Heirs of Malabanan vs republic

FACTS:

On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan, petitioner, filed an application

for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-4
52-D, Silang Cadastre situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, which consist o
f 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property fro
m Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interes t had been in open
, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designa
ted the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan hi
mself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco test
ified that the property originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property own
ed by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons  Benedicto, Gregorio
, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inhe
rited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban an
d Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It
was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Ari
stedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also knew the property and I affirm
the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.  The Republic of the Philippines
likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, D
epartment of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that t
he subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land pe
r Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approv
ed as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. 
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment ifavor of Malabanan. The Republi
c interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, stating that Malabanan had faile
d to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of th
e public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in posse
ssion of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law f
or confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23 2 007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court noted that sin
ce the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alie
nable and disposable only on March 15 1982, the Velazcos  possession pri
or to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of posses
sion.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can apply for Land Registration pursuant to:
a. PD 1529 Sec. 14(1) in relation wi th the Public Land Act Se. 48 (B)
b. PD 1529 in relation w ith Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
RULING:
According to PD 1529 Sec. 14, the following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whethe
r personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of aliena
ble and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownersh
ip since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds b
y right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for b
y law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file a
n application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that
should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, t
he latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceeding
s.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trus
t.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the evidence of the Petitioner is insuffici
ent to establish that Malaban has acquired ownership over the subject property u
nder Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioner as hi
s predecessor-in-ienterest have been in possession of the property since June 12
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioner can date back their possession ac
cording to their own evidence is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail thems
elves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can Petitioner properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for the registrati
on. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that it is no longer intend ed for public use ser
vice or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 4
22 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable an
d disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusc
eptible to acquisition by prescription.
Case 1.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

 On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.

Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land;
 Three of said parcels, re situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon
Province.the fourth parcels is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and
province. As basis for the application, the applicant claimed title to the various properties
through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.
 The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was the
service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.

 In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the
Solicitor General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that
the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being
applied for.

 At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation
of the Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence,
an Order of General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except
for the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development

 There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the
right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated
as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the
Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
  In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands
vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the
time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and
Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Case 2.

National grains authority vs intermidate appellate court

On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of a parcel of
land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or less 105,710 square
meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico,
and Amelita Magcamit (herein private respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang
Mabiling Muli."

Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in question was issued to and in the
name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and on
April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez
authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.

the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering,
among others, the property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid
indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner

By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Laguna was issued in the name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that
private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued covering
the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner.
Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00
which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of
sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private
respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their
obligation under the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the
offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974
petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of the
property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.

After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 1984, reversing
and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of
transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the
names of plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and
Engracia Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3)
within thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No damages and
costs. (Rollo, p. 19).

Issue:

whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the
sellers, and private respondents, the buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its
issuance, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner
NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.

Ruling:

under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of
a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of
title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted
on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law.

It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided for
under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner herein.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, now
Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.

Case 3.

Republic v UmaliG.R. No. 80687, April 10, 1989PONENTE

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS

The land situated in Tanza, Cavite which consists of 78,865 square meters was originally purchased on
installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedlytransferred her
rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in1922. 2 Tomasa
and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971 these threeassignees
purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support theirclaim that
they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the said land on which they saidthey had
already made full payment. On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, infavor of the
said affiants. A complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985 when the registered owners of the
land, following several transfers, were Remedios Micla, Juan C. Pulido, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique
Naval.They asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud.
The plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on
January8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No.
V-10910(Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based.In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any
participation in the join affidavit and said theyhad all acquired the property in good faith and for value.
By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. For her
part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the government had no cause of action
against her because there was no allegation that

she had violated the plaintiff’s right, that the government was not the real party

-in-interest because thesubject land was already covered by the Torrens system, and that in any event
the action was barred by prescription or laches.

ISSUE

Whether or not the land under the new owners are obtained thru forgery and fraud and subject
toreturn the property to the State

HELD

We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint 13 filed by the petitionerthat
any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject
land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading.
Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and
renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change
despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: Every person
receiving a certificate oftitle in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takesa certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those notedon said certificate.The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stopforever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time ofregistration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, itwould seem that once the title was registered,
the owner might rest secure, without the necessity ofwaiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
"mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losinghis land.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered

Case 4.Benin vs tuazon

Benin v. Tuason,
Three civil cases
Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La
Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having
an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land
from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that
they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely,
and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that
Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894,
that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto
Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said
lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the
last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and
paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.

2nd case ivil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two
parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La
Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate
area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them
from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan
Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara;
that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in
interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay
and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894
plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by
the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed
and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last
World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said
lands and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them.

3rd plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located
in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area
of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their
ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his
predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from
time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili
and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly,
adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural
products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his lifetime, Candido
Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of
said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and
registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from
Manila and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their
houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.
 57 SCRA 531 (1974)
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court
may allow, or order an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the
amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act, the court may at anytime order
an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of
the application. The amendment may be made in
application or in the survey plan, or in both since the
application and survey plan go together.
If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the
application for registration an area or parcel of land
not previously included in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously
included in the original application, as published, a
new publication of the amended application must be
made. The purpose of the new publication is to give
notice to all persons concerned regarding the
amended application. Without a new publication, the
registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the area
covered by the original application, and the decision
of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as
the decision concerns the newly included land. The
reason is because without a new publication, the law
is infringed with respect to the publicity that is
required in registration proceedings, and third parties
who have not had the opportunity to present their
claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.
But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original application
and the original plan as previously published, a new
publication is not necessary. In the latter case, the
jurisdiction of the court is not affected by the failure of
a new application.

Case 5.

Sta. ana vs. menla

FACTS: On June 24, 1947, attorney for opposition Eulalio Menla filed a petition for
reconstitution, alleging that the court records of the above-entitled case were destroyed in or
about March, 1945. Notice for the hearing of the abovemotion was furnished the attorney for the
applicant Pascual Sta. Ana, who thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
reconstitution, on the following ground: that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. On November 21, 1957, the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the
records of the above-entitled case reconstituted upon (a) the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the trial; (b) the blue print plan, PSU 9624 and 96264 covering the land in question;
and (c) the decision of the court dated November 28, 1931.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio,
presiding, ordering the reconstitution of the records of the above-entitled case, and against
another order for the issuance of the decree of registration over the lands subject of this
proceeding, in the name of the oppositors Arcadio Narvades and Dominga Narvades. On June
24, 1947, attorney for oppositor Eulalio Menla filed a petition for reconstitution, alleging that the
court records of the above-entitled case were destroyed in or about March, 1945. Notice for the
hearing of the abovemotion was furnished the attorney for the applicant Pascual Sta. Ana, who
thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution, on the following ground: that
the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. On November 21, 1957, the court
denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the records of the above-entitled case reconstituted
upon (a) the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial; (b) the blue print plan, PSU
9624 and 96264 covering the land in question; and (c) the decision of the court dated November
28, 1931. A motion to reconsider the order for reconstitution was denied. On March 26, 1958,
counsel for the oppositors filed a motion, alleging that the applicant had abandoned his right to
the reimbursement of his expenses for registration and praying that a decree for the registration
of the land be issued in the name of the oppositors. Opposition to this petition was again filed by
attorney for the applicant, on the ground that as the decision in the case became final 30 days
after November 28, 1931, and the oppositors have slept on their rights, their cause of action is
barred by Statute of. Limitations. The lower court overruled the objection and on May 14, 1958,
it ordered issuance of the decree of registration of the parcels of land in the name of the
oppositors. A motion to reconsider the same having been denied, the applicant has prosecuted
this appeal. In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that as the decision in the
registration case was rendered on November 28, 1-931, it had become unenforceable 15 years
later, that is, at the time the petition for the reconstitution of the records was presented on June
24, 1947. The above contention is without merit. Act No. 3110, which governs the reconstitution
of lost or destroyed records, provides that records of judicial proceedings in the office of the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance may be reconstituted as soon as practicable, after
the occurrence of any fire or other public calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the
records of judicial proceedings. (Sec.

1, Act 3110). The loss occurred during the Liberation of this country in 1945, and the application
for the reconstitution was made on June 24, 1947. It is apparent that the petition for
reconstitution herein is not belated; it must have taken some time before the oppositors-
appellees, who asked for the reconstitution, came to know of the loss of the judicial records of
the registration case. Besides, in a resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1946, the period
for there constitution of judicial records was extended to June 30, 1947. (42 O.G. No. 10, p.
2446) In any case such reconstitution was also extended by the provisions of Republic Act No.
441 to June 7, 1951. The second assignment of error is as follows: THAT THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION
CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME
FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE. We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision
in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of
10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action,
upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. The third assignment of error is as
follows: THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON A
DECISION WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY CASE ON A
DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. We also find no
merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the
second assignment error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land. Registration Commission; failure
of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been
filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
For the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the applicant-appellant.

Case no. 6

ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC., Petitioner, v.

FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

Facts:
Regional Trial Courts now have exclusive jurisdiction, not only over applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, but
also over petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
It appears that the disputed "Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered into by and
between the parties on 30 September 1963 had already been rescinded so that there is
no more basis for the continued annotation of the notice of adverse claim on the
petitioner’s TCT No. 62203. Records show that the herein petitioner had filed an action
against the respondent for the rescission of said contract of purchase and sale on 1
August 1967 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case
no. 70298, and after trial, the said contract was ordered rescinded for reasons therein
stated. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 42467-R,
the judgment was affirmed. The respondent then appealed to this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. L-35008; again, its petition was denied on 15 May 1972, "for being factual
(insufficient showing that the findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence)
and for lack of merit." The judgment became final and executory on 14 August 1972.

Issues:
The issue raised is whether the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court,
acting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to cancel an adverse claim based on
a contract to sell or promise to sell which can no longer be enforced because of non-
payment of the agreed purchase price.

Ruling:
he resolution of the respondent Court, dated 17 August 1970, is hereby set aside. The
notice of adverse claim annotated on petitioner’s TCT No. 62203 by virtue of the
"Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered into by and between the parties on 30
September 1963 is hereby ordered cancelled. Without costs

Case no. 7

CASE DIGEST] REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES v. IAC (G.R. No.

L-67451)
September 28, 1987

Ponente: Cortes, J.

FACTS:

Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila are covered by three (3)
distinct sets of Torrens titles, one of which is TCT No. 20408 issued in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record
Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.

In 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No.
20408." The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived,
is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a court of
ordinary jurisdiction.

During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging that the case at bar is
closely connected with G.R. No. L-46953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray
Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving
as they do the same property. By Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for
consolidation.

RULING:

Whether or not the case at hand and G.R. No. L-46953 should be consolidated? - NO, they should not be
consolidated.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an
action to remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in
question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party
complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its own title.
Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title of the Civil Code and Rule
64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies of the Rules of Court.

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but
being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.
(McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between
the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]). The ruling in this case is therefore without any
prejudice to this Court's final determination of G.R. No. L-46953 – a case involving the validity of the
compromise agreement between the parties in this case.