In Re Umil vs Ramos

The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality
of one's detention

The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrest has committed it;

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. .

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers
who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance
with the requirements

An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is
without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities

Mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect

People vs Dela Cruz

Buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the
accused to commit a crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated.
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. 14 It is a matter of judicial
experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the
malefactors were invariably caught red-handed. 15There being no violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
The absence of any civilian witness should not undermine the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction
of a civilian to inhibit himself from being a witness to a crime is understandable. A criminal proceeding
entails a lot of unavoidable inconveniences, aside from the time involved in attendance as a witness in
investigations and hearings

Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

Suffice it to say that even if the money given to De la Cruz was not presented in court, the same would not
militate against the People's case. 19 In fact, there was even no need to prove that the marked money was
handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The crime could have been consummated by the mere
delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not
limited to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another
personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense.

People vs Animudin

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the
PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence,
the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
Harvey vs Defensor-Santiago
Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance
of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof."
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace
officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section
5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for
three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without. Those articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.

It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning"
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances
the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as
"psychosexual perversion involving children." At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be
released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its.
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section
37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien;

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is
never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the
charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators. However, all the strict rules of
evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental and
essential like the right of cross-examination. Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is
given the opportunity to explain or rebut it.
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings."

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence.

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in
order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion
on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released
under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The
use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the Commissioner.

The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power.

People vs Sucro

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the
activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away
from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to
some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three
times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to
P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught
throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-
appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just
committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team
which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is
paramount is that probable cause existed.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule

There is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence

People vs Rodrigueza
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or
posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this
qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of
dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and
taking him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of
marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the
aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the
law.

An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial examination. He was also asked if he was
waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of
a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present
case, the waiver made by appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient
to invalidate said sworn statement. 14
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. 15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 16 when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; 17 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a search may be validly made even without a
search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls
under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and
necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid,
then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that
became the basis of appellant's conviction.
It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not affect his
credibility. It even enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has not been
rehearsed. 25 However, when the inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial points, the same detract
from his overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are tainted with serious flaws and material inconsistencies rendering the same incredible. 26
CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of the place where
the buy-bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he did not even know the exact place
and the identity of the person from whom he was to buy marijuana leaves.

Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly
shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause.
People vs Bagista
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected
to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving
vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view. 16

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. 17

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18

The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from
the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since
she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.

Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the
course of said search is admissible against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of
the evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to
a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom.

People vs Mengote
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had
yet to be committed.

Go vs CA
the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and
completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of
Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
 his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when
[the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who
had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113.
When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself,
in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that
he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of
Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error,
for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded
him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial
Court.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While
that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established
by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The
accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak
of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened
criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive
him the full measure of his right to due process.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke
it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had
vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation.
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was
equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands
was not strong.
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be,
in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation
of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the
evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

People vs Bolasa
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an
impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, [3] and prevents him from being
irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some
measure agreeable."[4]
Arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed unreasonable and are thus allowed
even in the absence of a warrant -
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[6]
An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact
been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.[7] A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. [8]
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-
enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were
about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was
committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third,
accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later
on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped
first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the
room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance
considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-
appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest
being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during
the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; [9] hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law.

People vs Manlulu
The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (
1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and,
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Here, at the outset, the two accused have already failed to show that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more, is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression. For
unlawful aggression to be appreciated in self-defense, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 18
Even the means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not reasonable. Furthermore, their
flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of their guilt. 20 Indeed, a righteous individual will
not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally justified
in so doing.
If the accused honestly believed that their acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of
the victim, they should have reported the incident to the police, instead of escaping and avoiding the
authorities until they were either arrested or prevailed upon to surrender. 22
Certainly, the police authorities should have first obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused Rolando
Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing took place at one o'clock in the
morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some
nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest.
In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in fact just been
committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of
Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of
information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows
the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.
In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e.,
the .45 cal. service pistol of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial
confession which was taken in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, still the prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on
record point to their culpability. 24

People vs Escordial
Rule 113, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball court
in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, NegrosOccidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a
crime when he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could
be effected even without a warrant.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officer making the arrest.[38]
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only
on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present
when the crime was committed, they could not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of
the commission of the crime so as to be justified in the belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the
crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against
him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997 without questioning his warrantless arrest.[39] He thus
waived objection to the legality of his arrest.[40]
Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest
was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free
from error. B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that
[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. He contends that he was subjected to custodial
interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel
preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from
him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellants rights under this provision.
In other words, nouncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have
been excluded as evidence against him.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that
such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. [42] However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as
accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain
Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-
of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is
identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. [43] During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of
these pre-trial proceedings might well settle the accuseds fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.
[44]

Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being the direct result of the illegal lineup come at by exploitation of [the primary]
illegality.[46]
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree. [48] This in-court
identification was what formed the basis of the trial courts conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not
derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof,[49] it is admissible
as evidence against him.

People vs Jayson
Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: . . . .
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the
victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact
accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was then
fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and
of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.
This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous circumstances.
The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the seizure from him of the firearm was
likewise lawful. Rule 126, 12 states:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.

People vs Salvatierra
The element of immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense and the time of the
arrest had not been complied with.
While these arguments may be valid, appellants claim that the case against him should be dismissed
for violation of his constitutional rights, must fail. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of
his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[28]
29]
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and participated during the
trial.[30] Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was free from error. [31]
Neither may appellant successfully assert that the case should be dismissed because during custodial
investigation and the police line-up he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
The right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police
lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reason for this is that at that point, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. The accuseds right to counsel attaches
only from the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.[35
In the same vein, appellant may not validly claim that dismissal of the case against him should
be a matter of course because he signed the booking and information sheet without the assistance of
counsel. Granting that affixing the signature of an accused is covered by the constitutional mandate
requiring assistance of counsel to an accused during custodial investigation, this piece of evidence may be
disregarded without the least diluting the prosecutions case against appellant. The booking and
information sheet is not the only incriminatory evidence against appellant.
]
Minor discrepancies in the testimony of a witness even enhances her credibility, as these minor
discrepancies could also indicate that the response given by the witness was honest and unrehearsed.
[41]
In fact, when an unlettered person like Milagros testifies, inconsistencies in her testimony may be
disregarded without impairing her credibility

People vs Hernandez
There is no question that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under
circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest. [29]Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated
the Constitution.[30] However, jurisprudence is settled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. [31] In the case at bar, by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial, appellants
waived their right to challenge the legality of their warrantless arrests.[32]
We rule that appellants' extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence. It bears emphasis
that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary for no sane person would confess to a
crime unless he has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to prove the involuntariness of his
confession.[33] In the case at bar, appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this burden.
We cannot sustain appellants' charge that they were coerced to execute their confessions. Their
accusation lacks proof and is belied by the records. No medical certificate was presented to prove their
maltreatment.Neither did they exhibit any physical marks of violence. The records reveal that appellants
did not file an administrative or criminal complaint against their alleged torturers. During the preliminary
investigation, appellants even subscribed their confession before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu who certified that
he personally examined appellants and was fully convinced that they voluntarily executed and understood
their extrajudicial confessions.Hence, the trial court rightly rejected appellants' allegation of maltreatment.
[34]

The fact that Atty. Villanueva is a retired member of the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on
his impartiality in assisting appellants during their custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence of
bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva.
With the proper admission of their extrajudicial confessions, we find that the guilt of appellants
TUMANENG and LORENZO was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It again bears stressing that
appellant LORENZO was convicted not only on the basis of his extrajudicial confession, but also on the
positive identification by prosecution witness EVA STA. CRUZ, the victim's nanny.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. The conviction of
appellants ALFREDO T. TUMANENG and JOSE L. LORENZO for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom is AFFIRMED, while appellant MARLON FAMODULAN is ACQUITTED for insufficiency
of evidence.