Crimpro Search and Seizures

June 21, 2010. G.R. No. 188611.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BELEN MARIACOS, appellant.

Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Searches and Seizures.Law and jurisprudence have laid
down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; It is well to remember that in the instances recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause; Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged, and, the grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. It is well to remember that in the instances we
have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos
a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Search of Moving Vehicles; A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure, but it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judgea requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
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be sought. Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
Same; Same; Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 13. Search incident to
lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit: x x x Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession or Transportation of Prohibited Drugs; When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her
but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence. When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Crimes Mala Prohibita; Mere possession and /or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act; Anti-narcotics laws, like antigambling laws, are regulatory statutesthey are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of
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society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Appellants alleged lack of
knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibitacondemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another; There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drugwhen the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.
Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another. There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.
Same; Same; Same; The accuseds possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gives rise to the disputable presumption that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. Appellants
possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissiblewhat is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. It
is admitted that there were no
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photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Same; Same; Same; Assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, failure of the accused to raise this issue before the trial court is deemed to be a waiver of any objection on the matter.While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for
non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; Actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.The actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of
custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Office of the Solicitor General for appellee. Public Attorneys Office for appellant.
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos
NACHURA,J.: Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon: Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos; 2. 1. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union; from a passenger jeepney; 3.
That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted
_______________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-13. 2 CA Rollo, pp. 13-29.
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That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab; 4.
That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana; That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained ( and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams; The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and family ( 7. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused 8.sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino. During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence: On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic). At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.334
5.
6.sic)
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the
black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away. PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered. Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that: On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant
discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the
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owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.3 On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media. SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.6 Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990,
which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs
_______________ 3 Rollo, pp. 2-5. 4 CA Rollo, p. 29. 5 Id., at p. 45. 6 Id., at p. 48. 7 Id., at p. 50.
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the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same. On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was
confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.11
_______________ 8 Id., at p. 108. 9 Id., at p. 112. 10 Id., at p. 113. 11 Id., at pp. 114-115.
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In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was
on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accusedappellant. xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is
misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to
intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the BarangayIntelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving
vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could
_______________ 12 Rollo, p. 13. 338
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not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.13
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction. Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less,
clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not. Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer. Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant. Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2. Section
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
_______________ 13 Id., at pp. 8-9.
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1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are: 2.
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (a)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (b)
the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(c) (d)
plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; Consented warrantless search; Customs search; 5. 4. 3.
Stop and Frisk; and 6. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 7.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a war_______________ 14 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880; 288 SCRA 626, 637-638 (1998). (Citations omitted.)
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rant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.15 In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18
_______________ 15 Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 118, 126; 302 SCRA 490, 498 (1999), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 (1996); and People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).
16 G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 68-69. (Citations omitted.) 17 People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at p. 880; p. 638. 18 Except when the prohibited items are in plain view.
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Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.20 Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judgea requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.21 This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
_______________ 19 People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at p. 880; p. 638, citing People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301; 280 SCRA 72 (1997). 20 People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632; 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1999). 21 People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15, at pp. 128-129, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740; 366 SCRA 471 (2001).
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dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.22 Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported from BarangayBalbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the BarangayIntelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs. This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
13. SEC.Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.23
_______________ 22 Salvador v. People, 502 Phil. 60, 72; 463 SCRA 489, 501 (2005). 23 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126.
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For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
5. SEC.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (a)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (b)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (c)
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.25 Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
_______________ 24 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113. 25 People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752; 412 SCRA 142 (2003).
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5. SEC.Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence. When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26 Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged ismalum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery
_______________ 26 People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21, at p. 751; pp. 481-482. (Citations omitted.) 27 Id., citing People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38 (1999).
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of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28 Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.29 Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to another.30 There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.32 Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption33
_______________ 28 People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229, 239; 365 SCRA 747, 756 (2001).
29 People v. Doria, supra note 20, at p. 618; p. 696. (Citations omitted.) 30 People v. Peaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 125. 31 People v. Jones, 343 Phil. 865, 877; 278 SCRA 345, 355 (1997). 32 People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679, 700. 33 Section 3 (j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court states: 3. Sec.Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxxx That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole (j)
346
that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient. Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags. Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited
and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua nonfor conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delictiof that crime.35 Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
21. Section
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
_______________ act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. 34 See People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21. 35 People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 909; 428 SCRA 51, 61 (2004), citingPeople v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120 (1994). 347
347
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (1)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
21. SECTIONCustody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be requi (a)red to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
348
348

officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then
marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.37 Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
_______________ 36 CA Rollo, p. 16. 37 People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436-437, citing People v. Del Monte, 552 SCRA 627 (2008).
349
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are
inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.38 Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter. Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.39 In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Perez,** JJ., concur.
No. L-71410. November 25,1986. JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PCINP MARINDUQUE, respondents. Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Words and Phrases; Probable cause definedProbable cause was described by Justice
*
Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff as referring to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
Same; Same;Judge should not limit his inquiry on complainants affidavit only.By his own account, all he did
was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same, and only because the application was not yet subseribed aad swora to. The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicants deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
Same; Same; An application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance of that writIn
other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicants deciarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
_______________
*
EN BANC.
SUPREME COURT EEPORTS ANNOTATED Roan vs. Gonzales
688 68
8
establish the applicants claims.
Same; Same; Ulterior motive ofapplicants witnesses to application for search warrant should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations.A study of the depositions taken from
witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be intelligence informers, shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a Lecarista) did not excite the respondent judges own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
Same; Same; The judge should inquire into how the deponents were able to know even the caliber of the guns and the number ofguns and bullets that are allegedly being kept in the place to be searched.0ne may well wonder why it did not
occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the withesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing.
Same; Same; Waiver; Estoppel; Conformity of person in writing for his house to be searcked by the military while serving a search warrant cannot be considered voluntary; No waiver to defects in the warrant can be implied therefrom.We
do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,
689
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 Roan vs. Gonzales 689
the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive
atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; A prohibited article falling under the concept of malum prohibitum, such as a pistol, may be seized butonly when the search is validProhibited articles
may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an article, like a gun, covered by offenses deftned as mala prohibita may not be summarily seized; A search warrant is still necessary; Exceptions.It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegalper se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may
not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities couid have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing. Same; Same; Same; Same.It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting
officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the states jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
690 69
0 Roan vs. Gonzales SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same: Same; Same; Same.Clearly, though, the instant

case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and builets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioners pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Same; Same; Evidence; Seized pistol under a void warrant shall remain in custodia legis pendente lite although it cannot be used in evidence against the accused.The pistol and bullets
cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.
Same; Same; Courts; There is no need to ask for quaskal of warrant by the court that issued it when tke petition before Supreme Court raises serious and urgent constitutional
issues.Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have,

before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normai procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.
PETITION to review the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Marinduque, Br. XXXVIII. Gonzales, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. CRUZ, J.; Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul. One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where
691
he was monarch of all he surveyedL This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown. That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past
despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son retuming. That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or af firmation of the ccmplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searcheci, and the persons or things to be seized. SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking, these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) and thereafter permanently enjoined. The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioners house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
1 2
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 21,7779.
Ibid, pp. 4, 23.
692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Roan vs. Gonzales
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of ihe charge against the petitioner. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin inBurgos v. Chief of Staff as referring to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. The inclusion of the requirement for the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the 1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federal Constitution of the United States which served as our model, it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedjire. Never3 4 5 6 7
_______________
3
Id., p. 5.
Annex"N'', Petition. Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court;Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383; Lim v.
Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299;Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169;People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache & Co. (PhiL), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 82.3.
6
133 SCRA 800. Stonehill v. Diokno, supra; Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312; Castro v. Pabalan, 70
SCRA 477; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301; Oca v. Maiquez, 14 SCRA 735.
693
theless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention. Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
8
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicantThe municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personaily examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainants two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
9
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quillosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Af terwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me.
10
By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same, and only because the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. The
_______________
8
Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, No. 22, pp. 10981105. Rollo,pp. 102,116121. Ibid, pp. 10M02.
10
694
suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicants deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented tohim. As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: .
11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he saw no need to have applicant Quillosas deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicants declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish
12 13
_______________
11
128 SCRA 388, 391. Rollo, p. 102. Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33; Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil 230;Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689; Burgos v. Chief of
12
13
Staff, supra.
695
VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 Roan vs. Gonzales
14
695
the applicants claims. Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be intelligence informers, shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by TohiKda that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a fqllower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a Lecarista") did not excite the respondent judges own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them. The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate. He could even positively say that six of the weapons were .45 caliber pistols and two were .38 caliber revolvers. One may weli wonder why it did not occur to the respondent
15 16 17 18 19
_______________
14
People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667: Rodriguez v. Villamiel, supra;Alvarez v. CFI, supra. Mata v. Bayona, supra; cf. Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 119120.
15
16
17
Ibid, pp. 26,27,117,120.
18
Id, p. 120. Id.
19
696
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at ail, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformityinwriting. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the nulitary authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
20 21
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen live bullets seized from the petitioner were il~ legal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence. the illegal articles could be taken even without a warrant. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
_______________
20
Ibid., pp. 145,151,152.

Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770.
21
697
military officers who enterecl the petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets. It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked forthe guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant The fact that they did bother to do so indicates
that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing. It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause, Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the states jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
22 23 24 25 26 27
_______________
22
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, cited in Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857;People v. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86. Almelda-Sanchez v. U.S., 37 L. ed. 2ed. 596. Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336; Papa v. Mago, supra. People vs. Malasigui, 63 Phil. 221. Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234.
23
24
25
26
27
698
Clearly. though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even
claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioners pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle. Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because the constable has bhmdered, Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hands justification that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.'' The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said artieles rnust rernain in custodia legis. Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, ftted a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos,this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised." WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 184 issued by the respondent judge on May 10,1984, is hereby declared null
28
and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J. Feria, Yap, Fernan, MelencioHerrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
_______________
28
Supra.
699
Narvasa and Feliciana, JJ., in the result Search Warrant No. 184 null and void and accordingly set aside.
G.R. No. 144309. November 23, 2001. SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORPORATION and ROBERT SITCHON, petitioners, vs. THE SHERIFF OF RTC QC, Branch 93; SANLY CORPORATION, ERA RADIO AND ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, LWT CO., INCORPORATED; ROD CASTRO, VICTOR TUPAZ and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Only judges have the power to issue search warrants.It is undisputed that only
*
judges have the power to issue search warrants. This function is exclusively judicial. Article III of the Constitution unequivocally states: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]
Same; Same; Inherent in the courts power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued.
Inherent in the courts power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: SEC. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
Same; Same; In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant.In the
determination of probable cause,
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93
492 49
2
the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. Prior to the revision of December 1, 2000, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided: SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection withone specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Words and Phrases; A preliminary investigation, by definition, also requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime.A preliminary investigation, by definition, also
requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime. Previous to the 2000 revision, Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court defined a preliminary investigation as an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other.The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a
search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the others finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.
Same; Same; Same; When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation.When the court, in determining probable cause
for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file an information for the courts ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the
493
VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 493
Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93
executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.
Same; Same; Same; The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, including the preliminary investigation.The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the
ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, including the preliminary investigation. Article III of the Constitution provides. SEC. 3. (1) x x x. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. It may be true that, as a result of the quashal of the warrant, the private complainant is deprived of vital evidence to establish his case, but such is the inevitable consequence.
Same; Same; Same; It is puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing.The
Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions
to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation.
Intellectual Property Code; Unfair Competition; There is no unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code where a person did not pass off the subject goods as that of another.We disagree with petitioners and find that
the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong. Petitioners also allege that private respondents made it appear that they were
494 49
4 Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines. Assuming that this act constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Affidavits of Merit; An affidavit of merit is not necessary where the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the facts.We
agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues when it ruled that there were no grounds for the issuance of an order of preliminary attachment. The only issue raised with respect to the preliminary attachment was whether the application for the writ should have been denied because the same was not supported by an affidavit of the applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who
personally knows the facts. Whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the order is a matter best left to the trial court, which apparently has yet to hear the matter. Thus, we sustain the Court of Appeals original decision holding that an affidavit of merit is not necessary since the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the facts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
S.P. Rivera & Associates and Romulo, Mabanta,Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for petitioners. KAPUNAN, J.:
The petition at bar stems from two cases, Search Warrant Case No. Q-3324 (99) before Branch 93 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), and Civil Case No. Q-9337206for damages and injunctions before Branch 91 of the same court. The facts are set forth in the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 6, 1999:
x x x on January 28, 1999, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, upon application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), issued Search Warrant No. 3324 (99) against Sanly Corporation (Sanly), respondent, for violation of Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 (unfair competition).
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VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93 495
By virtue of Search Warrant No. 3324 (99), EIIB agents seized 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper from respondent Sanly. x x x Forthwith, Solid Triangle, through Robert Sitchon, its Marketing and Communication Manager, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for unfair competition against the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT Co., Inc. (LWT), docketed as I.S. No. 1-99-2870.
Sitchon alleged that ERA Radio and Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated by LWT, is in conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi brand photo paper to the damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle, [which claims to be the sole and exclusive distributor thereof, pursuant to an agreement with the Mitsubishi Corporation]. On February 4, 1999, petitioner Solid Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas sala an urgent ex
parte motion for the transfer of custody of the seized Mitsubishi photo color paper stored in the office of
EIIB. On February 8, 1999, respondents Sanly, LWT and ERA moved to quash the search warrant which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an order dated March 5, 1999. The said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by Judge Bruselas in the first assailed order of March 18, 1999. Respondent Judge held that there is doubt whether the act complained of (unfair competition) is criminal in nature. Petitioner Solid Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the quashal of the search warrant is not proper considering the pendency of the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 1-992870 for unfair competition wherein the seized items will be used as evidence. On March 26, 1999, Judge Bruselas issued the second assailed order denying Solid Triangles motion for reconsideration. On March 29, 1999, petitioner Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the same Court, presided by Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo, Civil Case No. Q-99-37206 for damages and injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and attachment. Impleaded as defendants were Sanly, LWT and ERA. On March 30, 1999, the defendants filed their opposition to the application for the issuance of writs of injunction and attachment. On March 31, 1999, Judge Genilo denied petitioners application for a preliminary attachment on the ground that the application is not supported with an affidavit by the applicant, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts.
496
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93
Meanwhile, on April 20, 1999, Judge Bruselas issued the third assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the court directs
1. 1)EIIB, Mr. Robert Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales Corporation to divulge and report to the court the exact location of the warehouse where the goods subject of this proceeding are presently kept within seventy-two hours from receipt hereof; 2. 2)Mr. Rober Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales Corporation to appear and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for failure to obey a lawful order of the court at a hearing for the purpose on 12 May 1999 at 8:30 oclock in the morning; 3. 3)The Deputy Sheriff of this Court to take custody of the seized goods and cause their delivery to the person from whom the goods were seized without further lost [sic] of time; Let a copy of this order be served by personal service upon Mr. Robert Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales Corporation. Serve copies also to EIIB and the respondents Rod Castro and Sanly Corporation. SO ORDERED.
1
Alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioners questioned before the Court of Appeals the orders of Branch 93 of the Quezon City RTC granting private respondents motion for reconsideration and denying that of petitioners, as well as the order dated April 20, 1999 directing petitioners to, among other things, show cause why they should not be held in contempt. Petitioners also assailed the order of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 91 denying their application for a writ of attachment. Upon the filing of the petition on April 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Bruselas from implementing the Order dated April 20, 1999. On July 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment initially granting certiorari. It held that the quashing of the warrant deprived the prosecution of vital evidence to determine probable cause.
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1
Rollo, pp. 58-61.
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VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 497
Admittedly, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City has filed a complaint for unfair competition against private respondents and that the undergoing preliminary investigation is in progress. In the said proceedings, the prosecution inevitably will present the seized items to establish a prima facie case of unfair competition against private respondents. Considering that Judge Bruselas quashed the search warrant, he practically deprived the prosecution of its evidence so vital in establishing the existence of probable cause. Petitioners reliance on Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [155 SCRA 186 (1987).] is in order. Thus:
The proceeding for the seizure of property in virtue of a search warrant does not end with the actual taking of the property by the proper officers and its delivery, usually constructive, to the court. The order for the issuance of the warrant is not a final one and cannot constitute res judicata (Cruz vs. Dinglasan, 83 Phil. 333). Such an order does not ascertain and adjudicate the permanent status or character of the seized property. By its very nature, it is provisional, interlocutory (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657). It is merely the first step in the process to determine the character and title of the property. That determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection with which the search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal action should be prosecuted, or commenced if not yet instituted, and prosecuted. The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property.
2
The appellate court further ruled that the affidavit of merits is not necessary for the order of preliminary attachment to issue considering that the petition itself is under oath:
The denial was based on the ground that the application is not supported by an affidavit of the applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts. We cannot go along with respondent judges theory. In Consul vs. Consul [17 SCRA 667 (1996)], the Supreme Court held:
Affidavit of merits has a known purpose: Courts and parties should not require the machinery of justice to grind anew, if the prospects of a different conclusion cannot be reasonably reached
_______________
2
Id., at 61-63.
498
should relief from judgment be granted. We look back at the facts here. The petition for relief is verified by petitioner himself. The merits of petitioners case are apparent in the recitals of the petition. Said petition is under
oath. That oath, we believe, elevates the petition to the same category as a separate affidavit. To require defendant
to append an affidavit of merits to his verified petition, to the circumstances, is to compel him to do the unnecessary. Therefore, the defect pointed by the court below is one of forms, not of substance. Result: Absence of a separate affidavit is of de minimis importance.
3
Upon motion by respondents, however, the Court of Appeals reversed itself. In its Amendatory Decision, the appellate court held that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Accordingly, the evidence obtained by virtue of said warrant was inadmissible in the preliminary investigation.
x x x Under Sections 168 and 170 of R.A. 8293 (the Intellectual Property Code), there is unfair competition if the alleged offender has given to his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer and sells or passes them off as goods of that manufacturer or dealer in order to deceive or defraud the general public or the legitimate trader. Also, if he makes false statements in the course of trade to discredit the goods, business, or services of another. Undisputedly, the seized goods from Sanly are genuine and not mere imitations. This is admitted by petitioners in their application for a search warrant and supporting affidavits, Annexes A to D, inclusive, in their April 27, 1999 Submission of Annexes to this Court. It bears stressing that there is no showing or allegation that Sanly has presented, sold, or passed off its photographic paper as goods which come from Solid Triangle. There is no attempt on its part to deceive. Both Sanly and Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi products. Solid Triangle acquires its goods from Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with Mitsubishi Corporation. While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming it is a parallel importer, not an unfair competitor. As defined, a parallel importer is one which imports, distributes, and sells genuine products in the
market,independently of an exclusive distributorship or agency agreementwith the manufacturer. And, this is precisely what Sanly states as its commercial status.
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3
Id., at 63-64. Italics by the Court of Appeals.
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VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 499
Records show that Sanly sold its photographic paper purchased from Hongkong without altering its appearance. It is distributed in the same Mitsubishi box with its logo and distinguishing marks as marketed in Japan. The same brown paper with the Mitsubishi seal is wrapped around its products. Copies of the importation documents and the certification on imports issued by the Philippine government recognized Societe Generale d Surveillance (SGS) were appended to the motion to quash search warrant. Thus, on factual basis, the real dispute is actually between Solid Triangle and the manufacturer Mitsubishi. If Solid Triangle feels aggrieved, it should sue Mitsubishi for damages, if at all for breach of its distributorship. But that is between them. Certainly, there is here no probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant based on a criminal action for unfair competition. Therefore, since there is no probable cause for unfair competition in this case, then the quashal of the search warrant by respondent Judge Bruselas is valid. This being the case, there is merit in the motion for reconsideration. In ascertaining the legality of a search warrant and the validity of the search and seizure conducted by the EIIB agents by virtue of the warrant, it is essential that a crime has been committed or is being committed and that the things seized are fruits of the crime or the means by which it is committed. The validity of a search and seizure is of constitutional dimensions. The right to privacy and the sanctity of a persons house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures are not only ancient. They are also zealously protected. xxx Solid Triangle contends that the quashal of the search warrant deprived it of its right to prove a prima facie case of unfair competition in the preliminary investigation. We initially agreed with it. While Solid Triangle has the right to present every single piece of evidence it can gather and muster, however, it has no right to prove its case through the use of illegally seized evidence secured in derogation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The constitutional provision that any evidence obtained in violation of the provision against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding finds application here. The goods seized without probable cause are fruits of the poisonous tree
500
and cannot be used for the purpose of proving unfair competition during preliminary investigation proceedings. The case of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appealsdoes not apply since it involved a different set of facts and issues. On the contrary, it is the case of People vs. Court of Appeals [216 SCRA 101 (1992)] that governs, where the Supreme Court ruled that with the quashal of the search warrant, the seized goods could not be used as evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding.
4
As regards the preliminary attachment, the appellate court found that there was no ground for the issuance of the writ because:
x x x Sanly does not deny that it sells Mitsubishi photographic color paper. But there is no showing that it attempts to depart from country, defraud Solid Triangle or the buying public, conceal or dispose of unjustly detained personal property, or commit any of the acts provided in Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 5
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 4, 2000. In assailing the Amendatory Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners argue that:
I. THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED A SEARCH WARRANT THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED CANNOT QUASH THE WARRANT ANYMORE, AT LEAST WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE FINDINGS OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR WHO HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE. II. IN THE PARALLEL IMPORTATION EFFECTED BY THE RESPONDENTS WITH DECEIT AND BAD FAITH, THERE EXISTS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE CRIME OF UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.
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4
Id., at 74-79. Italics in the original. Id., at 80.
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VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93
III. PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT CANNOT BE DENIED ON THE GROUND THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IS NOT APPENDED TO THE COMPLAINT, AS THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALREADY RULED, AND ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IT BECAUSE THE QUESTIONS PERTINENT THERETO ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS BUT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. IV. PETITIONERS CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR CONTEMPT IN NOT RETURNING THE GOODS SUBJECT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RULE ON THIS POINT FURTHER WHICH IS A GRIEVOUS ERROR TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PETITIONERS.
6
501
Petitioners contend that the Constitution does not authorize the judge to reverse himself and quash the warrant, especially after goods had been seized pursuant to the search warrant, and the prosecution is poised to push forward with the goods as evidence. In finding that doubt exists that a crime has been committed, it is argued that the judge trench[ed] upon the prerogative and duty of the city prosecutor. The contention has no merit. It is undisputed that only judges have the power to issue search warrants. This function is exclusively judicial. Article III of the Constitution unequivocally states:
7 8 9
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and par-
_______________
6
Id., at 29-30. Id., at 20. Id., at 33. Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 (1990).
502
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]
Inherent in the courts power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
10
SEC. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. Prior to the revision of December 1, 2000, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]
_______________
10
11
People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 (1998).

Presently Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which now reads:
11
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
503
Note that probable cause is defined as:

x x x the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
12
In Kenneth Roy Savage/K Angelin Export Trading vs. Taypin, the Court was confronted with a search warrant that was issued purportedly in connection with unfair competition involving design patents. The Court held that the alleged crime is not punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, quashed the search warrant issued for the non-existent crime.
13
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. x x x.
A preliminary investigation, by definition, also requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime. Previous to the 2000 revision, Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court defined a preliminary investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Section 2 of the same Rule enumerates who may conduct preliminary investigations:
14
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to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
12
People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262 (1998).

331 SCRA 697 (2000). The phrase cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been omitted in Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised
13
14
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
504
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct preliminary investigations: 1. (a)Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; 2. (b)Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; 3. (c)National and Regional state prosecutors; and 4. (d)Such other officers as may be authorized by law. Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
15
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation has been described as an executive function. The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the others finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding
16
differs from the other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court. When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the inves_______________
15
Under the Revised Rules, this provision now reads:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct preliminary investigations: 1. (a)Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants, 2. (b)Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; 3. (c)National and Regional State Prosecutors; and 4. (d)Other officers as may be authorized by law. Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
16
People vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
505
tigating officer not to file an information for the courts ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation. The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, including the
preliminary investigation. Article III of the Constitution provides.

SEC. 3. (1) x x x. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be true that, as a result of the quashal of the warrant, the private complainant is deprived of vital evidence to establish his case, but such is the inevitable consequence. Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained through an illegal warrant does not necessarily render the preliminary investigation academic. The preliminary investigation and the filing of the information may still proceed if, because of other (admissible) evidence, there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The finding by the court that no crime exists does not preclude the authorized officer conducting the preliminary investigation from making his own determination that a crime has been committed and that probable cause exists for purposes of filing the information. Petitioners also argue that Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra, while intended to resolve conflicts of responsibility between courts, does not expressly cover the situation where the criminal complaint is pending with the prosecutor. In such a case, petitioners submit, the public
506
prosecutor should be allowed to resolve the question of whether or not probable cause exists. The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation. We now turn to the question of whether the facts, as presented before the trial court, constitute an offense. Private respondents are alleged to have committed unfair competition in violation of Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code, which states:
17
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.168.1 A person who has identified in the mind of the public goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other property rights. 168.2 Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those
of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
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17
Id., at 303-304.
507
168.3 In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition: 1. (a)Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a lie purpose; 2. (b)Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the service of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or 3. (c)Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. 168.4 The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
The same law, in Section 170, provides the penalty for violation of Section 168:
SEC. 170. Penalties.Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.
Petitioners submit that the importation of even genuine goods can constitute a crime under the Intellectual
Property Code so long as fraud or deceit is present. The intent to deceive in this case, according to petitioners, is patent from the following undisputed facts: 1. (a)Before marketing its product, the respondents totally obliterated and erased the Emulsion Number and Type that was printed on the
508
1. box/carton of the product because of which the source of the goods can no longer be traced. 2. (b)Respondents even covered the boxes with newspapers to conceal true identity. 3. (c)Being also engaged in the sale of photo equipments [sic] and having had the occasion of participating in the same exhibit with petitioner Solid Triangle several times already, respondents certainly knew that petitioner Solid Triangle is the sole and exclusive importer and distributor of Mitsubishi Photo Paper. 4. (d)Two agents of the EIIB were also able to confirm from a salesgirl of respondents that substantial quantity of stocks of Mitsubishi Photo Paper are available at respondents store and that the products are genuine, as they are duly authorized to sell and distribute it to interested customers. 5. (e)No better proof of unfair competition is the seizure of the goods, 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper. Petitioners further expound: 1. 47.We may categorize the acts of the respondents as underground sales and marketing of genuine
18
goods, undermining the property rights of petitioner Solid Triangle. The Court of Appeals itself recognized the rights of a dealer. The acts of the respondents were made to appropriate unjustly the goodwill of petitioner Solid Triangle, and goodwill is protected by the law on unfair competition. 2. 48.Petitioner Solid Triangle has established a trade or business in which it had acquired goodwill and reputation that will be protected, and so, to permit respondents to continue importing and distributing Mitsubishi Photo Paper, would be to countenance the unlawful appropriation of the benefit of a goodwill which petitioner Solid Triangle has acquired and permit the respondent to grab the reputation or goodwill of the business of another. 3. 49.x x x petitioners have a valid cause to complain against respondents for the criminal violation of the Intellectual Property Law when the latter made it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines, when in truth and in fact they were not, and when they were hiding their importation from the petition_______________
18
Id., at 43-44.
509
1. ers by such acts as removing the Emulsion Number and Type and covering the boxes with old newspapers.
19
We disagree with petitioners and find that the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong. Petitioners also allege that private respondents made it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines. Assuming that this act constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation. We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues when it ruled that there were no grounds for the issuance of an order of preliminary attachment. The only issue raised with respect to the preliminary attachment was whether the application for the writ should have been denied because the same was not supported by an affidavit of the applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts. Whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the order is a matter best left to the trial court, which apparently has yet to hear the matter. Thus, we sustain the Court of Appeals original decision holding that an affidavit of merit is not necessary since the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the facts. Similarly premature is whether petitioners failure to return the goods to respondents constituted indirect contempt. The assailed order dated April 20, 1999 was a show cause order. Before any hearing on the order could be held, petitioners promptly filed a petition for certiorari.
20
Clearly, the trial court had yet to rule on the matter, and for this Court now to hold petitioners act contemptuous would preempt said court. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Amendatory Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000, as
_______________
19
Id., at 44-45. Italics in the original. Rollo, p. 123.
20
510
well as its Resolution dated August 4, 2000, is AFFIRMED insofar as it holds that (1) the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, has the power to determine the existence of a crime in quashing a search warrant and, (2) the evidence does not support a finding that the crime of unfair competition has been committed by respondents; and REVERSED insofar as it holds that (1) there are no grounds to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and (2) petitioners are guilty of contempt. The case is remanded for further proceedings to the courts of origin, namely, Branch 91 of RTC, Quezon City for resolution of the application for a writ of attachment, and Branch 93 of the same court for resolution of the application to cite petitioners for contempt. Petitioners are ordered to return to respondent Sanly Corporation the 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Petition partly granted.
Notes.The purpose of the rule that search warrants must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998]) Preliminary investigation proper is not a judicial functionit is a part of the prosecutions job, a function of the executive. (Gozos vs. Tac-an, 300 SCRA 265 [1998])
October 16, 2009.
G.R. No. 158467.*
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, petitioners,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, respondents.
Searches and Seizures; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC; Hierarchy of Courts; The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts, but, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it, such as one involving the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.The general rule is that a party is
mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution. At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,Clarifying the
Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January
25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.
Same; Same; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive
Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
_______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 58
5 8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People
firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads: Chapter 6POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES Sec. 31.Duties of Assistant Heads and
Subordinates.(1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform such
duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as may be specified by their superiors not otherwise
inconsistent with law. (2) The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the
assistant head to act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without additional compensation, and (3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate officer or employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law.
Same; Same; The guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
59
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Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was voidab
initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no
longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law. The petitioners contention lacks merit. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitledGuidelines On The
Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rivera, Perico, David & Rivera Law Offices for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** J.: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Order1 dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimlas Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
_______________ ** Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 739. 1 Rollo, pp. 29-32.
60
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People
Evidence Illegally Seized, and the Order2 dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City3 and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,4 both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagascas request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize the following articles/items:
Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as SHABU, MARIJUANA, weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia, all of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended, and are hidden or being kept in said house/premises.5
Executive Judge Mario Guaria III (Judge Guaria III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad,
_______________ 2 Id., at pp. 33-34.
3 Id., at p. 51. 4 RTC Record, p. 61. 5 See Notes 3 and 4.
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VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 Marimla vs. People 61
Angeles City, an undetermined amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu andmarijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guaria III issued a search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 02-2677, which commanded any peace officer to make immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the properties subject of the offense and bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law directs.6 On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, namely, SI Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten Hernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners house on February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in the morning.7 They were able to seize cash in the amount of P15,200.008 and the following items:
One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape marked RCL-1-2677, (net weight 915.7 grams); 1. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape ( 2.sic) wrapped in a newsprint marked RCL-2-2677 (net weight 491.5 grams); Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a newsprint marked RCL-3-2677 (net weight 127.9 grams); and 3.
Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic bag marked RCL-4-2677 (net weight 18.2736 grams).
_______________ 6 RTC Record, p. 11. 7 Id., at pp. 12-13. 8 Believed as proceeds from the earlier sale of prohibited drugs. 9 RTC Record, p. 14.
4.9
62
On February 20, 2002, an Information10 for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola. On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized11on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence. In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Documentary Evidence,12 asking the court to admit the following documents: (1) application for
Search Warrant No. 02-2677; (2) authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the signature of NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco (Director Wycoco); (3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G. Lansang with the Signature of Director Wycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was defective considering the application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco, and that the latters signature in the authorization letter is different from that as appearing in the identification
_______________ 10 Id., at p. 1. 11 Rollo, p. 35. 12 Id., at pp. 53-58.
63
card, and therefore it is not the true and genuine signature of [Dir.] Wycoco.13 In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,14 the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-1009-SC,15 which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized.16 He avers that Judge Guaria III issued Search Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-9717 issued on February 12,
_______________ 13 Id., at pp. 53-54. 14 Id., at p. 39. 15 Promulgated on January 25, 2000. 16 Rollo, pp. 59-60. 17 Administrative Order No. 20-97 17In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the Hon. Roberto A. Barrios, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and in his absence the Hon. Rebecca de Guia Salvador, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Manila, the Hon. Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Manila and the Hon. Edgardo P. Cruz, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila are hereby authorized to act on all applications for search warrants filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and by the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC), duly certified by the legal officers and personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for the search of places to be particu-
64
1997. He also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant in the house/premises of petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles
City and Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In an Order18 dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T. Viola denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:
The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI. The NBI also was able to explain that the authority to apply search warrant was personally signed by Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who is authorized to sign and that he was delegated the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director on documents of this like. Deputy Director Fermin Nasol
_______________ larly described therein, and the seizure of property or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places even outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts. This order is effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this Court and shall be an exception to the provisions of Circular 13 dated October 1, 1985 and Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987. The authorization herein granted shall cover applications for search warrants involving illegal gambling, dangerous drugs, illegal possession of firearms and other major crimes. The authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued. 18 Rollo, pp. 29-32. 65
VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 Marimla vs. People
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having that authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director, Reynaldo Wycoco, there is, therefore, compliance with the law regarding the issuance of authority to apply search warrant. WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with the views of the prosecution as well as the NBI. And this being so, the Court finds not enough ground to quash the search warrant issued against Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla. The motion filed by them and their supplement, is therefore denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 on the ground that the denial of their Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized is not in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence. They claim that no evidence was presented by Deputy Director Nasol that he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco. Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent court on the ground that the issues raised therein were mere reiterations of petitioners arguments that had already been considered and passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. Respondent court added:
To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the opinion that the Deputy Director of the NBI possesses the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director requesting for the issuance of a search warrant and nothing in the Administrative Matter 99-10-09 prohibits the delegation of such ministerial act to the Deputy Director who is an alter ego of the NBI Director. It is also quite clear that the NBI Director approved said authorization for SI Ray Lagasca to apply for a search warrant because said document was never recalled or amended by the Office of the Bureau Director up to the present.
_______________ 19 Id., at pp. 31-32. 20 Id., at pp. 46-49. 66
66

The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-10-09 is still valid, binding and legal by virtue of the
fact that not even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make any pronouncement withdrawing and or declaring the same ineffective, hence, until such order is issued, this Court must interpret and rule for its continued validity and applicability.21
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners claim that the search warrant was issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of this petition on the ground that the filing of the said petition directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The OSG argues that while this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals (CA) over petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been filed with the CA. The OSG contends that the petitioners have not shown any compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition directly with this Court. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.22 In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of
_______________ 21 Id., at pp. 33-34. 22 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574, 593.
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Marimla vs. People
the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rulemaking power under the Constitution.23 At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 9910-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances below:
Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application
for the Enforceability of Search Warrants In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms. The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts. The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
_______________ 23 Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution. 68
68

This Resolution is effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this Court and
shall be an exemption to the provisions of Circular No. 13 dated 1 October 1985 and Circular No. 19 dated 4 August 1987. x x x
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure Rule 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 2. Sec.Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) (b) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.69
Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the application for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners conclude that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect that rendered the application on the questioned search warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null and void because the spring cannot rise above its source.24 We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads:
Chapter 6POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES 31. Sec.Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates .(1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations,or as may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law .
The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant head to act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without additional compensation, and
_______________ 24 Rollo, p. 14. 70
(2)
70

In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate officer or
employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law. (3)
Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is unassailable. Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law. The petitioners contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On
The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which
explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
71
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:25
Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of V. Chapter Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision 12. Sec.Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of
Manila and Quezon City.The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or
are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)
In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guaria III
_______________ 25 Effectivity date is February 15, 2004.
72
had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the questioned search warrant. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Nachura,*** Brion,**** Peralta***** and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.

Notes.Inferior courts must be modest enough to consciously realize the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. (Villaflor vs. Amatong, 344 SCRA 570 [2000]) Considering that a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine
on the hierarchy of courts. (Honoridez vs. Mahinay, 466 SCRA 646 [2005])
G.R. No. 117412. December 8, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents. Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime, though, as an exception, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, may be made when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched; Absent an abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed is not improper.The general rule is that
*
search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondents residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reasonable hour of the
day or night. Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.
Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about.Petitioner
submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Court of Appeals
454 45
4
a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about. To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such activities only at night.
Same; Same; The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions.
The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy. In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an
abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark or that it caused private respondents family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused inconvenience for private respondents family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a search.
Same; Same; Witness to Search Rule; In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.We find merit in the petitioners
argument that private respondents wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. There was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for the People. Joaquin Bobby Yuseco for private respondent.
455
VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 People vs. Court of Appeals 455
QUISUMBING, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 301291. Thedecretal portion of the assaileddecision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the respondent courts Order of 25 January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition irregularly and unreasonably seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are declared inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by the respondent court pursuant to applicablelaw. SO ORDERED.
1
The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, are as follows: On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National Police-Special Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino Toto Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket, the police officers immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber Raven automatic pistol SN-930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu from the glove compartment. The police then took private respondent into custody.
2
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent for violation of P.D. 1866 with the
3
_______________
1
Rollo,p.54.
Id.at 55.
The decree is entitled Codifying The Laws On Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In,
Acquisition Or Disposition Of Firearms, Ammunition Or Explosives Or Instruments Used In The Manufac-
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Court of Appeals
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Paraaque, Branch 77. Supporting the application were the depositions of two police officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the following unlicensed firearms: Baby armalite M-16; Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and withcorrespondingammunitions(sic). On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No. 92-94 commanding the PNP officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession the personal property subject of the offense described in thewarrant. Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special Investigation Group (SIG) team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security officer, went to private respondents residence in Paraaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same date to search said premises. Private respondents wife and their childs
4 5 6
nanny were both present during the search, but neither consented to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizureof the following unlicensed firearms and ammunition: 1. a.One (1) pistolcal. 9mm SN-1928923 2. b.One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620 3. c.One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449 4. d.Six (6) liveammo, for shotgun. 5. e.One hundred eighteen (118)live ammo for pistol cal. 9mm 6. f.Sixteen (16)live ammo, for M16 rifle 7. g.Thirty (30) live ammo, for pistol cal. 45 8. h.One (1) magazine forpistolcal.9mm 9. i.One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle.
7
_______________ ture Of Firearms, Ammunition Or Explosives, And Imposing Stiffer Penalties For Certain Violations Thereof And For RelevantPurposes.
4
Properly, the US caliber 5.56 mm (.223) Colt CAR-15 or XM-177 carbine versionof the standardColt M-16/M-
16A1 assault rifle.

5
Supra Note 1,at57. Id.at 58. Id. at 59.
457
Private respondents wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition. On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed and filed by the police with the issuing court. At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondents person and jeep in Makati invalid for
violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Paraaquevalid. On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, in Criminal Case No. 92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No.1866. The information alleged:
8
That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniouslyhavein his possession, 1. a.One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923 2. b.One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620 3. c.One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449 4. d.Six (6) liveammo, for shotgun. 5. e.One hundred eighteen (118)rds ammo for pistol cal. 9mm 6. f.Sixteen (16)live ammos (sic), for M16 rifle 7. g.Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45 withoutlawful authority therefore. CONTRARY TO LAW.
9
On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the charges against him arising from the illegal search and seizure in Makati also applied to the search conducted in his house in Paraaque. The trial court denied the same. Private respondent moved for reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied.
_______________
8
CONST. Art. III, sec. 2.
Supra Note 7at71.
458
On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the search warrant on the following grounds: (1) that he was not present when his house was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3) that the search was conducted in violation of the witness-tosearch rule. The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying his motion to quash search warrant. On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its decision declaring as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94. Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments of error:
I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT. II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7 RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. III THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO RETURN WAS PREPARED WHEN ANNEX G WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER OF SIG, CISC, CAMP CRAME. IV
THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRED
IN
CONCLUDING
THAT
THE
PROSECUTION INVOKED A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
459
VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 People vs. Court of Appeals
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
459
Petitioners grounds for this petition may be reduced to one issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from private respondents house are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search. The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for having been done at an unreasonable time of the evening causing inconvenience to the occupants of private respondents house, especially as there was no showing how long the nighttime search lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (1973), where we invalidated a nighttime search conducted on the basis of a warrant which did not specify the time during which the search was to be made. Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable since the search warrant specified that the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or night. The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 8. Time of making search.The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondents residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be
460
10
served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night. Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at nightwhere so allowed, is not improper. As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1985:
11 12 13 14
e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place ordered to be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrantsthatit be servedat anytime of theday or night;
But was the time during which the search was effected reasonable? Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-andabout. To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only
15
_______________
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 9.
11
Simmons v. State, 286 P2d. 296. Supra Note 7,at 56. Id. at 57. State v. Eichhorn, 353 NE 2d 861. State v. Moreno, 222 Kan 149, 563 P2d 1056.
12
13
14
15
461
hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such activitiesonly at night.
16
The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy. In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark or that it caused private respondents family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused inconvenience for private respondents family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the durationof a search. But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his household to act as witnesses to the search? The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:
17 18 19 20
Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses.No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficientage and discretion residing in the same locality.
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondents wife
_______________
16
US v. Plemmons, 336 F2d 731. State v. Schmeets, 278 NW 2d 401.
17
18
People v. Watson, 142 Cal. Rptr 245, 75 CA 3d593. US v. Young, 877 F2d 1099; US v. Escott, 205 F. Supp. 196; US v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 439, affd. 278 F2d
19
504, cert den 364 US 823, 5 L.Ed. 2d 52, 81 S. Ct. 59.

20
State v. Williams, 169 Conn 322, 363A2d72.
462
and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the Certification of Orderly Search and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondents wife. We find merit in the petitioners argument that private respondents wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. There was no irregularity when the PNPCISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses. In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the circumstances in this case. The unlicensed firearms and ammunition taken from private respondents residence pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94 are admissible in evidence against private respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 30129 is REVERSED and NULLIFIED. The firearms and ammunition seized from the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be admissible as evidence in proceedings instituted by the State. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.; JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and nullified.

Notes.The place the police officers have in mind in applying for a search warrant must be the same place the Judge should have in mind when he issues the warrant. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998])
463
VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 Ramoso vs. Courtof Appeals 463
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. (Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36 [2000])

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June 21, 2010. G.R. No. 188611.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BELEN MARIACOS, appellant.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 People vs. Mariacos

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 People vs. Mariacos

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 People vs. Mariacos

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 People vs. Mariacos

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos

the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Stop and Frisk; and 6. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 7.14

Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 People vs. Mariacos

21. SECTIONCustody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mariacos

establish the applicants claims.

Same: Same; Same; Same.Clearly, though, the instant

issues.Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have,

Rollo, pp. 21,7779.

Ibid, pp. 4, 23.

Ibid, pp. 26,27,117,120.

Id, p. 120. Id.

Ibid., pp. 145,151,152.

Rollo, pp. 58-61.

Id., at 63-64. Italics by the Court of Appeals.

Id., at 74-79. Italics in the original. Id., at 80.

People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 (1998).

Note that probable cause is defined as:

People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262 (1998).

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under the Revised Rules, this provision now reads:

People vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

preliminary investigation. Article III of the Constitution provides.

Id., at 44-45. Italics in the original. Rollo, p. 123.

October 16, 2009.

G.R. No. 158467.*

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People

VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 Marimla vs. People

3 Id., at p. 51. 4 RTC Record, p. 61. 5 See Notes 3 and 4.

VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 Marimla vs. People

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People

Hence, this petition.

Marimla vs. People

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Marimla vs. People

Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.

Acquisition Or Disposition Of Firearms, Ammunition Or Explosives Or Instruments Used In The Manufac-

16A1 assault rifle.

Supra Note 1,at57. Id.at 58. Id. at 59.

CONST. Art. III, sec. 2.

Supra Note 7at71.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 9.

US v. Plemmons, 336 F2d 731. State v. Schmeets, 278 NW 2d 401.

504, cert den 364 US 823, 5 L.Ed. 2d 52, 81 S. Ct. 59.

State v. Williams, 169 Conn 322, 363A2d72.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and nullified.

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