G.R. No. 123872 January 30, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

FACTS: - Evidence of the prosecution: o Appellant was apprehended by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin. o Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos. o These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer had informed them the day before that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney - Appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed that he traveled with only some pocket money and without any luggage. He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. ISSUE: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

WON the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto (YES) WON the civilian informer should have been presented in court (NO) WON the warrantless search and seizure is valid (YES) WON the evidence acquired is admissible in evidence (YES) WON there was probable cause to consider appellant in in flagrante delicto (YES) WON there was a violation of the Miranda rights (NO)

HELD: 1. This Court, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows: Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs . The penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. 2. The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. - For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because 9 of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course. 3. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded. - Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. - Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. - This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus: (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and

(6) "stop and frisk" measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions. In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana. The informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were begin brought by someone separately from, the courier. On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant 4. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under the provision, a peace officers or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. - A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender: (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 5. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). - These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. - The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. - In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning. - Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. - Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. - With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. - Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. - When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. - while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the law, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. 6. Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof. - Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no

incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.