters. They claimed that they inherited the from their ancestors. While
they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., with the aid of
armed men, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing,
demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of petitioner’s lessees, as well as the
improvements consisting of rice paddies. They also claimed that they did not know about the
registration of the land done by Tuason.
J.M Tuason and Co. Inc., denied all allegations and claimed that they are a buyer of good faith.
And they have published there registration in the Official Gazette
Court of Land Registration approved the Registration of JM Tuason Co. Lower Court declared
that the Registration is Null and Void. The petitioners are the lawful owner of the land. Court of Appeals
favors JM Tuason Co.
Issue: WON the registration of Tuason of the land without notifying the petitioners constitute Fraud.
Ruling:
The mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings
that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons does not constitute in itself a case
of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate
as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership
of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the Tuason’s
predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that existed
against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate
and legal encumbrances saved by law . In addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners
procured the non-appearance of Tuason at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one
year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such
decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more."

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Suobiron v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Four days after the American forces liberated Panay Island, the CFI was reorganized. Pursuant
to Act 3110, the clerk of court submitted a report stating that all courts record were destroyed or burned
as a result of the battle for liberation. The court issued an order directing the reconstitution of the
records. This was published in 2 leading newspaper in Iloilo City once a week for 6 months. Luis
Adelantar filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the LRC Case No. 673. The oppositors din
not appear when the motion was heard. On the same day, CFI gave due course to the motion for
reconstitution. The CFI issued decreed covering the property in litigation after which decrees were
issued by the LRC. On the basis of the decrees OCT 69237 and 69238 were issued in the name of the
spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.

During the war, Quintin And Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property and appropriated the
produce which led the filing for recovery of possession by the Adelantars with the CFI where CFI
declared the Adelantar spouses owners of the property and to deliver to them the possession as well
as the produce received by teh Lorezos. After the delivery, Quintin, Basilia, Bernabe and Fortunato
Lorezo re-entered the premises. The property soon became the subject of a cadastral survey. Fortunata
Ponce, filed an answer claiming ownership. Spouses Suobiron also filed an answer claiming ownership
of portions they purchased from Quintin, from Basilia and Isabel Lorezo and from Canuto Lucero.

Fortunata and other private respondents as heirs of Luis Adelantar filed an action for quiteing of
title and recovery of possession before the CFI. The complaint was dismissed. Petitioners Spouses
Suoborin, Jose Sullano and Ireneo Ferraris sought annulment of the certificate of titles of the Adelantars
but their action was dismissed. Thus petitioners filed their complaint alleging co-ownership of the
property. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered the petitioners to vacate the property and
deliver the possession to the private respondents and this was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: whether the provisions of act 3110 have been complied with

Ruling:

SC affirmed the decision of the CA. In the case at bar, the requirements of the law for the
reconstitution of a court were fulfilled. The clerk of court, soon after the liberation, sent a notice to the
presiding judge of the CFI informing him the destruction of all court records in the province. The judge
issued an order for their reconstitution which was published in 2 newspapers of general circulation in
the Province and City of Iloilo. The Adelantars spouses might have failed to submit in the reconstitution
proceedings an authentic copy or respondent court's resolution on 23 March 1943 as what they
submitted instead was the order dated 10 June 1944 of the CFI in LRC Case directing compliance with
and execution of the resolution. SC found that this is another instance of substantial compliance with
Act 3110, regarding presentation by the interested parties of all copies of motion, decrees, orders and
other documents in their possession relative to the record or record to be reconstituted.

The decision in Civil Case declaring Adelantar spouses owners of 2 parcels of land claimed by
Basilio and Isabel Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their
successors-in-interest, under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court held petitioners liable to to
private respondents for the net produce of the properties in question from the time the former's

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possession in good faith was legally interrupted when they were served summons in connection with
private respondents' complaint for recovery of possession with damages being filed on 22 July 1970.

It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith and had since
then occupied the same but such bona fide character of possession ceased when they were
served summons. Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the
case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not aware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully, conformable with art. 528 of the civil code.

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Maneclang v Baun
Facts:
Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and
9 children: Hector, Cesar, Oscar, Amanda, Adelaida, Linda, Linsa, Priscila, Natividad, and Teresita. No
guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children. Hector filed a petition for the
settlement of the estate of his mother. Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No.
203 of the Cadastral Survey containing an area of 7,401 sqm. Pedro, the administrator of the intestate
estate of Margarita, filed a petition asking the court to give him the authority to dispose of so much of
the estate that is necessary to meet the debt enumerated in the petition. While notice was given to the
surviving spouse, Severo, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
The intestate court issued an order authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell the
properties. Pursuant to said order, Oscar, the new administrator, executed a deed of sale in favor of
the City of Dagupan a portion consisting of 4,515 sqm in consideration of P11,687.50, approved by the
intestate court on March 15, 1954. The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and
constructed thereon a public market at a cost of P100,000 more or less. It has been in continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of the market. However, on Sept. 28,
1965, Adelaida, the new judicial administratrix of said estate, file with the CFI an action for the
annulment of the sales made by Oscar, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession, and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not there is interruption of good faith on the part of City of Dagupan as a purchaser
for value.
Ruling:
Under Art. 526 of Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or
difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. The Court find no circumstance in this case to
have alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the authority of the judicial
administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. However, Art. 528 of the Civil Code provides
that: “Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully.” The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for
cessation of good faith. The City of Dagupan’s possession in good faith must have lasted up to the date
of service of summons. Under Art. 544, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before
the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, City of Dagupan must not be ordered to pay rentals from its
possession in good faith up to the filing of the complaint.

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Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses leased parcels of land on which they operated a gasoline station. One was
from respondent Edilberto de Mesa, while the other lot from respondent Gonzalo Daleon and his brother
Federico A. Daleon. When the lease expired, the petitionerss obtained a new lease from respondent
Edilberto de Mesa. As regards the lot of the Daleon brothers, the petitioners were not granted renewal.
Instead, they received demand letters from ordering them to vacate the premises. Petitioner spouses
simply ignored the demand and continued operating the gas station.

Moreover, their lease contract with respondent Edilberto de Mesa was not renewed when it expired
again. Nonetheless, the petitioners continued to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on
the lot of respondent de Mesa despite the latter's demand to vacate. Respondents Edilberto de Mesa
and Gonzalo Daleon caused the closure of the latter's gasoline station by constructing fences around
it.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents.
Invoking their status as owners of the withheld premises, the respondents admitted in their respective
answers having caused the fencing of the plaintiffs' gasoline station thereat but reasoned out that they
did so on account of the plaintiffs' refusal to vacate the same despite demands.

The lower court ruled in favor of respondents. Later, with leave of court, the petitioners amended their
complaint to allege, among others, that the complained acts of the respondents cost them damages.
Consequently, the lower court awarded damages to petitioners. Private respondents filed their
respective appeals before the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modification, the decision of the
trial court. Petitioners appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, contending the latter erred in the
amount of damages.

ISSUE: WON Respondents are liable for damages for fencing the lots leased by petitioners. YES

Ruling:
Article 536 of the Civil Code previously quoted explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one
who claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private respondents personally took it
upon themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the
law, they became liable "for all the necessary and natural consequences of [their] illegal act."

Similarly, we uphold the award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in order to deter similarly
minded individuals from pursuing the course of action taken by private respondents. The law on this
matter is clear: "(h)e who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession of a thing, so
long as the possessor refuses delivery, must request the assistance of the proper
authority." Petitioners' arbitrary conduct of fencing their properties under the claim that they own the
same brazenly violates the law and circumvents the proper procedure which should be obtained before
the court.

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Arambulo v Gungab
Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land with improvements located in Quezon City and covered by
TCT No. 48330 registered under the name of EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB (respondent).
Gungab’s counsel made a formal demand to her sister Victoria R. Arambulo and nephew Miguel
R. Arambulo III to vacate the lot but they refused. Following the unsuccessful amicable settlement in
Brgy., Gungab filed an ejectment complaint and alleges that:
(1) she owns the subject property;
(2) that she tolerated petitioners' occupancy of certain portions of the subject property without rent; and
(3) that despite her demands, they refused to vacate the subject property.
Arambulo’s denied the claimed of sole ownership by Gungab and alleged co-ownership. They
stated:
(1) that after Pedro Reyes, father of respondent Emerenciana and petitioner Victoria, died intestate in
1964, the property became part of the common properties of the Reyes clan;
(2) that during her lifetime, Anastacia Reyes, wife of Pedro, allowed her daughter, petitioner Victoria,
to use and occupy a certain portion of the subject property;
(3) that Victoria continuously used and occupied this portion for the last 20 years;
(4) that Anastacia also allowed her grandson, petitioner Miguel, to use another portion of the subject
property since 15 years ago; and
(5) that their "use and possession" of these portions of the subject property "had been with the
knowledge, consent and tolerance of all the other co-owners."
Issue: Whether or not Gungab can eject Arambulos
Ruling:
Gungab as registered owner is preferred to possess it. The age-old rule is that the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them is bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Notably, Anastacia
Reyes only allowed petitioners to use and occupy certain portions of the subject property. They
admitted their "use and possession" of these portions of the subject property "had been with the
knowledge, consent and tolerance of all the other co-owners." Consequently, after Gungab obtained
title to the subject property and withdrew her tolerance later on, Arambulos refusal to vacate it rendered
their possession thereof unlawful.
Since Arambulos occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, they are not entitled
to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. They are aware that their tolerated
possession may be terminated any time and they cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Thus,
Gungab may validly eject Arambulos.
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Barnachea v Court of Appeals

Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by Luis Santos. It was inherited by his daughter
Purificacion and was subsequently divided and transferred to Santiago Isidro and Procopio de Guzman.
Sps. Baranchea’s property was derived from Santiago’s while respondent Ignacio’s was from
Procopio’s.
Sps. Ignacio filed a complaint for ejectment against Sps. Barnachea. The properties in dispute
were the lots in Mr. Ignacio’s name which were adjacent to the property of the Sps. Barnachea. It was
alleged that the Sps. Ignacio allowed the Sps. Barnachea to occupy the property by tolerance and that
they demanded the latter to vacate but they refused.
Sps. Barnachea argued that the cause of action has prescribed. The last demand letter was
received on Aug. 31, 1998 but the complaint was filed only on April 5, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not the ejectment case filed by the Sps. Ignacio against the Barnacheas is an
unlawful detainer or forcible entry
Ruling: unlawful detainer
Possession of another by mere tolerance is not unlawful. Neither is it adverse and, therefore,
no matter how long continued, it cannot ripen to ownership by prescription or be barred by
laches.
In this case, the complaint shows that Sps. Ignacio allowed the Barancheas to occupy the
property by tolerance. The complete absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy or
stealth(FISS) in the complaint with respect to the Barancheas’ possession does not signify an illegality
in the entry nor an entry by FISS that would characterize the entry as forcible. It has been held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant in the
ejectment case shall be analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose terms have expired but whose
occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. Their action is that of an unlawful detainer.

Moreover, the ejectment suit was filed within the prescriptive period. TN that the prescription
started running from August 31, 1998 (the date of receipt of the demand letter to vacate). It ran for two
months until interrupted on Oct. 20, 1998 (the date of filing of the ejectment case by the Sps. Ignacio).
The complaint was dismissed on Dec. 8, 1999. Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive period ran again
for four months until another interruption intervened (the revival of the complaint). (2 + 4 = 6 months,
therefore within the 1 yr period)

Certiorari by Sps. Barnachea was dismissed.

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Llobrera v Fernandez
Facts:
Subject of the controversy is a 1,849 square-meter parcel of land. Fernandez is one of the
registered co-owners of the land, served a written demand letter upon Spouses Llobrera, et al., to
vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from notice. Llobera refused to vacate claiming that they
have been occupying the property for so long and that they have consent to one of the co-owner which
they are paying monthly rental. Fernandez file a formal complaint against them before the Barangay
Captain of Barangay 11, Dagupan City. Upon failure of the parties to reach any settlement, the
Barangay Captain issued the necessary certification to file action.
Fernandez then filed a Complaint for ejectment and damages against the petitioners before the
MTCC of Dagupan City. Llobrera claimed that the contract between them and the other co-owner was
burned by the fire. MTCC, RTC & CA In favor of Fernandez.
Issue: Whether or not the Llabore’s possesion of the property is founded on contract or not.
Ruling:
Petitioners failed to present any written memorandum of the alleged lease arrangements
between them and Gualberto De Venecia (Co-Owner). The receipts claimed to have been issued by
the owner were not presented on the excuse that fire burned the same. Simply put, there is a dearth of
evidence to substantiate the averred lessor-lessee relationship. A person who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him.

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