PNB V.

DE JESUS
411 SCRA 557
FACTS:
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over
the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land situated
in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters covered by TCT No. T-17197, and
that on 26 March 1993, he had caused a verification survey of the property and discovered that the northern
portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters.
Despite two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981
from then Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the
situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to
petitioner at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The sale, however,
did not materialize when, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged
the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines. He also contends that he is a builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not being a builder in good faith matters under article 448.
HELD:
Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the
owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or
otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the
issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

Macasaet vs Macasaet

G.R. 154391 92

September 30, 2004

Facts:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

7.

Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are
first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
The parents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated in Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by
way of a verbal lease agreement, their son and his wife occupied these lots in March 1992 and
used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that their
parents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots. They added
that it was the policy of their parents to allot the the land owned as an advance grant of inheritance
in favor of their children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT no. T-103141 had been
allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT-78521 was
allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of their
parents house.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against
their children for failure to pay the agreed rental despite repeated demands.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the parents and ordered the children to vacate the premises. It opined
that the children had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by tolerance
of the parents. As their stay was by mere tolerance, the children were necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate the lots upon demand. The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot
had been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground that succcesional rights were inchoate.
It disbelieved that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction material.
On appeal, the RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. RTC allowed the parents to appropriate the
building and other improvements introduced by the children, after payment by indemnity provided
for bt Article 448 in relation to Article 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
On an appeal by both parties to the CA which were consolidated, the CA sustained the finding of
the lower courts that the children had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of their

8.

parent. Thus, possession of the subject lots by the children became illegal upon their receipt of
letter to vacate it. The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code
was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, the children had the
right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the improvements made.
Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, the children brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1.

WON the children can be ejected

a.

b.

c.

d.

2.

Based on the parents love reasons for gratuitously allowing the children to use the lots, it can
be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children
benefitted from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition existing between
the parties occurs like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved
conflict or animosity the agreement maybe deemed terminated. When persistent conflict and
animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and the children, the purpose of
the agreement ceased. The children had any cause for continued possession of the lots. Their
right to use became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And
because they refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them.
The children had no right to retain possession. The right of the children to inherit from their
parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise. Rights of succession
are transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that there was an
allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with the parents.
The childrens allegation that the indebtness of their parent to them has been paid through
dation cannot be given credence as there were no sufficient proof of a settlement or contract
of dation to settle the alleged debt, and is inconsistent of the separate action by the children to
recover the same debt.
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

Rights of a Builder in Good faith

a. As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of owner to everything that is
incorporated or attached to the property. Accession industrial building, planting and sowing
on an immovable is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.
b. As the court found that the children possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, the
applicable rule would be Article 448. This article has been applied to cases wherein a builder
had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.

FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR. V. CLARO L. LAURETA

G.R. No. L-28740. February 24, 1981

FACTS:
On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao an action for nullity, recovery
of ownership and/or reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees against Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata,
Fermin Z. Caram Jr. and the Register of Deeds of Davao City.
On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of

the plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a notary public or any other
authorized officer. At the time the sale was executed, there was no authorized officer before whom the sale
could be acknowledged inasmuch as the civil government in Tagum, Davao was not as yet organized.
However, the defendant Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the peaceful and lawful possession of the
premises of the land together with the pertinent papers thereof such as the Owner's Duplicate Original
Certificate of Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax declaration, tax receipts and other papers related thereto.
Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is still in continuous, adverse and notorious
occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants or their
representatives. In fact, Laureta had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced
improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint.
However, the said property was sold to Fermin Caram, Jr., the petitioner, by Marcos Mata on May 5, 1947.
And was able to declare the ODOCT in the possession of Laureta null and void, after Mata filed for an
issuance of new ODOCT before the RD of Davao on the ground of loss of the said title.
The Trial Court ruled infavor of Laureta, stating that Caram, Jr. was not a purchaser in good faith, and the
Court of Appeals thenafter affirmed the decision of the lower court.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The petitioner assails the finding of the trial court that the second sale of the property was made through his
representatives, Pedro Irespe and Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. He argues that Pedro Irespe was acting
merely as broker or intermediary with the specific task and duty to pay Marcos Mata the sum of P1,000.00
for the latter's property and to see to it that the requisite deed of sale covering the purchase was properly
executed by Marcos Mata; that the identity of the property to be bought and the price of the purchase had
already been agreed upon by the parties; and that the other alleged representative, Atty. Aportadera, merely
acted as a notary public in the execution of the deed of sale.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner have acted in bad faith through his agents action.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the court found that the Attorneys Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of the
circumstances, and knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers pertaining to the land was
taken by soldiers under the command of Col. Claro L. Laureta. Added to this is the fact that at the time of the
second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and Aportadera should have investigated
the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed to exercise the ordinary care expected of a buyer of real
estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of
the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure.
The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the
certificate and inquire into transactions the existence of which is not there intimated 18 should not apply in
this case. It was of common knowledge that at the time the soldiers of Laureta took the documents from
Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet established and that there were no officials to ratify
contracts of sale and make them registrable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew that even if Mata
previously had sold the disputed property such sale could not have been registered.cdrep
There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property of
Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency, Caram, as principal, should also be deemed to have
acted in bad faith.
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. (1973)".
Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L-45038, April 30, 1987
TOPIC: Administration of exclusive property
FACTS:

Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores,
then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy
the lot.
April 2, 1950
o The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal
properties covering the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under custodia legis.
April 22, 1950
o Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent amounting to P1,500
for the lot
o Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700 which he did not pay or was unable to pay
because the heirs of Tambunting could not settle their differences.
April 28, 1950
o Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and the respondent
remained in possession of the lot in question.
March 13 and 20, 1959
o Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda
Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of
those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale provided for terms and conditions.
Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. This
includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots
Trial Court dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to
enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor
(Don Vicente Legarda).

ISSUE: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?
DECISION: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
RATIO:
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which
was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the
death of Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunting
but was only consummated after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers
the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the
husband shall give adequate security.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab
initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the
case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the
probate court.

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara
Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente
Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. But Don Vicente
Legarda had no effort to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to
protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.

Kasilag v. Roque
-

The heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio commenced a civil case for the recovery of
possession of the land and its improvements from petitioner, which was granted to Emiliana by way
of homestead
Petitioner alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof
by virtue of a mortgage contract between him and the deceased
A year after the execution of the said deed, Emiliana was unable to pay the stipulated interests as
well as the tax on the land and its improvements
o They then entered into an oral contract whereby she conveyed the to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect interest, attend to the
payment of land tax, benefit from the fruits of the land and would introduce improvements
thereon
Thus, petitioner entered upon the possession of the land
The CA concludes thus:
o That the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed,
was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements
o It held the whole contract null and void and without legal effect as well as the subsequent
verbal contract
The literal sense of the stipulations in the contract should be followed
o If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail
The words used by the contracting parties in the deed clearly show that they intended to enter into
the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum
o In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the
land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and
the stipulated interest thereon
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated,
is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order
should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made
because they are independent of the valid contract
In the contract, should Emiliana fail to pay the mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute
sale
o This was however modified in that the petitioner would take possession of the land and
would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of
interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax
o This converted it into a contract of antichresis

This being a real encumbrance burdening the land, this is illegal and void
Hence, it was error to hold that the contract entered into was one of absolute sale and for holding
that the contract is null and void
Moreover, the petitioner was arguing that the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was a holder in
bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof
o From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116
o This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance
of the laws

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but
possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis
It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land
In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a
jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116
o Hence, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be
the basis of his good faith
o Therefore, the respondents are entitled to the improvements upon indemnifying the
petitioner or compel the petitioner to buy the land by paying its market value
The appealed decision is REVERSED
o The contract is valid and binding

The contract of antichresis is null and void and without legal effect

Petitioner is a possessor in good faith

Ballesteros v Abion
GR no. 143361, Feb. 9, 2006
FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 15, 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37,in Civil Case No.
2917.The property subject of the petition is a two-door, three-story commercial building and the 229sq.m.
parcel of land on which it stands. The property was originally owned by Ruperto Ensano,as evidenced by
TCT No. 6178. Ownership was subsequently transferred to the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines (DBP)
which, in turn, sold the property to Dr. Rodolfo Vargas in a deedof absolute sale dated March 30, 1988.
Despite these transfers of ownership, however, theproperty was registered in the names of DBP and Dr.
Vargas (TCT Nos. 941 and 942,respectively) only on February 21, 1996. Petitioner asserts that the
Municipal Trial Court in theCities (MTCC) had no jurisdiction to try the case because the complaint did not
allege that hewas withholding possession of the property beyond the expiration of the lease period and
that,in violation of Rule 70, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, respondent failed to establish a cause of action
by omitting to allege that demand to vacate was made for failure to pay the rent or comply with the
conditions of the contract. We disagree. Furthermore, it is also worthy to notethat, in his motion for
reconsideration of the RTC decision, petitioner explicitly prayed that the"MTCC decision be affirmed." Since
he actively participated in the proceedings before theMTCC and in fact later sought the affirmation of its
decision, he in effect recognized its jurisdiction and he should now be estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of that court. Inother words, petitioner cannot now assail the jurisdiction of the MTCC after
voluntarilysubmitting himself to its proceedings.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court (MTCC of Iriga City, Br. 2) had jurisdiction to try the case?
HELD/RATIO:The Supreme Court that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case. In the
motionfor reconsideration of the RTC decision, petitioner explicitly prayed that the MTCCs decision
beaffirmed. In effect, he recognized the jurisdiction of the said court and should be estopped
fromchallenging the questioning of the MTCCs jurisdiction. The actual participation of the petitioner would
also be a strong manifestation of his recognition of the courts jurisdiction. The SupremeCourt held that
while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a partys activeparticipation in the proceeding before
a court without jurisdiction will estoppe such party fromassailing suck lack of jurisdiction.The petition was
denied by the court, while the decision of the court of appeals was affirmedwith modification as the
attorneys fees were deleted.

Wong vs Carpio
203 SCRA 118 Civil Law Property Possession; cant be recognized in two persons at the same time
Ejectment Force, Intimidation, Threat, Strategy, or Stealth
In 1972, a pacto de retro sale was executed by William Giger in favor of Manuel Mercado. Giger failed to
repurchase the land within the agreed period hence Mercado was able to consolidate the title unto himself
and the sale was notarized in 1973. Since then, Mercado paid the taxes onthe land and he would
periodically go to the said parcel of land and gather coconut products for his business.
However, in July 1976, Giger again sold the same land to Ignacio Wong. Giger then delivered the title of the
land to Wong. In August 1976, Wong started deploying his laborers to the said farmland; he built a
farmhouse thereon; he fenced the boundary; and he also put up a signboard which indicates that the land is
his.
In September 1976, Mercado learned of the presence of Wong within the disputed land. In November 1976,
Mercado filed an ejectment case (forcible entry) against Wong.
In his defense, Wong insists that a forcible entry case is not proper because, in possessing the land, he
never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; that he entered the said land without issue
after he purchased the same from Giger.

The trial court agreed with Wong as it ruled that Wong had a better title because it was he who had prior,
actual and continuous physical possession of the disputed property as opposed to Mercados only acts of
going to said land periodically.
On appeal, Judge Lucas Carpio reversed the decision of the municipal trial court in the ejectment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong has a better title over the disputed property.
HELD: No. Mercado had prior possession. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities for acquiring such right. The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary.In this case, the notarized sale made by Giger
in favor of Mercado transferred the possession of said land from Giger to Mercado.
The second sale made by Giger to Wong did not transfer possession to Wong because in the first place, by
that time, Giger is not in possession of the land anymore. Further, possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession, which is not
the case here.
Anent the argument of Wong that he never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS),
the Supreme Court held that if a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person
already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and
excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
The Supreme Court also noted the rules regarding questions regarding the fact of possession:
a. Present possessor shall be preferred;
b. If there are two (or more) current possessors, the one longer in possession is preferred;
c. If possessors acquired possession at the same time; the possessor who can present a title is preferred;
d. If all possessors present the foregoing conditions equally, then the property in question shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

Ortiz vs Fuentabella
FACTS:
- Don Ramon Ortiz was in possession of a parcel of pasture land in the place called Tagas in the
municipality of San Jose of said province; in area 27 hectares and 90 centares; bounded on the north by the
rivulet Dacuilan and Calauit, on the south by the San Miguel River, on the east by the sea, and on the west
by the lands of Mariano Pelayo, Maria Pagueo, and Gaspar Codillo.
This possession was inscribed in the property registry of the Province of Ambos Camarines since August 6,
1892 and stated that Don Ramon had "provided before the justice of the peace of that town the
possession he had held of said land for fifteen years previously, when he had acquired it by
cultivating it himself, without securing any written title;" and it was approved by order of July 2, 1892.
(1892 15 = since 1877)
- on March 10, 1909 Ramon's daughter sent a letter to Fuentabella asking her to desist from planting coco
palms on the lands owned by her parents, being used as pasture land for cattle. Fuentabella answered the
letter on March 19, 1909 stating that she did not plan to plant on lands belonging to the Ortiz's.
- Asuncion Fuentebella appears in a public document dated December 29, 1909, as buyer of all the land
inscribed information, the vendors being Juan and Sotera Cano (Siblings). "This land has been quietly and
peacefully possessed by our late parents for thirty years prior to this date." (1909 30 = since 1879)
- After this public document, Ramon Ortiz filed complaint for restitution of the possession of the land and
P200 as damages.
- Fuentebella cited Juan and Sotera Cano in defense of the title. Her defense is that the Cano's possession
was inherited from their parent Felipe Cano.
- CFI ruled in favor of Fuentebella. Ortiz Appealed.

Issue: Was the letter enough to halt Fuentebella's good faith?

RULING: Yes.
- The Cano's could not justify their sale to Fuentebella. According to their witness, Felipe possessed a
portion (not the whole) of the land in Tagas, but not the land in question, after he died, the Cano siblings
occupied another portion, since they moved their residence to the other side of Mitil creek, again no the land
in question. Their claim cannot defeat the inscription of possession for Ramon Ortiz.
- Court held that Ascuncion's possession in good faith ended with her been made aware of a defect in her
mode of acquisition by way of the letter from Ortiz's daughter.
Defendant's bad faith began after the warning given in a letter by the plaintiff's daughter in March, 1909, for
after having received it she then had ground to doubt that Sotera and Juan Cano could transfer any title of
possession in the following December.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from
the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (435a)
The two cases illustrate Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware
that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
There is no conflict between the two cases, whether by letter or summons, what matters is that the
possessor becomes aware of a defect in his mode of acquisition. Even if possession was acquired in good
faith at the start, it may become bad faith from the moment the fact can be proven that the possessor has
become aware of a defect in his possession.
The letter sent by Ortiz's daughter was clearly proven, since Fuentebella answered it wih her own letter. The
Summons given to the Cabrals to answer for their possession was definitely enough to make them aware
that there was a contention or possible defect in their possesion.
By the way Art. 528 is written, it only requires a fact to be proven which makes a person aware of a defect. It
does not require the specific form of such fact to be in letter or even orally. The problem comes from proving
that such fact exist and whether or not it is sufficient to cause a person to doubt his mode of possession or
claim of ownership. A rumor can be merely a rumor, a letter may just be harassment, it would depend on the
circumstances of each case whether such fact would logically have made the possessor/owner doubt. This
can be proved based on the strength of the possessor/owner's own claim. In the case of Fuentebella, she
acquired the Land in good faith from the Canos, but the Canos did not give her conclusive evidence that
they had actual authority to sell the whole lot or that they had previously possessed the lot. So when the
letter came, it is logical to conclude that Fuentebella would now have doubt in her own claim, this is further
shown by her making a public instrument after the letter was received. So in the Ortiz case, the letter was
sufficient. On the other hand, in the Cabral case, there can be no doubt that a summons logically means
there is awareness of a defect in one's claim.