117. YU V.

PACLEB

FACTS:

Respondent Baltazar and his late first wife are the registered owners
of a parcel of land known as the Langcaan Property (subject property). This
property became subject of 3 documents purporting to transfer its
ownership, all of which however, were unregistered. The first document was
a Deed of Sale allegedly between the respondent and Rebecca Del
Rosario. The second was a Deed of Sale between Del Rosario and Javier.
The third one was a Contract to Sell between Javier and petitioner spouses
Yu. The title of the property, however, despite the alleged transfers,
remained in the names of respondent and his wife.

On September of 1992, petitioners accepted Javier’s offer and gave P200k

as downpayment. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to
petitioners. At the time of the turn-over of the property however, petitioners
discovered that a portion of the lot was being occupied by Ramon Pacleb
(respondent’s son) and his wife as tenants. Petitioners claim that Ramon
surrendered possession of their portion to them and they later on appointed
Ramon as their trustee over the subject property.

Petitioners took possession of the property and caused the annotation on

the TCT of a decision rendered in their favor in a Civil Case (Action for specific
performance against Javier) Petitioners allege that they exercised ownership
rights and enjoyed open, public and peaceful possession over the property
from Sep 1992 to 1995, during which time, respondent was in the United
States.

When respondent returned to the Philippines, he allegedly entered the

property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
causing the ouster of petitioners and their trustee, Ramon. Despite repeated
demands, respondent refused to vacate the premises while continuing to
assert that he is the registered owner of the same. Hence, petitioners filed
an action for forcible entry.
MTC ruled that respondent should surrender possession of the property to
petitioners. Upon appeal to the CA however, the decision was reversed.
Hence, the petition.

Petitioners are claiming that the CA erred in finding that respondent had
prior physical possession of the subject property as it was him who was
possessing the same because respondent was in the United States during
said time.

ISSUE: Who has better right over the property?

RULING:

The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. To possess means to have, to actually and physically
occupy a thing, with or without right. Possession always includes the idea of
occupation. However, it is not necessary that the person in possession
should himself be the occupant for occupancy can be held by another
in his name. Without occupancy, there is no possession.

Elements of possession:
1. There must be occupancy, apprehension or taking
2. There must be intent to possess (animus possidendi)

In this case, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical
possession to justify a forcible entry case. In fact in the Civil Case cited by
petitioners as basis for their right to possess, it was held that “petitioners
were never placed in possession of the subject property”. Their claim that
the lot was turned over to them in 1992 is self-serving. On the other hand,
respondents were able to present tax declarations and receipts in their name
which bolstered their claim of possession for the payment of real estate tax
is one of the most pervasive indications showing the will of a person to
possess with claim of ownership. Not to mention the fact that despite the
alleged transfers, title of the land remained in the name of respondent.

Possession under the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession. In this case, Ramon, as respondent’s son was named
caretaker when respondent left for the US. Hence, the property was
in possession of respondent’s son during the contested period.

118. REPUBLIC V. JACOB

FACTS

On August of 1970, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 739

“Establishing as Reservation for the development of geothermal energy a
parcel of land in the Province of Albay. The subject lot was covered by the
said Proclamation. 24 years later, however, private respondent, a retired
public school teacher, filed an application with the RTC of Albay for the
confirmation and registration of her alleged title over said subject lot.
Naturally, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG opposed the
application claiming that the said land is part of the public domain by virtue
of the Proclamation, hence, not subject to private appropriation.

The Trial Court approved respondent’s application simply because the

Republic did not offer any evidence to support its opposition to the
application. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
petition.

The OSG claims that private respondent failed to prove her claim that the
original owner of the property (Bondal) sold the property to her uncle. Also,
private respondent admitted that she had no copy of the deed of sale. Even
assuming that the sale existed, still, private respondent still failed to prove
that her PII had exclusive, open and adverse occupation under a bona fide
claim of ownership over the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, up to
August 1970 when the property was declared as a reservation.

ISSUE
Whether private respondent can validly have the land titled under her name?

RULING
No. PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides that applicants for
confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following:
 1. That the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain
2. They have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier

Under the principle of Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Hence, occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

In this case, when private respondent filed her application in 1994, the
subject lot was no longer alienable and disposable property of the public
domain because it was declared part of the reservation for the development
of geothermal energy on August 1970. She was 24 years too late. She further
failed to present evidence to show that by August 14, 1970, she had already
acquired ownership over the property through OCENPO since 1945 or earlier.

The law speaks of "possession and occupation." Possession is broader than

occupation because it includes constructive possession. Unless, therefore,
the law adds the word "occupation," it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
"continuous," "exclusive" and "notorious," the word "occupation" seems to
highlight the facts that for an applicant to qualify, her possession of the
property must not be a mere fiction.

Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of

dominion of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over
her own property. A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by
the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership. Such possession is not exclusive and notorious as it
gives rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The applicant is
burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land.
 119. SARMIENTO V. LASACA

FACTS

On January of 1949, plaintiff bought from defendant 2 parcels of land. After

the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical possession of the lands but she
was prevented by Martin Deloso who claims to be the owner thereof. Hence,
she sent a letter to defendant asking him to either change the lands sold
with another of the same kind or return the purchase price together with the
expenses she incurred in the execution of the sale. Since defendant did not
agree to said proposition, plaintiff filed a complaint praying that the contract
of sale executed between her and defendant be rescinded, because
defendant failed to place her in the actual possession of the lands she
bought.

The court rendered judgment declaring the deed of sale rescinded. CA

affirmed said decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

Whether the execution of the deed of sale in a public document is equivalent

to delivery of possession of the lands sold, thus relieving defendant of the
obligation to place plaintiff in actual possession thereof?

RULING

NO. Art 1462 of the Civil Code provides that the thing sold shall be deemed
delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and possession thereof.
While the 2nd par provides that the execution of a public document is
equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds true when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing from the hands of the vendor to
the vendee. Hence, in order for such symbolic delivery to product the effect
of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have such control over the
thing sold that, its material delivery could have been moment at the moment
of the sale. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the public
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy
of the thing and make use of it himself because the same is opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality – the delivery has
not been effected.

The impediment in this case is the insistent refusal of Martin Deloso to

surrender the property, claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff is
entitled to have the contract rescinded. The right to rescission is deemed
implied in reciprocal obligations in case one party fails to comply with what
is incumbent upon him. The person prejudiced may either ask for specific
performance or rescission.

120. HEIRS OF MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC

1. Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration

(Cavite)
 He and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years
 The property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain – certification by the CENRO of the DENR as
proof

2. RTC granted the application

3. OSG appealed the judgment

 Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain
 RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title.
4. CA reversed the decision
 Cited the ruling in Republic v. Herbierto - period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession
 CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
 Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession

5. Malabanan’s contentions
 The ruling in Republic v. CA and Naguit is the controlling doctrine
- any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act. (CA 141 Public Land Act)
 What is important – during the application for land registration,
the land has already been classified as alienable and disposable

6. Republic’s contention - an applicant is entitled to registration only

when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable
and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUES:

1. Whether it is necessary that the land must first be classified

before applicant’s possession.

Answer: NO. The agricultural land subject of the application needs

only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land
is inalienable.

2. Whether Malabanan is qualified to register the subject

property under his name.

Answer: NO. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to

establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the
 Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -

possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree

Land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)

of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Requirements for application under Sec 14 (1) of the Property Registration

Decree:

1. The applicant has been in possession and occupation of the property

subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12,
1945, or earlier
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of
the public domain.

3. May a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be

deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition
by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
 Answer: In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.

Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.

Section 48 of CA 141

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied.
 121. CHUA-BURCE V. CA

FACTS

On August of 1985, Ramon (Manager of Metro Bank) requested Penaflor

(Assistant Cashier) to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the
vault which should total P4M more or less. They discovered a shortage of
P150k. Hence, the bank initiated 4 investigations. The first was by Ramon
(Manager), second was by the bank’s internal auditors, then the bank’s
Department of Internal Affairs. Thereafter, the NBI. All of these
investigations concluded that the person primarily responsible was the bank’s
cash custodian Cristeta Chua-Burce (petitioner).

Metro Bank hence filed a civil case for sum of money against petitioner and
her husband Antonio Burce. Also, a criminal case for Estafa was filed
against petitioner. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, to which the court
granted. The CA however ruled that there was no such prejudicial question.

The court rendered a consolidated decision finding petitioner guilty of Estafa

under the RPC. Naturally, petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the trial
court’ decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that there can be no
misappropriation when there were other persons who had access to the cash
in the vault.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner can be held liable for Estafa.

RULING

NO. The elements of Estafa through conversion or misappropriation under

Art 315 (1) b of the RPC are as follows:
1. That personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond
2. That there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it
 3. That such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another
4. That there be demand for the return of the property

In the case at bar, the first element is absent. When the property is
received by the offender from the offended party in trust, on commission or
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means
a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this
case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the
cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to
that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. The possession of
the teller is the possession of the bank. Hence, petitioner can only be liable
for qualified theft and not Estafa. (Taking without the bank’s consent – theft)

The teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank.
An agent on the other hand, can even assert as against his own principal,
an independent and autonomous right to retain money in consequence of
the agency.

Being a mere cash custodian therefore, petitioner had no juridical possession

over the missing funds. The element of juridical possession being absent,
petitioner cannot be convicted of Estafa under the RPC.

122. CARLOS VICTORIA V. REPUBLIC

FACTS

On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her

daughter, Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for registration
and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by a subdivision plan.
She alleged that she is the owner of the land which she openly, exclusively
and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under
a bona fide claim of ownership, that there is no encumbrance, that it is not
part or any military or naval reservation and that there are no tenants on the
said property. Tacking her possession with that of her PII, petitioner claims
that she has been in possession of the land for more than 50 years. This
application was however opposed by the Republic through the Director of
Lands.

Petitioner presented witnesses in court to testify on her and her PII’s

possession and occupation on the property. She also presented officers of
the DENR to establish that the land is alienable and disposable. Trial court
granted the application but was later revered by the CA upon appeal. CA
ruled that the applicant, at the time of the application was no longer in
possession and occupation of the land since on Oct 16, 1996, applicant’s
mother and PII sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation – a fact
admitted by applicant herself. Hence, as early as 1996, possession and
occupation of the land pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan
Development Corporation, thus applicant has no registrable title over the
subject land.

ISSUE
Whether applicant has a registrable title over the land?

RULING
No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following:
1. The land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain
2. They have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The second requirement is absent in this case. The applicant must show
that he is in actual possession of the property at the time of the
application. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is
broader since it includes constructive possession. Hence, when the law
added occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Hence, to qualify, possession must not be a mere
fiction.

In this case, when applicant applied for registration in 2001, Maria Carlos no
longer had possession of the property of the property since the same was
sold to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. Nonetheless, even if it
were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the
land at that time, such possession was no longer in the concept of
an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways:

1. Possession in the concept of an owner and

2. Possession of a holder

A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself

or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses
as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan
Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the
certificate of title to the corporation upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be
said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of
ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses the property under a bona
fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.

123. PO LAM V. CA

FACTS

Lots 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots located in the heart of Legaspi
City’s commercial district which were sold by Lim Kok Chiong to the Legaspi
Avenue Hardware Company (LAHCO) sometime in the early 60’s. Around
1964, the brother of Lim Kok, Felix Lim, filed a complaint against his brother
and LAHCO to annul the deeds of sale on the ground that they included 3/14
pro-indiviso portion of the lots which he inherited from his foster parents. In
1965, Felix filed a notice of lis pendens over the two lots and the same was
inscribed on the TCTs.

Trial court rendered a decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of

the said lots. As a consequence of its decision, the court ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens inscribed on the titles of the 2 lots.
However, the other one remained uncancelled because the duplicate owner’s
copy of the said TCT was with the Continental Bank because Lot 1558 was
mortgaged by LAHCO to said bank.
Felix appealed the decision. During the pendency, LAHCO sold the two lots
to petitioners Spouses Po Lam. The Spouses had the notice of lis
pendens cancelled. Subsequently, the certificate of title were likewise
cancelled and replaced by TCTs in the name of petitioners.

1 month after the Po Lam spouses purchased the lots from LAHCO, they
leased the commercial building erected on Lot 1557 to private respondent
Jose Lee for one year. After the contract expired, Jose Lee continued to
occupy the same, paying monthly rentals. However, Jose Lee eventually
refused to pay rentals, informing the spouses that he would deposit the
payment in court since Felix Lim had promised to sell the property to
him. As a consequence, the spouses filed an unlawful detainer case against
Jose Lee.

Trial Court rendered a decision declaring spouses Po Lam as transferees

pendente lite and NOT purchasers in good faith. The annotation of lis
pendens on the TCT served as notice to the spouses that the said lot is
involved in a pending litigation. Settled is the rule that one who deals with
property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a
purchaser in good faith. Such decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
upon a petition for certiorari. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether spouses Po Lam are purchasers in good faith.

RULING

YES. While a notice of lis pendens on TC 2851 covering Lot 1558 was still
subsisting at the time the spouses bought the property, there was already
a court order ordering that the annotation be cancelled, as it was
in fact cancelled on May 20, 1974. A possessor in good faith is one who
is unaware that there exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the
thing. It consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from who he
received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title.
In this case, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as being aware
of a flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing since the
alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens was already being ordered cancelled
at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, petitioners can already
be considered buyers in good faith.

A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a real

property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest
over said property does so at his own risk. The basis of the doctrine of lis
pendens is public policy and convenience – once the court has taken
cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with
consummation of the judgment.

The lis pendens annotation although considered as a general notice to all

the world does not mean that it is part of the doctrine of notice. The
purchaser pendente lite is affected not by notice but because the law does
not allow litigating parties to give to others pending litigation, rights to the
property in dispute as to prejudice the opposite property. The doctrine rests
upon public policy, not notice. Hence, the spouses cannot be considered as
having constructive notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make
them purchasers in bad faith.

CABAL V. SPOUSES CABAL

FACTS

1. Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land in Zambales.

 Marcelo died, survived by his wife and children
 5 years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son Marcelino to
build his house on a portion on Lot G. Since then, Marcelino
resided thereon.
 Marcelino’s son also built his house on the said property

2. Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the

parcel of land owned by Marcelo (Lot G)
  It was found out that Marcelino and his son occupied and built
their houses on another lot, Lot 1-E and not on the lot designated
to him (Lot G-1)
 Lot 1-E was owned by spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal
 Parties agreed to a re-survey and swapping of lots but this did
not materialize.

3. Spouses Cabal filed a complaint for recovery of possession

 They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad
faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled
in his name

4. Marcelino contended that:

 Spouses have no cause of action against him because he has
been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents’
knowledge and acquiescence
 Acquisitive prescription has set in

MTC COURT ruled in favor of Marcelino

RTC reversed the decision

 Marcelino's possession was in the concept of a co-owner and therefore
prescription does not run in his favor
 His possession, which was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen
into ownership.

SUPREME COURT

Whether the disputed property was co-owned

NO. Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in 1949 with the
consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot
since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his
father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or
share in the co-ownership was already particularly designated or physically
segregated.

There is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined

and identifiable, though not technically described. Thus, since Marcelino built
a house and has been occupying the disputed portion since 1949, with the
consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just
and equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not one
adjacent to it.

Whether Marcelino was a builder in good faith

Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was
informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s
possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the lot
covered by his title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the
consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that
Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’ property when he
continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was
effected.

125. NEGRETE V. CFI MARINDUQUE

FACTS

Petitioner Ignacia Negrete is an indigent widow over 70 years old. Since

1945, she and her late husband had been in continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot covered by a tax declaration. Petitioner claims
that they have been exercising acts of possession (clearing the land and
planting rice therein) until January 1956 when defendant Igmedio
Maderazo unlawfully entered the northern portion of the land and
began cultivating the same. Hence, a forcible entry case was filed against
defendant.

Defendant, in his answer, alleged that the land he is presently cultivating is

a different land. Hence, the court ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection
of the subject land to determine whether the land area cultivated by
defendant is the same land claimed by petitioner as the northern portion of
her land.

The court ruled that there is no dispute as to the identity of the land alleged
to have been unlawfully entered by defendant since the ocular inspection
showed that the land presently being cultivated by the defendant is the same
land as that alleged by the petitioner.

Defendant on his part claims that he had been continuously cultivating the
land since 1951 when he bought certain portions of it and possessed the
other portions as tenant of his brothers and sister-in-law.

The court ruled in favor of defendant. Since in a forcible entry case, the
only issue is possession de facto, defendant had been in continuous and
peaceful possession of the land since 1951 and that he was in the material
and physical possession of the said land within 1 year prior to the filing of
the instant complaint. Hence he has now the security that entitles him to
stay in the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

After 10 years, petitioner Negrete filed an action for recovery of ownership

of the property alleging that she is the owner of the subject land, having
inherited the same from her later father and that she and her PII have been
in possession of the same for about 70 years. Defendant on his part of course
denied all the allegations and is likewise asserting ownership over the said
northern portion of land. Defendant further alleged that he bought the land
from Tito Oriendo as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale.

Trial court ruled in favor of defendant saying that defendant has been in
possession of the land since 1954 and therefore even if there was a flaw in
their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, having possessed the land in good faith within a
period of 10 years. There is good faith because the defendant’s possession
of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale.

ISSUE
Whether the deed of sale executed by Tito Oriendo on August 30, 1954 in
favor of late Igmedio Maderazo could be considered as a valid basis for good
faith and as a just title, in order to justify the acquisition of the disputed
parcel of land by ordinary prescription through adverse possession of only
10 years.

RULING
Real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years. If the possession
however is in good faith, adverse of possession of 10 years is enough.
However, since it was established in this case that respondent was not in
good faith, he needs 30 years before he can acquire the subject lot through
acquisitive prescription.

A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware of any flaw in his
title or mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in the
honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior
claim and absence of intention to overreach another.

A deed of sale, to constitute a just title to generate good faith for

the ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years should refer to the
same parcel of land which is adversely possessed. In the case at bar,
the deed of sale covers a parcel of land patently different from the disputed
land owned by plaintiff in terms of location and boundary owners.

Hence, defendant cannot claim good faith in occupying said land on

the basis of said instrument of sale. It his position were to be
sustained, it would be easy for anyone to acquire ownership of an
untitled land belonging to another person by adverse possession of
only 10 years on the basis of a document of sale covering a distinct
parcel executed by a person who is a stranger to the land. This
could not have been intended by the legislature, because forged
deeds of conveyance could be conveniently interposed to oust the
true owner from a land by adverse possession of only 10 years.

126. BALTAZAR V. CARIDAD

FACTS

The cadastral court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision awarding Lot 8864
to the spouses Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their conjugal
property. A decree was issued and the lot was thereafter registered in their
names under an OCT. While the case was however pending, the southern
portion of the lot was in possession of respondents Caridad and her
daughter since 1939. Hence, petitioners (surviving wife and children of
Julio Baltazar) filed a motion praying for writ of possession against
respondents. Said motion was granted by the trial court, however, the court
directed the sheriff NOT to remove or destroy the permanent improvements
on the lot without an express demand. The sheriff enforced the writ and
placed petitioners in possession of the southern portion of the lot.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to compel respondents to remove

the houses which they built in the southern portion of the lot, to which the
court granted. The court ordered respondents to remove their houses within
30 days from receipt of said order. This is the order being appealed now
by respondents.

Respondents insist that they are builders in good faith of the

houses in question. They further question the jurisdiction of the court
sitting as a cadastral court to order the removal of their houses which were
built in the subject lot long after the issuance of the final decree of
registration. They insist that the case is cognizable only by a court exercising
general jurisdiction and the only remedy available to petitioners is to file an
ordinary action for ejectment or recovery of possession against them.

ISSUES

1. Whether respondents are possessors and builders in good faith

2. Whether the order of demolition is valid.

RULING

1. No, because they are bound by the 1941 decree of registration that
obligated their parents and PII. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in
the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one’s title despite judicial
adjudication. The fact that in 1959, respondents demolished and replaced
their old house with new and bigger ones cannot enervate the rights of the
registered owners. Otherwise, the right of the registered owners to enjoy full
possession of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an
unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old
house with a new one from time to time.
2. Yes. The order of the cadastral court granting petitioner’s motion to
compel respondents to remove their houses from the disputed lot is valid
and enforceable against respondents. The trial court sitting as a land
registration court has the authority to order as a consequence of the writ of
possession, the demolition of improvements introduced by the successor-in-
interest of a defeated oppositor in the land registration case. To require a
successful litigant in a land registration case to institute another action for
the purpose of obtaining possession of the land adjudged to him would be a
cumbersome process and would result in multiplicity of suits.

130. MANECLANG v. BAUN

FACTS

On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land containing 7,401 square meters more or less. She was
survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and 9 children. On July 30, 1947,
a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang,
one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at Dagupan
City, Pangasinan. At the time of the filing of the petition, 7 of her 9 children
were below the age of 18 but no guardian ad litem was appointed by the
court for the minor children.

On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate

estate filed a petition asking the court to give him the authority to dispose
of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated in
the petition. While notice thereof was given to the surviving spouse,
Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no
such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.

On September 9, 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the

intestate court issued an Order granted Feliciano’s petition.

Following the order Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator executed a

deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan, represented by its mayor, a
portion consisting of 4,415 square meters of the lot. This sale was approved
by the intestate court on 15 March 1954.

The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and

constructed thereon a public market It has been in continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of the
market. Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were
sold by the administrator pursuant of the same authority previously granted.

On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the intestate

estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita filed with
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the
annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator
pursuant to the order cancellation of titles, recovery of possession
and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, etc
and the City of Dagupan.

ISSUES
1. W/N the sale to the City of Dagupan is null and void ab initio
2. W/N the plaintiff is in estoppel in assailing the legality of the sale
3. W/N the defendant City of Dagupan is a purchaser in good faith and
for value
4. W/N the amount to be paid by the City is right

RULING
 The authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would
be null and void ab initio.

The Civil Code provides that the father or mother, as such, the administrator
of the child's property but it does not follow that for purposes of complying
with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice
to the father is notice to the children.

It is explicitly provided that notice must be in be writing, must be given

to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a
time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be
given to the interested parties.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang,
was notified through his counsel. The remaining seven (7) children
were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed
to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was
not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of
Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority
to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and
void ab initio.

 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of

the estate and against the children.

The court reiterated the ruling in Boñaga vs. Soler, "that a decedent's
representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed
purporting to convey land; and if this be true of the administrator as to his
own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to question the acts
of his predecessor are not conformable to law."

 The children who were already of legal age at the time of sale were
already barred by laches

It took (12) years, 10 months and 24 days from the sale before an action for
annulment was filed. Four of the children were already of legal age when
deed of sale was executed. Their inaction and delay constituted laches. This
conclusion will not apply to the minor children at the time of the sale. Neither
delay nor negligence could be attributed to them as a basis for laches.
Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of the questioned property.

 The City of Dagupan is a buyer in good faith.

While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually
issued on September 9, 1949, the same was secured during the
incumbency of the then judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano. Even
if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz
induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the property, the fact remains that
there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having been
issued by a Judge who was lawfully appointed to his position, he
was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed.

It was not incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed
there was a valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any
court can be relied upon by the parties.
Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.

We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee,

the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the authority of
the judicial administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part
of the possessor rests the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon
the administrator to established such proof, which We find to be
wanting.

However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: "Possession acquired in
good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging
bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith.

Upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a
possessor in bad faith.

The Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that the property had no
access to the national road prior to the sale to the City, and that it was the
city’s improvements that caused the appreciation of the value of the
property.

Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain
possession of the property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value
of the building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price
amounting to P6,493.05

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all

respects, except to the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale
in favor of the City of Dagupan, executed on 4 October 1952 (Exhibit "F"),
is hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches
as abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the
presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all
surnamed Maneclang, may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right
to retain the property until it shall have been refunded the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to
reconvey to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property
in question, for which purpose said parties shall cause the appropriate
partition thereof, expenses for which shall be borne by them proportionately;
and (c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable
compensation for the use of 5/9 of the property in question at the rate of
P500.00 a month from 5 November 1965 until it shall have effectively
delivered the possession of the property to the intestate estate of Margarita
Suri Santos. Upon the other hand, said intestate estate is hereby ordered to
refund to the City of Dagupan that portion of the real estate taxes the latter
had paid for the lot corresponding to 5/9 thereof effective taxable year 1965
and until the latter shall have delivered to said intestate estate.

131. VILLAFUERTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Villafuertes are operating a gasoline station named as Peewee’s
Petron Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the
premises of three adjoining lots. One of these lots is owned by private
respondent Edilberto de Mesa; the other lot is owned by private respondent
Gonzalo Daleon; the third lot is owned by Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of
petitioner Perlita Tan-Villafuerte.
Petitioners leased the lots owned by private respondents de Mesa for a year.
However, as regards the lot owned by private respondent Daleon, the
petitioners were not as lucky. Petitioners received a demand letter from
Daleon ordering them to vacate the said premises. The petitioners ignored
the demand letter.
Since the petitioners ignored the letter sent by Daleon, a complaint for
ejectment was filed by the latter before the Office of the Barangay Captain
but no settlement was reached so the Lupon issued a certification for Daleon
to file action.
While the issue between the petitioners and Daleon was far from over, the
lease agreement between the petitioners and private respondent de Mesa
expired. De Mesa sent a demand letter demanding the petitioners to vacate
but the petitioners did not yield to such demand. A few days later, private
respondents Daleon and de Mesa caused the closure of the petitioner’s
gasoline station by constructing fences around it.
Subsequently, the petitioner Villafuerte countered with a complaint for
damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private
respondents.
ISSUE:
Was it appropriate for the private respondents to fence the premises on their
own causing the stoppage of the operation of the petitioner’s gasoline
station?
RULING:
Highlight: Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force
or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of
a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.
No, it was not appropriate for the private respondents to fence the premises
on their own causing the stoppage of the operation of the petitioner’s
gasoline station.
Article 536 of the Civil Code previously quoted explicitly provides for the
proper recourse of one who claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing.
When private respondents personally took it upon themselves to evict
petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the
law, they became liable "for all the necessary and natural consequences of
[their] illegal act."
P.S. The only reason why the case reached the SC is the issue on the
determination of the amount of actual damages and whether which damage
should the court award. Other than that, MTC, CA and SC were unanimous
in saying that private respondents failed to exhaust the proper remedy.

132. ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB

FACTS

Respondent Emerenciana R. Gungab is the registered owner of the contested

parcel of land with improvements located in Quezon City and covered by TCT
No. 48330. Petitioners are her sister Victoria R. Arambulo and nephew Miguel
R. Arambulo III.
October 19, 1998, Emerenciana’s counsel made a formal demand to
petitioners to vacate the subject property on or before November 30, 1998.
But petitioners refused so Emerenciana sought the assistance of the
barangay authorities but no amicable settlement was reached.
February 2, 1999, Emerenciana filed separate ejectment complaints against
the petitioners before the MeTC. Alleging that:
 She owns the subject property;
 She tolerated petitioners occupancy of certain portions of the subject
property without rent; and
 Despite her demands, they refused to vacate the subject property

Petitioners assert that Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner. They said that:

(1) After their father Pedro Reyes, died intestate in 1964, the
property became part of the common properties of the clan;
 (2) Their mother Anastacia Reyes, allowed Victoria to use and
occupy a certain portion of the subject property;
(3) Victoria continuously used and occupied this portion for the last
20 years;
(4) Anastacia also allowed her grandson, Miguel, to use another
portion of the subject property since 15 years ago; and
(5) Their use and possession of these portions of the subject
property had been with the knowledge, consent and tolerance of all
the other co-owners

Victoria and her brother filed a case for transfer and reconveyance of title
before the RTC of Quezon City.
MeTC - dismissed ejectment case for lack of cause of action. It ruled that
summary procedure was not the proper procedure to resolve the cases.
- respondent’s allegation of tolerance was preposterous she failed to prove
her proper acquisition of the subject property; and petitioners were entitled
to retain possession of the subject property pursuant to Article 448 of the
Civil Code.

RTC-AFFIRMED MTC

CA- REVERSED RTC ordered petitioners to vacate the portion of the subject
property under their occupancy or possession, and to surrender the same
forthwith to Emerenciana. They said respondent had a preferred right to
possess the property because she had a genuine TCT. It rejected petitioners
claim that Victoria was a co-owner of the subject property cause
unsubstantiated.

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision by relying
only on the TCT without considering that respondent was never in possession
of the property. They were in possession of the subject property and so there
was no physical possession to restore and protect by Emerenciana. They
pray that the Court suspend CA Decision pending resolution of the case for
annulment of transfer and reconveyance of title before the RTC.

Respondent countered by saying CA correctly reversed RTC decision since

the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is the certificate of title. She
maintains that a pending civil action for annulment of transfer and
reconveyance of title in a separate proceeding is of no moment in an
ejectment case

ISSUE: Whether Emerenciana can eject the petitioners.

RULING
YES! SC- The cause of action of Emerenciana was for unlawful detainer since
she alleged that (1) she owns the subject property; (2) she allowed
petitioners to occupy it by tolerance; (3) she withdrew her consent and
demanded that petitioners vacate it, but they refused. Her complaints were
also filed within one year from the date of her last demand.

The ISSUE for resolution in unlawful detainer case is physical or material

possession. But even if there was a claim of juridical possession or an
assertion of ownership by the defendant, the MeTC may still take cognizance
of the case. All that the TC can do is to make an initial determination of who
is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its
possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. Courts in ejectment
cases decide questions of ownership only as it is necessary to decide the
question of possession. The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant
from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple
expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.

Respondent have a Torrens Title over the land. The CA correctly ruled that
respondent, as registered owner, is preferred to possess it. The age-old
rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof. Except for the claim that Victoria Arambulo is a co-
owner of the property, they have no other justification for their continued
stay thereon. BUT this determination of ownership is not final. It is only
an initial determination of ownership for the sole purpose of settling the issue
of possession. It would not prejudice the pending action in the RTC of
Quezon City between the same parties involving title to the property.

Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or

permission, without any contract between them is bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Petitioners’ occupation of the subject property was by mere
tolerance, they are not entitled to retain its possession under
Article 448 of the Civil Code. They are aware that their tolerated
possession may be terminated any time and they cannot be considered as
builders in good faith. Moreover, as aptly found by the CA, petitioners have
not presented evidence to prove that they made improvements on the
subject property and defrayed the expenses therefor.

Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an unlawful

detainer case. It is enough that she has a better right of possession. Thus,
petitioners prior physical possession of the property does not automatically
entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better
right to the property. Finally, petitioners cannot seek suspension of this case
pending resolution of the case for annulment of transfer and reconveyance
of title before the RTC. An action for reconveyance of property or accion
reivindicatoria has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property.

Petition is DENIED and the decision of CA is affirmed. CA ordered petitioners

to vacate the property subject of this case
 134. LLOBRERA VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS
 Fernandez, one of the registered co-owners of land in Dagupan City,
sent a demand letter to Sps Llobrera et al to vacate premises within 15
days. Petitioners refused and no settlement was reached on the
barangay level.
 Fernandez then filed a complaint for ejectment and damages.
 Petitioners defended that they occupied lot since beginning of 1945 with
the permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of co-owner, on condition
of payment of 20Php monthly rental. Sometime June 1996, they were
prompted to consign the same and pay it to Banco San Juan instead
which they maintained and update their payment.
 MTCC, RTC and CA favored Fernandez.

ISSUE
WON possession of the subject property is founded on contract
RULING
No. Petitioners failed to present any written memo of the alleged lease
arrangements between them and De Venecia. There is dearth (aba dearth.
Jima.) of evidence to substantiate the averred lessor-lessee relationship.
(ang ilaha excuse kay naa daw sunog na nadala ang receipts that’s why wa
sila ka present sa receipts na giissue ni De Venecia. Jima na pod)
Absent such proof of any contractual basis for their possession, the
legal implication is that they were possessing by mere tolerance.
Therefore, the person occupying is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he/she will vacate upon demand.
The bank deposits made, as consignation, has no legal effect insofar as the
respondent is concerned since there is no contractual relationship.
Therefore, Fernandez cannot be compelled to receive such deposits.