243 en PDF

ICAO
CIRCULAR
CIRCULAR 243-AM46
HUMAN FACTORS DIGEST

No. 9
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
ICAO FLIGHT SAFETY AND HUMAN FACTORS
GLOBAL SYMPOSIUM
Washington D.C., April 1993
Approved by the Secretary General

and published under his authority
INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATIOPII
MONTREAL * CANADA
Published in separate English, French, Russian and Spanish editions b y rk lntemtiond Civil
Aviation Organization. Ail correspondence, except orders and subscriptions. should be
addressed to the Secretary General.
Orders lor this publication should be sent to one of the following addressm, together with the appropriate
remitlance (by bank draft, cheque or money ordcrl in U.S. dollms or the currenty of the country in which
Ihc order is placed.
Documeni Sales Unit

lnlernarional Civil Aviation Organiation
I000 Sherbmke Street West, Suite 400
Montreal. Quebec
Canada H3A 2R2
Tel.: (51 4) 285-8219
Telex: 05-245 13
Fax: (5 14) 2884772
Sitatex: YULCAYA
Credil card orders (Visa or American Express only) are accepted at the above address.
Egypt. ICAO Represenm1ive, Middle East Oftice, 9 Shagaret El Dorr Street, Zamalek 1 121 I , Cairo.
Frcmce. Rcprdsentant de InOACI,Bureau Europe ct Allantique Nord, 3 his, villa kmilc-~er~erat,
92522 Neuilly-sur-Seine (Cedex).
India. Oxford Book and Stationery Co., Scindia Housc,Mew Delhi or 17 Park Slreel, Calcutta.
J ~ p u nJapan
. Civil Aviation Promotion Foundation, 15-12. I-chome. Tomnomon, Minato-Ku, Tokyo.
Kenyu. ICAO Representative, Eastern and Southern African Office, United Nations Accommodation.
P.O. Box 46294, Nairobi.
Mexico. Representante de la OACI, Oficina Nortearn6rica. Centroarntrica y Caribe,
A p n a d o pstal5-377. C.P.06500,Mexico, D.E
Peru. Rcpresenvante de la OACI. Oficina SudamCrin. ApWddo 4127. Lima 100.
Senugul. Repdsentant de I'OACI, Burcau Afriquc occidcntale el centale, Boite postatale 2356. Dakar.
Spairr. Pilol's, Suministros Aeronhuticos, S.A., CIUlises, 5-Oficina Num. 2,28043 Madrid.
Thilund. lCAO Representative, Asia and Pacific Office, P.O. Box I 1, Sarnyaek Ladprlo. Bangkok 10901.
United Kiqdos. Civil Aviation Authority, Printing and Publications Services, Creville Housc,
37 Gratton Road, Cheltcnham, Glos., GL50 2BN.
The Catalogue of ICAO Publications

and Audio Visual Training Aids
Issued annually, the Catalogue lists all publications and audio visual
training aids currently availabte.
. Monthly supplemenfs announce new publicationsand audio visual

training aids, amendments, supplements, reprints, etc.
Available free from the Document Sales Unit, ICAO

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opening Ad&esss
Note,- The Opening Session was also addressed by Mr. Joseph DeL Badzo, Acting
Administrator of the Federal A$&~OR Administration and the Honourable J m s L
Oberstnr, ~hj~irmm, House Subcommittee on Aviation, Unied Stam HUM@of
Represena#dives.
Address by Dr. Pldlippe Rochat, Secretary General bf ICAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Message of the Preadent of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission .................. 7
dureau, lCA0
Address by Dr. William R.Eromme, Dirsctor, f i x ~avi'~ation ........... 8
Keynote Addresses
I .
THE HUMAN FACTORS REVOLU7TON: hfEANlNCFUL C W G E OR TEMPORARY TNFA~WA~UN?

Dr. H.Clayton Foushee, Jr. ........................................... 11
LES DEFIS DES M S PROCHAUVES M N E E S

Mr. Jean Paries ..................................................... 31
Abstracts
I. Developing Human Factors Knowledge

, ,
....................'.............. 36
11. Developing Human Factors Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :. . . . . . . . . . . . 45

, , ,
III. Human Factors Training for ~utorn&ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

(ii) Circular 243-AN/146
Page
Appendix A: Papers
I. Developing Human Factors Knowledge
Human Factors Training for Operational Personnel

Capt. Neil Johnston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
Human Factors in Learning and Instruction

Prof. Ross Telfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-15
Human Perfomumce Limitations Requirements - The United Kingdom

Experience
Dr. Rory M. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-23
Human Factors Knowledge Requirements for Flight Crews

Dr. Barry H. Kantowitz, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-29
Implementation of Human Factors Knowledge Requirements

in the Canadian Flight Training System
Insp. J.H. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-35
Human Factors in General Aviation

Mr. Ronald D. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-40
New Aviation Professionalism: Knowledge Systems that

Integrate Human Factor Competencies in Job Performance
Prof. Graham J.F. Hunt, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Some Aspects on Our Human Factors Concept

Capt. Gunnar K. Fahlgren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-64
Training Humans for an Automated ATC Environment

Mr. Bert Ruitenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-70
Transavia's Integrated Approach to Human Factors Training

Mr. David Lawson, Capt. Han Luchsinger, Capt. Frans Trompert . . . . . . . . . A-75
Training of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Human Performance Investigators
Dr. Malcolm Brenner, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Not available at time of publication)
Training the Investigator

Mr. Peter G. Harle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-8 1
Circniar 243-AN/146 (iiil
Page
II. Developing Human Factors Skills
H m Factors Topics in Canadian Private Pilot Training

Insp. Arlo Speer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-98
H m n Aspects Development (HAD) - me Swissair Trainirig Syllabus

b.B. SchL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . * . . . . . . . . . . . .A-104
Maintaining Operational Inleg n' fy through the Introduction of
Hunaan Factors Training
Mr.Douglas Shwartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 124
CRM Program Develuprnent: A T h for Interaction
Mr. J. N o ~ K o m i c h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-128
CRM: Feedback and Appraisal System

Ms,P. Antersijn and Ms. M.Verhoef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 134
Development of Hwnan Factors Skills and Professional
Attitude of Operational Personnel in Korean Air Transport Industry
Prof. Soon-Kil Hong , Ph*D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 147
AIM, Aircre w Integrated Management: A Manufacturer's

Experience in Crew Resource Managernen$
Mr. Eddy L.Racca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 158
A Human Factors Commitlee
Capt. Flemmlng Kirkegaard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 171
The Development of H m n Fmtors Skills mad Professional
Attitudes
Capt. Hans Sypkens ........................................ A-178
Humcan Fuctors and Training lssues in CFlT

Accidents and Incidents
Capt. Roberto Arostegui and Capt. Daniel Maurino .................. A- 184
Enhancing the impact of Human Factors Training

Mr. H. Thomas Heinzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-190
Human Factors Research Data Applied to the TakeofS Safety Training Aid
Capt. William C. Roberson and Dr. William D. Shontz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-196
111. Human Factors Training for Automatiofi
Lre in the Second Deccmde of tlie Glass Cockpit

Prof. Earl L. Wiener, h . D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-203
(iv) Circular 243-AN/146
Page
Managing the Modem Cockpit - A Manufacturer's View
Capt. C.L. Ekstrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-213
Fundamental Engineering Training of Flight Personnel as a

Means to M a k Human Factors More Active in Aviation
Dr. P.V. Nazarenko and Dr. M.F. Davidenko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-221
The Other Side of Automation - A Challenge for Pilot Training

Capt. Dieter ScNund and FIO Martin Wyler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-227
Training for Computer Assisted Flying (CAF)

Capt. Matti Sorsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-232
Improving the Process of the Selection and Training of

Controllers in Automated ATC Systems
Dr. E.L. Kan and Dr. I.G. Yunatova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-236
Pilot's Strategies of Crew Communication in Advanced

Glass Cockpits: A Matter of Expertise and Culture
Ms. Claire Pelegrin and Dr. RenC Amalberti, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-242
Computer-based Approaches for Enhancing Human Pe@ormance

in Aviation Maintenance
Dr. William B. Johnson, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-257
Instructional Qualities of a Simulator and Human Factors

Dr. L.M. Berestov and Dr. G.A. Meerovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-263
Taxonomy and Models for Human Factors Analysis of

Interactive Systems: An Application to Flight Safety
Dr. P. Carlo Cacciabue, M. Pedrali and E. Hollnagel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-270
Overcoming Obstacles in the Application of Research 'to

Practice in the Aviation Environment
Dr. Thomas McCloy and Dr. Mark Hofmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B: Evaluation of the Symposium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-1

Appendix C: List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C-1
The opinions expressed in the addresses and papers reproduced in this digest are those of
the speaker or author and do not necessarily reflect those of ICAO.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ICAO FLIGHT SAFETY
AND HUMAN FACTORS GLOBAL SYMPOSIUM
Washington D.C., 12 to 15 April 1993
ORGANIZATION OF THE SYMPOSIUM
The Second ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium was organized by
ICAO and was held at the Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington D.C., from 12 to 15 April 1993, at the
kind invitation of the United States Government. It was attended by 325 participants from 42 States
and 6 International Organizations.
The Opening Session was hosted by Mr. Garland P. Castleberry, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Standards, Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. Joseph Del Balzo, Acting Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration; Dr. Philippe Rochat, Secretary General of ICAO; the Honourable
James L. Oberstar, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives and
Dr. William R. Fromme, Director, Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO addressed the delegates. Mr. R.D.
Cook, Member of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission read a message from the President of the Air
Navigation Commission.
The opening keynote address was presented by Dr. H. Clay Foushee, Managing Director,
Flight Procedures Training and Standards, Northwest Airlines and the wrap-up keynote address was
presented by Mr. Jean Paries, Deputy Chief of the Accident Investigation Office (Bureau Enquetes
Accidents), France.
The symposium was organized as one body with panel presentation and individual papers.
The theme of the symposium was "Human Factors Training for Operational ~ersonnel".
Presentations were grouped into sub-themes and panels were established to cover the various
presentations.
The following sub-themes, divided into morning and afternoon panel sessions were covered:
1: DEVELOPING HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE
Chairperson:
Morning Session - Capt. Neil Johnston (Ireland)
Afternoon Session - Prof. Graham J.F. Hunt (New Zealand)
2: DEVELOPING HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS
Chairperson:
Morning Session - Dr. Nikolai Stolyarov (Russian Federation)
Afternoon Session - Mr. James P. Stewart (Canada)
2 Circular 243-AN/146
3: HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR AUTOMATION
Chairperson:
Morning Session - Prof. Earl L. Wiener (USA)
Afternoon Session - Dr. William B. Shepherd (USA)
The officers of the Symposium were:
ICAO
Dr. William R.Fromme Director, Air Navigation Bureau

Mr. Paul Lamy Chief, Personnel Licensing and
Training Section
Capt. Daniel Maurino Technical Officer, Personnel
Licensing and Training Section,
Secretary of the ICAO Human
Factors Study Group
Capt. Haile Belai Technical Officer, Personnel
Licensing and Training Section
Mr. Herve Touron Associate Expert, Personnel
Licensing and Training section
Mrs. Alejandra Bertorini Chief Interpreter,
Interpreter, Interpretation Section
Ms. Fil Paglia Secretary, Personnel Licensing
and Training Section
UNITED STATES
Mr. Garland P. Castleberry Associate Administrator for

Aviation Standards, Federal
Aviation Administration
Dr. William B. Shepherd Manager, Biomedical and
Behavioural Sciences Branch,
Office of Aviation ~ e d i c i n e ,
Federal Aviation Administration
Ms. Jean Watson Biomedical and Behavioural
Sciences Branch, Federal
Aviation Administration
Dr. James F. Parker BioTechnology Inc.
Ms. Diane Christensen BioTechnology Inc.
Ms. Suzanne Morgan Galaxy Scientific Corporation
The working languages of the Symposium were English, French, Russian and Spanish.
Circular 243-AN1146 3
OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM
The Second Global Symposium was part of the ten-year ICAO Flight Safety and Human
Factors plan of action approved by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission and endorsed by the ICAO
Council. It follows the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Seminar held in Leningrad, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 3 to 7 April 1990.
The theme of the Symposium was "Human Factors Training for Operational Personnelt'.
The great importance that ICAO places on Human Factors training for operational personnel is
reflected in Assembly Resolution A26-9: " ...human factors' programmes.. .should be put to practical
use, with the view to raising the safety level of air transport.. ." Given this importance, it was
considered essential that as many as possible attend the Symposium in Washington, so they could
benefit from the presentations and discussions presented by the world's foremost experts in Human
Factors. The Symposium was not only limited to officials from States but also included
representatives from airlines, manufacturers, concerned international organizations and academic
institutions.
The objective of the Symposium was "to improve safety in aviation by making States more
aware of and responsive to the importance of Human Factors in civil aviation through the provision of
practical Human Factors materials and measures developed on the basis of experience within States".
4 Circular 243-AN/I#6
OPENING ADDRESSES
Address by the Secretary &nerd of the
International Civil Aviation Qrgaaization (ICAO),.
Dr. PhPhBippe Rochat, to the Opening Session of the
Second Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium
Washington, D.C., United States,

-
22 15 April 1993
In an address to the opening session of the Human Factors seminar in what is today
Saint Petersbwg, on 3 April 1990, the President of the Council of lCA 0 suggested to an audience of
more than 300 experts from all over the world that, after fifty years of working on #he hardware and
achieving admirable levels of reliability, it was time for the aviation industry to start focusing upon its
people. Three years after his suggestion, I am pleased at the response of the international aviation
community.
As aviation moves towards the 21st century, our industry is facing unprecedented
challenges. The Council of lCAO took up action in this regard in early 1990, and developed a global
strategy of implementation priorities for the 8cof10mic, technical and legal fields for the present
decade. ICAO's Strategic Action Han, as endorsed by our 174 Contracting Stam -- now 177 -- at our
last Assembly six months ago, classifies identified challenges far international civil aviation into three
types:
Technological and/or technicJ, Including CNSIATM systems and airport and
airspace cangestion;
Economic, legal and/or financial, which include comercia1 developments and

economic reguladon as well as financial resources, and
Human and/or M a l , including unlawful interference, environmental protection,

human resources and the subject of this symposium, Wght s&ty and Human
Factors.
I have keenly fol'iowed recent developments in the fieId of aviation Human Factors.
Today, technology flows us to conduct controlled scientific studies of human gwformance in
operational contexts. As such, we are able to scientifically design relevant Human Factors training
programmes, included by lCAO as part of its operational personnel licensing syllabi as well as by
operators in their mining programmes. ICA 0 has initiated a sustained campaign to increase the
awareness of the prvasiveness of human error in aviation safety. We now have employment selection
criteria which can predict successful on-the-job performance. Technology gives us the '"pateal", by
way of higNy automated equipment -- in the flight deck, in the a3r traffic control suite and in the
maintenance shop, -- to "enginm"or '"design" human error out of aviation.
As we aI1 aze aware, in spite of these commendable endeavours, statistics attribute
about 75 per cent of accidents to lapses in human pWf~rmmm,under the regrettably recurring label of
human error. !raise the question: is it passible by way of ducation, training h d new technology to
improve these statistics? Are we in the right track? The President of the Council of ICAO in opening
of he 29th Session of the ICAB Assembly Iast Oci%k stated: "ZCAO attaches considerable
importance 10 Human Fmors. W I e tfie safety W r d o f civil: aviation is himy mmmendable, the
fact remJns Ihaf about 75 per cent sf all aviation accidents are due to human mor." He fwWr added
-- and in my own view thjs is the cmx of the m a w -- "New skills, new approaches, new eorpapnitppleplts
are mded PO w ~ d v et A i prdictdw
~ prubkm ".
I believe we are headed in the right direction. However, we will make tangible
progress only when we make the mmaninents and adopt the approach= the dynamic international
civi%aviation system demands.
Sp~cifjmlly,flabwe must recognize the challenge of jncreased mhn01ogy and

automation, both in the interest of improved safety and efficiency. The interactions between people
and high-techfogy are not allways predictable, d t h o~asionally dire results. Traditional approaches
to personnel training and accident prevention must be reevaluated. Second, we mast improve the
dialogue within the internadond civil aviation com'nunity. Today more than ever, designers,
regulators, trainers, safety investigators, researchers and operational personnel must maintain an own
and candid exchange, Each needs to know rhe solutions the ochers are expIoaimg w improve aviation
safety. The best engineering soludon may perhaps be in conflict with limitations infierent to humans.
The best training solution may not be applicable due to consuaints inherent to design. Results of
research may not be relevant to the needs of an operational environment. Prevention lasons learned
through the investigation of accidents m a y perhaps pmve difficult to translate into action unless these
are advanced in a meaningful context,
Finally, as it relates to aviaon safety, we must think in collective rather than in

individual terms. We must think in terms of sysfem e m u rather thatl individual huffsramerror. IXs js
nowhere more evident than in the implemenZation of the lCAO CNSIATM systems. Observing a
systems approach to the design and implementation of these systems, we achieve --again potentially--
the synergistic combination of the best technology can praduce and the best humans C a n pfonn. If
we do not, we may squander the signifEcant system benefits. This must not be allow& to happn.
Attitudes towards Human Factors changing. But change is sustainable only when
it starts at the top. Change, as well as resources and safety, must be managed, l l o s e who can best
effwt change are those who, by v h e of their positions, can make strategic &isions to change
direction and ~ m m i resources
t as nscessay.
Of course, to implement management initiatives, those in charge of the practical,
hands-on impIemenWon must possess the necessary skills to achieve it. New chdlenga require new
skills. New skills can be acquired through training, but if new training approaches are to be
developed, they must be preceded by a process of e d ~ c t a ~ iof
m fhe strategic decision-makers in .
aviation. Aviation managers must understand the concepts and challenges involved in these new
approaches to szlfety.
One thing is clear, there is a disparate level of understanding about aviation Human
Factors in different regions of the world. We are trying to overcome this imbalance and this is the
thrust of the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors programme. This is an educational programme
directed to increase the awareness of middle and senior managers within the international aviation
community about the importance of Human Factors in civil aviation. This Symposium is but one
avenue to foster such education as the vehicle for change. Ideally, it will provide managers with the
~031sto develop Human Factors training programmes, recognizing the needs and constraints of their
organizations. It will contribute to a more uniform level of understanding of the new challenges in
different regions of the world. It will help us place proper priority on the people who manage and
operate our international civil aviation system.
ICAO is also using its technical cooperation programme to provide assistance to

developing States in implementing Human Factors endeavours, mostly -- but not exclusively -- related
to training. The TRAINAIR programme which is a major initiative recently established by ICAO to
promote effectiveness of training within international civil aviation, is an additional asset which will
be used to pursue Human Factors training and education.
I extend my congratulations to the Government of the United States of America for

their insight in sponsoring the event and for their generosity in its implementation.
I wish all of you a most productive week.
Thank you very much.

Circular 243-AN1146 7
Address by Mr. R.D. Cook, Member of the ICAO
Air Navigation Commission (USA) on behalf of the
President of the Commission, Mr. Matt ~ i l k e s
Good afternoon distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I bring with me from
Montreal, Canada a message from the President of the Air Navigation Commission. I would like now
to deliver that message.
Mr. Chairman,
Regrettably, I am unable to attend your Flight Safety and Human Factors Symposium.
On behalf of the Air Navigation Commission, I can assure you of the importance that the commission
considers this subject in today's and the future aviation environment. In recognition of the importance
and interest in this subject, a number of members of the commission are in attendance.
The theme of the symposium "HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR

OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL" is considered most appropriate and recognizes the importance of
the role of the human and interrelated factors. A greater understanding and recognition of this subject
in today's environment will facilitate the progressive implementation of evolving the technology in
tomorrow's global operational environment.
I wish you a most productive Symposium and I am sure your discussions will
contribute to the enhancement of safety of international civil aviation operations.
I would now also like to recognize my fellow commissioners who are in attendance
today. They are from the States of Switzerland, Canada and Norway. Collectively as a group
representing the Air Navigation Commission, we wish this meeting in meeting its goals and objectives
and look forward to receiving and reviewing the proceedings from this Symposium.
Thank You.
Address by the Director of the Air Navigation Bureau,
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Dr. William R. Fromme,
to the opening session of the
Second Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium
Washington, D.C., United States, 12-15 April 1993
I wish to join the Secretary General of ICAO in extending my appreciation to the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration for the efforts made by his staff in preparation
for this joint ICAO - United States Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium. I wish also
to extend my appreciation to the lecturers and chairpersons of the different panels for their very
significant contributions.
It is my pleasure to moderate your symposium. In anticipation to the opening of the

technical agenda, tomorrow, I will briefly summarize the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors
accomplishments for the first three years of our programme's life, and share with you some thoughts
as to our future activities.
Keep in mind that the ICAO aviation Human Factors programme was established:
to improve safety in aviation by making States more aware of and

responsive to the importance of Human Factors in civil aviation through the
provision of practical Human Factors materials and measures developed on
the basis of experience within States.
To assist us in this effort, we established a group of experts from the international

aviation community, a group with diverse but complementary credentials, professional interests and
geographical representation. The ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Group has been
instrumental in supporting our Human Factors work. I would like to take this opportunity to express
my appreciation to those States and organizations supporting members of our Flight Safety and Human
Factors Study Group.
What is ICAO doing &out Human Factors?
In order to increase the awareness of the international community about the relevance
of Human Factors to aviation system safety, ICAO has prepared a series of reports or digests which
focus on different aspects of aviation Human Factors, e.g. Fundamental Human Factors Concepts
(Digest No. I); Flight Crew Training: Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and Line-oriented Flight
Training (LOFT) (Digest No. 2); Training of Operational Personnel in Human Factors (Digest No.
3); Proceedings of the ICAO Human Factors Seminar (Leningrad) (Digest No. 4); Operational
Implications of Automation in Advanced Technology Flight Decks (Digest No. 5); Ergonomics (Digest
No. 6); Investigation of Human Factors in Accidents and Incidents (Digest No. 7);Human Factors in
Air Traffic Control (Digest No. 8) . These eight digests are available and you can browse through
them at the exhibition stand by the registration desk. The two last digests in the series, Human
Factors, Management and Organization and Human Factors in Maintenance and Inspection will be
completed during the-present year and distributed during 1994. The Human Factors digests will then
be consolidated into a single, ICAO Aviation Human Factors manual.
Circular 243-AN/146 9
Seminar Progmmme
Additionally, a series of regional seminars is underway to further the educational

objectives of the programme. Two regional seminars are conducted each year in pur triennial
programme cycle. During the first three-year cycle, these seminars have addressed the same basic
Human Factors issues covered by the series of digests. At the end of each cycle, world-wide
symposiums, such as this one, are held. Recent progress-in Human Factors is examined by experts
from the community and the plan of action for the following triennium is defined. The first world-
wide symposium was held in what is now St. Petersburg, from 3 to 7 April 1990. Two regional
seminars were held during 1991 and 1992. The first seminar in 1991 was held in Douala, sponsored
by Cameroon, and the second one in Bangkok. In 1992, regional seminars were held in Mexico City
and Cairo, this last one under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Transport and Tourism of Egypt.
The next regional seminar is planned for South America towards the end of this year, and two
seminars are planned for 1994, in Europe and Eastern Africa. The programme will.continue in 1995,
in the Asia Pacific region.
Tenth Air Navigation Conference
The Tenth Air Navigation Conference (Montreal, 5-20 September 1991) endorsed the
ICAO CNSIATM systems as the standard for the next 25 years. One of the recommendations of the
Conference addressed the need to broaden the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors programme to
include specific CNSIATM related Human Factors issues. We have done so. Five CNS/ATM
Human Factors aspects are now under review: flight deckIATS integration; automation and advanced
technology in future ATS systems; human performance in future ATS; training, selection and
licensing of controllers, and safety monitoring of ATS activities.
Towards the end of this year, ICAO wil-l produce its first guidance material on the
subject of flight deck and ATS integration. We have placed special emphasis on the unique
integration aspects of ATS and flight deck. The role of automation in future systems is also a matter
of priority, and guidance material on that issue will be available early next year. I have no doubts
that, when we next meet, in 1996, I will report to you on our significant accomplishments related to
Human Factors and CNSIATM. I will submit to you now, in fact, for your consideration, a proposed
theme for the 1996 global Human Factors symposium: Human Factors issues infuture CNS/AIU
systems. Think about it.
Controlled Flight into Termin
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I am pleased to announce to you another

ICAO Human Factors initiative, one which will translate theory into the practical reality of aviation
safety improvements and, specifically, into further reductions in the rate of aircraft accidents. I refer
to our Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) programme. Statistics recently released suggest that
some 50 % of all aircraft accidents and incidents over the last 10 years are CFIT related.
The investigation of CFIT accidents has uncovered problems of human failures, and
deficiencies in equipment design, regulations, education and training. All of these deficiencies are
human factor problems and we should be able to do something about these problems. Indeed ICAO's
Air Navigation Commission has agreed that in view of the critical flight safety aspects of CFIT,
urgenthigh priority ICAO action was warranted. It is time to move from theory to practice with our
Human Factors programme. We intend to apply what we've learned to the CFIT problem, with the
I0 Circular 243-AN/] 46
goal to reduce the incidence of CFIT accident so far about human factors, world-wide. Time will tell
how successful we are.
I am certain that the discussions and conclusions of this symposium will provide both
'to ICAO and yourselves with additional tools to pursue our Human Factors objectives. I anticipate n
challenging and exciting symposium. I wish you all well in your endeavours and a most rewarding
week.
Thank you very much.

THE HUMAN FACTORS REVOLUTION:

MEANINGmTL CHANGE OR TEMPORARY INFATUATION?
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Dr. H. Clayton Foushee, Jr.
ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Symposium

Washington D.C. 12 April 1993
Dr. H. Clayton Foushee is Managing Director of Flight Procedures, Training, and

Standcards at Northwest Airlines. In this capacity, he is responsible for all flight training, safefy, quality
assurance, and operating procedures at the airline. Before joining Northwest in June, 1992,Dr. Foushee
served at the Federal Aviation Administration as Chief ScientBc ~ n dTechnicad Advisor for Human
Factors. During this time, he headed a joint efort of the FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, with Department of Defence Assistance, to develop and implement a comprehensive
National Plan for Aviation Human ~actors. Prior to his appoinment at the FAA, Dr. Foushee was
Principal Scientist of the Crew Research and Space Human Factors Branch at NASA AMES Research
Centre in Sun Francisco. Here, he headed a Research Programme on Team and Organizational Factors
in both aviation and space.
Dr. Foushee is a graduate of Duke University and received a Doctorate Degree in social
psychology from the University of Texas. Following his doctoral studies, he accepted a fellowship porn
the National Research Council at AMES Research Centre and then apermanent NASA assignment, where
he began ce series of research investigations into the factors that influence crew behavior. i%ese studies
shed new Eight onfactors underlying many aviation accidents and simulated the development of newflight
crew training programmes.
It's real pleasure to be here today and 1'm honored to help open
this ICAO Flieht Safety and Human Factors Symposium. Before I do
anything else, I would like to recognize the efforts of Bill Fromme and
Daniel Maurino, who have worked tirelessly within the worldwide aviation
community to heighten awareness of the importance of Human Factors to
aviation safety. I would also like to recognize my friends at the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), our hosts here, and in particular, Bill
Shepherd and his staff for organizing this remarkable worldwide gathering.
I was fortunate to be a part of the first symposium exactly

three years ago held in a city until recently known as Leningrad and in a
country then refered to as the Soviet Union. I think this observation should
serve as an interesting reminder that change can often be upon us before we
know it. When it does occur it is often swift, sometimes complete, and we
often do not understand the implications of the changes that have occured
until well after the revolution is complete. Sometimes revolutions have
tendency to reverse themselves after the initial excitement has subsided.

In a sense, this is the theme of my remarks this afternoon.
My subject and that of this symposium, of course, is flight safety and

human factors, but what I would like to focus upon today is how quickly
"human factors thinking" has infiltrated the world of aviation and high
technology in some parts of the world. My good friend and colleague, Earl
Wiener, has referred to this period of time as the "Golden Age of Human
Factors." While I certainly agree that we have made remarkable progress,
I sometimes wonder whether the revolution is complete enough, or
whether we really yet understand the human performance implications of
the technological changes that have either already occurred or a r e
imminently upon us. I also wonder whether the technical community's
increased interest in human factors is just a temporary infatuation or
whether it will really produce meaningful change.
I have been extremely fortunate that my own career has been perfectly
synchronized with the increasing acceptance of human factors thinking. I
was trained as a research psychologist and was headed for university
career until my colleague and dissertation advisor, who is with us here
today, Bob Helmreich, mentioned to me that NASA was interested in a
new area of research related to human factors and aviation safety. I was
invited to a meeting in San Francisco in 1979 chaired by John Lauber of the
NASA-Ames Research Center, the subject of which was a newly-coined
term Cockpit Resource Management Training (now "crew" or CRM). No
one at that meeting really understood the meaning of that term, but the
NASA team and many of the attendees did understand that there was an
apparent need that was not being met in aircraft operations and training.
Of course, no one in 1979 could have foreseen the explosion of interest and
acceptance of the CRM concept in a less than a decade.
Shortly, after that first industry workshop on CRM, I accepted an offer

from NASA and along with Lauber and Helmreich, began a research
program to explore the nature and extent team performance in aviation
and space environments. I remember vividly that many in the operational
community were not terribly receptive to our CRM message, but things
have changed--neither John Lauber, nor Bob Helmreich, nor anyone, has
to work very hard any more convincing the operational community that
such things are critical to aviation safety.
I left NASA in 1989 to accept an offer from the FAA Administrator to serve
as Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors. My position was
a new one, which was created as a result of an outpouring of public
concern after a number of well-publicized and entirely preventable aircraft
accidents. Ironically, some of these accidents occurred in "new technology"
aircraft that were highly automated as a means of reducing operator
workload and human error. These aviation accidents, as well as those in
other non-aviation environments (e.g. the nuclear reactor accident at
Chemobyl, USSR; the accidental destruction of an Iranian airliner by the
USS Vincennes; and the "Herald of Free Enterprise" ferry capsizing at
Zeebrugge, Belgium) have shocked us all and stimulated new discussions of
the human performance problem.
Fortunately, this high level of concern also prompted some significant

14 Circular 243-.4#/5/146
action. In 1989, the Congress of the U.S. enacted new legislation, "The
Aviation Safety Research Act" which provided for the increased funding of
human factors research. In addition, the Air Transport Association of
America (ATA) mobilized a Human Factors Task Force made up of
representatives of various airlines, avionics and aircraft manufacturers,
U.S; Government agencies (e.g. FAA, NASA, NTSB), labor unions, and the
scientific community to address the problem. . For the first time, the
technical and operational community became fully involved and drafted a
list of priorities for human factors. But more importantly, the operational
community made an important statement about the critical importance of
human factors to aviation safety and brought a tremendous amount of
political pressure on the system to recognize this importance.
Just last year, Northwest Airlines asked me if 1 would be interested in

running their flight training, flight procedures, and flight standards
organizations. I was surprised at first because such organizations have
traditionally been headed by individuals who have spent their entire
careers in either operations or management, certainly not by research
psychologists. But, it also occurred to me that their interest was in large
part indicative of how far the operational community's thinking has
progressed and how quickly it has embraced the importance of human
factors. Moreover, I am by no means a unique case. John Lauber, also
trained as a research psychologist and human factors specialist, was
appointed by the President of the United States to, and now serves as a
member of, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (John will
address our closing banquet Thursday night). David Nagel, former head
of the human factors division at NASA-Ames is a Senior Vice President at
Apple Computer in charge of new technology development, and I cannot

resist the observation at this point that aviation systems ,designers could
learn a great deal from Apple's success in designing "user-friendly"
systems. Another former NASA colleague, Curt Graeber, manages flight
deck design research and development activities for Boeing Commercial
Aircraft. Bob Helmreich, also with us here, serves on several advisory
panels to senior NASA management and is frequently sought after as a
consultant to senior managers in aerospace organizations worldwide.
Earl Wiener, who chairs the panel on flight deck automation on Thursday
is a member of the FAA's Research and Development Advisory Committee,
and many of us, so-called "human factors specialists" are rapidly
infiltrating all aspects of the operational and advanced technology
communities.
Now, some may still think that this is arather alarming trend (and it may
yet prove to be!), but I prefer to interpret it as a level of acceptance that we
could have scarcely dreamed of 10 years ago. Today, "user-friendly" is
becoming the buzz-word of the 90's. Even the designers of videotape
recorders are now developing and advertising products based upon their
ease of programming.
I
\
While I was at FAA, I was fortunate to work for an Administrator, James
Busey, who genuinely understood the importanceof human factors. In his
remarks, he frequently referred to the need to make human factors a core
technologv, equal in importance to the emphasis we currently place on
technological development. Unfortunately, while we now have high levels
of support, we have not become a core technology yet in the aviation
Foushee - lCAO Address

environment. Many productive research programs dealing with human

performance in aviation have been undemay in the FAA, NASA, DOD,
academia, and industry for years, these efforts have never been well
organized into an overall plan that addresses the comprehensive nature of
human factors issues in the operation and maintenance of all types of
aircraft, in air traffic control system operation and maintenance, and in
the interface between air and ground. Moreover, these efforts have not
yet been provided with resources anywhere near proportional to the
problem. It is still far too easy, when budget money is tight, for decision-
makers to defer the human factors efforts because hardware approaches
to solving human performance problems somehow seem to them more
tangible. New technology is always exciting and thus easier to sell.
Despite improvements in technology, 60 to 70% of aviation incidents and

accidents are attributed to human performance problems, and that number
has not decreased over the years. If projections for future traffic growth
are accurate, in the next couple of decades, we may experience a major
aviation accident every week despite constant improvements in
technology. This statistic has led many to conclude that the only way to
produce dramatic improvements in safety is through increased emphasis
I .
on human factors.
The National Plan for Aviation Human Factors

In November of 1990, the FAA published a two-volume, draft National
Plan for Aviation Human Factors. The plan is a major step toward a
coordinated national program and is the result of a concerted effort by the
FAA and NASA, with significant assistance from DOD, and industry to
come to grips with human performance problems in aviation. It is

designed as a comprehensive, long-range plan to address the most
operationally significant human performance issues in the aviation
system.
The purpose of the National Plan is four-fold. The primary purpose is to

identify and plan the technical efforts necessary to address the most
operationally significant human performance issues in aviation as a guide
to future project planning, budget formulation and implementation: For
the first time, the plan has produced a general consensus between the
scientific and operational communities in the U.S. on the research
priorities.
The second purpose is to allocate national resources efficiently by

coordinating research programs at various Government laboratories. In
the past, program planning has occurred at Government agencies without
any overall coordination, which has led to gaps in some areas and
redundancy in others. While this situation still exists to some extent,
significant improvement priority setting has occurred, particularly in the
FAA and NASA programs.
The third purpose of the National Plan is to communicate research needs

to academic and industry "centers of excellence." Given the magnitude of
human performance concerns in aviation and budgetary constraints, it is
unrealistic to expect that Government agencies will have all of the
personnel or monetary resources necessary to implement this plan,
without the assistance of industry and academic institutions.
The fourth purpose of the National Plan is, in many ways, the most
important. It involves the means by which human factors knowledge is
transferred to Government and industry. As most of you are aware, the
products of human factors research have not been applied on a
widespread basis (CRM training is perhaps a notable exception. The
National Plan seeks to provide a framework for this application and is
heavily "product-oriented."
I'd like to turn my attention now to two prominent issues in the flight
safety and human factors area, the first having to do with the issue of
flight deck automation and the second the effectiveness of crew resource
management training.
Flight Deck Automation--Friend or Foe?

One of the biggest temptations facing the designers and engineers
struggling to reduce human error in the aviation system is to address the
problem by automating many of the tasks traditionally performed by
humans. Many tend to accept this as a relatively recent trend, but as
Charles Billings (1991) has pointed out in his very comprehensive analysis
of aircraft automation, the Wright Brothers were working on a stability
augmentation device in 1907, and Orville Wright won the Collier Trophy
in 1913 for demonstrating "hands-off" flight using an automatic stabilizer.
Ever since, each new generation of aircraft has introduced more
automation. The pace of automation quickened considerably after World
War I1 and the introduction of turbojet transports introduced new
requirements for automation.
However, as Billings suggests, it was the introduction of solid-state

electronics and small, powerful digital computers armed with software
that made it possible to automate virtually every function and display
unprecedented amounts of information, but at a cost of greater system
complexity. It is this trend toward more information, more complexity,
and more automatic operation that have begun to raise concerns in both
the human factors and the operational communities.
Under this design philosophy, the human operator has begun to assume
the predominant role of "systems monitor," or serving as a backup to the
automated systems. This approach has resulted in an impressive array of
aircraft and air traffic control technology that is highly reliable and which
contains vastly superior capability from a pure performance standpoint.
No one questions that the technology is better. The current generation of
transport aircraft are vastly superior to the generations they have
replaced. And yes, lest there be any doubts, with the appropriate standard
operating procedures and training programs in place, they are probably
safer than previous generations of aircraft. However, there are some
traps built into these designs that have provoked both technical experts
and operational community representatives to openly inquire, "how much
further can we automate and allow for human operators to remain fully in
command?" System complexity is already such that pilots under some
circumstances are having difficulties staying fully in the loop. One of the
humorous stories circulating in the airline industry these days, is that the
most common question on the flight deck used to be, "what should we do
now?" That question has now been replaced with, "what's it doing now?"
Another interesting observation is that, originally, advanced aircraft

automation was often justified on the basis lower training costs due to
ease of use. However, to my knowledge these cost savings have clearly
not materialized. At Northwest, we operate three types of advanced
"glass cockpit" aircraft (A-320, 8747-400, and 8-757) and our training costs
are the same and in some cases significantly higher than earlier
generations of aircraft. Why? Because we feel that it is critically
important for our pilots to understand both the benefits and the potential
pitfalls of automation, we spend a substantial amount of time teaching our
pilots, for example, how to operate an A-320 in a way similar to that of a
DC-3. In addition, we are also obligated to devote a considerable amount
of training time to a mastery of all aspects of the advanced systems. The
net result for us is usually additional training time. However, in fairness, I
must also point out that it is entirely possible that this trend may reverse
itself once the industry develops more experience with these aircraft and
once air traffic systems are more compatible with the new technology.
One of the things that we are beginning to learn is that it is simply not true
that automation is an easy way to remove human error from the system.
While automation can and does eliminate certain classes of error, we have
begun to realize that it can also create whole new classes of error. It has
been observed by some researchers in this area (e.g. Wiener; Billings), that
in some cases new errors created through automation can be worse than
the types of errors alleviated by automating. We have begun to
understand that automation can fail in spectacular and completely
unpredictable ways. The reasons for these failures are often exceedingly
Circular 243-AN//46 21
complex and not very well understood. Thus, it is becoming increasingly

common to hear suggestions that we critically examine ,our automation
philosophy and consider new approaches to automation that are more
"human-centered." Given these concerns, can we afford to follow the
current trend toward the automation of more functions leaving humans
with less to do?
Although we know that humans are far from perfect, there are certain
things that they do very welt. They are capable of high levels of ingenuity
in the face of uncertainty, and they are capable of abstraction to degrees
impossible in any computer current1y envisioned-even the most advanced
proposed systems for producing artificial intelligence. Yes, they do make
errors, get distracted, suffer fatigue, occasionally take unacceptable risks,
and just plain forget. How do we protect against the inadequacies in
humans, while at the same. time keeping intelligent, motivated, skilled
human involved in the system? Unfortunately, no one has been able to
come up with the answer to this rather complex questio~,but sp$cialists in
both human factors and engineering disciplines seem to now agtee that it
is dearly not an easy task.
Bainbridge (1987), in a very insightful analysis of automation, 'The Ironies

of Automation,"points out that designers usually leave those tasks to the
human operator that they carnot figure out how to automate. These "left-
overt'tasks are often rather arbitrary and may not always represent the
best use of human capabilities. One of the problems with this approach to
design is the expectation that humans must monitor the system and
takeover should anything go wrong. The irony of this notion is that in a
22 Ci~cuIar243-AN/l#6
reliable automated system, the operator is by definition inexperienced in

the cognitive and manual skills necessary to control the system, because
the computer usually takes care of things. In addition, there is usually
more to take care of when the operator has to intervene because the
reason the system was automated in the first place was to increase its
capacity--hence more work to do. To make matters worse, he or she is
expected to take over at a time when the most skill is required--after the
system has malfunctioned and operator workload is at its peak. And of
course, the foregoing presupposes that the human operator noticed the
problem in the first place since it is well known that humans suffer
significant lapses in vigilance after only a short period of time in passive
monitoring situations. In short, the design of many automated systems
requires that the operator stay alert in boring situations, and if anything
goes wrong to perform mope complicated operations with lower levels of
experience and skill. This is ironic indeed.
There does appear to be general agreement on certain categories of

problems that have been experienced and in current generations of "glass
cockpit"aircraft-problems that might benefit from a better understanding
of human-computer interface, which could be applied to future designs.
These include: 1) too little workload in some-phasesof flight and too much
workload associated with programming when flight plans or clearances
are changed; 2) the potential for substantially increased head down time; 3)
an inadequate "cognitive map" of what the system is doing making
recovery from automation failures sometimes problematic; 4) hesitancy of
humans to question or take over from an automated system even when
there is compelling evidence of a problem; 5) degradation of basic skills; 6 )
job dissatisfaction associated with the lack of a challenge; and 7)

complacency, lack of vigilance, and boredom.
Most human factors specialists strongly believe that this area of research
should be the top priority for human factors research and development.
One thing is clear. Within the next 20 years, the technology will be
available to allow the construction of a completely "pilot-less" and "air
traffic controller-less" system. The point is not whether such a system is a
good idea--just that the technology will probably be available. No one
seriously advocates such a system. In fact, most analysts argue forcefully
that humans will need to remain centrally involved. The pressure to take
advantage of this technology to gain additional system efficiency and
capacity will continue, as it should. It should be troubling to all of us,
however, that there are no established guidelines for the human's role in
such a system. The is clearly an area where the human factors revolution
cannot declare victory as of yet. One of our highest priorities should be the
establishment of guidelines for "human-centered" automation. Our next
highest priority should be to make sure that once established, they are
carefully applied at the beginning of every new system design effort.
CRM Training--Does it Work?

One of the success stories of the human factors revolution has been the
rapid acceptance of CRM training concepts in the worldwide aviation
community. In a period over a little over a decade CRM is now widely
perceived to be a necessary part of flight crew training. In a recent
keynote address to the Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium, Bob
Helmreich likened the evolution of CRM over this period to a rather rapid
progression from the Stone Age (rocks and clubs) through the Bronze Age
(lances and spears), to where it exists today in the midst of the Iron Age
(muskets and sabers). And at the risk of belaboring this metaphor, many
of us hope that the evolution of CRM will soon continue rapidly into the
Renaissance.
As I'm sure you all know CRM refers to the utilization of all available
resources--information, equipment, and people--to achieve safe and
efficient flight operations. At NASA-Ames, after a series of simulation
studies, we were able to confirm what many had suspected--that one of
the principal causes of accidents in aircraft operations was a failure on the
part of flight crew members to utilize effectively all of the resources
available to them during flight operations. We also concluded that the
major factors underlying these failures had to do with inadequate training
in skills associated with crew coordination, communication, leadership,
and teamwork not with technical proficiency and aircraft handling skills.
We spent a considerable amount of effort discussing our findings with
pilots, airline management, and aviation safety specialists and were struck
by how infrequent these factors were dealt with in industry training
programs, despite the magnitude of the problems. To its credit, the
industry has moved quickly to address this oversight.
At its inception in the late 1970s, the acronym CRM stood for cockpit
resource management training and today no one questions that CRM has
advanced the cause of aviation safety. Over the years, training specialists
began to realize that the applications of CRM go far beyond the cockpit
door. CRM is a form of team training and the cockpit crew is part of a far
larger team, that includes flight attendants, dispatchers, gate agents,

mechanics, and air traffic controllers. Several airlines have begun to
explore the possibility of expanding the CRM training framework to
include job specialties other than pilots. This broadened framework has
now been formally recognized and the acronym has changed in most
circles to crew resource management.
Bob and his research team supported by both the FAA and NASA have been
evaluating the effectiveness of CRM programs worldwide, and -while
there is good news, it is also clear that the revolution or evolution is not
complete. I'd like to spend a little time reviewing the report card on CRM.
First, crew members find CRM and LOFT to be highly effective training.
Second, there are measurable and positive changes in attitudes and
behavior following the introduction of CRM and LOFT. Third, effective
CRM programs generally cannot be purchased "off the shelf," and are best
designed with extensive involvement of people from the organization
desiring such training. Fourth, management, check airmen, and
instructors play the most critical role in determining the effectiveness of
CRM training, and I'll have more to say regarding this point in few
minutes. Fifth, without reinforcement, the impact of CRM training
decays. CRM training is clearly not something that an organization can
highlight one year and consider its work complete. As the FAA's Advisory
Circular on CRM so clearly states, it must be continually reinforced. And
lastly, a small percentage of participants do not change as result of
exposure and tend to reject CRM training, but the positives far outnumber
the negatives.
Have we accomplished most of our objectives with CRM training? I

would argue that the answer is emphatically no! The very fact that we still
showcase CRM as a "new"type of training indicates that we have not
accomplished our objectives. To be maximally effective, CRM training
needs to be integrated into everything we do in training. Think about it.
When evaluating a crew executing a complex Category II or some other
complex maneuver, how many airlines train their instructors or check
pilots to evaluate and debrief the CRM aspects at the same time they
evaluate the technical aspects of the individual crew members'
performance? Now, I would argue that there is more CRM to observe in
the execution of those types of procedures than in many so-called CRM
exercises I have observed. In fact, in several presentations over the years
I have made the assertion that I will be happy when the term CRM
disappears from the list of "hot"topics at conferences like these. What I
mean by that statement is that hopefully the disappearance of the tern will
signify complete acceptance and integration into all aspects of training, the
Renaissance if you will, and not rejection because of our failure.
In a time of scarce resources, and looking backward with, of course,

perfect hindsight, there are some things I would do differently with regard
to CRM. I feel strongly that no organization has prepared its instructor
and check airman corp. to take maximum advantage of the CRM concept
In my opinion, this i s the key to successfully integrating CRM into all
aspe&s of training. I sometimes wonder if we might not have been farther
along in the industry had we used all of the resources we had spent on
"awareness level" or classroom CRM courses and expended these
resources on instructor training instead. Better instructor preparation

would have also allowed most organizations to utilize the LOFT concept
more effectively. No, the revolution is not complete, but at the same time
the concept is flourishing in most training programs.
The Institutionalization of Human Factors

Is the human factors revolution complete or will the increased interest in
human factors fade away over time? The answer to the first of these
questions is that no, the revolution is not complete and only time will tell
whether we continue to move forward. In my opinion, however, we can.
never make a meaningful difference in the human error statistics until
human factors concepts become institutionalized into the aviation culture.
This means decision-makers must become more cognizant of human

factors principles. It also means that human factors principles must be
applied at the earliest stages of the design process of new aircraft, air
traffic control, and maintenance technology and continue through
procurement and introduction. In order for this to occur, an
organizational commitment to a decision-making process must be in place
that formally considers the human factors implications of every facet of
the aviation system. This formal process must have the support of the
highest levels of management in the aviation community. Moreover, it
must become an integral part of the "culture" of the organization, and this
will require a fundamental shift in most organizational thought processes.
This "culture-shift" has accelerated in the U.S., Japan, and some western
European nations as more and more managers and decision-makers have
become more sophisticated with regard to human factors principles.
Although by no means unique today, one of the earliest and most

promising models for institutionalizing human factors was developed in
the U. S . Army. This program is known as the Manpower and Personnel
~nte~ration
program (MANPRINT), and it has been widely acclaimed as a
method for applying human factors principles through the use of a "total
systems approach." MANPRINT was developed in response to the "force
multiplier" notion of the early 801s,whereby a smaller, but better-equipped
force could theoretically out-perform a numerically superior adversary.
However, this notion created considerable pressures to achieve design
excellence. After a number of experiences with technically elegant systems
that failed in the field because they could not be operated or maintained
effectively, the concept of design excellence began to broaden to include
the human operator. As a result, the Army MANPRINT program has not
only been credited with improving the quality of a number of significant
pieces of hardware, but it has also resulted in considerable cost-savings in
a number of major programs.
The developers of MANPRINT attribute its success directly to the

aggressive and highly visible support of the senior leadership. These senior
managers were unusually active in persuading other senior managers that
traditional practices regarding hardware and software development and
acquisition needed change. Among other things, the program required that
the performance of program managers would be evaluated on how well
they applied human factors principles in their design efforts.
However, the aspect that has distinguished this program and made it
perhaps the most ambitious attempt in the U. S. to apply human factors

principles is its recent institutionalization in the Army procurement system.
Procurement policy, operating principles, and management practices are
prescribed in extensive documentation and are a required part of every
procurement. These requirements are part of every "Request for Proposal"
and are weighted heavily enough that they routinely affect contract
awards. Because companies wanting to sell expensive hardware to the
military have been required to formally satisfy human performance
requirements, the result has been increased human factors expertise
applied to system design and integration into many "corporate cultures."
As part of the National Plan, the FAA is taking steps toward making
human factors part of the aviation culture. These include: 1) increasing
the number of human factors specialists in all key agency organizations; 2)
the development of human factors training courses for agency managers,
system designers and engineers, certification personnel, and other job
specialties; 3) reviewing and modifying all agency orders to assure proper
consideration of human performance dimensions; and 4) developing
formal requirements for human factors specialists to be involved in all
system design teams from the earliest stages of development; and 5)
increasing regulatory requirements for human factors training, such as
CRM; and 6 ) placing a stronger emphasis on human factors as part of
aircraft and avionics certification requirements.
Summarv
In closing, let me reiterate what many now feel, human factors
improvements will be the only way to dramatically improve the safety of
30 Circular 243-AN1146
the aviation system. The technology has achieved a level of reliability that
will be difficult to significantly improve. Increased emphasis on human
factors in the U.S. and emerging interest in other countries offer
tremendous potential for improvement. However, increased efforts in the
U.S. will not be adequate because the aviation system is truly global in
scope. Safety problems cross international boundaries very quickly.
To a large degree, it is the people in this room, who will determine

whether the human factors revolution will produce meaningful change or
is just a temporary infatuation. You are the ones who must take the
human factors message back to your home countries and organizations.
You are the ones who must argue for the integration of human factors
thinking into every aspect of the aviation culture. We've made a lot of
progress in the last 10 years, but it is the next 10 that will determine the
success of the human factors revolution.
DISCOURS DF- S PAR 3. P-ES
PI~&W~% W C E )
AU
~mrxlkMESI%WOHUM OACI
SWR LES FACTEtTRS HUMMNS ET LA S k U ' R d ~ R T F , ~
WASHINGTON DC 12-15 AVRIL 1993
Mr. Jean Pwies is a Civil Aviation Engineer. He gradwtedfiorn I '&ole Nabbade de

I 'AviationCivile @NAG) in f 973.He worked in the French Civil A v i i o n Authority (Virectl'onankrale
de 1 'Aviation Civile - DGAC) before he became, in JEW, the Deputy Chief of tke Accident Imstigation
Once (Bureau Enq&tes Accidents - BEAJ. He is also a Profssioml Pilot with ratings in IFR, Multi-
engines and Turbines. He is a member, since its creation, @the ZCA 0 Flight Ssfy and H m n Factors
Study Group,
Mesdames et Messieurs,
C'at un trb grand honneur pour mon pays et porn moi-mgme que d'avoir et6 invith 5
prhenter quelques rbflexions de synthbe finale I'issue d'un symposium aussi prestigieux et fertile que
celui-ci. Mais cd'estun homeur redoutable.
Je n'aurai pas l'ambition de resumer en vingt minutes ce que tmt dd'orateursbien plus
qualifiQ que moi ont dit pendant trois jours. Je voudrais simplement, pour que tout ceci continue et
s'ouvre sur l'avenir , replacer les probli!rnes de formation d m leur contexte general, et xmkhir avw
vous sur la fagon dont I'avenir se prbente.
Le programme me suggkre d'organiser cette reflexion autour du tharne suivant : aLes

defis des trois prochaines nnndesl~.Poucquoi trois annees? Je crois bien que c'est le rythrne qu'a choisi
I 'OACI pcxu tenir des symposiums mondiaux tels que celui qui s'achbve en ce moment. L'idh at d&
lors toute naturelle de se tourna un instant vers le passe : en effet .on ne gtevoit bien que ce qui existe
ddjb.
Vous le savez, ce symposium at le second, Le premier s'est tenu il y a trois ans dans
une ville qui s'appelait alors Leningrad. 3e crois que I'OACI n'aurait pas pu choisir un lieu plus
symbolique h l'dgard de ce que je voudrais vous dire. Le monde change P une vitesse et une profondeur
impressionnantes. Et bien h i d e m e n t , notre @ monde de l'aviation n'est pas epargne.
En fait, le transport aerien internationalvit depuis quelques annk une mutation pmfonde,
que certains sociologues appellent mutation du systbme sociotechniqum. Cette mutation a deux faces.
La ~rernikeest dSordrekconomiaue. Vous connaissez a u m t que moi le vocabulaire de

ce veritable tremblement de terre qui affecte aujaurd'hul la plupart des compagnies adriennes dans le
monde. 11 contient dm mots du g m e udQ6gImentatiom, econcufrence sauvagm, + p r t e s enorma,
mise en liquidations, urachats*, *fusion9.
Cette situation n'est pas exempte de risques pour la skurite, ni a court terme, ni a long
terme.
A court terme, elle engendre inevitablement des tentations d'economies sur les budgets
de fonctionnement de la skurite, tels que ceux consacres la formation et 2 l'entralnement des
personnels, ou a l'entretien des materiels.
Elle engendre aussi une tentation de repli sur soi, d'economie sur les deplacements et la
communication. Est-ce que vous croyez par exemple que tous ceux qui auraient voulu participer 2 ce
seminaire ont obtenu les moyens de le faire?
A long terme, les effets peuvent &re encore plus profonds. Je crois en effet que la
transformation des structures 6conomiques du transport aerien a laquelle nous assistons reflkte une
evolution profonde de son role dans nos soci6tCs. D'une activite privilegiee, protegee par l'interet du
pavillon national, tourne vers les elites economiques et politiques, il devient une activit6 massive et
banalisee. Sommes-nous certains que cette realit6 nouvelle restera en pleine harmonie avec l'approche
-exceptionnelleque le transport aerien a su developper dans le passe vis-a-vis de la sbcurit6? Je crois que
la question merite d'etre posee.. .
La deuxikme face de la mutation est du registre techniaue. Tout le monde le repkte :

nous vivons depuis quelques annees l'apparition d'une nouvelle generation d'avions. La nouveautk est
a la fois evidente - un peu c o m e le passage des helices 2 la reaction - et malgre tout assez confuse.
On a du mal nommer cette nouveaute. Aucun des mots utilisQ (et la je dois m'incliner devant la
superiorit6 Bcrasante des anglophones) glass-cockpib, uhighly automated aircrafb ne rend vraiment bien
compte des differences. On a aussi du mal dater la nouveaute.
Question : Quel est te premier avion de la nouvelle gCneration?
Eh bien, je vais prendre devant vous un gros risque. Un double risque. Celui d'etre
accuse par certains d'etre vendu 2 Airbus, et en meme temps par d'autres accuse de dQigner l'A320
la vindicte populaire. En effet, je pense que c'est 1'Airbus A320 qui ((incarney,la mutation dont je parle.
Je pense que cet avion a btabli un nouveau standard, valable pour de nombreuses annees.
[Je crois que dorenavant, les avions auront des commandes de vol electriques avec des
interfaces adapt&, donc differentes des commandes mkaniques. Je crois qu'ils auront des protections
automatiques de domaine de vol, des systkmes gCrCs par calculateur et des pannes egalement gdrees par
calculateur, avec des instruments qui prQentent 2 1'6quipage les informations et les check-lists
pertinentes].
Je crois que dorenavant, les avions seront construits autour d'un systkme centralist5 de
traitement numerique de l'information, devenu un veritable u~artenairey,de l'equipage. Je crois aue c'est
un fait irreversible, qu'il modifie de f a ~ o nprofonde les rapports entre les pilotes et l'avion, et que nous
devons en tenir compte.
Mais tout ceci constitue ce que j'appellerai la partie amddiatique~de la transformation

technique. Car l'avion, loin s'en faut, n'est pas le seul element concerne. Des 6volutions analogues 2
celles que je viens d'evoquer, bien que moins spectaculaires, se produisent dans tous les domaines, de
la maintenance au contr6le de la circulation akrienne.
[Les nouveaux outils informatiques d'assistance au contr6le, les liaisons de donnhs

Circular 243-AN/l46 33
numeriques air-sol, les systbmes d'antiabordage embarques, les systbmes sol d'anticollision avec le relief
tels que le MSAW, sont les premiers 6lements d'une mutation technique globale].
Un gigantesque rbeau de traitement et d'echange d'information se construit peu a peu.

I1 rassemblera dans un seul systbme l'ensemble des fonctions de navigation, de gestion du vol, de contr8le
aerien, de regulation du trafic, de planification op6rationnelle et cornmerciale.
Quels peuvent Ctre les effets d'une telle mutation sur la securite?
Je crois au'il faut se mefier des revonses trov simvles...
Bien sQr, la securite des systkmes complexes repose sur l'experience, les essais et les
erreurs du passe. Et bien sQr, par duuction irnmuiate, la securit6-des systbmes complexes n'aime pas
les situations transitoires.
Et je suis sGr que beaucoup d'entre vous cet 6gard pensent a nouveau a L'A320. Voila
en effet que l'avion dont j'ai dit qu'il uincarnaib la nouvelle generation subit 3 catastrophes pendant ses
4 premibres annees d'exploitation.
I1 est terriblement tentant de conclure qu'on est a116 trop loin.
Je crois que ce serait une grave erreur, et ceci pour plusieurs raisons.
Tout d'abord, on ne peut pas conclure valablement sans avoir analyst? les accidents en
profondeur et compris en quoi la nouveaute de l'avion, ou ses automatismes ou ses particularites, sont
impliques dans le m6canisme.
Ensuite, je crois que ce serait une vision totalement nahe du fonctionnement du systbme.
Que cela nous plaise ou non, le monde change, les techniques 6voluent; et la securite doit s'y adapter.
Enfin ce serait une vision nake des rapports entre technique et securite.
Pour illustrer cela, je voudrais prendre l'exemple d'un autre avion : le B727. Lui aussi
a connu de nombreux accidents pendant ses premikes annQs : 4 je crois dans les 3 premikes a n n h .
Lui aussi r presentait une nouveaute consid6rable pour les pilotes et le systbme. Dans son cas, le lien
nouveaut6accident est clair : les pilotes habitues aux avions a helices se laissaient surprendre par ses
caracteristiques aux basses vitesses et le temps de reaction des moteurs.
Aux ~ t a t s - ~ n ilas ,presse de l'epoque n'a pas h&itC presenter des titres c o m e uground
the killer,. Vous connaissez la suite. Le B727 est non seulement le plus grand succbs commercial, il
est aussi l'un des avions les plus sQrsjarnais construits. Son taux d'accident sur les 10 dernibres annees
est du mCme niveau que celui des avions les plus recents.
Est-ce que cette petite histoire a une morale?
Oui, je crois qu'on peut en tirer une l e ~ o ntrbs importante : il ne faut pas confondre
changement et situation transitoire.
Si le meme avion peut &re successivement le pire et le meilleur, c'est que la technique
et ses 6volutions n'ont pas vraiment, en elles-memes, d'effet particulier sur la sbcurit6.
34 Circular 243-AN/l46
Tout depend de ce qu'on en fait.
Tout depend de la facon dont le systkme la prend en compte.
Et c'est la qu'un symposium c o m e celui-ci prend toute sa signification. Car il est

evident qu'un element decisif de la prise en compte que je viens d'evoquer est la formation et
l'entrainement des acteurs de premiere lime. Et je ne pale pas ilniquement des pilotes.
Bien que je ne sois pas un chaud partisan de la notion de ((cause primaire, je vais me
rdfbrer nouveau 2 la statistique annuelle de Boeing : on y constate en effet que les deux seules familles
de ((causes primaires~qui ont augment6 dans les 10 dernikres annees sont celles liees la maintenance
et au contr6le aerien.
I1 etait donc important qu'une place soit faite a la formation des contr6leurs et des
personnels de maintenance dms ce symposium, tout cornme il etait important que toute cette dernikre
journ6e soit consacrbe h la formation des personnels par les systkmes automatis6s. I1 est essentiel en effet
que les programmes de formation, y compris CRM, prennent dQormais en compte cette dimension de
-la realite.
Plus gbneralement, je crois aue le defi maieur des deux ou trois annees a venir sera de
prendre toute la mesure des transformations en cours. et de cerner clairement les ada~tationsnecessaires,
surtout pendant la pbriode transitoire. Pour prendre une metaphore, les systkmes sociotechniques
rdagissent un peu c o m e les etres vivants. Tout changement important d'enviromement les rend
inadaptes, et ceci provoque un stress. Le bon stress est capable de rdtablir l'adaptation en provoquant
les evolutions ndcessaires. Le mauvais stress rend malade. Dans notre cas, la maladie s7appelleaccident.
Tout l'enjeu des annees h venir sera de liberer le bon stress et de lui permettre d'agir.
I1 faudra savoir faire la part de ce qui relkve de la conception, des p r o c ~ u r e s ,de la

formation, et peut-&re meme de la selection.
Faire la part, cela veut dire ne pas faire assumer par la formation ce qui relkve des
defauts de conception si on peut faire autrement. Mais c'est aussi prendre la realit6 comme elle est et
les avions comme ils sont, sans tomber dans une sorte de guerre des boucs emissaires : c'est la faute de
l'automatisation. Non, c'est la faute des pilotes.
Avant de terminer, je voudrais indiquer un certain nombre de conditions de succks face

a ce defi.
La toute ~remikre,par ordre d'importance, c'est de convaincre les responsables. I1 est
evident que rien ne peut avoir d7efficacitCreelle sans la volonte globale, la conviction des dirigeants.
Ce sont eux qui pensent ce que pense le systkme. 11s donnent le ton, etablissent les vraies priorites, celles
qui sont inscrites non pas sur le papier, mais au fond des tetes et des cultures.
Convaincre les managers que, precisement Pace aue les temps sont difficiles, il faut 1
augmenter les investissements dans la securite, la conception des materiels, la formation des h o m e s , i
voila probablement le plus difftcile des defis h venir, et je n'ose pas dire des 3 ans a venir.. .
Deuxikme condition (et maintenant je n'etablirai plus d'ordre d'importance) : faire

beneficier 2 l'ensemble du monde ce que chacun a appris. Les avions, y compris les plus modernes, ne
volent pas uniquement aux ~ t a t s - ~ neti sen Europe. Je ne voudrais pas &re mal compris. I1 ne s'agit
Circuhr 243-AN1146 35
pas ici que de pretendus ((savants, aillent prgcher chez de pretendus eignorants*. I1 s'agit veritablement
de communication, d76changenecessaire des experiences. Je voudrais souligner ici le r01e essentiel joue
par les seminaires anim6s par I'OACI autour du monde. I1 y a eu Douala, ~angkok,Mexico, Le Caire.
I1 faut que cela continue. [J'ai eu la chance de participer 2 certains d'entre eux~etje dis bien qu7il s'agit
d'une chance. A chaque fois, j'ai 6t6 ravi de tout ce que j'avais appris].
Une troisikme condition me parait egalement importante. Rassurez-vous, c'est presque

la dernikre.
Je crois que convaincre et enseigner ne suffisent pas toujours. Le haut niveau de sBcurit6
de l'aviation civile internationale s'est construit en grande partie sur des rkglements. Le temps est venu,
me semble-t-il, d'inscrire dans des rkgles les quelques acquis dont nous disposons en matikre de facteurs
humains. J'ai relu recernrnent les articles des rkglements de certification des avions de transport
concernant la conception des postes de pilotage. 11s demident que les pilotes soient convenablement
proteges des intemperies, et c'est sQrement trks bien. Le problkme est qu'ils ne sont pas d'un grand
secours pour certifier un FMS. Je crois que le moment est venu de reviser les rkglements qui cancernent
la certification, l'agrement des simulateurs, l'entrainement periodique, l'appariement des equipages, la
formation des acteurs de premibre ligne pour y inscrire plus fermement ce que nous avons d'ores et d6ja
appris en matikre de facteurs humains.
Enfin, et j'en aurai termine, je pense qu'une condition d6cisive de succks est que nous
sachions adapter le svstkme de retour d'ex~erienceaux necessites de l'heure. I1 n'est pas acceptable que
des quasi-accidents puissent se r6peter plusieurs fois dans le monde sans qu'on n'en sache rien, pour
finalement se produire vraiment un jour en tuant des centaines de passagers. I1 faut rajeunir, reactiver,
repenser le retour d'experience. Nous disposons des outils. Plusieurs pays ont mis en place des systkmes
de recueil confidentiels d'incidents. Plus de 50 compagnies dans le monde ont mis en oeuvre des
programmes d'analyse des domkes de vol. I1 y a la un outil extraordinaire, il faut avoir le courage de
s'en semir. C'est un veritable d6fi que celui-la, et il concerne tout le monde : les organisations
professionnelles, les responsables des compagnies, les constructeurs, les autorites.
Certes il y a des obstacles majeurs : la competition cornrnerciale, les actions judiciaires,

les actions disciplinaires, tout cela paralyse le retour d7exp6rience. A cet bgard, il nous faut vraiment
changer de sibcle.
Mesdames et Messieurs, j'aurais pu allonger cette liste des conditions du succbs, en

parlant par exemple des necessitds de recherche, et des perspectives offertes en particulier par la
psychologie cognitive. Mais je sais que j'ai d6ja largement d6passe vos possib'ilitds d'attention et meme
d'indulgence. 11 faut savoir terminer un symposium, aussi p a s s i o ~ a nsoit-il.
t
Je vous souhaite un excellent retour, et je vous donne rendez-vous dans trois ans, pour
le troisikme symposium de I'OACI.
ABSTRACTS
Abstracts of the papers presented by lecturers are arranged in order of their actual
presentation. The full text of the presentation, in its original language, is to be found in
Appendix A.
MORNING SESSION CHAIRPERSON: CAPT. NEIL JOHNSTON (IRELAND)
HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL
By Capt. Neil Johnston (IRELAND)
The primary emphasis in this paper is on Human Factors knowledge training during initial
pilot training. The paper starts by reviewing the background to the existing ICAO Annex 1 (Personnel
Licensing) requirement for Human Factors knowledge training. International differences in training
practices are then considered and the distinction between Human Factors knowledge and the application
of Human Factors skills is examined. The outline Human Factors knowledge syllabus recommended by
ICAO is discussed briefly and the experience of those involved in implementing such training is
subsequently reviewed.
Neil Johnston joined the ab initio pilot training programme of Aer Lingus, the national
airline of Ireland, directlyfrom school. He is now a Boeing 737 Captain with Aer Lingus. He was the
founding chairman of the Human Performance Committee in IFALPA (the International Federation of
Airline Pilots' Associations). He is currently chairman of the Human Factors Working Group in IATA
(the International Air Transport Association). He represents IATA on the Flight Safety and Human
Factors Study Group at ICAO (the International Civil Aviation Organisation). He is an Associate Editor
to the International Journal o f Aviation Psvcholonv. His interests include the marriage of theory to
practice in aviation and pilot training. He has been intensively involved in various innovations in pilot
training, working both for Aer Lingus and as an independent consultant.
HUMAN.FACTORS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION
By Prof. Ross Telfer (AUSTRALIA)
At the University of Newcastle, the undergraduate program for the Bachelor of Science
(Aviation) Human Factors are a key area of study. Initial concentration is on the individual's capacities
and limitations as a pilot, incorporating aviation medicine and ergonomics. In the second year, when the
student has attained initial licensing and is beginning multi-crew training, the focus moves to group
dynamics (communication, climate, cohesiveness, etc.) and social psychology relating to multi-crew
activities.In the third year, students relate human factors to learning and instruction in aviation. The first
half of the Year examines ground school activity, and the second half of the year deals with airborne
instruction (usually linked with a flight instructor rating). The optional fourth year (leading to an Honours
degree) provides an opportunity for a research project in human factors.
In contrast, a human factors course for airline training captains Ims to be compressed into
the shortest period which will provide effectiveness. For efficiency, a multiplier principle of training
trainers is utilised. To capitalise on the short contact time, pre-reading and a reference manual are
provided. An instructional design is drawn from andragogy (adult learning) rather than pedagogy,
concentrating on process rather than content. Modular construction and a spiral curriculum enable the
course to be started economically, then expand to provide flexibility in adapting content to suit the
participants' expertise and experience.
Current international research (Telfer and Moore, The University of Newcastle) with airline
pilots has shown three identifiable motives and strategies used by pilots undergoing training and
instruction. The deep (or intrinsic) approach, the shallow (or surface) approach, and the achieving
approach can be identified by the Pilot Learning Process Questionnaire, and have clear implications for
the effectiveness of pilot training.
Professor Ross Telfer is Head of the Department of Aviation at the University of

Newcastle. He is the author or co-author of six books (including The Process o f Leaminx (Prentice Hall,
1981; 1987); Psychology and Flight Training (Iowa State University Press, 1988)) and editor of Aviation
Instruction and Training (Ashgate, 1993). He has published monographs, articles and conference
presentations and has collaborated with aviation organizations on instruction and training. His current
research looks at pilots' approaches to learning.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS REQUIREMENTS -

THE UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE
By Dr. Rory M. Barnes (UNITED KINGDOM)
The United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority first considered introducing a knowledge
of Human Factors into the requirements for a pilot's licence in the mid-1970s. Consultation with the
training schools and other aviation organisations produced muted enthusiasm on the grounds of the
additional time and cost involved and also on the basis that some of the subject matter was already
covered in other topics.
Following the requirement for the introduction of the subject Human Performance and
Limitations into all professional flight crew examination syllabuses in the 8th edition of ICAO Annex 1
the CAA notified the aviation community that it would be complying with the requirement and that
candidates would be examined in it.
A syllabus was drawn up by the CAA following internal discussions and advice from the
Applied Psychology Division of the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine. Because of the imminence of
the European Joint Aviation Authorities they syllabus was also reviewed with our European partners.
The final syllabus proved to be very similar to that subsequently recommended by 1CAO.
Examinations were scheduled to start in 1991, the intervening period being required to
brief the training schools, airlines and other interested aviation organisations on such matters as the
syllabus and the reason for including specific subjects, the qualifications for instructors, the provision
of training courses for instructors and sources of suitable reading material.
When first Introduced for professional pilots in April 1991 it was not necessary to obtain
a pass in order to gain a licence, although a re-sit of the exam was required. Since January 1992 a pass
is mndatay for the issue of a pmfssional licence and on re-lssue or upgrade of a licence. U p to the
end of 1991 the pass rate was 30%. Since a pass became compulsory the rate achieved has been over
70%.
Private pilots are also required to study an appropriately adapted syllabus and to date some
2000 have sat the exam successfully.
More important than the exam itself, which is a means to an end, is the interest the subject
appears ta have generated within the pilot population.
Dr. Barnes obrained his medical degreefrom London University in 1962. Afer the usual
intern posts he pen1 rime in Public Health Lahrotories, as a pathobgist a d as a family physician. His
aviation medicine career started in 1962 when he joined wwkat tk now British Ainvup. He was originrdly
responsible for the clkrkal care of air crew. He was promoted ro a new post of Senior Medical w e t - ,
Flight Training and Research with responsibiliry for medical #raking within the airline.
Ira 1975 he undertook a programme of research on workload in CAT IIII landings

sponsored by the CAA whom he joined full time in 1976. He is ccurrently SMO Flight Safety and
Research, md Depusy to the Chief Medical m c e r . His principle task is to &vise on Hwnan Factor
problems. He holds specialist q u l @carions in miahahon
medicine and occupational health.
He is a Feliow ofthe Aerospace Medical Assvci~thmand Royal AeronauEical Society and

rn Honorary MedkaL Adviser w The Guild @Air Pibts and Air Navigators. He is a Member of ICAO
Hwnan Factors Study Group.
h addition he is a qualified helicopter, gJi&r andjixed wing pilot and currentlyflks with
a commuter airfiae.
He has written papers on workbad and physiological fators in relation to flight and
cabin crew.
H U M FACTORS KNOWDDC;B REQUIREMENTS FOR FUGHT CREWS
By Dr. Bany H.Kmtowlb; Ph.D. (USA)

Human factors covers a very broad area of knowledge. For example, my own human
factors textbook (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 1983) conrains 700 pages divided among twenty chapters and
rapires an entire semester of class time: Wee hours per week for sixteen weeks. A more recent edited
text devoted solely to aviation human factors (Wiener & Nagel, 1988) contains 684 pages in nineteen
chapters. It is probably unreasonable to expect the typical flight crew to master all of this information.
ICAO Circular 227 (ICAO, 1991) offers a human factors training curriculum covering
eight modula in 35 hours, only slightly less than lhe 48 hours required in the typical university first
human factors course. This article compares the topics in the ICAO curriculum to those covered in a
university human factors cum, noting both differences and similarltles. Suggestions are made for
mmfications to the ICAO curriculum that will capme recent mnds in'human factors research and
practice,
Such trends center on the increased use of cognitive modefs of human behaviow to predict
and explain human performance and human m r . Traditional views of human factors axe based upon
empirical "lambs and dials1hsfud3es. Modem human f m emphasjm the need W predict flight crew
behaviour based upon theories of human performance. Several aviation examples are discussed that
demonstrate that the best human factors tool is a good theory. This is especially true when reviewing
the human factors of flight crew interaction with advanced flight deck autonlation.
Guidelines for the training of professional human factors personnel (Kantowitz, 1987;
Howell, Colle, Kantowitz, & Wiener, 1987) also contain useful suggestions that can be applied to the
knowledge requirements for flight crews. Of course, flight crews do not need to have such a high level
of training as human factors professionals; nevertheless, there is much to be gained by understanding the
range of requirements for human factors specialists. Thus, implications for flight crew training are
discussed.
1969 - Ph.D., Experimental Psychology, Joint Minor in Computer Science and Industrial
Engineering, University of Wisconsin,Madison, Wisconsin; 1967 - M.A., Psychology, Queens College
of CUNY, New York, New York; 1965 - B.A., Psychology (Research Honors), fie City College of
CUM, New York, New York.
Barry H. Kantowitz is .the Senior Staf Research Scientist at Battelle Seattle -Research
Center in the Human Factors and Organizational Efectiveness Research Center. He received the Ph.D.
degree in Experimental Psychology with a joint minor in Computer Science and Industrial Engineering
from the University of Wisconsin in 1969. From 1969 to 1987 he held positions as Assistant, Associate,
and Full Professor of Psychological Sciences, as well as Full Professor of Industrial Engineering, at
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. From 1977 to 1987 he was Director of Graduate Human
Factors Training at Purdue. Dr. Kantowitz was elected a Fellow of the Society of Engineering
Psychologists and the American Psychological Association in 1974. He has been a National Institute of
Mental Health Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Oregon, a Senior Lecturer in Ergonomics at the
Norwegian Institute of Technology, Trondheim, Norway, a Visiting Professor of Technical Psychology
at the University of Lulea, Sweden, and is currently an Aflliate Professor of Psychology at the University
of Washington. He was recently appointed Human Factors Scientijlc Advisor to the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System.
Dr. Kantowitz has written and edited more than one dozen books, including Human
Factors (John Wiley & Sons) now in its tenth printing, and Experimental P ~ c h o l o p(West) now in its
fourth edition. His research on human attention, mental workload, reaction time, humanmachine
interaction, and human factors has been supported by the Ofice of Education, the National Institute of
Mental Health, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Air Force Ofice of ScientiJic
Research, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Power Engineering Test Center (Tokyo), the
Electric Power Research Institute, a major Japanese airline, and the National Highway Trafic Safety
Administration. He served a five-year term on the editorial board of Oraanizational Behaviour and
Human Performance. He has published over 75 scientijlc articles and book chapters, including two
chapters in the Handbook o f Human Factors.
IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENTS

IN THE CANADIAN FLIGHT TRAINING SYSTEM
By Insp. J.H. King (CANADA)

Given the importance of sharing Human Factors information with member States, this
paper imparts the development of Human Factors knowledge requirements in the Canadian flight training
system. The report centres around the following:
1. How ICAO Human Factors Digest No. 3 is utilized in the examination computer
system and in the development of flight crew study and reference guides and
examinations.
2. Adaptation of ICAO Human Factors knowledge requirements to encompass previous

efforts in pilot decision-making and aeromedical information and the development
of basic resource materials to support this endeavour.
3. Attempts to undertake a research study to develop and validate a total human factors
program including knowledge and skill requirements.
4. Endeavours to p a s on requirements and reference materials to pilot candidates.
Insp. J.H. King is an Aviation Education Specialist with the Aviation Training Division
of Transport Canada. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology and geography and has done p o ~ t
graduate studies in educational design and teaching behaviour. He has worked as an educaeor, pilot and
flying instructor. He has owned and operated a@ed base flying operation and has been responsiblefor
theflight instructor and instrumentflying programs at the Sault College of Applied Arts and Technology.
HUMAN FACTORS IN GENERAL AVIATION
By Mr. Ronald D. Campbell (IAOPA)
This paper is aimed at the requirements to be considered when relating Human Factors
education to single pilots, as distinct from multi pilot operations which are heavily controlled and
monitored by the airline oriented companies. It could therefore act as a catalyst discussion on Human
Factors in the General Aviation and Aerial Work sectors.
Ronald D. Campbell, Technical Co-ordinatorfor the Europe Region of the International

Council of Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations (IAOPA), Frederick, U.S.A.
m E R N O O N SESSION CHAIRPERSON:
PROF. GRAHAM J.F. HUNT, PH.D (NEW ZEALAND)
NEW AVIATION PROFESSIONALISM: KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS

THAT INTEGRATE HUMAN FACTOR COMPETENCIES IN JOB PERFORMANCE
By Prof. Graham J.F. Hunt, Ph.D (NEW ZEALAND)
One of the much used words in aviation is that of "professionalism". Every pilot wants
the privileges (especially money), respect, and responsibilities that come from being a captain employed
by a major airline. To achieve this end, pilots accept that the means to such an end involve high
technical standards of performance, integrity and an acceptance of the "rules of progression" from trainee
pilot; second oficer, first officer and finally captain. Similar aspirations may be found with air traffic
controllers, maintenance engineers and other occupational groups within the industry. Acceptance of
these "means to an end" are what job incumbents mean when they describe their work status as "being
professional". However, is this label legitimate? This paper will examine the strategies which will need
to be implemented if airline flight crews, .air traffic controllers and maintenance engineers are to develop
from craft and trade based operators, to members who can be accorded the status and responsibility
practised by most of the recognised professions. Aviation's need for an internationally recognized,
tertiary-based content of knowledge, long accepted by other professional groups, is discussed. Included
in such knowledge systems will be the need for integrating human factor dimensions,with those that
recognise the cultural context in which aviation personnel operate. The new professionalism in aviation
, . Circular 243-AN/l46 41
will result in expanding the competencies of its members in technical, management and human factor
applications,
SOME ASPECTS ON OUR HUM4 N FACTORS CONCEPT
. I will discuss 'What Human Factors mean". Some have a v a y negative view of it in their
minds, namely that it is a contributing factor to accidents in our life. Human Factors cause accidents.
Accident shall be avoided and consequently Human Factors should be eliminated.
Others have a much more positive view of this ex~cessioa.Human Factors are those
factors which make us human. What we need is a united and a more holistic view of the meaning of
Human Factors. We need a definition suitable for ow business.
I will also discuss how we should handle the pilots testlexamination on the subject
"Human Performance and Limitations" I will propose that written tests should be avoided on this subject.
The resachen, nrrw going on e w i a l l y in the U.S.A. usually focus on thr: negative side
of Human Factors. This is g o d , as we can learn our limits. We also investigate a lot more incidents now
than we did before. This is also good. But we must very carefully think about, how this new approach
on Human Factors will influence the image of safety. I will say that the ICAO and IATA members must
control this, be aware of the risks and act in a way that this positive stake not will turn out to produce a
boomerang effect on our customers and our employees. We must use &e Human Factors concept
positively and give our customers the correct feelings and the conviction that they can trust our industry
now and for ever.
We often hear and read that 75% of all accidenl are caused by Human Factors.
But we can also say that thanks to Human Factors orher reasons for accidents are as low as 2 5 4 . Which
expression do you like best?
r Fahigren retired m captark in Scawtdinavicm

AFer 42 years us a pilaf, G w ~ K.
Airlines System, where he workd as Flight Inslmbor, Chief Pilor atad CAA inspector. He has several
years of studks in psychology at Stockhoh Universiry and has been a speaker at FSF annual meetings
at Tokyo 1987,Sy&y 1988 and Rome 1990, He is now working as a H m t t Factors consultant in.
Sweden with branches in Belgium and Malaysia md has conducted Human Facdors coursesfor m r e than
a thousand pilots fmm huenq airlines. He is a member of lATA Humun Factors working group.
TRAINING HUMANS FOR AN AUTOMATED ATC ENVJRONMENT
By Mr. Bert Ruitenberg OFATCA)
The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associalions was founded in 1%1
and has since grown to a worldwide organization with OVH 80 Member Associations that is accepted by
the aviation-world as "thevoice of the Air 'kaffic Controller".
IFATCA participates in ICAO's Human Factors Programme and feels honoured to be

invited to present a paper at this Global Sympsiurn. In the paper, differences in AW-training compared
with pilot-training are highlighted. There are a number of areas where safety-related standards that are
accepted in pilot-training are conveniently "overlooked" in ATC-training.
IFATCA's views regarding automated ~ ~ c - s ~ s t eare

mexplained,
s with much emphasis
on the role of the Human Being in an automated environment. Will automated systems inherently lead
to an increase in capacity, enabling more traffic to be handled by less Controllers, or is this influenced
by the role of the Human Element?
It is our firm belief that automated systems should be designed to assist Air Traffic
Controllers, to enhance both job-satisfaction and the safety-element of the Controller's task.
Therefore IFATCA has always urged that Controllers be involved from the
designing-phase onward in the development of new equipment. The Human Factors aspects of automation
must be fully considered when developing automated systems and should include the maintenance of
essential manual skills and Controller awareness. The Human Element - the Air Traffic Controller - must
remain the heart of the ATC-system, a system that is there for the Controller, not the other way around.
Mr. Bert Ruitenberg was born in 1955, and his Air Trafic Control career began in 1976,
when he entered training in the Royal Netherlands Air Force. In 1980 he transferred to the Dutch CAA
as a lWR/APP-controller at Schiphol Ailport and has worked there ever since. As of 1988 he was also
giving instruction on their ATC-simulators. From 1983 to 1989 he was a member of ZFATCA 's Standing
Committee 4, the Federation's working-group dealing with Professional matters (working-conditions,
medical items, selection and training, Human Factors, etc.). At the 1992 ZFATCA Annual Conference
he was elected EVP Professional, which means that he is currently the Executive Board Member
responsible for the Professional matters of the Federation.
TRANSAVIA'S INTEGRATED APPROACH TO HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING
By Mr. David Lawson (UNITED KINGDOM),

Capt. Han Luchsinger and Capt. Frans Trompert (NETHERLANDS)
In 1984 Transavia Airline's Flight Training Department conducted an evaluation of Flight

Crew performance to determine if current training programmes were meeting crew needs. Arising from
that evaluation Transavia introduced a LOFT programme into the 1985 Recurrent Training schedule.
This LOFT programme identified. a discrepancy between the skill levels of crews in the technical and
non-technical areas. Transavia saw the need for a programme to develop enhanced non-technical skills
amongst its crews.
Working in cooperation with the Personnel and Cabin Crew Training departments, the
Airline agreed a set of goals and training objectives in September 1988. Several Senior Instructors met
with representatives of airline's conducting CRM training and attended CRM programmes conducted by
United Airlines and KLM. Arising from this research Transavia chose Interaction Trainers Limited as
consultants. ITL is a UK based company working in the field of CRM and Instructor training with many
airlines around the world. ITL's task was to assist Transavia with the design, development and
presentation of a Crew Management Course.
Pre-design meetings began in March of 1989 and ITL conducted the first course
November 1989. Since 1989, a total of 110 pilots have attended the Transavia CMC. In 1990, ITL and
Transavia introduced a twoday Follow-Up course for Instructors. The Follow-Up deals with debriefing
CRM in Recurrent and Command Training. A oneday refresher course also forms part of the command
training syllabus. Integration of CRM into Recurrent Training took place in 1992.
Transavia has plans to introduce CRM into all Flight Crew Check and Training as part
of their continuing integrated approach to crew development.
David Lawson was' the Royal Air Force Engineer 1966-1970 and Royal Air Force
Navigator 1970-1988. Operated VClO, Vulcan, Hawk, HS125 and Tornado. Joined IZ in November
1988 as a Training Consultant. Appointed to the Board of In as a Director in April 1992.
Capt. Hun Luchsinger worked for the Royal Netherlands Air Force 1968-1977. Flew
F104 Sta fighter. Joined Transavia as First W c e r 1977. Instructor Pilot 1978. Captain in 1981 and
Chief Training Captain 1984-1987. Appointed CRM Project Leader 1988.
Capt. Frans Trompert workedfor the Royal Netherlands Airforce 1966-1974. Flew FlO4
Starjighter. Chief Instructor of local Flying School and Regional Charter Operator 1974-1978. Joined
Transavia 1978. Currently Training Captain on B737 and Type Rating Examiner. Joined CRM Project
Team 1990.
TRAINING OF NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD (NTSB) HUMAN PERFORMANCE INVESTIGATORS
by Dr. Malcolm Brenner, Ph.D. (USA)
Human performance issues are often central to the investigation of aviation accidents.
The NTSB provides training in human performance to both field investigators and human performance
investigators working for the agency.
Field investigators, located in field offices around the United States, are required to
conduct by themselves the investigation of small aviation accidents (typically fatal accidents in general
aviation or minor airline accidents or incidents). These investigators complete an initial 2 112 week
training course developed by the agency that covers all aspects of aviation accident investigation. It
includes a 2 112 hour class on human performance that focuses on practical behavioral evidence that needs
to be collected. The class teaches that there are five areas to be covered in a basic human performance
investigation: 1) information on the individual's activities before the accident, beginning with the
moment of the accident and working back at least to the beginning of the last rest period; 2) information
on the individual's aviation ability (as from an interview with a flight instructor or chief pilot); 3)
information on the individual's personal life (as from an interview with next-of-kin); 4) information on
the individual's medical history; and 5) toxicological testing. Investigators are provided with a written
reference manual. The chapter on human performance provides a short checklist of human performance
questions that can be helpful for conducting interviews. Investigators can also consult with human
performance investigators for assistance with their cases.
Human performance investigators, located at the agency's headquarters, form part of the
major team that investigates large airplane accidents (such as fatal airline accidents). They focus on the
performance of pilots, air traffic controllers, or mechanics involved in the accident to ensure adequate
treatment of relevant human performance issues. Human performance investigators are recruited from
3 backgrounds: 1) an academic background with graduate level training in human performance and some
degree of aviation exposure; 2) an industry background such as militarylairline piloting with some
degree of human performance training or exposure; and 3) a police investigation background. Human
performance investigators receive the same initial training as field investigators, and, in addition, receive
on-the-job training by experienced investigators on several accidents. Relevant reference material is
available, and informal interaction.among investigators and specialists is encouraged.
Malcolm Brenner is a senior human performance investigator with the National

TransportationSafety Board (NXYB), Washington,D. C. Prior tojoining the Safety Board in September,
1986, he served as a scientific consultant to NASA and the U.S. Air Force for human performance
research, and as an expert witne s on human performance issues for the U.S. Senate, the U.S.
Department of Justice, and for private litigation resulting from aviation accidents. He received a Ph.D.
degree in Psychology from the University of Michigan. Dr. Brenner is a private pilot. (IOU
TRAINING THE INVESTIGATOR
By Mr. Peter Harle (CANADA)
While the aviation community is adjusting to the importance of human factors in accident
prevention, to date there has been little coherent effort to provide accident investigators with the requisite
knowledge and skills to deal with human performance issues in a systematic way. Even when
investigators do receive special training, the tendency has been to focus on the performance of those
individuals closest to the operation at the time of the accident or incident.
Increasingly, an awareness is growing that the aviation system is plagued with accident-
conducive circumstances. These may be the product of inadequate decisions at the highest levels in terms
of equipment acquisition or design, of improper maintenance or operating procedures, of training or
scheduling shortcomings, of cost-cutting resource allocations, of communications failures throughout the
organization or industry, of psychological or other pre-conditions that we operate with daily, etc.
If the generalist investigator is to meet the challenges of investigating the Human Factors,
they require relevant training in the basic principles; eg. the interdisciplinary nature of human factors,
fundamental areas of examination, data that should be collected, data sources and collection methods
including interview techniques, analytical techniques, etc. They must also learn about the types of
specialists that are available to assist in the investigation of human factors, where they can be found and
when it would be appropriate to employ them.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has developed and is implementing a course
to specifically prepare Canadian accident investigators to systematically examine the total context in which
an individual's performance can trigger an accident situation. In addition to enhancing their basic
knowledge of human factors, the course aims to develop their skills in identifying and analysing safety
deficiencies in human performance, in drawing reasonable inferences from the investigation as to cause
and contributing factors, and in recording relevant human performance data for macro-analytical
purposes. The training program is a one-week, residential course with a mixture of classroom
presentations and practical exercises conducted in syndicates.
By better understanding the context in which normal, healthy qualified personnel find
themselves facing an accident situation, effective measures can be developed to reduce systemic safety
deficiencies and thus reduce the risk that an individual can create a triggering event that will slip through
the inherent defences in the aviation system. This paper examines how the TSB is meeting this challenge.
Peter Harle is a graduate mechanical engineer and a former militarypilot. For 26 years,
he served in Canada, the United States and Europe in pilot training and air operations. Retiring in 1985
as a colonel, he became an investigator and safety analyst with the former Canadian Aviation Safety
Board. Today, he is the Director, Accident Prevention in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. He
is currently responsiblefor the analysis of safety deficiencies in the marine, rail, commodity pipeline and
aviation modes of transportation, with particular emphasis on the analysis of human perjormance issues.
MORNING SESSION CHAIRPERSON:

DR. NIKOLAI STOLYAROV (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Dr. Nikolai Stolyarov (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Dr. Nikolai Stolyarov is the Director of the Ergonomical Department of Russia ScientiJic
Research Institute Air Navigation. He is the head of science development of Human Factors problems
in Russia Civil Aviation and is the author of several training programs for flight crew members. He
graduated as "Candidateof Technical Sciences on Operations of Air Transport" and "Doctor of Technical
Sciences on Ergonomical Questions". He worked for the Tupolev Design Bureau in development of
military and civil aircraft. Mr. Stolyarov is a member of the Bilateral Russian-American Co-operation
in the field of Aviation Medicine and Human ~actors.He is also a participant in the ZCAO Flight Safety
and Human Factors Study Group.
HUMAN FACTORS TOPICS IN CANADIAN PRIVATE PILOT TRAINING
By Insp. Arlo Speer (CANADA)
Instruction given to Private pilots is fundamental to future pilot performance. Human

Factors training must become integral to training at the Private Pilot level. Instruction in Human Factors
has been a part of effective instruction for years; it is now being formalized. Mr. Speer will outline
Canadian initiatives for the integration of physiology and psychology (including pilot decision-making)
into private pilot training. He will review Canadian desires for research that (1) identifies Human Factors
skills for various pilot licences, (2) determines effective strategies for teaching and evaluating Human
Factors, and (3) increases instructors' knowledge of how to incorporate Human Factors training into all
courses.
Arlo Speer is Superintendent of Flight Training with Transport Canada. He holds a

Masters degree in Education specializing in Measurement and Evaluation. He completed graduate work
in curriculum design, teacher education and supervision and is currently pursuing doctoral studies in
perjormance testing and certijicationtesting. Mr. Speer has served as a pilot, flight instructor, classroom
teacher, high school administrator, and college tutor in teacher training. He has operatedflight training
units in Canada and served as a Transport Canadafield inspectorfor eight years.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS SKZLLS AND PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES
By Dr. B. Schar (SWITZERLAND)
For SWISSAIR, the HAD programme serves to ensure that pilots are capable of
guaranteeing safe, reliable flights thanks to optimum cockpit resource management (CRM).
At SWISSAIR, our flight training and recurrent training programs of our pilots have long
included elements acknowledging the need for a balance between technical and non-technical skills.
Among elements of our training program that take the human factor into consideration
are: Line oriented Simulation (LOS), Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), safety awareness programs
and combined cockpitlcabin emergency courses.
With the aim of finding a comprehensive, systematic solution, the HAD CONCEPT was
approved in 1991. The HAD Concept is composed of three main elements:
1. Elementarv Training during basic instruction for trainee pilots attending the SWISS
AIR TRANSPORT SCHOOL. This training delivers fundamental knowledge and
establishes attitude and behaviour patterns for the entire career of the airline pilot.
2. Training of the Trainers, i.e. the ground and flight instructors. The rationale for this
part of the program is that the success of the HAD Training rests on the availability
of capable and inspirational instructors.
3. Repular and s~ecialisedHAD Refresher Courses for all cockpit crew at 2-year
intervals. For SWISSAIR, this repeated training on human factor skills is a
prerequisite to ensure a lifelong adequate level of proficiency.
The Concept's major characteristics are:
- It is embedded within corporate management (corporate commitment). Hence, the

program is granted considerable significance.
- Standardised requirements and company-specific needs are taken into consideration

(e.g. corporate culture, management principles).
- The program is practice-oriented and integrated into other aspects of training and
deployment.
- The program is clearly geared toward lifelong, continual development.

- Input is drawn from specially selected line pilots as co-trainers, and next-in-line
superiors to Fleet Chief Pilot and Chief Flight Instructor.
- Course content is flexible, reflecting to developments of modern technology.

- Responsibilities are clearly designated. Head, Flight Crew Training is responsible
for Elementary Training and Training of -the Trainers. Head, Cockpit Crew is
responsible for the HAD Courses for line pilots.
- A management committee ensures the coordination and administration of the overall

program.
As a comprehensive, integrated program HAD represents an innovation, the need for

which is undisputed. It serves as a vehicle for many important changes. Moreover, it is complex,
difficult and tricky to implement.
Through pragmatic, practice-oriented application, SWISSAIR is confident of being able

to implement this ambitious programme successfully.
The program reflects international developments and trends. SWISSAIR is prepared to

make its program available for the benefit of safety and prosperity of international civil aviation.
Dr. Beat Eduard Schar was born on 31 December 1944 in Solothum, Switzerland. After
having obtained his Military and Civil Professional Pilot licence/Flight Instructor in 1968 and 1969, he
graduated from the University of Berne with an MBA (I 977) and Ph.D. (1983). He flew for the Air Force
as a Flight Instructor (1967-1990), Chief Flight Instructor (1977-1984), Commandant Pilot Schools Swiss
Air Force (1986-1990) and Commandant Surveillance Wing Swiss Air Force (1990-1991). He worked
also since 1967 as a Civil Flight Instructor, and he is working now since I July 1991 as the Head of
Flight Crew Recruiting and Training of SWISSAIR.
-
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE .
By Mr. Douglas Schwartz (USA)
When ICAO last convened a Flight Safety and Human Factors Symposium in
St. Petersburg three years ago, I had the privilege to report on the history and use of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) training in the international airline community. That presentation chronicled three
generations of CRM training spanning a ten year period. The paper concluded with predictions of what
the future held for CRM training.
The paper to be delivered in Washington will briefly review that history. It will then
focus on the period since the meeting in St. Petersburg which has seen a flurry of activity in the CRM
world. Among recent events that will be addressed ...
The term Cocbit Resource Management has been replaced with the term Crew Resource
Management implying a broader context for the training than originally intended.
The consensus that human factors training is important has become more focused. Today
there is growing agreement that while flight crew members need a body of technical knowledge and skill
to perform effectively, they also require a body of non-technical knowledge and skill as well. CRM
training has become the vehicle to fill this void.
It has become clear that a CRM course alone is inadequate to address the needs of the
operational community. Today, we think in terms of a CRM training system that will introduce, foster
and reinforce the use of CRM knowledge and skills on the flight line. This systemic approach more
carefully defines long term objectives, measures progress toward those objectives and invites stronger
organizational commitment.
The prevalence of automated technologies in todays cockpits, changes in crew

compliments, and multi-cultural dimensions to crew pairings have also put new expectations of the role
of CRM training.
These, and other facets of the current state of CRM training will be explored. The paper
will conclude with a brief discussion of where CRM will go in the future, suggesting that perhaps it will
disappear, as the "technical" and "human factors" components of crew training merge into one.
Douglas Schwartz is the Deputy Director of Flight Standards, Flight Safety International
(FSI). He began his flying career in 1974 and has been with this company since 18 years as simulator
instructor, flight instructor and training center manager. Currently, he is responsiblefor co-ordinating
flight and training standards among'FSI's network of pilot training centers. He is also responsiblefor
design, implementation and delivery of CRM trainingprograms'and has worked with CRM for ten years.
He is a member of the Flight Safety Foundation International Advisory Committee; and the Air Transport
Association AQP Committee. He is also a frequent contributor to the ICAO Flight Safety and Human
Factors Regional Seminar Programme.
CRM PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT: A TIME FOR INTERACTION
By Mr. J. Norman Komich (USA).
For over a decade now, the aviation industry and the airlines in particular, have all been
great proponents of CRM Training. There have been a plethora of papers presented on the need for and
benefits of formal CRM Training. However, and most unfortunately, there is little formal guidance on
- HOW to conduct such training; there is no single common reference at the Library of Congress titled
"CRM Program Development: Years One Through Ten." It has basically been left to the ingenuity of
the individual program developer with references from a few dedicated psychologists in academia. While
effective in the initial stages of a CRM program, such an approach ultimately suffers from the law of
diminishing returns when restricted to just those individuals within one company.
Keeping recurrent training fresh, stimulating, and productive, training new captains and
first officers, incorporating flight attendants, training check airmen, effectively developing LOFT
Scenarios, training CRM Facilitators, and most importantly, treating the recalcitrant pilot who is
probably the biggest threat to aviation safety but who can pass his periodic checkrides with metronomic
regularity are some of the issues that are currently being addressed at many air carriers. Yet there is little
or no interaction between carriers on how to most effectively address these issues. The resultant parallel
reinventions of the wheel are too costly in time and effort in keeping the margin of safety in commercial
aviation as high as it can be. There is a need now throughout the international aviation arena to share
what works m e Good), what doesn't work (The Bad) and how to effectively handle the Recalcitrant
Pilot ('The Ugly) in CRM Programs. This paper describes the problems and provides some solutions.
Mr. J. Norman Komich is a line pilot with a major air carrier where he is the CRM
Program Developer. He has attended eight other CRM Programs and assisted in the development of
CRM Programs for three other air carriers. Since 1985, he has spoken on three CRM issues at the Ohio
State International Aviation Psychology Symposium and in 1991 he conducted a workshop on "CRM
Scenario Development: llhe Next Generation".
CRM: FEEDBACK AND APPRAISAL SYSTEM

By Ms. P. Antersijn and Ms. M. Verhoef (NETHERLANDS)
Taking "non-technical" training seriously, it is important to regularly evaluate the training

packagelapproah. In 1987188 KLM started to develop a new approach: structurally integrate
non-technical training in the traininglcounselling process of pilots I FIE:
1. Non-technical training should not be a once-only activity.

2. Instructors must have the necessary tools (consequences instructors training)
3. Every pilot 1 FIE must know what is expected from himlher.
4. Responsibility of management in this, and acceptance of all pilots 1 FIE'S,
is essential.
The Feedback & Appraisal System (FAS) plays a crucial role when munsdiing non-
technical skills. 'he FAS consists of five m Jn categories (WORK A T I T ~ ~I N~~ E
RM, A T I O NMANAGEMEW,
LEADERSHIP, STRESS MANAGEMENT, CO-OPERATIOM) with 14 subCategories. Of each subcategory a short
definition, the matching behavioral components and a description of the desiredlundesirable behaviour is
given. On 1 July a h 4 started a try-out with this system. 7% first resultsAwillbe presented during the
symposium.
Afier her study E d ~ a t b n a lTechmbgy.al the Technical Universify Twente in the

Netherlands, Putrkia AIttemjjn entered KLM Flight Operations Diviswn in 1987. To Jamiliarise hersev
wish the cockpit environment she completed the A310 and 747-300grounBrchml paining. In.her job she
has, anaong other things, done research into the field of Human Factors and Cockpit Resource
Managemetit. She is me of she panicipants who are responsible for the new set-up of the Crew
Management Courses, the development d introd~ccfionof a Feedback and Appraisal System for
nun-technical skills for cocbit crew members md the developmena of a new training for groundschool,
simulator and rouie instructors. At the m n t she is working as a star member of the Flight Crav
Trmhing Centre.
M h k e Verhoef studied Educaliunal Technology at the Universe of Amsterdam in the

Netherlands- During that tim she did research on how to improve learning performance. She entered
KIM in I987 as cabin at#ndant. During that period she becme farmarmliar with the line opemtion and crew
scheduling etc. In. 1989 she nuwed to the training d s p a r m n t and was responsible for the development
a d ~xecratknof a managemnt coursefor the cargo dqarbnerrr, and a starmbn mnagers course. In 1990
she joined the KLM Flight Crew Training Centre. To get ftarnili~rwith the cockpit enviroment, she
attended she A310 groundschool and simulator training. She participated in the development of the
Feedback and AppraBal System for non-technical skillsfor cockpis crew members md is aIso responsible
for the developmnt of a compkte new set-up for the training of gmmdschml, simularur and route
insrmctors. A I the moment she is working as a at@ member of the Flight Crew Training Centre.
DEVELDPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL

A TTITUDB OF OPERAWONAL PERSONNEL IN KOREAN AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
By Prof, Soon-Kil Hong, Ph.D. (KOREA)

The paper briefs the major aviation accidents arad t k i r cauM during the last 30 years in
Korea. The paper discusses the p e n t status of human factors trdning for operational personnel to
improve flight safety by the two flag carriers, Kosean Air and Asiana The paper also considers the
planned efforts to develop human factors skiIls and attitudes of professional operational personnel by
Korea Air and Asian& The paper p;arlicularly studies whether there should be any different human factors
training because of different cultural nonns (Oriental Culture Confucianism: vs. Westem Culture:
Christianism). The preliminary research demonstrates that (1) The qualification of captain as team leader
is the most important factor and (2) To improve effective teamwork and GO-ordinationof cockpit crews,
personal relationship among crew members based on schmls {educational background), military
experiences, native places, seniority and &., should be carefully considered.
Born on March 15, 1942 as Chong-Ju Cify, Korea B.A. and M A from Seoul National
University. M.A. A. P.h.D, from the George Washington Universiry (Aviation Policy and Law).
Experknced in mmbn industry md research during 20 years (General Manuger of infernational
ReEatims,Plmning, Marketing, Hong f i n g and Washington, D.C., of Korem Air). Represented Korean
Governmerat and A v i u t b Communiry at numbers of mulrilalewl and bilateral conferences such as ICAO,
IATA, OAA, Korea-US air talks and etc. Presently Professor md Chadmtara, Deparhent of Aviarwn
Admiraistratbn, Hank& Aviation Vniversiry. Execm've Director of K o r m Assoch?im of Air Law.
Adviser to Mirlistiy of Transportation and Korea Airports Authon'sy. Wrotefour Gooh and numy articles
i m d d n g Aviutiun Policy-Makiag in Kwea in Engbh (1990).
50 ' Circular 243-AN/]46
AlTFRNOON SESSION CHAIRPERSON: MR. JAMES P,STEWART (CANADA)
hlr. James P. Stewart (CANADA)

Mr. J a m s P. Stewart joined the Bep~rfmen?of ~ansporbas an aircrofl accident
investigator in 1981 after a twenty year career with t k Royal Camdim Air Force and the Canudion
Amed Forces. In the military,Mr. S t m accumulated over 7000hoursflight time as a crew member
anQ pilot on a number of different aircrafs qpe9, inchding large tramport aircraft.
For six years Mr. Stewasr was employed by the military a d Tramporl CQRada os an
aircrq7 accident investigator. in 1984,Mr, Stewrr joined the newly formed Aviation Scrfeety Programs
Branch of Tr~nsporrCanada as an accident prevention specidbt. U t e r that yew he was appoinlecd
Chief, Aviation Safesy Araalysis and Research. In 1987, Mr. Srew~rtwas m i n t e d Director, Aviation
Safety Programs. With theformation of the Sysrem Sofeefy Directorute on 1 April, 1991,Mr- Stewart was
appointed Director &nerd, System Safety.
Mr. Stewari has received specialist safety training from she Universiry of Southern
CalL$ornia, the United States Air Force, the Canadian A m d Forces and TransporC Cunada. He is the
President of the CamdimSocieby of Air Safety Invessigators and Canadian Councillor to the International
Socieg of Air Safety tnvestigca~ors. UnriE his appoinbmenr os Director General, System Safety, Mr.
Stewarr sewed as the C a d i a n represendative to the ~ratemationolCivil Aviation Organization Human
Factors St@ Group. He has been published in various inlern4biond safety journals and spokn ab
numerous iternutional safety semiluars.
AIM* AIRCREW INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT

A MANUFACTURER'S EXPERIENCE IN CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
By Mr. Eddy L, Rawst (FlUNCJ3)

For Airbus Industcie and Aeroformation, since the beginning of the Iaunching of the first
Airbus, the paramount idea has been to obtain the best safety.
To do so, we have obviously used a21 the tools given by the technology, and also from
the first transition courses given in 1972 with the first Airbus A300, we tried to integrate as much as
possible, h e Human Factors aspects within the technical ones.
In this context, we decided m do again better in 1990, and to introduce in our transition
courses, a Crew Reswrce Management module.
Our CRM course is named AIM, Aircrew Integrated Management, as it is fully integrated
within the technical training of the transition course for crew members, throughout the five weeks they
spend in our center.
It is the first attempt of an aircraft manufacturer LQ address in such a way, the Human
Factors component of crew performance in the customer training.
In this paper, we will describe :
- the evolution of our' concepts of Human Factors throughout the years

- ,
Circular 2434 N/I46 51
- the process of implementation of this caurse, that has been a joint effort between
Flight Safety International and Aeroformation
- the content of hwse

- the feedback from the trainees and the impact of AIM on the results at the end of the
tyansition course
- the analysis of the survey conducted with the help of the University of ?EXAS
(CMAQ = Cockpit Management Attitude Questionnaire)
- the projects of extension of AIM to the other categories of trainees
Mr. Eddy L RACCA bum in 1934, completed his initial studies in Marseille, France, then
in Paris at the French National School of Aeronautics and Space. He joined the French Flight Test Center
of Istres in Nuvem.ber 1960 as an Air Force officer, then, in December 1961 ax a civilian. -He w m
graduated as a flight test engineer by the Flight Test Pilots School of Istres in July 1963. From this date
to March 1988 he mted as a Flight Test Engkeer in charge of arresting barriers tests, Ifren of civil
aircrafl airworthiness, going from the gliders and light laircr~ftto the cotpomte aviation uiairplmes and
commercial airplanes. As such, he Pew 6.000 hours as an engineer and 2.550 hours as a pilot, on 278
diflerent cypes of aircroft, with 428 difiwnt pilots {a good pwparahn for the hwnun factors !). In April
1988 he joined Aeruformacior~,a subsdiary of Airbus Industnks?chat impbmnts rhe training of Fiighd
Crew members md naintenance people of Airline buying Airbus airplmes, in charge of Human Factors
studies department, md is now Senior Director General Resewch. His areas of interest are, among
others, Cosynus the data bme s y s t m for @&tees, AIM, the Aerofomtion 's CRM coursefirLly integrated
in the transition course for the Airbus aircraft crew memkrs, and relations with miversiq for different
researches in she area of training? crew cummmicm'on, erc.
A HUMAN FACTORS COMMITTEE
Capt. Hemming Kirkegaard
The paper covers the organizational set-up,composition and function of a Human Factors
Committse an a srnalkr civil aviation administration. The purpose of the # d m is to advice the
Director Aviation Inspecaon Department on any Human Factors related subject which may have a b&ng
on fljght safety.
The committee numbers 5 members from various parts of the aviation industry.
The committee has discussed the most often recorded cause factor in aircraft accidents -
deviation from basic operational procedures - and concluded that a strong defence against deviation might
easily be established.
Captain Flcmming K i r b g w d hm flown fur 33 years as a fighter pilomight instmcwr

in the airforce and captain in SAS. He has 15,000 hours on medium and heavy aircrafl. He has been
a chiefpilot on DC-9MD-80 aiecrfc in SAS. He is chairman of the Danish Civil Aviation Administrations
H U ~ Facrors
R Committee and is flying MD-80,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS AND PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES
By Capt. Hans Sypkens (IFALPA)
IFALPA thinks of training for Human Factor Skills and developing Professional Attitudes
as of high value. Worldwide developments have come a long way but still we can improve a lot.
At the same time however we recognise that training, how necessary though, is only one
part of the "aviation system" in the effort of maintaining and improving flight safety.
There is some kind of paradox here. The better training pilots receive, e.g. by enhanced
Human Performance training, the better they can cope with existing deficiencies present in the "aviation
system". In other words, we create a Super Keeper able to stop more and more mistakes made earlier in
the game. However this does not help much in the end when not addressing at the same time the latent
failures in the organisation, including the decisions which led to them. Not having such a strategy will
produce a very busy Keeper who indeed needs all of his new learned skills.
This is not an argument against such programmes as CRM and LOFT, on the contrary.
But a strategy not eliminating latent failures will set up pilots to make errors in spite of such training.
IFALPA recognises the need of formal education in all aspects of Human Factors for
Ab-Initio pilots. We are convinced of the large positive effects when this education is fully integrated in
the first years of the basic training. All successive training has to consolidate or enhance this basic
training. The objective being that in the end all training is "Human Performance Impregnated". Even
when starting today it still takes a whole career's time to train every pilot in this manner. In the meantime
we need Human Factors "conversion" courses of an unfortunate duration of a couple of days or weeks.
In this view the CRM courses as we know them today are not the permanent solution.
Consequently IFALPA thinks Recurrent Training in Human Factors Skills is very

important. We do, as with technical skills, need feedback on such a skill as decision-making or feedback
on leadership style to improve ourselves. Both examples are shown in behaviour patterns as with many
other "non-technical" matters. Since we are looking for effective behaviour patterns in the cockpit, at the
same time knowing that behaviour can be observed and measured, it is most promising to receive feedback
on behaviour components during &briefings.
J.G. (Hans) Sypkns studied Mechanics for four years at the High Technical School.
Besides line-flying on the DC-10, a Flight Instructor and Type-rate Examiner on this type of aircraft.
CAA examiner. Sewed the Human Pellformance Committee of IFALPA for eight years of which four years
as Vice-Chainnun and the last two years as Chainnun. Founding member of the Dutch Human Factors
Advisov Group (HUFAG). Chairman of the "non-technical" Working Group of the local CAA. Member
of a KLM Working Group developing a Feedback and Appraisal System for cockpit behaviour patterns
of pilots.
HUMAN FACTORS AND TRAINING ISSUES IN

CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFZT) ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
by Capt. Roberto Arostegui (ARGENTINA) and Capt. Daniel Maurino (ICAO)
Corntrolled flight into terrain (CIFIT) occurrences are a topmost concern within the
international aviation safety community. Recent statistics suggest that close to 45% of aircraft losses
d u ~ n gthe last ten years can be accounted under M s category. This has major hQernati0ml
organizations, including the Hnteanationd Civil Aviation Organization (HCAO), the Right safety
Foundation (FSF) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), to multiply their endeavours
to reduce CFIT accidents and incidents.
Proposals to reduce CFIT occurrences rest on the time-honowed, three-legged stool'

aviation has favoured for decades: engineering and design, regulation and enforcement, and training,
including Human Factors training, or any combination of these approaches thereof. These piecemeal
solutions are mostly directed towards operational personnel. Human Factors is in particular one area where
misconceptions about potential solutions may abound. It is essential to put the Human Factors issues of
@FIT occurrences and their training solutions into context to avoid such miscsnceptions as well as flawed
allocation of resources as a consequence of partial solutions.
This paper takes as point of departure that CFIT accidents and their potentid solutions
should not be considered as particular or isolated events, but rather within the greater context of the
aviation system within which they occur. It is further argued that unless the system supports those who
have the last opportunity to provoke or avoid CFIT occurrences --pilots and controllers-- design,
regulation and training will have limited success. A system approach to the understanding sf the causes
of CHT occurrences is advanced as essential to avoid piecemeal approaches to reduce such occurrences.
A contemporary, system-oriented approach to accident causation and prevention must be the unchdlenged
partner to design, engineering and training in the quest for reducing CFIT occurrences.
Capt. Wober?o Arostegui is Vice-President, Flight ~raining,Aerolineas Argentinas, and

as such the Manager for the airline's Flight Training Center in Buenss Aires, Argentina.
Capt. Arostegui started his flying career as a naval aviator in the late sixties. During his
tour of duty as naval oflicer, he flew transport and search and rescue missions and he was also an
insauclor pilot at the Naval Academy. He joined Aerolineas Argentinas in 1975, where in addition to his
flying duties, he has held several Paining and management positions. In addition, he was President of
the Argentine Airline Pilots Association for the period 1982 to 1984.
His experience includes more than 10 000 hours, with type ratings m Captain in HS-125,
Douglas DC-3, Grumman Albatross HU 16B, Fokbr F28, Boeing B737, Boeing B727-and A4c Donell
Douglas MD80.
Captain Dan Maurino is the Secretary of the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors
Study Group. After obtaining a degree in education, he joined Aerolineas Argentinas, where he held
several management positions, including that of Training Manager for the airline.
In 1988 he joined CAE Electronics in Montreal, Canada, to participate in a flight

simulator training research programme. In May 1989, he joined ICAO with the responsibility of
developing and implementing the Organization's Human Factors programme.
Dan is a member of the Human Factors Society (HFS) and of the International Society
of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI).
ENHANCING THE IMPACT OF HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING
By Mr. H. Thomas Heinzer (USA)
New training techniques are emerging with promise measurable increases in crew
performance in terms of "human factors". Such techniques extend the results of such training beyond that
previously available from so-called "awareness" training. At the same time, new training regimens are
being used to moderate the impact of organizational influences which can contribute to crew-preventable
accidents. The two kinds of training, in concert, offer the prospect of significantly reducing the incidence
of human-preventable accidents.
Mr. Heinzer serves as Director, Training Standard. for SimuFlite Training, International
which provides Advanced Simulation Training for Airline, Corporate and Military Clients. He is
responsible for Standardization, New Training Development and Government Affairs for SimuFlite. He
brings 20 years of Instructing and Training Management experience in addition to his 4 000 hours of
Corporate, P.135 and Instruction time to his present position. He earned a B.S. in Physics from
Georgetown University, and a Masters in Business Administrationfrom Florida Technological University.
Tom serves on the Air Carrier Working Group of the ARAC Training and Qualification
Sub-committee, ATA's Advanced Qualification Program Working Group and has been an active member
of GAMA's Safety Affairs Committee for six years.
HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH DATA APPLIED TO THE

TAKEOFF SAFETY TRAINING AID
By Capt. William C. Roberson and Dr. William D. Shontz, Ph.D. (USA)
The Boeing Company has led a group of airframe manufacturers, airlines, pilot groups and
government/regulatory agencies in developing the Takeoff Safety Training Aid that has been distributed
to a large portion of the airline industry. In support of the development of this training aid, a simulator
study was useful in obtaining a better understanding of the areas in which crew performance can be
improved. The study also provided a baseline of performance that could be used to confirm that the use
of the Aid does provide improved performance.
The study was conducted in a B737-300 full flight simulator at the Boeing Customer
Training facility to evaluate pilot decision making and performance under various situations in which
decisions on whether or not to reject a take off had to be made and executed. A total of eight (8)
situations were defined in which GoINo Go decisions had to be made near V1 speed. Subjects included
24 Boeing instructor pilots and 24 line pilots from five different airlines. The sequence of events the
pilots met was carefully balanced across the subjects to control for learning effects. The results of the
study are reported as quantitative data on RTO decisions, stopping performance, and procedure
accomplishment plus a summary of data derived from post-run debriefings of the airline pilots. Lessons
learned, conclusions, and recommendations for RTO training are presented.
How this study was used to develop example training scenarios and how this new training
has been incorporated into simulator training will be reviewed.
Captain WilEiam C. Roberson, Senior Instructor Pilot, Flight Crew Training, Boeing
Commercial Airplane Group, maintains instructor currency in the 737, 757, and 767, and was co-manager
of the Takeoff Safety Training Aid development program.
Bill received his bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineeringfrom the U.S. Air Force
Academy in 1973 and his master's degree in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering from Stanford
University in 1981. He has also attendedjlight test courses at the University of Tennessee Space Institute.
Bill is a command pilot in the U.S. Air Force Reserve jlying the C-141.
In addition to flying jobs, Bill also spent four years as an Assistant Professor of
Aeronautics at the USAF Academy teaching aircraft performance, stability and control, aircraft design,
andflight test. During this time, he continued to keep up hisjlying by instructing in various light aircraft
along with the DH-6, Twin Otter. .
Dr. WilliamD. Shontz, Ph.D., is the technical lead on several projects within the Systems
Awareness Program which he manages. The projects involve development and testing of advancedjlight
deck systems concepts.
Bill received his Ph. D. degree in Experimental Psychology from Iowa State Universiry
in 1967 and his M.S. degree in Industrial Psychology from ISU in 1959. He also was a medium transport
pilot in the Air Force.
Dr. Shontz has 12 years experience conducting human factors studies and human
performance research in aerospace and commercial airplane companies. He also has 18 years experience
teaching and conducting research in applied behavioral science topics.
HUMANFACTORSTRAINING
FOR A UTOMATZON
MORNING SESSION CHAIRPERSON: PROF. EARL L. WIENER, PH.D. (USA)
LIFE IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE GLASS COCKPIT
by Prof. Earl L. Wiener, Ph.D. (USA)
As we enter the second decade of highly sophisticated airline cockpits, it would seem wise
to take stock of the lessons learned, and the problems yet to be solved.
First always is safety. The glass cockpit aircraft have distinguished themselves with the
best safety start-up period in air transport history. At the time of this writing, there has never been a
serious accident involving a U.S.-operated glass cockpit aircraft. Still safety problems remain, and the
professions cannot relax their vigil. Problems of mode confusion, possibly of situational awareness, and
of locally excessive workload still must be addressed by both the research and the operational community.
Training for advanced technology aircraft is an area that has still not been worked out to
the satisfaction of the airlines, particularly for pilots transitioning to glass aircraft for the first time. Some
novel solutions, including pre-ground-school introduction to aircraft automation (IAA), pioneered by Delta,
are now being introduced by other air carriers, and appear to be quite effective.
Crew coordination and CRM for the advanced cockpits has only recently been examined
by the research community. As this research matures, it will probably point the way for better
management in the cockpit. It is clear that the glass cockpits tend to be "management intensive". How
to handle this phenomenon is less clear.
Cooperation between the research community and the user community has been excellent.
In the decade ahead, researchers will have to confront more of the "fuzzy" problems of modem flight, such
as situational awareness, complacency, and. the influence of automation on crew coordination and
communication.
Earl L Wiener is a professor of Management Science at the University of Miami. He

received his B.A. in psychology from Duke University, and his Ph.D. in psychology and industrial
engineering from Ohio State University. He sewed as a pilot in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army, and
is rated in fijred wing and rotary wing aircraf.
Since 1979 he has been active in the aeronautics and cockpit automation research of
NASA's Ames Research Center. Dr. Wiener is a fellow of the Human Factors Society and the American
Psychological Association, and has served as president of the Human Factors Society. He currently
serves on NASA's Aerospace Research and Technology Subcommittee, and the FAA's Research,
Engineering, and Development Committee.
He is the co-editor (with David Nagel) of Hwnan Factors in Aviation, published in 1988
by Academic Press, and a forthcoming book, Cockpit Resource Management (with Barbara Kanki and
Robert Helmreich), also from Academic Press.
MANAGING THE MODERN COCKPIT -

A MANUFACTURER'S VIEW
By Capt. C.L. Ekstrand (USA)
The last decade has seen the introduction of many high-technology airplanes into the air
transportation system. These high-tech airplanes have typically included flight decks with a highly
integrated Flight Management System (FMS) which among other elements, include Flight Management
Computers (FMC's), electronic displays, advanced capability autopilot/flight director 'systems, and
centralized crew alerting systems. Some allege they have also introduced a host of problems in terms of
effectively utilizing the nw technologies. It has been suggestedthey are, on balance, taking the. pilot out
of the loop.
Some detractors would suggest that we need to return to less sophisticated flight decks.
Others say we need to make significant changes in the new technologies to fully meet the needs of pilots.
Available data, however, gives little support to the arguments of those who would seek
to undo what has been done or suggest significant design change is necessary. However, not all is well.
High-tech airplanes have provided many tools which have potential to be a detriment if not properly used,
resulting in an environment of complacency where pilots allow themselves to get "out of the loop".
There are many factors which are essential in assuring that we effectively and responsibly
utilize the vast capacity provided by high-tech flight decks. No factor is more important, however, than
the operating strategies that flight crew employ in use of automation and the related training that assures
the strategies are appropriately applied.
Highly successful operating strategies and training must recognize and respond to needs
of new technology airplanes and to changes in the operational environment. The near life-like reasoning
capability of the FMC becomes much like a third person on the flight deck and, if misused, disrupts the
desirable madmachine relationship where humans work effectively together to interface with the machine.
Because of this potential the man/madmachine relationship must be consciously and deliberately managed
and trained-to in order to optimize the outcome.
This paper examines perceived problems with high-tech flight decks and examines
opportunities for improvement through operating strategies and training.
Captain Chester "Chet" Ekstrand, is currently Director - Flight Training and Industry
Regulatory Affairs for the Customer Services Division of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. He has
responsibility for flight crew and flight attendant training, as well as airline' support responsibilities
including development of airplane operating and training manuals. Additionally; he is responsible for
liaison with regulatory authorities and industry groups on issues related to the inservice operation of
airplanes.
Chet began his Boeing career 26 years ago and has been qualified in one or lore
crewmember positions on the 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767 airplanes. Prior to assuming his current
position in October of 1991, Chet has held positions as Instructor Flight Engineer, Instructor Pilot,
Assistant Chief Pilot - New Airplanes, Chief Pilot - Flight Training and Director - Flight Crew
Operations.
In addition to training airline crews, Chet has been extensively involved in jlight crew
related technical activities including flight deck design and flight test. He has also been involved in
industry activities and issues, particularly those associated with flight safety. He was the prime Boeimg
pilot focal point for development of the FAA Windshear Training Aid and had overall responsibility for
the development of the recently completed Takeoff Safety Training Aid.
FUNDAMENTAL ENGINEERING TRAINING OF FLIGHT PERSONNEL

AS A MEANS TO MAKE HUMAN FACTORS MORE ACTIVE IN AVIATION
By Dr. P.V. Nazarenko and Dr. M.F. Davidenko (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
The increasing complexity of the design of a new generation of aircraft, the striving for
a reduction in operating costs by reducing the number of crew members and the implementation of new
technologies in aviation require intensified fundamental engineering training of flight personnel which
makes it possible to train successfully operators of flying automated electronic systems. A new system
of flight personnel instruction, which combines the fundamental, humanities, general scientific, engineering
and professional training of flight engineers and pilots, has been implemented at the Flight Faculty of the
Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers. At all stages of instruction, there is goal-oriented training in
the area of the influence of human factors on flight safety. The new concept of flight personnel training
was successfully approved over a period of 15 years of experience in instructing flight engineers for
top-of-the-line aeroplanes. The concept has now been transformed into a training system for
pilot-engineers for a new generation of aircraft.
P. V. Nazarenko, Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Head of the Kiev Institute of

Civil Aviation Engineers. .
Michail F. Davidenko is Head of Flight Safety Department, Dean of the Faculty at the
Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers. He graduated from the mentioned Institute in 1954, then
worked as an engineer at Aviation Enterprises. While continuing his post graduate studies, which led to
a Candidate of Science Degree in 1966, he pursued his technical activities in the jield of Aircrafr
Maintenance. M. F. Davidenko received scientific title of Professor in 1990.
His career as a scientist and educator is closely connected with the elaboration of Human
Factor problems in flight safety. He has actively promoted flight engineers and pilot-engineers training
on the concept of engineering knowledge and aircrafr piloting experience.
58 Circular 243-AN/l46
THE OTHER SIDE OF AUTOMATION - A CHALLENGE FOR PILOT TRAINING
By Capt. Dieter Schlund and FIO Martin Wyler (SWITZERLAND)
1. Starting point
In order for pilots to be properly trained for work in modern cockpits, it is first necessary
to explore and determine the technical characteristics of the Advanced Technology Flight Deck and its
effect on the crew.
Characteristics of the advanced technology flight deck
The most outstanding features of the modern cockpit are the computation and display of
flight data, user-friendly controls, and a high degree of automation. For the crew, this means both a
greater level of situational awareness and a reduction in workload. All in all, the technological advances
have made for more efficient flight operation.
Less obvious are the negative effects of technological advance, which can be described
as new risk factors. These can be summarized as follows:
- The increasing complexity of modern systems, one effect of which is to hinder the
analysis of unforeseen errors.
- An uneven workload during a flight, one effect of which is to heighten monotony,

thereby creating an opening for negligence. On the other hand, a sudden necessity
to deviate from the programmed routine may create an unexpectedly heavy
workload.
- The deficiencies of software controlled systems, which increasingly ,dictate flight

operation and sometimes present us with supposedly digital precision derived from
erroneous data banks.
- The erosion of good airmanship, which must be understood as a human reaction to

the design of the Advanced Technology Flight Deck.
3. Consequences for training
The immediate priority is to raise cockpit crew awareness about the risks identified above.
As these are problems inherent in the system, they are not necessarily obvious to those affected.
New avenues will need to be explored in training. The theory aspects need to be
expanded to include computer technology and system networks as independent subjects.
Complex systems need to be learned in a dynamic environment, for which computer based
training and simulators are very well suited. Integrated training, i.e. combining theory and practice, is
the ideal approach.
In order to learn about the various systems, training in resource management is essential.
SWISSAIR believes that implementing training in resource management and human aspect development
(HAD) as a partial substitute for line checks better serves the interests of flight safety.
Finally, initiJ and recurrent training must be conducted in such a manner that pilots have
full confidence in their basic flying skills.
Capt. Dieter Schlund was born on 29 February 1944, in Zurich, Switzerland. He

graduated as a pilot from the Swiss Civil Aviation School in 1967. His career with SWISSAIR began in
I968 as First Oflcer on DC-9, CV-990 Coronado and DC-10. lRen he was upgraded as Captain on DC-
9 (1976) and Fokker Fl OO (1987). In addition to flight service, Capt. Schlund,hasperjomed various
duties such as route check, simulator and flight instructor. He also assumed management finctions for
SWISSAIR since 1979, and is now the Head of Cockpit Crews and Chief Pilot since 1988.
Martin Wyler, born May 6, 1954 in Lucerne, Switzerland. Gymnasiumfor economics

and study in economics at university of Zurich. Trained as a military pilot. Seven yearsfill time military
pilot, mostly as a flight instructor (Switzerland also knows the militia airjorce system, similar to the US
National Guard reserves). For three years member of the Swiss Air Force Aerobatic Team "Patrouille
Suisse". Since 1991 commander of a F-5E reserve squadron.
Since 1983first oflcer with SWISSAIR, initially on McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-30 and -50,
on Fokker F100, since 1992 on MDC MD-I 1. Member of cockpit management: one year as deputy chief
pilot Fokker FlOO, since 1990 assistant head cockpit crews.
TRAINING FOR COMPUTER ASSISTED FLYING (CAF)
By Capt. Matti Sorsa (IFALPA)
IFALPA wishes everybody to understand that training has no independent value as such.
Training is a part of the system where earlier decisions concerning hardware and software design of the
equipment, procedures and company policies behind them and the over-all socio-economic climate will
dictate most of the end result, flight safety.
Computer Assisted Flying (CAF) is a term we in IFALPA prefer for automation. The
basic function of the pilot has not been changed too much. The pilot is still the human tasked to be
responsible for the safe and economic execution of the flight. It is relatively easy to test this claim. You
only have to think of the possibilities of the pilot not to operate in a safe or economic manner. Thus,
as ever, it all ultimately rests on the shoulders of the pilots. Technical assistance has changed a lot during
the years, of course. At the moment the order of the day is the assistance provided by computers. We
think that CAF is an accurate term to describe what we are talking about.
When components change in any technological system, training should reflect that change.
It would be simplistic to approach this requirement by demanding that training should be directed at these
new components only; in this case computers and their effect on the autopilot. CAF demands a totally
different way of thinking. Due to its inherently totalistic nature we think it is essential that training is
not concentrated on the software and hardware as such. As the concept of operating aircraft is so deeply
affected it should be taken into account from the beginning. Thus, in practice, training for CAF should
be integrated with the effects of this level of technology on the essential functions of decision-making and
communication as well as leadership concepts.
Training upwards along these lines requires that the training systems uses intelligently and
economically the CBT (Computer Based Training) and FTD (Flight Training Device) opportunities.
Perhaps the most important phase of the CAF training are the familiarization flights on the line. It cannot
be over emphasized how important it is to select the right people for the role of the route instructors.
It is understandable that especially in the case of the manufacturers' training the emphasis
is on the positive and advanced aspects of CAF. It is however operationally important to learn well when
you should not use some specific level of automation. In fact there are two kinds of redundancy,
voluntary and involuntary.
We pilots in IFALPA feel that flying advanced airplanes, flying assisted by computers,
requires a truly wholistic training approach. The operational implications of the various levels of the
automation chosen or available for use should be made clear from the start.
Captain Sorsa is an active Airline Pilot flying Finnair MD-80 aircraft. He received a
Master's degree in applied psychology from Helsinki University and specialized in Aviation Safety and
Human Factors. He has been actively developing Human Factors training and the application of Human
Factors in accident investigation. Captain Sorsa is a member of the IFALPA Human Pevorrnance
Committee and IFALPA's representative in the ICAO Human Factors Study Group. He has been an
active member in Western European Association for Aviation Psychology and a Secretary of WEAAP's
I985 Conference.
IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF THE SELECTION

AND TRAINING OF CONTROLLERS IN A U T O U T E D ATC SYSTEMS
By Dr. E.L. #an and Dr. I.G. Yunatova (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
On the basis of a large number of actual medico-physiological and psycho-physiological

data, comprehensively characterizing the particular features of ATC controllers' activities, the existence
of professional intellectual-emotional stress in this category of workers in the ATC process is formulated
and validated. The concepts of physiological reserves, tolerance and effectiveness of adaptation to this
stress are identified. Specialized technical devices have been developed to identify medico-physiological
and psycho-physiological qualities which are important professionally for working in automated ATC
systems. A computer set of diagnostic tests using modem software has been developed and implemented.
Automated psycho-diagnostic hardware has been developed and approved for the operational assessment
of the Ievel of development of the professionally important quaities of an ATC controller. The possibility
of developing these qualities in the controller instruction and training process is validated. It is
recommended that prolonged professional selection be conducted. This makes it possible to relax the
criteria for the preliminary professional selection of school-leavers and of candidates who wish to transfer
to work in automated systems. This is advisable given the low competition for educational institutions
and the implementation of an individual approach when allocating graduating students around airports with
different levels of complexity and according to the degree of automation. The results of the study
performed make it possible to formulate approaches vis-a-vis the process of training specialists and their
work in automated ATC systems.
AFTERNOON SESSION
CHAIRPERSON: DR. WILLIAM T. SHEPHERD, PH.D. (USA)
Dr. William T. Shepherd, Ph.D. (USA)
Dr. Shepherd is manager of FAA's Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences Branch in the
Office of Aviation Medicine. He is responsible for the Washington Headquarters Aviation Medicine
research program dealing with such topics as air traffic controller performance and protection of general
aviation aircraft occupants in accidents. Dr. Shepherd has B.S. and M.S. degrees in aerospace
engineering and received the Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Connecticut. He is a member
of the Human Factors Society and the Aerospace Medical Association. He is also a commercial pilot with
instrument, flight instructor and multi-engine ratings.
Circular 243-AN/146 6I
PILOT'S STRATEGIES OF CREW COMMUNICATION IN ADVANCED
GLASS COCKPITS - A MATTER OF EXPERTISE AND CULTURE
By Ms. Claire Pelegrin and Dr. RenC Amalberti, Ph.D. (FRANCE)
The strategies of crew coordination of 40 Airbus A320 trainees representing several

airlines from different continents have been analyzed during their regular training courses on the A320.
The experiment was sponsored by the French Civil Aviation Authorities (DGAC) and have
been jointly conducted by severi~ationalResearch Labs in order to observe and record the differences
in crew coordination according to the level of expertise and some cultural factors such as the command
of English or the use of gestures.
Each crew has been simultaneously filmed from three different angles, during two
simulator training sessions, one at the beginning of the Full Flight Simulator training phase (FFS) and one
at the end of this FFS phase just before the final check.
The analysis of sessions (horizontal analysis) systematically considers verbal

communication, gestures, and overall scanning .of the two pilots. A classification of the methods of
communication and the resulting strategies of crew coordination emerge from this analysis. This
classification serves as a tool for comparing English native speakers and non English native speakers,
especially considering the change in the ratio between verbal and non verbal communication.
A second analysis (vertical analysis) compares the changes in communication strategies due to progress
in training (between-session comparison).
Results show various patterns of crew coordination deviating to a greater or lesser extent
from the laid-down procedures. What is important to consider is that these deviations are rarely due to an
intrinsically weak professional level of pilots, but result more often from three external factors : poor
command of English, glass cockpit effect (change in task sharing and in the instrument panel), and
individual style of communication (which depends both on individual traits, cultural factors and on the
level of confidence in the other pilot).
A final discussion of these results may introduce some changes in training methods and
subsequent improvements in flight safety.
At first, Chire Pelegrin specialized in human sciences. Various experiences in

psychomotor skill, in the field of public relations and organization were a good approach to the study of
human behaviour. She joined Aerofomuation in I988 in the General Research Department and deals more
particularly with the improvement of training from a human point of view. Concerning the human aspect,
she is in charge of COSYNUS (data acquisition system for aiding pilot training) aimed at improving the
pedagogical approach. On the other side, a data basis gathering trainees opinions aims at improving the
training pe$omuance. She also is involved in the training team for AIM (Airbus CRM course). She also
takes part in research programs held by research centers and universities.
Dr. Rent Amalberti, Medical doctor, Ph.D. Cognitive Psychology, Deputy-head of

Aerospace Ergonomics Department of CERMA (Centre d ' ~ t u d e et & Recherches de Me'decine
Ae'rospatiale), Associated Professor University Paris VIII. Two books and over 100 national and
international papers published. Project-manager, Head of the research program on human factors aspects
of intelligent assistance in military cockpits (French Pilot's assistant program). Consultant
Aerofonnation-Airbus for A320 pilot training. Consultant Human factors for the French Aviation
Authorities ("Bureau des EnquCtes Ae'riennes" National enquiry board ofice). Lecturer at the OCAI
international turning seminar on "Humanfactors in aviation". Co-responsible for the French-American
me'litaq coopemtion on Advanced cockpits (virtuals cockpits).
COMPUTER-BASED APPROACHES FOR

ENHANCING HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN AVIATION MAINTENANCE
By Dr. ~ i l l i a mB. J O ~ ~ S O ~ , ' P ~ . D . ( U S A )

'
Advanced technology computer hardware and software provides opportunities to enhance

the performance of aviation maintenance technicians. Maintenance tasks require that the technician be
properly trained and have access to technical information appropriate for each aircraft. Therefore,
improved training and information access is likely to enhance human maintenance performance.
This paper describes the concept of integrated information systems for maintenance
environments. These systems capitalizeon expert-system software technology to deliver simulation-based
training and real time job-aiding for troubleshooting. The systems operate on small desktop and portable
computer hardware. In addition, the systems are being designed to use "Pen" computers, that require
no keyboard and use a pen to write on the computer screen. The pen technology will permit easy access
to technical documentation as well as a convenient means for the technician to complete required
documentation of maintenance.
The paper and presentation will show specific examples of operational integrated
information systems.
Dr. William B. Johnson is the Vice President of the Information Division for Galaxy
ScientiJic Corporation in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. He is the Galaxy program manager for the Human
Factors in Aviation Maintenance research program sponsored by the FAA Ofice of Aviation Medicine.
Dr. Johnson received his Ph.D. in Education from the University of Zllinois. He is an
Aieame and Powerplant mechanic and a pilot. He has over twenty jive years experience in the
development and delivery of vocational and technical education materials in secondary schools,
universities, and a variety of industrial and military environments. He has over seventy publications
related to the use of computers in technical training and working environments.
.INSTRUCTIONAL QUALJTIES OF A SIMULATOR AND HUMAN FACTORS
By Dr. L.M. Berestov and Dr. G.A. Meerovich (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Up until recently the measure of the efficiency of simulators has been whether the
achieved flight performance and other characteristics have been equal to those of the original aeroplane.
This principle is the basis of standards for simulators, for example, the FAA AC 120-40B standard. As
a result of research performed at the Flight Research Institute, another, we think, more progressive
principle is proposed - in addition to the requirements mentioned above - that is whether the piloting skills
acquired on a simulator are equal to those developed when instruction is given in flight on the same
aeroplane. The principles of direct assessment of instructional qualities do not contradict the principle
of the equivalence of performance, but rather they must be considered as corresponding to a higher level
of simulator evaluation. Such is the opinion of the participants of the Working Group on the development
of international standards for aircraft simulators.
The instructional qualities can be formalized and quantitatively determined on the basis
of the so-called "piloting references"; these are to be determined during the certification testing of an
aircraft. Their substance, tolerances and methods of experimental assessment will be described in detail
in the paper.
An important role in the development of the simulator instructional qualities is played by
the information field of the instructor's console. The information field includes, on the one hand, the
piloting references for continuous and discrete control procedures and, on the other hand, the actual
piloting parameters. A comparison of the actual parameters with the piloting references makes it possible
for the instructor not only to monitor operationally with a high degree of precision the actions of the
person being taught, but also to control the training effectively. In this way the principle of formalizing
the instructional properties, which is used to improve the simulator, makes it possible to increase
substantially the quality of the training process. As a result one notes a reduction in the negative influence
of human factors not only on the pilot, but also on the instructor. The paper intends to cover in deal the
results of many years of research which has made it possible to optimize the information field of the
instructor's console.
The last part describes the results of research on an important aspect of piloting skills, that
is ensuring the interaction of crew members. Here parameters such as the characteristics of separate
piloting, the identification of the pilot perforping certain specific procedures and, finally, the monitoring
of conversations on the basis of acoustic references, are illustrated.
Dr. L M. Berestov is currently Deputy Directorfor Science at the Flight Research Institute
of the Russian Federation Aviation Industry. He has been working at the Institute since 1957 upon
graduatingfrom Moscow Aviation Institute. His research interests are in flight dynamics, identification,
in-flight simulation, organization and methods of jlight testing and certification, airworthiness
requirements development. He is Professor of Moscow Aviation Institute. In 1990 he was awarded the
honorary title of Honoured Man of Science and Technology. He has been a member of the USSR
Delegation at the last three ICAO Assemblies, and taken part in the ICAO Flight Safety and Human
Factors Study Group. Dr. Berestov has published five books.
Dr. Georgy Meerovich is working at the Flight Research Institute since 1947. He is a
prominent specialist in the field offlight testing, certification,flight simulator development, human factors.
He defended his candidate thesis on the ejection dynamics in 1954 and received his Doctor of Science in
methods of flight testing for airplane effectiveness evaluation in 1969. He is Professor of Moscow
Physical and Technology Institute. Since 1954 he is Head of the Laboratory for rain in^ Methods and
Aids, a member of the Working Group for developing international requirements to flight simulators. He
has published a number of books including Large System Effect, Flight Simulators and Safetv o f Flight,
Certification Tests.
TAXONOMY AND MODELS FOR HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

OF INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS: AN APPLZCA TZON TO FLIGHT SAFETY
By Dr. P. Carlo Cacciabue and M. Pedrali (ITALY) and E. Hollnagel (DENMARK)
This paper discusses how the problem of handling human erroneous behaviour can
appropriately be studied by a framework that comprises four modelling phases, namely: the consideration
for a paradigm of human behaviour; the development of a taxonomy for the consideration of human
erroneous actions, which maintains a logical connection between causes-manifestation and consequences
of human erroneous behaviour; 3) the evaluation of appropriate tables of the taxonomy and correlation
with the working environment able to account for the actual domain of analysis and the Human-Machine
Interaction (HMI) process; and 4) the assumption of a human factor approach offering different levels of
complexity for tackling a variety of problems.
Such type of analysis can be carried out either in a retro-smve or in a pro-spectiveway.
In this manner, the evaluation of already occurred events (retro-spective)can be performed identifying the
detail link existing between h e actual working environment and the modeWtaxonorny framework.
Similarly, the study of hypothetical future events (pro-spsctive can then be dome in a consistent manner
with the dynamics of the HMI armd the reality of the work domain,
The current research and development of the taxonomy, as far as theoretScal work is
concerned, is well advanced, The application to real working domain has been focuses as civil avialion
and the study of a real accident case has been performed using ~e retro-spactive approach. Such study
case will be described and discussed in detail, showing how the feedhack deriving form the malysis of
real cases is fundamental for he formulation of sound modelling paradigms for safety and reliability type
studies.
P. Carlo Cacciabue, Comiss&n of the European Communities,Joint Research Centre,

Institute for S y s Engineen'ng
~ ~ and Infomtics, Ispra. Italy.
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES IN THE APPLICATION

OF RESEARCH TO BRACTICE IN THE AVIATION EWVIRONMEMT
By Dr. Thorns McCloy and Dr. Mark Hofmann (USA)
Fist, this paper will provide examples of r w c h results which have been put into
practice in the aviation environment. These examples may apply to jobs, pxocedum, andlor design.
Second, this paper will discuss factors that are i m w a n t when inEoducing new things or ways of doing
business. Le., "change." This will include factors as seen from various p e r s w v e s such as operators,
maintainen, investors, etc. m r d , this paper will relate these factors back to the examples PreviO~sly
&cussed where research results reached practice. Fourth, this paper will provide a list of factors which,
if addressed, will enhance the success of applying research to practice in the aviation environment.
Dr. Tom M d h y received his pilot wings through the Unired States Air Force
Undergradu~teP i h Training Progtraa He faas a variev of mi~torexperience, incE*g c m k t arwd
noncombat, jet and propeller, fixed mad rotor wing Cmircrafl. He was a Professor of Hwnma Factors at
the Unired Ssotes Air Force Academy, and tuughr human factors engineering at the Air Force Tesf Pibt
School. Tom is currently a Scknt#c md Technical Advisor for Hwm Factors with the Federal Aviatim
Adminisaration. In this capacity, his p h r y fwus is coordinating research effoHs in support of the
IVm'onal Plan for Aviurion Human Factors, and facilitating the impkmentation of their results into she
operatiawl cammiby.
fi. Mark Hofmuna has been lain the human factor$ buiiness in various capacities within
the D e p a m n t of Defense for many years. In his last assignment, he served as the Associate Director
of the U.S.A ~ n yH u m n Engineering kborawty. Mark is currently a Scientific md Technical Advisor
for Humnn Facrors with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In this capacity, his primry focus
is to ~arsistthe FAA m i n t ~ i n b t ga tespoflsive Human Factors program.
APPENDIX A - PRESENTATION OF PAPER$
DEVELOPING HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE
MUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL

Neil ~ohnston'
(Ireland)
Introduction
When I s a t down to prepare this paper I first looked back
through my o l d notes and correspondence, d a t i n g back to the early
1970s. 1975 marks the f i r s t reference to my long-held belief that
there was a need for human factors training for operational
personnel. That particular reference was in internal IFALPA~
correspondence, and it was in an IFALPA capacity that I lobbied
over subsequent years f o r the incorporation of s u i t a b l e human
factors training into the pilot training and licensing bystem.
T h e latest revision to ICAO Annex I (Personnel Licensing),
effective November 1988, established an international vquirernent
for licence applicants to demonstrate s u i t a b l e humdn factors
knowledge at t h e ab i n i t i o pilot training stage. 'Given t h e
preceding comments, it will come as no surprise that # strongly
supported and endorsed this ICAO initiative. . 'I
I
It was a particular pleasure to be subsequently invited to
represent IATA~ at t h e then newly formed fCA0 light safety and
Human Factors Study Group. A s a member of that group I produced
the first draft of I C A O Human Factors D i est Number 3 , "~kainingof
7
Opermtional Personnel in Human Factorsfv. I make these remarks to
establish t h a t I am n o t an entirely neutral participant when
discussing this particular subject!
Aerospace Psychology Research Group, T r i n i t y College, Dublin 2, f relaid.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Federation af A i r line P i l o t Associations
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r Transport Aasoeiat ion.

a
ICAO Circular 227-RMJ136, 1991. This was t h i r d in a series of Human
Factors Digests published by 1-0. To date a total of e i g h t Digest8 have been
published.
A-I
In t h i s paper I seek to explain why I believe that human
factors knowledge has an important role to play. I provide some
information an how this new training is being received by trainee
pilots. The primary emphasis here i s c o n human factors knowledge
training for pilots. However most of the discussion can be applied
ta others in t h e operational environment, including a i r traffic
controllers and dispatchers,
Human Faotors - Knowledge or Bkills?
It is an enduringly well established and repeated fact that

human failure is t h e predominant contributory factor in aviation
accidents and incidents. Equally enduring is t h e plaintive
question "but what can w e do about it?!*
I remember my surprise when I first discovered that academic
psychology had long known the nature of visual and other illusions
while I, as an a i r l i n e pilot who was potentially susceptible to
various life threatening illusions, had received little information
about those illusions, nor about those circumstances in which they
might occur. My interest in human factors training for operational
personnel dates from that time.
However, it must be immediately conceded that a decision to
send a l l pilots on an undergraduate course in aviation psychology
is no solution, Indeed it has long been a matter of debate as to
which aspects of human capabilities and limitations shauld - or
could - be successfully addressed by training, For instance, an
immediate riposte to my visual illusions example above might be as
follows: nknowing about the nature of visual illusions, and about
the underlying psychological processes, provides little protection
-
from their more i n s i d i o u s effects greater preventative value has
been achieved over the years by improvements in infrastructure
(such as the introduction of VASIfs) and through t h e rigorous
application of Standard Operating Procedures and Standard
Calloutsmq.
Thus we have here two rather different perspectives. A very
crude generalisation can be made at this point, namely that there
has been a tendency in North America to favour t h e latter argument,
focusing on t h e development of infrastructure and applied cockpit
-
skills, while other areas of the world most notably Europe have -
tended to emphasise the acquisition of basic knowledge. This
general European orientation and emphasis on basic knowledge is
reflected by the fact that t h e ground-school training for airline
sponsored C P L / I R ~ training in Europe o f t e n requires 1,000-1,400
hours of study, whereas one can obtain t h e same basic licence in
the U . S . after considerably less ground study (Johnston, 1989).
Commercial Pilot ' s Licence and Instrument Rating .

It thus comes as no surprise to hear that one of t h e very
first knowledge-based Human Factors courses for operational
personnel, KHUFAC -
t h e 4LM
, Human zactors Awareness Course was -
produced by a leading European a i r l i n e , KLM. The theme of the
KHUFAC course was +@education is t h e keymt. KHUFAC was developed as
a course for established airline pilots and it received mixed
reviews. Some felt that it gave pilots '% new language and
understandingM, while ethers felt it was overly academic in its
approach and lacked an applied focus.
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) responded
promptly to t h e 1988 ICAO Annex f human factors training
requirement, producing a detailed syllabus for t h e i r course on
Human Performance and Limitations (HPL), The United Kingdom was
the first European country to mandate, for pilot licensing
purposes, a pass in an examination associated w i t h an HPL course
(Barnes, 1993) ,
On t h e other hand, it was a leading U.S. carrier, United
Airlines, which developed and introduced the first CRM course. CRM
has always had a highly applied emphasis. Indeed in t h e following
years, as w e have advanced into third and fourth generation C W
courses, the emphasis on applied and practical issues has increased
steadily, along with the sophistication of CRM training.
Similarly, it was the governments of t h e United S t a t e s and Canada
who pioneered and sustained the Pilot Judgment and
Aeronautical/Pilot Decision Making programmes, enchiof which has an
equally applied f o c u s . The developing trend to<AQP (Advanced
Qualification Programmes) is another U . S . initiative which shows
great operational and training promise.
These points having been made, it must be immehiately stated
that the picture I have painted here could be misleading-in certain
respects. For instance, it is a paradox that it is only in
countries such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia that one can obtain a university qualification in
aviation psychology. There are no such courses at any university
in Europe and, until r e c e n t l y , (January 1993) there had never been
a Professor of Aviation Psychology in Europe! On the other hand
the proposal by t h e European J M ~for 3 0 hours of mandatory Multi-
crew Cooperation (MCC) Training as part of t h e CPL/IR syllabus, is
a unique and highly applied innovation in t h e area of applied human
factors and resource management skills (Johnston, 1993a; J o i n t
Airworthiness Authorities, 1992).
Why Should Pilots havm to Know about Human Factors?
Thus, as with a l l crude dichotomies, there are a number of
J o i n t Airworthiness Authorities.
inconsistencies to be found in my characterisation above. Perhaps
the best way of resolving these differences, at least for the
purposes of this discussion, is to first observe that we are
comparing different licensing, training and operating environments
- each with their unique local cultures, operational needs and
solutions. However, I do think we may each need to learn a little
from each other, and perhaps the best way forward is to integrate
the better aspects of each system.
When we discuss human factors knowledge - in other words the
learning of facts and theories relating to human capabilities - it
is important to clearly differentiate between the needs of the
aspiring pilot and the needs of those who are already qualified as
pilots. Qualified pilots are typically pragmatic and they tend to
be opposed to the acquisition of abstract knowledge which lacks
immediacy and an applied focus. On the other hand, most qualified
pilots will initially look with some sympathy at applied training
which appeals to their sense of professionalism, and which aims to
increase their competence as a pilot.
In this discussion the focus is entirely upon ~ i l o t s
undersoins trainins for the issue of their licence - the ab i n i t i o
pilot. The argument I wish to promote is simple - if we feel that
such pilots need to know and understand facts and theories about
meteorology, aerodynamics, navigation, and so forth, then they
should equally be expected to know and understand basic human
factors, as this relates to their safe and effective functioning
within the aviation system.
We have been prepared for decades to mandate hours of study
for technical subjects, but have denied the relevance, importance
or practicality of training in human factors. until relatively
recently this, in fact, was very much the conventional wisdom. It
remained the conventional wisdom for years because of diverse
arguments. Two key arguments against the recent Annex I revision
were, (i) that pilots would reject any such training as being
irrelevant, and, (ii) that it was impossible to specify training in
human factors because there was no agreed definition of the term
human factors, and no agreement as to its constituent elements.
Both of these arguments originate from another era and are
invalid. Consider the first argument, that pilots would reject
such training. So far two courses of ab i n i t i o pilots from my
airline (Aer Lingus) have undertaken the Human Performance and
Limitations (HPL) course as part of their CPL/IR training in the
United Kingdom (at Air Services Training, Perth, Scotland). I can
certainly testify that they enjoyed their training and felt it was
very relevant.
I have spoken to both classes at some length and only one
pilot expressed any reservations - and that was to the length of
the course, rather than the content. Mi~ora revealing was the
general belief that the HPE course covered information which they
felt was an inteqral part of becomins an airline pilot. They found
it difficult to believe that previous generations of pilots had not
had the benefit sf such training. .Indeed,this is an interesting
reaction in itself. These pilots felt that the knowledge they had
gained on the course was an essential part of the knowledge
required of any professional pilot. My understanding from
enquiries made to a number of U.K. training schools is that such
sentiments are shared by most trainees.
Regarding the purported impossibility of defining Human
Factors, I can only observe that a working definition is to be
found in ICAO Human Factors Digest number l7 ggFundamentalHuman
Factors Conceptsn:
Human Factors is about it is about people in their working -

and living environments, and it is about their relationship with
equipment procedures and the environment. Just as important, it is
about their relationship with other people. It involves the
over-all performance of human beings within the aviation system.
Human Factors seeks to optimize the performance of people by the
systematic application of the human sciences, often integrated
within the framework of system engineering. Its twin objectives can
be seen as safety and efficiency.
Furthermore, in ICAO Human Factors Digest Number 3' an entire

outline training HPL syllabus has been specified and the Appendices
contain information on several additional syllabi. Paradoxically,
given the claimed difficulties in defining and teaching human
factors subjects, the FS&HFSG found a widespread international
consensus as to the essential content of an appropriate HPL
training course.
Both of these ICAO sponsored solutions to supposedly
intractable problems of definition and application testify to the
fact that a lot can invariably be accomplished if we actually get
down to a task - rather than arguing ex ante about the viability or
feasibility of that task!
Human Factors Training: ICAO Initiatives
Recent ICAO initiatives in the area of human factors training
for operational personnel followed the publication in 1988 of the
Eighth Edition of ICAO Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing). Annex I now
ICAO Circular 216-AN/131, 1989.
' ICAO Circular 227-AN/136, 1991.

mandates a Human Factors knowledse requirement for each category of
flight crew licence holder, namely;
If....
to. ..(the
human performance and
l i c e n c e b e i n g issued)
lo.
limitations relevant
This knowledge requirement has the same status as knowledge

required in respect of any other part of the traditionally accepted
pilot training syllabus. It thus requires that pilot training
establishments prepare and implement an appropriate training
syllabus. Licensing authorities must equally prepare an
examination in Human Performance and Limitations (HPL). The
implications of this are reviewed in Johnston and Maurifio (1990).
It should also be noted that the Annex 1 requirement for the
successful demonstration of human factors skills was also
augmented. For instance, the holder of an Airline Transport Pilot
Licence must henceforth;
"demonstrate the ability ...to...
(c) exercise good judgement and airmanship, ...
(f) understand and apply crew co-ordination and
incapacitation procedures; and
(9) communicate effectively with the other flight

crew members.
The new JAA proposal for MCC (Multi-Crew Cooperation) training
at the CPL/IR training stage is one response to the developing
Annex I emphasis on human factors skills training.
Another important ICAO initiative was the formation of the
Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Group (FS&HFSG). This acts
as an international forum for discussing issues relating to human
factors in aviation. ICAO has also published a number of Human
Factors Digests, based upon the deliberations and work of the
FS&HFSG. A number of world symposia and regional seminars on Human
Factors have also been initiated (Maurifio, 1993).
In responding to the Annex I knowledge requirement the FS&HFSG
developed the third in its series of Human Factors Digests, titled
"Training of Operating Personnel in Human ~actors~'~.The general
subject content of Digest 3 is outlined in the following section;
for detailed information readers are referred to Digest 3 itself.
-9
ICAO Circular 227-AN/136, 1991.
What do Pilots Need to Know about Human Factors?
A general survey within the aviation industry led the ICAO
FS&HFWG to conclude that approximately 35 hours of training would
be required to adequately address the proposed human factors
training syllabus. A minimum training time of 20 hours was
suggested. Judging from recent experience in the United Kingdom,
it would appear that 25 hours of training is more than sufficient
to reach a good standard of HPL training. U.K. training schools
also report that 12-14 hours suffices for experienced pilots who
are upgrading from an existing licence to a higher licence (OATS,
personal communication, November 1992; AST, personal communication,
March 1993).
The following outlines the general subject areas suggested for
HPL training in ICAO Human Factors Digest 3. The percentage of the
total time to be devoted to.each module is suggested in Digest 3,
in order to assist training establishments achieve training balance
across the syllabus;
Module 1 Introduction 5%
Module 2 The Human Element (Physiology) 20%
Module 3 The Human Element (Psychology) 30%
Module 4 The Human Element (Fitness) 5%
Module 5 Pilot: Equipment 5%
Module 6 Pilot: Software 10%
Module 7 Interpersonal Relations 15%
Module 8 Operating Environment 10%
The ICAO FS&HFSG envisaged that HPL training would be as

practical and applied as possible. In Digest 3 it is strongly
emphasised that HPL training is not intended as an academic
exercise, and that an operational orientation to training is
essential. In this regard, feedback from the Aer Lingus trainees
referred to above indicates that they found the operational
examples and "war storieslhangar talkw to be of special value and
assistance during their HPL training.
The two key considerations in achieving a practical and
operational orientation to HPL training are; (i) the qualifications
of the instructors and, (ii) the nature of the examination. The
ICAO FSCHFSG felt that instruction should generally be accomplished
by existing flight and ground instructors and that the HPL
examination should not have the effect of turning HPL training into
an academic exercise. Both of these recommendations were followed
when the U.K. training and examination were first developed, though
some concern has been expressed about the abstract nature of a few
recent examination questions.
Evaluating HPL Training
A clear differentiation was made in Human Factors Digest 3
between examining or assessing human factors knowledge.and human
factors skills. As a general statement it can be said that the
FSCHFSG felt that knowledge of facts and theories - "declarative
knowledget1- is suitable for examination. There appears to be a
general consensus, even amongst pilot trainees, that the discipline
of preparing for an examination or test in HPL is essential. A
multiple choice test seems to be the evaluation method of choice;
a number of typical questions are provided in Appendix 1.
On the other hand, it was generally agreed by the ICAO FSCHFSG
that teaching and evaluating human factors skills requires much
greater subtlety. Adult learning methods (Telfer, 1993) and
experiential teaching techniques are more appropriate to teaching
applied human factors skills. Success in using these techniques
necessitates an open learning environment and an operational
orientation to the training. Such an environment is incompatible
with the dictates of a concluding examination or test. Not least
of the reasons for this is that trainees frequently seek to tailor
their performance and responses to their perception of what is
required to pass the test, or to please the instructor. Whatever
else this may do, it is most unlikely to lead to sustained
experiential learning - itself the key training objective
(Johnston, 1993b) .
Teaching HPL - Experience and Issues Arising
In conducting my research for this paper, I spoke to various
U.K. training schools and instructors. Several indicated that
their interest in HPL training was initially driven solely by the
U.K. CAA licensing requirement. Many attended the first instructor
training course in a highly sceptical frame of mind. It was
interesting to discover that a number of instructors who were
initially sceptical about the desirability and feasibility of HPL
training have since become very positive about its value and
importance. I feel that this is an interesting and instructive
development. Certainly the Aer Lingus trainees, to whom I referred
above, found their instruction enthusiastic and relevant.
Some interesting observations were made regarding the impact
of culture, notably in circumstances where trainees come from an
authoritarian culture. Certain aspects of human factors training,
readily accepted by Western students, may be leks appealing to
students from other societies, indicating that flexible delivery of
HF training can be important. For instance, the gender-free
orientation in most western societies is not the norm in many other
societies. Certain CRM principles may be viewed as a challenge to
the natural social order in some societies and some care during
instruction may therefore be appropriate (Johnston, 1993~). There
are also some indications that the actual HPL examination
performance of such trainees may differ from that of trainees from
western societies.
Basic ab i n i t i o training is conducted in accordance with the
provisions of ICAO Annex I. Historically these Annex I provisions
have emphasised an individualistic approach to training - not least
because each licence is issued to an individual, who .must
demonstrate personal competence. There are, however, some signs
that our ab i n i t i o training methods may have to change somewhat to
make them compatible with the increasing trend to emphasise the CRM
.and teamwork aspects of crew performance - and especially in the
light of the teaching content in HPL courses. .This represents a
new and growing challenge for training establishments.
One of the interesting developments which followed publication
of the new Annex I HPL requirement has been the publication of an
increasing number of textbooks on human factors in aviation. A
number are listed in the bibliography at the end of this paper -
although this does not seek to be definitive. Some of these texts
are exclusively directed to the HPL examination syllabus, while
others are sophisticated and interesting introductions to human
factors in aviation. One U.K. training school has developed an
attractive workbook on HPL, in which there is a combination of
diagrams, teaching text and blank spaces in which trainees fill in
their answers to various questions on applied aspects of human
factors (AST, personal communication, October, 1992).
A number of university based pilot training courses, which
include training for the CPL/IR, have been implemented in recent
years, with human factors fully integrated throughout the training
syllabus (Hunt, 1993; Telfer, 1993). Similar courses are available
at several universities in the United States. A developmental
approach to the human factors knowledge requirement is being
pursued in Canada (King, 1993), while the draft JAA pilot licensing
requirements suggest that human factors training will play an ever
increasing role in Europe (Johnston 1993a; Joint Airworthiness
Authorities, 1992) .
Is Acquiring HPL Knowledge An Isolated Act of Rote -Learning?
I referred above to feedback from Aer Lingus trainees who have
undertaken HPL training, and who found the supplementary Itwar
storiesw or Ithangar talkn to be of special value and assistance
during their HPL training. It is easy to disparage such comments,
since we all know that generations of students from all walks of
life have preferred "idle chatvtto real learning. But an important
issue is raised here - namely, is such hangar talk really "idleu?
I was alerted to the fact that there was much more to this
"idle chatttduring a number of ostensibly factual lectures on
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) . I conducted these
lecture/discussions during the MCC "bridgem training course
conducted by Aer Lingus for pilots joining the airline (Johnston,
1992). My lectures consisted of a brief review of SOPs, starting
with a background justification, followed by a general run through
the Aer Lingus SOPs we use in our MCC simulator training.
Most of our MCC training is conducted as a classroom dialogue
and I noticed after a number of courses that much less attention
was initially paid to the actual procedures than to considerations
about the context in which the procedures were used and,
specifically, when they would - and would not - apply. In the
beginning I kept returning to the facts, namely the substance of
the SOPs, feeling that the trainees were missing the point.
Eventually I concluded that it was I who was missing the point.
For, to the trainees, the "factsttabout our SOPs, and the merits of
memorising them, were only relevant after they came to some
understanding about the social and operational context in which
their learning was to be applied.
I feel that this is a key point, and it has caused me to
revise somewhat the views I previously held on human factors
training for operational personnel. The reader may consider that
I am overstating an obvious point. However, if it is really
obvious and important, I must then ask why we fail to draw the
necessary conclusions for training practice and move to regularise
and formalise the consequent training implications across the
entire aviation training spectrum?
I still feel that factual knowledge about HPL is of
considerable importance, but it is equally clear that learning
facts - declarative knowledge - cannot be isolated from the
understandings of trainees regarding the operational pertinence of
those facts. In the words of Lave and Wenger "...learning is an
integral and inseparable aspect of social practicett (Lave and
Wenger, 1991) . Learning, or knowing, various facts about human
factors cannot be considered independently of the trainee's ability
to recognise their operational relevance and understand how they
should be applied. In Lave's terms (Lave, 1988) we are dealing
here with a dynamic encounter between the trainee and his
understanding of the nature and demands of the operational
environment.
The trainee is moving through a long training process - of
which HPL training is but one part - and this will play an
inevitable part in changing him or her from novice'to.expert. In
Lave and Wengerfs terms, our trainees are apprentices in a
"community of practicettand it is -through "legitimate peripheral
participationN in the activities and understandings of that
community that their cognition - and hence their future practice -
is shaped.
Among the skills we associate with the transition from
neophyte to skilled practitioner is the ability to recognise the
relevance of knowledge, combined with a contextual understanding as
to how that knowledge can be appropriately and successfully~
invoked. Part of our aviation "apprenticeshipw thus constitutes
learning the dialectic between our repertoire of acquired skills
and knowledge, and the subsequent application of that knowledge in
dperational settings. I think it follows that such considerat-ions
merit particular attention when HPL training is developed and
delivered.
Conclusion
The available evidence suggests that the latest ICAO
initiatives on human factors training for operational personnel are
meeting with considerable success. The experience of those who
have implemented and received HPL training endorses this. When we
consider the training needs of ab i n i t i o pilots, the seamless
transition from human factors knowledge to applied human factors
skills is undoubtedly an issue of key importance. Having
established an adequate base of human factors knowledge at the ab
i n i t i o level, finding better methods of training and developing
human factors skills represents a major training challenge for the
future. Only when we have successfully integrated human factors
knowledge and skills across the entire aviation ab i n i t i o and
recurrent training system can we truly claim to have properly
addressed the human factors training challenge.
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank the various training schools and
aviation instructors in the United Kingdom who assisted me with
information and comment during preparation of this paper, and
especially Air Services Training, Perth and the Oxford Air Training
School. My thanks are also extended to the Irish Department of
Transport, Tourism and Communications for nominating me as a
speaker. I also thank ICAO - and in particular Captain Daniel
Maurifio - for inviting me to speak at this important symposium.
A-12 243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/Uup~~n~~p
,References and Select Bibliography
Barnes, R. (1993). Human Performance Limitations Requirements:

The United Kingdom Experience. In Proceedinss of the ICAO
Human Factors S ~ m o s i u m , Washinaton, D.C:, April 1993.
Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organisation.
Campbell, R.D. and Bagshaw, M. (1991). Human Performance and
Limitations in aviation. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Green, R.G., Muir, H., James, M. Gradwell, D. and Green R.L.
(1991). Human Factors for Pilots. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.
Hunt, G.J.F. (1993). Knowledge Systems that integrate Human
Factor competencies in job performance. In Proceedinas of the
ICAO Human Factors Svmvosium. Washinston. D.C., April 1993.
Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organisation.
International Civil Aviation Organization. (1989a). Human
Factors Disest No.1: Fundamental Human Factors Concevts.
Circular 216-AN/131. Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization. (1989b). Human
Factors Disest No.2: Flisht Crew Trainins: Cockpit Resource
Manasement and Line-Oriented Flisht Traininq. 217-AN/132.
Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization. (1991). Human
Factors Disest No.3: Trainina of Operational Personnel in
Human Factors. Circular 227-AN/136. Montreal, Canada: Author.
Johnston, A.N. (1989). A review of airline sponsored ab i n i t i o
pilot training in Europe. In Proceedinas of the Fifth
International Svmvosium on Aviation Psvcholoav (pp. 33-38).
Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, Department of Aviation.
Johnston, A.N. (1992). Airline ggBridgew Training. In Revort of
the 8th. General Flisht Trainina Meetins, Stockholm. Montreal:
International Air Transport Association.
Johnston, A.N. (1993a). Human factors training for the new joint
European pilot licences. In Proceedinas of the Seventh
International Svmvosium on via ti on Psvcholosv. Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University, Department of Aviation.
Johnston, A.N. (1993b). LOS/LOFT debriefing skills and
techniques. In Proceedinss of the Seventh
Internationai Symposium on Aviation Psvcholosv. Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University, Department of Ayiation.
Johnston, A.N. (1993~).CRM: Cross-cultural perspectives. In
.
Wiener E.L., Kanki, B.G. and Helmreich, R.L. (Eds.) Cockpit
resource manasement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc.
Johnston, A.N. and Maurifio, D. (1990, May). Human Factors
training for aviation personnel. ICAO Journal, 16-19.
Joint Aviation Authorities. (1992). Flisht Crew Licensinq
Pro~osalsfor the Joint Aviation Authorities. Fourth Draft,
July 1992. JAA: Hoofddorp, Holland: Author.
King, J.H. (1993). Implementation of Human Factors knowledge
requirements in Canadian flight training system. In
Proceedinas of the ICAO Human Factors Sym~osiumWashinston,
I .D C April 1993. Montreal: International Civil Aviation
Organisation.
Lave, J. (1988). Cosnition in practice: mind, mathematics and
culture in evervdav life. Cambridge University Press,.
Lave, J., and Wenger H. (1991). Situated Learninq. Cambridge
University Press.
MauriAo, D. (1993). Cross-cultural perspectives in Human Factors
training: The lessons from the ICAO Human Factors Program. In
Proceedinss of the Seventh International Sym~osiumon Aviation
Psvcholosv. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, Department
of Aviation.
Telfer R. (1993). Human Factors in learning and instruction.
In Proceedinss of the ICAO Human Factors Symposium Washinston,
I .D C April 1993.. Montreal: International Civil Aviation
Organisation.
Trollip, S.R., and Jensen, R.S. (1991). Human factors for
seneral aviation. Colorado: Jeppeson Sanderson.
Wiener E.L. and Nagel, D.C. (Eds.). (1988). Human factors in
aviation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc.
.
Wiener E. L: , Kanki, B. G. and Helmreich, R.L. (Eds.) (1993)
Cock~itresource manasement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press,
.
Inc.
APPENDIX I
Typical test/examination questions on Human Performance
and Limitations used in the Unitea Kingdom.
1. To avoid the risk of decompression sickness, it is recommended that
you do not fly within.... hours of diving using compressed air at a depth
in excess of.... :
(a) 12 hours : 24' (b) don't fly at all

(c) 24 hours : 30' (d) 30 hours : 24'
2. The time available to a pilot to recognise the development of HYPOXIA
and t o do something about it is termed the time of useful consciousness.
This is approximately ....at 30,000 feet:
(a) 5 seconds (b) 1 minute

(c) 5 minutes (d) 20 minutes
3. On a go-around you experience a pronounced pitch-up feeling. You

recognise this as.... illusion and rectify it by. : ...
(a) a saccadian : keeping the head still
(b) an optical : using visual cues
(c) an echoic : closing eyes momentarily
(d) a somatogravic : relying on instruments
4. You are captain of an aircraft which has a major problem and a
decision must be made on how best to tackle it. To arrive at the best
decision you should:
(a) express your own ideas instantly because you are the captain
(b) run a "tight ship" and discourage adverse comment
(c) solicit ideas from other crew members encouraging doubts and
objections
(d) make a decision and keep it to yourself
(Courtesy, Air Services Training)

HUMAN FACTORS IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION
Professor Ross Telfer

Department of Aviation, The University of Newcastle.
Australia
This paper examines the provision of Human Factors education in two aviation
settings: a University baccalaureate program involving ab initio commercial pilot trainees, and an
airline three-day workshop for line instructors. Finally, a new focus, the different ways pilots
approach learning, is discussed. Preliminary results are provided of a study involving eight
international airlines and a sample of 230 pilots, revealing differences in learning strategies. The
next phase of the study will examine ways in which these strategies can be optimally linked with
various topics, exercises, checks and examinations in pilot training.
The provision of human factors as a key area of study was part of the-rationale for
Australia's first University aviation degree, which commenced enrolments at the University of
Newcastle in 1978. Conventionally, university studies are either discipline-based, liberal (with a
wide choice of subjects from a number of faculties or schools), or in varying combinations of the
two. Because of the simultaneous demands on undergraduate students from flight training, pilot
licence examinations, and the usual academic pressures of assessment exercises, assignments and
examinations, the aviation program at the University of Newcastle has been revised and refined
since 1978 to become a single-purpose, specialist course with no options in the beginning years. In
brief, the course consists of four sections: aeronautical engineering (including engines and systems,
avionics, fatigue, design, and aerodynamics); aviation science (including meteorology, forecasting,
navigation and flight planning); aviation manapement (including aviation law and computer
applications), and human factors. It is the last which will be detailed to show a sequence in
content suitable for ab initio pilots. The depth, however, will need to be varied according to the
entering abilities of the students or trainees, and the time which can be ailocated in the training
syllabus.
TABLE 1 :THE UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE HUMAN FACTORS COURSES

JBACHELOR OF SCIENCE. AVIATION).
Year 1: Introductory Human Factors-4hrslwk- (information processing, vision and balance;

spatial disorientation; perception; memory; decision making; motor control).
Aviation Psychology and Medicine-3hrslwk- (atmosphere, respiration, acceleration,

vision, hearing, air sickness,drugs, health, first aid, fitness, fatigue, attention,
workload, stress, personality, communication).
Year 2: Human Factors-4hrslwk (ergonomics, displays, aircraft control, automation,

simulation, training, stresslarousal, flight phobia, fatigue)
Human Performance in Multi-Crew Operations-3hrslwk- (personality,
communications, group processes, leadership, cabin safety)
Year 3: Aviation Instruction - Ground-4hrslwk- (psychology of learning, instructional

methods, evaluating instruction and learning, lesson planning, preparing and using
aids, aviation'instruction)
Advanced Aviation Instruction-4hrslwk- (instructional design, problem-based

learning, computers in instruction, simulation, training environments, student stress
and training, aircrew performance assessment)
Flight Deck Performance-3hrslwk- (systems theory, pilot selection and testing,

human factors research methods, accident investigation)
Aviation Instruction Practicum-4hrslwk-(practice instruction)
Directed Study (4hrslwk) (project)
Year 4: Honours Research Thesis (20hrslwk for year)
Aviation Research and Methodology (6hrslwk)
In analysing the success of Human Factors education at the ab initio level, there are
some important findings. For the inexpert and unexperienced pilot, there tends to be a ready
acceptance of the importance of human factors as an integral aspect of pilot training. Provided the
examples and applications are drawn from operational situations, from the outset there is high face
validity in the equal status given each of the course components. Just as engineering contributes to
aircraft systems, ergonomics and psychology contribute to their efficient operation. There is an
acceptance of a body of knowledge to be transmitted, and because of this receptivity by the
students, teaching methods usually are the lecture, assignment, reading, or group projects such as
accidentlincident analysis and discussion.
Experienced pilots, however, are a different matter. They may have flown for some
time in the absence of serious consideration of stress management, decision models, resource
utilization or situational awareness. They have performed well to date. Why another new course
for them to attend?
For them, it is change, not mere education, which is the goal. Airline training in
human factors thus is based on a different instructional design to that used with ab initis pilots.
There is little point in lecturing to an uncommitted audience md expect that change will result. The
emphasis has to switch from content to process: from what to how (and why). The medium of
interaction is no longer expert to class: it is peer to peer in a group situation structured by a peer
facilitator.
The instruction itself has a different basis,too. For students who have come directly
from a high school education, pedagogica.1 methods are possible. For adult learners, androgogy is
the appropriate base (Knowles, 1980). It takes account of the differing motivation, experience,
approach to learning and maturity of the airline pilot. Pupils become peers, and lectures become
discussions and group exercises which enable the participants to draw their own conclusions rather
than being presented with them. Instructional efficiency, in terms of time, is sacrificed for
effectiveness. Better to take a little longer and convince someone by means of role play that group
decision-making is almost invariably more effective than an individual's. The message becomes
more indelible: change is more probable.
Maximum participation and activity is sought so that the group as a whole benefits
from the sum of the experience and expertise that resides within it. Group dynamics, such as
cohesiveness, leadership, climate, norms and communication have to be given time to take effect.
Time for pilots' workshops, however, is a scarce and costly resource, so all phases of learning
have to be exploited. Pre-reading, a course outline, statement of objectives, questions atid exercises
act as advance organisers in the presage phase. Receiving this material about two weeks in advance
( not too soon, so that it will be shelved and forgotten; not too late so that it is given a hurried
perusal on the way to the workshop), participants are aware of expectations of them, and can
prepare in advance for the contributions they are expected to make during the workshop.
The next learning phase is that of the actual process of the workshop. The design
will be such to ensure that there is a sequence of structured activities through which the facilitators
will lead the group. Like a catalyst, the facilitators are vital for the change process, but their actual
presence will not be evident in the personal consequences for each participant. The choice and role
of the facilitator is thus vital for the success of human factors training. Apart from the obvious
human qualities, they need to have high personal credibility with their peers.
Facilitators have the role of ensuring that each participant is involved as much as
possible, while balancing inputs to restrain the verbose and encourage the recalcitrant.. . and all the
time maintaining relevance in the contributions. For self-evaluation during sessions of the
workshop, facilitators can periodically ask themselves: "What do I expect each of the participants
to be DOING right now?" Because the workshop is activity-based, people should be active, not
passive, learners. This will also remove the need for editorialising or risky "expert" comment from
facilitators.
The workshop design will include (apart from the pre-reading manual mentioned
above), a course manual to provide later reading and reference for participants1 facilitators, and a
guide for facilitators. For example, the Cathay Pacific Airways Instructor Workshop Guide for
Facilitators uses a standard format listing the points where audio-visual aids can be introduced and
how to introduce them; a guide to timing; a script (not intended to be read, but to provide guidance
in the choice of questions, introductions, summaries, and responses); hints on non-verbal
communication which can be used; appropriate points for coffee breaks or discussion; room layout;
use of equipment; back-up activities if the group works quickly when and how to use the prepared
participant contributions; and an evaluation sheet for use in both formative and summative
evaluation. This is advisory, not prescriptive as the course rationale is that instructors are effective
because of personal ability, personality and experience ( the art of instruction) combined with a
knowledge of the underlying theory (the m f t of instruction) (Telfer and Biggs, 1988). There is a
degree of autonomy for facilitators to use their personal style in presenting and structuring the
workshop experiences. (See Telfer and Bent, 1992, for details of the course, its objectives and
results of initial evaluations).
That workshop also makes use of follow-up (the product phase) in the form of a
pocket-sized checklist given to all participants. It thus utilises the before (presage), during (process)
and after @koduct) phases of instruction for maximum effect and the greatest probability of
inducing change in participants (Biggs and Telfer, 1987). A spiral curriculum extends over three
days in which subjects are treated initially, then revisited for consolidation and elaboration.
The emphasis on process rather than content reflects another form of indirect
instruction (characteristic of androgogical principles). The workshop itself exemplifies the methods
and philosophies it espouses. Thus, the schedule varies in session length over the duration of any
one day. Longer sessions are in the morning, when the more difficult topics are encountered.
Thought-provoking or discussion-inducing topics precede coffee or lunch breaks so that reflection
or clarification can occur in time-out. Variability, the design of contrasting activities to maintain
interest and prevent boredom, precludes similar media or methods being used in successive
sessions. The medium becomes the message.
Aviation instruction is distinctive in several ways: its structure, mission, stakes,

focus, budget, flexibility and immediate transfer of training. At the individual learning level, there
are differences related to the nature of the material to be learned, the nature of the examinations
(typically multiple choice questions), and the application of the knowledge, skills and values to
operations (Telfer, 1993). There are, therefore, special constraints in the design of human factors
workshops for the aviation industry. These constraints take the form of tensions between traditional
instructional design and that which aviation requires. The first tension is between effectiveness and
efficiencv. Effectiveness is always the intention: but efficiency will intrude. Time off- line for
pilots and facilitators; opportunities for prior and later contact; the need for professionally produced
videotapes; multiple revisions and reprints of manuals as the course is refined; allocation of a
specialist training room and resource centre; ancillary staffing: all are highly desirable but subject
to budgetary restraint.
Similarly, there is a tension between education (knowing why) and training (knowing
how). The latter is by far the easier to attain, and companies may settle for second-best in the
hope of faster change. Faster, perhaps, but far less sustainable.
The third tension is between theory and ~ractice.While the aviation industry should
be able to expect the same guidance from research in instructional methods as it obtains from
ergonomics or engineering in aircraft design, instructional theory appears to suffer in comparison.
Part of this is due to ignorance of what there is to offer in the 1990's, and part of it is misguided
application by supposed experts who uncritically import the results of studies which cannot be
validly applied to aviation. The behaviour of a Grade 4 social studies class in Minneapolis has little
to do with two Qantas trainees in a simulator at Sauth Australia. Guiding theory is available: but it
has to be selected judiciously with a clear priority to validity in application.
The design and implementation of a human factors workshop in airlines is inevitably

a compromise between what is actually needed to effect the change management seeks, and the
amount of resources it is prepared to provide. Some conclusions, however, are unequivocal.
Workshops for experienced pilots have to be designed on androgogical principles requiring group-
based, active learning which is based on participation rather than passive recipience of lectures.
Support of the process of change has to extend before, during and after the workshop. Follow-up,
in the form of a periodic refresher, newsletter and posters, is vital for change to occur. In brief,
there needs to be an awareness of how pilots learn.
Over the last decade researchers have identified three predominant approaches to
learning: Deep, Surface, and Achieving (e.g. Entwistle & Waterson, 1988; Watkins & Hattie,
1990; Biggs 1987a, 1987b). The deep approach to learning is intrinsically motivated, with a desire
to be competent in the area of study. To achieve deep understanding, learners read widely and
integrate their new knowledge with their existing knowledge base. The surface-oriented learner,
however, is motivated by anxiety and the desire to do the minimal amount to pass the sibject.
Surface oriented strategies include rote learning and reproduction of material provided in course
notes or manuals. The third approach, achieving, is concerned with ego enhancement and
organising the time, source and place of learning.
The relationships between approaches to learning and performance in aviation have

now been examined in several different populations as part of the ongoing Approaches to Pilot
Learning Project at the University of Newcastle (reported in Moore, Scott and Telfer, in press).
The first study examined approaches to learning (and their relationships with learning outcomes) in
a sample of commercial pilot trainees. The second gained data from a sample of experienced pilots
who were undertaking retraining, and the third study involved interviews with a small sample of
experienced airline transport pilots. The concluding study examined ways in which approaches to
learning in experienced pilots might be more appropriately assessed, leading to the development of
the Pilot Learning Process Ouestionnaire.
The Ab Initio Studv used 62 trainee commercial pilots for its sample (and is fully
described in Moore and Telfer, 1990). Data were gathered on approaches to learning and on
individual performance in each of the nine ground school topics (such as Aerodynamics,
Navigation, or Flight Planning) and the time it took them to fly solo.
For the ground school results, the most prominent finding was the consistently significant negative
relationship between ground school scores and the surface' approach measure. Ab initio pilots who
reported adopting a surface approach to learning scored lower on all measures of ground school
learning than those who adopted a less surface oriented approach. Trainees adopting a deep
approach to learning went solo earlier. Briefly, then, the findings from the ab initio study
demonstrate the generally negative effect of a surface approach to learning, and a tendency for
positive effects of a deep approach.
The Pilot Under Initial Training (PUIT) Study was based on responses from a
sample of thirty experienced pilots being given initial training by an international carrier.In addition
to ground school results, a rating was gained for the PUITs' performance in their final simulator
check ride. Correlations showed very little relationship between approaches to learning and
performance in ground school or in the simulator. The only significant relationship was between
scores on the Type test and Deep scores. PUITs reporting a meaning-oriented, wide-reading
approach to learning scored higher on this test. In contrast to the ab initio results, surface scores
were not negatively related to performance, and deep was not related positively to the measure of
knowledge application, flying the simulator.
The findings from this second study raised some questions about the reliability and
validity of a school/university questionnaire for examining pilots who had substantial experience in
the industry. Several of the PUITs had indicated in their responses that items seemed irrelevant to
the retraining or endorsement context in which they were learning. Additionally, reliability co-
efficients were quite low. A third study was therefore undertaken, interviewing pilots about their
own approaches to learning (Moore and Telfer, 1992).
The Interview Study was based on a small sample (n = 11) of captains or first officers
flying with domestic or international carriers. This study demonstrated that experienced pilots use a
range of strategies and motives for the specific learning they need to do in aviation. Clearly, some
of these approaches are "deep" in orientation (e.g. desire to understand, reading widely, self-testing
levels of learning, using own summaries), others are "surface" (e.g.learning emergency drills), and
others "achieving" in orientation (e.g. prioritising, using timetables for study, having material in
compact form for studying). With these data and the results of the two previous studies, a fourth
study was undertaken to develop an instrument for assessing experienced pilots' approaches to
learning in aviation (Telfer, 1991).
The Ouestionnaire Develo~mentStudv aimed to develop a reliable and valid

questionnaire that could be used to assess experienced pilots' approaches to learning. The
questionnaire was designed to distinguish Surface Approaches (motives and strategies), Deep
Approaches (motives and strategies), and Achieving Approaches (motives and strategies). A sixty-
two item, 6 point Likert scale, instrument was developed and distributed to eight international and
national carriers.
Two hundred and thirty experienced pilots returned the questionnaire. Factor analytic
and reliability analyses were undertaken to determine the structure of scales and the items to retain.
The result was a three-scale, thirty item instrument: the Pilot Learning Process Questionnaire
(PLPQ).
Circular/Circulair~~p~cyn~p
243 -AN/146 A-2 1
The next fwus of investigation is the relationship between pilots' approaches and
their performance in ground school topics, simulators and check rides to. ascemin if particular
approaches by pilots are more beneficial. for specific ateas of learning. Diagnostic and remediation
strategies can then be introduced to increase pilot learning. Further, the a&fication of the PLPQ to
pilot selection testing will be investigated to examine the benefits to the individual and to the
employer of identifying pilots' characteristic approaches to learning.
Biggs, J.B. (1987-a) 8 Hawthorn, Victoria: Australian

Council for Educational Research.
Biggs, J.B. (1987-b)Th Hawsers'um, Victoria:

Australian Council for Educational Research.
Biggs, J.B. and Telfer, R.A. (2987) The Process of Lmrning, Sydney, Prentice Hall.
Entwistle, N.J., and Waterson, S. (1988) Approaches to studying and levels of processing in university
students. B a g , 58, 258-265.
Knowles, M. (1980) acticesf

Modern Pr to Androgonv. New
York, Cambridge.
Moore, P.J. and Telfer, R.A. (1990) "Approaches to Learning: ~elatidnshi~swith Pilot
Performance", The Journal of AviationlAeros~ace'Education and Research. Vol 1, No. 1.
Spring .44-58.
Moore, P.J. and Telfer, R. A. (1992) -roaches to LRarnin~in a Vocational Context, Paper presented
to the AustralianlNew Zeatand Association for Research in Education Conference, M n
University, Geelong.
Moore, P, , Scott, R., and Telfer, R. (in press) "Implications of Pilots' Approaches to Learning. "
Paper submitted for presentation to the 7th International Sytrnpsiuum on Aviation Psychology,
Columbus, Ohio,
Telfer, Ross and Bent, John (1992) "Prducing a Workshop for Training Airline instmctors,"
The Journal of AviationlAeros~aceEducation and Research. Vol. 2, No. 3 , Spring.
Telfer, R.A. and Biggs, J.B. (1988) The Psvcho1~vof Flight train in^, Ames, Iowa State
University Press.
T e k , R.A. (1993) "What makes Aviation Instruction Different?", Chapter 13 in Aviation

I n _ s a u c t i o n g edited by R.A. Telfer, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Telfer, R.A. (199 1) "How airline pilots learn." Paper presented at the Human Factors in South
Pacific Aviation Symposium, New Zealand Psychological Smiety's Annual Conference,
Pdmerston North, August.
Watkins D. & Hattie, J. (1990)Individual and contextual differences in the ap p r o a c h e s to

learning of Australian secondary school students. Educational Psvchaloaist, 10,
333-342.
Dr R M Barnes
UK Civil Aviation Authority
The United b g d o m Civil Aviation Authority may have had an advantage over some ather regulatory
authorities as the importance of Human Factors in aviation was recognissd as far back as the 1950s. At
this time a Senior M a d i d m c e r (Flight Safety & R-h) was appointed to look into the Human Factor
probkms of high flying, fast jet tramport aimaft He was supported by a Human Factors Steering Group,
membrship of which was drawn frm all sectors ofthe aviation industry.
In the mid-1970sthis group noted the inmasing si@cance af human error in accidents and recom-
mended that human factors be included in the syllabus for a professional pilot's lioence. This suggestion
reoeivd further support when a King Air super 200 ~~near Nan& in Franceb
The aircraft was on a training detail during which the instructor d e d out a "pmcticedecompression%at
3 1,000 feet by using the dump switch. Following maintenance the oxygen Wrn had not been
remnnectd and the crew rapidly became unconscious. The aircraft mashed nearly six b u m later at the
end of its endurance having drifted over the channel into French airspace.
A quabus was prepad and discussions with the training schools and professional organisationsarranged.
Although there was general acceptance of the idea and agreement was reached to include limited time on
this subject in flying m g pfogmnrnes there was resistance to the Authority making it compulsory.
We were therefme in a good position to meet the requirement in the 8th edition of ICAO Annex 1 that
Human Performance and Limitatiom be introduced in all professional flight crew d t i o n s .
A new ~Uabuswas dram up following internal discussions and advice from the RAF institute of Aviation
Medicine and the Applied Psych01og-y Unit at Craml5e1d Wfate of Aviation Technology. Because of the
immheaoe of the European Joint Aviation Authorities the syllabus was dso review& with our European
partners. The h d syllabus is very simiIar in content to that subsequently recornmeadd by ICAO.
By 1990 we were in a positioa to put out Aeronautical Infomtion Chculars artvising that from ApriI 1991
applicants for a professional pilot's licence wmdd be required to sit an exanthation in Hman Performance
aad Limitations. This requirement would also apply to plots upgrading their !iceace h m CPL to ATPL,
and to anybody who renew4 their licence afkr having let it lapse. Applicants for Flight Engineers and
Flight Na~galorslioences and PPLs wishing to include an -mi rating on their licence, would also
havetosittZlisexamwitheffectfromOctober 1991. Fnall~therewastobemin~uctorysixmonth
period during which anybody who failed the exam would be -led a licence, aIthough expected to re-
and m i t this exam. Current licence holders would not be quired to sit the emdmtion retr0sp~t~e1y.
The i n W betweenthe drmlation of the AIC and the introduction of the exams was used to consult with
training schools, airlines, various aviation orgadrations such as the British Air Line Pilots Association ntnd
Guild of Air Pilots M d Navigat~rsand representatives fiom the private pilot hkdty, Moanists etc.
though a series of s e m h m . These gave the aviation industry a furCher c b c e to express its views and
the Authority an opportunity to explain the exam rcquiremena and justrfy the syllabus. in understanding
the latter it n& to be borne ia.mind that this may well be the only d o n on which tbe candidate wi11
have to demonstrate a knowledge of h m factors. It was also nscessary to set up suitable courses for
~ c t o r swhich, currently take place at C d e l d Institute of Aviation TecbaoIo~. A m e r oonsid-
eration was to e n m e that suitable reading material was available for applimts not attending a set course,
In practice, noacaaion ofthe i m ~ exam ~ prompted
g the a p p m c e of several new books on this
rmbjea suitable for ah m w applicants.
Exams are part ofthe educational system in the UK, What is important is not passingthe e x .but that
the applicant should have been given an initial insight into hnman factors which hopefdy he wiU explore
and exploit as his m r develops. This is m n l y embedded in our approach to airhe training since all
holders of an Air @mators &Mateare required to include a Cockpit Remme Management coucse in
t b e ~ p r o ~ .
One of the aims o f t h i s paper is to o u t h e and justtfy the syllabus. We have divided this into four main
topic areas:-
1. Basic aviation physiology and h d t h mairitmce.

2. Basic aviation psychology.
3. Stress fatigue and their management
4. The sccidl psycbobgy and wg~nomiicsofthe fight deck. ,
'BASIC AVIATION PHYSIOLOGY AND EWALTH MNIWENANCE
Basic avidon physiology and the effects of flight.

hatomy a d physiology of the eye, ear,vesbidar, circulatoy and respiratory systems.
Composition of the atmosphere, gas laws and the nature of the huum requirement for oxygen
E&GS of r e d u d ambient pressure aod sudden decornpressiow, times ofusefirl c o n s c i ~ n ~ .
Recognising and coping with hypoxia and hyperventilation.
Entrapped gases and barotmma.
Diving and flying.
EBecs of aderation (+I-@ on circulatory system, vision and consciousness.
M e c W m , effects and management of motim sichss.
A howledge of the anatomy and physiology of the eye, ear, vdbular, cimdatow and respiratory systems
and of the composition ofthe atmosphere and gas laws is n v to undentmd the rest of the topics
CCW&
The relevance ofmost oftbe other topics listed hopefully needs IMe explanation. Had the h s h c t o r in the
King Air previously mentioned been fully aware of the dangers of a d a m p e o n at 3 1,000 feet h o p f d y
he would have been content to simulate the emergency or at least a n y it out at a lower bdght. The
problems of excess gas in the gut &er a fatty meal or flying with a d d are embarrassing and p d d d
experiences that most air crew will have suffered.
I would like to add a note of caution. A colIeague who flies a large jet was detaired to carry out a type
rating on a young first oficer. On fhe day m ~ e ~ n he e dwas &wing h m a cold. Nol wishing to let fie
first officerdown, and mindful that o ~ previous
1 occasions when be hsd flown with a cold be had
experienced little discomfort, he repteed far duty. As they clbtrd away fmm the airfield he looked at the
merits only to h d they were spinning round. When he concentrated on individual numbers on the
dials t h y spun r m d in their own righL F o m t d y the h t a c e r was very competent and brought h e
airwaft safely back The captain m m e d had Merd an upupset of his vestr'bular system as a
consequence of his cold, leading to this illusion. FamiWity shodd not be dowed to develop into
comp1acency!
Motion si*as d m a special mention since a number of pilots expwfenoe this in their early training.
A knowledge of how it is produced and what ma l x done to alleviate f may help these people enabling
them to continue th& chosen wreer.
Hypwatil:ation, or over-breathing, is more common than is often d s e d . It is potentiated by shes,

m o t h sickness, excessive heat and breathing lhrougha madq all of which con&tions mag 0- infight.
Moderate bypewentilatienisdistressing and causes dimadon Ifaltowed to continue collapse can occur,
with obvious safety impIiCations.
Underwater diving appears to be popular with air crew- AU divers should be aware that if you dive to a
depth of more than 30-feet a timed ascent to Ihe d a c e is necessary to avoid the "beads". What niexs
sametimes forget is that flying affer a dive has the same effect as diving to a grater depth, in that it
increases the total presswe change experienced,
Hying m d beaith,
Noise-and-ag-induced h h g loss.
Visual defects and their correction.
herial disease and coronary risk factors, ECG, blood pressure, stroke.
Diet, exercise, obesity.
Psychiatric diseases, drug depdenw and dmho2ism.
Tropical diseases and their prophylaxis, hepatitis and d y transmitted diseases.
Common ailments arid fitness to f l gasbo-enteritis,
~ colds, use of common drugs and their side effects.
Toxic hazards.
Causes and management of in-flight incapacitation.
Not everybody would agree that Mth is a subject for examination, but in my opinion there are a number
of reasons for including it.
By the time a pilot has fmished his mining a great deal of money has been i n v w in him, Anything that
can.be done to encourage him to preserve his state of h d t b and hence his career, is worthwhile. A
knowledge of diet, the e8Fects of h i t y and the bendit of reasonable mounts of exercise on physical and
mental perfommae is relevant, as is M o m t i o n on the e:E& of alcoholism and drug dependence.
Fitness to fly is somethjng weq pilot should address, The commonest causes of incapacitation are not
serious illness, such as coronary thxombosis, but gasl~o-inteshwdupsets and upper respiratory Wections.
Most airlines now include incapacitation trainjllg in their courses.
Recently the captain of a Boeing 747-200 on a long-haul flight bgame ill. ~ommandI& taken by the m-
pilot and the mptain left the fight deck. The co-pilot decided to reom to base, although hewas now more
than two hours out h m base, During the return the capfain re-appeared on the flight deck stating that be
now felt better and could continue. The co-pilot decided this was not the case and returned to base where
his decision was upheld. Some knowledge of the likely course of conditions that might be met on the
flight deck may aid pilots who h d themselves in this & E d t gosition is likely.
Blood donations, pregnancy and medications, botb prescriid and "overthe counter" a l l special
sigi5caflc.e in aviation+ Air crew s W d that any doaor to whom they go for mment is aware of
their professioa They should also r d d him that they *en* travel abroad, if appropriate. There
have been a number of wasions where, during an epidemic, a pilot has been diagnosed as baviag "nu
whereas the true diagnosis has been malaria. Regretab&, one case 1know of bas resulted in the death of
the person concwned.
Many pilots:worry about their m d d q parkuhly a deterioration in their sight and hearing. In most
cases this is associami with advancingyears rather than discme. Ifthe pilot understds tbis be is far
more likely to accept the need for reading glasses rather than squintiag and holding the test card as far
away as his authoriwl mBdicaX examiner will allow.
BASIC PSYCHOLOGY
Basic plan of human information processing, including the concepts of sensation, attention, memory,
central decision-making and the -tion of mental models.
Limitations of central decision channel and mental workload.
Fmcrion ofa*nLiim in seleEti~~g infomation m e s , atteadorl-getting stimuli.
Types of memory; peripheral x m v memory, long term (semantic and episodic) memory, short term or
w o r b g memomy, motor memory (skills).
Memory limitations md ~~.
Perception, the integration o f m o r y information to form a mental model.
EEWs of e~~ and expectation on permtion.
Erroneous mental models; visual, wsti'bulax and other Uusions.
Reoognhing and managing spatial, disorientation.
Use of visual cuw in landing.
Eye movements, visual search techniques, mid-air coUisiom.
Skill, rule and 'lmawledgbased behavim
The nature of skill acquisition, the exercise d skill, consdous and automtic behaviow, errors of skill.
Rule based beha.riOur,ptwdws, sdacor mining, fzduses ofdeb& kha.ri~~.
Knowledge based bebadour, problem solving and decision making, inference formation, lures in
knowledge W behiour.
Maintaining a m t t mental models, ihatimd awareness, conbmtion bias,
Fl$sg an Mis a canpiex task iwolviag the a s i d a t i o n of clues from oatside and within the airma&
p r o e g this information to gain situational awareness and &en making deci$ionsand acting upoa them.
This process imoks nxle and Imow1dge based behaniopt, couxhus and a m d c and*
exercise ofmentad and manual SWS. Such complex prmessing is qm to error. The cause ofthe errw
may be very simple, such as a failure d short-term memory. We a n normally retain.about seven
umbted i t e m h~our workiag or short-term. memory. Ifoat actually rehearsed within 10-20 seconds this
type of informatim will be lost. This obvionsly has si@cance when dealing with compLiW
irnctiom. Emr may also occur due to erroneous mental models associated with such things as visual
and vestibular flusions. Jt mu slso result fTam preanceived eqxctation or pSt experjmce.
The pilot of a fighter experiend severe vibration caused by M u r e of tfie bilfin of the air- ejecting at.
the last moment and ~ o w escaping
~ y death, Some .months later he agah e.-qeried severe vibratiod
and immediately ejected. The aircraft flew on fox some considerable W, he vl'bration having been due to
clear turbdence.
The number o f tvics involved in this particular part ofthe sflabus prec1udes going through them
i n d i W l y . A suitable simile to coyer the syllabus A d the that wen as m e how1sdg of how the
parts of scar m k helps in I&g to drive, so a larawledge ofhaw our brain warks helps in using it to
the best advantap.
STRESS AND S'ITUCSS MANAGEMENT
Mod& and effects of stress

Defi~tiws,cwoeptF~d~of~.
Arousal, ooncepts ofover-and under-aro~~I
Erdroame~ anb their & t ; heat, noise, ~Ibration,low humidity.
Domestic s&s, borne relatianships, b e m e m a t , h c i a l , and time cahtments.
Work m s , relationships with colleagues and management.
Effects of dress oa attention, motivation and performance.
Life mas and health, other clinical effects of stress.
Defence mwhani5ms, iden-g sks and s k a s management
Stress comes in many form stcMmlngh m the emhnmenk work and the domstic scene. Inthe
aviation. environment noise, miration md low humidity play a particular role but m a q dthe ~fl'essorsare
part of aur normal existence, Dem&c H m s and ifs problems are well horn to mosl people. Both m y
&& a person's abikiq to w o r m on the flight deck.
The pilot of an air taxi hit a large concrete obstacle, smashing the extended undemnhge, whilst making
an approach to a small M e l d . The obstacle was clearly visible and no satidactoq cause for the accident
was established other than "piloterror". A personal conversation with the pilot some ? h elater established
that his wife bad waked out on him on the morning of the accident. He readily a h & d that this situation
had m y pre-occupied his mind and that his flight had containsd a series of minor errors prior to the
incident d e s c n i .
Stress may also arise from the crew relationships and fightdeck worktoad. Some degree of & a s is
desirable in the promotion o f a d and performance, but foo great a stress decreases performance and
may even cause the person to freeze, a very undesirable situation in an emergency. Performance also f d s
off with too little stress which may have sign5cance on the automated flight deck It must be borne in
mind that what is stressful to one person may not be stressful to another, A howledge of stress and its
effects, and recognition ofthe symptoms, are important factors in coping with it. Those that are prone to
stress can be cowwHed and taught methods of managing it
Sleep and Fatigue

Biolo@d clmh and circadian rhythms, sleqhakefulness and temperature rhythms, "zeitgebers".
Sleep stages, sleep at abnormal times of day, required quantity of sleep.
Work-indud fatigue.
Shift work.
AJI of us have a circadian rhythm which governs our bodily functions and ability to perform therely
preparing the body for periods of sleep and wakefulness. Performance peaks between 1200 and 2 100 hours
and is lowest between 0300 and 0600 hours. It dm falls off with time on task. A pilot is therefore more
likely to make mistaka &er a long flight ending in the early hours of the morning, and this sirua~onis
b e t avoided. It is also important to preswve an adequate pattern of sleep if normal performance is to be
achieved.
Airtines usually bave "roundthe clock" operatiam which may be further complicated by fights wbich cross
mdtiple time zones with mmequent upset to the operating pilots' normal circadian rhythm. Thts may
make the objjectives outlined above di@cult to achieve. Some pmWon is offered by flight time
regulations but even the best of these does nat cope with every situation. PiIots therefore need to develop
their own deep strategies. This rnonly be done if they understand how their lmly functions and how to
m g e sleg,, including the b & t s of napping and the ust and abuse of drugs.
SOCIAX, PSYCHOLOGY AND ERGONOMICS OF TEE F'LIGHT DECK
IndvfduaI differences, social psychology and flight dexk management

Individual differences, d a t i m of intelligence and personality.
Assessing personality
Main dimensions of persdity, extroversion and anxiety. Other importan! traits; warmth and
Sociability.
Impulsivity, tough-mindedness, dominance, stabiIity and boldness.
God-directed, person-directedtypes of bebaviow.
Individual pe~~~naIityrelated problems of f lag especially risk-taking.
Personahty interaction on the fight deck and the interaction of personality with status or seniority, role (eg, -
handli@non-badhg) and perceived ability of crew members.
Concepts of conformity, compliance and risk shiR Implication of these concepts for the flight deck with
regard to eEk& of crew size (eqxxdly 2 v 3 crew),
Comuniwtion; mdml and nm-verbal communication,one and two way communication, differwt
oommunication styles.
Methods of maximising mew effectiveness and improving flight d a or oockpit resome, management.
Interacting with cabin crew, air t d i c services, maintenance personnel and passengers.
Personality aad individual traits will affect a person's approach to flight safety. We Bave all met the
"hearty,kick-the-wes,lets go'mtype as w& as the "doubtingThornas" who d s 1 1 his checks three times
and still isn't sure things are satisfactory. Both are undesirable baits carried to exbema. A knowledge of
their personal lmits d l not change an iudivdiual but it may highlight possibb shortcomings, letting the
person make suitable allowanes for them.
Flying invariably calIs for cantact with other people, be it as part of a mew1with ATC, or witb ground
handlers. Knowing bow to handle -cult gersoaalites, how others can influence y ou dezisions aad how
'
to communicate is therefore important:. Much of this forms rhe basis for Flight Deck Resource
h g e m e n t courses.
One personal experience concerns a m a e w kighter deshtxl for Miran. The oo-pilot had only joined
the company recently but bad many hours on type, more than the captain who was a rather d ~ & e e ~ g
genfleman. Alfhougb there were thufldmtorms about the captain elected to position for the approach by
means af an ADF beacon. The first &oer felt this was unwi9e but rather than comment he preferred to let
the captain "stew in his own juice". The result was that pieces of the freighter covered nearly half a square
mile on a hill W i d e Milan. Luckily the crew were not seriously hurt.
The design dflight decks, documentation and procedures

Basic principIm of controI, display and wo- design
Eye datum, aathropomeby, and workspace comhaints. Extend vision requhahmts,-4 comfort and
Zwsture*
Display size, legiity, scale design, colour and illudutioa Common errors in display interpretation.
ConmI size, loading, locating, location and compatliility afmtrols with displays.
The presentation of warning information and misinterpre&on ofwadngs.
The design and appropriate use of checklists and manuals.
E Bm of automation and the "@ass cockpit". Integration of idormation from many data sources on one
display and automatic iclectian of display& iaformation. Mode and status representation.
Machine intelligence and xeiationship betweea aircraft decisions and pilot decisions.
The avaidanw of * ~ m p l and v boredom and mamtarihg situational awareness. Maintainhg basic
flylng skills.
Mod- aircraft may have verg complex flight deck wifh Ihe extensive use of automation. AJthwgh rrmch
thought and Human Factors &ort goes into most designs it is inevitable that compromises are made. A
howledge d the basic plinciplptes used in the design, common errors in interpretation of displays and the
of automation can help to avoid pitWs. This WIapplies to a knowledge of tbe corm3 approach to
check lists and manuals.
Jndgement
7% inclusion ofthis topic in the mrllabus d no-cation. It is interesting to note that various
cmn~es have prgrnoted "judgementtmhingmwith good eBect on acFiden~Incidentrates.
I am reminded of the pilot who flew i b m caribou hunters up to the mountaim As they deputed he
advised them that the limitations of the aimaft would mean they could only carry one caniou on the return
fight. A week later they mted him with two caribou assuring him last year's pilot had carried two on
the same plane. He was eventually permdad m accept both d m a k and took off, crashing shortly
afterwards. After recovery from shmk one hunter asked where they were. "About W a mile away from
where we d e d last year" advised one of bis c o m ~ o n s .
To date approximately 10,000 UK professional and private pilots have taken the exam. The ~ t i a pass
l
rate was around 30% but this has now risen to between 70-80%- It is obviously too early to judge whether
it is having an &ect on flight safetJr. Wbat is encouraging is that Human Factors has become a common
topic of conversation in creftr rooms md there is a waiting Iist ofpeople wishhg to bomw some of the
mmmended rekme books h m tbe CAAS libmy.
243-AN/146
Circular/Circulair~/Yup~yn~p A-29
Human Factors Knowledge Requirements for Flight Crews
Barry H. Kantowitz
~ a i t e l l eSeattle Research Center
Center for Human Factors and Organizational Effectiveness
Seattle, Washington USA
HUMAN FACTORS EDUCATION

Education precedes training. It would be difficult to train a pilot how to correct for
the effects of wind strength and direction upon flight path over the ground if the pilot did not
b o w what a vector was. Similarly, an introductory physics student who asked "Where does
the light go when it goes out?" is indicating a fundamental misunderstanding of elementary
physical principIes. But because many a'spects of human factors seem in~tiveto those-who
are not yet educated, the parallel between the question about where light goes and the
question "What is pilot mental workload?" is not obvious (Kantowitz, 1987). While aviation .
personnel can be readily trained to obtain some measure of pilot mental workload, perhaps by
using a subjective rating scale, the proper interpretation and use of this measure requires a
human factors education.
The distinction between education and training has been well stated in TCAO Circular
216 (ICAO, 1989):
Education encompasses a broad-based set of knowledge, values, attitudes and

skills required as a background upon which more specific job abilities can be
acquired later. Training is a process aimed at developing specific skills,
knowledge or attitudes for a job or a task. Proper and effective training cannot
take place unless the foundations for the development of those sklls,
knowledge or attitudes have been laid by previous education [p. 151.
This paper discusses human factors education that will provide a broad base for
acquiring later job sHls. It suggests key areas that flight crews need to understand and
compares such suggestions to existing curricula in aviation human factors.
Key Topics in Human Factors
Human factors covers n very broad area of knowledge. For example, my own human
factors textbook (Kantuwitz & Sorkin, 1983) contains 700 pages divided among twenty
chapters (Table 1). Furthermore, the second edition now being written contains several topics
that were either entixely omitted or only briefly mentioned in the first edition. Human factors
is a field that is evolving rapidly and any text more than a decade old cannot do justice to its
Current state.
I. System md People 11. Data Entry
2. Error and Reliability 12. Feedback and Control
3. Hearing and Signal Detection Theory 13. Human Factors in Computer
4. Vision Programming
5. Psychomotor Skill 14. Decision Making
6. Human Information Processing 15. Workspace Design
7. Visual Displays 16. Noise
8. Auditory and Tactile Displays 17. M icroenvironments
9. Speech Communication 18. Macroenvironments
10. Controls and Tools 9 Environmental Stressors
20. Legal Aspects of Human Factors
Table 1. Key Topics from Kantowitz and Sorkin (1983)
At first, one might hope that by narrowing topics to only those that apply to aviation
human factors much material could be eliminated. However, a more recent edited text
devoted solely to aviation human factors (Wiener & Nagel, 1988) contains 684 pages in
nineteen chapters (Table 2); not much saved here.
1. Introductory Overview 1 1. Pilot Control

2. The System Perspective 12. Aviation Displays
3. System Safety 2 3. Cockpit Automation
4, The Human Senses in Flight 14. Software Interfaces for Aviation
5. Information Processing Systems
6. Human Workload in Aviation 15. Cockpit-Crew Systems Design and
7. GrouphteractionmdFIightCrew Integration
Performance 16, A i i n e Pilots' Perspective
8. Flight Training and Simulation 17. General Aviation
9. Human Error in Aviation Operations 18. Helicopter.HumanFactors
10, Aircrew Fatigue and Circadian 19. Air Traffic Con~oI
Rhythmicity
Table 2. Key Topics from Wiener and Nagel (1988)
Human factors textbooks, including my awn, tend to place heavy emphasis upon facts
and known empirical findings. Often, principles of human factors are taught inductively by
giving concrete examples of good and poor designs. Thus, as shown in Table 1, a
considerable body of fairly detailed information can easily overwhelm the reader. For
example, a tabIe in my own text lists aural aIerts in different &planes. While pilots might
find this information compelling, the average reader drowns in such detail, and this table wilI
not appear in the 'second edition. However, this kind of detailed information fills most human
factors textbooks,
Such details have the advantage of convincing the reader that human factors is more
than common sense. The human factors profession has always needed to stress horrible
examples to emphasize the importance of human factors, which tends to get noticed only
when done incomcdy or not at all. While any aviation human factors education should cover
human factors mishaps, if only to get the crew's attention, it is difficult for students to retain
lists of details a d concrete examples. Thus, some integrating mechanism is also required for
sound human factors education.
Beyond SHEL
The SHEL model --software, hardware, environment, livew are-- provides a conceptual
framework for human factors that was used to generate a model syllabus (ICAO, 1991). Half
of the course time is devoted to the Human Element (Liveware) and the remainder of
pairwise interfaces between the SHEL elements, e.g., Liveware-Hardware, Liveware-Software,
Liveware-Liveware, and liveware-Environment.Hence the SFEL model provides the
necessary integrating mechanism for sound human factors education.
While the proposed ICAO cuniculum does a good job of covering traditional human
factors, it needs to be extended to reflect current advances and recent trends. Such trends
center upon the increased use of cognitive modeIs of human behavior to predict and explain
operator performance and error. Traditional view of human factors are based upon empirical
"knobsand dials" studies. M o d e m human factors emphasizes the need to predict flight crew
behavior based upon theories of human performance. Especially in highly-automated flight
decks, extrapolation from older empirical findings will not be sufficient. Theory is necessary
to guide human factors measurement, interpretation, and design (Kantowitz, 1992). I believe
the following discussion illustrates how theory can be introduced to pilots without sacrificing
practical utility or creating abstract academic exercises. Indeed, theory, when properly
explained, becomes a powerful practical tool.
In this section I f i s t introduce a practical problem that has considerable safety

implications for flight crews, the issue of altitude deviations. The khavior of crews is then
related to their mental model of flight-deck automation, Rnally, a theoretical explanation of
stimulus-response compatibility is invoked to help explain why inappropriate mental models
are used by pilots when automation has been implemented in violation of good human factors
practice.
Figure 1 shows that altitude deviations in the MD-80 were a serious problem from
1985-1987 (ASRS, 1990). An Aviation Safety Reporting System synopsis based upon
reported incidents suggested that many of these deviations were reIated to the automation
introduced in the MD-80. Pilots flying manually tend to slow their rate of ascent when
within one or two thousand feet of the desired altitude, But in the MD-80 automation
maintains rt high rate of climb, in some instances 4000 feet per minute. Thus, pilots tended
to worry that this high rate implied that the automation would exceed the target altitude.
Therefore they manipulated the trim pitch wheel to slow the rate of s e n t . However, such
piIot action also disarms the dtitude capture function which the pilots did not realize due'to
the stress of the moment and the poor annunciation provided by illumination of an LED. The
airpIane, at a decreased rate of climb, then continued through the assigned altitude.
Ironically, by taking actian the pilot created the deviation he or she was trying to avoid.
Neither the automation nor the pilot was controIling the aircraft.
MD-80 ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS 1985-1987
Pitw i
A l t h B a m i m t o m A5sign
Acft Equip ProblLes Scupc
AcR Equip Robffritieal
Figure 1. MD-80 Altitude Deviations 1985-1987 (ASRS, 1990)
The mental model of these MD-80pilots was that automation functioned in the same
way as another human pilot. When the behavior of the automation failed to match the
expectations generated by this mental model, pilots made a dynamic allocation of function
decision to correct the automation. Eventually, pilots learned through experience how the
altitude capture function really worked and modified theit mental model. Altitude deviations
in the MD-80 then decreased.
From a human factors perspective, this problem is one of stimulus-response

compatibility. Figure 2 shows a recent model of frames, rules, and response tendencies
(Kantowitz, Triggs, & Barnes, 1990). Without going into technical details, it is sufficient to
define only a frame as a well-developed knowledge structure derived from pilot training and
experience. Frames tell us what rules to invoke in different situations. For example, what
direction should a switch be thrown to turn on a light? In the United States, the switch
should be thrown up. In England, the switch should be thrown down. h many flight decks,
a "sweep-on"rule is used to detedne how overhead switches should be thrown. Knowledge
of one's environment activates the appropriate frame.
Plans and actions that run counter to established frames, i.e., conditions of low
s tirnulus-response compatibility, are potentid flight-deck problems. Thus, a pilot's mental
'
frame that invokes a rule that automation functions just like another pilot is likely to cause
trouble. The optimal human factors solution is for the original design to be consistent with
stimulus-response compatibility principles. However, airlines and pilots have to use the
equipment at hand and sometimes this means that training must be used to overcome design
deficiencies. A pilot who has been educated about frames and mental ,models is ktter
prepared to benefit from such training.
Figure 2. StimuIus-Response compatibilities.
FLIGHT CREW EDUCATION
I believe that there are three key issues that are important for the human factors
education of flight crews:
Honor thy user, This is the fixst principle of human factors. Tt means that all designs
should take the user's limitations and strengths into account. Unfortunately, not all flight
decks are designed to meet this vital goal. A crew that is educated h human factors will be
able to evaluate to what extent the f ~ s principle
t has been achieved. This will help them to
fill any gap between their own capabilities and the demands of their airplane.
The crew is part of a system. As the SHEL model indicates, humans, equipment,
procedures, and environments form a system. Any part of a system will influence the other
parts. Since dl the parts are important, crews must understand that undue attention to any one
part may compromise their ability to detect error and to implement needed corrections in
other parts of the system.
Knowledge of aviation. Here flight crews have an advantage because their

professiond training and experience gives them a deeper understanding of aviation than the
typical human factors expert. General human factors principles and theories are of little use to
flight crews unless they are applied in a concrete way to aviation problems.
The training of human factors professionals is quite arduous, crossing many disciplines
(Howell, Colle, Kantowitz, & Wiener, 1987). Fortunately, operational personnel do not need
to become human factors experts. Instead, they require an appreciation of how human factors
professionals think and approach problems. This can be accomplished through a series of
human factors case studies that not only illustrate how ergonomists work but also drive home
the point that human factors is quite relevant to aviation. This casebook would be based upon
human factors theory and key concepts that are supported and illustrated by appropriate
A -34 Circular/Ci~ulaire/~up~yn
SIP 243-AN/I46
aviation examples. I would make extensive use of incident reports (ASRS, CHIRPS, etc.) in
creating a workbook of aviation case studies. I believe such an approach would be especially
valuable for helping pilots avoid errors with advanced flight-deck automation (Kantowitz,
1992). New methods have been created to analyze incident reports objectively using multi-
variate statistical techniques to relate incident components to taxonomies of flight-related
topics as wen as a model of human information processing (K-antowitz & Bittner, 1992).
This would allow appropriate incidents to be selected. A workbook based upon these selected
incidents would help flight crews gain a relevant human factors education.
ASRS . (1990). MD-80 altitude deviation synapsis, aviation safety reportting system, NASA-
AMES/FLS:262-4. Mountain View, CA.
Howell, W. C.; CoIle, R. A.; Kantowitz, B. H.;& Wiener, E. L. (1987). Guidelines for
education and kaining in engineering psychology. American. Psychologist, 602-604.
XCAO. (1989). Fundmental. human factors concepts. Human Factors Digest No. 1.
Circular 2 1 6-AN113. Montreal, Canada: In ternntiond Civil Aviation Organization.
1-0. (1991). Training of operational personnel in human factors, Human Factors Digest
No. 3. CircuIar 227-AN/136. Montreal, Canada: International Civil Aviation Organization.
Kantowitz, B.H. (1987). Mental workload* In P. A. ]Elancock (Ed.), Human Factors

Psvchologv. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-HoIIand.
Kantowitz, B. H. (1992). Cockpit automation and pilot workload. International Conference

on Environmental Systems, Society of Automotive Engineers, Paper 921 132.
Kantowitz, B.51.; & Bittner, A. C. JY. (1992). Using the aviation safety r e p h n g system
database a5 a human factors research tool. Proceedings of the 15th Annual Aerospace &
Defense Conference, Institute of Industrial Engineers, 3 1-39.
Kantowitz, B. H.; & Sorkin, R. D, (1983). Humun Fuctors: Understanding People-System

Relationships. New Yo&: John Wiley & Sons.
Kantowitz, B. H,;Tsitggs, T.J.; Barnes, V. (1990). Stimulus-response compatibility and

human factors. In R. W. Proctor & T.Reeves (Eds.), Stimulus-Response Computibili@.
Amsterday, The Netherlands: North-Holland.
Wiener, E. L.; & Nagel, D.C. (1988). Human Factors in Aviation. San Diego: Academic
Press.
IMPLEMENTATXCFN OF HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE REQUINMENTS
IN 'FWE CANADIAN FLIGHT TRAlNING SYSTEM
J.H. King
Transport Canada Aviation
Ottawa, Canada
It is an honour to be able to share our human factors endeavours with you. And in
keeping with the objectives of the symposium,
I trust that relating our experience to you will open the door to further discussion
and development.
Several Branches in Tmsport Canada are involved with human factors. Our
Branch--Aviation Licensing-is concerned with pilots who are undergoing training for flight crew
licences. Other Branches direct their efforts at licensed pilots.
Aviation Training is a Division within the Aviation Licensing Bmch. It is divided

into two Sections: Flight Training and Aviation Education. Flight Training deals with skills and
Aviation Education with knowledge requirements. As I represent the Aviation Education Section, I
will address our efforts at developing human factors knowledge. From this perspective, I will
relate how Transport Canada has proceeded with the introduction of TCAO human factors
knowledge requirements in the Canadian Flight Training System.
My discussion will centre around the following:

1. how we utilize ICAO Digest No. 3 in the development of of our examinations and
publications,
2, adaptation of our existing pilot decision-making and ammedical materials to the

basic ICAO outline,
3. efforts to pass on requirements and reference material to pilot candidates, and
4; research endeavours to improve and validate the program.
ICAQ--Basis of the Program
The basis of our human factors program is the philosophy and training curriculum
outlined in ICAO Circular H m n Factors Digest No. 3. We altered the ICAO outline slightly and
numbered the headings and sub-headings to fit into a master coding index utilizsd in our
examination computer system. This satisfies a requirement to code examination questions and to
A-36 243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/~up~yn~1p
identify areas that are being tested.
The study and reference guides for the various flight crew licences were then revised
to include the ICAO human factors topics appropriate for that particular licence. This was done by
checking off items from the master list and including them in the study and reference guide. Many
human factors topics, such as aeromedical facts, have historically been included in Canadian flight
crew examinations and in corresponding study and reference guides. These were formerly listed
under the Flight Operations section heading, but we have now reorganized the headings.
Our new study and reference guides designate Human Factors as a separate section
heading along with other major headings such as Air law, Meteorology and Navigation. This
produces a distinctive visual advantage that raises the profile of human factors and allows for the
inclusion of a greater number of sub-sections and topics under the heading. I think that this is a
significant starting point.
Pilot Decision-making
Transport Canada's early commitment to pilot decision-making has been over-taken

by developments in human factors. Briefly this is what has happened. A joint study in the early
1980's by the Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Canada and the General Aviation
Manufactures Association resulted in a prototype judgement training publication. Other countries
and agencies added their support to the project and a series of Aeronautical Decision Making
manuals were published by the American Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Air Safety
Foundation. When the AOPA manuals became available, Canadian instructors were encouraged to
use them on a trial basis--but their use was not mandatory.
In early 1991, Transport Canada produced a combined student and instructor manual
entitled Pilot Decision-Making Manual for Private Pilot Training. The major focus in this manual
is the decision-making process and the factors that influence decision-making. In contrast, the
AOPA manuals contain a greater emphasis on attitudes.
The intention was to make the new manual simple, concise and oriented towards a
broader human factors perspective. The manual also suggests strategies for teaching pilot decision-
making in ground school and in the cockpit. This 14-page reference contains six chapters:
The Decision-Making Process
Factors that Influence Pilot Decision-Making

Situational Awareness
Stress
Managing Risk
Hazardous Attitudes
Following ICAO recommendations and practices, Canada has made human factors
including pilot decision-making a mandatory requirement for all flight crew licences. The enabling
document is the Personnel Licensing Handbook Volume 1.
Aeromedical Facts
In order to suppIement the reference material available far pilots undergoing basic
training, the Department of Health and Welfare, a government agency associated with Tmsport
Canada, has prducsd a manual entit14 Xk Pilot's Guide to Medical Human Factors. The topics
contained in this manual d m g with the Pilot Decision-Making M a w 2 for Privabc Pilot Training
cover the topics included in the private and commercial study and reference guide, The pilot
decision-making manual is directed towards psychologid aspects, while physical and physiological
aspects are grouped together in the medical manual,
As a point of interest, in 1981 the Department of Health and Welfare produced an.
advancd book entitled Cause Fator: H m n - - A treatise on Rotary Wing H m Factors. This
book was ahead of its time containing human factors information that is current toclay.
Given a strong aeromedical base, we wantd to expand the broader aspects of human
factors into the Canadian flight training system. We had to keep in mind that a number of topics
would be new to some while recognizing that many flying training colleges and larger flying '
schools have been offering excellent instruction in human factors for many yeas.
Another area of consideration is the time required for human factors training. The
minimum ground school required for private nnd commercial licence in Canada is 40 hours.
Although 40 hours would be a reasonable minimum for a human factors course, it may not be
practical for a small flight schml to provide 40 hours of human factors instruction. Consequently,
the new human factors manuals were designed to be a realistic starting point that could be easily
enlaged .
In future, we intend to put a greater emphasis on aviation psychology, for example

information processing.
In addition to study and reference guides, publications and written examinations,

human factors howledge has been promoted in several other areas.
In 1989, a flight training enhancement project was initiated to develop six additional
training publications to assist flight instructors. These include instrument flight training, private
pilot training syllabus, night flying , multi-engine training, ground school, and instructor training.
All of the publications will include human factors.
A -38 243-AN/l46
Circular/Circulaire/~up~yn~~p
Human factors are also being promoted at flight instructor refresher courses and
flight test examiner workshops held across Canada each year. Targeting instructors is important
because they are probably the most effective means of distributing human factors knowledge.
Research and the Transportation Development Centre
The Transportation Development Centre is Transport Canada's centralized research

and development organization. It serves as a centre of expertise on transportation technology and
innovation.
In January 1991, our Branch asked the Transportation Development Centre to

undertake a research study to develop and evaluate a total human factors program including
knowledge and skill requirements. The request was based on the questions:
- What human factors knowledge requirements are appropriate for pilots at various
experience levels?
- What human factors skills are appropriate for pilots at various experience levels?
- How are human factors knowledge and skills best learned, and what teaching
methods and activities are most effective?
- What resources are required to support the instructional activities?
- What are the most appropriate testing processes for written and practical
examination, and are there areas that should not be evaluated?
This project is indicative of what we would like to accomplish, and this research is
especially important to validate our initiatives. The project was delayed for a time due to financial
restraints but it is now underway.
To keep abreast of developments in other countries, representatives from our

Branch have attended human factors courses at the Cranfield College of Aeronautics in Great
Britain and the Aeromedical Training Institute in the United States. We have also discussed human
factors development with the British Aviation Authority (CAA) and the United States Federal
Aviation Authority (FAA).
The Future
Our plans for the future basically consist of continuing in the same direction, but
with an emphasis on the psychological side of human factors.
We are optimistic that the Transportation Development Centre will guide us in the
243-AN/146
Circulur/Circuluire/~up~yn~p A-39
development of a total program. We are especially looking for self directed resources aimed at
assisting flying instructors to teach human factors and tools to evaluate both human factors skills
and knowledge.
We will continue to maintain joint'human factors committees within our Branch and
other Branches in Transport Canada to liaise with each other and external groups.
Perhaps most importantly, we have recommended to our management that our

Directorate establish various levels of personnel expertise in human factors. If we have the
training and expertise in place, the application of Human Factors will follow.
Summary
I have given you a brief description of how the Aviation Education Section of
Transport Canada has proceeded with the introduction of human factors knowledge requirements.
There is much more happening in human factors in other groups and directorates in Transport
Canada, but I have been speaking for my Section.
I have discussed (1) how we have used ICAO Digest No. 3, (2) how we have
adapted aeromedical and pilot decision-making materials to the ICAO outline, (3) efforts to pass on
information to pilot candidates, and (4) research activities.
I have presented this to you knowing that we have just commenced our human
factors journey and knowing that there is a great deal more to do. I hope that sharing this
beginning with you will open the door to much more discussion of the subject with each other.
HUMAN FACTORS IN GENERAL AVIATION
Ronald D. Campbell (IAOPA)
Introduction
For the purpose of this paper, the term General Aviation also includes Aerial work opera-
tions as the statistics quoted apply to the period before ICAO separated these two activities.
Most (if not all) books published on human factors are written around multi pilot opera-
tions in large aircraft, thus a large part of such books are of little interest to General Aviation
pilots who, in the main are engaged in single pilot activities. This means that most of the human
factors material which is available for reading concentrates on human inter-relationship on the
flight deck, much of which is irrelevant to General Aviation pilots.
This results in a situation where although the subject of human factors in aviation has at
last been given much greater exposure, it has been mainly directed at the Commercial Air Trans-
port sector, which is the smallest segment and also the one in which the least number of acci-
dents occur. Nevertheless, this is understandable in view of the fact that just one accident involv-
ing a multi pilot aircraft can affect the safety of a large number of passengers. If we are to
improve safety across the total spectrum of aviation operations, more emphasis must be given to
the sectors which conduct the largest number of aviation movements, and in this respect it should
be noted that General Aviation conducts over 8 times the number of aircraft movements than the
Commercial Air Transport sector.
However, human factors involve pilots and therefore what is probably more relevant to this
symposium is the fact that some 80% of all pilots operate within the General Aviation sector. It
is also pertinent to point out that a number of single pilot air taxi operations occur within the
Commercial Air Transport sector. From this we see that in terms of pure numbers, our current
human factors education is predominately aimed at the lowest number of active pilots, and the
following general figures illustrate this fact.
-
Aviation facts World Wide
Due to small annual variations, the following figures are approximate.
Pilots - 1 million
20% of all pilots are employed in the Commercial Air Transport sector
11% of all aircraft operate within the Commercial Air transport sector
80% of all.pilots operate within the General Aviation sector
89% of all aircraft operate within the General Aviation sector.

243-ANfl46
Circular/Circuloire/rl~p~~sp A-41
Total Aircraft 330,00i)
Aircraft employed in Commercial Air Tmsport operations - 40,000
Aircraft ernpIoyed in General Aviation operations - 290,000
Total aircraft movements (departures)
Commercial Air Transpoit - 18 million
General Aviation - 99 million
Although the latest ICAO figure for annual flying hours being compkted by Commercial
Air Transport (CAT) and General Aviation (GA) show that GA conducted just over twice the
flying hours done by CAT, this does not show a true comparison when it comes to measuring
safety factors. This is due to the fact that the 'risk factor' varies with the type of operation being
conducted, and the specific phases of flight in which past accidents have occurred.
Pilot experience versus the environment

If we are to succeed in improving GA safety through the human factors approach, we
clearly need to establish the operational environment which GA pilots have to cope with, as
distinct from their contemporaries in CAT operations. In accepting this philosophy, the folbw-
ing factors would have to be considered in structuring human performance education for private
pilots, while bearing in mind that a number of these factors would also apply to pilots engaged in
Aerial Work activities.
EXPERIENCE & ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS FOR CONSIDERAmON
90% ofpilots used in CAT have an instrument sating

10% of private pilots have an instrument rating
75% of the hours flown in CAT me carried out with two pilots on board
95% of the hours flown by private pilots w conducted with only one pilot on board
90% of aircraft used in the CAT sector have two or more engines
90%of aircraft flown by private pilots have only one engine - a significant fact when one
engine fails
Pilots involved in CAT fly on average 300 to 500 hours per year
Private pilots fly on average, say 10 to 30 hours per year
Pilots involved in CAT have on average 5 times more training in terms of hours and
experience than private pilots
85% of flights undertaken in CAT take place in the confines of protected airspace
90%of the flights undertaken by private pilots take place in uncontrolled airspace
CAT flights are conducted mainly horn large well equipped aerodromes
Private pilots operate from small aerodromes and landing strips, the latter leaving little
margin for pilot error
60% of all accidents occur during the take-off and initial climb, and the approach and
landing phase of the flight:
The average length of a CAT flight is 2 hours
The average length of flights conducted in GA is 30 minutes
Thus GA flights are exposed to the highest risk area 4 times'more often than those in CAT.
Additionally, the annual total flying canied out in GA include I million hours with student
pilots at the controls.
From the preceding facts it can be seen that type specific information is needed when
developing programmes aimed at improving pilot behaviour during single pilot operations.
Currently during training, all pilots are indoctrinated into the facts concerning aircraft perform-
ance. However, it is just as importact for all pilots to have an understanding of human perform-
ance and how fatigue, stress, anxiety, lack of arousal and imperfect communication between
others and oneself can inhibit the ability to make sound judgements and decisions.
The ability to safely operate an aircraft stems from the development of physical skills and
cognitive judgement. The definition of the latter can be loosely stated as:
'getting it altogether through perception, reasoning, or intuition and arriving at a correct

decision and then implementing it at the right time'.
However, in this respect the main problem which faces the pilot is the fact that, whereas physical
skills can be developed through good tuition and practice, cognitive judgement is much more
difficult to acquire. This is because the cognitive process has no colour, shape, size or feel, thus
it can only be developed through the acquisition of knowledge and implemented by the use of
intellect in conjunction with experience (or experiences).
If we study the recorded details of past incidents and accidents, it is not difficult to see that
in most cases it was not so much a lack of physical skill which gave rise to the mcurrence, but
rather the lack of a good decision implemented at the right time. Therefore, it is this aspect to
which our training initiatives on human factors must be directed.
The limitations of flight checks
In this respect, that oft quoted panacea for safety - the 'flight check' is not enough, because
all pilots know that on these occasions, their pay cheques or their privileges are on the line, and
JP 243-AIV/146
Circular/Circculaird~up~yn A -43
being cogniaant of this facr,will operate by the book. What concerns us today are the flights
conducted after the examiners or check pilots have completed their assessment and gone on their
way, It is then that human behaviour reverts and so easily becomes prone to errors of judgement,.
brought about by the insidious presence of complacency and other common behavioural atti-
tudes, which of course are not easily recognisable in oneself.
Human factors education

Following the publication by ICAO of the 8th edition of Annex 1, considerable interest has
been aroused and much work is being done to bring the subject of human attitudes and
flightcrew co-ordination to the fore during training and at regular intervals thereafter. However,
in relation to single pilot operations and the individual type of activity ranging from recreational
flights to aerial work, it is far less practical to consrmct programmes for reinforcing knowledge
of human performance aspects after completion of basic pilot training.
Human factors and the flight instructor
Flight instructors are the people most involved with pilots education, and this is particu-
larly so in the case of private pilots, a group who hold over half the world's pilot licences. There-
fare it is vitally important that flight instructors have an 'in depth' understanding of human fac-
tors, if they are to incuIcate awareness of human behaviour into student pilots during their initial
training and while they are under supervisory control.
Notwithstanding the fact that flight instructors aim to impart good judgement, it is gener-
ally done in an irregular fashion, mostly based upon specific situations as they arise. This is
largely because there has been no structured guidance material or specific written goals within
the various pilot syllabuses. Traditional training programmes in the past have tended to focus on
physical pilot skills rather than on cognitive judgement.
The statement i n the foregoing paragraph can be reinforced by the fact that while there is a
surfeit of books covering the development of flying skills and technical knowledge, it is only in
recent years that bmks have appeared which relate to the involvement of human factors in
aviation. This has been an encouraging move, however while it would be wrong not to acknowl-
edge the expertise of the authors of such publications and the excellent work they have done, it
must also be appreciated that these books have to be easily understood by people who wish to
obtain a pilot's licence and be competent in that role, rather than becoming experts in psychology
or physiology, To sum up this last statement, we need more written material which states the
facts simply, and to which the reader can relate in the environment of the cockpit rather than a
deep and extensive psychological treatise on human behaviour.
Conclusions
Bearing in mind the important part which flight instructors play in establishing levels of
safety to both students and qualified pilots , the way fornard would be to incorporate specific
human factors training programmes i n all initial flight instructor training courses. In addition
4 -44 243-AN// 46
Circufur/CirculairdUuppcyn~~p
re-current training i n this subject via seminars should be a mandatory requirement for re-validat-
ing flight instructor ratings.
Seminars, specifically designed to cover human factors with an emphasis on the develop-
ment of good judgement and decision making should become a standard method of communica-
tion between civil aviation administrations, flight safety officers and General Aviation pilots.
More readable, motivating written material, aimed at the total pilot population, shouId be
made available and in a form which encourages student and qualified pilots to give greater
thought to human behavioural patterns in relation to reducing risks and developing better judge-
ment and decision making,
NEW AVIATION PROFESSIONALISM:
KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS THAT INTEGRATE HUMAN
FACTOR COMPETENCIES
IN JOB PERFORMANCE
Dr Graham J F Hunt
Massey University
School of Aviation
Palmerston Norrh
New Zealand
Abstract
One of the much used words in aviation is that of "professionalism"'.Every pilot wants the
privileges (especially money), respect, and responsibilities that come from being a captain
employed by a major a+ine, To achieve this end, pilots accept that the means to such an
end involve high technical standards of performance, integrity and an acceptance of the
"rules of progression" from trainee pilot, second officer, first officer and finally captain.
Similar aspirations may be found with air traffic controllers, maintenance engineers and
other occupational groups within the industry. Acceptance of these "means to an end" are
what job incumbents mean when they describe their work status as "being professional".
However, is this label legitimate. Tkis paper will examine strategies which will need to be
implemented if airline flight crews, air traffic conQolIers and maintenance engineers are to
develop from craft based operators, to members who can be accorded the status and
responsibility practiced by most of the recognised professions. Aviation's need for an
internationally recognised tertiary-delivered, content of knowledge, long accepted by other
professional groups, is discussed. Included in such knowledge systems will be the need
for integrating human factor dimensions, with those that recognise the cultural context in
which aviation personne1 operate. The new professionalism in aviation will result in
expanding the competencies of its members in technical, management and human factor
applications.
The Nature of Professions

One of the much used words in aviation is that of "professionaIisrn". Every pilot wants the
privileges (especially money), respect, and responsibilities that come from being a captain,
employed by a major airline. To achieve this end, pilots accept that the means to this end
involve the attainment of high technical standards of performance, integrity and an
acceptance of industry folk laws including seniority systems for career progression from
Painee pilot, second officer,fsst officer and finally captain. Acceptance of these "means
to the e n d ' b e what pilots mean when they describe their work status as "being
professional". However, is this a label which accurately reflects c m n t status, or is it a
hope for some future social attainment?
What is a Profession?
The word "profession" conjures up many images: high public esteem, respectability,
independence, prestige, and in many cases, wealth. Traditional professions, medicine, law,
engineering - are almost universally accorded high p ~ s t i g estatus when compared with
other occupational groups - construction workers, sales representatives or clerical
workers. And in most societies, education for a career in one of the major professions is
regarded as a gateway to financial and social security, The best students from secondary
education fiercely compete for available places in the professional faculties of a nation's
best universities. To succeed, students must devote long years to education and training,
achieve a high level of self-discipline and be prepared to expend considerable sums of
money (either from their own or family's financial resources, or through those resources
provided by the state).
Ff it is this kind of status which pilots either believe they are a part of, or seek to become a
part of, what are its characteristics. What is it that professions have which set them apart
from other occupational p u p s , and for which individuals or families & sacrifice so
much in order to be admitted? This author believes there are at least 3 characteristics
which are important is separating "professions" from other working groups:
1. Ways of acting or operating which relate to "discipline-based" procedures rather

than "craft-based" practices.
2. A defined body of knowledge (or knowledge system) which is general1y agreed to
, be requisite for the group to operate in a professional manner, and which is
organized in such a way that the knowledge system becomes "owned"by its users
(the professional incumbents).
3. Accepted codes of .individual and group conduct and procedures for punishing
infractions against such codes.
Characteristics of a Profession
1. "Discipline" versus "Craft-Based" Practices
Characteristics of Craft-Based PracSices.
It is the s u t from craft-based practices to discipline based methodologies that usually

signal the emergence of a "professional discipline". The business of transfening howledge
from a master craftsperson to novice in a crafts-based occupational context, is invariably
based around the following activities and structures:
I. The novice is reqiuired to observe the processes and products of the "master"
Initially, the learner is not allowed to do anything, but "watch"an,d I'learn".
2. After a period of time, the master, "seeing"that the novice is ready to progress to the
next stage, wiU invite the student to execute some of the basic sldls that he or she
has observed These skills will IE very simple and general.
3. A good deal of time will be allocated so that the student can practice and practice
again these defmed skills until. a high level of mastery has been achieved. Often, this
"time to mastery" will k quantified and documented in some industrial ward or
competency type statement.
4, More W s wili be added to the novice's repertoire of skills. Some of them will be
mare compIex extensions of those previously learnt. Again, the mastery of these
more complex behaviours wiU be defined in terns of allotments of time the maser
believes is required for the s W s to be learned, as well as to experience the ways in
which the skills might be used.
5, Should the master describe the way in which knowledge is to be transferred, these
descriptions would more often than not emphasise concepts of lines gradation, that
is, teaching from concrete objects to abstract concepts, and progressing from simple
howledge and skills to compIex expert p e r f m c e s .
Useful though these approaches to bahhg might seem they contain a numkr of obvious
disadvantages:
1, The novice'sperformance is very dependent upon tfie quality of the master, since
person is the "fountain of knowledge", Lf the master's ability to transfer his or her
knowledge is poor, the novice's chances of acquiring those requisite knowIedges and
skills is also likely to be poor.
2, The knowledge that the master has acquired, and now demonstrates as his or her
expertise, is different from the knowledge required in achieving that expertise. It is
difficult for many masters to make this distinction. They wish to impart the
knowledge they currently use, not the knowledge and skills which were needed to be
acquired before their comptency could be expressed,
3. Undertaking practice in the real world of the master may be expensive, and
dangerous if mishandled. It may weU be better to provide instructional simulations of
the real world so that the novice can, practice the requisite knowledge and skills h
safe and inexpensive ways.
4. It is often difficult, if not impossible to get into the "mind of the master". High levels
of understanding generally require access to the broader disciplines from which the
specific applications are derived.
Most examples of ab irrifio pilot h i n g follow the craft-based model of competenq

development. Experience is defined by regulatory authorities in terms of logged hours.
Criteria for the award of private or professional licences are based upon prescribed flight
hours. Little attention is paid to how those hours might have been achieved, nor the types
of environme~tdor h - a m factw conditions which might be required to optimise
"mastery peafomance". The broader disciplines for problem solving aid decision making
are absent.
Examples of Occupational Groups which hare progressed from craft-based to

discipline based learning.
General Praciitioners - The forefathers of todays general practitioners were individuals

who diagnosed a patients problems, created the remedies and prescribed the treatment
regime. If the patient lived, their fame and reputation grew (so too, presumably did their
fees). If the patient died, forces from the other side of consciousness, and beyond the
reasonable control of the practitioner, were found to explain the unfortunate failure. It,
was someone or something eIsels fauIt. It is perhaps interesting to note that many of the
occupations which were the forerunners of todays prestigious professions still exist.
Surgeons who still are required to exhibit a high degree of manuat dexterity only separated
from a manual workers union, the English Barbers Guild, in the seventeenth-century.
Elementary School Teachers - Elementary teachers might argue that they have only
comparatively recently joined the ranks of true professionals. Teacher training has long
been a craft-based practice. Entry into the so called profession required that a teacher
trainee be assigned to a "master teacher" and admonished to observed the ways and means
by which he or she handed down knowledge and skill to those intrusted to their care.
Such "masters" might well have declared (and often did) that "You don't need a university
education to teach kids - alI you need is a strong arm and a powerful voice to force the
right ideas into their little heads."
In many countries, pre-sewice training for elemenmy (and secondary) teachers now
require at least three years of tertiary based intensive theoretical and practical education.
The content of such study includes an extensive examination and application of scientific
disciplines such as psychology, sociology, the sciences, educational practices, and
classroom management.
2, A Body of Aviation Knowledge
Discipline-Based Knowledge
The theory of professionalism has much to do with hbw knowledge (and/or sHl) is used
by its owners (the knowledge incumbents) to pursue their activities. Most often the
professions are centred on typical 'problem-solving1systems of knowledge and or skill.
The problems are posed or solved in a conceptual. framework. These concepts and their
relation one to another tend to be used by convention in one way and not another, and
those who have the appropriate education or training know how ta use it. Two points of
view have atisen on the importance of knowledge systems. The first asserts that what is
important is the prestige and power that the knowledge provides the owners, whether or
not that knowledge has any real value in solving problems (Collins, 1979). The second
views knowledge acquisition as much more instrumental to professionals (it is knowledge
that is required in job performance) h actual problem solving, and in enhancing their
standing in society. It is this second perspective that has importance in aviation. Pilots are
charged with the requirement to conduct their activities in a professionally safe and
effective manner. The knowledge to do so must be instmmentdly Gad and more
inclusive than just the technical requirements of flight performance or systems
management It must include the operational competencies for safe and effective
perform=, and also the cultural, managerial and human factor abilities that high capitol,
high technology, and high socially significant systems demand
The howledge system which supports pilot perfowce has evolved &matically in only
a few short decades. For centuries the human race's fascination for flight was expressed in
m y artistic and ingenious attempts to emulate the bird. Not until sufficient howledge
had been assembled in related dimensions such as aerodynamics and the requisires of
power-to-weight ratios were Orville and Wilbur Wright able to make their fnst epic flight
in 1903. As an aside, there is still some'support for the view that the worId's rmt, powt*d
flight took place not at Kitty Hawk, but on a desolate farm in the South Idand of New
Zealand at Waitohi by a recIuse inventor, Richard Pearse. If such a flight did take place
on the date claimed by many, M m h 31, 1903, the event would have predated the much
pvblicised Wright Brothers epic by 9 months. Whatever the case, the fact that he was one
of the earliest pioneers to access this same knowledge system, though separated by
hcrusands of miles from other pioneers of the knowIedge, is not in dispute.
In the pioneer days, seIection criteria for- persons who might become owners of the
knowledge @ilo&)tended to emphasise ingenuity, tenacity, versatility and adaptability.
Like the forefathers of tadays m d c d practitioners, early pilots were required to invent
the resources which could be used in applying the then known knowledge. For example,
as Elwyn Edwards has described "Flying was wcomfortable, difficult and hazardous.
Experience indicated, however, that certain basic aids were essential in order to achieve an
acceptable level of control. Early amongst these was the famous piece of string tkd either
to the trailing edge of an elevator or to a lateral frame member so that the pilot could
avoid skid or slip during a turn by keeping the fluttering sting parallel to the fore-and-aft
axis of the aircraft. Without this aid, m s could w i l y Iead to a spin from which there
might be no recovery (p.6-7)."
Om of the earliest attempts to construct a pilot training cuniculum was that developed by
the British pioneer aviator, Robert Smith-Banie. Xn 1913 he produced the f i s t Flying
Training manual. His reasons for doing so were quite clear, Contemporary approaches to
disseminating fight knowledge to trainee pilots was haphazard, capricious and sornehe
quite untrue. The best inswctors were promoted from mining to administration or other
activities, and took with them their knowledge and experience. New insmctors were
reliant on the knowledge that had been passed to them Mrn their insmctors, right or
wrong. An andysis of his manual is interesting. It comprised three major content areas:
practical flying (about 85 percent of instruction); engines (con~olsand maintenance - 10
percent); and map and compass reading (5 percent). What might have been termed
"airmanship"was more cIosely idenlifjed with "officerqualities", skills in horse riding and
mess etiquette. These attributes pilots were expected to have developed prior to
undertaking flight trainkg.
A Model for Identifying Requisite Pilot Knowledge
Analyses of requisite pilot performance have traditionally been derived from

observations of flying skills ("stick and rudder") and the individual's knowledge of flight
rules and procedures. When these dimensions have been translated into predictive
indices, no more than about 25 percent of the variance of performance at advanced stages
of competency have been accounted for (Roscoe and North, 1980). However, as these
researchers note, despite the prediction problem, flight crew are able to identify
"abilities" such as estimating probable outcomes for different courses of action, or
attending to resolving an emergency without losing control of the on going routine
procedures. The &ick in developing a map of pdot competency is to be able to relate
these types of requisite abilities to contextual applications. For instance, consider the
abilities involved in executing a landing. At least two are critical: assessing the relative
position of the aircraft in relation to the ground; and perceiving the changes in the shape
of the runway in relation to reducing height. A description of this interactive process of
obilily and context might be provided in an instruction to a minee pilot such as:
"You will recognise the flure height when the runway
appears to expand rapidly outwar&. Use this view as the
cue for assessing the moment at which you need to flare."
In this example, the identification of each "abiIity" assumes a larger, more integrative
howledge base from which it has been derived. In a knowledge smctures hierarchy
model of pilot competency, this assumption is smctured in a top down, three-level
hierarchy of increasingly specific capacities to process knowledge. T h i s method
developed by Hunt (1986), provides a procedure for mapping abiIities i n a manner in
which intemctive specfications of human competency can be prescribed.
Figure f Knowledge Structures Hierarchy
Performances
Abilities
243-ANL46
Circular/Circulaird~~pgvnap A-51
At the Apex of the hierarchy is the Mission or overriding goal. This is the purpose to
which all the accumdating activities are directed. These statements claim their validity
from the degree to which all participants within the mission's purvie'w can agree to i s
value and usefulness in providing direction and purpose. In civil aviation an acceptable
mission might be "theprocess of managing and operating the transportarion of people
and goo& by air, both nationally and internationally, in a manner which rnaximises
safety, efficienq and flech'veness." Such a statement provides goal directed purpose for
identZlabIe sectors within the industry; aviation regulators; air traffic controllers, airline
operators; aircraft manufacturers; travel and tourist operators; airport managers and
adminismators; flight crews; cabin crews; aircraft maintenance engineers; and passenger
service personnel. Each of these groups must in turn translate the macro based statement
into sector mission statements giving specific focus and direction. For airline flight
crews, a sector mission might be "to operate gad maintain scheduled aircrafr services'
which maximise safety and enhances the mciency and flectiveness of the airline's
services." In this statement implicit reference is being made to a number of pre-requisite
capabilities, Such a sector mission could not be achieved without the prior attainmenstof
the organisation's ability to be "accomplished" or highly competent in the complex
behaviours which underIie flight standards and flight operations management, command,
and the management of other technical sub systems,
The level beneath the mission provides individual elaborations of the goal's directives.
These elaborations or accomplishments are the broad functional capabilities which
contribute to personal expertise. Each accomplishment is the synthesis of two or more
generic knowledge bases which are stored in and retrieved from long-term memory. For
example, the flight crew accomplishment of command,defines a capacity to exercise
formal, legal power and authority over aircraft crew and passengers and to establish and
maintain effective and efficient crew performance,
Each accomplishment is in turn defined by two or more peq%rmances. A performance is

a statement of procedural knowledge ("intellectual skill," "knowing how") that is
required in executing an accomplishment. This entisy is an application of the concept
developed by Newall and Simon (1972) who propounded the notion of a cognitive entity
as a production, which entered into more complex production systems. Such an entity
comprised a rule of procedural knowledge composed of a condition and action Gagnt &
Glaser, 1987), In this knowledge structures hierarchy model, performances provide the
intellectual skill definitions related to individual accomplishments. One performance (for
exampIc rnakifig in-flight adjmtments), may with other performances, provide the
particular characteristic of a given accomplishment (say, aircraft pqfomance
management). That performance, in a different constellation of performances, will
provide the construct for another accomplishment (for example, navigation
management). Competency analyses of flight crew behaviour (Crook & Hunt, 1988)
have identified that the command accomplishment can be defined by six performances,
each one providing a subordinate contribution to its dependent accomplishment. These
performances have been identified as captain supemisiirg, pilot managing, mannging
critical incidenrs, and managing crew inreractlou.
The base of the hierarchy is provided by the-spgcflcabilities which define each of their
superordinate performances. Specific abilities may have both cognitive and affecrive
applications. For exmple, from the accomplishment of command and its performance,
crew interacting, cognitive abilities are included in assessing, decision-making and
monitoring, and affective abilities in leading and listelling.
A Map of Pilot Competency

In a study of pilot competency (Hunt, 1990) a sample of 120 airline pilots were surveyed
for their perception of the desirable ability attributes for pilot performance. From a
mission statement which found more than 75 percent of the sample agrwing to a goal
which explicated "the process of mmaging and operating the transportation of people
and goods by air, both natiortally a& internatioeatly, in a manner which mmimises
sufeo, eflcr'e~b~ya d efeciveness. " a canonical discriminant analysis generated six
statistically significant accomplishments. Further analyses revedd that these
accomplishments could be categorised into two groups (figure 1). The rust related to the
pilot's operational management of the aircraft and its systems. These accomplishments
together are descdbcd as "piloting accomplishments." The second cluster prescribe the
pilot's relationship to the types of operatima1 requhments (air transport, aerial work,
etc.,) and flight stmdards (regulatory and organizational requirements) which impact
upon flight crew procedures, These arc described as the piIot's "r=nvironmcntd
accomplishments,"
ACCOMPLISAMX-
~
Perfomancs
Management
I system M a a g e m ~ n t
Command
Navkpfion Management
Fight Sfondords
Fight Opercrtlons
. - 1-
0 5 tO 15 M 25 !
h t
In the- piloting accomplishments both aircraft performance management (APM) and

aircraft systems management (ASM) have a similar magnitude in perceived importance.
APM is defined as the accumplisbed ability t ~ rsafely and productively cone01 the Right
profile of the aircraft under Visual and Insmment Right Rules (VFR and IFR) from
"take off' to "landing."It embraces all the capacities a flight crew must engage in order
to operate and control an aircraft through the performance modes of take off, climb,
cruise, manoeuvre, descent and land. In contrast, ASM is defined is the accomplished
ability to safely and productively manage the ahcraft's technical systems in all
environmental and performance conditions including the flight crew ability to recognise
abnormal aircraft system performance, identify malfunctions and arrive at solutions to
remediate the conditions.
The third piloting accomplishment is navigation management. This accomplishment is
defined as the dynamic process of systematically determining the position of an aircraft
in flight in legally defined operating conditions and taking it safely and productively in
those conditions from a given position to the desired destination.
The final piloting accomplishment is cornand. While there are legal role connotations
embedded within this accompIishment for analytical purposes this critical piloting
outcome is defmed as being the capacity to manage interpersonal relationships with inter
system relationships (aircraft crews, passengers, and air traffic, with aircraft systems and
performance requirements) in order to achieve the operational goal of a flight. It may
include the exercise of formal, legal power and authority over other crew members and
passengers, but also includes the responsibilities of a First Officer (whether that officer
be in a "Pilot Hying" or "Pilot Not Flying" status. It is within this accomplishment, but
not exclusively related to it, that much of the focus of "crew resource management"
(CRM) (Helmreich, & W ilhelm, 199 1) takes place.
An Example: Flight Crew Performance Management
Effective flight crew performance has been defined by Chidester and Foushee (1989) as a
joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes and personality characteristics of team
members, As Jensen and Biegalski (1989) and others have suggested it is to the first
component of this definition that much of the effort in training has been historically
expended. OnIy in more recent times, and especially since the airliner collision at
Teneriffe in 1977, have attitudinal and personaliry characteristics received much attention
for training purposes. The focus of this attention has been to enhance the problem-
soIving and decision-making saategies of crews in normal and abnormal operating
situations. However, as the studies reviewed by Chidester and Foushee reveal, short
training interventions to achieve persondity changes which might induce more
consultative, open and collective problem-solvingleadership offer little promise. Further
more, although the evidence is less conclusive, attitude modification training
programmes for the same purpose tend not to be effective when delivered over short
periods of time. On the other hand, as Rumelhart (1981) has argued, effective problem-
solving and decision-making strategies can be established if the information smctures
which underlie them are built into clearly organised knowledge smctures and schemata.
Such schemata represent procedural knowledge (accomplishments, performances and
abilities) and the interrelationships between objects, events, and sequences of events.
Once an appropriate schema is retrieved to working memory, knowledge processes are
.
available to problem soIve a situation, However, the variable for ultimate effectiveness
is the prior organization and perception of relevance that the schemata may provide
Flight crew performance management (FCPM)then is seen as a process for developing
i n g decision making strategies on the' flight deck.
schemata to enhance p r ~ b l e m - ~ ~ l vand
An example of FCPM schemata can be seen from figure 2. The key piloting
accomplishment command is defined by five contributing performances: c r m
interactions, resolving conflicts, captain supervising, managing critical incidents and
pilot managing
Performances which define

COMMAND
PlfotManaging
Mng Critical Incidents
Captah Supervising
Resokrlng Conflicts
Crew Interactions
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0,7 0.8 0.9
Cmffiaent
I
Wilks Lambda .7327 Chi-Squared I21 -91 DF 52 Significance 0.00p<.bl
Each of these performances are in turn defined by process abiIities which combine in a
cognitive and affective manner many of the attributes which have been the subject of
CRM type courses (figure 3). As the data demonstrates, the effective execution of a pilot
managing performance in both Pilot Flying and Pilot Not Hying modes is predicated on
the previously stored abilities for decision-making, om1 communicating, confro/ling,
assessing,leading, monitoring and active lisrening.
I
Monitoring
aActive Ustenlng
I
Deckion Making
Orol Comrnunlcatlng
@ Control!Ing
El bessing
Leading
I
-
I
- 243-AN/146
C1~1~6r/Circulaire/~up~yn11p - -- .- -- -
.. -- A -55
For training purposes, each of the capacities when defined as performances or process
abilities can be analysed in terms of the impact they make in defining their superordinate
performance or accomplishment. Added to this as figure 2 illustrates; is an instructional
weighting continuum which identifies each capacity as being "cornrnqn," "potent," or
"critical." A critical performance or process ability is one in which the size of the
correlation within the discriminant function is high (approximately at least +.30), while
at the same time accounting for a high proportion of the reported observations. The size
of the correlation is based upon each capacities pooled within-groups correlation between
discriminating variables and canonical discriminant functions. A potent performance or
process ability is one in which the size of the correlation within the discriminant function
is high, but the frequency of reported observations is less than 35 percent of the total
observation. At the level of least impact are those performances and abilities which are
common. These entities have a low discriminant coefficient and are reported on by less
than 35 percent of the observations. Common entities tend to equate with the "core"
components of a training syllabus, while potent and critical entities suggest crucial
capacities for learning and competency acquisition. In the discriminant analysis of the
process abilities underlying pilot managing both decision-making and controlling
resulted in critical weightings, while active listening, monitoring, assessing and oral
communicating were found to be common.
Validating Knowledge Structures
GagnC and Glaser (1987) have assumed that different learning outcomes require different
conditions for competency acquisitions. Similarly, if the content of learning (especially
declarative (knowing that) and procedural knowledge) can be specified in terns of facts,
concepts, rules and procedures, so can the thinking processes which are required to
transform the information into expressed outcomes. One approach to this two-
dimensional matrix has been described by Merrill and others (Menill, 1983) as a
performance-content matrix. A 'modification to this matrix has been made by the author
and applied to the identification of the levels of learning outcome processes to content
knowledge structures. For example (figure 4), examine the learning process and content
knowledge requirements for solving this question:
Frequent inspections should be made of aircraft exhaust manifold-type heating systems

to minimise the possibility of
(a) exhaust gasses leaking into the coclpit.

(b) a power loss due to back pressure in the exhaust system.
(c) a cold running engine due to heat withdrawn by the heater.
Figwe 4 Knowledge-Process Outcome Matrix
Hypothesize
(Solve new problems)
Use
(Apply information)
Remember
(Recall information)
Fact Concept Rule Cognitive Flight
Procedure Procedure
- The answer to the question lies in the student being able to access rule knowledge and
process this information at the "remember a rule" level of learning outcome. Recognition
of these content-process intercepts can be used to validate the applications of howledge
structures in the context in which the capacities will be used. For instructional design
purposes, these content-process interactions are identified through the construction of
competency specifications (figure 5). Such specifications not only detail the contextual
application of the knowledge under consideration, but also the means for determining a
criterion-based measure of the competency's validity.
The ramification of these results for training and regulatory purposes are s i ~ ~ c a n t .
They provide licensing authorities, trainers and flight crew examiners with an objective
means of defining, prioritising, instructing and evaluating flight crew competencies. Given
such maps of pilot ability and the contexts in which they apply, it is possible to construct
competency specifications identifying the interaction of abilities with any number of their
contextual applications. For example, in a competency specification which focuses on the
accomplishment command management, and pilot managing as a critical performance, a
crew resource training application for this competency might be:
"Given bury radioltelephone traffic, including the issuance

of amended decent profiles, the First Oficer is required to
brief the air crew on arrival and approach procedures in
accordance with the airlines standard operating
procedures. The Captain will assess the appropriateness of
the plan and the alternatives which have been suggested to
cope with a shortened visual approach or emergency. The
Captain will decide on which strategy is best."
243-AN//46
Circufur/Circu!uire/~up~yn~p A-57
Figure 5
Competency Specification
Given busy ndioltelephone traffic, including the issuance of ammended decent profiles,
the FO is required to brief air crew on arrival and approach procedures in accordance with
airline's SOP'S. The Captain assesses appropriateness of plan and alternatives which have
been suggested to cope with shortened visual approach or emergency. The Captain will
decide on which strategy is best.
In this example, the performance of pilot managing is being examined through the
interactive application of the abilities of such as speaking (oral communicating), active
listening (being able to critically listen for relevant information) assessing (determining
relevant environmental and interpersonal conditions), and decision-making (choosing the
best of competing alternatives). Cognitive and affective skills are embedded in the overall
mastery of the accomplishment.
3. Professional Responsibility
A third characteristic of a profession is the way in which it organizes and moderates its
activities, particularly in relation to its clients. Carr-Saunders and Williams (1964) and
others have gone so far to declare that no profession is a "true" profession until it throws
up an "autonomous corporate association with the function of guaranteeing the
competence, honour and security of its members." However, this principle of autonomy is
atypical of the vast majority of professions. In England, probably only banisters could be
regarded as "true" professionals. The more usual form of relationship is through some
form of collegial control modified by state or external regulatory controls. In aviation, the
potential for this characteristic to be met may be found through the interactive relationship
of regulatory licences, airline corporate governance, and pilot associations. A pilot's legal
status is defined in national civil aviation legislation and the privileges under which
employment is executed, through the various licences and ratings which the legislation so
recognises. However, the conditions of service which may apply to any given pilot
(excluding those conditions which may be deemed to impinge upon safety - for example,
flight hours and rest periods) are more a function and responsibility of the particular airline
or employer.
One of the major anomalies of the pilot fraternity is the system of company seniority. The
airline pilot is firmly attached to bis or her company, since seniority is not transferable. In
large airlines, promotion from second officer to first, and especially from first to captain, is
slow. Stone and Babcock (1988) have suggested that in large airlines it may take a pilot
15 to 20 years before being made a captain. Airlines, largely supported by regulatory
authorities condone the seniority system. It is the traditional system, and a system which
q u i r e s few assumptions to be made about competency. Increased competency is simply
the sum of experience, which is the s u m of time spent in continued flight operations,
However, the AirIine Deregulation Act of 1938 may be part of the processes of changing
these conventions. In this environment pilots are increasingly seen to be more critical to
the airline's success, h a less regulated environment,completing a mission, at rrrinjmum
cost while achieving maximum revenues is having the effect of making the pilot a more
critical factor in the operation, kyond the accepted safety dimensions. Pilots see their role
as being more susceptible to "pushing" - being forced by direct or indirect means to
compromise safe practices in order to complete flights. Regulators increasingly
recognising these pressures are supportive of changes to pilot education and training.
Programmes Like the FAA's Advanced QualifScation Program are examples of ways by
which new approaches to pilot competency may be researched, implemented and
evaluated. The net result of these trends, and a more scienfic understanding of pilot
competency, may move piIots away from inflexible seniority based systems of promotion
to professionally prescribed systems of competency-based performance.
Pre-Service Education and Training

FmaUy, a l l major professions require a pre-service educational programme in which
candidates undertake si@cant periods of formal education study prior to entering the
practice of their chosen profession. These programmes are located in the professional
schools of mdti faculty universities - schools of medicine, law, architecture, dentistry, and
now aviation. Sn retrospect, it is perhaps surprising that aviation has been so slow in
recognising the need for more formal. educational approaches for entry into the industq.
The statistics clearly demonstrate that while flying may be much safer than driving a motor
car, it is not as safe as it could be,
In the first half of 1989 more than 600 people died in 26 aircraft accidents. This compares
with an annual average, caIculated since 1959, of 567 persons (ZATA, 1986). The
prognosis for eliminating human error in aviation accidents is not very good. The
consistency and stability of these figures across time, political and cultural boundaries is
remarkable. Hawkins (1987) reporting on a German study by Meier MuUer h 1940
concluded that in that year 70 percent of all aircraft accidents could be attributed to some
form of human factor deficiency. In a more detailed analysis of ordy judgemental and
decision-&g factors, Jensen and Benel (1977) idenmed these two components of
human factors to account for 52 percent of all general aviation fatalities in the United
States from 1970 to 1974. To sum up, approximately 70 percent of all fatalities are due to
pilot or air Wfic induced error, Of the remaining 30 percent, probably about 12 percent
can be attributed to weather related factors, 9 percent to acts of terrorism of one l&d or
another, 6 percent to maintenance defects and only about 3 percent to stn~ctwdfailures.
Pilot training must change. University based approaches may provide a means to that end,
but only if they develop integrated programmes - that is, academic cunicula which
integrate flight skills with technical, scientific and human factor disciplines. There are a
number of major international universities which provide aviation education, The Ohio
State University; the University of wok;and the University of Newcastle (New South
Wales, Australia) and Massey University to name some. However, Mdssey university is
one of a very few which achieve an integrated programme. The Bachelor of Aviation is an
undergraduate degree which includes 2 year full-time Flight Crew Developmenr for
students wishing to integrate pilot training (commercial and air mansport licences and
ratings) within an academic programme.
Figure 6
Integrated Bachelor of Aviation degree

(Massey University)
Aviation Human Factors

Aviation Studies (core)
Aviation Systems
Flight Crew Development
Flight Instruction
Flight
A-M) 243-AN/146
Circuhr/Circulaird~~prcyn~p
Cultural Contexts
Cultural Characteristics Right deck performance is all about the interactive effects of ,
three different variabIes - (1) the personal and group characteristics which each member of
a crew bring into the cockpig (2) thk ways in which cofnmunication and work pmtices
are processed, and (3) the quality of the group's overall perfommce in achieving its task
in relation to the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of the flight and the manner in which
the members of the group feel about themselves and each other (figure 7).
Figure 7 Interactive variables in group performance
Inputs Processes Outcomes
n Individual
group interactions
n Performance
-
u Cr~up
characteristics
Personal
interpersonal
Within this model is the recognition that the members of a crew come to work with a set
of ideas about themselves (knowledge, skills and attitudes - achievements and failures)
which make up each individuals "self conceptt'. Some of these characmistics rub off from
one to another. A depressingly maniacal. person is likely to turn the flight deck group info
a cautious, humourless and even feasful group of people. Interwoven into both the
personal and group characteristics are the cultural values which moderates the manner in
which each individual interacts with each other. This overlay effects the way in which the
group interacts in [ems of communication modes, interpersonal relationships, power and
authority. These in turn will influence the outcomes of the operation, particdar1y to the
degree that the crew will feel the prfommce together was a satisfying and rewarding
experience. As the satisfim become less obvious, and degenerate into mnayers so the
p e r f o m c e effectiveness of the flight may become more jeopadised.
UnfortunateIy, very little evidence has been established for the generalisabiity of these
models of social interaction (Ark & Sharon, 19873. Their conclusions questioned the
justification of applying theories and expIanations of human behaviour conducted within a
particular cultural setting (eg., European, or Nonh American airline operations) to other
settings (eg., African or Asian airline operations), unless such theories and explanations
have been replicated in the target setting. Rarely, has this been done in aviation.
One model which has attempted to examine the manner with which both input and pr6cess
variables can be effected by culture has been the focus of systematic study by Professor
Geert Hofstede (1983). In his study of work-related values across different cultural
groups he determined that individuals tended to share a range of characteristics which
tended to aggregate to a national persona. These characteristics in turn could be scaled
and differentiated across four basic dimensions: (1) power-distance; (2) uncertainty-
avoidance; (3) individualism; and (4) masculinity. Captain Neil Johnston (in press ) has
provided an important glimpse as to how the interac~vedinensions of this model might
apply cross culturally to flight deck performance. But no data has yet been generated
demonstrating the culturally specific diversity of these dimensions in fight deck
performance. Much more effort will need to IE made on studying the cultural
transferabilities of human factor components from one cultural setting to another if models
included within accepted European and North American practices such as crew resource
management are to be translated from dogma to human effectiveness.
Conclusion
This paper commenced by raising the issue as to whether practices in aviation, particularly
those personified h flight crew performance, couId meet criteria that would be acceptable
in according its incumbents with the status of "a profession". The question was asked
whether such a condition was extant, or a still to be achieved goal? The proposition put
was that professionalism embodied at least three key attributes, two of which related to
the inculcation of a specialised body of higher order knowledge. Justification for this
attribute was based n o t only upon within group notions of exclusivity, but more rationally,
upon empirical evidence in which observed expertise was seen as a domain specific
phenomena (Glaser and Chi, 1988). The competencies which contribute to the
professional accomplishments of a pilot constitute one such domain. Evidence to date
would suggest that, especially in terrns of pre-service preparation, aviation has a
considerable way t o go before it can rightCulIy claim equity with the more traditional
professions such as medicine or law. However, the growing effort of a handful of
universities around the world which provide for the integration of technical theory,
academic knowledge and manipulative practice in dedicated qualification progmmnes
provide the promise of a new, and perhaps real professionalism in aviation. In this
promise lies the future for professional flight crew deveIopment
References
Amir, Y.,and Sharon, 1 (1987). Are social psychological laws corss-culturally valid?
Journ~lQ~CTOJX Cdturad P,ryc~Io#,X8,4,pp. 383-470.
Besce, R.O.(198'3). Analyzing knowledge deficiencies in pilot performance. In R.S.
Jensen (Ed.) Proceedings of the Fifth httrernationhl Symposium on Av iarion
Psychology, Vol I . The Ohio State University, 6 1-86.
Billings, C.E. (1991). Toward a human-centered aircraft automation philosophy. The
International Jourml of Aviation Psycblogy , 1,4,261-270,
Cam-Saunders, A-M,, and Wilson, ?.A. (1964). The professions. London: Cass.
Collins, R. (1979). The credential society: an historical sociology of education and
stratification. New York: Academic Press.
Costley, J., & Johnson, D.,& Lawson, D. (upublished paper). A camp*son of cockpit
communication B737-B757.
Chase, W.G., & Simon, H.A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology, 4,55-
'
81.
Chidester, T.R.and Foushet , H.C. (1989). Leader plersondity and crew effectiveness: a
full-mission simulation experiment. In R.S. Jensen (Ed.) Proceedings of the Fvch
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Val 2 . The Ohio State
University, 676-68I.
Crook, C.,& Hunt, GLF. (1988). Comperent flight me.w licensing IZ: the rems of
reference for the Hurda Programme. Palmerston North: Instructional Systems
hogramme, Massey Univesity.
Chi, M.T.H., Glaser, R.,& Rees, E, (1 982)- Expertise in problem solving. In R.
Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Yo]. I, pp. 17-
76). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Coley ,J., Johnson, D. & Lawson, D (unpublished) A comparison of cockpit
cornmunication B737-B757. St Ives, Cambridgeshire: Interactive Trainers
Limited.
Edwards, E. (1988). Introductory overview. In E.L Wiener & D.C. Nagel (Eds.),
Humctn factors in avialion (pp,3-25). San Diego: Academic Press.
Foushee, H.C., & Helmreich, R.L. (If 9833 Ir, E. L Wiener 8r D, C.Nagel (Eds.), Human
factors in aviation @p. 189-2271. San Diego: Academic Press.
Gagnk, R.M. (1970). The Conditions of .&earning (2nd Ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehm
and Winston.
Gagnk, R,M. & Glastr, R. (1987). Foundations in Ieaming research. Xn R.M. G a p e
(Ed.), Inskuctional technology: foundations @p .49-83), Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence
klbaum Associations.
Glaser, Ti., & Chi, M,T.H. (1988). Overview. In M.T.H. Chi, R Ghrer, & M.J. Fan
(Ms.)The , nature ofapertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Ex'lbaum Associates.
Hemre'ih, R.L., & Wil helm, J.A. (1991). Outcomes of crew resource management. The
lnternalionaf Jourfial of Aviation Psychology, 1 ,4,287 -300
Home, R.E. (1973). Introduction to Infomation Mapping. Lexington, Massachussetts:
Information Resources, Inc.
Hunt, G.J.F. (1986). Needs assessment in adult education: tacbcal and strategic
considerations. Instructional Science, 15,287-296.
Hunt, G.J.F. (1990). An abilities based approach to pilot competency and decision
making. In ICAO Human Factors Digest No. 4 @p. A302-A309). Montreal,
Canada: ICAO.
Jensen, R.S.,& Biegalski, C.S. (1989). Cockpit resource management. In R.S. Jensen
(Ed.), Aviation Psychology. Aldershot, Hants.: Gower Technical Press.
Johnston, N. (in press). CRM - cross-cultural perspectives. In E. Weiner, B. Kanki, and
R. Helmreich (Eds.). Cockpit Resource Management. San Diego: Academic
Press.
Kantowitz B.H., & Casper, P.A. (1988) Human workload in aviation. In E. L Wiener &
D.C. Nagel (Eds.), Human factors in aviation (pp. 157-187). San Diego: Academic
Press.
Merrill, M.D. (1983). Component display theory. In C.M. Reigeluth (Ed.), Instructional
design theories and models: an overview of their current status. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-hall.
Posner, M.I. (1988). Introduction: what it is to be an expert? In M.T.H. Chi, R Glaser &
M J Farr (Eds.), The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Roscoe, S.N. and North, A.A. (1980). Prediction of pilot performance. In S.N. Roscoe
(Ed.) Aviation Psychology. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa University Press.
Rumelhart, D.E. (1981). Understanding understanding. La Jolla, CA: University of
California, San Diego, Centre for Human Information Processing.
Stone, R.B. and Babcock, G.L. (1988). Airline pilots' perspective. In E. L Wiener &
D.C. Nagel (Eds.), Human factors in aviation (pp. 529-560). San Diego:
Academic Press.
Wiener, E., & Curry, R.E. (1980). Flight-deck automation: promises and- problems.
Ergonomics, 23,995- 1011.
Williams, R.G. (1977). A behavioural typology of educational objectives for the
cognitive domain. Educational Technology, 17,39-46.
Some Aspeds on Our Human Factors Concept
bY
Captain Gunnar K. Fahlgren
IATA working group on Human Factors
Human Communication 193 32 Sigtuna, Sweden
Human Factors
For three days we are going t o talk about Human Factors. It is therefore
extremely important that we have a united view about the translation of these words.
In discussions with others and in articles I have found that this expression has quite a
different meaning for different people.
Every one of us, of course, has a very clear idea of the meaning of the
words. But, if we analyse each individual, we will soon find that these very clear
opinions diverge a lot. Different nationalities and different cultures as well as
differences in age, occupation and academic background, have a great influence on our
feelings towards these words. Some have an old meaning of Human Factors in their
mind.
In the ICAO circular, Human Factors Digest No.1, there is a warning on page 3 against
this misconception about Human Factors and the belief that it is somehow a branch of
medicine. Human Factors is, for many of us, the same as Human Error. The view of
Human Factors as being a contributing factor t o accidents in our life, is a negative one.
H m a n Factors cause accidents. This is very bad and, as accidents should be avoided,
consequently Human Factors should be eliminated.
Others have a much more positive view of this expression. Human Factors are those
factors which make us human. Some even regad our Human Factors as Divine
Factors. I would like to say that it is thanks to Human Factors, that the airline business
is the safest transportation system of all.
Thanks t o Human Factors, in the whole airline system, IATA members flew more
than 1,25 billion passengers safely from gate t o gate last year.
We often hear that 75%of all accidents are caused by Human Factors.
But we can also say that, during the last twenty years, thanks t o Human Factors,other
reasons f o r accidents have been dramatically reduced and are now as low as 25%.
Which expression d o you like most?
Let us compare with the word FEVER
For most of us fever is something very negative.
It keeps us in bed and makes us unable t o work
For others, fever is a positive reaction which helps our infected body t o recover.
Also in the ICAO Human Factom study group, Ihave clearly noticed that
the group members look' at "Human Factors" from different angles.
Both the positive view and the negative view can be clearly both seen and heard.
And of course it is important that some kind of identification of the expression is
made, m order to unite and help instructors and students in our industry,
An View of the Meaning
In the ICAO digest No.1 we can,in the very first sentence, read "Human
Factors as a term has to be clearly defined"
But no clear, shcsrt and holis-tic definition, suitable for practical IATA work, can be
found in the text. There are definitions and they are different from each other.
Scientists from different faculties will have and must have different definitions,
because they do research and they look at Human Factors from quite different angles.
If we just take one of those and apply it to our airline sphere, we MI1
have difficulties in being united. Our faculty is flying. What we need is a kind of
definition which suits our work Something we can accept and use in our airline
business.
There already exists a wide spread explanation of the word Psychology so why not start
with that?
It says, Psychology is: The scientific study of Behaviour and Mental Processes.
In order to cover Human Factors completely we have to add the fundon of our body
and its limits. That is Physiology. May I therefore propose the following, which
contains both the positive and the negative aspects and can easily be accepted by
Airline Personnel. For us Human Factors means
Physiology Behaviourand Mental Roceses-
And when I say Mental Processes, I include EMOTIONS.
EMOTIONS is a factor, which is extremely important to throw light upon, if we want
to improve tlight safety by uskg knowledge of Human Factors as a tool in our
industry.
In combination with the SHEL concept and its components, Software, Hardware,
Environment and Liveware, it covers what Human Factors should mean t o those of
us engaged in the flying business.
Yes, within IATA, we need a more united and holistic view of the meaning of Human
Fadors m the future. A holistic view will act as a conditioned stimulus for the whole
system and wr behaviour will change towards more flight safety related actions and
t hmking.
The Use -ofHmnan Factors
I usually say that the Human model we now are operating is about 50,000
years old. Our brain and our nervous system then got its present design with its
mxm-mus capacity.To know more about Human Factors is firstly to know and
appreciate the performance of our system.The performance and capacity which has
made it possible to create our world and our v e v safe air transport system.
The expresdun "Human Performance and Udtations" is used by ICAO. And a very
important p ii d Human Factars train@ is t-o know about the Unaitatims.
Limitations there aR and timitations we have. With howledge of the W t a t i m s we
cart impmve safety.
Without that knowledge, those limitations will cause a lot of accidents.
If we look pusitive1y at Human Factrxs, we c;an use it to improve

communication and reduce the risk ofmisunderstanding,
W e can handle stress and improve our perCmance,
We can increase pmducKvity. me soda1 part d our life can get better and
we become more confident.
Negative attitudes can be redwed and this gves us more job satisfaction
If we have a positive attitude towards Human Factors and if we learn more about it,
this lfsfcan be made endless. On the dher hand, if we look negatively at this concept,
the fist will b~very shM and the result will be disastrous.
Human Fact- courses m themfare necessaryfaralJ airhe prsormel.
Fm R i m , Cabin Attendants, Technicians, Inmctors, fm Front M e Persome, and
last bul not least all the managers from FIi@ Operations,
mght Operations, being responsible fur flight safety, easily get the wnmg impression
that they are experts on Fhght Safety and sometimes believe that their Right
O p m t i o t l s Manual can take care of all problems regding Human Factors.
a final resort they decide to spend some money and smd theif plots on a three day
c a m e to get rid of the last trace of dangerous Human Factam
1 am now palntlng a very dar&piare, but unfmhmafely tMs picture

exists. I can also paint brighter and more col-1 pictures of Managas and Flight
Operaffons,who really want to learn.
They do not considerthe Human Factm concept as a concept, which can be learned
once and for all. They consider the Human Factors concept to be a m s , which mns
t h m g h the Ahfine and which will continue forem, where m e learned psychoIo$cal
item will lead to another interesting question and so an.
1can see airlines and 1 can see aimaft manufa- uf d i f f m kinds.

One tries to Human Factors and the ether Zries to e)ixrtiraate Human Fadors.
I can also see the mmH and I cmt assure you that the-organisation,which tries to
eihhtafe Human Fact- wiII definitely 1we in the iong run.
If fnstead we try to use tt, we Wll learn how to avdd g-g into the danger zone.
So,e n q bas to be spent on Human Factors courses, where we can learn

how to utitise Human Performance and h o w the limftations and make flying even
safer. The interest for Hman Factors has @wn dramatically during the last ten years
and that is indeed very good But there is always a risk that also positive thitlzdng and
positive actions mi@ m a t e a situatia with unexpected backlash effects.
A lot of resemh has started (at universities around f h e wurId) on
Human Factors and fiyltlg Thanks to this we have learned a let. But this research
Is mostly focused mthe negative side d Human Factm. When it reaches the public,
via press rado and TV,they easily get and transmit the wrong impression that flying is
heamg towards reduced safetymstead of towards increased safety, as it is inreaHty.
There is a risk that this research is digging deeper and deeper into pilots' mistakes
only. And that will cause a dilemma far our industry and its reputation as being an
extraordinarily safe transportation system.
As counterbalance I wmld like So have research abo on how H m a n Factm
eliminate e m and mistakes, That kind ofresearch wmid make the picture of what
we are doing in our industry more cmplete. It would make a positive impact on the
pMIc and -ate confidence in our business.
It is not difficult to find e m made in connection with flying.
I have been flying for50% of aviation histmy and during that time Z have made
around 13.000 safetake efts and landing. But ladies and Gentlemen, I can assure you
that on a lot ofthose 13.000fights, I have made errors caused by Human Fadom. But
also, thanks to Human Factors, those e m we-recorrected and compensatedfor and
the result was a safe flight
The second risk of a backlash, which I will mention, i s that our great
interest in Humm Fadors now, which I s very positive*has caused a situation, where
we obsenre and analyse incidents, which bid not bother us same years ago. This new
intemst is very good,but it creates an uncomfortable situation for the specbtors.
Because both airline personnel and passengers, who very often regard an incident as
an accident, get the impression that there I s an increased rate of accidents caused by
Human Fadars. We know that w e are inpaving ftight safety that way, as we have
away5 done,but the spectators believe that dangefous events happen m m often now
than earlier, when, in reality, the o m f e is true.
These Human Factm incidents must be looked at from anather, more

positive, point of view. Namely, Human Factors prevent incidents from becoming
accidents. An incident positively indicates that our Human Factors safety net is
operating as expected. That message must be given to the public and Airline
persmel.
W e must remember that incidents happen daily in every man's life.
?hey might happert when we drive a cat,when we crass a m t or do the cooking
The person who takes them too senlously and regards them as accidents, will most
pmbably meet an early death due to psycho1ogical stress and not due to the incidents.
?he third backlash risk we might face and which we must work upon to
reduw is the introduciion of the Human Factors concept to pilots within our
eqanisat ion.
Many countries have M e d , or will soon the ICAO annex 1

mggesHon to have Human Perfomance and limitations an the training programme
for all levels of pilot Mcensing. That is extremely goad.
me tr;lfnfng swbject "Human Factors" will then have the same status as
Aerodynamics, Metemlogy and others had earlier.
For years those subjects have been the subject of written examination. And usually
those tests have been in the form of Multiple Choice,
As Human Factors now has the same status, It I s very easy to fall into the same habtt
regarding tests and the result is that we start to test Human Factors knowledge by
glw'ng Multiple Choice questions.
I think it Is OK,but not necessary, to have such a test on the Private Pilot Ljcence
level, where most of the questions are about physioloa~and simple questions on
psychology. &t on higher levels, for commercial plats,there should not be any
wriftm test. k a k r s h k p *Attitudes, -ctMmagemmt and Ctmmmicatimare
subjects too important to simplify as just right and w m g .
The tuition and its m H will get much better without a written test.
Those pilots, who are going to use their howledge within commercial flying, are
wise, judicious and interested. My experjmce is that they are very interested in this
rather new subject, And this Interest would mast pmbably decline if they h e w that
the seminar would end in a written test.
Their way of Bstening would change. That is a Human F a d d
They wwid listen less to the message and try instead to concentrate on what h d of
questions wi31 come up later. Valuable &sc-ussionswould p~ntjablyvanish, as they take
time and the students want m t i r r u a u s infmation frrrm start to finish.
Authon'ties, schoals and instructors also display a rather poor Human Factors
)ar~Med$e,if they believe that simple, unambiguous answers can be given m this
variable and complicated subject.
Well then, how can we be sure that the pilots know, what they should
lanow about Human Factors. The answer is: " W e can never be s m " .
At least not after a test.
Then the students are happy and will pmbably not think a b u t it any mom.
But Mthaut a test we might start a process which will continue long &er the cwrse
has ended.
In Sweden the CAA is now mning a system m trial, which I fully agree W h . They
give tests a the ficence A level. Qn the cammercial plat Hcence level they do not
give tests but have system checks on those, who conduct the teaching. To be approved
by CAA as an instructor, one has to have a lot of bowledge and experience both of
psychology and commercial flying
2434N/I46
Circrtlar/Circulaiw/rIup~n~p A-69
In chapter 2 sf Annex I (Personnel Ucensing) nothing is said about a written test.

It says:
5of haveowledEeo
t
-
? his duw.
That can be dme in a dialague bdween the instmctur and the student during the
Human Factors seminar, So,is a test really necessary?
We should n d spoil the great and &rowing interest for Human Factors
among pilots by giving them tests on a subject which has more nuances than just
black and white.
W e must think, very camfully, about haw this Human Factors concept
will influence the i m a e of safety. I would H k e to say that the I ATA members and the
l CAO people must control arid act in a -way, so this pasiffvestake will not turn out to
produce a boamerang effect. Apositive a p c h to Human Factors will create an
optimistic picturn, which is what we need.
W e must have a united and holistic meaning of the expfessian m a n

Factors, which suits those who work within the airline business.
L& me suggest Rysiology Behavim a d MemM m*
We must use the Human Factors concept pudtively and give our .
customers the c m c t feelinp and the convictim that they can have confidence in
our industry now and in the future,
Appendix
I will take this oppmhmify to propose a definition af another word which is very often
used in aur IATA vocabulary and that is Complacency.
It is a word, w e very aften use -inconnection with accidents and incidents.
In a researcll some years ago professor Ragnar Hagdahl at 5tockholm University and 1
asked pilots and others to answer an Investlgatim quest!ormalre, in order to give us
an isldicatim, what the word Complacency really meant to them. The form was
delivered to a m d 1400 pemns and we got hundteds afdifferent answers This
indicated that the meaning d this word is quite differentfor Merent incfividuals and
a h dfffered befween nations and different languages.
Of c m e irnpcrrtant w d s tlsed in impartant 6ommmication shwld be defined. And
in cxrr report an tMs research we suggest that C ~ q l a c e n c ~y l fn b pM is defined as
a state where
lbe pilot m ~ ~tiasInot use y the k n d d e and iadormation available
That means that the pilot, mder c & h conditians, mcmsdmsIv does n d fully
ufiJise his OW or his colleagues' copitJve skEl and hawledge,
TRAINING HUMANS FOR AN AUTOMATED ATC - E N V X R O m
Bert Ruitenberg
Executive Vice-President Professional
IFATCA
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Bert Ruitenberg, I live in The Netherlands where I worn
as an Air Traffic Controller at Schiphol, the airport of Amsterdam.
Today I have the privilege to address you in my function as the Executive Vice-bsident Professional of
IFATCA, the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations. I am aware that She
previous sentence may have baffled you slightly, but I will explain more of the organization of IFATCA
'in a few minutes, so stay tuned and it will dl become clear.
Before giving a short overview of the contents of my presentation I would like to use this oppomnity to
~ I ~ a nICAO,
k first of all for inviting IFATCA to present a paper at this Global Symposium on Human
Factors in Aviation, and secondly for arranging the timetable of the presentations in such a way to allow
&is speaker to I x here and still be able to arrive in Christchurch, New Zealand, in time for IFATCA's
Annual Conference and the associated pre-conference Boardmeeting on Friday.
The first part of my presentation will k a short introduction to IFATCA, followed by a look at the
relation between the Federation and ICAO's Human Factors Programme. Next, we wiU arrive at the main
body of the presentation: ATC-training, Automated working-environmentsand Human Factors. I hope to
point out some interesting differences compared to pilot-training, and will use some examples to indicate
the role of Human Factors in ATC-training. Finally, of course, there are a number of conclusions that will
k subtly brought ro your attention.
Now that you know what is in store for you, we might as well get it over with, so we will launch directly
into the short introduction to IFATCA I promised you.
The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations was founded 32 years ago by Air
Traffic CmtroUers f m 12 European ceunujes and has since g r ~ w nto a body with over 80 Member
Associations woddwide.
Among its objectives are: "the promation .of safety, efficiency and regularity in International Air
Navigation", and: "to render assistance and advice in the development of safe and orderly systems of Air
Traffic Control".
IFATCA is an independent, non-government, non-political, professional organization that has gained
universal recognition from other aviation-related organizations as -being "the voice of the Air Traffic
Controller". This recognition is given shape by the many invitarjons PATCA receives lo participate in
meetings, panels, working-groups etcetera where the opinion or input fmm operational Air Traffic
ControUers is sought.
The IFATCA-~presentativesat those meetings :set. can rely on an extensive set of Federation Policies
covering most of me ropics that will be up for discussion, be it in the Technical Reld (e.g. on
ATC-procedures, TCAS or ADS) or the Professional field (e.g. on working-conditions, medical or legal
topics).
To conclude this brief introduction to IFATCA. you are probably wondering where I fit in the
organization, so I will tell you. As the Executive Vice-President Professional I am rhe Executive
Board-member responsible for the Professional matters of IFATCA. In-the Board are also an EVP
TecMcal, EVP Finance and EVPs for each of our four Regions, together with an Executive Seccetq and
an Editor. To keep us all in check we have a very competent President and Chief Executive Officer, aided
by a Deputy President. V all his sounds impressive - good! (It was designed to do just that).
With this knowledge about IFATCA and its methods, it will be no surprise that there exists a healthy
relation between IFATCA and ICAO, a relationship that may well be illustrated by our involvement in
ICAO's Human Factors Programme. This incidentally brings us to the second part of my presentation.
Although we didn't attend the Leningrad Symposium and also weren't present at the first Regional
Seminar (Cameroon), IFATCA was aware of the importance of the Programme and so was only too
pleased to accept ICAO's invitation to present a paper at the second Regional Seminar (Bangkok). From
that time on, similar presentations were made at Seminars in Mexico City and Cairo, and IFATCA was
also involved in the drafting of the ICAO Digest on Human Factors in ATC.
Inspired by the ICAO Programme, IFATCA has furthermore begun an internal campaign to increase
awareness of the importance of Human Factors in Aviation in general, and in ATC in particular. To that
end, I have the honour to present a seminar-type paper on HF in ATC to the delegates at our Annual
Conference next week.
It is felt there is a need for such a campaign, for in traditional ATC-training very little attention is given
to subjects other than those dealing directly with ATC-procedures, separation-criteria or
aviation-background (iike meteorology and aerodynamics). To be fair to ICAO, I hasten to say that
recently the licensing-criteria for Air Traffic controllers have been reviewed, and that one of the changes
is the inclusion of a requirement "to have knowledge of the human performance and limitations relevant
to Air Traffic Control", so it looks like things will get better in the future.
If you remember the beginning of my presentation, you will have noted that I smoothly took you from
the second part into what I called the main body of it, for we are now already looking at ATC-training.
But before exploring this further, I have a little anecdote about training in the Royal Dutch Air Force that
I want to share with you.
In recent years the Dutch Airforce operated two different fighter-aircraft: the NF5 and the F16. As the
NF5 was growing outdated, the Airforce was in a process of slowly phasing them out while looking for
a replacement when all of a sudden the Gulf-war erupted. NATO put heavy pressure on the Dutch and
it was decided that the Tornado would be the successor of the NF5.
The Tornado's characteristics are such that it would make up for all shortcomings of the NF5: it's bigger,
has a better performance and endurance, larger payload, etcetera. The only small disadvantage is that
because of all this the aircraft is more difficult to operate, which led the Airforce to decide to use two
piA-lots on it. The task for each pilot was tentatively worked out on paper, but could be adjusted
operationally if found necessary. This couldn't be practised in a simulator, as there was none available yet.
Again, under NATO-pressure, it was decided to go operational with the Tornados immediately, even
before official test-flights could be made by Dutch Airforce pilots. Such test-flights weren't possible
anyway since various vital systems from the NFSs had to be built-in in the Tornados, while the number
of operational fighters had to remain constant. (The Airforce had ordered new systems and instruments,
but delivery wouldn't be before the end of the year so they had to be installed afterwards).
The Airforce however was confident that everything would go well, starting with the first missions in the
Tornados. After all, the pilots were able to operate their NF5s too, weren't they?
In case you still have doubts: this story is NOT true. That is to say, it is not about the Airforce, aircraft
or pilots. The scary part is, it is about Civil Aviation, the transition from an old to a new Control ~ o w e r ,
and Air Traffic Controllers!
This is what really happened "somewhere in Europe". As a result of airport-expansion, there was a need
for a higher Control Tower, with a larger cab (or workfloor). This made up for all shortcomings of the
old Tower, but had one disadvantage: because of the diameter of the cab and the height of the Tower, it
proved to be impossible to see the part of the airfield below the opposite end of any control-position. So,
management decided that there were going to be two Groundcontrollers (i.e. the Controllers responsible
for taxiing aircraft) working simultaneously, as opposed to the existing practice of having just one
Groundcontroller.
A few internal co-ordination-procedures were devised (on paper), but it was expected that these would be
modified while working the new system. As there was no Tower-simulator available, there was no way
of checking things in advance. Furthermore, it was impossible to use the new Tower to test the procedures
before going operational, since vital equipment from the old Tower had to be transferred to the new one
at Transition Day. New equipment was ordered, but delivery was delayed so it would have to be installed
later. Management however was confident that the Controllers would be able to cope. After all, they were
able to work from the old Tower too, weren't they?
Do you see the analogy with the Airfarce-story? The big difference is that in the Airforce-story everyone
would agree that this is not the way to do it, whereas in the real ATC-story it took the ATC-association
a lot of effort to convince management that maybe some things could be done differently - and even then
the transition took place without any simulation at all, for simple lack of a simulator. This is in fact a
common occurrence with ATC throughout the world.
Lei's have a closer look at ATC-training in general. As with pilot-training there is normally an extensive
programme to bring ab initio-trainees up to licensing-standards, although even here already it is probably
correct to say that in pilot-training more use is made of simulators. Please don't think that Air Traffic
Controllers are against the use of simulators for training! The reason they're not used is far more basic:
it involves money, as usual.
When a manufacturer of simulators builds a simulator for, say, a Boeing 737 he has a wide range of
potential customers. Every B737-operator in the world can use that simulator to meet his demands, give
or take a few minor modifications. But try selling a simulator for Heathrow Tower to an ATC-school in
Japan!
ATC-simulators are by nature very site-specific, and thereA-fore expensive to buy. Furthermore, they
usually require a lot of manpower to operate them (fake-pilots/blipdrivers), including up-dating of the
training-exercises, which adds to the operating-costs. For those reasons there are still many ATC-agencies
that do not have the simulation-capabilities they require.
So what training is done in ATC after qualifying for the licence? In the more advanced countries with
simulators, some refresher-training is conducted, and regular proficiency-checks take place. But this is the
exception rather than rule, when looking at it on a global scale. Usually the post-licence training consists
of no more than seeing changes in procedures (including major changes) on paper, after which experience
on how to use these new procedures is gained while working - in an operational environment with real
aircraft!
And when new equipment is installed, the Air Traffic ConA-trollers usually receive an introduction on
how to operate the hardware (i.e. what the buttons are for), but not how to use it. That again is left for
the individuals to discover while working, using live traffic as part of the learning process.
In that process, interesting discoveries are sometimes made! For example, in a new system that was about
to be implemented somewhere in Europe, one of the more spectacular items that were automated is the
traditional Flight Progress Strip - the rectangular piece of paper used by Controllers to keep track of the
whereabouts of an aircraft. Normally, annotations concerning estimates, heights and speeds are made in
pencil or pen on the strip, but in the new system every input goes per keyboard and electronic strips
appear on monitors. '
Controllers do not have to sort the strips anymore - the computer does it all, based on the estimates. The
interesting discovery however was, that people using keyboards do tend to hit a wrong key every now and
then. Well, maybe this was known already, but the discovery that if an estimate-time is wrong by one hour
or more, the computer will sort the strip straight to a part of its memory where it cannot be retrieved until
that time comes up, surely was a new one!
This was just one example, and mom could be quored here. The b t t m l i n e is: if the design of
ATC-systems is left solely to technicians, and the Conrrollers receive little training before using the system
opmtionally, the Latent Failure-phase of the Reason-model is entered without a second shought. And
guess who are in the last line-of-defence?
Is automation as beneficial as many engineers and managers seem to believe, anyway? It is tempting far
them to think that by introducing a high level of automation in Air Traffic Control there will be a
spectacular increase in capacity, in other words, that because of automation more aircraft can be handled
by less controllers. I would like to label this "a popular misconception", I will even explain why.
No matter how state-of-the-art the automated systems that become available far ATC are, there is not
going to be one that is absolutely faiI-safe. So, when the system fails, it is the Air Traffic Controller on
whom everybody relies to handle the problem. And since his automated system has failed, he will k
required to use a back-up system, which will usually be automated to a lesser degree. This implies a
higher workload for the Controller, so he shouldn't k overloaded with too high a number of aircraft to
handle. In other words: even in an automated environment a Controller should never be responsible for
morc aimafi han he can safely handle without the automated equipment - which is equal to the' number
of aircraft he handled before automation was introduced. So far for the increase in capacity.
But surely the number of ContmlIers required can t>e decreased with automation, you say? I'm afraid the
same argument as kfore applies: you need sufficient Controllers to take over when the system fails, so
you probably need rhe same number as before. Worse even: you might require more than before!
Although I maintain h a t there is no such thing as an absolutely fail-safe automated ATC-system, I will
concede that today's systems are pretty fail-safe. (Which in ATC is just not good enough!) Therefo~, just
like pilots, 999 out of 1OOO times an Air Traffic Controller will work a shift without experiencing any
problems with the automated system - or even at better odds. It is that ONE time occurring that makes
people realIy appreciate having pilots on board, or Controllers an the ground. For that reason, pilots go
through regular training-programmes where the special skills required to handle emergency-situations a=
practised and sharpened.
It should not be different for Air Traffic Controllers working in highly automated environments. If their
old-fashioned or manual skills are relied on to keep disasters from happening whenA-ever the system
breaks down, you better make sure they haven't forgotten hew to use them! Sa, when automation is
introduced, rhis doesn't cancel the need for training the Controllers in the old methods it enhances that
need, while at the same time adding the need for training how to operate the new system. If a l l that is
done conscientiously, it may well imply hat because: of the introduction of an automated ATC-system
there are more Controllers required than before.
Having arrived at this point, it is interesting to note that in many areas of the world there is a serious
shortage of Air Traffic Controllers, a shortage that many politicians and other people responsible for ATS
expect to soIve by automation. See why I called it "a popular misconception"?
By now you may get the impression h a t F A T C A (or Controliers) are completely against alI forms of
automation in ATC. If you do, you are wrong. IFATCA feels there are genuine needs for automation to
assist Controllers, to improve performance and reduce workload, to increase efficiency, to remove
nan-essential tasks, and to enhance job-satisfaction and the safety-element of the Controller's task. But
there is also a need for Air Traffic Controllers to be involved as an essential part of any fuiure
ATC-system. The man-machine interface needs to be examined closely so that the system fits the human,
rather than have the human fir the system.
Therefore IFATCA has always urged that Controllers be involved from the designing-phase onward in the
development of new equipment. The Human Factors awcts of automation must k fully considered when
developing automated systems and should include the maintenance of essential manual, skills and
ControUer awareness.
It is our belief that the Controller must remain the key-element of the ATC-system and must retain the
overdl control-functionof the system. Safeguards must be established to ensure that the Controller remains
an active, rather than a passive, user of an automated system. .
The preceding statements are examples of IFATCA-policies that I referred to in my introduction to the
Federation earlier. They are the result of many meetings in which Controllers from all over the world
endeavour to formulate statements on subjects that concern them all.
Another such policy is that before a new system i s implemented, ControIlers shouId receive adequate
training In operating the system. This should seem obvious but is not always done. IFATCA is aIso in
favour of regular refresher-training and proficiency-checks. always with the aim to keep the professional
standard of the Controllers as high as required.
Coming to the end of my presentation, in which you first were briefly introduced to how FATCA works,
and what the relation is between FATCA and ICAO's Human Factors Programme, it is my hope that the
main part about ATC-training, Automated working-environmentsand Human Factors has given you an
insight in our Federation's concerns in this field. Don't get carried away by technological possibilities
when considering automation in ATC.Remember h a t the Human Element - the Air Traffic ControUer -
remains the heart of the ATC-system, and that the system is there for the Controller, not the other way
around.
Thank you for your attention.
Transavia's Integrated Approach to Human Factors Training
Mr David Lawron
interaction Trainers Limited
S t Ives, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom
Captain Han Luchsinger and Captain Frans Trompert

Transavia Airlines
Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
The Background
The early 1980s saw a growing interest amongst airlines in Cockpit Resource
Management training. The publicity and interest generated through various
conferences and symposia led to more airlines perceiving a potential need in this
area. In 1984 Transavia Airlines' Flight Training Department began an evaluation of
flight crew performance to determine if current training programmes were meeting
crew needs. After consultations with t h e instructor corps, Transavia introduced a
LOFT programme into the 1985 Recurrent Training schedule. All the airline's
instructors attended a briefing prior to the LOFT. A t this briefing they were advised
of the goals of the Recurrent Training:
1. To find out how crews dealt with communication, cockpit management
and crew decision making.
2. To give simple feedback on crew non-technical performance.
Transavia sealised that with no formal training in this area, instructors would be
basing their feedback on accepted subjective norms of behaviour and conduct. The
major purpose of the exercise was t o derive feedback from the instructors on the
overall level 05 non-technical skills of the crews. Three scenarios were used which,
whilst n o t complex, nevertheless provided instructors with an opportunit to
9,
using t e former American Airlines B737 simulator a t London Gatwick. The
b
investi ate the non-technical behaviour of t h e crews. All the crews flew k e LOFT
performance evaluation of the LOFT included recording all the routine and
emergency PA broadcasts from the flight deck.
After completin the LOFT programme, all t h e Instructors met t o discuss the results.
9
The LOFT identi ied a discrepancy between technical and non-technical skills among
the crews. There was a subjective feeling that some pilots needed training in the area
of nan-technical skills. A number of pilots developed some natural skills in the
appropriate areas despite having no formal training. Overall Transavia decided to
develop a training programme to meet this need for enhanced non-technical skills
among i t s flight crews.
Captain Han Luchsinger, the Chief Instructor at the time, started a discussion among
the FFigh t Department personnel t o establish the training objectives for a Crew
Resource Management course. These early discussions included representatives of
the Personnel Department and the Chief of the Cabin Crew Department.
A-76 C i r c u l a r / C i r c u l a i r ~ u p~p
~ ~ 243-AM46
n
The Design and Development

Working in cooperation with the Personnel and Cabin Crew Training Departments,
the airline a reed a set of goals and training objectives. These discussions were
3
valuable in eterrnining from the outset how the airline would approach the matter
of CRM training. C R M was seen as a comprehensive system for improving crew
performance, not a quick overnight fix. It was accepted that CRM training should not
be independent of othertraining but should be integrated into the aircrew system.
CRM is an opportunity for people to examine their own behaviour and convince
themselves of the need for chan e. It is not an opportunity for management t o
4
dictate or impose a specific set o rules a bout how the crews will work together. If it
wasto be successful it would require support and commitment from the
management and participation from the crews. The agreed training objectives were
subsequently incorporated into the course design with the overall goal of reinforcing
the safe operation of Transavia's aircraft, whilst preserving independence ofcrew
action with operational limits.
By September '1988, Captain Luchsinger had assumed leadership of the CRM Project
Group and handed over his job as Chief Instructor to Captain Alf van den Bichelaer.
Transavia's next step was to investigate what CRM training was currently availab te.
Captain Alf van den Bichelaer attended the United Airline" CRM programme and
Captains Han Luchsinger and Willem de Regt attended t h e KLM Crew Management
Course. After evaluating these courses and other available information, Transavia
decided that the KLM approach was more in line with their needs. Transavia liked
what they saw in KLM Crew Management Course but the course did not fully meet
their specific objectives. Transavia approached Interaction Trainers Limited for help
in developing a C R M programme. 1TL is the UK based training organisation which has
conducted KLM's CMC training since 1979. Transavia chose ITL as their training
consultants because of the Company's proven track record in worldwide airline CRM
and Flight Instructor training. An initial meeting occurred a t Schiphoi Airport on 2 1
March 7989 between the Transavia CRM Project group and ITL. t h e meeting set the
goal of running a 4-day proving course by the end of 1989.
The CMC (the accepted title) would be consistent, wherever possible, with existing
management training in the airline-The target group was all pilots, starting with the
a
middle roup of junior Captains and senior First Officers and working outwards from
there. T e CMC would be followed u p through Type Recurrent Training and Type
Qualification training where appropriate. Flight instructors would require some
additional training beyond the initial CMC. Because of the high level of participation
required, the aim would be to have 6 participants per cow*. The course would be
residential and conducted away from Schiphol airport..
ITL devised a Project Plan and Costings for Transavia's consideration. The plan
envisaged 5 phases to the project:
Phase 1 from July to ~ u g u s1989
t Programme Design
Phase 2 from September to October Preparation of draft training materials.
Editing and production of Master
Documentation
Phase 3 during November 1989 Conduct of t h e proving course and
revision meeting
Phase 4 during Nav and Dec 1989 Revision of training materials
Phase 5, January 1990 onwards Conduct of the CMC programme and
tutoring of Transavia CMC trainers
Captain Luchsinger attended a pre-design meeting at ITL's headquarters at S t Ives,

Cambridgeshire on 8 August 1989. There followed further design and development
meetings and on 20 October the training materials were approved.
The proving course was conducted in The Netherlands between 7 - 10 November

1989. The course was held at Castle Staverden, a residential training centre operated
by Nedlloyd, the shipping group. A mixed group of Captains and First Officers with a
representative of the Personnel Department attended the course. Some minor
revisions of the material were carried out and then the programme was implemented
in January 1990.
The Crew Management Course Programme
The CMC programme operates during the quieter winter months thus avoiding the
busy charter periods of the spring and summer. The training season has run every
year since 1989 from November through t o March.
Originally the intention had been that Interaction Trainers would design and develop
the programme and conduct only the initial courses. Transavia pilots would shadow
ITL and then co-tutor courses with ITL, eventually taking over the conduct of the
entire programme. Early in the initial courses, Captain Luchsinger had formed the
view that the specialist expertise of the ITL consultants was an essential part of the
course. It was decided that the pro ramme would continue with each course
?I
conducted by an ITL consultant wit support from a Transavia pilot. Throughout the
entire programme Han Luchsinger and FransTrompert have shared the responsibility
for supporting the CMC.
The 4-day CMC programme addresses the following areas:
Communication -the core subject

Leadership ,Decision Making
Judgement Information Management
Delegation Teamwork
A mix of presentations, group discussions, group exercises and video accident

reconstructions is used in the course. The emphasis is on participation by the pilots. In
4 days the course aims t o increase knowledge in all the subject areas and improve
communication skills. A computerised analysis takes place of all the group discussions
and interactions during exercises and the individual and group data is fed back t o the
participants. The data provides feedback on their communication styles and any
changes that take place during the course.
The methodology is based on original research in the United Kingdom by the Air
Transport and Travel Industry Training Board and the Huthwaite Research Group.
That research generated a technique of behaviour analysis which enables tutors t o
observe and record communication behaviour. The behaviour analysis used in the
Transavia CMC is ITL's own development based on this original research. These verbal
behaviour observations can be fed back t o the participants, which is helpful for
changing behaviour and improving skill and performance. The participants can see
how they stand in relation t o others in the group. They can-comparetheir behaviour
with the modelsfor effective performance presented in the course.
In the earliest NASA workshops on CRM, it was recognised how important effective
communication is t o the overall teamwork and management of a modern aircraft.
The Transavia CMC course aims to target this area throughout all the subject sessions.
To date, 22 Crew Management Courses have been conducted by Transavia and ITL.
All the Captains have attended the programme and almost all the current First
Officers. The current situation has created an opportunity for a major review of the
CRM programme with the goal of even greater integration of CRM into a total
training philosophy to meet the needs of the next century. Since the programme's
inception in 1990 a number of changes have been incorporated in response t o
participant feedback. Some sub'ect areas have been streamlined t o make them less
C,
intensive. The evening sessions ave been reduced to combat fatigue and increase
effectiveness. The CMC course was always seen as a dynamic event that should evolve
as experience was gained by the airline and especially in response to feedback from
the participants. Changes have been implemented in response to consist feedback
themes, not as reaction to isolated events or perceptions.
Instructor Follow-On Training
One of the outcomes of the meeting of 21 March 1989 was acceptance of the need
for additional training for instructors. Since CRM was t o be integrated into Recurrent
Training and Command Training, it was evident that instructors would need
additional skills to be able to handle CRM debriefing sensitively and effectively. A
two-day workshop wasdesigned to meet this need. The first part of the first morning
is spent identifying the learnin styles of the instructors. The remainder of the day is
9
spent refreshing the content o the CMC by showing video reconstructionsof events.
The videos were produced in a flight simulator using Transavia flight deck crew and
flight attendants. The instructors are required to identify the CMC related topics
depicted in the events and the impact they have on the crew. The participants are
provided with small plastic aide-memoire cards for future use.
The second day deals with debriefing CRM in LOFT and Recurrent Training. The idea
is t o provide the instructors with a guideline for conducting a debrief or feedback
session followed by practice of the technique. The group are shown video scenarios
and then'role play the debriefing. Two participants play the roles of the crew as
depicted in the video and one acts as the instructor. The debriefing is recorded on
video for subsequent review and discussion amongst the group.
The practice sessions involve the SPIN approach to debriefing:

S = Situation
P = Problem($
I = Implication(s)
N = Need(s)
Through use of questions, the instructor guides the crew through the debrief
allowing them to identify where both positive and negative CRM is evident. The use
of video feedback on their debriefin performance is a valuable tool for emphasising
3,
the shift in behaviour necessar to ac ieve success. The ITL tutor gives a
K
demonstration of how t o use t e SPIN approach effectively. This approach is a non-
threatening method for debriefing in what can be a sensitive and subjective area.
Because of the very practical nature of the training, participant numbers are usually
limited to 4 per course.
The first instructor Follow-On course was conducted on 12 Novewber 1990. To date
1 1 Instructor Follow-On courses have been completed.
Annual Refresher Training

Annual refresher training for all crews is t o be instituted in f 993. I t is designed t o
refresh the content of theCMC and to strengthen the non-technical skills of all pilots.
The duration will be one da ;the course will use a mixture of video and presentation
i
and be conducted in-house y t h e airline. ITL will assist with the design and
development of the programme.
Recurrent Training
In the 1992 Recurrent Training programme the emphasis was on CMC aspects.+LOFT
scenarios were constructed, allowing crews the opportunity to use the knowledge
and skills learnt from the CMC. The additional training provided fo'r instructors
enhanced the quality of debriefing on non-technical performance.
Command Training
During his career as a First Officer with Transavia, a pilot is encouraged to work
positively toward developing a high level of professionalism and proficiency. The
Crew Management Course forms part of that development process which will make
the transition to command natural and smooth. The Command Course is designed t o
assist a First Officer in reaching the required standards expected of t h e Pilot-in-
Command. CMC aspects are integrated into the initial Command Ground Course and
into the subsequent simulator sessions.
The Future Approach in Transavia Airlines

With all the Captains and most of the First Officers having completed the CMC,
Transavia and ITL have embarked on a project to provide an integrated approach to
training for the year ZQOQ.The pro ramme follows the natural progression of a pilot
7
from initial recruitment as a First 0 ficer through his Command Training and
subsequent development as a Line Trainin Captain then on as a Base I Simulator
9
Instructor.The Training courses are stand-a one modules which integrate into a total
training programme.
The Integrated Training programme comprises:
2. A CMC 2 course for Captains, as part of Command Training, with a

proposed length of 2+ - 3 days.
3. A flight Instructor Skills course (FlS 1) for Line Captains designed to teach
basic instructional skills - duration 2+ - 3 days.
4. A second Flight Instructor Skills course (FIS 2) for Base / Simulator
Instructors, desi ned to enhance the basic skills learned from FIS 1 -
3
duration 2+ - 3 ays..
Pilot Training Progression

,--------------
New Pilot
I 1
L-----
l------'
,--------------v
TypeTraining
Note: This model shows a sequence of
I I integrated formal training.
,--------------$. Annual recurrent training could also

contain integral coverage and appraisal
I
LineTraining I
I of C R M elements
L-----
-I------'
This assumes that Flight Instructors are
Captains. (Some airlines draw their
CMCl ! instructorsfrom the ranks of both
I I
Captains and First Officers)
: Command ,-------------.,
1 Part of Command Training
Training , I
CMC 2 I
I I
I Line I
I Captain
-- - ---'- - - - --
Flight I r------------1
Line
I lnstructor
: Module 1 instructor j
r----------'------ 7
Flight lnstructor
;*I Refresher Module
r-------------'---
:
Flight
Instructor
I
-!+; BaseISimulator
Instructor
I-, r----------------- 1
I; Optional LOFT
Design Module
:
I
I
Module2 ,
I
I
L-----------------A
I
L-----------------J
Summary
Transavia's move towards a fully Integrated Technical, Non-Technical and Instructor

Development Programme-willprovide a progressive training system, aimed at
meeting the needs of a new First Officer, shaping and developing their skills
throughout their career in the airline.
PRESENTATION TO TCAO FLIGHT SAFETY
AND HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSIUM .
WASH1 MGTON, D. C.
12 to 1 5 April 1 9 9 3
" TRAXNING THE XNV&S'PIGATORn

Peter G. Harle (CANADA)
FOCUS ON PROXMATE CAUSE.,.

(IE. UNSAFE ACTS BY OPERATOR)
ATTACK BLAME FOR FdaURE TO ASSESS Rim...
ACCIDENT REPORTS DEPICTBD:
* REPORTS S U b O M DEPICTBD:
Z n accident invas tigation, traditionally investigators have

tended to focus on the proximate cause: s p e c i f i c a l l y , they have
i d e n t i f i e d the unsafe acts committed by t h e operator. Since the
p i l o t is u s u a l l y the first one at the scene sf t h e accident,
there has been a tendency to focus on " p i l o t errorI1 - o f t e n
attaching blame for t h e f a i l u r e of the p i l o t to assess the
inherent r i s k s in his actions, such as continuing i n t o instrument
meteorological condf t i o n s under Visual F l i g h t Rules IVFR),
descending below published m i n i m a , deviating fro^ established
procedures, e t c . Hence, t h e i r accident reports typically have
d e p i c t e d what? when? and who3 w i t h a factual travel l o g of t h e
occurrence, micro-second by micro-second examining the crash
dynamics, 1 nvestigators have focused on the personnel failures,
o f t e n w i t h much finger-poi nting, such that the Honourable John
Lauber of the National Transportation Safety Board of the U . S .
speaks of the ' W h ~ d u n i t ? ~approach
' to accident investigation. On
a woxld-wide basis, accident reports have a eldom d e p i c t e d
a c c u r a t e l y why3 and how? the occurrence came about. They have
provided l i t t l e assessment of the events preeedi ng t h e accident
w i t h a full consideration of a l l the p o t e n t i a l contributing
factors.
+ SFFUATION ''RIPE" FOR ACCIDENT
, O H P m * rnrnENm3
NOIRMAI, ~ I ' H Y C
WELL-EQUIPPED PERSONNEL CHPLICATED
EEh4ENT OF CHANCE PRESBNT
+ GOOD LUCK VS GOOD MANAGEMENT7
* lLBNY UTBNT FAILURES PRBSBNT XN SYSTEM
* DESIGHRRS, PUNMEW bt M A O E R S ACCEPTED
PaOTS 11NAWARB OF THOSE RISKS...
When we analyze accidents, we f i n d that a l l too often the

sf t u a t i o n was rips before the accident; the e x p e r t s were saying
"it is j u s t a matter of t i m e u . A l l too o f t e n , we f i n d that
normal, heal thy, competent, experienced, well equipped personnel
were implicated in the accident. They d i d not have any i n t e n t i o n
of committing s u i c i d e ; on t h e contrary, they often had strong
motivation towards mission accomplishment. Often, they had
committed t h e same p o t e n t i a l l y unsafe act hundreds of times
before, suggesting an element of chance. It would seem then that
accident avoidance is often more a question of good luck than
good management. Daily, we aee i n c i d e n t s p o i n t i n g to l a t e n t
f a i l u r e s that are present w i t h i n the a v i a t i o n sys tern. Designers,
planners, and managers often knowingly (but sometimes
unwittingly] accept the inherent r i s k s o f these failures in the
system. Sometimes p i l o t s are not even aware of those r i s k e , such
that some observers have called p i l o t s t h e @@unwittingi n h e r i t o r s
of a l l the system1s defectst1.
OUR CHALLENGE
m no NORMAL,
QUAWFIED,
EXPERIENCED,
WELIPEQUIPPED
PERSONWEL COMMIT HUMAN ERRORS?
So, when investigators a s k Itwhy do normal, healthy, qualified,

experienced, we11 equipped, gsrsonnell conmft u n s a f e acts?,11they
must strive to bettsr understand the context in which these
errors w e r e committed.
SYSTEMS APPROACH
ACCIDENT IlWESTIGATLON
CONSIDER TOTAL LATENT SITUATION

W!EN UNSAFE ACT WAS COMMhTED:
DEMONSTRATE CONTEXT IN PEOPfiF:

mRE IMPLICATED IN ACCIDENT CAUSATION.
-4
This suggests a nee& f o r alternative approach to accident

i n v e s t i g a t i o n , whereby we consider the t o t a l l a t e n t s i t u a t i o n
when the unsafe acts are committed. A systematic approach i s
required. One useful model is t h e SHEL Model offered by Elwyn
Edwards, as modified by Frank Hawkins. This model focuses an
human b e i n g s (Liveware). I n a d d i t i o n to understanding the
physical, physiological, and psychological factors a f f e c t i n g the
p i l o t ' B performance, we must examine t h e i n t e r f a c e s between
personnel, t h e i r equipment, t h e i r operating environment, and t h e
effectiveness of a l l of the system support t h a t is p u t in place
for them. By examining a l l blocks and interfaces of the SWEL
Model, we should be able to demonstrate t h e context in which
normal people were implicated in accident causation.
Mare recently, Dr. James Reason of t h e University of Mancheater, '
has offered another syatematic approach which considers t h e w h o l e

production system - in our case the entire a v i a t i o n system. Here
is a layered d e p i c t i o n of this systems approach. One l a y e r
d e p i c t s the unsafe a c t s undertaken by f l i g h t crews and other
personnel. Fortunately, the aviation system has many structural
defences b u i l t - i n to m i t i g a t e t h e circumstances of such unsnf a
acts; for example, an incorrect read-back of an ATC clearance
should be p i c k e d up by an a l e r t controller. On t h e other hand,
if a pilot disables a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), t h e
s a f e t y b e n e f i t of t h e GPWS is n u l l i f i e d . But Reason goes further
than focusing on the immediate circumstances of the accident. He
would have us examine a l l of t h e pre-conditions at the time of
the occurrence, including such t h i n g s as -I1psychological
precursors" . Such pre-conditions might include c r e w fatigue,
stress, p r i o r experience w i t h f a l s e indications etc. which might
e x p l a i n why t h e pilot chose to d i s a b l e the GPWS. He d e f i n e s a
fourth layer, to d e p i c t t h e effects of l i n e management on the
production system, This i n c l u d e s t h e role of f i r s t - l i n e
supervision, where crew are scheduled, a i r c r a f t dispatched,
t r a i n i n g conducted, e t c . And f i n a l l y , Rsason includes a l a y e r
representing a31 senior decision-makers; those of the carrier,
t h e manufacturer, the regulator, and the unions, Reason notes
that these decision-makers f r e q u e n t l y make " f a l l i b l e " decisions.
Under a pawtf c u l a r set of circumstances, a window of opportunity
may be created for an occurrence. I f the defence8 work, we might
have a benign incident. If they fail, we may have a t r a g i c
accident.
As already mentioned,, traditionally in invas t i g a t f ons of a v i a t i o n
occurrences, we have focused on the unsafe acts and how the
d e f e n c e s may have f a i l e d . But if we are to make any s i g n i f i c a n t
impact on accident preventf on, we m u s t better examine t h e latent
f a i l u r e s in the system, as evidenced by t h e higher three l a y e r s
af Reason's model; i. e, t h e prs-conditions, l i n e management, and
decf si on-makers.
TO IDB- UrBM PAtLttRBS I?? ?WE flsFBB
* ASSWWTIONS
+ GOrnSB DBrnLOPMEIVT
+ OBJ~GTCYES
* OPTIONS
+ APPROACH
My a i m today is to demonstrate how the Transportation Safety

Board of Canada ( T S B ) i s t r a i n i n g its investfgators to i d e n t i f y
t h e l a t e n t failures in t h e transportation system; in other words,
to bettez understand the context in which humans erred -
so t h a t
preventive measures can be taken,
First, X w i l l b r i e f l y d i s c u s s some of our basic assumptions and
t h e course development process we w e n t through, o u t l i n e OUlr
training o b j e c t i v e s , review the options that we hab available to
us for t z a i n i n g and t h e approach we f i n a l l y s e t t l e d upon; then I
vLll g i v e you a preliminary i n d i c a t i o n of our i n i t i a l results,
and conclude by d i s c u s s i n g some of the remaining challenges ahead
fox us.
-CAZWRS HART KMLlX OF fRbCTICAt KKPERENCE
gXPElPrS LACE BREADTH OF PR4CTICAL W N C E
* XtWEFTCIENT EXPERIS FQR ROLTlNR IWESITISATTUNS
GENElWJSrS CAN COPE WlTEI RO- HP fSSUES
* H O U S E SPECMEW A v W 'PO IWJBlTGdMRS
AVbaalLE OPT DEMAND FOR NON-ROUTINE
In undertaking such a training program, we made several

assumptions, some of them explicitly and some of them i m p l i c i t l y .
Because a11 of our Snvestigatora have extensive operational
experience and are t r a i n e d as generalists in tho i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
a v i a t i o n occurrences, we believe t h a t they have a s i g n i f i c a n t
personal knowledge of t h e more common human factors through ebeir
daily work exposure. Although this knowledge i s seldom based on
their academic c r e d e n t i a l s , t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r s r practical
experience supports t h e i r broad appreciation o f t h e more common
phenomena. We f i n d that t h e more h i g h l y qualified subjeut matter
experts in human f a c t o r s have a profound knowledge of s p e c i f i c
phenomena, but o f t e n they Lack the broad practical experience
that o u r investigators possess. Moreover, given t h e incidence o f
human factors in v i r t u a l l y a l l investigations, there are
i n s u f f i c i e n t resources available to provide s p e c i a l i s t advice f o r
each and every investigation. Thsref ore, ju s t as our generalist
'investigator6 must address such diverse i s ~ u e sas meteorology,
aerodynamics, and engineering, we b e l i e v e t h a t our investigators
can cope w i t h r o u t i n e human factor ins ues. However, reoogni z i n g
t h a t they will frequently have ineuf f i c i e n t f o r ~ a tl r a i n i n g to
address particular issues, we, have a small staff of human
performance 6pecfaliste in-houes available on a consultancy basis
to a s s i s t o u r investigators. Furthermore, when investigating
human performance at the extremes of any normal distribution of
human behaviour, we can a l s o o b t a i n the consultant s e r v i c e s of
g r o f e s ~ i ~ n aexperts
l outside t h e organf aatf on.
TEACH CENERUISTS TO HEAP THEMSELVES
The concept t h a t w e followed in developing the t r a i n i n g pfogram

w a s t h a t w e would h e l p our generalist investigators discover how
they can h e l p themselves in i n v e s t i g a t i n g human performance
issues. We have no i n t e n t to t r y and develop the indivPdua1
i n v e s t i g a t o r s as pseudo-subject matter experts in human factors.
J u s t as we advocate a systems approach to investigation, we t r i e d

to follow a systems approach in t h e development of our course. We
began w i t h a formal assessment of o u r investigators' and
a n a l y s t s ' needs - across a l l modes of the TSB, W e then spent a
lot of t i m e c a r e f u l l y analyzing t h e t a s k s they are required to
perform in an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . We selected,the t r a i n i n g methods and
strategies that w o u l d b e g t facilitate our course members'
acquisition of t h e knowledge, s k i l l s , and a t t i t u a e s necessary 'to
complete these t a s k s in the field; and f i n a l l y , we must follow-up
w i t h an e v a l u a t i o n of the course i t s e l f and a v a l i d a t i o n of i t s
effectiveness over time, r e f i n i n g t h e course as necessary to meet
our i n v e s t i g a t o r s 1 needs.
JlISCUSS BASIC HP CONCEPTS
IDENTIFY EHP &EFICdEIVCfES
APPLY STANDARD METHODOLOGY
Having surveyed and anal ys sd our individual investigatorst needs,

we egtablirshsd f i v e broad Learning objectives. We decided that,
upon course completion, a l l investigators and safety analysts
s h o u l d be able to:
- Discuss the basic concepts of human performance that
frequently impact on transportation safety;
- I d e n t i f y human performance d e f i c i e n c i e s which miy
degrade t r a n s p o r t a t i o n safety;
- Apply a standard niethodology for t h e conduct of the
i n v e s t i g a t i o n and analysis of human performance i s s u e s ;
- Draw reasonable inferences from t h e i r investigations
and analysis for the findings, r e f l e c t i n g the
appropriate level of certainty;
- Record human performance data f o r macro a n a l y t i c a l
purpos es .
Of note, t h e s e objectives are w r i t t e n in performance-oriented
terms, We want our investigators to be a b l e t o 8~ s p e c i f i c
things as a result of this training.
CONTENT KT NEEDS
* OUX OF COUATRY
BUY C'USTOMXZFL, TRAINING

* T M h t CONSULTANT
* GXFENSTYB
DEVELOP OYN ITRAINING

IN-ROUSE EXPERTISG
Having established our learning objectives, we considered several

options for conducting t h e training.
I d e a l l y , we would buy the t r a i n i n g '*off the s h e l f n .
Unfortunately, l i t t l e comprehensive human factors t s a i ning at the
l e v e l of operational psrs annel i s currently being offered in
Canada. Further, of the human factors training programs
a v a i l a b l e to us outside of Canada, none are tailored to meet t h e
needs of t h e accident i nvsstigator. These courses tend to focus
on the knowledge-related aspects or t h e basic concepts of human
performance; but they do not address t h e s k i l l s needed of an
investigator.
Consideration was given to having a consultant develop a
cus t o d z ed t r a i n i n g program f o r us. Unf artunately, such
situations u s u a l l y involve spending a g r e a t deal of money to
t r a i n t h e consultants who w i l l then charge you a big fee to
deliver the service you trained them for.
F i n a l l y , w e considered developing an in-house training program
based on o u r own expertise. Although we have our awn
pa ychologis ts and many h i g h l y experienced investigators, we have
l e s s experience in d e s i g n i n g and d e l i v e r i n g ef f e c t i v a . t r a i n i n g
programs.
I n t h e end, w e compromised. With t h e professional s e r v i c e s of a
c o n s u l t a n t w e developed an in-house program. The c o n s u l t a n t we
r e t a i n e d has a good working knowledge of t h e a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y
and has e x t e n s i v e experience in designing and d e l i v e r i n g t r a i n i n g
programs - inclu&ing the cockpit resouroe management t r a i n i n g
program used by A i r Canada.
* MULTI-MODAL PROGRAM
WkTE UWODAL CASE STrmBS
ONE m K DURATION
+ Rl3SII)ENTIAL
PRE-COUWB PEEFARATION
* IN-HOUSE TRAINERS
AND FACEJTATOBS
LEARNING VS TEACHING ENVIRONMENT
Because we have responsibility for i n v e s t i g a t i n g occurrences

involving marine, rail, commodity p i p e l i n e and a v i a t i o n
occuxrencee, our training program is designed to be multi-modal
- catering to the needs of a l l of our investigators. However,
much of the syndicate or group work is based upon uni-modal case
s t u d i e s . For one week, the entire group lives and works
together, exchanging views and sharing t h e i r experience. There
is some pre-course preparation, reading s o m e of the basic
concepts that will be applied during t h e week, By and large, we
use f n-house t r a i n e r s , assisted by experienced invas ti gators
serving as facilitators for the delivery of the program. Their
job is more one of creating a learning environment than
d e l i v e r i n g lectures.
In its s i m p l e s t terms, the course can be viswaa as four blocks:
collect data, analyze data, record data, and w r i t e accident
report. Thus, we work through the sequence t h a t an i n v e s t i g a t o r
a c t u a l l y performs h i s duties. For each of these blocks, various
terms, models, and principles are discussed, and the tools and
t a s k s necessary f o r completing the i n v e s t i g a t i v e actions are
a p p l i ed.
Basic models such aa SHEL and REASON, and Rasmussent s Skills- ,
Rules - and Knowledge-bas eB approach to considering human errors
form t h e knowledge p o r t i o n of t h e curriculum. The i n v s s tigators
then develop s k i l l and practice in applying these c~nceptain
real situations, mimicking f i e l d behaviour in group a c t i v i t i e s .
Of prime importanue, they learn that Human Fsctuxs i n v e s t i g a t i o n
is not something that you add-on to a normal investigation.
Rather Human Factors considerations are an i n t e g r a l part of every
phase af the i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
The focus of our traininq efforts has been on t h e question 'what
will f do on Monday mordnglf? The possession of tieoretical
knowledge by t h e investigalora w i l l be of l i t t l e u s e if they l a c k
t h e s k i l l and confidenee-to apply these concepts in t h e i x daily
work.
Typically, we find that one week courses try to cram a lot of
information i n t o i n t e n s i v e lectuxee. Thus, a key strategic issue
for us was: how much learner involvement could we afford in a one
week course? With the volume of material to be covered,
i n t u i t i v e l y l i t t l e time could be spent in syndicate work*
However, t h e mare important question became how would we b e s t be
able to help our people perform back on t h e job? Since people
tend to r e t a i n 10% of what they read and 20 % of w h a t they hear
YEI. 9 0 % o f what they say and do, w e opted far h i g h Itsarner{group
involvement - even though it meant covering less content.
Therefore, much of t h e course is spent in syndicates, working on
practical c a s e s t u d i e s . To t h e extent practicable, we have t r i e d
to create situations where the course members can m i m i c t h e
bshavf o u r required in actual i n v e s t f gations in an a d u l t learning
environment. We promote continuous personal f nvalvement in t h e
l e a r n i n g process, and we try to create a climate where the course
members enjoy t h e process, believing that people tend to remember
best w h a t they had most fun doing.
With this approach, w e b e l i e v e t h a t our investigators will have
the confidence to apply t h e i r knowledge and newly practised
s k i l l s when they r e t u r n to t h e f i e l d .
DEMISTJFY B U W FACmRS
RESPECT hWBD FOR BP IMBSTICATIONS
VALUE ACT1 l%"Y AS WURTKKBILE
FTLWNC TO U S 6 AZL RESOURCES
K01PTKAAFED TO CONTINUE LEARlVING
In p u t t i n g t h e course tagsther, it became apparent t h a t in

a d d i t i o n to t h e five formal learning objectives which had been
ea tablis hsd, we must recognize a secondary agenda of attitudinal
objectives if the training is to be effective. For example, we
r e a l i z e d that many of our investigators see human factors as soma
k i n d of mystique. Therefore, we have t r i e d to demystify the
subject of human factors - putting academic concepts into
practical and workable terms, underatandable to the fiefd
investf gator.
For a number of reasons, many of our investigators have developed
a cynicism towards t h e practicaPity of human factors
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . For those, we must h e l p them develop a respect
f o r t h e fundamental need f o r emphasisfng this aspect of t h e i r
work, and to realize t h a t efforts expended on these o f t e n non-
material issues are worthwhile.
We discovered that many of o u r investigators are not aware of t h e
organizational resource6 available to h e l p them in t h e i r
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of human factors. Without academic credentials,
many felt they were not competent to address Human Factors
issues. Thus, during t h e txaining program, we a i m to develop
t h e i r knowledge and willingness to use a l l t h e resources '
a v a i l a b l e to them; f o r example, t h e services of our medical s t a f f

for physiological issues, our behaviourial s p e c i a l i s t s , our
engineering laboratory s t a f f f o r computer-based anthropornetric
modelling, our library services for literature searches, e t c .
Furthermore, recognizing the limitations of a one-week course, we
must s t r i v e to motivate O u r course members that t h e course is
just t h e beginning; hopefully, we will have provided them w i t h a
framework and t h e m o t i v a t i o n to f a c i l i t a t e continued learning
t h r o u g h t h e balance of t h e i r careers f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
human factors issues.
DIFFICULTY VS TIME
B U S E D TIME --
Our consultant brought to our a t t e n t i o n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s in
s u c c e s s f u l l y implementing a human factors t r a i n i n g program such
as we envisaged, As i n d i c a t e d earlier, it is not simply a matter
of imparting knowlsdge; t h a t fs relatively simple in tarma, of t h e
t i m e required and the d i f ff c u l t y value. Developing s k i l l s to
apply these concepts and p r i n c i p l e s in a practf c a l and credf b l e
way is a much more d i f f i c u l t t a s k taking greater t i m e . B u t if
our individual course members harbour negatfve>or cynical
attitudes towards human factors, we have an even greater
challenge in terms of d i f f i c u l t y and the t i m e required to effect
the necessary a t t i t u d i n a l change. F i n a l l y , no matter how
s u c c e s s f u l we are in developing our s t a f f for the i n v e s t i g a t i o n
and analysis of human factors issues, a l l w i l l be f o r naught,
unless there is a fundamental organizational acceptance of the
methodology and importance of this kind of work. S s n i o t
management and the Board i t s e l f can create an organizational
culture which is contrary to successful. application of the basic
prfncf p l e s learned during t h f s training.
We must ensure that our overall organizational climate or
corporate culture fosters building on the training. During the
course, it was clear t h a t t h e investigators had formed personal
goals and commitments f o r t h e application of t h e i r knowledge,
s k i l l s and attf tudes towards lnves t i g a t f ng human factors. To t h e
extant that they receive p o s i t i v e feedback and are given an
opportunity to practice and refine t h e i r s k f l k s , we will receive
tangible benefits.
ERODING TRAINING
COMMIrnEMT k
--------------
However, if t h e real-world work environment gives them negative

feedback, denies them the opportunity to practice and develop
what they have learned, there w i l l be unlearning w i t h poor .
i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e s u l t s . Thesef o r e , management may have to modify
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c u l t u r e to encourage our i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n the
application of these s k i l l s .
Time w i l l t e l l how suc~essfulwe are w i t h respect to these
attitudinal and organizational changes. S u f f i c e it to s a y that
we are workfng,from both ends of the equation to a c h i e v e these
changes.
d-4 GGRADUATES(agprox, 33%)= CRITICAL MASS

HIGHLY F'osm PEEDBACX
NET MOB = HEW WAY OF LOOEING AT TH[NGS
GROUP PRACTICE = ram COrnrnCE
OPTYMSM POR WBOVED ACCIDENT PNREMTlON
To date we have delivered t w o offerings of the course. 4 4 course

members or approximately one t h i r d of our i n v e s t i g a t i v e and
a n a l y t i c a l s t a f f have received t h i s t r a i n i n g . They consti tuts an
important c r i t i c a l mass in terms of developing organizational
momentum f o r a p p l y i n g this t r a i n i n g .
As in many t r a i n i n g programs, we d a i l y seek feedback
from the
course members to evaluate our success in delivering t h e program.
Feedback to date has been extremely p o s i t i v e . Aceoxding to the
course members, we have given them a new way of looking at t h e
things they have been confronted w i t h through the years.
Practising these methods in uni-modal c a s e s t u d i e s has given them
a n e w confidence to approach t h e i r d a i l y work.
However, our r e a l success w i l l not be known for several months
u n t i l we begin to v a l i d a t e the effectiveness of t h e t r a i n i n g by
going back to ctux course members and their supervisors in the
f i e l d to examine t h e effectiveness of the t r a i n i n g . A t that
t i m e , w e will re-assess the entire loop.
But, b a s e d on our e a r l y feedback, we have considerable optimism
that there w i l l be a g a f e t y d i v i d e n d i n terms of a c c i d e n t
prevention.
CQ- MYlWAnQN AND S W D m -

* 3 W F K m RESOURCES POR M-DEPTH lNWSPIOATl[lNS
+ BOARD & tNDVST#Y ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS
BETTER IDENTIFICATION OF SMElY DlZTCX&PICES
m C E 3 l ACCIDENT FRETENTION
'F O ~ - V P7?ummG
As Confueius said " A journey of a thousand miles begins w i t h the

f i r s t stepw. We have o n l y j u s t begun. We must complete t h i s
i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g program, modf fyi ng it a s necessary -
based upon
t h e experience of o u r first course offerings. For those who have
completed t h e initial training, we must imp1 ement an extension
program to ensure t h e i r continued motivation and s k i 1 1
development. We must ensure t h a t our investigators do have
s u f f i c i e n t resources to draw upon for the conduct of the
f i e l d investf gations of a l l p e r t i n e n t human performance issues.
Both internally w i t h our organization and oxternally in industry,
we have a s i g n i f i c a n t challenge in terms of c r e d i b l y
communicating t h e results of our human performance investigations
fn a way t h a t will be accepted. If we do a l l of the foregoing
well, our s a f e t y analysts should have better information
a v a i l a b l e to them f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the s a f e t y
d e f i c i e n c i e s i nhsrent in t h e a v i a t i o n system, thereby
facilitating enhanced accident prevention. A t no p o i n t w i l l we
be able to rest on our laurels; there w i l l always be a
requirement for furthax follow-up t r a i n i n g .
DEWLOPING HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS
HUMAN FACTORS TOPICS IN CANADIAN

PRIVATE PILOT TRAmNG
Arlo Speer
Transport Canada
Ottawa, Canada
In the discussion which follows, human factors training for Canadian private pilots will
be viewed from three perspectives: (1) work currently under way to introduce human factors
topics into Canadian private pilot training programmes, (2) what we perceive as the need for
further reseaxch into human factors training for pilots, and (3) the need to plan human factors
programmes geared to the needs of beginning and recreational piIots. I present what we do,
what we think and what we hope for not from a desire to have others copy our experience.
Rather, it i s my desire that sharing our experience and our ideas might allow us to join with
other aviators and other aviation administrations and reap a synergistic benefit that can make us
all stronger.
CURRENT CANADIAN PRACTICE
Initially, I would like to share some of the initiatives to introduce human facto s training
into the Canadian private pilot syllabus. Sparked by the rscent position taken by ICAO, Canada
has introdumd the requirement for human factors training, including pilot decision-making, as
a mandatory part of our private pilot curriculum. The human factors component is largely
theory based and is primarily associated with the licence's Knowledge requirement. It was
considered essential to introduce a knowIedge requirement for two reasons. Tfie first was one
of practicality; basic reference materials were readily available to guide instructors. The second
reason was a pedagogical one;.we felt that before we could address human factors skills to any
great extent, we would need to ensure a firm knowledge base on which to build. ,
Transport Canada has also published Pilot Decision-Makinp-Manud for Private Pilot
Training. Ideas, procedures and points of theory were consolidated from many sources. The
end result has proven to be a readable manual that is usable by lay instructors and students alike.
This fourteen-page manual was developed with three thoughts in mind. We wanted to improve
flight safety by helping pilots make better, safer decisions. We dm wanted to provide a
common decision-making process around which instructors could model their teaching. Most
important, we saw the need to bridge the gap between instructors (who were charged with
providing their students with practical human factors information) and theoreticians and
researchers (who, in many cases, provided excellent information but used a format that was less
than "user friendly").
The manual suggest ways in which instructors can apply the decision-making process and
concepts to the myriad of decisions, large and small, that make up the routine of every flight.
Instructors are cautioned against making flight decisions for their students. Rather, instructors
are encouraged to lead students through the decision-making process and to involve students in
all of the decisions that must be made. Briefly, the manual provides a decision-making cycle
that involves (1) recognition of a situation involving some element of risk, (2) identification of
available options, (3) choosing the most favourable of options, (4) acting on that choice, and (5)
evaluating the outcome.
Fortunately, the need for drastic and spectacular decisions comes infrequently, especially
in most training flights. At the same time, each flight is filled with the opportunity to make
many, many decisions. Which runway should we use? Where should we park to do our pre
take-off checks? What take-off or landing technique is most appropriate? At what altitude
should we fly? Should we refuel before this flight? What should we do if the ground station
does not respond to our radio call? Should we fly if we cannot locate a particular &craft
document? These decisions may appear trivial, but they provide a wealth of opportunities to
apply the decision-making process. Instructors are reminded of these opportunities and
encouraged use them to guide students through the five step process.
Successful instructors tell us that a student learns best when the student flies the aircraft
and less well when the instructor does all the flying. Instructors know that they have to let their
students fly a lot and we encourage instructors to let their students decide a lot, too. In the same
way that learning to fly a manoeuvre requires a sound description of the manoeuvre, a good
demonstration and then lots of opportunity to practise, learning to make decisions requires a
sound description of the decision-making process, a good demonstration and then lots of
opportunity to practise making decisions. The approach suggested in our manual is a simple
one: take advantage of the little decisions that occur naturally as part of each flight.
Demonstrate how the decision-making process is applied and then give students as many
opportunities as possible to make decisions for themselves. Just as for flight manoeuvres, initial
attempts are watched very closely by the instructor to ensure that errors are not made. As
student ability increases, the student is afforded greater autonomy.
In most schools, Human factors training is limited to training in medical facts and
decision-making. For many years Canadian Colleges offering aviation programmes and some
of the larger flight schools have introduced more extensive human factors programmes into their
pilot training. Additional topics include the influence of stress, the identification of stressors,
situational awareness, successful risk management, personality and others. Because of the
opportunities for expanded academic programmes at colleges, many of these human factors
courses take the form of full year college course equivalents. These human factors programmes
provide much-needed training and cover the human factors in a depth which parallels that of
many of the fine current books available on the topic.
We recognize that before human factors topics can be effectively introduced into pilot
training programmes, instructors must be prepared to offer that instruction. Within the past
year, the requirement to present human factors topics has been included as one of the
qualifications for an Instructor Ratings. The pre-service training for new instructors now
includes training in the presentation of human factors topics including pilot decision-making.
Candidates attempting both initial and renewal Instructor Rating flight tests in Canada may, at
the discretion of the examiner, be. asked to demonstrate their ability to present pilot decision-
making concepts.
Aside from pre-service training, we also devote our attention to the in-service training
of practising instructors. Transport Canada sponsors an annual programme of Instructor
Refresher Courses. Each year, 129 instructors are selected from a large number of applicants.
These instructors attend one of six one-week refresher courses held in locations across Canada.
Among other items, human factors and pilot decision-making are included in the topics
discussed. At these courses, emphasis is shared between providing the instructors with human
factors knowledge and providing suggestions about effective methods of teaching human factors
topics.
In addition to instructors, flight test examiners are also given in-service training. All
examiners who conduct flight tests for the issue of private or Commercial Pilot Licences or
Multi-Engine Class Ratings are required to attend a workshop every second year. Like the
Instructor Refresher Courses, these workshops include discussions of pilot decision-making
concepts. The human factors content is intended, in part, to improve the human factors
awareness and skills of the examiners. In addition, the examiners discuss ways they can
integrate decision-making activities into their assessment of required flight test exercises.
What we have done in Canada is a start. Despite a very broad understanding of "human
factors", the current Canadian emphasis thus far has been on pilot decision-making. We have
published a decision-making manual. We require training in human factors including pilot
decision-making for those applying for a private pilot Licence or for the initial issue or renewal
of an Instructor Rating. We include training in human factors in Instructor Refresher Courses
and examiner workshops conducted or sponsored by Transport Canada. This should not be
taken to imply that we feel human factors training should be limited to decision-making. We
recognize the need for the development of materials to allow us to proceed with other human
factors. We have started, but we still have a long way to go.
RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
Much research has been completed into the area of human factors. We need to make
decisions about specifically which human factors should to be taught at what level. We then
need to ensure that instructors have the appropriate background training and to ensure that
appropriate things are being done at each level. This leads to the second perspective from which
I would like to view human factors training. There is a need for further investigation to identify
the level at which each aspect of human factors knowledge or skill is most appropriately taught.
The Transportation Development Centre, or TDC, is Transport Canada's central research

and development facility. TDC has been tasked with human factors research on our behalf.
TDC has been asked to identify various human factors that apply to each level of pilot licence
from private to commercial to airline transport pilot. Certainly, there are many factors that
243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/~up~yn~1p A-101
apply to all pilots regardless of the level of licence or experience, but it is reasonable to assume
that some factors apply more to operations in multi-crew, airline situations while other factors
apply more to operations in light aircraft operating with a single pilot. Commercial flight
operations involve certain risks and stresses unique to the commercial nature of the operation.
We must recognize that personal and recreational operations are not immune from their own
risks and stresses. We must also devote attention to identification of the special Human Factor
needs of private and recreational pilots.
TDC has also been charged with investigating ways in which pilots learn to master human
factors knowledge and skill. It seems unreasonable to suggest that those teaching methods which
have proven successful in fostering physical pilot skills will be the same methods best suited to
mastery of many human factors concepts. It is our assumption that no one teaching technique
can provide optimum success in all areas. We wish to identify how the instructors can best
teach each of the aspects of human factors. As well, teaching and learning activities must be
accompanied by proper resources to support learning. TDC has also been tasked to identify the
resources and activities that are available. We have also asked TDC to offer suggestions on the
additional resources that can supplement what is presently available.
Aside from questions of teaching human factors, we need to address the question of
evaluation. When new points of knowledge or skill are added to a curriculum, the question of
assessment of student performance must arise. Currently, formal testing of human factors is
limited to evaluating human factors knowledge using multiple choice written examinations. In
recent years, human factors has received increased emphasis in our written examinations. Not
only is the depth of human factors knowledge increasing, but more and more of our
examinations are including human factors as an .area for testing. Written examinations for
private and Commercial Pilot Licences have for some time included questions on human
physiology, psychology and decision-making. Similar topics are soon to be included in
examinations required for other licences and ratings including flight instructor ratings.
Canada does not flight test human factors skills as such. While we do not test decision-
making skill directly, we do encourage flight test examiners to incorporate decision-making
activities into the assessment of the various exercises that make up our flight tests. For example,
the flight tests for both the private and commercial aeroplane licences require the candidate to
demonstrate the ability to complete take-offs and landings in non-normal situations. Examiners
refrain from asking the candidate directly to demonstrate a short field take off clearing an
obstacle and taking into account the crosswind from the right. Instead, examiners either place
the candidate in a situation with readily available information or they describe as clearly as
possible the situation. The candidate is then expected to collect the necessary information and
make appropriate decisions. Assessment of performance is based on physical piloting skills, on
the quality of information analysis and results of decisions made.
We need to determine the extent to which learning in human factors areas can properly
be evaluated. We need to determine whether it is appropriate to measure performance in all
areas of human factors knowledge and skill. For those areas where measurement is appropriate,
we must identify strategies for assessment. Additional research is needed to determine if our
current practice of testing human factors knowledge but not skill is correct.
A-IG2 243-AN/146 -
Circular/Circulaire/L(up~yn~~p
NEEDS OF PRIVATE AND RECREATIONAL PILOTS
I have briefly outlined some of the steps Canada has taken to introduce human factors
training into the private pilot programme. I have also expressed our desire for further research
to supplement what has been done already. The third perspective from which I wish to view
human factors training is related to the importance of human factors training in the initial
development of a pilot. Instruction given to private pilots is fundamental to future pilot
performance. While human factors training is becoming an integral part of in-service training
of pilots at senior levels, steps must also be taken to ensure that human factors training is
included in pre-service training for those working toward their very first pilot licence. It would
be easy for one to form the impression from current literature and practice that human factors
training is limited to training for the Airline Transport Pilot Licence and for currently employed
airline pilots. This situation must be changed. Human factors training must also become an
integral part of private pilot Training.
In Canada, we are fortunate to enjoy the opportunity for extensive recreational flying.
Flight safety research reveals that accidents involving recreational pilots can be linked to the
knowledge-skill interaction-the human factor. We must not forget the needs of the recreational
pilot. Without reducing efforts directed toward commercial aviation, we must dedicate ourselves
to identifying those aspects of human factors that are applicable to the private pilot. It is not
reasonable to expect human factors knowledge to filter down from the more senior licences.
Training in Cockpit Resource Management and Crew Coordination is essential for a

certain segment of the pilot population. Considerable publicity has been generated around
successful programmes that have been developed and implemented to meet this particular need.
It is now time to accept the need for similar effort to be directed toward identification of human
factors topics appropriate for the beginning and recreational pilot. Simply assuming that
whatever human factors component is needed can be picked up with future training at a more
advanced level does a disservice to human factors as an area of study. More importantly, it does
a disservice to those pilots whose formal training ends with a private pilot Licence. We must
ensure that human factors skills (and not just decision-making) form a part of the training given
to pilots from their very first lesson. In this way those pilots embarking on a career will have
a foundation on which further, training can be based. At the same time, those pilots wishing a
licence for purely recreational purposes will benefit as well.
THE FUTURE
In Canada, we have made a start in the area of human factors training for private pilots.
For us to continue, I ask for two commitments. First of all, a commitment from the research
community to further investigate the human factors issue to: (1) identify the multitude of human
factors that should be taught to pilots, and determine the licensing level most appropriate to each
factor, (2) suggest teaching procedures best suited to presenting human factors topics and (3)
comment on the question of evaluation of human factors skills.
The second commitment I ask is from the aviation community as a whole. We need a
commitment to provide a human factors emphasis at the level of private pilot training that is at
least equivalent to the emphasis currently given at more senior levels of the aviation industry.
Certainly, it is crucial to continue work in areas such as Cockpit Resource Management, Crew
Coordination and other areas relating to the operation of complex, multi-crew aircraft. At the
same time, we must recognize that it is equally crucial to provide appropriately selected human
factors training to those entering aviation. We must not forget that private pilot training is the
foundation upon which all future aviation training rests. We also must not lose sight of the fact
that, in Canada and other nations, a significant number of pilots obtain a licence for non-
commercial purposes. These pilots deserve the opportunity to benefit from human factors
training geared to their particular type of operation even if they choose to end their formal
aviation training with a private pilot Licence.
Those who work actively at the heart of aviation rely on the research community to
investigate better and different ways to address the many human factors questions. Front line
practitioners rarely have the time or the opportunities to investigate complex issues to the degree
necessary to break new ground. In Canada, we have taken a few small steps in recent years.
We have introduced, as best we currently know how, some aspects of human factors training
into pilot training at all levels. We recognize the need for further information to help us answer
questions like: "What kinds of human factors information should we pass on to those training
for a private pilot Licence?", "Are there more effective and efficient ways to help our students
master human factors concepts?" and "Can we evaluate mastery of all human factors concepts
and if so, how should we be attempting to complete the evaluation?"
If you feel that our Canadian experience can offer assistance or guidance to your
particular application, I invite you to copy, modify or otherwise follow what we have done. I
will happily provide more specific information to any members upon request. For those of you
who have already exceeded our work, I would be most pleased to hear of your experiences in
hopes that we can supplement our work based on your accomplishments. For those of you with
technical knowledge and research experience and abilities, I urge you to consider our suggestions
for areas of further research.
Just as I know that pilot training is today very different from what existed earlier in this
century, it is my hope and my belief that as we move into the next century, we will see gigantic
strides and new directions for human factors training. To do so will take more than the efforts
of individuals and nations. It will take the combined and cooperative effort, skill and knowledge
sf literally a world full of specialists to maximize our results. It is through gatherings such as
this that we can share ideas and plans. I look forward to the development and growth that I am
sure will come.
A:10! 243-AN/146
Circular/Circuhire/~up~yn~~p
ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Symposium
Washington USA April 13-1 6 , 1993
..............................................
Human Aspects Development (HAD)

-The Swissair Traininq Syllabus : by Dr. B. Sc.har (SWITZERLAND)
1 . Introduction
Since January 1 of this year, Swissair has been conducting a

two-day course devoted to Human Aspects Development for Line
Pilots and Flight Engineers on a near-weekly basis. The course is
held in a charming yet modern hotel in a picturesque village not
far from Zurich. Away from the hustle and bustle of the airport,
the building and its surroundings are a stimulating setting in
which to promote-the interpersonal aspects of being a cockpit
crew member.
With few exceptions, the course managers and trainers are

themselves active line pilots who have volunteered for this
activity. They have all passed an assessment and completed
special training.
Half of Swissair's 1,100 pilots will attend the course in 1993.

The other half will undergo a standard route check in an
aircraft. Next year the two sides will switch. By the end of 1994
al1,pilots will have taken a HAD course and a route check, both
of which are compulsory prerequisites to obtain Proficiency
standing. Furthermore the element "human factor" is part of the
Standard of Performance as set down in the Flight Operations
Manual (FOM).
The theme of the 1993194 HAD course is Communication. The highly

practical and interactive approach requires that participants
become truly involved. They cannot remain passive. Through the
activities in the course participants gain the skills necessary
to communicate effectively, good communication being an element
of optimum Cockpit Resource Management (CRM).
243-AN//&
Circular/Circulaire~up~/~stp A-105
The introduction of these HAD Courses marks a bold step forward.
In addition to checks and refreshers, which take place either in
t h e cockpit of an aircraft or in a flight simulator, tkie
development of human s k ' i l l s takes p l a c e in a less technological
setting.
On t h e basis of our f i r s t three months' experience, we regard t h e

HAD Courses as a success. Response has been thoroughly positive,
Participant feedback indicates that t h e courses have had a
positive effect an their skills and conduct and have made a
discernible contribution to enhancing flight safety. Further
indications show that close communication between participants,
trainers and management pilots has a clearly positive effect on
corporate spirit.
This brief review of the HAD course for line pilots serves as an
Introduction to the theme of HAD -
The Swissair Training
Syllabus .
What is the basis of this syllabus? What does it i n c l u d e ?
What is Swissair's rationale for the program? What approach do we
take?
The folLowing explanation-s w i l l provide answers to those

questions:
2. Swissair Positioning
Fundamentals of Swissair pilot training
~ w i s s a i rs' positioning is a determining factor in a l l t r a i n i n g

and advanced training activities for f l y i n g personnel, including
HAD. Without well-directed training, we cannot hope to meet t h e
challenges ahead.
Three main features identify Swissair's positioning, each

relating to particular qualities:
- we aim to transport our passengers as s a f e l y as possible
- we aim to o f f e r o u r passengers maximum reliability

A-106 243-AhVI46
Circ~iar/Circulaire/Uup~yn~p
- we aim to provide our passengers with individualised, t o p
quality service
When i t comes to flight safety, we make no compromise. Even if

that involves great e x p e n s e and on-going e f f o r t . This point
applies particularly in economically difficult periods, which i s
when saving in t h e wrong areas is particularly unwise.
F l i g h t t r a i n i n g at Swissair is based on five principles which

govern as well HAD. The first of these principles is the most
important. The o t h e r four a r e p l a c e d in no p a r t i c u l a r order but
are all dependent on the f i r s t principle.
The first principle:
Flight safety is We first p r i o r i t y of a l l t r a i n i n g activities.
Since flight safety as an overall probability is made up by t h e

multiplication of all probability elements in flying, no single
probability element can be allowed to tend toward zero.
Therefore considergtion must be given to all influential factors

pertaining to f l i g h t operations.
The consequence then is easily expressed. We should strive for

the highest possible level of quality in every aspect: namely,
- with regard to trainees and, by extension, s e l e c t i o n
- . with regard to trainers
- w i t h regard to t r a i n i n g equipment
As a consequence of this basic principle, HAD is indispensable:
The point is that it is no use having a i r c r a f t and c o c k p i t crews

which achieve t h e highest possible qtandards o f technological and
aviation capabilities, i f t h e crew's interpersonal skills and
conduct jeopardise flight safety.
The second principle i s :
retain control over training
T h i s does not mean that Swissair intends to do everything itself.

The principle allows f o r cooperation and delegation of t a s k s . But
it does mean that Swissair intends to retain control of content,
procedures and results of any training.
Consequently, Swissair must, f o r t h e decisive t a s k s , have i t s own

trainers, own t r a i n i n g material and its own t e c h n i c a l resources.
From Swissair's point of view, purchasing training services

completely from outside sources would n o t be in keeping with t h e
high standards of quality stipulated in our airline's positioning
concept.
AS a component of training, HAD is a far more delicate matter

than the technical side of training. There is a strong likelihobd
t h a t pilots will reject any pointless unsuitable training
activities related to human a s p e c t s . Such misguided activities
would ultimately do more harm than good, simply failing to
advance the cause of flight s a f 8 t y . As.we see it, this is t h e
main reason why the introduction of practical programs has been
so difficult worldwide.
Therefore, the second principle has the following implications

for HAD :
- Experiences drawn from international practice and knowledge

drawn from worldwide research axe valuable. A s such, they
are i n t e g r a t e d into Swissair training.
- Support and i n p u t from external experts is valuable and

should be encouraged.
- HAD -- as a process and as training --

is a task that
should be handled for the most part in-house, using in-house
instructors. ~urther,HAD m u s t be b r o a d l y s u p p o r t e d and
clearly endorsed b y top management of t h e company.
The third principle states:
Flight training musk "be consistently geared toward practical

aspects and the realities of the market.
In particular:
- A 1 1 forms Q£ training (basic, advanced, r e c u r r e n t ) must be
geared toward t h e practical aspects of aviation.
Consequently, active line p i l o t s should be assigned on a
secondary basis to participate as instructors in t h e
training program.
- Wherever possible, training f o r c o c k p i t and cabin crews
should be carried out j o i n t l y .
- Pilots t o o must be willing to perform specific customer
service d u t i e s . Without khat willingness, a pilot is ill
suited to fly a passenger aircraft. Technical and aviation
s k i l l s are, of course, essential but n o t enough on t h e i r
own.
From the o r i e n t a t i o n toward r ~ a lflying operations follows:

- Social and interpersonal skills must be t a u g h t a s more than
theory. HAD must be geared as much as possible to practical
applications. All participants should be able to apply in
practice evexything t h e y l e a r n and be able to r e g i s t e r
progress in their daily work.
- Trainers should be practice-oriented, w i t h a recognisable
f l a i r and aptitude f o r instructfan, and properly prepared
f o r t h e difficult task ahead. In o t h e r words, t h e p r i n c i p l e
here is t h a t HAD should be conveyed primarily from pilot to
pilot, with o u t s i d e specialists taking a supporting role.
That approach minimises pilot rejection.
The fourth p r i n c i p l e states:
A l l training activities should ensure that a suitable balance is

maintained between technical/economical and interpersonal
requirements.
Because of t h e nature of t h e , e x e r c i s e , a clash of objectives may
arise t h a t s e t s the pilots' own expectations and goals in
conflict w i t h t h e technical conditions and economic forces on t h e
company. Resolving this polarity may,not be e a s y , particularly
during periods OE economic d i f f i c u l t y .
Nevertheless, an acceptable balance m u s t be found that can be

implemented by a l l those i n v o l v e d . Failure to do so may
jeopardise the entire project. Management and trainers are
challenged to c o n s t a n t l y seek a workable s o l u t i o n .
HAD makes an important contribution to this balance in t h a t it

has a positive influence on corporate spirit and a l l forms of
interpersonal relationships, Further, this principle contributes
to making technicall and noa-technical t r a i n i n g a holistic entity,
w i t h the long-range goal being integration of the two.
The fifth and f i n a l p r i n c i p l e states:
Flight training must be efficient and effective.
This principle requires:

- The stated objectives and abilities are to be achieved w i t h
minimum of personnel and material resources
(economy-of-effort principle).
- Flight training must be reviewed regularly to enbure that
training f a appropriate. The question is: Do we train the
sight things and * t h e procedures a r e t h e y adequate?
With regard t o HAD, t h e following consequences apply:

- We determine what we want t o teach and what we want to
achieve. We endeavour to do ,so according to t h e principle of
economy-of-effort.
- we constantly review whether our content and procedures are
appropriate, makfng use of international contacts and -
experiences in t h e process. But feedback from those involved

is also important. A f t e r all, HAD musk prove effective in
the cockpit and must also have a beneficial e f f e c t f o r
passengers.
A-110 243-AN/]46
Circular/Ci~culai~uprcyn~1p
3. ~wissair's HAD Concept
The Swissair HAD concept approved'in 1991 pursues a central

goal :
Special training, known as HAD, should complement existing
training, which to date h a s been geared rather toward t h e
operationalltechnical aspects of flying. It should
contribute toward maintaining and/or improving flight safety
to the highest possible level.
Further, HAD should foster all aspects of interpersonal
dealings of the cockpit crew in t h e performance of their
daily work in the a i r c r a f t and within the company in
general.
This concept consists of t h r e e main elements:

1. HAD Schweizerische ~uftverkehrsschulelSLS (Swiss Civil
Aviation school): basic HAD training during the 18-month ab
initio training as line pilot
2. HAD instructors "Train t h e Trainer ~rogram"for a l l
instructors involved in training flight personell. The
t r a i n e r s serve as examples and conveyors of information for
the t r a i n e e s - If they are inadequate i n terms of "human
aspects", i.e. if t h e r e is a gap between expectations and
reality, then the entire HAD training is doomed to f a i l u r e
from t h e start.
3. HAD f o r line p i l o t s : t h e focus here is on advanced HAD
. training, i . e . on t h e f o s t e r i n g of "human skills" as a pilot
i n t h e cockpit, as a team member in t h e aircraft, and as a
colleague w i t h i n the company. This advanced training should
be an ongoing care&--long process, j u s t l i k e checks and
refreshers in t h e a i r c r a f t and flight simulator,
The HAD Concept is based on t h e following considerations:
- HAD is supported by corporate commitment as a n essential

element of training at t h e h i g h e s t level.
- HAD is an integrated component of flight training and n o t
an artificial appendage. Human skills and t e c h n ' i c a l skills
m u s t complement each other as a cohesive whole.
- HAD means lifelong learning and f u r t h e r development. T h e
a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge and abilities cannot be l e q r n e d on a
one-shot basis. Real progress can o n l y be made through
repeated effort to foster non-technical skills.
- A commitment to t h e need for HAD means t h a t the human
aspects be g i v e n greater weighting in recruiting and
qualification than thus f a r has been t h e case. A pilot
.trainee or a *fully-trained pilot who later proves inadequate
in terms of human aspects must, i f we are to be consistent,
be dismissed, even if he is a brilliant pilot from a pure
t e c h n i c a l p o i n t of view.
- Responsibilities are t o be r e g u l a t e d in precisely the same
way as applies to other aspects of f l i g h t t r a i n i n g . But
because of the highly interlocking nature of human aspects,
t h e f i e l d s of Flight Operations, F l i g h t Safety, and Flight
Train'ing must work much more.closelp together than they have
in the past.
- HAD training is new and complex. So resistance and
skepticism are quite n a t u r a l . It is essential that
participants come to display a high degree of acceptance.
Therefore, the best approach is to be pragmatic and
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. A h i g h l e v e l of
applicability is essential, with the emphasis to be placed
on suitable practitioners r a t h e r than external specialists.
- HAD t r a i n i n g must be in line with international standards,
recommendations and experience. In particular, such training
must satisfy t h e regulations of I C A O and J A A , thereby '
ensuring international standardisation.
Responsibilities for HAD t r a i n i n g , a k e y factor in ensuring t h a t

the o b j e . t f v e s are reached, are regulated as follsws:
- The Vice President Flight ~ e r v i c e s(Division 0) issues the

mandate to conduct HAD training, based on t h e concept as
outlined.
- The Head of Flight Crew Recruiting and Training (OT)
controls the HAD t r a i n i n g program.
A Steering Group, which consists of the Head of Cockpit
Crews (OC), the Head O f Flight S a f e t y ( O Q ) and t h e Head of
Training (OT) supervises t h e program.
- The Head of HAD Training (OTE) is i n charge o f t h e
specialist unit for HAD, which makes i t s services a v a i l a b l e
on a cross-divisional basis. The HAD u n i t counts
approximately 30 co-trainers who are all line-pilots
s p e c i a l l y selected and trained.
4. HAD Schweizerische ~uftverkebrsschule/SL~~{Swiss

Civil
Aviation school)
The Swiss C i v i l Aviation School trains candidates starting from

PPL in an 18-month training program.
The training program is d i v i d e d into t h r e e main sections:

- Advanced Training PPL, aircraft t y p e Piaggio 149
- Training for Commercial pilot ~ i c e n c e(CPbI with Instrument
Rating (IR), flight tsainer/simulators and aircraft types
Piper Seneca or Beech Baron
- Training f o r A i r l i n e Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL),
simulators and a i r c r a f t type P i p e r Cheyenne or Saab 3 4 0
upon completion of training, pilots then join Swissair a n d '
complete further training to become First ~ i f i c e r son the MD-80
or Fokker 100.
During their training at the Swiss C i v i l Aviation School, the

trainees attend a basic HRD course lasting .overall n i n e days,
which eorr@spands t o the standards set by t h e Eurapean ~ o i n t
Aviation Rules Flight Crew Liceneing (JAR FCL). This t r a i n i n g
serves as t h e foundation far a l l l a t e r HAD t r a i n l n g during the
pilot's entire career.
5 . HAD Instructors
The purpose of the HAD program for trainers:

Ta teach and develop t h e skills necessary to enable instructional
s t a f f at a l l levels to s e t an example'regarding human aspects to
all trainees. ~i;heirconduct should have'; %positive r n u l i t i p l i c a -
t i v e effect.
we a r e convinced t h a t trainers without adequate interpersonal
skills of their own c a n n o t be permitted to t e a c h traine'es.
~ n s t s u c t o s training is also geared toward t h e standards

e n v i s i o n e d by JAR FCL. Instructors a r e to acquire basic t r a i n i n g
as a foundation before being permitted to teach. Thereafter,
compulsory refresher courses are held at r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s .
~ e y o n dthat, advanced training is offered, which provides f u r t h e r
practical instruction.
6. HAD for L i n e Pilots
Motto f o r HAD Program f o r Line Pilots:
"TO t h e best level of safety, service and well-being t h r o u g h

development of human potential".
~ h ' i straining cons'ists of two main elements:
First:
t h e two-day HAD courses which a l l pilots attend every two years,
t h e course content being d i f f e r e n t each time. These courses are
cost-neutral in t h a t from 1993 onward they replace the previous
system of a n n u a l i n f l i g h t xoute checks (RCI. On a biannual basis
a ground-based HAD course can replace a costly line check in t h e
a i r . The somewhat shorter Ground S c h o o l Refresher ( G S R ) continues
to be held y e a r l y .
Second :
S p e c i a l HAD training for F i r s t officers (FIo), i . e . for young
pilots in t h e early stages of a career. T h e t r a i n i n g focuses on
"followership" and leadership, Crew performance, and
process-oriented interaction.
The basic outline of t h e HAD-courses is as follows:

- 40-50 two-daycourses p e r year , '
- Main trainer provided by t h e Flight Safety Department

- 2 co-trainers support and a s s i s t
- maximum 18 p i l o t s per course, inclusive one management pilot
A- I I4 Circular/Ciscuiaire/Uupw/~w
243-ANJ146
The main themes for t h e 1993/94 cycle is Communication. The f o c u s

here is on stimulating and fostering existing t a l e n t s and
improving communication skills. This process is designed to
fulfil the objective of having a positive i n f l u e n c e on p i l o t
conduct, attitude and interpersonal understanding. It goes
without saying that this in turn w i l l have a positive influence
on flight safety, thereby fulfilling the objective.
The content of the two-day course is consistently geared toward

interactive, practical application. This means that t h e ,
participants spend t h e two days communicating w i t h o n e a n o t h e r in

a real way, as they would while actually performing t h e i r d u t i e s ,
The emphasis is on practice, n o t theory. In other words,
participants gain experience in hands-on training in
cornrnuni&t ion.
7. Conclusion
What we do want:
Inadequate communication, unsatisfactory cooperation, lack of
mutual understanding, inadequate ability to solve problems in
difficult situations, poor system management, diminished
flexibility, poor cockpit/cabin cooperation, cockpit regarding
passengers as a nuisance.. .
Summary: flight safety and performance unsatisfactasy.
What we want:
E f f e c t i v e communication and cooperation, a positive relationship
based on mutual understanding and shared attitudes, clear
expectations, relfable and appropriate problem solving i f i a l l
situations, optimum system management, high degree of
flexibility, positive teamwork between cockpit and c a b i n crews,
cockpit regards passengers as partners and customers. .....
Summary: flight safety and performance satisfy h i g h e s t standards.
Also unwanted:
Over-emphasis on technical aspects, resulting in non-technical
aspects being n e g l e c t e d . such an approach poses serious r i s k s :
- flight s a f e t y stagnates or d e c l i n e s
243-AN/I46
Circular/Circulaird~up~n5tp A-115
- chances of maintaining market position are diminished

- corporate culture jeopardised
- chances of developing human potential impaired
~ l s o
unwanted:
over-emphasis on non-technical aspects, resulting in t e c h n i c a l
aspects being neglected. Such an approach poses the same r i s k s as
referred to above.
we strive to establish an optimum balance between t h e t w o . We a r e
convinced that :
- by doing our utmost to a t t a i n the h i g h e s t possible standard of
quality with regard to technical aspects of flight operations
and training,
- by effectively i n c o ~ p o r a t ~ nnon-technical
g aspects, i.e:
"human" a s p e c t s ,
w e then l i v e up to our responsibility to our passengers, in t h a t
we offer them the highest possible level of flight safety,
thereby earning their t r u s t ,
At Swissair, we are convinced that our HAD Program:

- fosters flight safety
- develops in a positive way interpersonal skills and many o t h e r
professional attributes of our cockpit crews
- thereby contributing to t h e well-being o f a l l involved
- influencing corporate culture in a positive way
- enhancing the quality of o u r service and cost-benefit ratio.
In doing so, we are a c t i n g in the interests of our passengers,
o u r own company, and c i v i l aviation.
----------
MAINTAINING OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF
HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING
Operational Tntegri ty
Oprational Integrity
Operational Integrity is a term that embraces the six imperatives of every flight crew. To assure'
that the flight is operated safely; the aircraft and resources are used efficiently; the flight
complies with the established schedule; that passengers are provided with the most camfortable
flight possible; the flight i s operated in accordance with applicable government regulations; and
mat the flight is operated in accordance with company operating policies (often called operations
specifications).
OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
SAFETY OPS SPECS
EFFICIENCY SCHEDULE
* REGULATIONS COMFORT
I
I
CREW PERFORHANCE CREW PERFORMANCE
TECHNICAL 1- HUMAN FACTORS ]

Operational Integrity is the responsibility of every flight crew.
THE COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY
The performance of a flight crew to achieve Operational Integrity has two compments.
The technical component of crew performance includes knowledge and skills relating to aircraft
systems; normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures; ATC procedures; instrument
flight procedures; navigation and charts.
This area is well documented, thoroughly trained and rigorously checked. In fact, the airline
industry is quite accomplished in the technical component of crew performance.
243-AM46
Circular/Circulair~up~ynsp A-125
The human factors component of crew performance includes a body of non-technical knowledge
and skills that influence the technical performance of flight crews. Co~nmunicationsskills; team
building; the exercise of command and use of leadership; decision making; management of
resources, workload and stress are among the subjects relating to this area.
Today, the airline industry is only just beginning to address the requirements of the human
factors component of crew performance. It is poorly documented, rarely trained and almost
never checked.
TECHNICAL VERSUS HUMAN FACTORS INFLUENCE IN ACCIDENTS
It is revealing to note that only 30% of crew caused accidents result from technical crew
performance failure. However, 70% of crew caused accidents are the result of human factors
crew performance failure,
OPERATIOMAL INTEGRITY
EFFICIENCY,
REGULATIONS
CREW PERFORMANCE
+ 30%
TECHNICAL
OF ACCIDENTS
Success achieved in the area of technical crew perfor~nancemust be repeated in the area of
human. factors crew performance if we are to improve system safety.
This requires a different view of old issues. As an industry, perhaps even as a society, wehave
grown to expect technical solutions to resolve our operating problems. Today however,
technical solutions are providing less and less margin of improvement while, at the same time,
becoming increasingly expensive.
An example of the application of technical solutio~lsto operating problems in the Iate 1960s and
early 1970s was the use of flight simulators. Simulators all but eliminated the risk of accidents
during training flights within the airline industry. And because simulators provided an effective
tool for better pilot training, still more irnprove~nenti n the line safety record was realized.
In the 1980s, the introduction of ground proximity warning systems helped improve the accident
record by reducing controlled flight into terrain errors. As effective as these systems were, and
continue to be, they did not have as much impact as the broad use of simulation.
TCAS, terminal collision avoidance systems, today are another example of technical solutions
applied to operational problems. TCAS is a valuabIe resource and a welcomed addition to the
cockpit that will help reduce the risk of midair conflicts. However, does the cost justify the
benefit? When was the last midair collision involving a11 airliner? Many cannot even remember
that it was in 1989 in the Los Angeles area when an AeroMexico MD-80 collided with a light
singIe engine aircraft over Cerritos, California.
Is TCAS worth it? Probably yes. But it is an example of increasingly expensive technical
solutions applied to operational problems that yield a declining measurable benefit to system
safety.
SOLZrrrONS TO BE FOUND IN.HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING OF CREWS
We must recognize that human solutions to operating problems will provide more benefit for less
investment than will technical ones. Flight crews require both technical and human factors
knowledge and skills if they are to be as effective as possible. Training in the non-technical
knowledge and skills normally referred to as Crew Resource Management (CRM) training wiII
influence the technical' performance of flight crews and provide an effective m a n s to improve
system safety.
Appendix
COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING

PROJECT OVERVIEW
c o c k p i t resource management training is designed to i n c r e a s e t h e safety

and efficiency w i t h which flight crews operate a i r c r a f t in scheduled
service. Because the operating environment at each a i r carrier is
different,.the best CRM program is one that is customized to meet the unique
requirement o f t h e airline.
Flightsafety recognized this and suggests t h e following process which can be
used to customize o u r basic two-day CRM workshop to your specific needs.
I Strateqv Meetinq
Flightsafety CRM experts meet with airline
representatrves to derine the airline's goals and
expectations f o r C W training. Flightsafety personnel
observe line flights from jump seat to develop better
understanding of airline operating environment. CRM
course outline defined; t a r g e t dates established.
I1 Facilitator Traininq
FlightSafety will assist t h e airline in selection of CRM
facilitators, Facilitator t r a i n i n g is then accomplished
in accordance w i t h a prescribed facilitator trainlng
plan.
111 Courseware Desisn and Materials Production
FlightSafety w i l l modify our b a s i c two-day CRM workshop
program to meet the requirements established during the
strategy meeting.
I n s t r u c t o r manuals, audio-visual materials and s t u d e n t
handouts and manuals will be produced f o x delivery to
the a i r l i n e .
IV Proaram Implementation and Courseware Revision
Flightsafety w i l l assist in implementation of the
Program at your a i r l i n e , supervise the first classes
by your facilitators and make a revision to the course
following the second workshop.
V L i n e check Airmen and Instructor P i l o t Traininq
--
FlightSafety will conduct a s p e c i a l two-day training
session for lid@ check a i m e n and instructor pilots
describing how they can implement CRM behaviors during
line training and checks.
VI Follow-on
FliahtSafetv will ~ r o v i d eadditional assistance and
supGort, asarequirGd, to assure smooth and successful '
implementation of the C M program.

CFUI PROGRAY DEVELOPMENT: A T M E FOR INTERACTEON
J Norman KorlcA
Flight S a f e t y f n s ' t i t u t e
Sacramento, CA .
In an intarvlew in the Oct is90 i s s u e of t h e Airline Pilot

magazine, Clay Foushee was asked about LOFT and CRM training.
In h i s answer, be s t a t e d "If I were running one UP these
programs, I'd have a martor exerctse e v e r y year with m y flight
training and operations s t a f f t o cornplatley revise t h e
scenarios," X wholehearted support t h a t statement, but I find
myself wandering "Why limit t h e diacusslan t o only the personnel
within one's own f l i g h t operations department?".
Motivated by the need for a new CRlY currlculnr for

recurrent training once a year, such an "annual review" has
become common amongst CRY program developers. However, when
these Individuals responsible f o r de termlning t h e next year's
curriculum, pool their thoughts, what is the source of their
ldeas? In s p i t e of years of emphasis on t h e NEED for CR16
training, there l a still little formal guidance available on HOW
t o teach CRM concepts. Discussions on t h i s subJect a l t h a
number of air carriers, indicate t h a t t h e i r ideas are typically
spontaneously gensrat ed by t h o s e indiwkduala within t h e group.
Experience is proving t o 'be THE mentor on teaching C W . I f this
'exparlencew Ls lkmlted t o those within one flight operations, I
pose t h e following l o u r questions:
i) How many years of a CRM program must pass before the "Law of
Diminishing Returns" t akea place within one flight operations
group ?
2) How iuch redundancy of e f f o r t is presently occuring and i f
15 Is, can t h e CRM industry a f f o r d t h e reduced margin of s a f e t y
associated witb such reinventions of the wheel? A
3) Are the line p t l o t a all over t h e world getting the VERY best
CRY traPning they can for t h e t i m e , effort and expense put into
t h e t r training?
4) Is t h i s system addressing ALL the problem areas associated
with CRM Issues?
Taking each question in order, the answer t o t h e f i r s t

takes inEo constde~stlon t h e b.asfc CRM concept t h a t synepgism
between members of a group produces a better outcome then
s P f o r t s By Individuals. Why is CRM program development any
d i f f e r e n t ? Which w i l l have t h e b a t t e r outcome, sacs flight
operations department, or s e v e r a l working i n concert? Perhaps
i t s time t o practice what is being preached.
The next question on redundancy l a somewhat sabJective but

with regard t o a s a f e t y issue as erltical as C W continues t o
be, the aviation industry can ill e i f o r d t o waste time
accomplishing something t h a t someone else already Bas.
Hlatorically, t h e r e was an lnltial reluctance t o open one's CRM
program t o others. This was p r e c i p i t a t e d by t h e i n i t i a l c o a t of
e s t a b l i s h i n g a program a s well a s t h e proprietary 'attitude
rr;ssocfatad with t h e "culture" of one's own airline. T h i s
a t t i t u d e has changed o v e r the year's and more and more CRY
programs are opening their doors t o o u t s i d e r s ; the CRM industry
needs t o s t r i v e POF ALL programs t o have such a policy.
Additionally, t h e Northwest Airljnrss annual CRM workshop, held
twice so far, fa t h e f i r s t formal opportunity f o r s u c h
int bract ion between a varlet y of operat ions including various
air c a r r i e r s , t h e FAA, t h e military e t c ; t h e rrorldwfde CRY
indLIst~yneeds many more of these.
The third q u e s t i o n on t h e q u a l i t y of CRY training being

p r e s e n t l y received is somewhat sublective. Entire presentations
have been given on evaluating the q u a l i t y of CRM programs,
S u f f i c e i t t o say here that whale significant gains have been
made in improving teamwork b o t h in and out of t h e cockpit, the.
CRI i n d u s t r y n e e d s t o look a t what must stdl1 be done, and not
Just r e l i s h what already h a s been accomplished. I base t h i s
conclusion on the fact that CRM "war stories" continue t o be
t o l d in which an accident or incident did not occur but t h e s a f e
arrival w a s simply too close f o r comfort, Because t h e y don't
result in an accident, Just a reduction I n t h e margin of s a f e t y ,
such "dirty laundryw is n o t typically aired for t h e public, but
l i n e p i l o t s are a c u t e l y aware of them. As a c u r r e n t l i n e pilot
who also f l e w in three different military reserve units, each
with p t l o t s that I conttnue t o question who come from a wlde
c r a s s section of varkoua air c a r r i e r s , a s w e l l as querying
extensive Jump s e a t r i d e r s from other c a r r i e r s on my f l i g h t s , I
continue t o hear such a t o r l e a . As an Individual concerned over
avfatlon s a f e t y , 1 point these o u t as evidence t h a t while the
CRM industry has come a long way, i t still has a long way t o go.
B e f o r e discussing the s p e ~ l f i c sof assuring the very b e a t

quality of CRY training, let me take a moment t o d i s c u s s t w o
fdiosyncraetes a s s o c i a t e d with training p i l o t s . The f i r s t
fnrolres t h e 'studentsQnd is t b a t pilots attending tralning
typically fall into t h r e e categories: 1) the f i r s t a r e extremely
conscienactoua t o t h e point of Eurfovsly writing down everything
t h a t t h e instructor s a y s In a notebook f o r f u t u r e reference, 2)
the second group are the t h e maJortty who s i t and l i s t e n and
depend on "recall" o f t h e i r memory t o carry o u t t h o s e laapqrtant
messages; ie i f I t was notewortby enough, t h e y ' l l automatically
remember i t , and 3) t h e l a s t group a r e t h e ones who already know
everything and have forgottan braore than t h e instructor w i l l ever
know; they t y p i c a l l y read t h e paper and daydream in class.
N s s d l e s s t o say the t h r e e groups form a t y p i c a l b e 1 curve with
1 and 3 a t t h e extremes and 2 making up t h e brunt o f t h e middle.
The second idoayncracy involves the instructor; experience has

shown that t h e ' b e t t e r ' I n s t r u c t o r s of p i l o t s have two
o b j e c t i v e s with regard t o any p i l o t training program:
1) they need t o e s t a b l i s h the "MEAT" of t h e program, ie the
message t o be taken o u t of t h e classroom and carried i n t o the
cockplt, and then t h e y haye t o
2) find a may t o present I t in an entertaining and stimulating
manner so that t h e class accepts and r e t a i n s t h e message; with
regard t o f l i g h t crews, "Savvy" instruct o ~ s bava a c h i e v e d this
t b ~ o u g ba variety of approaches including humor, shock,
interactive Involvement, and sex (before Anita HIIXL Put
another way, t h e s a v v y CRM program developel; becomes a
"translat er* who int srpret s material provided by academia, 4 be
FAA, t h e NTSB, aircraft s s a n u f a c t u r e ~ setc. and puts I t Into a
language t h a t t h e l i n e pilot wU1 l i s t en t o , remember, and use
on his o r her next and ensuing f l i g h t s . Such savvy i n s t r u c t o r s
a r e typically born and only "made" with considerable effort.
This effort n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e requirement for ALL the assistance
available, n o t Just wltbin one group but wlthin the entire CRY
industry. This global perspsctlve t s necessary IF t h e goal i s
t r u e l y t o provide t h e highest quality CFUL training available.
Determining what c o n s t l t u t e s the "reat" and then
translating i t inta an "entertainingu presentation is the k e y t o
a successful CRM program. T h e Introductory f i r s t class In any
C W program attended by those wbo have never heard of CRH
before, Is relatively easy. The subject Is so new and d i f f e r e n t
when compared t o traditional ground training, tbat it Is
typdcally well received, even by many of t h e "group 3"
crewmembers. However, once the newness w e a r s off and t h e
honeymoon is ovea-, optimizing t h e effecttveness of the CRM class
by keeping it fresh, stimulating, and productive Fs a c o n s t a h l
challenge f o r t b e CRM program developer. Wlth that i n mind, I
o f f e r the PolZowing suggestions t o the CRY i n d u s t r y t o optimize
t h e quallt y of a l u m programs; in addition, where applicable,
I present m y motivation f o r Including them:
l a ) To allow sharing of successes in developing CRY
programs, the aviation industry needs to continue k o W Q F ~ toward
openlng i t s CRM program doors t o everyone. The following
scenario J u s t occurred I n Marcb of $ 9 9 3 when 1 received a phone
call from a p i l o t at a large regional, airline who was seeking
assistance i n s t a r t i n g a CRM prograta an their property. I asked
what sort of assistance t h e y were g e t t i n g from t h e l a r g e carrier
they code shared with and 1 was very surprised a t t h e response
of "None'". So while t h e CRM industry has made a l o t of progress
In t h i s area of sharing, t h e r e is still a long way t o go.
I Such attendance should provide t h e opportunity for
"outsiders" t o critique what they have observed. This does n o t
require that all s u c h critique be accepted, but the sincere
avenue f o r i t s presentation should be made. CRM Frogran
Developers need t o b e *ore open t o constructive critlclsm from
peers o u t s l d e t h e i r operation. 1 make t h e observation that "CRU
Program Development is a CRLl ISSUE P. By t h a t I mean t h a t one
CRY i s s u e taught i n ' e v e r y CRM class is t h e onnipotant caytaln
who feels he knows everything and tbat the othelt t w o creamembers
have little t o o f f e r i n t h e way o f advice, Likewise, I see t h e
enthusiastic CRM program developer so caught up i n t h e
243-AN1146
Circular/Circulaire~up~yn~p A-131
e x c i t e m e n t and power of t h e i r p r o g r a m t h a t t h e i r r e c e p t i v i t y t o
criticism is minimized. The CRY i n d u s t r y c o u l d u s e a l i t t l e
humility and h u m b l e n e s s when i t comes t o s e e k i n g o u t s i d e
c r i t i q u e i n making o n e ' s CRM p r o g r a m t h e v e r y best i t c a n be.
When o n e p r e a c h e s t w o way communication i n t h e c l a s s r o o m a s a
CRY c o n c e p t , t h e y n e e d t o be s u r e t o t a k e t h e i r own a d v i c e . I
c i t e a s a n example of t h e n e e d f o r t h i s , t h e s t a t e m e n t
r e p e a t e d l y made by t h e CRM p r o g r a m d i r e c t o r f o r a m a j o r air
c a r r i e r : "We s t i l l c o n s i d e r CRM t o b e "COCKPIT R e s o u r c e Q
Management" and n o t "CREW R e s o u r c e Management" b e c a u s e o u r
c a p t a i n s a r e going t o ALL b e p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d in CRM s k i l l s and
c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s d o n o t h a v e t o be." When i t
w a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t o n e e i g h t h o u r class
would b r i n g e v e r y C a p t a i n i n t o t h e CRY f o l d , h e did n o t w a n t t o
h e a r i t . S u c h n a i v e t e c o u l d n o t o n l y r e s u l t in J u s t a l e s s
e f f e c t i v e CRM program, it c o u l d b o r d e r on d a n g e r o u s .
2a) Quality videotapeg a r e an excellent teaching tool. I
r e a l i z e t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i o n of s u c h items c o s t s money. However,
s u c h items s h o u l d NOT b e l o o k e d a t a s a s o u r c e of r e v e n u e b u t
r a t h e r a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o make t h e whole a v i a t i o n community
s a f e r . I n i t i a l l y , witholding s u c h t a p e s a n d n o t s h a r i n g them
g e n e r a t e s NO a d d i t i o n a l r e v e n u e s . Then a f t e r a p e r i o d of time,
s u c h t a p e s a r e o f t e n s h a r e d , b u t by t h e n t h e y a r e o u t d a t e d . I
h a v e r a i s e d t h i s q u e s t i o n with o t h e r s and I h a v e been challenged
on t h e p r e m i s s t h a t In a d d i t i o n t o t h e monies involved, t h e r e is
a r e l u c t a n c e t o a i r o n e ' s d i r t y l a u n d r y when n e g a t i v e i s s u e s a r e
presented. I understand such protectionism, but I o f f e r t h e
following: a s w i t h ALL n e g a t i v e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n CRM classes,
t h e y s h o u l d b e i n t r o d u c e d w i t h t h e game r u l e s t h a t "we view
t h e s e a c c i d e n t s and i n c i d e n t s w i t h t h e i n t e n t of n o t looking
b a c k w a r d s t o s a y 'what a bunch of dummies' b u t r a t h e r t o l o o k t o
t h e f u t u r e t o a s s u r e t h a t w e don't make t h e s a m e m i s t a k e when
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n in o u r c a r e e r s " . A q u a l i t y
CRM f a c i l i t a t o r c a n o f t e n t i m e s c o n v e y t h e c o n c e p t of " t h e r e b u t
f o r t h e Grace of God, g o I" i n s u c h i n s t a n c e s . A s t w o examples
of t h e n e e d f o r t h e a b o v e , I cite t h e search f o r c o p i e s of t h e
v i d e o s on t h e t w o DC-8 a c c i d e n t s : t h e f r e i g h t e r a t S a l t Lake and
t h e f u e l s t a r v a t i o n a t Portland. A f t e r calling e v e r y r e s o u r c e I
could, I w a s t o l d by o n e c a r r i e r t h a t I c o u l d h a v e t h e c o p i e s
f o r o n e t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ; I e v e n t u a l l y g o t them f o r n o t h i n g
t h r o u g h t h e A i r F o r c e . R e g a r d i n g t h e L-1011 w i n d s h e a r a c c i d e n t
a t D a l l a s F o r t Worth, a f t e r r e p e a t e d l y viewing t h e v i d e o on t h a t
a c c i d e n t and r e p e a t e d l y b e i n g d e n i e d a copy, I f i n a l l y l e a r n e d
t h a t i t c o s t f i v e t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s a n d t h e s i g n i n g of m u l t i p l e
l e g a l d o c u m e n t s t o p r o c u r e c o p i e s . Now i t is becoming more
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f o r nothing. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e l e g a l
ramlf i c a t i o n s o f l i t i g a t i o n following a n a c c i d e n t , t h e CRM
i n d u s t r y n e e d s t o r e e v a l u a t e what and what doesn't c o n s t i t u t e a
r e v e n u e s o u r c e when i t comes t o a v i a t i o n s a f e t y and t h e n
r e c o n s i d e r making t h e s e v i d e o s m o r e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o o t h e r s .
2b) One of t h e g r e a t e s t t e a c h i n g t o o l s f o r p i l o t s is
"Hangar Flying", t h e s h a i r i n g o f ' t h e r e I w a s ' stories. T h e r e
n e e d s t o b e a forum f o r t h e CRM i n d u s t r y t o s h a r e t h e s e highly
e f f e c t i v e d e v i c e s f o r p u t t i n g a CRM p o i n t a c r o s s .
3) Methods of Instruction o f t h e various: concepts of CRM
vary widely in technique and success. Again, there should be
t h e spportunlty t o share and exchange s u c h technlgues, w i t h
explanations of the evolution. Typically when a CRY program
d e v e l o p e r puts an annual currlculum t o g e t h e r , this currlculem
undergoes an evolution p r o c e s s a s i t is p r e s e n t e d t o flightcraws
month a f t e r month. T h e final product might vary considerably
from the f i r s t class. Again, i t is a t e r r i b l e ' w a s t e t o b a r e
ranather CRY program undergoing t h e sane "relnrention of t h e
wheel" when they ~ a k et h e same mistakes another program already
experienced and discarded. There s h p l y needs t o be a more
formal avenue t o share such knowledge.
4) There a r e a wtde v a r i e t y of meetlngs which are held each
year t o df s c u s s CRld issues. I f t h e concepts,.conclusions,
t h e o r i e s , perceptions etc. s h t c h arise from each of these
meetings do n o t make i t t o t h e l i n e pillat, then I make such
efforts analogous t o the football team which struggles 99 2/3
yards t o t h e one foot line but f a l l s t o score, thereby
accoapllshlng really no thing. The atrlbne lndu s t ry can 111
afford t o waste such efforts; they need t o a s s u r e that ALL such
pertinant d a t a uakes I t t o t h e l i n e pilot. Add1t ionally,
everyone should have access t o tbese meetings whether a member
o f t h e organization or n o t . There needs t o be an a c t i v e
worldwide "Network" l i s t l n g of CRM program d e v e l o p e r s t o assure
t h e y are aware of all such gatherings. Also, one should be able
to reference ONE source to learn about what t h e CRM calendar
holds f o r t h e f u t u r e with r e g a ~ dt o ALL pertinant meetlngs.
The l a s t question of whether the CRM industry is addressing
ALL t h e CRM issues i t should, Is pointed a t the "meat" portion
of CRM curriculum development and I offer tbe following subject a
f o r considerat lon. One special poln t of Intares t regarding
these aubdects is that they are earmarked for special groups. I t
is no longer t h e development of a CRM program to cover t b a
"masses" of t h e entire pilot farce; rather, I t is the design of
a special currlculum t o address the speelflc needs of speclfic
tndlriduals. Developing t h e t w o p o i n t s above of the "Meat" and
the *Deliverym of such n specialized curriculum is f a r more
d i f f i c u l t than t h e generic CRM program and consequently randat ss
even further requirement for t h e CRM i n d u s t r y t o Interact. 1
acknowledge t h a t some carrlers have already begun t o a d d r e s s
tbese i s s u e s , but again, why does the i n d u s t r y t o l e r a t e such
duplication of e f f o r t when someone else begins t o address tbese
i s s u e s for the fErat time?
i s r ) Mew Captain and new f i r s t officer upgrades deserve spacial

CRM a t t e n t i o n which a d d r e s s e s those speclfic issues they w i l l be
c o n f r o n t e d w l t b i n their new posltlon. Again, how does one
determine what these i s s u e a are and b o w to eiPectlvely teach
thm?
lb) Over age s i x t y flight engineers. After flying as captain
f o r many years, the lndlvtdual is put into a subordinate seat.
Most handle it well but what about the one who does not?
lc) Regression due t o f u r l o u g h s In which a Captain i s
243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/rluptcyn~~p A-133
downgraded t o F/O a n d a n F/O is downgraded t o S/O. B o t h are

s l g n f f i c a n t c h a n g e s , n o t coming by c h o i c e b u t r a t h e r by
mandate. A t p r e s e n t , t h e t r a i n i n g f o r s u c h d o w n g r a d e s o n l y
i n v o l v e s checking o u t i n t h e equipment e v e n t h o t h e r e is much
opportunity f o r disgruntlement.
2) Bringing o t h e r g r o u p s i n t o t h e realm of CRM. Including
F i g h t A t t e n d a n t s, d i s p a t c h , m a i n t e n a n c e , a g e n t s , c l e a n e r s , e t c
in CRM c l a s s e s e f f e c t i v e l y , t a k e s a c e r t a i n f l a i r .
*3a) Overly a s s e r t i v e f i r s t and second o f f i c e r s . This i s s u e
h a s b e e n a r o u n d f o r a l o n g time b u t t h e D e t r o i t g r o u n d c o l l i s i o n
b e t w e e n t h e DC-9 a n d B727 d u r i n g r e d u c e d v i s i b i t y h i g h l i g h t e d
t h e requirement t o a d d r e s s It.
*3b) The i n d i v i d u a l who s a y s o n e t h i n g a n d t h e n d o e s s o m e t h i n g
else: "I want CRM in t h l s c o c k p i t " b u t t h e n when someone
challenges h i s decision, h e f a i l s t o respond.
*4) Remedial CRM f o r a n e n t i r e c r e w t o a p p e a s e t h e FAA on a
" V o l u n t a r y D i s c l o s u r e " i s s u e . My c a r r i e r h a s s u c c e s s i u l l y
implemented t h i s twice; h a v e a n y o t h e r s a n d how did t h e y d o i t ?
*5) CRM t o c o v e r i n t r a c o c k p i t s t r e s s d u e t o a m e r g e r o r p o s t
s t r i k e , t w o highly v o l a t i l e i s s u e s t h a t c a n g e n e r a t e c o n f l i c t .
*6) In t h e a u t h o r s ' opinion, o n e of t h e b i g g e s t compromises t o
s a f e t y i s t h e non team p l a y e r , o c c a s i o n a l l y r e f e r r e d t o a s a
"boomerang" b u t t h a t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e is a c t u a l l y a movement
in t h e wrong d i r e c t i o n . T h a t f a i l s t o a d d r e s s t h e i n d i v i d u a l
who j u s t d o e s n o t move o f f t h a t f a r l e f t p o s t i o n o r i f h e d o e s
move, i t i s n ' t enough. B o t h t h e b o o m e r a n g s and t h e non m o v e r s
g e n e r a t e many o f t h e CRM w a r s t o r i e s . In S e p t 1 9 8 9 , ALPA r a n a
f u l l d a y workshop on t h l s s u b j e c t t i t l e d "The Remedial CRM p i l o t
problem", y e t t h e w a r s t o r i e s c o n t i n u e t o be t o l d . S i m i l a r l y ,
o n e m a j o r c a r r i e r d e v e l o p e d a r e m e d i a l program d e s i g n e d a r o u n d a
n a t i o n w i d e n e t w o r k of c o u n c i l l o r s , b u t t h l s program w a s d r o p p e d
d u e t o c e r t i f i c a t e j e o p a r d y on t h e new FAA form. To d a t e t h e n ,
t h e r e s u l t s of a n a c u t e a w a r e n e s s of t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s is j u s t
TOLERANCE; from a s a f e t y p e r s p e c t i v e , t h i s in u n a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s
is a n i s s u e t h a t m u s t be a d d r e s s e d m o r e f o r m a l l y a n d o n e t h a t
MUST h a v e i n t e r a c t ion b e t w e e n g r o u p s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e r e is
a n y n o t e of s u c c e s s .
NOTE: I acknowledge t h a t t h e a b o v e *'d items a r e t y p i c a l l y
highly s e n s i t i v e from b o t h l e g a l and r e p u t a t ion p e r s p e c t i v e s ;
n o n e t h e l e s s , with t h e a p p r o p r i a t e emphasis, t h e y can b e t r e a t e d
a c c o r d i n g l y and i n t e r a c t e d upon f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e e n t i r e
a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y as o p p o s e d t o b e i n g hidden a w a y l i k e some
s k e l e t o n on a c l o s e t .
S o l e t u s n o t l o s e s i g h t s f t h e t r u e g o a l of ALL CRM
p r o g r a m s ; l e t ' s remember t h a t i t i s n o t simply t h e g e n e r a t i o n of
a n 8 hour. class t o f i l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s r e q u i r e d by t h e l o c a l
i n s p e c t o r ; n o r is I t t h e g e n e r a t i o n of a n in h o u s e p o w e r regime
t o f u r t h e r o n e ' s own empire; n o r is it t o j u s t g e n e r a t e r e v e n u e
f o r a commercial v e n t u r e ; n o r is i t t o g e n e r a t e s t a t i s t i c a l d a t a
f o r a r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t . No it is n o n e of t h e s e ; t h e t r u e g o a l
of ALL CRM p r o g r a m s is t o p r o d u c e s a f e r a n d more e f f i c e n t f l i g h t
crews f o r a l l of a v i a t i o n . P r o - a c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e e n CRY
program d e v e l o p e r s is o n e k e y method t o achieving t h a t goal.
CRM FEEDBACK AM3 APPRAISAL SYSTEM
Ms.P, Antesip and Ms. M. V e M f (NeWflands)
Assessment of non-technical skills,
Is it nossibk?
As you all know, airlines must start assessing non-technical skills in the near future, But is it
possible, and how should we do it? At KLM we are convinced that, before you are able to
assess non-technical skills, you have to make sure that your training in non-technical skills is
adequate and sufficient. And that the people who will coach your cockpit crew on nan-technical
skills (and in the near future will assess them), have the right tools to do so.
In this presentation, I would Qkelo give you same insight into KLWs approach to deal with this
probIem.
This presentation will cover the following topics:

I. The philosophy behind KLM" training approach.
2. Implementing a new training tool: the Feedback and Appraisal System.
3. First results of the twout of the Feedback & Appraisal System in KLM's A310 and DC-10
division.
KLMs Training philosophy:

I.
If you take training seriously, it is important Lo regularly evaluabe p u r training package and
training approach. At the end of 1987 KLM's Flight Crew Training Centre came to a major
conclusion:
All important training items to ensure a good working cockpit crew were covered, but there was
still something missing.
We had our skill training, LOFT training, Crew Management training, a training in Public
Address'techniques, our KHuFAG, but they were all separate courses or subjects; there was
no real relation bemeen the technical and&-technical training.
Subjecfs taught during, for instance, the Crew Management Course, were not reinforced during
simulator training. The instructors did not have a tool to do this,
As a consequence the instruction of non-technical skills within KLM was not as effective as it
could be.
The missing part was A STRUCTURALLY INTEGRATED TRAINING APPROACH OF

TECHNICiAL AND NON-TECHNICAL TRAINING.
243-AN/l46
Circular/Circulaire/~upnyn~~p A-135
This point of view was strenghtend by studies done in the field of didactics. They show that as
soon as one has finished a course, skills which are rarely or never used, deteriorate.
Also a decline in the norm occurs for skills that have become routine. In a refresher training the
participant's skills are brought back up to standard. This performance curve can be described
as a sawtooth and can differ from person to person.
Traditionally, we accept and use this "sawtooth" curve as the basis for the setup of our
technical training (our Type Recurrents and Proficiency Checks), but it is of course also
applicable to non-technical training.
Figure 1: "saw-toothed" performance curve
after
training .
safe
training
*\1
necessary
legal minimum leveL
unsafe
When this conclusion was reached at the end of 1987, the Flight Crew Training Centre was
confronted with the question where to start. Non-technical training was up to then, a once in a
lifetime activity. And instructors didn't have the tools to give effective feedback on non-technical
performance of the cockpit crew.
At the same time KLM was confronted with other developments influencing the training
process, such as:
- The ever growing competition between airlines.
- Changes in the corps of Pilots and Flight Engineers related to age structure, distribution of
experience and cultural background.
- Operational changes such as long-haul flights.
- Changes in cockpit layout and ergonomics as a result of automation in the cockpit.
- And finally, general developments in the airline industry concerning Cockpit Resource
- -
Management Training and related laws.
A.E.36 C i r c u l a r [ C i ~ u l s i r e J ~ n #243-ANM6
To find out where t~ start, it was first ne#ssaq to map out the existing training process. In that way,
it became clear woich factors played a role and how they influenced each other, It also made ctsar
where io sfad with integrating non-technical training into the existing training set-up.
Figure 2: Training Process
P = Peftannance
M = Motivation
K+S Knowkdge and Skills
\ iM ntvt explain the complete diagram to you, but for KLM it pdnted out tmt the main area's,
were: - job description,
- sslction,
- *Bbaining Bsefi9 -
- the process af data collectiarr a d comparifig ihis to the rtom,
and the org$niraBonaJstructure for monitoring and controlting part.
The job plays an impodant role in this proces.

- It is impadant for the selection criteria.
- It determines M a t mmU be trained.
- It form9 a f m e of reference to determine i f a perm is performing as squked, fodeternine
y the mining and se(m*onprocess.
the q ~ l i t of
- am it offers a fm~f ~e%xw,cefar thb pwson hlmse\?,When someone's prtamana is
being measured, that parson has a right to know what is expected.
This is why KLM started the integration pfoces with the adjustment of the job profiles. By means of
interviews among middle and higher management the missing items were added. And with the help
of surveys among all pilots and flight engineers, its general completeness was checked.
Notwithstandiflg the other important items, I will focus the second part of my presentation on
the development of a tool for instructors. This tool Was to help them in the of non-
technical data collection and to help them to compare this data ,to fhe norm. We called it the
Feedback & Appraisal System.
2, Implementing a new training tool: the Feedback and Appraisal System.
The Feedback and Appraisal System consists of fw0parts: a terminology pait and a reference
part.
When dealing with non-technical skills, it is important that: both tDe instructor as well as the
crew, know wnat they are talking about That they speak the same language.
Miscommunication, misunderstanding and misintepretations are fatal for effective counseling or
debriefing. Especially the acceptance of the crew of the instructors feedback is important. The
qualiiy of the feedback can be just as good, bui if the acceptance is zero, the effect of the
debriefing is rero.
This demands a carefully planned debriefing tactic from the instructor.
A frame of reference is important so that everyone knows what KLM expects. tn training and
assessment situations, the frame of reference gives the instructof a tool to be as objective as
possible.
Of course, it is very difficult to describe a kind of norm for non-technical skills. The behaviour of
a crew depends on the situation and on the individual crew members themselves, or does it?
If we want to assess non-technical skills, it is important that this be done as objectively as

possible. At KLM we have been working on the Feedback and A~praisal.Systemfor 3 years
now.We are not 'CornpIetety ready yet, but we have gme a k g m y inthe ri~htdirection.
The strength of the Feedback and Appraisal System is that it describes in clear terminology the
work of our cockpit crew; Clearly visible for everyone and with no psychology, at all.
This is because it was developed from on-the-job situations. More than 60 interviews with instructors,
pilots and flight engineers resulted in over 600 cases where non-technical aspects play an important
role in the safety of the operation. In the end, all these on-the-job situations were divided into five
main categories, with the acronym WILSC:
WORK ATTITUDE
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
LEADERSHIP
STRESS MANAGEMENT
CO-OPERATION
There are 14 subcategories.
A short definition is given of each subcategory and underneath the matching behavioural
components that play a role in this category.
See for instance one of the subcategories of Work Attitude: Exercise of self-criticism.
The definition of this subcategory is: Being critical in relation to one's own functioning
With behavioural components as:
- evaluating one's own performance
- willing to discuss one's own functioning
- being open to criticism from others
and l or
- asking others for information about one's own functioning
All definitions and descriptions are available to the instructor as well as to the pilot and/or flight
engineer. So the instructor as well as the person who receives feedback in the debriefing, know what
is meant by certain terms, how this is translated into observable behaviour and what KLM expects
from her crews.
This approach and setup is one of the most important points if you want to get acceptance for
implementing a new tool. In order to gain acceptance from the users, it should be practical,
visible for everyone and deal with their job, no hocuspocus or amateur psychology. The users
must be part of the development of the system.
243-AN/146
CircularJCircuiuire/Uupq~~p A-139
Other important items for an effective irnplernentation are among others:

- Keep everyone informed during the development phase (users,management, unions),
- Try the system out under real circumstances and evaluate.
- Pick an implementation date, so that it is visible to the whole organization when the iool
will be implemented officially; the instructors know when to use it in their training and the
crew also knows when they will be confronted with it.
- Prepare the organization by means of informing and discussing implementation strategies
with management, Chiefs Pilots and Flight Engineers, Chief Instructors, Planning and
Scheduting Department, etc.
- Prepare each crew member by means of sending them information about the system and
its implementation.
- Prepare the instructors to use the system and make sure they are properly trained in
instruction techniques; briefing-, observation-, debriefing- and reporting techniques.
At KLM we started in July 1992 by trying out the Feedback and Appraisal System,in our A310
and DC-10 Divisions. To introduce the system to all the pilots and flight engineers of these two
divisions, we developed a special Type Recurrent program.
Instead of studying parts of the AOM at horns, the crew was asked to read the information
about the feedback and appraisal system.
In the briefing there was one hour to show a 15 minute video about FAS, to do a short exercise
on non-technical behaviour and ta discuss questions on this subject. The simulator session
was a real LOFT session. And during the debriefing, the non-technical performance of the crew
was discussed according to the new system.
To prepare our instructors we made sure that every instructor went to an advanced instruction
training in which they learned how to use the feedback and appraisal system and in which a
refresher of instruction techniques took place. An instructor was not allowed to give the Type
Recurrent as long as he had not taken the course.
Close contact with chief instructors and especially the Planning and Scheduling Department
was very important.
In our instructor training we teach the instructors to use the feedback and appraisat system in a
very practical way. We use cases, video-analyses and debriefing roleplays. But first of all we let
them think about the meaning of the main categories for themselves.
A-140 243-AN1146
CErcuiar/CirculaireiZlup~yn~
For instance, what do you think that the category INFORMATION MANAGEMENT means?
In the discussiofl that follows things come up like: getting information, using resources, deciding
on priarities, planning, taking decisions, updating plans, ,strucfuring information.
After this, we looked at the definitions used in the system. i h e subcategories of INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT are: - Information analysis
- Planning and Anticipation
- Decisiveness
With for instance behavioural components of Information analysis as:
- actively and systematically searching for relevant hformation
- using available resources
- involving proposals and suggestions of others
- classifying information into main issues and side issues / muse and effect
- , penetrating to the heart of a matter
- keeping an overview by continuously comparing new information to the actual infomation
The jnstnrctors had to conclude for themselves that the definitions matched their own thoughts,
that the Feedback and Appraisal System really deals with their work and is in fact not something
completely new but just an agfeement on the teminodogy used when talking abbut non-
technical performance. In short: that it is a tool for them to make their job easier.
3. First results of the try-out of the Feedback and Appraisal System in KLM's A31 0 and
DC-10 division.
What are the results of the try-out of the Feedback and Appraisal System in our A310 and DC-
10 division so far.
The main questions were:
- Will the system be accepted by instructors as well as pilots and flight engineers?
- 1s the feedback and app~akalsystem really a helpful tool to assjsf instructors in coaching
crew members in their non-technical performance?
and
- Is the system complete, are parts missing or superfluous?
y ~ ~ p 46
Circulor / C i ~ u u l i r ~ u p ~243-AN/] A-141
To get information to answer these questions, we asked instructors and crews to fill out a
questionnaire after every Type Recurrent. In the period July to December this resulted in a total
of 118 instructor questionnaires (a response of 99%) and 194 questionnaires from pilots and
flight engineers (a response of 87%).
Some results:
What' categories are used during the debriefing?:
Figure 3: What categories are used during the debriefing?
Instructors:
Procedure Qnenratiwl
Ercrcise d cell cMcism

Sense d Respyn8ihIii-f
lnbrrnatimManagement
Ptanninp 8 Antmwtion
Task O n e W Leadership
P W e Otieded Leademhip
%s Management
wolbinp with &en
Pilots I Flight Engineers
lnfwrolmManagement
Planning 8 AnticrpaO'on
wiutnus
Task On'entsd Leadenhip
b p l e C~&MJXILeadership
Shss Management
wofking with omem
AtbMwmss
The responses of the instructors and pilots / flight engineers were more or less the same as
expected. All categories were used but the 5 most used categories were:
- procedure orientation
- assertiveness
- information analyses
- planning and anticipation
- and task oriented leadership
and the 5 categories used less:
- exercise of selfcriticism
- sense of responsibility
- service orientation
- image
-- and attentiveness.
The explanation can be found in the fact that the 5 less used categories are categories which
are more visible during normal line operation and not during a simulator session. This contrasts
with the 5 most used categories which are necessary skills to solve abnormals or emergencies
trained during simulator LOFT training.
Other questions concerned the quality of the debriefing.

For the instructor:
- Were you able to discuss the items you wanted to debrief?
- and Was FAS a useful tool in this?
Figure 4:
Where you able to discuss the items you wanted to debrief?
WrlY excetlent
C i r c u l u r / C i r c u l a i ~ ~ 243-AN/146
~~y~~p A-143
Figure 4 (contd.)
Was FAS a useful tool?
not at all excellent
47% of the instructors were able to discuss the items they wanted to in a positive to excellent
way. 45% were neutral, which means that these was no difference with the past.
Over 50% was convinced that FAS was'a very good tool to help them. 41% were neutial.
Further research showed that the main reason for their neutrality was a lack of experience with
FAS.
Concerning this subject we asked the pilots/ flight engineers:

- If the debriefing was clearer because of the use of FAS?
- and if the use of FAS helped them to gain more insight into their perfomance? '
figure 5:
Was the debriefing clearer because of the use of FAS? (1%: no opinion)
39
not at all certainly
Did the use of FAS helped you to gain more insight into your performance?
I no opinion)
(%:
not at ail Certainly

Over 60% of the pilots and flight engineers were of the opinion that the debriefing was more
clear because of the use of FAS,, 28% was neutral. And almost 70% found that FAS was a
good to excellent tool for giving them more insight into their pefiorrnance.
During the try-out of the Feedback and Appraisal System, we'stimulated instructors to use
video during the debriefing. 93% of the instructors did so and the pilots and flight engineers
were very enthusiastic. 87% were of the opinion that it was very useful.
Figure 6:
To Pilots I Flight Engineers:
What is your opinion about the use of video during the debriefing?
useless very
useful
To check the acceptance of the System, we asked the instructors:

- What is your opinion about the use of the FAS as a tool to debrief non-technical skills?
and the pilots and flight engineers:
- If they would recommend the FAS 10 other calleagues?
Figure 7:
Instructors:
What is your opinion about the use of FAS as a tool to debrief non-technical skills?
negative positive
243-AN/I 46
Circular/Circulaire/~~p~yna~~ A-145
Figure 7 (cantd.):
Pilots J Flight Engineers:
Would you recommend the FAS to other colleagues? (3%: no opinion)
no certainty
99% of the instructors were neutral to very positive toward the use of FAS as a tool. And 71°h
of the pilots and flight engineers would strongly recommend it to other colleagues, 20% were
neutral.
Although these figures are rough indications, they show a clear trend that we are on the right
track.
At KLM we have already concluded that the try-out of the Feedback and Appraisal System is a
succes, even though the try-out runs to July this year. And we have decided to start
implementing the system in our other divisions.
To come back to our main questions:

- Will the system be accepted by instructors as well as pilots and flight engineers?
The answer for the A31 0 and DC-10 division is YES.
- Is the feedback and appraisal system really a helpful tool to assist instructors in coaching
the non-technical performance of crew members?
The answer again is YES. But experiences of the last few months show that coaching the
instructors is very important until the use of the Feedback and Appraisal System has become
second nature.
- Is the system complete, are parts missing or superfluous?

We have the idea that, although more research is necessary especially during route training,
that YES, the system is complete. Some categories are more useful during route instruction on
normal flights while others are more impottant during simulator training.
A-I46 243-AN//46
But what about assessment?

Can the feedback, and appraisal system be used to assess non-technical behaviour?
At KLM we think we are on the right track. We believe that we have now developed a very
strong tool in training and coaching crews in a structured way. And most important of all, the
try-out proves that the system is acceptable. If you want a system to assess non-technical skills
then acceptance is an essential condition.
We are convinced that when instructors and crews are used to work with it in training
situations, the Feedback and Appraisal System is a strong basis on which non-technical
behaviour can be assessed.
Thank you for your attention.

2434 M/146
Circ~lar/Circulaire/~up~y~~p A-147
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS

AND PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE
OF OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL
IN KOREAN AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
April 12,1993
Prof. Soon-Kil Hong, Ph.D.

Hankuk Ariation University
Seoul, K o m
Contents
B, Review of past aviation accidents in Korea
C. Present efforts to develop human factors skills and attitude relevant to flight safety of
professional operational personnel in Korea air transport industry
D. Particular considerations to be given in human factors training in the Orimital

society (influend by Confucianism)
E. Conclusion
I , Introduction
In accordance with numerous aviation' safety reports, more than

two-thirds of world aviation accidents in the past were caused by human
factor errors.
Therefore, we can not improve aviation safety and reduce aviation
accidents effectively without efforts to reduce human factor errors.
Various definitions have been employed in attempts t o describe the
subject matter of Human factor. One such definition is referred here:
Human factors ( o r ergonomics) may be defined as the technolog>l concerned
to optimize the relationships between people and their activities by the
systematic appl ication of the human sciences, integrated mi thin the
framework of systern engineering.
(Elrvyn Edwards : 1988 )
While quite number of seseaches and analyses on the subject of human
factor and f 1 ight safety have been presented so far,
very few studies have been made in the East Asian countries including
Korea.
The paper briefs the major aviation accidents and their causes during
the last 35 years in Korea. The paper discusses the present status of
human factors training f o r operational personnel t o improve flight safety
by two flag carriers, Korean Air and Asiana. The paper particularly
studies whether there should be any different human factors training
because of different cultural norms (Oriental culture : Confucianism vs.
lestern culture : Christianisrn),
Finally, the paper presents summary of findings and suggestion to
develop human factors training in future not only for Korean air
transport industry but other countries i f applicable.
The study is based on the data from Korean civil Aviation Bureau
(KCAB), the Ministry of Transportation, Korean Air and Asiana Airlines
and tentatively veri fied through the interviews wi t h about 50 officials,
instructors, inspectors, pilots and professors who are concerned with
flight safety from .KCAB, Korean Air, Asians- and Hankuk Aviation
Uni vers i ty.
n. Review of Past Aviation Accidents i n Korea
Total Number of aviation accidents i n ' Korea during the last 35 years
are 156 and resulted deaths of 543 persons. Periodical breakdorm of the
accidents are as follows.
243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/~up~yn~p A-149
Table 1. Periodical Breakdown of Aviation Accidents
1990 1 - 7 8 2
Total I 25 25 106 1 156 1 543
(Source : Korean Ministry of Transportation)
note 1) Including two case of explosion.in the air
by KE007 on Sep.1983 and KE858 on Nov.29.1987)
If we analyze above accidents in accordance with the stages of flight,

substantial number of accidents are occurred during the stage of landing.
Other details are as follows.
Table 2. Analysis of Accidents per Stages of Flight

Stages of Flight
Number of
Period Take off Cruise Landing Ground Remarks
Accidents
one case of
1950s - -
3 2 1 cruise is
(56-59)
hijacking
one case of
1960s
38 3 5 20 10 cruese is hi-
(60-69)
jacking
one case of
1970s
46 7 9 11 19 cruise is
(70-79)
hijacking
two cases of
1980s
61 6 21 27 7 cruise were
(80-89)
exploded in air
1990 8 - 1 3 4
Total 156 16 38 62 40
If we analyze the accidents by causes, major causes of accident are

human factors such as pilots and maintenance persons like the examples of
other countries of world total. The detail breakdown are as follows.
Table 3. Aviation Accidents per Causes
Aviation accidents were increased periodically ; 38 in 1960s, 46 in

1976s and 61 in 1980s. However, if rve consider the increased number of
aircrafts and flying hours in 198Qs, accident rates were decreased.
Table 4. Aviation Acidents and Flying- Hours

~ircraftslasof the end Flying hours(as of the Number of
Perid
of each decade) end of each decade) accidents
1960s 63 28.000 38
1970s 95 99,000 46
1980s 167 186,000 61
Based on data of accidents per stages of flight, 78 of total 156

accidents were-occurred during the stages of take-off and landing which
is equivalent about 50% of total accidents,
According to the above review of accidents, t o reduce human errors,

Korean Ministry of Transportation recommended-flag carriers t o introduce
new education systems and to apply them in training flight crews such as
CI?M(Cockpit Resource Efanagement)and LOFT(Line Oriented Flight Training).
These education systerns are characterized as crew interaction, human
r d u d m c y , situational awreness, active mi toring, improvement of
associated ski I 1s. And a1so working procedures of maintenance personnels
should be .carefully appl ied in accordance wi t h the maintenance manual s
and bulletins. Effective cooperations and c o ~ i c a t i o n sbetween flight
crews and air traffic controllers are absalutely required and so
institutionally supported. In the long run, government and industry
management should pay keen attentions to train sufficient pilots and
other aviation specialists,
III. Present efforts todevelophuman factors s k i l l s m d .
attitude relevant to flight safety of professional
operational personnel in Korean air transpoet industry
To reduce human factor errors, various measures including CRM seminar,

LOFT, lectures and regular meetings of instructors and etc. are presently
undertaken by two Korean flag carriers, Korean Air and Asiana (started 5
years ago).
In this s e c t i o n , Korean Air CIM training program is introduced with the
summary of their report as the most successful and representative model
in Korean air transport industry,
1. Foreword
Korea Air has conducted cockpit resource management seminar for their
flight crews for the purpose of minimizing the p o s s i b i l i t y of aircraft
accidents. The seminar contributed greatly to minimi zing the possi bi I i ty
of aircraft accidents caused by human error, therby achieving greater
safety in f 1ight operations.
This CRM seminar program was originally developed by United Airlines
and Scientific Methods, Xnc. and applied t o Korean Air.
2. Main discourse
1 ) . The composi t i on of t h i s program and background
As sound aircraft operation is the process of working effectively rvi th

and through people to achieve' high quality performance, the participants
in this' seminar learn to work as a team in order t o study performance.
This requires that members learn to contribute and commit themselves t o
achieving as much as they are capahle of doing, CRM seminars promote
learning and development and deal with several tasks which provide
participants the opportunity to learn leadership concepts and styles. The
period of each seminar is 4 days, This study is the result of 288
participants who completed the seminar course.
2 ) . The concept of grid style and classification
The grid is a frame of reference providing a basis for understanding

differences between people and a means of comprehending hew and why
individuals behave as they do in t h e performance of their jobs.
There are two basic dimensions in the framework : concern for
performance, and concern for wople.
Table 5. Frame of Grid Style
1.9
Emphasis on needs of people 9.9
for satisfying relationships Work accomplishment is form
leads to a comfortable and committed people in pursuit
High friendly atmosphere and work of a common purpose based
tempo. on relationships of trust and
respect
Concern 5.5
for The necesslty of accompl ishing the

P ~ OeP ~ task properly is balanced
with maintaintng morale at an
acceptable level.
Minimum effort is expended

Efficiency of operation is a
to accomplish task. result of controlling conditions
Low
so that the human element
1.1 interferes to a minimum degree.
9.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Low Concern for Performance High
(Source : Korean A i r )
There are 5 styles relating to the management of performance and people
; The 1.1, 1.9, 9.1, 5.5, and 9.9 styles. The characteristics of each
grid style is described above.
3). Task Objectives in'the seminars and their results
(1 ) Analysis of personal grid styles
The goal of this task is to use the grid as a framework in assisting

each person to gain insight into personal behavior which can influence
effectiveness as a crewmember. The resusts were as follo\vs :
xp 243-AN1146
Circular/Circulaire/zEup~yn A-153
Table 6. Comparison of Grid Style

be tween Pre-Seminar and Post-Semi nar
UNIT: %
GRID STYLE
9-9 9.1 -
5.5 -
1.9 -
1.1
3
PRE-SEMINAR 73 4 14 6
POST-SEMINAR 28 23 33 14 2
(Sour- : Korean Air)
This figure indicates t h a t the majority(73~) of the participants

belived themselves to be 9.9 s t y l e before the seminar. But after the
seminar, only 28% of t h e participants evaulated themselves as 9.9 style.
( 2 ) A comparison study of performance values.
The goal of this task is to reexamine the performance values they

hold now .and compare them mi t h the values they held prior t o the seminar.
Before the seminar, 7& of the participants belived that they should
manage their cockpit in 9.9 style. But after the seminar, the percentage
shifted up to 90%.
( 3 ) Percept ion of a gap
We can chart a comparisim of the results.

Tab1 e 7. Perception of Gap between Pre-Seminar and Pos t-Seminar
, .
90%
78%
P E R F O W VALUE
73% -.
- STYLE
GRID
. 2877
PRE-SEMINAR POST-SMINAR
They found t h e results to be significant. As ,you can see, the 9 . 9

performance values shift upward (7& + 90%) : Further away from what the
flight crews consider to be their own behavior. This "TWO-WAY" shift
indicates a greater perception of the gap between current style and
desired performance value, And thus, a greater readiness t o the
i mpl i cat i ons of the resul t s and begin moving behavior toward desired
performance.
3. Evaluation
Flight crew effectiveness increases through greater teamwork and

cooperation. The Korean Air experience with CREY1 seminars demonstrates
that participants increase their self-awareness of current behavioral
style compared to desired performance.It is this awareness that leads to
changes in behavior, and thus, increased flight crew effectiveness. The
goal of increasing flight safety by reducing human error is thereby
achieved.
The participants evaluation of this seminar was expressed as FULLY
"
REWARDING ".
Korean Air has conducted 40 times of this CRM training course since
December 1986 and completed for 750 crew members which is equivalant
about go% of total crew members. Korean Air has aleady started Line
Oriented Flight Training(L0FT) through regular simulator training for
those who completed the above CRM training from July 1992.
Asiana as the newly established airline has not started the CRbl
training and LOFT yet but is strongly suggested to follow the above Korea
Air's program and practice in near future.
IV. Particular considerations to be given in human factor

training in the Oriental culture society
(influenced by Confucianism)
Confucianism is a philosophy based on the ideas of the Chinese

philosopher Confucius. It originated about 500 B.C. From the 100's B.C.
to the A.D. 1990's, Confucianism was the most important single force in
Chinese 1 i fe and also the lives of nearby countries(such as Korea, Japan
and Vietnam).
It influenced their education, government, and att i tudes toward correct
personal behavior and the individuals' duty to society. Confucianism can
more accurately be considered a guide to morality and good government.
Confucius believed his society could be saved if it emphasized
sincerety in personal and public conduct. Confucius defined a gentleman
not as a person of noble birth but as one of good moral character.
A gentleman was truly reverent in worship and sincerely respected his
father and his ruler. He was expected to think for himself, guided by
definite rulers of conduct.
Confucius believed that when gentleman were rulers, their moral example
would inspire those beneath them to lead good lives. Virtuous behavior by
rulers, he declared, had a greater effect in governing than did laws and
codes of punishment,
Like thus, Confucianism emphasized sincerety in personal and public
conduct, a gentleman o f good moral character, respect td his father and
h i s rulers,and particularly virtuous behavior by rulers rather 'than the
laws and codes of punishment.
Then the question is what are the particular considerations to be given
in human factor training i n these Oriental culture society and if it is
necessary.
A tentative finding is that we have to consider some particular -factors
in human factor training in these different culture society.
Through the interviews with the representative o f f i c i a l s , professors,
instructors, inspectors and pi lots vho are concerned in f 1 ight safety,
the major common factors t o be given particular considerations in human
factor training are as follows.
First, Leadership, morality and quality of captain as crew team leader

( rul er ) i s required.
Second, Team work and coordination among cockpit crew members are to
be stressed. ( Particularly for those w i t h long military
background)
Third, Personal relationship among cockpit crew members (based on
education, training background, mi 1 i tary experience : a i r force,
navy or military, native region, nationality, religion and
etc.) is still one of i p r t a n t factors. The more homogeneous
background of cockpit crew meinbers gives the more posi tive
ef dect i n f 1 ight safety than the relatively heterogeneous
background of cockpi t crew members.
Fourth, h t y , responsibility and royalty to the organization of crew
members are t o be stressed.
Fi f th, Understanding, cooperation and assistance of management and
other departments for the promotion of f l i g h t safety are
absolute1y necessary.
Sixth, Flight accident investigation should be done primarily for the
prevention of further accident and for the promotion of the
flight safety rather than for the p u n i s h n t of flight crews.
Otherwise flight crews may not report full detai 1s of their
errors or failures to protect themselves and i t may result
another accident,
The prel iminary research demonstrates as fol lows ;

(1) human factors (of personal and morale character) are stronger in the
Oriental society of Confucianism than in the Western society af
Christianism.
(23 The qualiflcation of captain as team leader is the most imporant
factor contributing t o flight safety.
(3) To improve effective teawork and coordination of cockpit crews
which is also impartant factor -in flight safety, personal relationship
among crew members based on educat'i ona l background ( schools ) , mi l i t ary
experiences, native places, seniority and etc. should be also carefully
considered.
( 4) Understanding, positive cooperation and assistance of the managemant
for the promotion of flight safety are very important and absolutely
necessary.
V. Conclusion
This section presents summary of discussions and suggestions for future
development of human factors training and promotion of flight safety in
Korea.
In accordance with the review of the past accidents in Korea, major
causes of accidents are human factors such as pilots and maintenance
persons like the examples of other countries, and about 50% of total
accidents were occurred during the stages of take-off and landing.
Therefore, to reduce human errors, it is necessary to develop human
factors skills and professional attitude of operation1 personnel in
Korean air transport industry.
To reduce human factor errors, two Korean flag carriers, Korean Air and
Asiana, perform various measures including CRM seminar, LOFT, lectures,
regular meetings of instructors and etc. Korean Air CRM training program
is the most successful model in Korean air transport industry, Asiana as
the young airline is suggested to apply this model.
Regarding the question whether particular considerations to be given in
human factor training in these Oriental culture society, a tentative
finding is that we have to consider some particular factors in human
factor training in Korea as one of Orient culture society. However, this
proposition and finding should be studied and tested further not only in
Korea but in other Oriental society of Confucianism such as China, Japan
and Vietnam.
In addition, government and industry management should pay keen
attention and cooperate to train sufficient pilots and other aviation
specialists in future. Effective cooperation and communication between
flight crews and air traffic controllers also are absolutely required.
To prevent accidents caused by environmental factors, Korean government
has to modernize airport facilities (including microwave landing system :
MLS) up to the level of category 11 and category lII and be we1 1 prepared
with emergency procedures against bad weather (such as wind shear). In
this sense, it is proper and urgently necessary for Korean government to
build New Seoul Metropolitan Airport which is completed around the end of
1997.
Finally, they have to establish new permanent organization of aviation
accidents investigation committee within the Ministry of Transportation
with full-time experts and investigators to promote safety and prevent
accidents in advance.
C i r c u l a r / C i r c ~ l a i r ~ u p ~ n243-AN/146
~1p A-157
The committee members are t o be composed of exports i n aviation

accidents investigation from the govermenrt, academjc institution,
industry. The committee also will study and introduce system and
procedures of other advanced countries i n civil aviatioi. I n general,
Korean government organization i n c i v i l aviation is needed ta be promoted
and enlarged t o manage e f f e c t i v e l y and t o cope with ever increasing
demand and volume of domestic and international air transportation.
References
C i v i l Aviation Bureau, Ministery of Transportation, C i v i l Aviation in

Korea, 1992. Seoul
Gyo-Tong Shin M u n Sa, Gyo-Tong Nyun Gam (Traf f i c Annual)

(1990 - 19921, Seoul, Korea
Hong, Soon-Kil. International Aviation in the Changing Global Order.

Hankuk Aviation University Press 1992, Seoul
Hong, Soon-kil, Aviation Policy-Making in Korea, Hankuk, Aviation

University Press, 1990, Korea
Korean Air, F l i g h t Safety (1990.1 - 1993.21, Seoul
Lee, Tae-Von, Modern Air Transportantion, (Korean) 1991, Seoul Computer

Press, Korea
Wiener Earl L.& Nagel, David C.eds, Human Factors i n Aviation,

Academic Press, Neiv York, 1988
A-158 C i r c u l a r r C i r c ~ l a i r e / r l ~ ~243-AN146
n~p
ICAO FLIGHT SAFETY AND W A N FACTORS

SYMPOSIUM
WASHINGTON DC
April 13-16, 1993
AIM, AIRCREW INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT
A MAlWFAC'RKER'S EXPERIENCE IN
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Eddv IL. RACQ

Senior Director General Research
Aeroformafion
France
T-General
For Airbus Industrie and Aeroformation, since the beginning of the launching
of the first Airbus, the paramount idea has been to obtain the best safety.
To do so, we have obviously used all the tools given by the technology, and
dso from the first transition courses given in 1972 with the frrst Airbus A300,
we tried to integrate as much as possible, the Human Factors aspects within the
technical ones.
In this context we decided to do again better in 1990, and to introduce in our

transition courses, a Crew Resource Management module.
Our CRM course is named AIM, Aircrew Integrated Management, as it is

fulIy integrated within the technical training of the transition course for crew
members, throughout the five weeks they spend in our center.
In this paper, we win describe :

- the evolution of our concepts of Human factors throughout the years
- the process of implementation of this course, that has been a joint effort
between Flight Safety Xntemationd and Aeraformation
- the content of the course
- the feedback from the trainees and the impact of AIM on the results at the
end of the transition 'course
- the analysis of the survey conducted with the help of the University of Texas
(CMAQ = Cockpit Management Attitude Questionnaire)
- the projects of extension of AIM to the other categories of trainees.
2 - Human Factors in Aeroformationls transition courses
As we said previously, even before the implementation of our A.I.M. course,

the Human Factors aspects .and the cockpit resource management concepts,
were taken in account in all our flight crew transition courses.
First, in the gtneraI philosophy of this course, explainmi to trainees in the

Flight Crew Training Manual, F.C.T.M., we can read that "since crew
members are bound to work together in an aircraft, the crew is considered as a
unit as far as training in procedures an aircraft handling is concerned."
Then before trainees begin to learn the details of the systems they are provided
with general information (concept, philosophy) regarding the fly by wire, the
F.M.G.S., the E.C.A.M., and a chapter is specially devoted to the two crew
member philosophy. In this chapter we can note the following points, very
important in the cockpit resource management mining :
- two crew member operations imply :

. crew communication : reduction of non pertinent d s , use of
standard phraseology, ability to be brief
and succinct, good cockpit resource
management
. crew coordination : strict adherence to procedures (normal,

abnormal, emergency) ; any deviation from
these procedures should be avoided. If a
deviation is thought to be needed due to
special circumstances, this must be
announced in advance; If time permits, a
specific briefing must be made so that both
pilots are aware of what is planned.
. cross check : each pilot must know the intentions of the other
. discipline : procedures and task sharing as defined in the official
documents must be strictly followed
- the application of these principles to normal-abnotmallemergency procedures
is then emphasized, for instance :
. normal procedures : sdections and actions made by one pilot are always
c h ~ k e dby h e other pilot independently of their
P.F. or P.N.F. role at the moment,
the autopilot must never.be considered as a pilot at
all times basic flight parameters must be monitored
by the P.F.
Examples are given.
. abnormallemergency procedures : do not rush .
correct identification of failure by 'the crew
request for appropriate E.C. A.M. actions or paper check list
no irreversible action must be accomplished without a positive

cross check and approval by both pilots
- the Captain will decide who will be the P.F. for the subsequent
anormallemergency procedure. He must clearly inform the First Officer of
his decision by saying "1 have control" or 'you have conuol". If he says
"you have controi" he must immediateIy give also instructions concerning
the desired fight path.
- throughout the Fixed Ease Simulator (F.B.S .) and Full Flight Simulator
(F.F.S.) sessions, the instructors check that trainees apply these concepts,
and moreover in certain exercices like precision approaches (Cat TZ and Cat
Ill), they check that the process of challenge-response very clearly and
precisely written in the procedures, is strictly respected,
-
3 hplernentation of A I M
. AIM desien process

The AIM program was designed through a coopesative effort between
Aerofomation and Flightsafety International. b c h brought important and
unique experience to the process. Aerofomation contributed its broad
expertise with the A320 and ather Airbus aircraft and its experience in
training Airbus flight crews. FlightSafety contributed its considerable
experience in cockpit resource management and flight crew training.
The A I M program is based on a two-day CRM workshop which has been

used successfully by Rightsafety for several years. The twoday course was
then highly modified F.O customize it to the specific requirements of
Aeroformation's mining: philosophy.
After careful analysis, it was decided that AIM should be composed of three
distinct elements.
The first is a one-day AIM workshop. This course occurs immediately prior
to beginning A320 VACBI training. It is a highly interactive format that
relies heavily an discussion, exercises and group activity rather than lecture.
The workshop will be described in more detail shortly. '
The second two elements reflect the importance of integrating human factors
considerations into the normal technical training curriculum. As a result,
five sessions in FBS-B and three sessions during FFS training include
dedicated AIM training activity.
. Facilitator traininq
The one-day AIM workshop is conducted by a group of twelve

Aerotbrmation staff. These people are called AIM facilitators, rather than
instructors, to represent the unique style of training used in an A M
workshop.
Facilitator training was accornpiished in two distinct, but related phases.

Dusing phase I, each facilitator participated in ten days of training allowing
them to become thoroughly familiar with the concepts and instructing
techniques used in CRM type training programs. During phase I, each
facilitator received initiai CRM training and then began the process of
becoming a qualified facilitator. They d s o provided valuable input to the
AIM course structure which was undergoing final design,
Phase I1 of facilitator training accomplished final qualification as an AIM

facilitator. During this phase, each facilitator became an expert in all
elements of the Aeroformation AIM course. This phase involved sixteen
days of training which ultimately led to full qualification of each facilitator.
. Instructor trainin<
The unique feature of A M is the integration of human factors training with
technical training. This is accomplished during eight specific FBS-B and
FFS training sessions. Accordingly, it was necessary to train simulator m d
flight instructors in A I M and their unique role in providing this training to
Aeroformation pilot trainees.
Instructor training was accomplished in two phases, similar to the fashion of

the facilitators.
In phase I, each Aeroformathn instructor received three more days of
training. This included a two-day CRM course followd by a briefing on the
ALM-project and the instructors' role in A I M tdning,
Approximately four months lavr, each insmctor received three more &ys
of training. This included the one-day AIM workshop followed by a special
two-day instructor course, At the session, instructors were taught how to
brief, observe, evaluate and debrief A I M performance during FBS-B and
FFS sessions. At the conclusion of the training, each instructor was able to
demonstrate their ability to use this material in training.
. Design vrocess ': Summary
The A M design program began in July, 1990 with the final course being
delivered in January 1991. In January thru March, 1991, all Aeroformation
instmetors were trained and the customer training began in April 2991.
AIM training at the Airbus Training Center in Miami began in October,
1991.
4 - Content of A I M course
4.1 General
As we said previously the pmgtarn designed to be fully integrated into the

Airbus transition training program includes a one day workshop foilowed by
emphasis on AIM techniques during FBS and FFS training.
Several concepts are studied, but as we think that an effective cockpit

management results in a high level of flight crew situational awareness, this
concept is the key theme of A M .
But we don't want just to give theoretical concepts and A I M is designed to

be a practicdI training, focused on skills and tools that can be.used in the
cockpit, so a l l the ideas learned wilI be applied'by the trainees during the
simulator session.
4.2 One dav workshoil
This workshop features short lectures, many facilitators and participants-led

discussions, problem solving exercises, case studies of actual accidents, and
a series of three constructive videos to illustrate Human Factors behaviour
taught during the workshop. This workshop is a very dynamic, ever
expanding program for both the participmts and the faciIitators.
The studied concepts are :
- Situational Awareness {lecture, Slides)

- Error chain Cldem)
- Error chain (Exercise)
- Communication (Idem)
- Communication skills (lecture)
- Barriers to communicate (Exercise)
- Synergy and crew concept WtuW
- Synergy (Exercise)
- Accident case studies Exercise, video)
- Cockpit behavior (3 parts video)
Before the workshop begins, the trainees are asked to fill a survey related to
a NASAKJniversity of Texas study, about cockpit behavior (CMAQ :
Cockpit Management Attitude Questionnaire). The same questionnaire is
filled at the end of the transition course, at FFSG, so that it is possible to
measure the change in behavior due to this training. This study is a
worlwide one, and U.T. provides us with our own results compared to
chose of the rest of the aeronautical community. It is a powerful tool to
improve our course.
A summary of the first results of this survey is given in chapter 6 .
At the end of the d a y facilitators make a summary of the day and receive the
comments from the trainees that are used, if necessary, to modify and
improve our course through the annual revisions.
4.3 Simulator sessions
During 5 FBS and 3 FFS sessions, the simulator instructors, that have also
been specidly trained for that, reinforce some of the concept studied in the
workshop and introduce other ones :
Reinforcement : Situational awarenesslError chain

Communication
Synergy and crew concept
New : Workload managemen f l a s k sharing

Briefings
Reliance on automation
Decision making (plus an exercise)
Stress
The concepts are developed in the briefing, and at the debriefing the
instructor makes comments about the behavior of the crew during the
session, related to this -concept.or to any AIM subject.
In our AIRBUS FFS are video camera allowing to record some parts of the
session, and all the briefing rooms are equipped with video feeback system ;
so the trainees may have a self debriefing of what they done.
This equipment is only used with the agreement af the crew and at the end
of the debriefing the tape is erased in front of them.
At the end of FBS114 the trainees are asked to fill a situational, awareness
plan, that they will try to implement during the FFS sessions.
At the end of FFS 6 they fill the CMAQ questionnaire, plus a short one
precisely directed to AIM, rating the value of the different lectures and
exercises, K, that-we can have a tool to improve bur course.
4.4 Documentation
The trainees are provided with a complete documentation :
- AIM trainee guide ;

In this guide they find copier of all the flip charts and slides presented
during the workshop, and of the flip charts used during the simulator
sessions. They have room to put all the handouts given at the welcome or
during the workshop.
- Practical cockpit management

In this book they find a summary of dl the different studied concepts,
articles from aeronautical reviews and extracts of communic=ations in
various seminars, related to these concepts,
- A I M check list
The trainees are provided with a Human Factors check list, Jeppesen size,
that summarizes the main concepts of AIM, and that they use in their
cockpit if they wish.
This check list enlarged as a poster, is on the walls of each briefing room.
5.1 At the last FFS session (FFS 6, just before the evaluation at FFS 7) trainees
iespond to a survey of 21 questions, allowing us to know what they think of
the course and of the various items that form it.
The result of this survey keeps evolving, as each week we add data from a
course of 10 pi10 ts.
Up to now the main results are very good and very encouraging.
For instance at the question "OveralI, how useful did you find this training"
(one day workshop plus simulator briefings), nobody responds "waste of
time" or "slightly usefultr,only 5.3 % respond "somewhat useful", and 57.9
% respond "very ukefuln, and 36.8 % respond "extremely useful".)
The average nting of the items of the one day workshop and of the
briefings during simulator sessions, is also very good, with often a better
rating for t h e second than for the first ones. That shows that the idea to
divide the course in two parts, and to use the simulator sessions to review
concepts or introduce new ones, was a good one.
The resuits are *as follows, with first the percentage for the one day
workshop, and second the percentage for the briefings sessions :
Waste of time 1,1 0,8 .

Slightly useful 7,3
Somewhat useful 30,3 19,2
Very useful 38 46,4
Extremely useful 23 32
When we compare all these results to those of other CRM courses existing
all around t h e world (by reading press articles or communications made in
symposiums or seminars), we understand that our course is very well
received by our trainees and highly rated by them.
For instance, in a communication of the ICAO seminar of kningrad in

April 1990, we note that for the question "Overall how useful did you find
this training" for two airlines there was 2 % "waste of time", 5 % "slightiy
usefuI", 25 % "somewhat useful", 48, % " v e y useful", and 21 %
"extremely useful", compared to us at 0 - 0 - 5.3 - 57.9 and 36.8 7%.
5.2 Our simulator instructors and training Captains really see a very positive
difference in behavior between the trainees having attended AIM and those
not having done so. There is a better communication between the crew
members, a better crew coordination, and so on, and the success at the first
check is increased. The trainees say that applying the concepts of A I M
during their training sessions is a powerful help that they appreciate very
much.
5.3 Also, a great sign of interest of our customers for this course, is that several
airlines have asked to us to extend this course, given up to now to their
crews coming to Aeroformation, to the other pilots having been trained
before the implementation of AIM or being trained in the airline itself.
Another interesting feedback is that the pilots of the airlines having a CRM
course in house, find that A I M is very powerful as a recurrent or refresher
training.
A- 166 Circubr/Circulaire/rlup~nstp243-Ahf/116
-
6 Results of CMAO (Cockpit Management Attitudes Ouestionnairel
6.1 Aeroforrnation works with a team of researchers from NASA/University of

Texas, directed by professor Robefi ' HELMREICH and doctor John
WIL.HELM, on a study rdated 10 the effectivmws of all of CRM courses,
and based on the use of the CMAQ (Cockpit Management Attitudes
Questionnaire).
The results given here are related to 44 courses, concerning 346 trainees,
going from ApriI 1991 to April 1992.
The NASAiUT's report underlines that A M "is a unique approach which

combines Human Factors and Technical Training into the initid and
upgrade cusriculum". It adds that "since integrated CTiM mining will
become mandatory for air carriers and training centers opting to accornpIish
training under the FAA's Advanced Qualification Program, results obtained
from this program ( A M ) will be particularly interesting".
6.2 Generally speaking, AIM training is very we11 received ; the majority of our
trainees responded to the question "How useful did you find the training ?"
by choosing the "Very Useful" response. (Figure 1). The average rating of
this item is 4,OS of a possible 5 , and this can be equated with a global "Very
Useful" response.
Rating of the utility of AIM for other crew members were similar to the
rating cited above (Figure 2).
6.3 On figure 3 we see that almost 75 % of our trainees choose "Agree

strongly" when asked to judge the statement "CRM training has the
potential ta increase safety and crew effectiveness",
Nevertheless we have a very small percentage (< I %) of "Disagree

strongly" ; we don't know if it is related to the well known '"oomerang
effect", but anyway it is far less than the usual percentage of this
boomerang effect, that is of around 4 %.
Concerning the expczted change of behaviour on the flight deck, Figure 4

shows that the biggest part is devoted to a "Moderate change" ( 35 %) and
"Flight Change" ( 32 %), and this is normal for the first exposure to a
CRM course ; myway nearly 21 % expect a " h g e Change" and this is
very encouraging.
6.4 We can slee on Figure 5 that a statistically significant attitude change is noted
for the "Cornmunicatian and Coordination" scale, in the positive direction,
indicating improved attitudes about cornrnunica&on and coordination of
activities between crew members after AIM mining. This can be linked-up
to the observations made by our instructors and our check-pilots (9 5.2)
6.5 There is a large and statisally significant change in attitudes taped by the
"Reliance on automation" scale (Figure 6), and this reflects a gmd feling
about the airplane due to the transition course training. Ir is not at all an
overconfidence or overreliance on automation, as we can see pn the next
figures :
- Figure 7 : "When using cockpit automation it is less important to double

check crew member inputs automation", 85 % Of trainees disagre
strongly
- Figure 8 : " ~ n c m ' e dautomation reduces the need for crew

communication' 75 9% of trainees disagree strongly.
- Figure 9 : "Automatic protections reduce the requirement for crew

members to monitor systems and flight status1;,80 95 of trainees disagree
strongly
So, dl that shows that pilots are confident in the use of the automation, but
are vigiIant in its use by the application of the rules teached during their
transition training, that we could summarize by the well known concept
"Trust but verify1'.
7 - Extension of AIM
--*
At the beginning, in order to fine tune it and to test its effects, AIM has only
been provided to A320 crew members in transition training, from April 1991.
In September 1992 we began to extend this training to A340 pilots, and in early
1993 we also will extend it to A310 crew members, than later to A330, A321,
A319, etc ....
We are studying the feasability to impIement a Human Factors cdurse for
maintenance people, but it is a more difficult question as m e background of
maintenance people varies widely from one category to the other, and as the
duration of their stay in the training cknter is very different from one course to
another. Anyway we' work on this subject and we hope to implement such a
module, next year.
FinaIly we will try also to develop a human factors module for flight attendants,
as they contribute with the technical crew, to the safety of the fight ; for
instance, for them, a very good communication and coordination with the
cockpit is of a paramount importance in case of an emergency.
8 - Conclusion
Our A I M program is now in service for two years, and we are very happy of
the results obtained, visible through the data reduction of the questionnaires
f i l l d by the trainees, and also through the better results in the check sessions.
This course is evolving due to the feedback and comments of trainees,
facilitators, instructors, and the Revision 1 is now implemented. We are sure
that with this program we have brought a goad contribution to the level of safety
in the Airline pibts work.
OVERALL ATTITUDE CHANGE POST-CRM RESPONSES TO THE ITEM :
ON THE CMAQ "RELIANCE 4. WHEN USING COCKPIT AUTO., IT IS
ON AUTOMATION" SCALE LESS IMPT. TO DOUBLE CHECK
' CREWMEMBER INPUTS
Scale range :5-25 Percent giving each response
mLmnq O P ~ I - ~ * ~
L
JV 10
18 80%
70%
16 60%
50"/0
14 40%
3 09'0
12 20°/'
10%
Reliancs on automatron"' O"/o Disagree Disagree Nw~ral Agree Agrm
srmngty slightly slightly strongly
Fig. 6 Fig. 7
POST-CRM RESPONSES TO THE ITEM : POST-CRM RESPONSES TO THE ITEM :

5. INCREASED AUTOMATION 20. AUTO. PROTECTIONS REDUCE
REDUCES THE NEED FOR THE REQ FOR CREWMEMBERS
CREW COMMUNICATIONS TO MONITOR SYS AND FLT STAT
P a m t giving each response Pemnr giving each response

8090r 100% r
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Neuml Agree Agree
swngty si~ghtEy sllighdy sn&ngly saongly slightly sCghrty strongly
Fig. 8 Fig. 9
OVERALL ATTITUDE CHANGE ON THE CMAQ
"COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION" SCALE
Scale Range : I 1-55
50 r
Communication and Coordination*'

.post attitude change "pc.005
Fig. 5
OVERALL, HOW USEFUL DID YOU HOW USEFUL WILL SUCH TRAINING
FIND THIS TRAINING? 8E FOR OTHER CREW MEMBERS?
Percent of students giving each response Peraant of-studentsgiving each response
V
Wasre Slimhtlv Somewhat Verv Extremelv ' Waste slightly Sarnewhaf Ven/ Extremely
Fig.2
CRM TRAINING HAS THE POTENTlAL IS THE TRAINING GOING TO CHANGE

TO INCREASE SAFETY AND YOUR BEHAVIOR ON
CREW EFFECTIVENESS THE FLIGHTDECK?
Percent ot students giving esch response Pemnr of students giving each response
80 r 40 r
Y
Disagree Qisagrea Neutral Agree Agree No R slight A moderate A large
strongly Slightly slightiy smngly change change change change
A HUMAN FACTORS corn-
Captain F l e m i n g Kirkegaard
Chairman Human Factors Committee
Danish Civil Aviation Administration
To combat and to gain victory over human factors in aircraft accidents and incidents is like
attacking a many-headed monster. Cut off one head and it grows out again in a new shape.
Throughout the last four decades barely no reduction in the relative percentage of human factors
caused accidents in air traffic has been recorded despite much effort.
The weapon to defeat accidents caused by human factors has yet to be designed, and if .
designed yet to be recognized and understood by its potential users.
We compliment all dedicated to the task of trying to reduce human factors caused accidents, but
especially ICAO for its strong leadership in this field during the last decade.
1 speak on behalf of the Danish Civil Aviation Administration (QCAA), Human Factors
Committee (HFC). A committee which is appointed by the Director Aviation Inspection Dqartment
(Director AID) and which has 5 members.
The purpose of the HFC is to propose initiatives for the DCAA to reduce and prevent aircraft
accidents caused by human factors. Initiatives which in a clear manner can be communicated to all
involved. It is our belief, that a strong interptay between regulatory agencies and operators is
required. We believe in the necessity to influence togmanagement to recognize human factors as a
major target in the accident prevention efforts.
Sharing our experience
There are two reasons tbr our wish to present a paper at this symposium.
One reason is to inform the audience of the DCAA, HFC which we believe could be a model for
smaller states. We have found our set-up encouraging. The other reason is to present an example of
our work. An example which we feel quite strongIy about and the conclusions of which we are
assured will constitute a strong defence against the most often recorded cause factor in aircraft
accidents: Deviation from Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).We have a very strong wish to share
our experience with you and we hope that this experience somehow will be beneficial to the aviation
society.
Aviation in Denmark
The flagcarrier in Denmark is Scandinavian Airlines System, SAS, a major international

airline which also has Norway and Sweden as shareholders. In addition there are three major
charteroperators, a number of commuters and general aviation companies. The total number of
aircraft movements at Danish airports, including Greenland and the Faroe Islands amounts to 640.000
a year (1991). All operators perform flight safety work either through specialized functions or through
appointed individuals. At higher levels the DCAA and the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board carry
out ff ight safety work in the traditional manner.
No operator has a specialized human factors function as such or anyone specifically assigned
to this area.
Civil Aviation Authorities and Human Factors
A few words on history.
A number of years ago the DCAA realized that it might be beneficid to look at flight safety
more specifically than through regulations alone.
The DCAA therefore establish4 a HFC drawing upon the expertise of persons fcorn various parts of
the aviation industry.
Through some years this HFC discussed a wide variety of subjects, but only in a few cases
provided advice to the DCAA.
Generally the conclusions on a given subject were in those days insufficiently structured. An
important reason for not fulfilling its own ambitions was that the HFC had the opinion that all
conclusions had to be extensively documented and anchored in the existing regulations instead of
simply being well argumented. This opinion sealed off the HFC from the outside world.
Thus the work of the HFC went more or less unnoticed. Despite this the members still
maintained a fairly high spirit.
The Human Factors Committee of Today
It i s a wellknown fact that the right crewcomposition is of paramount importance to mission

effectiveness. And that teamwork is to pull in the same direction. And at the same time.
This was very clearly demonstrated approximately 4 years ago' when the HFC was reformed
and at the same time an additional new member was appointed. This caused an immediate and
remarkable effect on the performance and the quality of the output from the HFC. More or less
simultaneously a new Director AID was appointed. This director immediately realized the potential of
the HFC.He showed interest in the work of the committee. What better motivation factor can be
found?
The synergy effect was very strong.
The HFC really took off!
Composition of the Human Factors Committee
The HFC of today is composed of the follawing members:

- A captain representing the flight operations managers
of all scheduledlnonscheduled operators in Denmark.
- A captain representing all pilot union organisations in Denmark.
- A senior aviation psychologist.
- A highranking administrator from the DCAA.
- The Head of the independant National Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.
No status is demonstrated in the sequencing. Everybody is of equal voice.
The operational expertise of the HFC is encompassing.
It has been demonstrated that the composition of the HFC is wise. Together the knowledge-
bank of the members covers most of the aviation fields. They have at their disposal in the DCAA the
required expertise in the field of aviation medicine.
The traditional, in Scandinavia at least, scepticism between the employer and the employee,
has never been an issue as both parties are represented and are locked together in a common interest.
The HFC is advisor to the Director AID.
It is very important to emphasize that the HFC has an advisory role only and no authority
except where specifically given by the Director AID.
Terms of Reference
1. To stay informed and in touch with developments and trends in the human
factors fields in aviation.
2. To advice the Director AID on any issue in the human factors field which has
or might have a bearing on flight safety.
3. To give priority to tasks concluded and to forward recommendation for
action to the Director AID.
4. To conclude tasks appointed by the Director AID.
Authority
1. To select subjects by own choice.

2. To discuss any human factors related subject brought to the attention of the
committee from outside- or inside sources.
3. To request assistance from specialists/experts.
4. To suggest formation of working groups to handle special tasks.
The HFC chooses its own chairman who decides upon frequency of the meetings. These take
place approximately every 6-8 weeks and if required at shorter intervals.
Policy
To ensure that human factors are implemented in accident prevention

efforts.
A-174 243-AN/146
Standard
To forward to the Director AID conclusions which are concise, based upon facts, balanced
and well argumented.
Major tasks concluded within the last 4 years:
- Advice on compulsory retirement age for airline pilots.

- Information folder on jet lag for aircrew (5000 copies)
- Analysis on the flightsafety effectslaftereffects of industrial disputes.
- Standard Operating Procedures.
- Structured guidance material to flying schools on the teaching of human
performance and limitations.
- Policy on recertification of alcoholic flight crew members.
The last four years have to us demonstrated, once again, that it takes the right kind of
persons, the right kind of organization and timing to breed success.
Success cannot be achieved unless you have the energy to reach the objective. All present
members of the HFC have surely had that. Emphasizing this is the fact that all members are working
on a voluntarily basis and without pay. Two members have so far been appointed for 15 years, one
for 8 and two for 4 years. This demonstrates a strong motivation for the task.
An Example of Our Work
As mentioned the HFC would like to share with you the experience of one of our initiatives.
When speaking of our subject the interplay between the training- and the operational field is
of paramount importance for flight safety.
The initiative is meant to be a strong defence against the most often recorded causefactor in
aircraft accidents. We sure hope you will agree to our conclusions. We feel confident that you will.
The industry has clearly established and documented that the most serious causefactor in
aircraft accidents is deviation from SOP'S. Boeing studies document that deviation from SOP'S is a
causefactor in approx. 35% of all human factors related aircraft accidents.
As this figure was confirmed by accident - and incident statistics in Denmark, and as a large
safety profit was to be gained by a reduction in this area we decid-ed to analyse the SOP problem.
We will tell you in short how we came to a conclusion.

We were aware that a major cause for deviation was to be found in behavioural factors.
We knew that flight safety is based on sound policies and procedures in daily operations.
We had no reason to doubt that The DCAA approved policies and procedures applied in Denmark
basically were sound. However, working through a number of operators flight operationslaircraft
operations manuals a number of weak points nevertheless were revealed. Our studies also revealed
that SOP were to be found in a variety of publications. We now listed a number of reasons as to why
pilots might deviate from SOP. By this listing a clear picture surfaced.
C i r c u ~ a r / G i r c ~ ~ a i ~ u p r c243-AM/I#6
yn~p A-175
This is the list:
Ambiguous procedures.
Insufficient review of procedures.
Poor knowledge of procedura .
Poor seifdiscipline by the Pilot-in-command.
Indifference to procedures.
Complacency
Insufficient training of procedures.
Chaotic prmentation of procedures.
Pilot-in-command a "Baser-W isser",
No training of procedures,
Home made procedures.
Poor quaIity control of procedures.
Flight instructors' application of procedures undiscipIined (insufEicient
knowledge).
Supervisory captain's application of procedures undisciplined (insufficient
knowledge).
Wrong procedures (those which then are not followed after a while).
Wrong presentationlno presentation of procedures.
New procedures trickling down the line but not documented in FOMIAOM.
We concluded that a reduction of accidents related to deviations from SOP'S were possible by
efforts in several areas, for instance simulator training in real-time, more emphasis placed on correct
procedure application during simulator training with retraining requirement at poor performance levels
and by management peridically communicating structured information on procedure awareness.
We found af cheaper solution though. A solution which would very much strenghten SOP by
highlighting its structure and acknowledging its importance.
We caocluded that a CAA enforced mandatory requirement for systemization of SOP'S for each
aircraft type could eliminate a lot of problems, By suggesting this we don't claim to have found the
philosofer's stone. We are convinced that most, if not all, first level carriers have systemized their
SOP'S. But we are equally convinced that a very great number of operators have their SOP'S
presented haphamidly throughout the operators and aircraft documentation.
What we want is to provide a pilot, whoever, working for whatever operator and with
whichever level of experience with a tool easily managed by which an aircraft should be operated. We
want all SOP now to be found throughout the Flight Operation Manual nnd aircraft documentation to
be removed from their various chapters, collected logically and presented in ONE chapter, namely
CHAPTER ONE in the Aircraft Operation Manual.
A systemization would simplify learning, reviewing, checking, correcting, confirming,

presenting.
And so on.
We also feel assured that a systemization would throw a bridge across to crewmembers having
difficulties with SOP in daily operation. The tyrannical captain would have a harder time trying to
enforce his own homemade procedures when company SOP are stated clearly, unambiguously and are
easily found in one place.
The nonassertive co-pilot would have strong weapon to use against the tyrannical captain by
simple referring to CHAPTER ONE which is easily consulted.
CHAPTER ONE is to be named "Ground and Flight Procedures" and is to consist of the following
subchaptets:
- Normal checklkttlExpanded checklist
- General:
Maneuvering, Thmt management, Braking, AFS , Navigation, Icing,

Turbulence, Stall, GPWS-procedure, Trimming,
- Ground operations:
Maneuvering, Use of lights, Use of thrust, Use of brakes, Use of anti-ice

systems, De-icing, Parking, Turn circle, Aircraft ground clearence, Safety
distances (Thrust),
- Take Ofk
General, Flapstslatslthmst setting, NAP, SpegdslTrim, Navigation,

Normallabnormal TIQ and climb out proc.lprofile, Discontinued TIO, X-wind
T/O, TI0 on contaminated RW, Met.conditions affecting T I 0 such as
Temp.lPress.JWindshear, Anti-ice systems.
Thrust setting, Speeds, Turbulence; Anti-ice systems.

- Cruise:
Flight level selection, S p d s , Turbulence, Stability.
Speed, Profile, Anti-ice systems.

- Approach:
General, Maneuvering, Flaplslat setting; Speeds, Std. instrument app .,CAT

fllnl, Pattern, CalI+uts, GIA's on all eng.1 with eng.fail., VMC app., Low
circuit patterns, Anti-ice systems, Windshear, App. with eng-fail.
Speed, Trim, Thrust management, Braking, Normal landing, Stopping

techniques, X-wind landings, Aircraft control, AbrmrmaI flapslslats, Landing
with eng.fail., Overweight landing.
The CAA regulation might be word4 very brief as follows:
"An operator engaged in schduled or non-scheduled commercial airtranspoq using rnulticrew aircraft
must for each such aircraft type operated develop and document SOP'S. SOP's must be presented
separately and must at least include standard procedures for all normal, abnormal and emergency
procedures. It is the operators responsibility to ensure compliance with standardized application of
SOP'S."
CHAPTER ONE which we envisage as a DESIGNATOR known with time by pilots

worldwide as THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES CHAPTER would typically for a
modern technology heavy aircraft contain about 4045 A4 pages,
Finally let me mention that in Denmark we have, in more that one case, experienced
difficulties during transition Erom old - to modern technology aircraft. DCAA inspections have clearly
identified insufficient structure of SOP's as one reason.
References.
1. Sears,R.L. "A New Look At Accident Contributors and the lrnplication of Operational and
Training Procedures". 38th International Flight Safety Foundation Symposium, Nov.
1985.
2. Lautman L.G."The Air Safety Story: Where We've Been And Where We're Headed". Flight
Safety Foundation, 42nd IASS, Athens, 1989.
THE DEVELOPMEm OF HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS
AND PROFESSIONAL ATTITWES
Capt. Hans Sypkens
Chairman, IFALPA Human Performance Committee
Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,
I thank ICAO for the opportunity to address you today on behalf of IFALPA.
It is a great honour indeed to participate in such an extensive programme as the one ICAO has
undertaken in Human Factors.
IFALPA thinks of training for Human Factors skills as being of high value. Worldwide developments
have come a long way, yet we can improve a lot. Looking at this process of development I would like
' to make some specific comments and remarks but with a word of caution.
With all the emphasis given today on various CRM training, LOFT and new developments such as
instruments for precise feedback on specific behaviour patterns in the cockpit, it is quite possible that
one loses the broad context in which solutions for the Human Factor problems are being sought.
Training in Human Factors Skills using LOFT scenarios is NOT the complete answer to the H.F.
problems but is only PART of the answer. There is some bind of paradox here. It is what I call the
training paradox, and this I will explain later.
Discussion
Ladies and Gentlemen, because the aim of this Symposium is to explore new devdopments in training
for Human Factors Skills of Proffesional Attitudes, allow me to explain our ideas as to how we see an
ideat integrated training in the future based on the knowledge and findings of today in this area.
Starting from scratch we would give ab-initio pilots a formal education .in Human Factors, part of
which includes knowledge of aviation physiology and psychology.
Educating the ab-initio pilot during his first years of basic training in physiology is as difficult as
educating him in aerodynamics or aircraft instruments.
Educating a pilot in physiology will acquaint him or her with the physid limitations of the body. The
pilot taking an exam will find questions on such items as hypoxia, hyperventilation, spatial
disorientation, visual: illusions, intoxication by tobacco, alcohol and drugs. They will also include
fatigue, body rhythms and sleep strategies.
How important is it to have knowledge of these subjects?

An example. Did you realize that you can actually suffer From mild hypoxia when flying a normal
trip of 4 or 10 hours at a cabin altitude of 8000 feet?
Did you know &at this reduces your night vision and that it reduces your colour distinction ability by
up to 401T Smoking, even passive, aggravates these effects significantly.
This is perhaps more common to you, the visual illusion. This runway tells us we are more or less on
a normal 3 degrees glide slope.
However this is a projsction of a runway with equal lenm but standard runlffay width. In fact we are
high on the approach as we take out the fist runway, causing dangers of high sinkrates and/or late
touchdowns. Our senses fooled us.
Chapter 2 of the 8th edition of ICAO Annex 1 now has the compulsory rquirement that pilots should
have appropriate knowledge of human performance and limitations. But how many countries have
actually examinations in physiology in place nowadays?
But it is important for pilots to understand their physical limitations.
It is thus important to have such mandatory examinations in place in the very near future.
What a b u t Psychology?
Educating people in relatively easily understood subjects like aviation physiology just mentioned is
one thing but educating pilots in pmfessiorral attitudes towards their job and towards other people is
quite another.
Doesn't that belong to one's character? Are we talking abut changing one's character?
No, we cannot change the traits of one's character. A trait is quite a stable quality of any one person,
Even if one is willing to change one's character, it is very hard to do so, if at all possible. It is not
necesarry either.
On the other hand we can change our behaviour. Behaviour is the way we act, the way we talk and
what we say.
Actual1y, we are Iooking for effective behavioural patterns inside and outside the cockpit. In this
respect a good pilot is aware of what his own behavior does to others.
It is possible to train people in this manner. We have seen this in the CRM Feedback and Appraisal
System presentation this morning and in Professor Helmreich's presentation.
There are a number of Human Factor skills we should master. Realize that subjects like Decision-
making and Leadership are skills which can actually be learned.
When given proper feedback we can improve on our Professional Attitudes such as Assertiveness and
Self-Criticism as well.
IFALPA very strong believes that this kind of CRM-related training should be given from the
beginning when the pilot-to-be enters a flying school.
The motivation to these people is very high and they will virtually do and learn everything necessary
in their great desire to become a pilot. We still know this feeling from our younger years.
The bottom line is that they are more open-minded to these relatively "non-technical" issues than at
anytime later in their career. They are young, can still be moulded and absorb these things better.
This non-technical training should be fully integrated in the day-today training programmes so as to
develop sound attitudes.
The big advantage is the availability of sufficient time, normally a couple of years, to accomplish this.
This compares to CRM courses with the rather unfortunate duration of 3 or 4 days. Or, if you are
lucky, some more days during a second follow-up course, as is the case nowadays. The people
attending these CRM courses are already pilots, &ere is no essential need for hem to do hard work
on these issues.
They are already rather set in their ways, they probably even have to "unlearn" some practices. This
is a waste of energy really.
Still following the lines of this ideal integrated training, there will be no need anymore for airline
pilots to attend to CRM courses simply because they had been well educated at flying school.
In the airline however we will by all means see Recurrent Training in Human Factors Skills.
.Feedback should be given on specific behaviour and behaviour patternsrelated to Human Factor
Skills and Professional Attitudes, using LOFT, video feedback etc.
The objective being in the end that all training and checks is "Human Performance Impregnated".
But even when starting today it still takes the time of a whole career to train every pilot in this
manner. In the meantime we need Human FactorstCRM "conversion" courses as we know nowadays.
As I said before even an ideal training is only part of the answer to the Human Factors problems. The
field of Human Factors is far broader, ranging from cockpit displays and the design of controls to
organizational philosophies. All these affect the performance of the human in their own way.
Let us therefore have a look at the role of the pilot in this "Aviation System".
If we compare the "Aviation System" with a football match, the goalkeeper represents the people on
the working floor; the mechanic, the air traffic controller, the pilot.
He has to stop all the shots at goal which result from mistakes apparently made earlier in the system.
By giving the goalkeeper more and better training, such as CRM training, he is able to stop the
results of even more mistakes. In other words we have created a "Super Keeper" and the performance
1 flight safety level will probably increase. However, if we are at the same time not improving our
defences, the mid fielders, the strategy, the organization etc. there is no use in having a very busy
"Super Keeper".
Here is the training contradiction.
The better crews are able to cope with deficiencies in the system, the less likely it is that the root
causes of Qese deficiencies will be dealt with.
Why? Because advanced training will show improvement in overall safety: For many people this is
proof that the problem has been adequately dealt with. They will be very reluctant to address these
deficiencies which costs effort and money.
Relying on training as an answer to a flaw in design or organization is not a good strategy.
Because of these deficienciestlatent failures, the pilots will be set up, time and time again to make
errors. One day, in a different set of circumstances they will make that fatal error in spite of
advanced (CRM) training.
This is not an argument against such programmes as CRM and LOFT. On the contrary. But it shows
that it is only Part of the answer and that we have more to .do.
Before I conclude, I would just add a few words on the present situation in Europe regarding Human
Factors skill tests.,
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) regard Human Factor skills as very important. Consequently
they are proposing new requirements for Multi-crew Type ratings and ATPL skill t&. As well as
for profchecks in the Multi-crew concept. Applicants shall be checked on issues as crew aperation,
effective communication, setting priorities and decision making.
Summery.
We believe that CRM training should be fully integrated in the ab-iaitio training scheduIe. Recurrent
training in Human Factor skills should be ongoing. Feedback should be directed towards specific
behaviouc (patterns).
We should realize that advanced training is only part of rhe answer. Much more effort must be
directed at solving existing deficiencies rather then trying to train them away.
To err is human. Even so, let us try to find out WHY!!

A-I82 243-dN/146
Circular/CircuIaira/Uup~yn~p
-DOCUMENTATION.
SOFTWARE
-PHYSIOLOGY
CRM
TRAINING
-PSYCHOLOGY
HUMAN
FACTORS
-DESIGN
-INCOMPATIBLE GOALS
ORGANIZATIONS
-ATC
C : i r c u h & C i ~ ~ u i u i ~ u243-A
p ~ y W146
~~~p A-183
FULLY INTEGRATED CRM TRAINING IN

AB-INITIO TRAININGS SCHEDULES
ONGOING RECURRENT TRAINING IN

HUMAN FACTOR SKILLS AND
PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES
FEJTDBACK DIWTED TOWARDS SPECIFIC BEHAVIOWR PAYTERFIS
ADVANCED TRAINING CRMILOE"T, IS .
ONLY PART OF THE ANSWER TO

HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS
HUMAN FACTORS AND TRAINING ISSUES IN CFIT
ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
Capt. Roberto ~ r o s k g u i
Vice-president, Flight Training, Aerolineas Argentinas
. and
Capt. Daniel Maurino
Secretary, Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Group, ICAO
INTRODUCTION
A controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident or incident is one in which an aircraft, under
the control of the crew, is flown into terrain (or water) with no prior awareness of the impending
disaster on the part of the crew (Wiener, 1977). Statistics suggest that close to 45 per cent of aircraft
losses during the period 1979-1990 fall into this category (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992). This has
led the international community, including the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the
International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), the Flight Safety Foundation @SF)
and the International Air Transport Association ( ATA), to multiply its efforts to reduce CFIT
accidents and incidents.
Concern over CFIT occurrences was first reflected in regulations the 1970's, after a B-727
struck a mountain during a non-precision approach to Dulles, Virginia. A premature descent was
attributed to ambiguous pilot-controller communications and unclear information in the approach chart
(ZUSB-AAR-75-16). This was one in a series of accidents in which otherwise airworthy aircraft were
flown into the surface by properly certificated flight crews. The solution was deemed to lie in the
implementation of the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) requirement for large, turbine-
powered airplanes engaged in international operations (ICAO Annex 6, 1978) and its ground
counterpart, the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) as a feature of the automated radar
terminal system (ARTS-3) (Loomis and Porter, 1981). Although GPWS has reduced CFIT
occurrences, it has still fallen short of fulfollingthe expectations with which it was introduced. Slatter
(1993) provides an excellent account of the shortcomings in the introduction of the GPWS as well as
operational solutions to improve GPWS effectiveness as a safety net.
During the 1980's, efforts to find solutions to CFIT occurrences were directed at enhanced
flight crew performance. Several approach and landing accidents attributed to breakdowns in crew
coordination and discipline acted as triggers. Crew resource management (CRM) and Line-Oriented
Flight Training (LOFT) (Cooper, White and Lauber, 1979; Lauber and Foushee, 1981; Orlady and
Foushee, 1986, Wiener, Kanki and Helmreich, 1993), emphasizing the need for improved intra-
cockpit communication, exchange of relevant operational information and situational awareness
boomed across the airlines. This was accompanied by the inevitable, age-old exhortations about
cockpit discipline and professional behaviour, elusive terms which escape sound definition and only
generate unimaginative solutions with rather dubious results. As with GPWS, although the
contribution of CRM and LOFT to aviation safety has been monumental, the continuing pervasiveness
of human error in CFIT occurrences suggests that Human Factors training is only a partial solution to
CFIT occurrences.
Reducing CFIT occurrences requires recognition that such accidents are system-induced
(Wiener, 1973, i.e., they are generated by shortcomings in the aviation system, including
deficiencies in the organizations which constitute it. The accident in which a DC-10 crashed into an
active volcano in Antarctica (Aircraft Accident Report No. 79-139) because incorrect navigation
coordinates in the computer-generated flight plan deviated the aircraft from its assumed track has been
asserted as an example of these shortcomings and the systemic nature of CFIT occurrences (Mahon,
1981; Vette, 1984; Johnston, 1985; Mcfarlane, 1991). Deploying people and funds -- always finite
resources -- in furthering regulations, design or training will not likely improve CFIT statistics.
Actions aimed at reducing CFIT should address system failures and organizational deficiencies
(Reason, 1990), since these are the areas where the greatest gains in safety improvement can be
realized.
BACKGROUND
In dealing with CFIT occurrences, the industry has so far followed a time-honoured approach.
Upon observing one particular safety deficiency (CFIT), remedial action, essentially backwards-
looking and aimed only at that deficiency led to regulations (Annex 6 and others), design (GPWS and
MSAW) and training (CRM and LOFT). Such remedial action based on regulations, design and
training worked reasonably well in the past; when the level of technology aviation employed to-
achieve its production goals (transportation of people and goods safely and efficiently) was relatively
low, and the interactions between people and technology therefore simple and predictable. On the
other hand, the relatively low level of technology utilized up to the 1970's imposed considerable
limitations on system goals, which in turn denied the system opportunities to foster human error.
Examples of these limitations include, among others, simple air traffic control systems, high weather
minima, flexible schedules, shorter legs, and more layovers which alleviated circadian disrhythmia.
Most important, equipment was simple and transparent in use, it demanded basic cognitive skills and
it responded to well-rehearsed mental models.
Although systemic elements can be found in accidents and incidents since the beginning of
aviation, human error in times of low technology was more a consequence of operational personnel
improperly applying their knowledge and skills (due to shortcomings in equipment design, deficient
training or silent regulations) than a result of stringent system demands. Within this context,
strengthening or adding local defenses (Maurino, 1992) through regulations, design or training
appeared a sensible approach to follow. The "sterile cockpit rule", enacted as a consequence of an
accident in which a Douglas DC-9 crashed 5,3 km short of the runway at Charlotte, North Carolina (NEB-
AAR-75-9) stands as a good example. Such an approach provided considerable yields and elevated
aviation to its status as the safest mode of transportation. The irony behind this progress is that
equipment designed to provide wider berth to human error eventually imposed greater demands over
the very humans they were supposed to alleviate, by increasing system production demands.
Technical advances are seldom used to increase the safety of the aviation system as a whole by
creating wider safety margins. They are frequently used to stretch system limits, leaving safety
margins largely unchanged.
Aviation in the 90s has become an extremely complex and sensitive system, in the sense that
even the smallest interference can lead to catastrophic consequences. To minimise human error and
maximise production, high-technology has been introduced on a large scale. Those who watched this
introduction with impartiality suggest two basic flaws in the process: (1) the introduction was
technology-driven rather than human-centred (Billings, 1992), and (2) it stopped short at the micro
rather than at the macro level of system design analysis (Meshkati, 1992). The cons.quence of the
first point is that technology. has not eliminated human error but rather displaced it (Wiener, 1988).
The consequence of the second is that the system complicated and difficult to grasp conceptually.
New high technology is inherently opaque. As of today, the consequences of the interactions among
people, technology and other system components in the safety of the system remain largely unknown
(Reason, 1992).
People and technology interact at each human-machine interface. Both components are highly
interdependent, and operate under the principle of joint causation (Pidgeon, 1991), i.e., people and
machines are affected by the same causal events in the surrounding environment. Furthermore, these
interactions do not take place in a vacuum, but within the context of organizations, their goals,
policies and procedures (Bruggink, 1990). Understanding the principle of joint causation and the
influence of the organizational context upon the aviation system operations is central to understanding
CFIT occurrences and their prevention. Such understanding will preclude the piecemeal approaches
based on design, training or regulations which have plagued past safety initiatives. Looking into the
organizational context will permit one to evaluate whether organizational objectives and goals are
consistent or conflicting with the design of the organization, and whether the operational personnel
have been provided with the necessary means to achieve such goals.
DISCUSSION
The success of the windshear training aid package (FAA, 1987) in reducing windshear-induced
accidents has lured the aviation community into adopting similar approaches to solve other observed
safety deficiencies. The recently produced takeoff training aid package (FAA, 1992) stands as a good
example, and it will undoubtedly contribute in reducing aborted takeoff, overrun accidents. Not
surprisingly, many advocate a training package to reduce CFIT occurrences. However, neither
technical nor Human Factors training are the solution to reducing CFIT statistics. Furthermore, any
CFIT training package would be redundant with existing training curricula and therefore an
unnecessary and unproductive waste of resources.
The success of the windshear -- and hopefully of the rejected takeoff -- training aids resides in
the fact that both situations present inherent factors which can be punctually addressed. In both cases
specific knowledge, skills and mental models must be developed,acquired or revised. Examples of
this include understanding the dynamics of windshear and its consequences in terms of aircraft
performance, as well as the aerodynamics involved in an encounter, the certification conditions behind
demonstrated takeoff distances, the sequence of controls selection or manipulation, etc. Specific skills
must be developed and mental models changed to fly at high body angles, to apply maximum braking,
etc.
There are no factors inherently specific to CFIT occurrences. All factors listed as
contributing to CFIT occurrences (Slatter, 1993) are addressed by existing training curricula:
navigational errors, non-compliance with approach or departure procedures, altimeter setting errors,
misinterpretation of approach procedures, limitations of the flight director/autopilot, etc. Those
factors not covered by technical training are included in CRM training: maintenance/loss of situational
awareness, deficient intra-cockpit interaction, flight crew communications etc. A dedicated training
package would be a meagre contribution to reducing CFIT occurrences.
The answer to CFIT occurrences lies in looking at them from a systems perspective and
acting upon the latent failures which have slipped into the system, ready to combine with operational
personnel active -failures and adverse environmental conditions to produce an accident (Reason, 1990).
Examples of these latent failures include poor strategic planning of operations, absence of clear
channels of communication between management and operational personnel (a widely lamented but
seldom acted upon, typical system failure), deficient standard operational procedures (a direct
consequence of the aforementioned), corporate objectives which are difficult or impossible to achieve
with existing resources and corporate goals inconsistent with declared safety goals, among others.
It is impossible to act upon a problem unless awareness about it is gainkl. Therefore, it is

advanced that the first answer to reduce CFIT occurrences is education. Education and training are
terms loosely used among operational personnel. They are, however, quite distinct and not
interchangeable (ZCAO, 1989). While familiar with training, operational personnel are seldom exposed
to education, since it is assumed that it forms part of the basic qualifications required for
employment. Given the complex and opaque nature of today's aviation system, it has been suggested
that it is time to review the need to further education in aviation (Kantowitz, 1992).
Rather than a training ~ackage,what is needed to decrease CFIT events is an educational

package, to acquaint both managers and operational personnel with the concepts of high technology
f2&p@&ow they manifest through organizational deficiencies, how they may lead to
incidents and accidents and the ways to cope with such failures and deficiencies. The next step is to
take into account Human Factors considerations during system design, both at the micro and niacro
level. At the micro level, the Human Factors analysis must go beyond knobs and dials in the
traditional ergonomic sense, towards the more complex cognitive, information-processing and
communication processes between people and between people and technology. At the macro level,
the interface between the human-machine sub-system must be considered within the context of the
aviation system as a whole, including the declared system goals and the resources allocated to achieve
them. If education takes place, this second step is perfectly achievable.
A CASE STUDY
In November 1975, an airliner with six crew members and sixty-five passengers on board
crashed while attempting to land, following a circling, non-precision night approach in poor weather
conditions at a remote location in South America. In a "textbook" approach and landing, CFIT
accident, the aircraft hit the densely forested, sloping terrain less than one mile short of the intended
landing runway. The aircraft was completely destroyed, and although there were three injured (one
of them the captain) there were no fatalities. The investigating agency took the view that the accident
was attributable to pilot error. The pilot was fined by the civil aviation authority and demoted by the
airline. Less-than-appropriate consideration was given to the difficulties of the immediate
environment, replete with visual illusion-inducing conditions and with precarious navigation and
approach aids. Neither did the investigation address the reasons which induced the crew to attempt an
approach in such adverse conditions. The safety and prevention lessons which might have been learnt
were effectively buried by the honest, but undoubtedly misdirected investigation, limited to the
cockpit activities immediately preceding the accident.
When looking from an organizational perspective, multiple latent failures within the airline
become evident. The most obvious organizational deficiencies include lack of strate~ic~lanning
regarding this fleet operation and incompatibilitv between the corporate goals assigned to the fleet and
the resources provided to achieve them. The type had recently been introduced into the airline and the
process had been plagued with problems, including the adequacy of the qualifications of the airline
training staff as well as the stability of the training organization. Ground school was conducted in-
house with inappropriate means and with scant consideration paid to the fact that student captains had
no previous jet experience and student first officers were being inducted into the airline. No flight
simulator was available at that time, so all training was conducted in the aircraft, with its inherent
limitations. Notwithstanding the mentioned lack of jet experience, line-indoctrination was hurriedly
completed, due to the pressing need for crews to meet an ambitious commercial schedule.
Management's inabilitv to establish clear lines of communication with operational personnel

was another serious organizational deficiency. This translated into deficient crew scheduling and
pairing, improper consideration of environmental and equipment limitations when scheduling regular
commercial services into destinations with doubtful infrastructures and unfriendly environments, and
lack of guidance to flight crews in terms of standard operational procedures as well as the limitations
inherent to the operations. Because of these deficient lines of communications, newly qualified flight
crews had no clear guidance as to which were the operational behaviours management expected from
them. This lack of guidance -- and support -- has been recognized as an organizational failure which
contributes to flawed decision-making by operational personnel (Moshansky, 1992).
Lack of strategic planning, incompatible goals, failure to communicate goals and to properly
train personnel to achieve them are but a few examples of latent failures. They generate working
environments replete with conditions which foster human error. Most important, such environments
oftentimes make violations inevitable if tasks are to be achieved. An example of violation-producing
conditions are those air traflic control procedures which generate nuisance GPWS warnings. They
force crews to ignore warnings, thereby generating violations to operational orders to fulfil such
procedures. Eventually environment or task conditions which generate errors and violations lead to
system-induced accidents. Accident databases are replete with CFIT occurrences which support this
contention.
CONCLUSION
When looking for solutions to CFIT occurrences, it is imperative to think in collective rather
than individual terms (Beaty, 1991).It is naive to brand an entire professional body as being mainly
responsible for aviation safety. It is equally impossible to anticipate the many disguises human error
may adopt to bypass even the most cleverly designed safety devices. Lastly, it is an unattainable goal
to eliminate all system deficiencies leading to accidents.
The solution rests in securing a maximum level of system "safety fitness" (Reason, 1992), by
working upon latent system failures, such as incompatible goals, poor communication, inadequate
control, training and maintenance deficiencies, poor operating procedures, poor planning and other
organizational deficiencies which modem accident causation approaches indicate as being responsible
for disasters in high-technology systems.
Periodic checking of these system "health condition" markers and continuously actioning upon
them remain the single most important keys to reduce CFIT occurrences. Such efforts .in CFIT
prevention would also have dividends in many other safetydeficient areas.
REFERENCES
Beaty., D. (1991) The Last Frontier in Aviation. Flight Deck, Issue 3, Winter 1991. British Airways Safety
Services.
B i g s , C. E. (1991). . Human-Centred Aircraft Automation: A Conce~tand Guidelines. NASA Technical Memorandum
103885.
Bruggink, G. M. (1990). Reflections. -no The Log, April 1990.
Cooper, G. E., White, M. D, Lauber, J. K. (Eds.) (1979). Resource Management on the Flight Deck. Proceedings of a
NASAIIndustry Workshop held at San Francisco, California, June 26-28, 1979. NASA Conference Publication 2120.
Federal Aviation Administration (1987). Widshear Training Aid, Vols. I and 11. February 1987.
243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire/~upqn~p A-189
Federal Aviation Administration (1992). Takeoff Safety Training Aid. August 1992.
Flight Safety Foundation (1992). Report of the International Advisory Committee. Arlington, Virginia: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (1978). Amex 6. Operation of Aircraft.
International Civil Aviation Administration (1989). Fundamental Human Factors Concepts. Human,Factors Digest No. 1,
Circular 216-AN1 13. Montreal, Canada.
Johnston, A. N. (1985) Erebus. The Log, December 1985.
Kantowitz, B. H. (1993). Human Factors Knowledge Reuuirement for Flight Crews. Paper presented at the Second ICAO
Global Flight Safety and Human Factors Symposium, 12-15 April 1993, Washington DC.
Lauber, J. K. and Foushee, H. C. (Eds) (1981). Guidelines for Line-Oriented Flight Traininq. Proceedings of a
NASNIndustry Workshop held at NASNAmes Research Center, January 13-15, 1981. NASA Conference Publication 2184.
Loomis, I. P., Porter, R. F. (1981). The Performance of Warning Systems in Avoiding Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain (CFIT)
Accidents. Paper delivered before the 1981 Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, 20-22 April 1981.
Macfarlane, S. (1991). The Erebus Papers. Avon Press, Auckland, New Zealand.
Mahon, P. T. (1981). Report of the Royal Commission to Inaulre into the Crash on Mount Erebus. Antarctica of a DC1O
Aircraft operated bv Air New Zealand Limited. Wellington, New Zealand.
Maurino, D. E. (19E). Shall we add one more defense? Keynote speech at the Third Seminar in Transportation Ergonomics,
Transport Canada Development Centre, 7 October 1992, Montreal, Canada.
Meshkati, N. (1992). Ergonomics of Large-Scale Technological Svstems. Ergonomics, No. 165
Moshansky, V. P. (1992) Commission of Inquirv into the Air Ontario Crash at Drvden. Ontario. Final Report, Voluine 111.
Ottawa, Canada.
National Transportation Safety Board (1975). Trans World Airlines Boeing 727-231. B e m i l l e . Virginia. December 1. 1975.
Report No. NTSB-AAR-75-16. Washington, DC,: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (1974). Eastern Airlines Douglas DC-9-31. Charlotte. N.C. Report No. NTSB-AAR-75-
9. Washington, DC,: Author.
Office of Air Accidents Investigations (1979). Aircraft Accident Reuort No. 79-139. Air New Zealand McDonnell-Douglas
D n Ross Island, Antarctica, 28 November 1979. Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
Orlady, H. W and Fnushee, H. C. (Eds) (1987). Cockpit Resource Management Training. Proceedings of a NASNMAC
workshop held in San Francisco, California, May 6-8, 1986. NASA Conference Publication 2455.
Pidgeon, N. F. (1991). Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 22
No. 1, March 1991.
Reason, J. (1990) Human Error. Cambridge University Press.
Reason, I. (1992) Collective Mistakes in Aviation: "The Last Great Frontier". Flight Deck, Issue 4, Summer 1992. British
Airways Safety Services.
Slatter, R. T. (1993). ICAO Initiates Comurehensive Programme to Prevent Occurrence of CFIT Accidents. ICAO Journal,
JanuarylFebruary 1993. Montreal, Canada.
Vette, G. (1983). Imuact Erebus. Aviation Consultants Ltd. Newtown, Auckland, New Zealand.
Wiener, E. L. (1977). Controlled Flight into Terrain: System-Induced Accidents. Human Factors, 1977, 19(2).
Wiener, E. L. (1988). Cockpit Automation. In Human Factors in Aviation, Wiener, E. L., Nagel, D. C., (Eds). Academic
Press.
Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. and Helmreich, R. L. (1993). Crew Resource Management. Academic Press.
Edaxlchg the Impmi of E m Factors Tmhhg
H. Thorn Heinzer
SimuFlite Training, htamtional
D W ,Texas
Aviation training has become much more capable over the last 15 years with the advent of
Advanced Simulation, Crew Resourn Management and Objectivw-based Training. It is easier
now to isolate and modifjr spw%c behaviors. The power of new mining tools and techniques
has in some ases however been under utilized. At the same time, littie progas has been made
in laming how the airline kaining function can support efforts to deal with orgmiationd
pmursors to crew-preventable accidents. Further changes in the t&kg mission and the design
of training itself can help in both M.
It is no semt that many Upemtors limit their k h h g to the target of pssing ttk inevitable
government chehide. Thus most Recurrent training in the U.S.,for example, tends to be
aimed at pr-g crews for the FAR 135.2931.297 or 121.441 Checks. The arguments against
limiting m g in this fashim derive fn>m the Bmitations of the check iwff:
* Shce the "checkidemtends ta consist of an mdated string of maneuvers and

procedural tasks, it doesn't reflect the real-world way in wbich emergencies tend
to unfold nor the environment in which they develop.
#
Checlaide cMengw may not match the reai-world ones that lead to accidents,
Checlrtide content just does not reflect all of the hazards crews must clrpe with
such as runway incursions, wind shear or altitude deviations while complying
, with complex ATC procedures, for example.
So, it is asserted that bath the content and execution of the checkzide may not provide the b a t
test of the actual proficiency crews need to fly in today" environment. Thus training limited
to the scope of the check is simihly limited in value.
Of course, problems with government requirements are wd'known and are being addressed to
some extent. In the U.S., the Advanced QualificationRogram initiative (SFAR 5 8) is tackling
the issue by encouraging Operaton to detemhe which training .tasks are aitical and how often
they need to be trained. But AQP is expensive, requiring as it does a fresh task analysis, and
may therefore be limited to only a subset of Operators. But 50 the extent that AQP is successful
and feasible, it will bring more real-world oriented checking with it. In the interim, progressive
checking will help if not resolve the situation.
Under special circums'tances, checlcdde tadrs can be intepted into a mining course a d
accomplished "pmgressively". Check accomplishment then becomes much more meaningful
when embedded in mission-oriented simulator training kssions that reflect realistic flight
scenarios. SimuFlite Training, International was the first to conduct advanced simulator
proficiency checks for Corporate Operators in this socalled "progressiv~manner and recently
initiated semi-progressive checks (spread over two days) with air carrier Clients. Progressive
checking builds realism into the check and bolsters the Operator's confidence in the pilots who
pass it.
Mission-Oriented Tra'ining
LOFT advantages are being realized more and more in the course of regular simulator training
sessions through greater use of mission-oriented training presented in the form of Line
Operational Simulations-or "LOS" for short.
The conduct of simulator and airplane training preceding checking h g been modeled for years
on the check itself. Thus conventional simulator training emphasizes trial and practice of series'
of procedures which are often introduced without regard to the way in which real-world
emergencies and abnormals develop. Such training in the hands of inadequately trained and
indoctrinated Instructors often deteriorates into simulator "gotcha'" games where crews
unwittingly collaborate with Instructors to see how many faults and emergencies can be tolerated
while keeping the airplane airborne. Often the stimulus for this kind of training comes from no
more sophisticated a rationale than an Instructor's efforts to fend off his or her own boredom
or the Check Airman's desire to set the stage for the sale of his or her particular "pet"
procedure.
Recurrent simulator training sessions, especially, ought to be shaped to mirror as closely as

possible realistic flight conditions from preflight planning on. Then, and only then, can
emergency and abnormal conditions develop as they do in real life and be dealt with in a realistic
environment that reflects the demands of coping,with problems while continuing to maintain
situational awareness and deal with ATC distractions.
Guidelines for Mission-oriented training sessions or "LOS" (Line Operational Simulation)

sessions have recently been outlined in an Advisory Circular by the FAA.
New Training Packages
We as an industry are getting better at developing focused training tools. This has led to more
self-contained training regimens designed from the outset to combat specific hazards. The Wind
Shear Training Aid is an excellent example as is the Takeoff Safety training aid also developed
under Boeing's leadership.
But there are limitations. First, the economics of training can limit the payoff of these
programs. Take the Wind Shear Training Aid, for example. Does your training organization
take an hour of simulator time to implement this or are your crews basically just being
"exposed" to one or two shear encounters? If you are in the latter situation you are not alone.
Wind Shear training, like other new items on the training menu, takes time. And Operators
often have neither the budget nor crew man-hours to take full advantage of these programs.
Another problem is integration. Unless we are taIJling about ab hitio of ttansition braining, 'the
mare mission-oriented or realistic the training, the better. But it takes planning and resources
to integrate things like the wind shear training exercises into full mission simulators scenarios,
Decision-making tmhhg and evaluation shodd be internoven into recurrent training curricula
as w d . Why? Because the maximum impact of dedicated training packages such as Windshear,
TCAS, CFIT and the like most certainly depend upon the individual and team's ability to maIte
an informed, prudent decision. While the authors of these regimens have won half the battle
by defining decision criteria and prescribing behaviors to employ following the decision, their
efforts can come to naught when a Captain or crew's ability or inclination to make a decision
is handicapped.
Consider, for example, the inability of some crews to extricate themselves from imminent CFIT
accidents. For not dl such accidents hinge on a compIete1y cemgfacent crew at a loss for
situational awareness. On the contrary, many of these accidents reflect a palpable air of
uncertainty and in some a m even concern on the flight deck preceding impact yet the crew was
uogble to make the commitment to exit the situation. I would suggest that mews would benefit
from dedicated t&hg "practicing"e s a p from terrain-separation uncertain situations-not so
much ta o p h h e pull-up techniques but to give the crews practice in making the, decision to
change h e i r plan and abandon the approach. TnstmcWs are m at with an analogous
situation. Pilots who are more comfortable executing missed approaches seem to have an asier
time "deciding"to do them.
htegraiion makes training powerful. But it takes frequent redesigning of the entire W g
regimen to effectively integrate new programs and techniques,
Better Evaluation Wi Yield Continuous & Pmmiptive T-g
One of the most exciting developments for training has been the spdiiation of the "CRM
Performance Markers" by Dr. Robert ReImteich, et al at the University of Texas, These
provide the f i s t concrete, easy to use measures of crew resource management. Their biggest
payoff could be the restoration of "waIuationm to its rightful role in the m w k m e n t of training.
After all, without concrete evaluation, we can honestly measure neither the n d for W g nor
the effectiveness of &ahhg. Bern evaluation tmZs will ailow us to M y tailor training in terms
of both time and content.
Conventionally, haining is aimed at restoring performance to arbitrary intervals. It doesn't tell

you about either performance decrements or improvements over time. Nor d m it answer
c .
d key questions like,. Was the training given too soon or too late? Did crew performance
deteriorate below minimum acceptat>lelevels between training events? Row do you " h o w "
when its time lo min again? These questions and others are usually never address&. Instead,
training frequency, me training content, is most often dictated by regulatory requirement.
Thus, you have no assurance of continuity of performance. If you have a "weak" pilot or a
systemic problem (e,g. lack of standardization) wt you reasonably expst it to be fixed with one
"dose*of W g administered without regard to the entry-condition of your crews?
Better evaluation tools will allow you to more accurately pinpoint when its time to min and an
what. As a consequence we will Iearn how to deliver compensating W g in smaller, mare
efficient doses nnd gradually flatten-out the retention w e . Tnhing in its smallest doses
usually comes in the form of coaching. Have your Check Aimen or Capthins been mined as
"coaches"? Line Check Airmen can learn to identify crew sesource management deficiencies
and though stnctured debfiefing, cuach against the problem there and then. If you think about
it, much of the behaviors that we w in uxkpita are habitual. They are &us much more
amenable to change through fiquent coaching versus once-a-year ?mining. Of course, to r d k
this vision, airlines will have to invest in better m g for their Check or s&ndmhtion pilots
and place greater emphasis upon evaluation.
More Powerful Evaluation RWorrts Management Control
Research into the organizational precurwrs of accidents to which aur industry has rqxntly
huned points to the critical nature of leadership and communication throughout the operational
organhtion. Reason's concept of "latentfailure" coupled with Westrum's view of the capacity
of the organhtian for "thought" leads to the conclusion that communication, espeially up the
chain and unconventional pathways, is critical to safety. For when organizations, be
they a flightcrew complement, flight department or airline, become cansb.ained from acting on
or communicating observations of hazards they become less able to conceive of such hazards.
westnrm, 1990,p.1091
Row does this happen to the organhatiion? By becaming intolerant of "bad news" and by
focusing excessively on maintaining the organization's structure. The resultant pathology of
organhtiorral thought tends to choke-off both the "bad newswand the innovative solu~onsthey
might stimulate, It also progressiveiy limits which kinds of conditions are perceived to be
genuine "problemsn in need of solutions. This pathological cuprate "thinhg" and
concomitant impoverishment of htm-organizational communication can permeate the
organizational culture. Cycles of safety lapses and cover-ups hide deficiencies m a , as jn the
case of the Space Shuttle Challenger, they take their toll. The situation is not ud&e that which
conventional CRM training works hard to attack at the flightcrew Iwd: blockage of
comml~nicationfrom the second-incommand to the pilot-in-wmmand and an inability of the PIC
to perceive the threat to the flight. Perhaps this model of organizational "thought"explains why
so often, when a Chief Pilot says that he or she just couldn't have "conceived"of a particular
accident happening, we should take him or her at their word. Perhaps the organizational context
in which they operated just did not allow for such a cfiain of events to be admitted to
consciousness.
More powerful evaluation of flightcrew performance can foster integration into Management's
SOU- of mnbol feedback. And the strong yet flexible leadersip q u k d of "heatthy"
o r g e t i o n s depends upon a commitment by Management to both l a d and conv01. By
sofidifjhg the connection beween crew performance evaluation and Management control a
communication path is established that sends a clear message of "responsibility" to w r
Management.
Zn short, more accurate evaluation of safety at the @it level aids communication of
managernent-contr0II.dprecursor 'latent failuresn up the orgahtion which, in turn increases
the probability of resolution and maintains Management's &Giq to conceive of and become
alarrnsd at the OCCIXTEXIC~ of such Mures.
Crews can be taught d-dkgnostic and self-mnathg skills to hold thwnin good s t a d b e m
training or coaching oppoMties. Tn the future more e g orgmkations wiU work with
crews to sharpen those sms. The process fosters openness among mwmembers and can
provide an e a r l y - d g system for hazardous crew behaviors, poorly conceived procedures and
the like. Othtnvise, it YeA rn to accident investigator m m h back for these hazards.
Instead of passive 'experience" from wbich we formulate lessons-learned we can teach crews
to achvely analyze thkr own pafoormance and the hfmtmture su&rting their mission.
At SimuFlite, we cail this "self discoveryi' and it is a tecwue used upon comp1etion of the
flight to facilitate seLfcritique by crewmembers. The god is to develop in the crewmember a
skili for &tical self-&sal that wj31 accompany him or her into the field.
Of course, teaching 'self discoveryw to crews is a delicate pmcess that requires axefully
indominated and trained Instnrcton. But the payoff for this investment in personnel is
tremendous.
'Sraining Can Aid IhpIoyee IDevd~pmrent
Traditionally, Training has been aimed at "restorkg"instead of improving performance. Why

do we not aim for improvement over time? Once we do, we wlfi probably find it to be a
powerful employee development tool. The business world has long used trainifig and
concomitantperformance improvement as w q n s against camphmcy and dipping motivation.
Are there nor certain areas of ImowIedge and even certain sldlls hat we would reasonably expect
to improve over time? Pilots, as compared to other professionals tend to spend a &reamportion
of their time restoxing skills instead of improving them or addhg new m a t e d to their
knowledge base. Designing training for improvement instead of just restoration can add to job
enrichment for h e individual pilot, an rejuvenate M e n md of course, mate more competent
pilots. Once again, this places a burden on w e n t evaluation habits howwer. Improvements,
q c i d l y in s W s , can only be demonstrated using masues that are valid and reliable. And
evduators must receive sufficient ttaining and practice.
Tmhing W i be Thought af hcreasislgIy as a Maaagemexlt Tool
Grater use of evaluation will allow Management to d y use training as a management tool.
Training should be held "accountabk"for certain hcidentdaccidents and should be the mt
fmus of attention instead of the individual mwrnemben. Again, the burden falls on W g
wduation systems to provide management with adequate feedback to redhe this management
control.
Greater Management involvement in, and concern for, training has already b e n shown to
improve CRM h x h h g effertiveness. vc Certainly, the same can hold true for the mining
directed at removing organizational precursors to accidents-an approach we call Or~anization
Resource Management.
Reference
Diehl, Alan E. "Human Performance and Systems Safety Considerations in Aviation Mishaps."
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Volume 1, Number 2, 1991
Helrnreich, R.L. and Widhelm, J. A. (I991). Outcomes of Cre$ Resource Management

Training. "I~tttm~onalJounraI ofAvim'on Psychologyn,VoI. 1, No. 4, pp. 287-3CQ.
b i n , C.M. (1991). The Impact of Initid and Recutrent Cmkpit Resource Management
Training on Attitudes. "Proceedings ofthe Siah Imentan'onal Symposium on AM'ution
PsychoEugy " .
Kotter, J.P. and Heskett, J.L. (1992). " Coprate Culiure and Pe~fomwnce*,The Free Press,
A Division of Macmillan, Inc ., New York.
Lautman, L.G. and Gallimore, P.L. (1987). Comol of Crau-Cawed Accidents. Prweedings
of the Flight Safety Foundation 40th Annual International Air Safety Seminar, Tokyo,
Japan
Reason, J. (199 1). How to Promote Error Tolerance in Complex Systems in the Context of
Ships and Aircraft.
Westrum, R.(1990). Management Strategies and Information Failure
Westrum, R. (1988). Orghtional and Inter-Urganizationd Thought, Resented to World

Bank conference on "Safety Control and Risk hfanagement", October 1988.
A-1% CircularKirculai~upxynslll243-AN/l46
HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH DATA

APPLIED TO THE
TAKEOFF SAFETY TRAINING AID
SECOND FLEJ3T SAFETY AND HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSTUM

WASHINGTON, D.C.
13-15 APRIL 1993
Csptain Willistm C. Rebema BocingCosmmcFcid AkpbGrOup

Dr.W
lti
iam D.Shona: B&g Commercial Airplane Group .
INTRODUCTION
This study provided human performance data to support the development of the Takeoff
Safery Training Aid. The goal of the Training Aid is to reduce the number of rejected takeoff
(RTO) related accidents and incidents. The objective of the human performance study was to
provide quantitative and qualitative data to aid in better understanding the areas in which
decision making and performance can be improved and generate data-based recommendations for
Training Aid content and direction.
Previous research (Foxworth & Marthinsen, 1969; Snyder, Drinkwater, Fry, & Forrest,
1973) has focused only on performance and then only in response to a single event (engine fire or
failure, respectively). The present study attempts to evaluate decision making, execution of
procedures, and performance in the presence of an array of events chosen to represent the types
of events that occur in line operations. Choice of the particular events used was based on reviews
of accidenuincident data on RTO overruns conducted by Boeing Product Safety as well as
material presented by Chamberlain (1991) and Strauch (1990).
Variables in the study included: type of non-normal event, availability of autobrakes,
crosswind conditions, and which pilot was flying. Pre- and post-run interviews were conducted
to obtain background data on the pilots and to assess decision making processes, crew
coordination, and procedure accomplishment issues.
Decision making was evaluated in terms of the Go/No Go decisions made in the
presence of non-normal events. Decision time as a function of engine versus non-engine related
events was also evaluated. Stopping performance was evaluated as a function of crosswind
conditions, autobrake availability, and exchange of aircraft control. Procedure accomplishment
was judged against the RTO procedure policy of the subject's company.
METHOD
Subjects
A total of 48 pilots type-rated in'the B-737 participated in the study. Of these, 24 were
Boeing instructor pilots and 24 were airline captains. Airlines solicited volunteers from their line
captains . No more than eight captains were used from any airline to avoid biasing the results.
One of two Boeing training captains served as the first officer for all subjects. Both
had considerable line experience and were able to closely emulate the characteristics of an
average line first officer. This procedure eliminated the inherent variability associated with
varying the first officer.
The test run scenarios under which takeoffs were executed were:
Normal takeoff, captain flying
Engine failure at 8 knots prior to V1, captain flying
Engine failure at 8 knots prior to V1, first officer flying
Engine failure at 2 knots after V1, captain flying
Engine failure at 2 knots after V1, first officer flying
Fire Warning at 5 knots prior to V1, captain flying
Blown tire at 10 knots prior to V1, captain flying
Master Caution light at 10 knots prior to V1, captain flying
The order in which subjects encountered the above listed conditions was varied across
the subjects. Four combinations of crosswind and braking conditions were also varied across the
eight trials per subject. The four crosswind and braking conditions were: 1) calm wind, manual
brakingrequired., 2) caIm wind, autobraking available; 3 ) IS kt crosswind, manual b d n g
required; 4) 15 kt crosswind, autobraking available.
The following is a rep~esentativescenario of mal conditions:
1. Engine failure at V1-8,captain flying, calm wind, autobraking available
2. Fire warning at V1-5,captain flying, 15 kt crosswind, autobrnking available
3. Engine failure at V 1+2, first officer flying, calm wind, manual braking required
4. Master Caution at V1-lQ, captain flying, 15 kt crosswind, manual braking rquSed
5. Engine failure at V 1+2,captain flying, calm wind, autobraking available
6. Engine failure at V1-8, frrss officer flying, 15 kt crosswind, autobraking available
7. Nomal takeoff, captain flying, IS kt crosswind, manual b&ng required
8, BIown tire at Vl-10, captain flying, d m wind,manual braking required
A pre-rest questionnaire was developed to assess the subjects' experience and
knowledge of factors related to Vl. A post-test questionnaire was developed to obtain additionaI
comments on RTO decision making,prwedure execution, and crew coordination.
Procedure
Tesdng was dona in one of Boeing's, 737-300 full flight simula~m.All takeoffs were
conducted at a runway limited condition, meaning hat fw the initial conditions, the computed
accelerate-stop distance was equal to the field length. The speeds at which the events occurred
prior to V 1 were chosen to provide approximately 1-2 seconds before V 1in which to "decide"
whether to continue the takeoff or reject.
After normal introductions, pilots were briefed that they were participating in a takeoff
study. They were then given the pre-test questionnaire to complete. Airline captains were
briefed on the differences b~tweenthe flight deck they were used to and that of the simulator,
These pilots were also given a familiarization takeoff and flight around the pattern befwe testing
began. The appropriate sequence of eight takeoff ~ d was s then adminisrezed.
Following testing, the pilot returned to the briefing mom for post-test debriefing.
RESULTS
Boeing pilots and airline piIots as groups had surprisingly similar profiles not only in
t m s of background md experience but also in the distribution of RTQ's across test conditions
and total number of RTO's. The number of RTO's per event varied by only I in all cases except
engine fire. Therefore, findings on performance and decision making are based on all 48 pilots
as one ' group.
Decision Making
The timing and nature of the events niggeted during the takeoff trials were designed to
produce situations in which pilots could appropriately reject the takeoff on 3 of the 8 trials, The
acceleration rate for 737 under the conditions used is between.4 and 5 knots per second, thus
pilots had from about 1 second (Vl-5) to slightly more than 2 seconds (V1-10) to decide whether
to reject or continue the takeoff.
Pilots did not reject takeoffs as often as was mticipated in the "classical"cases that are
normaily trained; namely, engine failures and fires. Almost one-thirdof the pilots ajected for
the blown tire although the only indication was a vibration. There were seven RTO's for a
Master Caution light which in this case came on due to a relatively insignificant hydraulic pump
overheat 10 knots below V1. Boeing, along with most airlines, specifies that "Once thrust is set
and takeoff roll has been established, rejecting a takeoff solely for illumination of the amber
MASTER CAUTION light is not recommended".
Stopping Performance
Stopping performance, as measured by runway remaining, was averaged for all rejects
for each event condition presented. Pilots were able to stop the airplane with the greatest margin
in the few cases when they rejected due to a Master Caution light illuminated 10 knots prior to
V1. In this case, the pilot had reverse thrust from both engines and the malfunction occurred
more than two seconds before V1. The worst case was the RTO initiated after V1, followed
closely by the rejects for the blown tire. ,
The effect of crosswind (15 kt versus calm) on stopping margin, while in the direction
expected, was negligible. Under calm wind conditions, average runway remaining was 119
meters; with a 15 kt crosswind, average runway remaining was 100 meters.
Most U.S. carriers and all those who participated in this study have the policy that the
captain both calls for and executes all RTO's. This obviously involves exchange of aircraft
control when the first officer is the Pilot Flying (PF). Although current Boeing manuals are
written with the PF doing the RTO, the Boeing pilots were told to use the policy they preferred.
With captains as the PF, the average distance remaining to the end of the runway was 152 meters
(500 ft). With first officers as PF but under the "captain call and execute" policy, average
distance remaining was also 152 meters (500 ft.). When first officers executed the RTO either on
their own initiative or with the captain calling the reject, the distance remaining was 94 meters
(310 ft.). Finally, with the first officer as PF and performing the reject only if the captain called
for it, the average distance remaining was 56 meters (183 feet).
Clearly, there is an exchange of control effect on stopping margins, but the effect is not
straightforward. Stopping margins achieved when the captain was the PF or was deciding on and
executing the RTO were substantially greater than those where the first officer as PF had the
responsibility to decide and/or execute the RTO. Variations in the ability of the first officer to
make the reject decision and what technique would be used if the reject decision was made were
a direct result of the captain's takeoff briefing. The quality and extent of these briefing varied
greatly across subjects. Post-test interview data on crew coordination issues indicated: a) none of
the pilots reported briefing RTO procedures on every takeoff, and b) the briefings that are given
relate primarily to local conditions. Captains typically assume a great deal with regard to what
first officers know about crew roles in RTO decision making and execution. During first officer
takeoffs with the captain performing the reject, there were few crew coordination problems.
However, in the situation where the first officer performed the reject, there often were crew
coordination difficulties. There is an inherent delay when the captain is required to make the
reject decision, verbalize it, and then have the first officer execute the procedure. There is also
often a delay when the first officer must decide on rejecting the takeoff and the criteria for that
decision are not clear andlor the cues from an event are ambiguous.
Stopping performance was also evaluated as a function of the availability of the
autobrake system versus manual braking. Boeing procedures and airline policies agree that the
first step in the RTO procedure is simultaneous application of maximum braking and closing the
thrust levers. Few pilots did this, but rather applied braking as the third or fourth step in the
procedure. Some pilots "pumped" the brakes, rather than holding full maximum pressure.
Others released brake pressure prematurely then had to reapply maximum pressure to avoid
overrunning the end of the runway. These actions reduce stopping margins.
The availability of RTO autobrakes substantially increased stopping margins. Average
distance remaining to the end of the runway with the autobrake system armed was 137 meters.
Average distance remaining using manual braking was 82 meters. Since autobrakes come on as
soon as the thrust levers come to idle, autobrakes typically give a 1-2 second earlier brake
application than manual braking. The autobrake system also applies more consistent braking
force. The negative side of autobrakes is that they can be inadvertently disengaged resulting in
no braking force being applied for a few seconds until the crew notices it. Maximum stopping
margin is achieved if pilots let the autobrake system bring the airplane to a complete stop.
Procedure Accomplishment
All Boeing pilots have the following procedure: "Simultaneously close the thrust
levers (disengage the autothrottle, if required) and apply maximum brakes. If RTO autobrakes
are selected, monitor system performance and apply manual wheel,brakes if the AUTO BRAKE
DISARM light illuminates or deceleration is not adequate. Rapidly raise the speedbrakes and
apply maximum reverse thrust consistent with the conditions." Some of the airlines represented
also have this as their procedure. Others have a procedure that uses the reverse thrust levers to
raise the speedbrake lever. The percentage of incorrect procedure occurrences, was-significant.
In each case, the error was selecting reverse thrust prior to raising the speedbrake lever manually.
No procedural errors were made by pilots whose company policy called for speedbrake
deployment using the reverse thrust levers.
During the course of the study, a new variable was unintentionally introduced. Due to
a simulator malfunction, the autospeedbrake deployment feature failed occasionally. This
provided an opportunity to observe whether pilots using the autospeedbrake deployment feature
actually monitored speedbrake deployment. In nine cases where the speedbrake failed to deploy
automatically and the captain's company policy dictated automatic deployment, only one captain
noticed that the speedbrake had failed to deploy.
A question of interest was the effect of the nature of the event on decision time.
Decision time in the study was defined as the time between event occurrence and the first
stopping action. As might be expected, decision times increased for events that were more
difficult to recognize, required crew coordination, and/or that are not as well practiced. The
shortest time from event to first action occurred for the engine fire warning at V1-5. This time
was taken as the reference for comparison across events. The results of this comparison are
shown in Figure 1.
Fire warning at V1-5, captain flying Reference time
Engine failure at V1-8, captain flying Reference time + .2 seconds
Master Caution at V1-10, captain flying Reference time + .4 seconds
Engine failure at V1-8, first officer. flying Reference time + .6 seconds
Blown tire at V1-10, captain flying Reference time + .6 seconds
Figure 1. Decision time represented as the time between event and first stopping action
It is noteworthy that errors in procedure accomplishment have a high positive

correlation with decision time. For those pilots whose company policy was manual speedbrake
deployment, 32% of the RTO's were done using auto speedbrake deployment. The percentage of
procedures incorrectly performed by event were:
- 42% for blown tire, captain flying
- 35% for engine failure at V1-8, first officer flying
- 30% for engine failure at V1-8, captain flying
- 25% for master caution light, captain flying
- 14% for fire warning at V1-5, captain flying
Uncertainty, whether in event recognition or crew coordination, leads to longer decision times
and more mistakes in the RTO environment.
Post-Test Debrief Findings
In the post-test debriefing, a number of questions were asked of the airline captains
relative to decision making, crew coordination, and procedure accomplishment. T h e conclusions
drawn from the responses to these questions are as follows:
- Company policy, as reported by pilots, varies considerably both between and within
companies in terms of the guidelines provided for RTO decisions.
- Many had a personal "pad"for V 1, but its size and the conditions under which it is used vary
widely.
- The impact of padded Vl's on height over the end of the runway is not always considered in
making the RTO decision.
- Captains appear to rely heavily on the first officer's memory and common training experience
to provide coordinated action during a RTO. Understanding af RTO procedures is often
assumed by captains, not confirmed. '
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Decision Making
The pilots tested were more "go"oriented than anticipated. This may be due at least in
part to the fact that many pilots use an informal "pad"with respect to V1. This pad, which
ranged between 5 and 20 knots, was the speed beyond which they would not begin a reject when
in a runway limit situation. It was not clear that pilots considered the impact of such a pad on
screen height as a part of the RTO decision.
The vibration associated with a blown tire appears to induce pilots to reject with no
other malfunction indications.
In spite of recommendations to the contrary, a number of pilots rejected for
illumination of the Master Caution light in the high speed regime.
ornmendation~- Training related to RTO's should:
- Impart an accurate meaning of V 1 assuring an understanding of the Go/No Go margins;
- Illustrate the effect of the reduction in screen height resulting from a continued takeoff with,
an engine failure prior to V I;
- Include academic training emphasizing the impact on stopping distance of a blown tire,
- Provide simuIator training to demonstrate the "feel"of a blown tire and the merits of
continuing the takeoff.
Stopping Performance
A substantial reduction in stopping margins was observed when first officers executed
the RTO either on their own initiative or when the captain called it. The smallest distance
remaining was observed when the captain called the reject and the fmt officer executed it. No
crew coordination problems were observed when the captain both called and executed the RTO
even though exchange of contrul of the aircraft was involved in those test runs where the first
offices was the PF.
The use of RTO autobrakes substantially inmased stopping margins over manual
braking even though he most common technique was braking initiated by the autobrake system
and completed by the pilot.
Recommendation2 - A recommendation for a standardized policy of having the captain
call and execute all RTO's appears to be appropriate. This would reduce the uncertainty
regarding crew roles when rejecting a takeoff. Greate~emphasis shauld be given to the value of
RTO autobrakes, however, optimum manual braking techniques should still be emphasized in
training.
Procedure Accomplishment
With pilots who operate under the manual speedbmke deployment policy, 32%of the
RTO's were done using incorrect procedures. Further, there was a strong correlation between
percentage of prccedural errors by event and decision time.
Recommendations - Exposure of pilots to "nod-classicd"as well as the more common
engine fire or failure events in training should reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity in the
decision process and perhaps lead to less regression to the well-practiced procedures of the
landing sequence. Proper accomplishment of the RTO procedure needs additional emphasis to
promote improved crew communication and coordination.
The study was vital to the development of the TakeoffSafety Training A id. The insight
gained on pilots' understanding of V 1 was extremely useful. in structuring the Training Aid. The
data on GoNo Go decision making with a blown tire led to special emphasis on this event,
Stopping performance data led to specific recommendations regarding crew coordination and the
use of autobrakes during RTQ's. The procedure accomplishment dam led to special emphasis on
training and procedures.
The Training Aid was distributed to all operators of western-built commercial jet
transports, many governmentaI and reguIatory agencies, pilot groups and airplane and engine
manufacturers in September of 1992. It includes a video, academic material and recommended
simulator training profiles. To date, many training groups throughout the industry have
confirmed that they are incorporating at least a portion of the recommended training in their
courses. The video is being widely used throughout the industry.
Chamberlin, R.W. Reiected Takeoffs: Causes, h b l e m s , and Consequences. Paper

presented at The Ohio State university Sixth International Symposium on viat ti on ?sych61ogy,
May 1,1991.
Foxworth, T.G. and Marthinsen, H.F. Another Look at Accelerate-Stbp Criteria.
AIAA Paper No. 69-772, AIAA Aircraft Design and Opmtions Meeting, July 14- 16, 1969, LUS
Angeles, CA.
Snyder, C.T., Drinkwater, F.J. m,Fry, E.B ., Fomst, R.D. Takeoff Certification
Considerations for Large Subsonic and Supersonic Transport Airplanes Using the Ames Flight
Simulator for Advanced Aircraft. NASA Technical Note, NASA TN D-7 106, March 1973.
Smuch, B. Factors Affecting Pilot Decision-Making in Rejected Takeoffs. Third
Human Error Avoidance Techniques Conference Proceedings,SAE P-239:902344,December
1990.
CircularKirculair~up~yn~1p
243-AN//& A-203
HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR AUTOMATION

LIFE IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE GLASS COClWlT
Earl L. Wiener
University of MimilNASA Ames
Address before the ICAO Flight Safety
and Human Factors Symposium
Washington, DC
April 15, 1993
We now find ourselves in the second decade of the glass cockpit. I would like to give
you a brief report card.
The decade of the 1980's saw a dizzying acceleration of flight-deck automation, enabled
by the development of the microprocessor. Suddenly cockpit technology was running at fast-
forward, but the human factors profession was not. In 1980 McDonnell-Douglas introduced the
DC-9-80 (later d l e d MD-801,which brought to the short and medium haul airliner avionic
saphistication previously found only in wide-body transports. But technologically this was a
small step campared to what lay ahead - when jn 1982 W i n g introdud the 767,the first
commercial aircraft with a glass cockpit and an advanced flight management system.
Coincidentally the decade of the 80's also witnessed the recrudescence of a type of
accident that we thought was a bygone day: p r cockpit communication, inadequate
performance of p r d u r e s , and faulty use of the checklist, or no use at all.
I have said before, and will continue to say as long as 1 can find an audience, that Le
most important safety device in the aircraft is not ground prox, is not TCAS, is not color radar,
in fact does not come in a box at dl. You can take it off the airplane and go down to your
local quick Xerox store, and for 3 112 cents they'll make you mother one.
The checklist is the eonductor" baton: it sets the tune, the rhythm, and the cadence for
dl that happens in the cockpit. Yes, it is a mere piece of paper, and the human factors
profession has never had a high regard for paper - we like boxes - but the importmce of the
checklist and its associatd behavior cannot be exaggerated.
I am h a m to report that this class of problem has been brought under control, largely
as a result of emphasis on procedural standardization (Degani and Wiener, 1990) and the cocwt
resource management training now offered at most airlines
Wiener, Kanki, and Helmreich, 1993).
Back to the glass cockpit. Glass displays are not merely computer-graphic repfications
of traditional instrumentation. They allow features that were never possible before -- six
different pilot-selected modes can be displayed on the HSI, including one that enables the pilot
to step through the waypoints one-by-one and display the course on the map, as a p~-flight
check of lateral navigation. Pilots can select or deselect information to be displayed on the map,
such as airports capable of taking the aircraft, navaids, and the like. Color radar can be
superimpossd on the BSI map, allowing a fusion of weather, present position, and lateral course
information. This combination of weather and course information is regarded by pilots as one
of the biggest advances found in the glass cockpit aircraft.
The latest models of glass aircraft, such as the 747-400, MD-11, and the A-320, can
display system schematics for diagnosis and management. Other features enabled by glass
displays include a path predictor vector, which shows where the plane wilt be 20, 40 and 60
seconds ahead, and the "green arc" which predicts at what point on the map the aircraft will
reach its target altitude. The green arc makes a lot of difficult mental computations very easy.
I can tell you from my field studies in the 757 and MD-88 that itis immensely popular with the
crews. With the green arc, making a crossing restriction becomes child's play.
---- GLASS DISPLAYS ---

The glass cockpit was, and is, an ingenious development, a generation step forward in
aircraft design. But it is not without its critics, of which I have been one (Wiener, 1988). In
CRM training we distinguish between "critique"and "criticism." Criticism is all negative;
critique bdances the inevitable good and bad that one finds in anything that is carefully
examined. I hope the reader will regard my remarks as critique.
In all fairness,before looking at the problems, let's look at the record, because it is quite
impressive. No passenger has ever been killed or injured in an accident involving a US.-
operated glass cockpit aircraft. There has been only one serious accident that I am aware of -
a rejectad takeoff resulting in damage to a 757 at San Jose, Costa Rica. The 7671757 have the
best introduction recard of any aircraft in history.
I must be brief M y ; let us look at some of the promises and problems.
----CONCERNS OF THE GLASS COCKPIT ----

1) The interface is often difficult to operate, and confusion of the various autoflight
modes is not unusual. I believe that it is true that every impartial investigator who has looked
at the glass mRrpit has discovered that mode confusion is a serious problem. The manufacturers
have often brushed this off as a training problem. The distinguished reseanhers Don Norman
and Ed Huchins d l this the "blame and train" approach.
When well trained, well motivated, well standardized pilots are still confused about the
implications of the modes they have selected, it is not a training problem; it is an interface
problem.
2) Equally seious, the promised reduction in workload has not occurred. If anything,
the result has been somewhat paradoxical, in that automation appears to increase workload when
it is aheady high, and dec- it when if is low. Time and again pilots that I have interviewed
have reportsd that when the going gets rough, they "click it off' -- that is, revert to more
manual modes of operation. This is a paradox.
When I take an observation flight in one of the glass airplanes, I always "break the ice''
with a wwwhat bland question to the captain. I say, "Captain, how do you like this airplane?"
The response is stereotrped and predictable. It goes something like this: "'I love this plane.
I love the power, the wing, and I even love this stuff" (with a movement of the hand toward the
flight guidance a m of the cockpit - meaning the automation). And then he w she will add,
"But I'U tell you one thing - I've never been so m.
in my life. " The operative ward is
I hear it time and again. Suffice it to say that the relationship between automation and workload
is not a simple me. Is this a training problem? No. It's an intexface problem. k t me give
you an example,
- LAT AMX) LUN WAYPOINT ------

3) A related problem is "head down" time in the glass cockpit. This is a tough one.
Everyone w h domes the crews in a glass cockpt is struck by the amount of time two heads
are in the cockpit, especially below 10,000 feet, near an airport, at the point where the pilots
need to be Imking out the most.
Now I hope no me will be tempted to say that this is not a problem, since TCAS will
protect you from other aircraft. That would be a classic exampfe of what Renwick Curry and
I, in 1980,labeled "prirnaryLbackupinversionu (the primary becomes a backup, and the backup
takes over as primary) > ATC 's responsibility aside, the p r i m w cockpit device for collision
avoidance, in VMC conditions, is the human eye, love it or not. TCAS is a backup.
I don't know the answer to the headdown problem. But I can assure you that it is not
an interface problem.
a training problem, it's
Head-down time may also turn out to be the undoing of datalink cornrnuni&tian, which
is right around the corner. Datalink displays, compared to voice radio communication,suck the
pilots' eyes right back into the cockpit. Using traditional voice communication, the pilot can
easily continue extra-cockpit m, needing to look down only long enough to chmge
fqumcies, which they can do rather quickly.
4) Another problem in all forms of digital systems in errox vulnerability. The glass
cockpit is good news and bad news. The bad news is that it is very easy to enter erroneous
information into the flight guidance computer. The g d news is that the glass displays can
make many errors, especially course errors, very apparent. This is what I call an "enor
evident" display. The system does not prevent the error -- but it makes it conspicuous. Let me
give you an example and contains both the good and bad news:
5) 1 hear a lot of talk from my colleagues in human. factors about "situational

awareness*, the buzz word of the W's, and the assertion that situational awareness suffers In the
highly automated aircraft. Maybe the problem lies in the fuzzy definition of the term, and that
is a prabIem, in fact you can bring a panel discussion on the subject to a stand-still by asking
what the qmker or the panel what they m a n by the "situational awareness", As I
understand the term, I do not see an automation problem. It seems to me that situational
awareness is enhanced, not degradd by advanced instrumentation. Look at all of the
information available to the pilot in the enhanced displays that I have already described - think
of the path predictor, the green arc, the ability to know (laterally) where you are at all times
with respect to waypoints, navaids, the course, weather, and the Meld. Think of the ability
to instantly locate the closest adequate airfield in the event of an extreme emergency. P have a
name for what can be gained from that type of information: situational awarene&
Furthermore, in its ability to monitor and display system status, EICAS (note that I am
using Boeing terminology; other manufacturers have their own names and acronyms for
essentially the same systems) is a marvelous improvement over the forest of engine and systems
displays, of warnings and alerts that we find in traditional cockpits. When it comes to aircraft
systems, EICAS would have to be regarded as an of situational awareness.
Yes, it is possible to become overly dependent on automation, and lose track of what is
happening, if that is what the critics mean by a loss of situational awareness. But as I
understand the term I would give the glass cockpit high marks far -g, not degrading,
situational awareness.
Ask any pilot who has made the "backward transition," returning to traditional aircraft
after flying glass. This has become a serious training problem at some airlines, especially where
senior first officers in glass aircraft b*ansitian to captaincy in traditional aircraft, such as early
models of the 737,and the DC-9.
I have been polite enough to call the older aircraft "traditional". Pilots have some other
terms for them:
I believe that these facetious names show a certain contempt for the ancient cockpits, and
reverence for the modern aircraft.
A word or two about cockpit resource management, and training for automation. I
believe that the CRM movement will some day be viewed as one of the great advances in flight
safety. I further believe that CRM, and its companion, LOFT, is particularly necessary and
helpful in the-advanced technology, two-pilot cockpit. The management asp& of flying the
glass cockpit are demanding, and crew coordination of the two pilot crew is a serious matter.
The value of C M training has not be proven in any statistical sense, but it is there for anyone
to see. On my report w d , I would give high marks to the first generation of CRM and LOFT
training, and look forward to what will be done in future generations.
Many U.S. airlines have experienced varying amounts of trouble with transition of crews
from traditional cockpits to glass. Much of this is lack of preption, and considerable
app~he~sion, and in many cases misinformation on the pat of trainees before they attend
ground school.
One airline, Delta, chose to face that problem head on, but devising a new course entitled
"Introductionof Aviation Automationw. Every pilot transitioning to a glass airplane for the first
time takes the course before ground school. It is model-independent; it is not a substitute for
ground school -- it's purpose is to prepare the pilot for the training he or she will receive. Delta
considers the course a big success, and it has numerous irnitatars. Delta deserves much credit
to being the industry leader in this field.
In conclusion, the glass cockpit will soon no longer be the "oddball"of the fleet, but the
mainstay. I would give high, but not perfect, marks to the glass cockpit aitcraFt. Their safety
record and reliability are impressive, and we have learned many valuable lessons about the
impact o f automation on pilots. More work lies ahead in improving interfaces that are difficult
and time-consuming to operate, in fine-tuning flight training, LOFT, and CRM. There is no
question in my mind that the industry is up to the challenge, and that automation will be the
servant of the pilot and not the other way around,
Degmi, A. S., and Wiener, E,L. (1990). Human factors of flightdeck checklists: the normal
checklist. NASA Comrackor Repofi No. 177549, NASA Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, CA, May 1990.
Wiener, E.L. (1988). Cockpit automation. In EmL. Wiener and D. C. Nqel, Hriman factors
in laviarion. San Diego: Academic Press.
Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. G.,and Helmreich, R. L. (1993). Cockpit resource management.

Sm Diego: Academic Press.
CONCERNS IN THE
GLASS COCKPIT
Difficult interfaces
Workload management
"Head-downv'time
Error vulnerability
Situational awareness
LAT & LON WAYPOINT
"After Wilson Creek cleared direct

37 degrees, 45 minutes north,
111 degrees, 05 minutes west,
then direct Farmington."
3745N/11105W N3745.OW11-105.0
NAMES TRADITIONAL
COCKPITS:
Steam Gauge
I
MANAGING THE MODERN C O C m
A MANUFACTURER" S E W
Cnpt. Chester L, Ebtrand

Director, Flight Training
Customer Services
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
Managing the modem cockpit is a statement that applies, both to the way in which
modern cockpit design is accomplished, and to the way in which pilots V t e the highly
automated airplane. In the context of this paper the modem cockpit refers to those Baeing
airplanes which are equipped with features including advanced autopibts, Electronic Flight
Instrument Displays (EFIS); advancad alerting systems; and a final fealure that is most
characteristic of the modem cackpit, the Flight Management Computer (FMC), Collectively,
these design elements comprise what we at Baeing refer to as the Flight Management System
(FMS). Airplanes with FFMS's are often referred to as glass cockpit or high technology
airpfanes. The modem cockpit airplane is not really new; in fact, the 767 entered revenue
service in 1982 and was a predecessor of other Boeing modern cockpit designs. Other airplanes
with madern cockpits are the 757, the 747-400,and the later 737 series airplanes (the
-3801-4001-500.) Of these sriqlanes, the 757 and 767 were all new flight deck designs and were
essentially common. The 747-400 was also dl new and inwrpocates improvements on the
7571767 flight deck design. The 737-300/-400/-500 are upgraded designs from much earlier
flight decks. ColIectively, these airplanes, as of Dsoember 31, 1992, numbered nearly 2,5#
airplanes in revenue service.
Some have said that making available the modern cockpit is akin to letting the Genie out
of the bottle. They suggest we have unleashed significant power but may tack the m a s to .
appropriately control it, or that the power or capability we have provided was not well thought
out in the first place. One researcher has suggested that in the modem cockpit, p p l e are not
sure they understand what is happening. In fact, he indicated in his research the most fxsquently
asked questions in the glass cockpit were: "What is it doing?" "Why did it do that?" and "What
will it do next?.
Other questions have been asked by researchers and plots regarding the modem cockpit.
"Is pilot workload up or down?" '7s sheads down time excessive?" and, of most concern of all,
'"s she modern cockpit taking the pilot out of the loop?". The comment, "taking the pilot out
of the loop" might be compared to the situation with the genie; who's in charge, the person who
uncorked the bottle, or the genie?
When one makes an attempt to assess the success of the mdern cockpit, one finds there
is limited data available, However, accident statistics are available and perhaps are the most
important data of all. After dl,the principal objective, in terms of design of airplanes and in
terms of their use, is safety,
To understand the influence of the modern flight deck on safety, let us begin by frrsZ
looking at hull loss accident rates for the entire history of the worldwide commercial jet fleet.
From the very late 1950's until the early 1960's the accident rate with such jet transports was
comparative1y high. We saw a dramatic decrease in accident rates during the period from the
d y to mid 1960's. The accident rate continued to improve until the mid 1970's but since then
has seen only very slight improvement. For the past several. years hull loss accident rates for
U.S. operators have been in the neighborhood of or less than, one per million departures. For
non-U. S uperators the hull loss accident rates in recent years have been two to three per million
departures.
- To m a k further assessment of safety, it is next necessary to understand what the primary
cause factors are for hull loss accidents. Data for the worldwide commercialjet fleet through
1992, shows that the flight crew has been found to be the primary cause factor in approximately
70% of all such accidents. The percentage of accidents for which the flight crew has been found
to be the primary factor has decreased only slightly (approximately 5 %) over the past 10 years.
The airplane itself is the primary cause factor in only 11 to 13 % of accidents, Clearly then; our
most significant oppartunity fox improvement is in the human factors area and a major goal must
be elimination of such human error as an accident cause,
Let us next look at accident rates as a function of airplane designs. First generation jet
transport airliners, those designed in the late 1950's and early 1960's, airplanes such as the 707
and DC-8, had comparatively high accident rates, approximately five to six accidents per million
departures. These airplanes were followed by another group of airplanes introduced in roughly
n ten year perid from 1963 to 1974, which induded second generation airliners such as the 727,
DC-9, and 737-1001-200 series. This grouping also includes airplanes such as the 747-100
1-2001-300 series, the DC-10 and L- 1011. While accident rates for these airplanes is somewhat
variable, they averaged rates in the neighborhood of one to two accidents per million departures.
The final group of airliners are those with madern flight decks. As indicatad earlier,
these airplanes entered revenue sewice beginning in 1982 and include the 767, 757,
737-30014001-500 series, and the 747-400. How have these airplanes fared? Very well indeed!
The 767, the first of the airplanes introduced, had a hull loss accident rate at the end of 1992
of 0.35 pr million departurn, and the 757 had a rate of zero? The 737-3001-4001-500 aiplanes
with their somewhat less a d v a n d flight deck designs had an accident rate of 0.57 accidents per
million departures. Although the 747-400has only been in service three years, like the 757,it
had a zero accident rate. From review of this data we find the airplanes with modern cockpit
designs have the lowest accident rates of all commercial jet transport airplanes.
It would appear something is happening which is very right with our modern cockpit
airplanes. Perhaps a way to further illustrate the area of benefit is to look at rates for hull loss
accidents which. are crew caused. The 707 had a crew caused hull loss accident rate of just
under four accidents per million departures. S m n d generation airplanes, the 727,early 737,
and early 747, had an average crew caused hull loss accident rate of appmx 0.60 per million
departures. Airplanes with updated flight deck designs, the 737-3001-400/-500 series, had a
crew caused hull loss accident rate of only Q.23per million departures. And the all new flight
deck designs, B e 757, 767,747-400 had a crew caused hull loss accident rate of zero! From
review of safety related statistics, one can only conclude that the modem cockpit, from a
standpoint of safety, appears to be serving the industry very well indeed.
Review of other availabIe data, such as dispatch reliability, also indicates modem
airliners are performing well. In fact, there is no data, particularry from a standpoint of safety,
that would suggest major mors in design have been made or that significant design changes
appear necessary. It is not my intent however, to suggest that all is well. ASRS and other
sources of data indicate that there are situations where the modem cmkpit is less than optimally
utilized. Part of the reason the benefits of the modern cockpit are not fully realized is obviously
rdated to its design. Therefore, we at Sot:@ are very much aware that continuous design
improvement is indeed appropriate.
I, for one, however, believe that the most significant opportunities for improvement lie
in the way that we o p t e modern cockpit airplanes and in the way that w e train ta them.
However, before discussing opprtunitid for improvement in the way airplanes are operated and
trained ts it may be appropriate to first understand how the designs came to be.
When W i n g or other manufacturers design airliners they first develop candidate design
for flight deck features and then expose those design features to customers. For example, the
747-400 during its design development was exposed to a large number of flight crew personnel.
During this period over 400 flight crew personnel reviewed the proposed design concepts. Most
of these flight crew personnel were from airlines and many of them were typical line pilots.
Wing's forthcoming new airliner, the 777, due in 1995, has also had its proposed designs
reviewed by many flight crew personnel, as of March, 1993,over 4QO. I n fact a total of 1,200
people, including pilots, have conducted such 777 design reviews. Remember this is an airplane
that is still well over two years from entry into revenue service.
I do not, however, wish to suggest we simply listen to airline pilots and provide
whatever it is they want. While this might initidly satisfy the customer, it may also result in
unwise decisions. Therefore, candidate designs offed by Boeing, and design changes made
in response to pilot inputs must be consistent with good flight deck design philosophies and
objectives. Nonetheless, design features are strongly influenced by users (piIots).
We at Boeing, among other design philosophies, strive for simplification, redundancy and
fault tolerant system design. Error tolerant designs are important and we must be dways
cognizant of the workload impossd on the pilots. Most important ofall, is that we appropriately
design automation ta meet the needs of the human pilot. It is our objective to achieve
automation in flight deck designs that allows pilots to choose a level of automation appropriate
to the task. Other objectives are to assure pilot awareness of the situation is presenrsd or
enhanced and that appropriate feedback is present with regard to pitot inputs or action.
With such philosophies in mind, let us briefly look at changes that are typical in modem
cockpit design. Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSI's) have long been the primary instrument
by which pilots maintain the desired course or lateral flight path of the airplane. In modem
cockpits Iike the 7571767,the HSI was replaced by an Elecmic Horizontal Situation Indicator
(EHSI). As we thought it important to preserve familiar instrumentation for the pilot, an N S I
display was made available that looked very much like the earlier generation eEectro-mechanical
HSI's.
Madem electronic displays, however, offer us the ability to display optional information
in the same display space, For example, while preserving much of the course related
information found on early HSl's, the electronic displays allowed us to supefimpe weather
information on the same display, so that the pilot could see the weather information without the
necessity to look at a separate indicator. Perhaps most importantly, it allow4 us to display the
literal equivalent of a pilot's navigation chart directly on the EHSX. So instead of simply
displaying information, regarding whether one was left or right of a desired course, one could
show a moving map of the ground based route and displacement of the airplane from that desired
route. It was possible, at the touch of a button, to selectively display other information such as
ground basad navigation stations, airports, and optional routes. 3 believe the moving map
display is one of the most powerful features in the modem clockpit. It has significantly increased
pilot awareness of their position and may be the single most important factor in reducing
controIlsd flight into terrain accidents.
hother feature of the modem cockpit that has significantly changed the way pilots do
their job is the Flight Management Computer (FMC) chaxac?&d by an FMC Control Display
Unit (CDU)provided for each pilot, These CDU's slow the pilots to access a number of
different displays and to view or insert certain information. The FMC CDU puts incredible
computing power into the hands of the pilots and allows them to manage the flight path of the
airplane in a manner that is much more highly accurate than was achievable in previous
gemtion airplanes. Further, it allaws the flight to be flown in a manner that is much more
optimal from an economic perspective than was previously achievable.
Other features associated with the modern cockpit are very sophisticated crew alerting
systems (messages), as well as messages of high technology engine indications which alert the
pilot when a parameter is beyond a desired limit. The very latest flight deck designs, such as
the 747-400, have also integrated a gat many flight deck displays into a single Primary Flight
Display (PFD). This display integrates airs@, airplane attitude, altitude, vertical speed, and
heading infomation that, in previous designs, were all found in qmate indicators. Putting
such infomatian on a single display is believed to enhance the ability of the pilot to easily and
accurately monitor the information.
Another feature of modern cockpit designs are synoptic displays which provide system
related information in a user friendly format. For example, a simplifiad schematic of the fuel
system is providd which shows p j t i o s l of the valves and resulting flow of fuel from tanks to
engines. Wile such information is generally available from other sources on the flight deck,
these displays allow a great deal of information to be derived from a single glance.
In summary, the modern cockpit airplanes have significantIy improved navigation

capability and accuracy. Awareness of airplane position and its progress are obvious at a glance
and route or tracking errors become much more obvious, We see improved system status and
monitoring information available to the pilot, along with improved alesting and annunciation of
airplane health. So with all these wonderful features is there a reason for concern? When users
voice concerns the answer can only be yes, and I, tm, admit there are areas of concern,
However, I characterize the concerns in a slightly different manner and put them into three
general areas.
My first concern is with the proliferation of information, the added capability. A great
deal of information has been provided to pilots operating the modern cockpit. While this
information adds capability, it also increases the amount of knowledge required to operate and
monitor the equipment,
An example which illustrates my first concern is holding information provided on me's.

Holding patterns have been with us for many years, long before modern cockpits were available,
and have always presentd a complicated and difficult maneuver for a pilot. Because of their
complexity many pilots felt holding patterns were prime candidates for automation and were
included in FMC's.
Such an automated feature looks like a tremendous advantage to pilots, and indeed it is.
But, the automated feature itself is fairly complicated, as many options are available in order to
respond to #he many variables in an actual holding pattern. The holding page of the FMC can
present a challenge to a pilot who has not utilized it in some time. Many such features are
provida! in FMC's and a number may be infrequently used. Therefore, a pilot who does not
axasionally .review such information to maintain proficiency may find it difficult to use the
features. However, one alternative is to enter a holding pattern without the use of the FMC as .
was done on previous generation airplanes.
The second area of concern is the complexity of some automated features, such as those
that accomplish highly sophisticated calculations which cannot be done by pilots.
An example of complexity that the pilot has difficulty understanding, is descent planning.
During descent in an FMC a series of waypoints or fixes can be entered. At each waypoint or
fix, the pilot has the option of selecting altitudes or airspeeds one wants the airplane to achieve.
The FMC will then calculate an optional profile between each waypoint to achieve the best
economy. A pilot can monitor the system to assure the desired altitudes and speeds are
achieved, but the actual profile flown may be different than a pilot would choose. Such
differences tend to frustrate pilots because they do not fully understand the choices the computer
is making.
And a final concern with the modern cockpit is its accuracy and reliability. That's right,
I said a concern is its high degrse of accuracy and reliability. When something is highly
accurate and highly reliable there is always the risk of carnplacency. In other words the pilot
finds that it perfoms so well day in, day out, that they begin to expect it will always perform
perfectly; they relax their vigilance and potentially fail to adequately monitor.
When designs offer incredible additional flexibility, capability, accuracy and reliability,
one must be concerned about the adequacy of training and strategies for operation of the
equipment. A number of concerns arise with regard to how successful. we have been in these
areas.
First of all with the modem mkpit, we sometimes find inadequate training has been
provided with regard to focus on actual job accomplishment. Training has fucused on repetitious
accomplishment of individual procedures to achieve a high degree of proficiency but rarely are
such procedures practiced in a realistic environment. Although some training programs include
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT)or Line Oriented Simulations (LOSS using training
scenarios designed to replicate the real world, such efforts are still relatively in-uent.
A second concern with training and operation is that we as an industry have been remiss
in terms of defhing strategies for the use of automation. Automation in many cases, has offered
many optional methods of job accomplishment and only m 1 . y have we indicated to pilots which
methods are preferred. One pilot may, therefore, choose one method, while another pilot may
make a different choice. When two pilots are flying together they may nat reach the same
conclusion regarding which method is optimal, In some cases the non-flying pilot has no idea
which method the flying pilot will choose, and is therefore pmrly prepaxed to monitor and
backup the flying pidot.
Another area of significant concern is that we rarely tell pilots when not to use
automation. In fact, we often use the automation in an inappropriate manner during training to
achieve the desired degree of proficiency. For example, we have both pilots heads down using
the FMC on final approach; a method we would never advocate in revenue service where one
pilot should be heads up, looking out the window and monitoring trSca Additionally, we may
create the impression that problems or challenges are always to be solved through highly
automated means, even when simpler means would be preferable.
Another area of concern in training and operations is littIe attention is directed to

managing the ManlManlMachine relationship. In this context the ManlManlMachine is the
captain and first officer and FMC. Xn previous airplanes, Ule flight path could only be managed
by a high degree of communication by the captain and the first officer. Maps had to be viewed,
radios had to be tuned, courses had to be selected, and both pilots had to work together to
accomplish these activities. Further, due to the intracockpit communication necessary to
accomplish the tasks, it was obvious to both pilots what actions were being accomplishad. With
an FMC, however, the captain can very easily manage the flight path of the airplane without the
aid of the other pilot. Conversely, the first officer can do the same. In fact, a first officer who
is highly proficient with the use of the EMC may usurp the authority of a captain who is less
proficient or somewhat hesitant to use automation. Under other circumstances, one pilot may
be managing the flight path of the airplane through the FMC without intending to exclude the
other pilot, but fails to communicate what is being accomplished. The other pilot only finds out
what is being accomplished after the fact by monitoring the FMC display.
We have always had a concern with regard to pilots working together in an optimal
manner as a team to ammplish challenges present on the flight deck. The FMC allows
improvement with regard to this human resource problem, or inappropriately managed, it offers
the opportunity to isolate the two crew members on the flight deck in a manner that was not
achievable before.
A final concern is inadequate mentoring during initial in-service operation. With

previous generation airliners, the way pilots were trained to truly accomplish the job was for a
more experienced pilot to supervise them or assist them during the initial stages of operation of
the airplane in revenue service. While this principle or practice still exists, it has become much
more challenging. Remember, many more choices and options are available to pilots and the
challenge of teaching job accomplishment is heightened. The pilot who is supervising the new
pilot during their entq into revenue service may also focus excessiuely on the use of automation
to assure the newly qualified pild is capable of utilizing i t effectively, This again may lead to
the perception that it is desirable to operate the airplane in the most highly automated way.
Further, the pilot doing the supervision may have also not been properly trained in optimal use
of automatim and may offer little guidance in terms of prefer& methods.
It is my belief that we as manufacturers have significant responsibility for the methods

of v t i o n of madem cockpit airliners and for the adequacy of training programs. The
airplane design has significant influence on training programs and operational techniques.
Additionally, the manufacturer offer airlines a set of recommended operating pracedures and
structures a recommended training program. Therefore, the manufacturer has a unique
opportunity to influence the ways in which modem cockpit airplanes are operated,
Concerns also exist with regard to the influence of users of airplanes, principally pilots;
who, at limes, seem to have an insatiable appetite for more automation. On one hand, pilots say
that they are concerned that automation is taking aver, while on the other hand they ask for
more and mare features and more and more capability in the modem cmkpit. We all know that
users may be inadequate monitors of performance of highly automated systems, especially those
that operate reliably and awwrately day in, day out. But that in itself doeslittle to inhibit some
pilots from asking for more automation. Pilots also, at times seem to have an apparent and
almost obsessive need to salve challenges through highly automated means, wen when less
sophisticated means would be preferable. It is difficult to understand why pilots make such
choices, but it may be to prove to themselves that they are indeed in charge of, and capable of
mastering the automation.
A find area of concern is related to human factors research. WiIe such research is
essential to future improvement, the potential for benefit is, at times, not achieved. Perhaps we
are not as capable in the use of such data as we think we are, or perhaps we simply have a
disconnect or failure to comrnuniate between human factors researchers and those of us who
must undersmd what they have to say.
We must be careful when viewing results of human factors research or human factors
data to be sure it is indeed telling us what we think it is. At times a reseaxcher may examine
a problem without full awareness of outside influences. Or they may be only examining a
sub-element of a problem and the entire problem must be examined before conclusions can be
drawn. Also, problems may not be considexed in the context of total system influences. This
is not necessarily a deficiency on the part of human factors research, it is simply the result of
much of such research being done in segmented fashion, attacking one challenge at a time.
Human factors researchers may also identify a problem, but not determine its significance.
Solving insignificant problems, through use of greater automation could add complexity without.
any real benefit. Not all problems deserve to be solved. We,as recipients of human factors
research, may aIso mistakenly conclude that the human factors researcher is calling for us to
solve a problem when the problem is only beginning to be understood.
It is also necessary to be aware that problem related data often relates to perceptions of
problems. Surveys of pilots may be susceptible to such perception problems, If the question
is worded in a manner that is vague, general, or non-specific,then the answers that one receives
may be less than adequate to fully understand the problem. While perception of problems is
important and often is the first step in understanding real problems, one must be careful to
differentiate when perceived problems and real problems differ.
As previously indicated, I beliwe we have, in general, provided great benefit with the
modern cockpit. Yet there axe clearly opportunities for improvement and we must continue to
seek optimal solutions to modem cockpit human interface problems,
There are cases where the equipment is not as user friendly as it could be, and there are
cases where further optimization of designs is indeed readily achievable. But we must be very
cautious ta assure continued expansion of automation is consistent with act& human needs; that
we are indeed solving problems in a way that results in benefit. We must be cautious to not add
complexity, which has potential benefit that cannot be realized as a result of associated
challenges of understanding ox: operating the automation.
With regard to human factors related data, we as a community must work harder to
assure data which portrays problems is not vulnerable to misconceptions regarding its
significance, the degree to which it is conclusive, or the extent to whicb it is applicable to
solutions.
Without any changes to airplane designs, training programs offer potentid for significant
and near term benefit in managing the ManlManlMachine relationship. We must assure flight
crews understand appropriate practices for use of automation. Embedding human factors in
training is one element that is absolutely essential to achieving this objective. We must structure
training programs which cause the kinds of decisions, choices and activity which are appropriate
to actual job accomplishment. We must create awareness of when or why tasks or operations
are to be accomplished, create understanding of when non-use or limited use of automation is
preferable. We should embed in our training programs scenarios that have outcomes which
make it obvious to the crew how well they have prfomed as a team and how appropriate their
choices or actions were. Often times the best lesson learned is one which you discover yourself.
The modem cockpit may not be perfect, but by any measure can only be termed a
remarkable success. While there are opportunities for improvement in design that are
appropriate to pursue, it is my position that there are far greater and more immediate benefits
in us cwllectiveIy focusing on operational and training strategies for managing the
ManlManlMachine relationship.
Indeed, we have unleashed the power and choices of the Genie and it is up to us to assure
we are in charge!
d O ~ b if y ~ ~ u m n a r n wC~:CT&M
x depy~H.B ce6~yrcnumeme MHOFKX py-
TMHHMX o n e p u t : B najrolrapoBam:ti caMojxera x K a K oTh$euaa g o ~ ~ o p
I
K o ~k no YeJrosesecKowa @amowB & m ~ -

a Ha npe.mAJrqm cv,um3~y~e
K ~ XH cuepmamms onr! cam pe rnar%?eH~aqm H Ono ~e B C T B I I ~

R ~ R T ~ ~CTM
n amImemx ~CJIOBRXX 3xcmyaTauwm. H npu 803HEIKi03eZf1H O C Q ~

sricmee a s H a r 7 c l o H H o e O ~ U ~ ~ O F ~ H 06ecner1~sau~ee
M C , ; e c-
p a 3 ~ ~ ~ vnpQe
CVOH8JIbHh'X I\qhlCJII!T2JIbWYX fi,~ a ~ a l l T a I ! M O BbIIiYCKIiMKa K H a p -

cIl0 C O ~ H O C T
HO TEXHMrIe CKOh'Y n p O r p CCy B a B b i a ! Hki . npI4 0 6 f l e ~ t r ~n K J I 0 T O B 0 CiiOB-
~ h r sz a T p s T b I C B R B ~ Ic~ xe~iioiir r o ~ r o ~ o s ~ no?Topzy

oi~, ycsneme @y~,aa-
MeHTaJbHOI'O 0f;p8.30BaHLR HCHal.~HOPO Y B e J I K Y K B a e T 0 6 . i ~CTOMhlOTb
~ nos-
POTOEKE.; ( c ~ I a h 4'-1 1).
tiaxwoe s ~ a u e ~ xB eC K C T ~ O ~ H Mee
~ , ~~ ~ ~ ~ O But,ceeT R ry~am~ap-*
3aIiI4R ll ryMaHk:3aL!LiR. ' ~ ' M C I U ~ UIKOZa
R Q0Jur;Ha H e TOJrbKO A 2 B a T b Y3KO-
A-224 243-AN/146
Circular/Circulaire~up~yn~p
me n p e n y n p e m ~ e n b ~ o ct i~ r ~ a m 3 a m
ti e
onacHortj C ~ J U I ) R ~ H H Rc s e ~ atie
npx nocaa~eB c n o r n b ~ xM ~ ~ T ~ O Y C J I O B WwR XRpyrMe aBEarrJloHHbie n p o H c -
meCTBMR 3 a C T a B A f R l T H a C T I e ~ C M O T ~ TOTHOmeHKR
b K BOClDlTaHMIO JET-
npo+ecc~mBbIczee aBI.;a:.rsoh.Hoe o6ps30sa~kieC n e r w a n t r c T a . Hapmfi

noTeH1rk:en i k e CKO
~ PD HncTwryTa Kmaie p o ~PA, i i a c u ~ ~ ~ ~ aiir csbirne
ops
199 QOKT!3PB TeXHXueCKMX H a y K , ~ ~ C K ? ~ C CsOGKOXO
~ ~ B 500 KaH,4Mfla-
TO9 T e X K i Y e CKMX H a Y K , 40TleHTOB O @ ? C ~ ~ Y W B@~Y~HT, Q ~ ~ H T ~ J I ~HH-

H~T~)
- ~ B 2 X E ~ E IHa E e p C n e K T H B y p 3 B I I T M R 8BM8IMY .
K;Fe;lC?pI-!YKlITGQrOTOE EJT, O P ; , : e H T M
Ym~snbwazj z : e 6 ~ 0 - ~ 1 a 4 c p ~ o Casa
p ~ a ~KHCTETYTa I? neTHm ywbm::
CBR38HHtTX C OTKB3BMM aBuarwomR TeXHblKJI: B nOJIeTe.
npsew mu, oam npmep. Mucma, a3pnop.r B H ~ K O ~ O . I990 mn.

n a l ~ a psrbpro ssHrarensr ~ Q H ssJreae cahqoxe.ra W-I54. &ctzewep weir
HenpaamnHys, rttrTopnatrtrw, "I' Bac r o p T T ~ T M R.qm~raw~lb~.Lop~um~ep,
wdnon~sm@ Bcero numb T ~ T M C~ B! M O C T O R E ~ ~ H MnoneT,
~~ ~ ~ ~ B U RO W~- H O
HtrsaeT cmyarma M ~ e f l c m y e rB COOTBBTCTBHM co C ~ O ~ B ~ M K H0C6Bc m ~ -
'F3 XbCTBaMbl+
C T ~none TOR
6330nac~0 flpf?IIyCM~~pe~a
CMCTeMa PJlaPHOCTMKH I I ~ ~ @ ~ c c H o -
ICAO Right Safety and Human Factors Symposium,
Washington, D.C., UNITED STATES
12 - 15 Apri! 1993
The other aide of automation -

A challenge for pilot training
Capt. Dieter Schlund, Head Cockpit Crews

SFJQ Martin Wyler, Assistant Head Cockpit Crews
SWISSAIR, Swiss Air Transport Company Ltd., Zurich
1. SITUATION
Before we can answer the pestion, how to train pilots for modem cockpits, we have to
look into the technical specialities of the advanced technology flight deck, and its effect on the
crew.
What we first notice in a modem cockpit, are the flight data display and arrangement, the
refined simplicity of the control panels and the high degree of automation. This has given the
crew better situational awareness and a reduction in the workload.
2. THE NEW RISK FACTORS
2.1, The complexity and Interdependability of the cockpit systems
With the help of automation, faults are general]y easier to deal with. Some examples here
are synoptic displays, ECAM, flight warning computers and dark cockpit philosophy, Due to the
high degree of integration, however, we're beginning to see previously unknown faults, which
lead to unexpected combinations of warnings. This actually makes it more difficult to analyse
what has occurred. It's not easy to say what effect this has on flight safety, the complexity tends
to muddy, or black out completely the clarity of system status.
Faults in complex systems can have more serious results than in simpIe systems, and
they're more difficult to track down. Paradoxically there's an old aviation adage which sums it
up: The higher you go - the further you fall!'
2,2. Extreme varlatlons in work load
The increase in automation has led to the pilot no longer playing an active roIe in the
system. On longrange flights especially, the problems of boredom and monotony have increased.
The obvious human reaction is carelessness and premature fatigue, (When I look around the hall
here,.. I can see you're getting my message!).
If, on the other hand, events depart from programme, peaks of workload occur, which are
difficult for the crew to deal with. This is directly attributable to the mass of automatic actions
happening in a modern cockpit, thousands of potential faults, waiting to be dealt with,
2.3. The shortcom jngs of softwaredriven

. . systems
On sohwaredriven' systems, we're getting isolated, non reproduceable faults. They are
often caused by electromagnetic interference, and aren't the type of defect w e t e been used to.
They're not irreparable faults - weye seeing unique appearances, which then repair themselves.
These defects are inherent in the systems, and the crews often give up when faced with them, and
never do find out what caused them.
Faults in software, even when discovered, aren't so easy to repair. Changes in'the software
-
are often accompanied by new faults. The data banks basis of the digital technology, have
become so huge, that it is almost impossible, ta keep them free of faults. By all this, we can see
that aal the precision which we believed to be inherent in digital systems, is in fact based upon
blurred, faultridden information.
The built in software dictates more and more the operation. If the crew wants to fly
something other than what is programmed, they either have to forgo any support from the
automatics, or they have to do same very clever juggling, to get the system to play along.
2.4. The eroslon o l good airmanship
The introduction of fly by wire has made it possible to define a flight envelope, which
the pilot is unable to exceed. This...well..'wing clippingt together with the fact that the control
inputs of the pilot are refined by a computer, raise the question of the influenee of the pilot in
a system such as this. The user friendly panels allow the pilots to push buttons according to the
rules of play; they won? let people get any closer to the system 'though. It's this sort of thing,
which makes a pilot begin to think that 'maybe someone else is in charge here!' There's a distinct
danger that he"!, at least in part, abdicate his responsibility for the operation of the flight. Itas
important, in this connection, that not only the manufadurers, but the operators too, are dear in
their minds, that the responsibility for having a function carried out correctly is met by the man,
irrespective of whether the man or the machine carries the action out. (Here J should point out,
maps,that I am using the term 'man' in the generic sense, to mean what these days in
Washington, is called a 'person').
Actually, it can be proved, that pilots let automatics get away with actions, which they
would not have accepted from humans - including themselves.
-
Having such a large amount of systems, it's necessary and the generd dependability
-
reinforces this attitude that the pilot must place a lot of trust in them. This fact undermines his
natural healthy mistrust. It's getting more difficult for Joe Pilot to know where he can place his
trust and where not. As technology gets closer to perfection, we notice a certain carelessness
creeping in, which we certainly don't want in aviation.
Large1y as a result of cockpit layout, there is a danger of too much headdown flying, with
a consequent deterioration in lookout.
It's long been proved, that the increase in automation discourages hand Dying. One's
confidence in one's own flying skill is reduced. If we switch off the automatics, especially if they
have been operating at a high level, we lose some of the picture. This has tended to lead to a
reluctahce to switch off the autopilot, autothrottle, or whatever, although a difficult situation couId
have been more easily mastered in this way,
3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There really are some useful bareas where we can try to eliminate the negative
manifestations of the trend outlined. Here they are:
By improving the contact between man and machine with a human orientated bias.
By changing traditional operating policies, to adapt to the technology at harid.
By improving the communication between maintenance and flight operations (a 'whizz kid'
is not necessarily the best Technical Pilot - a straight soldier may see a fleet problem
earli tr).
By solving software probIems more quickly.

By adapting the ATC system to the cockpit technology, in order to make the most of its
potential.
By training the crews and engineers in a more suitable way.
4. TRAINING CONSEQUENCES
The problems we have seen can't be solved solely by improving the man machine
interface, although human orientated development philosophy is gaining in imporlance. Right
now, however, I intend to concentrate on cockpit crew training, which is all the more important, .
since there's no immediate improvement to be expected from the technical sector. We must learn
to accept the disadvantages, which presently go hand in hand with the new technology, and to
deal with them.
A-230 Circular/Circulaire/L(up~ynxp243-AN/146
4.1. The Extent of Training Needed
Flight training will have to be carried out as it always has been. In addition, every new
automatic system created to ease the pilot's job, must be fully understood by him; if it goes
unserviceable, the man has to take over the function of the machine. The consequence is more
extensive training. The training quality must improve, if the time 'required isn't to increase.
Lets's now see, what top quality instruction entails.
4.2. Instructlonal Methods
Traditional training methods are no longer suitable for teaching modern aircraft systems-
handling. What we used to do, was give the trainee a picture of the whole, by teaching him about
each individual part, like making a jigsaw puzzle. This method is too demanding for a student,
faced with modem complex systems. You see, in the dynamic state, there are so many different
ways in which the subsystems interact with each other, that it isn't possible to achieve a general
view, from the standpoint of the individual components.
A much better way of going about it, is total immersion introduction. In this method, the
aircrafc is presented as a whole. From the very beginning the aircraft is flown and operated by
the student. The operational experience he brings with him, is continually added to, and as the
Iogical relationships between the systems are understood a solid base of knowledge i s achieved,
which remains in the memory (the learning by doing approach).
Typical for a course based on this method are:
The intensive use of simulators from the earliest stage (full flight or fix-base simulators
may be used here).
CBT or computer-based training, which is especially suitable apart from other reasons,
due to the obvious possibilities for animation in the graphics.
LOFT or line orientated flight training, in which the connection is made to daily
operations, so that crews can use their line experience to assist their personal leaning
curve,
4.3, Corn plexity
In the future, computer technology as a pilot" subject is going to be imperative. The

assembly, functioning, then data transfer conformity of sonware driven systems must be
understood. It's also important, to know about system redundancy, the effect on behaviour, of
bugs in the system and to understand all about available computer modes.
243-AN/!46
Circ~lar/Circulaire~up~yn~p A-231
Integration of systems, has become a science of its own.
4.4. Resource Management / Human Aspect Development
The most efficient use of all the resources available (more of them all the time) has
increased in importance in the modern cockpit. The best method to train resource management
(and here we mean not only the systems, but the combined brain power of the crew) is in LOFT
training in the simulator.
Good crew teamwork is the irrevocable prerequisite for safe operation. A modern cockpit
offers many different ways of solving a problem, which requires optimum crew cooperation and
communication. (What's he going to do? What does he want me to do?). Here people are
involved, with all their strength and weaknesses, who have to get along together. If we look at
the man as an integral part of the system& we see that CRM-Training or HAD-Training (human
aspect development as we call it) has become a necessity. Technical training is no longer enough.
4.5. Self confidence
Recurrent training courses must be set in a way, that every pilot has confidence in his
flying ability. The manual option has to become a genuine one, under any condition.
For longrange crews flying enlarged crew missions, extra simulator training may well have
to be offered.
If pilots are not to feel defeated by the advanced technology flight deck, a high degree
of self discipline is required. Only those who refuse to be intimidated into working in the same
way as a machine themselves (which today's cockpit technology makes the pilot do) can make
use of the strength of the human in the system. There will only be genuine redundancy, when the
pilot behaves as an intuitive decision maker in the madmachine system. He can only do this,
when his level of knowledge is high enough, and when he is well trained. We can stop the
erosion of g o d airmanship by bolstering our pilot's confidence in their ability.
A-232 243-AN// 46
Circuhr/Circulaire/~uprcyn~1p
TRAINING FOR COMPUTER ASSISTED FLYING (CAF)
.Captain Matti Sorsa,

IFALPA
1. Training in the systems colatext
Training is an integral part of the life and career of any airline pilot. Unlike many other
professional people airline pilots regularly go through various training sessions practically until
they retire.
Computers is another essential element in the everyday w'mldng environment of the

airline pilots whether we like it or not.
It is thus more than natural that the Tnternationd Federation of this aviation community
is very interested in the combination of these two crucial. issues: computers in the aircraft and
training for their use.
IEALPA is very grateful to have the opportunity to present the views of professional
airmen in this ICAO Symposium of greatest importance.
It is necessary to understand that training has no independent value as such. Training is

a part of the system wdl described by Dr. James Reason. In this system earlier decisions
concerning hardware and software design of equipment, procedures and company policies behind
them as well as overall s o c i m n o m i c climate will dictate most of the end-result, the flight
safety.
Training during this process is indispensable, of course. But it has definite limits. It
should not be rnisusd as a cover-up of wrong decisions. Pilots are by definition extremely
adaptable. They will probably leam to fly anything that has some sort of wings. But human
adaptability should not be used against humans. What does it really prove that pilots have passed
conversion courm to advanced tschnology airplanes? Not much. Perhaps that with strong
motivation you can pass almost any course. It certainly does not prove that these aircraft have
been designed in a manner suitable for human operators or that the training system is optimal.
Training is too important to be used as a trash-box. It is irresponsible and intellectudly

lazy to argue: well, training can handle this or that when decisions are immature or simply
wrong. In addition, if the training sub-system in itself is badly designed the unfortunate trainee
shall then carry the burden of the sins of all involved, from the ignorant to the nonchalant.
2, CAF and its specific demands for training
Computer Assisted Flying (CAF) is a term we in IEALPA prefer for automation. The
basic function of the pilot has not changed too much, The pilot is still the human tasked to be
respnsible for the safe and economic execution of the flight. Just &ink about the 100% freedom
of the pilot not to do so.
Technical assistarm to the piloting task has changed a lot during of course. At the
moment the order of the day is the assistance provided by the computers. We think that the CAF
i s an accurate term to describe the relationship between the pilot and the automated technology.
When components change in any technological system, training should reflect that
change. But it would be simpEistic to approach this requirement by concluding that training
should aim at these new components only, in this case computers and their direct effect on the
autopilot. And yet, this has h
n the case in many instances.
e
Back in 1981 a major U.S, d m started their B767 conversion courses with the idea
that the students should program the FMS from the first training period. The first perids
were 90% of time concentrated attempting to learn the FMS and 10%learning to fly the
simulator. Only after a couple of years the established B757/767pilots managed to
convince the training department that the first few simulator periods should be devoted
to manual flying. When this conceptual change was executed an immediate lower rate of
failures - and happier students - resulted.
The CAF is a major conceptual change in the over-dl operation of the aircraft. It is a
new way of thinking having wide implications from the fight planning phase to all aspects of
the actual flight operation. Our B767 example is a reminder of the way the canceptwality of the
CAF was underestimated in the beginning. Either the conversion course was handled with the
same old syllabus plus some isolated facts about these new gadgets. Or even worse, the
conversion course handled the basic airplane as a kind of a secondary system and concentrated
an teaching these new magic things. The result was a lot af rather horrid flying dong the
infamous magenta line.
The CAF demands a new way of thinking. Due to its inherently totalistic nature it is
essential that the training takes the operation of the aircraft into account very early in the
instruction of the hardware and software. In practice the training for the CAF should integrate
this Level of technology to the decision-making, communication and leadership concepts, .
Computers have a profound effect on the workload distribution and time-sharing, long
and short term. If these elements are not made clear from the beginning the students will get a
twisted and over-optimistic picture regarding the role of this equipment. Incidentally, this aspect
has another implication. Only the red-world operator can competently teach these skills of the
new technology to the future operators,
3. Learning to use the computers
Training upwardsaalongthese lines requires that the training system uses intelligently and
economically the CBT (Computer Based Training) and FTD (Flight Training Devke)
opportunities. The fact that these devices are not airplane look-dikesshould not make us think
that the operational aspects can be left aside. Quite on the contrary. The computer used without
operational emphasis is a fairly worthless thing for an airline pilot.
Next aspect of this CAF training is that it should be aimed at crews not individual pilots.
Typically the errors in the use of computers are crew errors or mistakes. All traditional CRM
concepts should be present when learning how to fly effectively assisted by computerized
systems. The instructors should be line pilots specifically trained at the questions of the human
interaction in the flight deck. The computer system specific problems related to the cockpit
communication and workload distribution should become clear before even approaching the very
expensive FFS (Full Flight Simulator). In the FFS the most effective way of teaching and honing
these skills is the LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training). It should appear very early in the
syllabus and carry the main burden of that phase of training.
Perhaps the most important phase of the CAF training is, however, flying the line with
the route instructor. This practical familiarization phase requires that the right people are
carefully selected for this task of route instructors. Their training is worth of a major investment,
because their deep understanding of the system implications in the CAF determines how the new
pilots learn to use the computers in an optimal manner. As the very nature of the computers
implies abundant degrees of freedom to the conduct of the flight it is essential to learn early
which applications are safe and efficient and which not. Otherwise the risk-analysis of the new
pilots may not be based on realistic presumptions. The freedom of choices is not a negative
factor as such. It can enhance the performance of the pilots by making the work more creative
and satisfying. The only problem is that as there are so many alternatives and as you do not
really know all the software combinations it is very hard to learn by trial and error what you can
do and what you should not even try.
4. Learning to live without computers
When especially aircraft manufacturers train pilots their natural emphasis is on the
positive aspects of the new technology. It is however equally important to learn how to fly
without these new aspects of controlling the airplane. In fact, redundancy is one of the key
words of flight safety, now perhaps more than ever. In the CAF there are two distinct kinds of
redundancy, voluntary and involuntary.
Voluntary redundancy is the basis for the intelligent operation of the aircraft. From the
Human Factors point of view the issue is the control of the cockpit workload. As all line pilots
well know the computers create their own particular kind of a workload pattern. Sometimes it
is painfully far from the optimum. Thus for instance the computers have a well-recognized
tendency of setting the workload level ultra low during cruise phase of the flight. Equally,
during approach these modern wonders can demand so much attention that pilots have too little
mental energy left to the rest of the operation.
This is where the voluntary redundancy can really save the day. We should never forget
that computers are there to help the pilots to fly the aircraft. Learning from the beginning when
to switch off totally or partially is a major component in the ability to operate the aircraft in a
professional manner. In this kind of a learning the LOFT is probably the most effective training
tool. Living through situations where it makes sense to revert to manual functions in order to
optimize the workload is a major learning experience. Training should give the pilots mental
models and preparedness to reduce the level of automation when needed. Desperate clinging to
the automated devices is not a sign of professionalism.
The age-old cmss-checkjng concept is another form of the v o 1 u redundaqcy

~ in
action. There are too many examples of Standard Instrument ~epartur&(SID) flown by the
computer and never independently checked by the pilots.
The famous Bombay SID confusion was reported by one of our s e n i ~ rmembers: In
Bombay there is a departure called SUGlD 1. Now, if you try to find that in your FMS
page you quickly run into something abbreviated SG 1. The next page would give you
SUGlD1 if you ever got that far. You should. SG 1 is quite mother SID called
SONGADH I . The consequences of this situation when actually fiown without rdundant
cross-checking are obvious to this audience.
Involuntary redundancy is another training issue. When the computers gracefully leave
you when you most needed them the tfaining really should have given you ample aniount of
mental m d e l s in order to cope with the situation. We should tell the new pilots that these
devies may not always work as advertized, The surprise is most unpleasant if the training has
always emphasized the maximum use of automation. That kind of a training concept is totally
unfair to the pilots. This requirement for preparing pilots to operate with different levels of
automation is nothing more or nothing less that the good old back-@basics training principle.
The issues of cockpit communicaEion and workload control are particularly relevant here.
5. Summary: Traiaing operational wholes
We pilots feel that flying advancsd airplanes, flying assisted by computers requires a
truly integratsd training approach, Operationat implications of the various levels of
automation chosen or available for use should be made clear from the start.
Mental mdels are learned in realistic training scenarios (LOFI').
The use of the modem training technology (CBT,FTD) combined with the experience of
real-world line operators as instructors is a basic requirement.
The CAF can bring a lot of enjoyment to the work of the pilot and thus raise the Ieve1
of his performance if all the available degrees of freedom are utiliZBd. Training should
make this utilization possible.
Redundancy training back-to-basics is another aspect too easily forgotten.
All in dl we think in IFALPA that good training will create positive attitudes to the good
old flying - this time assisted by not only your fellow airmen but also by the computers.
e POCAZnHee AecRTMAeTHe HaMeTMflOCb O T r e T f l M B Q e yCAOXHEHME'
3 a ~ a ,r~ e a a e ~ b inx x c n e ~ u e p z ~Y ~ 8 A . T p y ~ asMafiHcnefqepoe C T a H c z M T c R
~ e 6 e s o n a c ~ b r~n P RH M X C ~ M L I X . ~ H ~ Y M T ~ A yYaqamc9
~ H O M oMonax#saH)TcFi
~ ~ o r o o E p a 3 ~ b npoReneHM
1e 9 q e p e 6 p o - ~ u c q e p a A b ~ U P <n a T o n s r M b 1 . 3 ~ He
0
MOX~T re C X B S B T ~ C ~ HZ s $ ~ e ~ ~ ~ s ~M o c ua,qex~ccrt:
r ~ ~
?~EAOS~K~-HZFMYHHX? CWCTeY. COHHeHMn 8 ~ & A ~ C O O ~ ~ ~ ~ H O C
~ ~ C R ~ A F ? F I wcYnneucwbIx,
WF &waw.ZMqecKMx, x ~ o r C + a ~ t a p n b r x~ c c n e ~ o e d H I r i h
pon ~renoeevEcKoro $ a ~ r o p a( W ) E 6 e s o n a c H o c . r ~ e o 3 ~ y u ~ o rABMXBMME
o
CER! -
B ~ I C O K Z F I F C M X 0 3 M 0 4 M O H a A b H a R HaflPFIXeHHOCf b M CAOXHCICTb fP Y A 2
asnan~one~rep,oos KTO~OB. X
DnpeAenReTcg B D ~ ~ W MKHO ~ M ~ ~ C T B+CB H H N ~
CTHOCRTCR TAKME , Y ~ KswpaxeHnaR nepagHoMepHocTb padoreu H a r F y s i C k i ,
~ 8 0 6 b l ~ t a f i Bb!COKaR
~0 O f E e T C f B&HHOCTb 3 3 6e30nzc~ocrb R a C C a X M F O E I.:
so3~yrunb1x c y ~ o s , Hpaune eslpaxeHHag cToxacrMyHocTb Bfl M
nereoo6c+anos~~, AeWYMT E~EMPH!~ AAR ~ ~ M H R T M Epe.wex~U ;
rHroAHHanw8, eapyweywg UupKaAuoro pMTMa M ~ p .~ T G R B n P e T c R

c f i o c w o ~ e ~ w e nn e s S x c ~ ~ n u c rnpMcTanbsoro
~ skimaw FI K 3~0p08b m
amaAwcneTveFos, ynyrueHne Y C A O ~ M U M X TpyAa M X M ~ H M cc CTOPOH~I
pYKoBogcre2 ~ c ~n
MS,~M~~:HCKC .
yxd~
~ A A~ ~ % E K T M & H O ~ O AOKB3aJBAbCTSa TOrO, YTO ~ a 6 0 ~ 3K C
y n p 2 8 P e H t ! I0 803AYI1IHhlff ABbl XEHMBM (YBn 1 MHMqMMPYeT BtlP&XEHUOB
Famp9menwe ncMxMrecKoh ccpepbi M C C H C S H ~ ~ XQ M ~ M O ~ O ~ M ~ C ~HCC TKE YM X
DpraHM3M.3, HaHM 6 h l f l ~ p a 3 p a 6 0 ~ a ~ bC
l rp2TerMR M Y a K T M Ka GL(eHRt4
$ Y H M ~ M C F ~ / ~ ~ H OC~0C070RHMR M YPDBHS 3dOPDBbR aBMaAbtCn8T%ZPOB.
CYU:)-IOCTb ~e Z ~ K A W Y ~ CSRT €3 KoxnneKcHQw gw~an~trsc~o~
~CWX@AO?WYeCYBM, ~CHX~QM~MCROPM~~CF.QH, $MSMO~~O~MVECKOM,
fYMatOAOTMqECKOH M ~ M O X M M M Y ~ C K O MC ~ C A B A O B ~ H M M
AMCnaTYepOS E &ByX
@asax A E R T e A b q O C T M -
s CBO~OAHMO ~ r pado~bl A e H b M 3 p23Hble CepMOAM
paa.~swnc~ A e P r s n h H o c r M no YBA c p e r ~ c ~ p s q ~donee eR 70 nepeMeHw!x e
VyM3eH@WMe!-l Tecrvpymqklx HarPy3QK. 370 l 7 0 3 B C ~ l M n O O ~ S E K T M E H O
noArBepgHTk PbPSMT&fe A C C f CuPePHblX RpH3Hd K O 8 ncY 7 M .IOCTORWYQFc
eMP3XeFHOf 0 M H f e,'lflEKf YbflbHOTO M 3HQYMOHaflbHOFO HanpFfXsHLlR no&
eflpi R H M E M ~ ~ O $ ~ C C M O P . ? ~ ~ A
SeW A b H c C T b + no Y 8 A .
R TOe U
Ace cdecn~rew
R ~ S~ICOKDU ~$$~K~MBHOCTM JPYAZ
B
C,~ X P Z H ~ H M R
fiMC?erm+P~09 T8VeHMe fiflMteAbHOr0 8psMeHM Ha EhlCOKOM
ypogwz WX H O ~ 3TA M
~ ~ ~ U T O C ~ ~ O C O ~ M OPOBbR1 'a CAeaOBaTeflbHO H
!lC>K3,32TE?,?€?~l L i e H T p Z A bHOG1 T e M O A M H a t - I M KM (QYHKUMM cepfi~2) w
nepucpepxqecvon ( M D ~ ~ O P O ~ KO ~ O B O O ~ ~ ~ ~ E H M Y
Sm) e. nepep, HauanoM
HO'4YQU CXeHbI y 50 6 0 6 ~ f l e ~ 0 ~ 2 W H b lAXM C f l e T ' 4 e p 0 8 CMCT5ilLlqzCKOe
(naKc!g~xan%~o e)
i?pTepkia?b?ib~ ~ a s n e ~ uAeo ' c n r a n o 130-175 M M FT.C-.,
2 EMacTonfiC(ecKoe ( w ~ n ~ ~ a ~ b 6 b~
1noo e s) npeAenax 90-100 MM P T . C T .
0 , ~ H o e p ~ ' " ; P . f iO~T~M e c i e H h i HaM8C;ICUJLle CpeC?,Herj3yT;nOEble€ ZHEtC(eEMFi LI
YCC, a TaKxe HaMxyguse c o c T o x n u e ~c3roporo ~ p o e o o O p a q e x ~ 2 .
Yc~zH~E.;???H'-~.!F 92ki.T i7;3ME?.fleK HZ!!LE 8Xb+M2HME, M H ~ M M 6b1ni4 p 2 3 ~ 2 6 0 f F 3 ~ b ;
CneUVa ,?bHb!z! M e T O A t ~ IM C p e & C T St3 KGppeKqMLI @ Y H K ~ M O H ~ A ~ HCO ~ RHLI R
S C~T O
M ~ ~ ~ ~ T O S ~ O C O ~ Hn O pa
p MC T M6 o ~ ee HOUHY~C M ~ H Y .
A ~ T ~ R ~ F M aCX~a A M 3 CTaTMCTMVeCKl! O ~ F ~ ~ O T ~ HF H
e 3~y n~b X
T2TDS
EoMpneKcyoro ~t5cnegosax~
6onbwoGl
<~ s t 1 5 o p x ~A M c n E T Y e p o s n o z s o n M n 52+?
S ~ I E ~ A/rib
M $1 R O ~ ~ O ~ H OO n M C a T b &Ba ZiA.kTSpUaTGl3HblX IICXOAZ
e ~ a n ~ t f q ~ s r ~ pbe a~K x
qi4L'r OP~"~?HM~:V~ ~a . npo@ecc~o?-!z.,~sxoe
' ~ ' H T S A R & K . T ~ ~ f i b W O - 3 M O i ~ W O Y 2 ~ b H OH
e2npRXeHH@. TO ~ @ @ ~ K T M E H ~ ~ M fl
E??:! f L:Fbl
S€33$$P.1,:.7>+ 2AaRT2!<b?!A Z,'l5:93It4Lfe UEi Y C I l Z L U H O C T b , H2fieXHOCTt
p3.?~~>
9i C!,lTTs?l2>.< YEA i.r 3'3QpOsbe &MCReTYepOB. B ~ A Y ~ McpaKTopoil
M
a IT~OI~ZCC . aganTarAMx, ~ s n s e ~ cypcernh
~ pe3epsos
TO.fl2pRHTHOCTM K ~ ~ ! ~ o @ ~ C C M O H ~ ~X ~
PGHHC
WMY EYC K Q M Y MHTS,IIICV.T)'~~~~HOM)' M
iTCMX03MOQMOHanbHOMY HaTIpRXeHMKt. n o ~ f l ~ f i x~a e
~ b~o n e e OT'4eTflMSo
ShiRB/IRfIOCt ilpV Fp!;tHeF&!+!.?r.l MX
C E ~ L ~ ! @ H ~ ~ C K ; ~ HeCfleGM@MYeCKMX
Earp:/30uHFJIX TECTCB A(3 HZ'4ana CMekib!, no 3 Z E e p E e H M L t -M 3 C E O ~ O & H ~ I ~
DT P ? ~ O T ~Z Ie H b .
~ Q @ ~ K T M Z a
+ AI a~n ~
T a~ q M R K npo@eccMo~anb!-io~y HanpRxeHMtc xMena
necro n~:r~k y 25-30 % O ~ C A ~ A C P ~ H H ~~I ~
Xcnesqepo
Ms npoxenRnact e
YCTORuMZOCTY nCMXOflOTMVeCKMX, ~CMXO@M~MO.AO~MY~CKMX,
$~3vonorb?vec~
M ~ox 5 rtpoqeccoe
~ e ~ ~ b : x no^ 8nwsHMeM no
p a 6 o ~ b 1 Yep,. Y
3fOA ROt-lYfiEqMM ,C,MOiTeTYEPOS CABMFbI 8 3.H2AM3MPYeMblX CMCTeMZX K K3Hl4y
pqdcweP CM2HbI MMeAM KFaTKOBP@MeHHhIfi 0 S p a ~ M ~ b l RX a p d K T e F , M I '+To
O1.JeHb S a X H O , OTCYTCTBOBanM flpM3H2V.M g : f l O ~ ~ e ~ ~
S C
~ B lO ~ G ~A He~ I ~RO R
T ~
~ a 6 0 ~ b R
l eHb. Ece 3T0 YKB3bIEd/lO HE! 8blCOKYK) TCAe?aHTHOCTb
(YCTOU~(MBOCT~) . Y ~QQ~KTMSHO aAdilTMP08aHHbiX ALICneT'4epC8 K
n p o Q e c c r . i o x a n ~ ~ b ~ nQ a K r o p a M % a n p s x e ~ w
9, TO M c6ecneqkisano
yCneUH0CTb onepaTopcKoh AeRTeAbHOCTM, COXpaHeHMe flCMXMqeCUOr0 M
COM2TM'-!&CKOrC 3AOP38bX.
M~aqe O~CTOMT Aeno e rpynne AMcneTqepos (MX 30-4521;
H e s r p g e w T ~ s x ca ~ a n T M p y m q M x c R u n p c @ e c c ~ o H a n b x o M y@ a v . ~ c p yHanpsmexsz
8C.CeflCTS%le HM3KMX pE3epSOB TORepaHTHOCTM K HeMy. B ~ X H OL4 TC, YTG y
3TOn TpyFr?bl ,QMCZ?TC(ePOS HM3KOn 6blnz TOAepaHTHOCTt: M K MblUeUHOc1
~ a r p y 3{ ~~ a~r p ~ ~ e 3 p~, Z0 ~ I R ~ M ~n
O p ~S ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ O M ~ T ~ M Y npobe)
C ,~ ~ C K G F I .
l l p ~ s x a ~He~ ~ Q Q ~ K T M B H O G aI A a n T a G M M nponsnRnMcb KaK B Q a 3 e AOCTZT~UHC
eb!pameHwoh npeAcMeHHon aKTMsaqMM ncMxonorMuecKoro c ~ a ~ y c a;I
@M~MO/~OFM~~CSM
CMX CTeM OPraHM3MZi; TaK M n0 3a8epLUeHMbl CMexb!.
I.(paFil-!e H € ? ~ A ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ M ROTa H
K T~ 0I M
M FIBnFleTCR * : ~ O C A ~ A ~ G ~ C T B8
~OCTORHM~ M R ~
CRO~O~!-!!JIF~ CT p a 6 0 ~ b ~ AeHb . Y H ~ ~ Q @ ~ K T M B H O
aA2nTMpOBaHHbiX
AMCEeTqep03 80 BpeMR p a 6 o ~ b 1O T M e q a n M C b n0XHble c ~ ~ ~ ~ T ~ I B ~OUMBKM
H M R ,
TMna nponycu? , C H M X ~ H M ~BHWM~HMR M ero pacnpeAeneHn~ MP,XAY
~ 3 6 n I O ~ 2 e ~ b i M
OM~ % ~ K T ~ M M
H e, O n T M M a n b H O e f l p O R % A e H M e $~HKL~IR Kb!UAe%blR
naMRTp, CubirneHMe ycneuHocTM npo@ecc~oxansiioW A e s T e n b K o e T M bi
P ~ ~ O T O C ~ O C Q ~ H O C TH
Ma. ~ B o n e e3 a K O H O M e p H C 3TM OTKAOHeH1.18 ,3blR';eARAMCb
n?H ?KCTF€??2,obHblX CMTyaQ:lsX, RpM EbiCOKCh MHTeHCMBHOCTM sfl MEM .rlpM
MOHOTOWHD!A p a 6 0 ~ e[ ~ a n p ~ ~ e8 pHOYHYM
, cneiiy).
C f l e & y e ~oco6o n O A q e p K H y T b , q T 0 H $ ~ @ @ ~ K T M ~ H ~ TI C
M iI7 aAdflTalfiMM
K G C O ~ B X H O C T ~ M ~ ~ ~ o @ € ! C C M O H ~ ~ ~ Hf iOe G
8 T~e n b H O C T M . no Y8A HapRAy C
HZPYWE3HL:RMM 8 nCMXMqeCKOC! Cqepe COnpOBDXAanCR ~HCr006p23~blMbi
HaPYUJ2HMSMM @YHKYMOH~A~HO~
COCTORHM8 CepAeqHO-COCYAMCTOGI CHCTeMbI
F. E K , q e ytialL(8HMF1 C ~ P A ~ ~ S M B H n 0M
8 b lF
U e~H,M R apTepM.tanbHOr0 AdEfleHMFI f l p M
D A H B B p e M E H W O M S H d r M T e / i b H U H CWMXeHMtf ' C O K ~ ~ T L ~ ~ T ~ $ A Y H~H H I MU .Cep,qr_ja,
~ VO
s c 4 c n a 5 n e ~ ~ 1npoqecca
.l c r a 6 r 3 n ~ 3 s y t lp~M T H a cepAu,a, 'rro 3 a 4 K~C M ~ U S B H O
npr! r e / i e ~ e r p v . t e c ~ o perkcT?aqFtr.
fi LfCC e r e q e H u e eceY, pa6orsM C M ~ H ~ I .
P~pena~k ~
yacrorF1 cepAervHr coKpaqemM npw ~ T O H HaxcAMnxcb 3
~ ~ 4 e n a z r l l ~50-163
e yAapoe 3 MMHVTY M donee flame npM Hesbrco~CiU
L+UTeFCMPHOCTM B E . V ~ e f l ~ c bM n p W 3 H a K M HapyUeHMR perMOHdpHQr0
rros r c l e c ~ r o1(.poeoo6~aqetrws.B c e ~ T Mc ~ s w r wn p w s o g m n w K @opH.?Mposa~~ a
zpTepvafib)-IoC< w . l n e . p r e H = w w Mn1.r ~ e ~ p o u ~ p ~ . y A h M~Q T~G HoM Mp . ~.Yo p ~ , q a
gcrcnervepce TOR rpynnbl Fosbrutanacb ceepnrsamqaz auTtisHocTb KPOBM,
KOr-lqeHT?ayMR aApsHanl!Ha M aTepclre41HblX AMRMAOB. H ~ A O G T E T ~ ~ H ~ R
TOfleFaPTHOCTt I4 MHTeflfleKfYaflSHOFY M 3MO~MOHa#bHOMY HaIlFRXEHMM
npvsofibjr K @op~wpoeawirn W M P O K O F O ?~aEopa': Q a ~ ~ o p opMcKa
s p a 3 m r R~
? a 6 ~ n e e a t + M~,~ B n e p ~ y w orepe&k, c ~ p ~ e u ~ o - c u c y ~ ~ ccr~oc m remb~
(npe~wyqecree~~oH rMnepromrecKofi € c n e s ~ ~ ) , ~apywes-cum
flCMXM'+PCYOrC> 3gOp08bFt C nptr3HaKaMM H@PBHO-nCMXMUeCKBri
u.,
Y~)/C'C~@VQROCT~~ C F M X e H M R * . t-rafieXHOCTH Rt2RTeAbHOCTlrl M CBKPaqEHk?#
n p o $ e c c ! e o ~ e ~ s ~ oAroon r o n e T H R .
M u o r a n e ~ ~ ep a ~ 6 o ~ a COTPYAHMKOJ ~ z w e r o K ~ ~ ~ K T Mn u BA ~
pyKa8ojicTeoE M npM nacromHaH y v a c r w npo@eccopa, AoHropa M e q .
H Z ~ K KAHR T.C. no nyenKe c a c T o 9 ~ ~,qMcnervepoe, s pabo~amqwxHa
w e a 8 r o n z r ~ ? ~ p o s a ncwcraHax
~~x Y B A w B p a 3 ~ ~CPDUM e afianTauMu w b C
y8fl ilC?Cfls MX SHeRpeHMR B HaWM a3pOilQpTbl TlO38C)AMRM . ~ O A Y C ~ M T ~
0 6 b ~ ~ 8~ ~l b AOKasaTeAbCT8a
r tt ~ ! oBnerreHH P MHQFMX CTOPOH A e R T e A b U O C T H
npw p a 6 o ~ e Ha AC Y 8 A M ynyrweHMR Y C ~ O P M R Tpyga nocne 8seAenwa
aerowarkt3aqww. ! 7 p ~3 TOM 3 a @u c
~~ p o e a n ocH%xeHMe y p o s ~na~rpysKM H a
HVO~MB ~ C M Y W I ~ C K M M~ Q M ~ M O A ~ ~ M ~ ~ npoyeccb!.
C K M ~ B~ec+a c Ten
o6eapyxewbr M HEKOTOPble HeraTMeHbIS Ha AC
n O C A e d C T 8 M R ~ 2 6 bl0 ~ YEA.
3 f 0 G C O ~ ~ H HKOE C a B T C R BblCUlMX nCCIX$4qeCKMX M SMOqMOHaAbHblX C J I Y H K ~ MM
U
Ct?CTEl9br rpo~tooQpalr(eHmR.Atrcnerre~aw -1, C ~AC
~ ~ ~ O T Z ~ HZ M M ?reg I ifOAXHbi
G k l ~ b FIF&A'bF?ElAeHbI llQErblUJeHWblE T ~ E ~ O S ~ H M KR n ? ~ f $ e c C ~ c i ~ a aaXHMM
nb~~
~auecrsa~ CflsK). 0 ~ n A O A X H ~ o d n a ~ a ~cnaco6~ocrbn
b oCecner~aarb
n e o 6 x o f l ~ ~ y wa K T y a A M 3 a q w m nc~xo@MsnoncrHqacKoh, ~ e ~ a ~ o f l ~ v e cu n o n
3awMTHOG+ c @ E ~ ,BbICOKMM YPOBHeM YCnelLIHOCTM AeRTefibHOCK!4, HaAMVMeM
XOpOlilErO YPOBHFl @YHK~MOHMPOB~HR
M peryflRT~pHblX MeXaHM3MOB
u p r a n ~ z ~ a . Ha xopowyn y c n e w ~ o cbr p a S o ~ t ~ no YBA s
aSTQMaTM3HPO#aHHMX CHCfBMdX MOXHO HaAeRTbCR AMUb npM H a A L 4 q M M . y
AHcnerqepa eeo6xogw~at-o nadopa IL ponxuoro y p o e ~~ ~ ~ S M T RMB KR. f f o ~
~ P ~ ~ H OKaq@CTBaM% mFM 3 T O H Mbi
~ J ~ ~ @ ~ S C ! - ~ O HSaXHblMM nOHMMaBM K Z i Y E Q T 8a
ueflOSFX3, baz o n p e A e n e H H O r 0 YPOSHFI p a 3 B M T M 9 K O f OPblX H e 8 0 3 M O X l f U
ycnelJnoe sblnonHenwe n p o # e c c ~ o ~ a n s H h l0 x 6 ~ 3 a ~ n o c r ecneqManMcTa
u Ye2
e m a n e o 6 e c n e v e ~ ~d9e s e n a c ~ o c rnonsroe. ~
Ponb ?TOR cocrasnmqeu s HaAexHccrM AMcneTrepos s Korrype
Y8A rp53 sb!VaG+HQ BefW K a . ~ C H X O @ ~ . ~ ~ M O A O ~ M ~ M@ C KMM 8A~MuMKCKMe
o 5 c n e f l o s a ~ ~ Awcnerregoa
s s n a 6 c p a r o p ~ o ~3 ~ c n e p b f ~ ec ~nov,oqbm ~e
T E X H M ~ S C K M X Y C T F o U C T S , nogenMpymPp>r o-rjie.shFb!e 3 n e w e ~ ~ bL!t $ ~ a r ~ e ~ r b i
A F 9 T 8 , ? b H O C T M Fc YEA, M 9 F O f l e E b ? X Y C f l U S M R x TlpM HenOCpeACTSeHHOM
Z>!CO,?YFHb15: ~ ~ w ~ ~ M O H W ?0 ~
@H~ 3~2 F! t X
HOCtefi no Y8A i7038OAMfl HaM
5b:Ae,qb175 neK -
3 TSrpynnbl ~ e ~ b ~ ~ & l i l t . r b l ~ MopanbHO-OpraHL13aTOPCK>iE,
Fcb:x??flr>:YeSKue $+ ~ C M Y ~ $ M ~ W O ~ O ~ M ~ @ M ~CA S
M KK~ ~
- ~;
LIGAO-MY~CKME.
!. r n y d o ~ a srownaHMe
3 ~ o csoero
n p o @ e c : c ~ ocbHoro
~a ~cnra V! ~SE~TCTZ~HHOCTM, ~ ~ C T H O C T ~ I ,
flFM94MEMaflbFCCTM, &SC~M7nMHMpOSsHHQCTM, CaMOKPMfMqH6CfW L1
astppxKc..
2. Fcwxonor~rec~~
Me ~ C H X O ~ M ~ W Q ~ C T M ~ ~TO XOPOLUMR
C K M ~ .
YpQZaHh pd38MTHR M H feA/leKTYanbHblX KaqeCTB, OnePaTMBHOCf b , T .& .
A-240 Circuiar/Cimulaire/Uupxm~p243-AN/I46
c.ncco6~0~~
Y, b ~ ~ ' C T ~ Q M Y
i7pMYFfTMXI PetlleHMFl 8 C/IOXHOG~ M qaCTO
vaHRn!qemcR O ~ C T ~ H O B K ~o,n e p a t ~ 8 ~ a n I nonraspeMeHHa8 nanmb,
3BPMCfUqeCKOe M-rStWfl~l-tMET, p a 3 8 M T O e npOCTpaHCf8eMHOe npe&CTaBAeHMe,
FE3SMThlM O ~ % P , M RHMMZHMR, C ~ ~ O C O ~ H O C TK~ el*0 KOHQEHTpZUMM M
nop%vnw.uaHkm; s ~ o y ~ a w a n b nyac~~ o A v ~ s o c ~cb o ,~ e x o y c T o U r ~ e o c t b .
3 . B r a r e c T s s CaMocToRTenbHoR C O C T a B A R W q e P nSK Ha OcHoaaHLIM
waltr!vT E ~ ~ ~ T M G E C K MLI X ~ F I ~ K T H Y E C K M X p a 3 p a 9 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ b i ~ e n e urpesb6
a
rpynna - ~ s ~ v ~ o - ~ ~ o n o r~~Sr Ke. ~ * ~OTHOCMTCR
Kc HUM x o 6 ~ e ec o c ~ c n ~ ~ e
3AOPOEbk M Q M ~ ~ * Y ~ c K OP~2 3 O8 M T M R . E ~ X H ~ I HRM
8ARDTCFl H ROCTaTOrHO
, C94 ila M y p a e H C E E l ! J a H H O C T b OCHO8Hb!X HepSHblX
Sb~pBS#ek+.?HbIFr l O R 8 k l X H Q O T b
npszecct:ba s cwcTerrax perynRqMM 8McuepanbHhlx $ y ~ ~ y ~ Ke f3 , ~ o Rrpynne
nS% Mbt 3THECfltl V! O f C Y T C T e M B S E ~ I Y . O A + ! O ~OT p ~ d o t b lAeHb A9CTsE@pXk!X
~ C M X Q $ M ~ M ~ , ~ O ~ M ~ E C b?~ Y X n p~ ~~ 3C~ Wa ~
B H C ~ ~ ~ O - M ~ T ~ ~ O ~ ~ M X o;
O C T ~ T O V H C ~ ~ ~ Q $ ~ C C W O F ~ A ~ H OM ~H OT ~ ~ ~ B K T Y ~ A b H B - 3 H O ~ M O H ~ ~ h
H2npRxerp~ M reM donee , ~ O K ~ M H M V B C K W Y ~ ~ M Z S ~ H O sa6oneea~wfi
B
Cepg5YHo-cOcyflHC-TCR CMCTeMbl M $ ' Y H K ~ M Q H ~ / ~ $t l~C~MOX~O - H e S p O A O r M ~ e C K O U
narfinnr~4r, s,n?T2rTV+!G 8MCOKWA ypn8eHb TQf!@pi3HTEQCTbl OCH98Hb!X
$ M ~ M O P ~ ~ M " ~ C Kn
~ C I ~ Y ? A C T ! . ! Y ~ Z K V YM M o
X ~ a 3 a ~ e n eKn n p s @ e c c n o ~ a n b ~ o ~ y
~ - ~ o ~ e p ~ p y e ~ o ~ y
MHTeAneuTyanbHoMy LI ~ H O ~ M O H ~ A ~ H Onanpmewm
M Y M K
~ 9 3 v p o e a ~ ~coy n g ~ a ~ c ~ M a n b HQ
sn ~ s ~ v e c w ouna r p y 3 ~ e . K 3 T O A me rpyfine
nEK O f H Q C W f C9 c ~ E ~ H MI70 ~ UHTeHCMEHOCTM M aReKBaTHblu no
Ha7PaB.leHHOCT M XapaV.T@p ~ ~ ~ A C M ~ H H d KO
T M~8 a q M M itatlbonee
H H @ U ~ M ~ T M ~ Fn ~o ~~ X
a 3 a ~ e n e hOCH08HMX $ M ~ M O / ~ O F M V ~ C K M XC,MCfEM M
ncwxonorMrecKopo craTyca, o ~ c y ~ c r acpasy
~ e no O K O H ~ ~ H M M paboren
CHeHhf Y pe3MepHblX 10 %
(Tlp@~bbLUa~?ul~~ K npeACMaHHOMy YPOSHM) ;
s a ~ ~ n y r b i r : ,M H P ~ ~ T M ~ O S ~ HM
HT~ r~t X
e~ewR WC, YE, A A , Ecxasa-renesj
~~MOAMH~MMKM, 3Kr M M E T ~ ~ O A M ~ H~ ~o,p ~ a n b ~nopeo ~ e n e ~ cyroqrsG7
' ~e
SMOPMTHM ~K
a x~n .
I e f i u ~Ox~ M E H H ~ I Xn p o q e c c o ~
B e @ ~ y ~ e o 6 ~ r a s ~b ~~c oon o r ~~ e & ~ i ~ o - 6 c t o n o r ~ ~ .:nna~br?
e c ~ o u 3~
yCl7~WF!ylO AfZ R T e A b H C C T 5 3 !-!a!JTaTHblX, 3 KCTpeMaAb HblX CMTyBGM FIX,
Y ~ O F X C , ~ ZH.ZI ~M~SI ~K~E MnnaHe ~ c ~ x o n o~ r C~ K
, r Qn o~ ~ r o r c g l rAOAXHM
~ Etr~fb
orpaAorsnsj no sosH.ro#r+locrM AoseAeHbt aa ' a s t o t . r a ~ ~ as ~ anpoqacce
o d y r s R~ ~c ~ O M O ~ ~~ pWe ~ a x e p . o e 3 f Q T n Y f b cUsepWencrsosnHMR R 8 K
AonmeH C n y X w T b RecoHbvM aKnaRaM K a K B npoqecce o B y r e ~ ~t a ~K , M y
p a 6 3 ~ a m q ~AMcneTrepo5,
x o c o 6 e ~ ~8o AC YBA. npbl 3 f O M ~ 8 0 6 ~ 0 ~
HHAMSMJl,yaRM3MPOSBTh i 7 P O X O X R e H M 8 M ~ a q a f l h H O GaAaIlTaqMM K
CTaXMPOBKM
n p o @ e c c ~ o ~ a ~ bAePTenbHocm
~otr s caepe Y B A , C ~ o e s p e ~ a ~ usober ~ l s n e ~ ~ e
HeAQCTaYQYHoFO P a 3 S M T M A nsK M H a P Y U l e H M R @ Y H K Y M o H ~ A ~ H O ~ C
DO C T O R H M R
nOJ8OAMT EpOsOAMTb 03~3pO8MTeflbHb!E M BOCCTaHOBPlTefibHble
HepsnpwgTMR. 3 r o i n c ~ x o n o r ~ r e c u anoflAepxKa,
s ncMxorepaneaTHvecKue M
fleMapCTeE?HHbE GpsflCTEa. F ~ M H P ~ ~ P ~ ~ O - COOTBeTCTSymQMe
T ~ H M CXeMb:
s o 3 A e m c ~ s ~ sanpo6nposa~wbte
, a ~ a 6 0 p a ~ o p ~ bu t xnonesblx y o n o s M R x .
~3 M3flOXeHHOrO oreaMAHo cnons a e n ~ u n r p e 6 o s a ~ ~ K~
K o M n n e ~ c yIlBK cneqManMcra no Y 8 A . Hanywe M Aocrarowan y p o s e ~ b
P ~ ~ R M T M Fn IR K RRAReTCR 3aAOFC)M 8 b l ~ O K O h HaflBXHOCTM np~Oecctfo~anb~~h
RePTenbHocm Awcnerrepa, a cnaaosaTenbHo M 6 e 3 o n a c ~ o c rB~A .
e BMAY 6 0 f l b ~ 0 U 3 E a q M M O C f M MCXOAHOrO YPOBHR pd3 BUTM R
KoMnneKca nSK ~ c o d o s a x ~ a e swareme np~oBperaer np08ne~a
nsp8J?YHora npc+or6opa. 0 6 y r a ~ b C n @ q M a A b H O C T M ' ~ ~ c n e ~ r e Y8A:
p
'Je~fiecQ0dpa3l-l~
CMWb ~ ~ U T Y ~OM
TEX B, ~ KHO fTOPbld M 3 H a q a A b H O c6na~awr
V ~ ~ ~ X O A M H HM ~M ~ O ~R Q
B KM, A a X e npM HeyAOSflaTBOpMTenbHQM y p O B H @ M X
Pa3smTUR. O T C ) ~ A ~C/l@AYeT UTO O"4eHb BasKHO n P 0 8 0 A M T b TqaTeflbHbiR
ne?BMrHMfi or609 c p e f i w a 6 n t y p ~ a n r o s M crcewsarb Ha 3 ~ o nc T a A M b 1
CcsCeM H E n P M r O A H M X ARFt fiaAbHeelUeu p a 6 0 ~ b l no Y 8 A , He nOAAaHIqMXCFi
TPeHaxy M o 6 y r e ~ ~B a T ~ ~ ~ Y E M oObMa e ~ e . Rpw n e p s w n o w npo4c~6ope
A ~ ~ Y ~ K ~ HcnQnHbtGl
~ T C R M.'IM He~08epweHHblm ~ a 6 0 p n8K. Ha 3TOM
Circulor/Circ~Iair&wwnsp 243-Ahl/l46 A-241
n p o q o ~ 6 0 p He = a n a ~ ~ ~ e a e r cHa ~ . pasHbix craaMRx Qop~~poeaHu~
MonoBuro cneqManwcTs onenyer npoAonxaTh nepeurHbbU npoQo~dop,
npononrnpys ero enpork ~o M o M a H T a saeapueHwR c r a m p o s w M Havana
8bfnYCHHM K Q M C Z P I O C t Z . 8 T E A b H O M l7PO$ECCMOHaAbHOFf AP-FiTeAtiHOCTM- no Ye;.
~ P M f l O e T ~ p V O h c?OE?Ppue YP08HFI
' Pa3BHfMFI n8K B CAyYae O ~ H ~ ~ Y X ~ H M F ~
Y JZ-,s?Yn8 W - ~ ~ ~ + K X & V M O C POFQlyb HI Cf7eyMZPbHblX TeXHttCteCKMX CpeACT e M
nporpaMM n C f l T R T b l E a T b , coPep!UeHCTBOBdTb H3KOTQpble He~OcTaTQ~Ho
BM r b r e rjFv I e caaen patiore ~ c n o n b 3 o a a n ~ p a 3 p a 6 0 r n n ~ b 1 n
K y r y e ~ s r wA . 5 . r<nl.r-rarcrppaejuren H ~ I - P Y ~ K M , ~ o a e n ~ p y l c ~ t tOTAenbHbie
~r
sne~errb:Y $ p a r Y e ~ ~ ,qemenbwocTw w no Y S A . f l f l ~3 ~ n xx e y e m h Hami
~ ~ n 0 f l 5 3 0 ~ a ~ bEarapes f ITCHXOl?OrMYbCKMX I< ~ M ~ ~ ~ M T ~ ~ M ~ H ~ O E ~ H
AM3~HOCTL7'4E!CKWX TeCTCS, tiraF3~ $?FpoablY n p M e M O 9 , TpEHaXZFbl &f
p 2 3 p a 6 0 r a ~ ~ h l hu2 M M C Q E F e C Y H o C K O H C T F Y K T P p a M M a8f OP,aTlilSMpCE3HHU3
R C M ' . ' : C , ~ F ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ L ~ ~ d~ ,C KP-pCWaAat:Mci
~ SM.trtAeY M ~ yxe 3nblTHyV 7lpCPap K y 8
f .
Crmu1eW Y q , ? f i e ~ l tss
p 0 6 ~ O ? r b iR ~ F C $ O ~ A T ~ LMI f 3 e H Z X neK MSI PEKOMeWAYeH npCSC*qM-b
e -pngescP c . 5 y . i ? c ; x ~ ; no . s a s e ~ a e ~:b ~ ~'s: rzranbwb!:'! n k p x o ~
c-awocTa?TenhHm C ~ ~ P T F .F!O Y E A . T n x a R cxsTeva o ~ E c p aH noflrcrcsuw
LMcEe'YFpc c 50 0;Jq5f,c3 H a L d M R Y C R S H V F '~ P C ~ O H ~ ~ : F C ~npo4or6opq ~ H H W ~ .
fl0 WZWCYy KuEHVB, TOnhKO TaKaR f aKTMKB np08e~eH1ASi
.T~C$OJ~O~ F 0B3 R 3 f l V T YQCTORHH= MHeTb O~P~THYHI CeR3b; OqeHHBaTb V
P ~ M H"O~VOAMYOCTM CCBFPWPHST S O E ~ hT Fpoqecc +$opHt?poezw+R
P P C $ P C C ; M ( ~ H E R ~ ' - ' ~P
IYabblKCP M yw..lgqVrl COSEPWEHCf 8 0 8 a T b Pi5XU.OAQrMXI . M
TF'+l*Yf?TKV? GpEgCT83 O ~ Y ~ ~ Y M
C PPb Q M a f t H O C T V ? A M C ~ E TY ~
8 f l~' . ~
9TM %epOnPMSTtlFI R 0 ' 3 E O f l 9 f BblAdeaTb C % ? T M $ M K ~ TC n e u M a A M C T 8 n C Y8A -
~ ~ P C T B e/rtrUc
M T -aAeYrOrc n p o @ ~ c C M O ~ a n a ,TO H~COMH~HHO ROE~ICMT
qaze#HDcTb YO s cucrene AC Y B A M desonacnclc~bE n , a Tax%= c o x p a w r
znopoehe w n p o 0 e c c ~ ~ ~ a n b~~s
Aonronerwe s r ~ xq e w b i x c n e q ~ a n ~ c ~ 9 8 ,
Coordination des pilotes dam 1 8 glass-cockpits
qveiques e f f wde I'exp~ptiseet de la culture"
Claire Pelegrjn,
AQ.ofomtion-Airbus
Avenue P.-Lat&oi?re, Blagnac, FRANCE
Rmb Amalberti,
CERMA, Dkparternent d'ergonomie akospatiale
CEV Brgtigny, 91228, FRANCE
La coordination d'dquipage comports dwx composantes de synchronisation : temporeIIe dam les

actions et cognitive dans le partage g u n rhfgrentid commun. La communication h o m e - h o m e et
hommmachke est I'outil essentiel de ces dmx tps de synchronisation. Oa remuve parmi tes hcteurs
-contribuant ces synchronisations des facteurs psychologiques non techniques particulikrement 6tudi&
d m les cours de OW: attihdes dm pibtes, aussi bien vis vis des autres mernbres d'@uipage que vers
I 'avion et des facteurs plus techniques, mins souvent 6vuqub mais tout aussi important surtout sw la
glasscockpits: connaissance des systerrres et des procBdures de corxununication, briefings, aanonces et
checklists. Cet article ss centre sur ces facteurs techniques en les mettant en relation avec: des facteurs
culturels tels que le niveau de mairise de I'anglais ou la familiarisation aux nouvelles technologies. On
utilise deux type de resultats: le premier provient de la base de donndes COSYNUS-A~roformationsur
1- performances des SCagiaires A320 en cours de transformation Touloust (1 148 dossiers), le second
provient d'unne etude commmdee p a la DGAC, portant sur les strategies de communications verbales et
extra-verbales utilis- par les equipages en cours de transformation sur A320. Les dificultks de
reconversion sur glasscockpits, particuli5rement dans les aspects comunicatoires sont remarquablement
, Li4es l'age et au dernier avion p i l ~ 6On. montte @dement que les difficult& de maitrise de 1' anglais
rdentissent f'apprentissage technique des systbrnes et se soldent prrr un handicap d m tout& les spheres
de la coordination home-homme et home-machine. Les equipages des pays non anglophones pallient
paaieidlemnt 2 cet handicap linguistique en utilisant plus intendment la communication extra-verbde,
particulikement gesme1le et visuelie (reguds), en melangeant aussi dans ~ E Sproc6durfs kur langue
maternelje pour les pr&l&ma difficiles et la langue anglaise pour les rmw et p h e s clB, et dam taus
la cas avec des variations culturell~non nggligeables dm la rnanike d'effectuer les contrdles rnutuels.
11 en rhulte des facmassez diffdrentes de se synchoniser dam les cockpits, y compris p u r l%sSOPS;
Ces fawns sont corlstruites pour pallier aux difficult4s sp~cifiquesde chacun, et semblent touts pouvoir
&re efficaces. Toutefois ces voies dternatjves soat d m I 'ensemble plus Iongues ir mertre en place par
1e.s Quipages et peuvent padois expliquer un certain retard dans la qualification par rapport h des
equipages anglophones, mais encore une fois sans necessaire prdjudice sur la qualit&finale des pilotes.
L'ktuds de la coordination des Quipaga en tours de traxlsfoimatiw sur A320 p&segt& en deuxikme pattie de
1'articIe est ftnanck par la DGAC F r d s e . 11 s'agit d'uae longue d k d a mi& conjOktemmt par b C m S
(J.RogaIskiet R. Samurcay), le C N W (P.Falmn), le CENA (S. Figarol) et bien siir le CERMA IR. Amalberti)
et ACrofomtion-~irbus(C.Pefegrb & E. Racca). LR pilotage DGAC wt nssurd par G. Molinim et F- Wihux
('&&mm~t partkipante d m l ' b ~ d eam cot& de P. Falzon). Nous remerciom vive-t tow ces chercheurs et la
QGAC qui orit accept6 que soit pdseate primeut & I'OACI, alars que l'btude n'et pas encore termin&, Ie a d r e
d a i o g i q ~ 6 une; p*mik &tie ch ~ & ~ I a t s .
$-La coordination d'kquipage sur glasscockpit : une Cvolution des
id6es
I- 1 les diEfkenrs modes de coordination &equipage
La coordinalion d'kquipage est un poinl crucial de la conduite des avions de

lignes rnodernes, particulikrement depuis que les equipages se sont rCduits i deux.
Le travail doit &re parfaitement partag6 entre les deux pilotes et le resultat global
doit &re synergique, supe~ieuraux resultats des individus pris skparkment.
Les modes de coordination sont de deux ordres :
>La stricte duplication des actions i la recherche d'une sornme du rtsultat est
exceptionnelle. Dans ce cas, CdB et copilote realisent le m h e bur i court terme
avec les rnErnes actions, cas p a exernple d'actions sirnultanCes sur un rnanche de
vol pour b i t e r un obstacle.
> Dans la plupart drs cas. iI y a bissociation partieIIe enuc C ~ eLBcopilote pour
mieux dCveloppel1a syncrgie et la gestion des sessources; ces siruations s'insciivent
dam It: cadre plus g&n&-aldes situa~ionsdt: coopiration: CdB. copi1ote se soni
par-[ages 1: rravail el les objectit's icourr termc; iIs se synchronisent p i r contre
r2guIikcement. Ce tte synchranisatian designc, d'une part. la sy nchl-onisation
cognitive'et, d'aurl-e part, la synchronisation tempo~lle,
>>La sy nchranisarion cognitive concerne la construction d'un r&t'Erenriel
comrnun, d'une conscience commune de la situation er d'une logique d'action
cornplementaire orient& vers ce mSme rt5fereniiel. Ce but zst par~iculi&szmsnt
important pour 1e suivi d e toute modificarion des modes dr: conduire, de paramktres
de vol et pour Ie dki+oulernzntd'actions planitikes.
>>La synchronisation temporelle concernt: aussi bicn 1e declenchement
simultani d'actions (mettre le chrono en route au dicollage en pleine puissance).
que le dtclenchement d'actions successiva (mettre Ibvion dans une configuration
donnee) ou le respect de condirions d'actions (e-i: attendre 400' avint d'engoger les
ECAM acrions suite ;i. un feu rnoteur au dkcollage).
1-2 le r6le des communications dans la coordination
La communication entre pilotes, quelle soit directe-ou pas le biais des

ordinateurs- est I'ouril men tiel de la dguIation de ces activitks synergiques.
Ces communicarions ont ttk. sous I'influence Amkricaine, largement trait& dans
une perspective de psychologie sociale et de carnrnunicatiofis exclusivement
verbales (voir par exernplt: Foushee. 1986; Foushee & Helrnreich. 1988) : les
Fdcreua Ctudiges anr principdement I a personnali~kse l attitudes des rnembres
d'kquipages dans le cackpi t, Ir: style de leadelship et la construction d'une conscience
de la situation eit'ectivement partag& cntre les deux pifotes par une dialogue acrif.
Un aurre pan de recherches a concern4 le risque d'interuptions et d'zlhandon de la
tzche en cours dans les cornrnunications verbales (voir par exemple l'itude
histo~iquede Ruffel-Smith, 1979).
Proche de cette pe~.spective,des dtudes plus kcentes ont anaiyse I'influence de la
culture de compagnie, mais aussi de la culrure au sens ethnologique du tenme, sur ies
relations entre rnembres d'equipage. Johnston (sous presse) dans un ti& cornpl&te
revue des aspects culturels en a6ronautique sauligne que Ies kcarts entre pilotes
appartenanr 2 des culrures ethnographiques diffirentes son1 peu l i b aux
connaissances techniques mais sont surlau t 1 iCes aux communications, i la
r6soIution dz contli t er aux relations interpersonnel les; partout les bons equipages
font preuvrts dss rn2mes qualitis : ct: son( ceux qui savenr sr: coordonner er Sue
o ~ i e t6s
n en permanence vers la t k h c et les 1n21nesobjectirs du vol; mais la rnani2I-e
d'y parvenir vaidir: largernenL mzme dans le cadre dzs SOPS (Standard Operating
Procedul-es).Ce point avait dkj; Ctk note dans le cadre plus limit& de I'usage des
checklists dans Ies cornpapies Americaines (culture de cornpagnie, Degani &
Wiener, 1991).
Tou~esces 6tudes sur la communication ont finalernent rnis forternent I'accent sur
la necessir6 d'une formation des pilates plus centrie sur Ie facteur humain,
complkmcntaire h la formarion technique. On rerrouve cette volonr6 dans le
developpernent des cours de Cockpit Resource M a n a ~ e m e n t(CRM) e l du Line
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) (Orlady and Foushee, 1987; Hetrnreich, 1988;
Wiener, Kanki and Welmreich, 1993). L'acceni esL rnis dans ces approchts sur trois
themes : partage de la representation {conscience de la situation), style de
leardership et b a n i h e i la communication entre membres d' equipage.
Figure I
Facteurs contribuant A la coordination d'tquipage.'Onretrouve en haut du schema
les facteurs IIOII techtriques : altiludes des pilores, aussi bien vis A vis des autres
membres $equipage yue vers I'avion et en bas les facteurs techniques et swiaux
recbniques : farniliarisation 3 I'informatique. cor~~~aissance de l'angtais.
connaissance de b rkpartirioa des Ijches 3 2 et des prcxedwes de cuwdina~ori.
Pornaine classique des CRM

7 PersonnaIit&
HiPratchie q
7
c0
+=$ Leardersl~ip qe-
$4
s a,+
+qtk
'
1
8 <%
Y @
/"
Coordination
Culture d e cumpagaic
Culture sociale
+ Communications f Ploddure
Aide riciproque
6
Expercirc Tecl~niquc
CRM-Glasscockpit
~ a i Bs cot6 de cette approche non technique (tisure I ) , I'autorna~isntion des

cockpits a ricemment 1.estituC un inter*& non negligeahle a I'Ctude des
comrnunicarions dans leur aspects techniques, que ce sait sur la forme ou sur !e
fond.
L'archit&turs et la trchnologir des glasscockpils a beaucoup a p p o r i en macibre
de t'aci1iG de I-epresentationdu monde extemr: mais elle a diminui les possihilitks de
synchronisarion non verhales. qu'il s'agisse de vision peripherique (le copiiote bouge
rnoins. les informations sont prtlcixs (alpha numerique) et Ia mobilitC des systkrnes
de commandes -rnanches et rnanettes -est riduite) ou de conduite "aux sensations "
(niveaux de bruir et rnises en attitudes lisses' par f'inforrnatique).
Les nouvelles architectures permettent igalernenr aux pilore un accZs individuel h
des bases dt: donnets dz tailIe sans cesse cmissante, et surtout un ~ C C aux ~ S
commandes quasi-individuzl. Cetle grnnde richesst: et souplesse d'u~ilisarionpeut se
ponctuellement en pikge si les deux pilnics ne . t n t pas d'eftbrts
transl+ol-lne~.
pariiculiers pour- st: cool-donnzr- sysikmariquement et annoncer m u ~ u e l l e m e n tleul-s
inientions et 1eu1.sactions sur le systeme (Amalberti, 1992a).
Cette dvolurion s'est donc accompagn6e, pour compenser les pectes en

coordination non verbale, pour gtSrer la confiance dans les syst5mes et dans le
pa~~enaire, et pour realigner en permanence les pt-qjew d'actions -donc Ia conscience
de la situation-, par une augmentation des contrdles visuels en vision centrale de son
tquipier et du syst2me (la vision pkripherique ne suffit plus) et une augmentation
des kchangzs verbaux I-kg1ernen~air.e~ (parriculikremen t annonces. mais aussi
briefings el check-lists).
Dans dous Ics cas, ces communica~ionssont heaucoup pIus dependantes des
,connaissances techniques que Its atritudes pricedemment &tudi&s.
Une nouvelle sCfie d'etudes dans I'aCronaurique er dans Ies situations coop6ratives
au sens large se developpe ainsi, plus orientie vers les interactions entre
connaissances techniques sur le systkme er niveaux de communication. Ces travaux
relhent plus de la psychologie ergonomique cognitive que la psycholagie sociale
(Navarro, 1987; Falzon. 1991; Rogalski. 1989; Degani & Wiener, 1991; Sarter &
Woods, 1992, Wibaux, 1992).
On notera d'ai1Ieur.s que les deltliers dt5veioppcment sur le concept dt: CRM (e.i.
CRM Air.France) prennent en compte cetre ivolution cent& sur la cornpdkension
rnutuells de la situation. rehabilitant au cot6 de l'itude classique des attitudes. les
diff6rent.s aspecrs techniques dr: la cornprkhension muruelle, de la confiance e l de la
communication sur glass cockpit.
Les resultats prisenttis dans cet article se place dans ce courant en essayanr de
~~~~~~~~~er unt: vision plus globaIe de I'interactions dzs differents frlcreurs techniques
et non techniques dans la coodination d'equipage.
2- I I'urilisation de la bask de donnks COSYNUS sur A320
A~raformation-Airbus s'esl dote d'une base de donnees intelligente sur les

perbi7nances des pilotes en cou~sde [I-ansfomationsur A320 (Amalberti, Pelcgrin.
Racca, 199 1). Cette base de donnee, appet I& COS YNIJS, recense tou tes les notes et
appreciations ohrenues par les stagiaires i chaque siance de simulation (FBS z t
FFS). Son d2veloppernenr a nkcessitk une revision substantielle de I'ensemble dc la
notation des inst~ucreul-s(notation a cinq niveaux) avec 1"introductiond'une natation
cornpl~mentait-eutilisant des valeurs qualitativ'es et non quantitatives. La base de
donnkes contient plus de 10(N dossiers de sstagiaires A320 ( I 148 pour les r&ultars
prQent6s) et est rnaintenan~Crendue aux aurres avions de 1a famille Airbus. Sa
conception pelmet dr: pixtjq uel- des statistiques mulri bases (differents types d'avion)
af'in de iddprerdes ~p6citici[6sd'apprenlissage communes i la famille airbus ou au
contraire plus lit% h un type donnk d'avion. COSYNUS est utiIis6e i
ACrofo~mation-Airbus cornme lableau de bord pour les instructeurs (suivi-qualite de
l'ins~luction.adaptation optimale de la fo~mationau profil des stagiaires).
2-2 1'6tude des'commvnications dans le cockpit en situation de forma~ionsur A320

Une etude systkmatique des communications verbaks et extc'd-verbales des
equipages en cours de qualification sur A320 a etC entreptise en 1992 sous
I'impulsion ds. la DG AC.
AOrol'onnation-A~I-busl'ounit I'accks el les I'aciIitCs dt: ses simulareurs (dispositil'
de monitoring video dans les sirnulateurs i trois priszs de vues cornbinees) ainsi que
le contact et I'autorisation de 11-availler avec dt: vrais gquipages en cours d e
formation. Ce dernier point est particuli2remenl important. cas i l assure une validit6
Ccologique parfaite i I'Ctude (il s'agit d e vrais stagiaires. motives, observCs dans le
cadre dl: leur transformation sur ~ 3 2 0 ) ~ .
Les compagnies auxquelles appartiennent ces pilotes, et les pilotes eux-mEmes
ont donnCs leur accord pour Ctre filtnks dans le cadre de l'ktudk.
Les sCances enregistrkes sont les F F S 3 (Full-Flight Simulation n03) e t FFS6
(sCance de LOFT -Line Oriented Flight Training). La formation sur A320 compte
sept seances de FFS. Les seances enregistrees sonr donc au milieu e t h la fin de la
progression. juste avant la seance d e qualification (FFS7).
On Ctudie un dkcollage avec feu moteur h V1 suivi d'une approche monomoteur
avec atterrrisage e n surcharge (durke moyenne 20 minutes) e i une approche VOR-
DME avec remise d e gaz (durke moyenne 10 minutes) .
Le codage de chaque bande video analyse systCmatiquement les comportements
des deux pilotes : position des mains. position de tCte, direction du regard, zones
consultCes, texte des communications verbales y compris relations avec l'instructeur.
3-1 Risultats de la base de donnCes Cosynus : expertise, niveau

d'anglais, culture et difficultis en coordination
Les rCsultats pr6sentCs portent sur 1148 stagiaires A320 passis au centre de
Toulouse depuis 3 ans. Ces Cquipages s e rkpartissent en Quipages Nord-EuropCens
(n=306), Sud-Europkns (n=313). Moyen-Orient (n= 199). Asie du Sud-est (n=187),
Europe de I'est (70), AmCrique hispanisante (n=56) et divers (17).
Une premiere G r i e de rCsultats rappelle les principaux facteuss en lien avec les
difficult& de progression dans la transition sur A320.
L'age du pilote stagiaire est d e fac;on surprenante Ie c r i t h e d e cette base d e
donnCes le mieux corrC1C i la rCussite i la formation sur A320. C e rCsultat est
relativement stable pour les pilotes d e plus d e 45 ans compare i u x resultats obtenus
sur A310 en 1987 alors que les jeunes pilotes semblent au contraire avoir plus de
faciliti j. se former sur des machines trks modernes (sans doute une prime i la
familiarisation prkcoce h I'infomtique) (figure 3)
L'handicap d e I'age pour les plus ages peut partiellement s e comprendre par la
classique risistance aux changements. mais il depend aussi d e deux variables
communicatoires : la maitrise d e I'anglais et la famliairisation aux nouvelles
technologies informatiques. La maitrise d e l'anglais est (en moyenne) une fonction
IinCaice de I'age pour les pilotes non anglophones (les jeunes maitrisent u h bien. les
plus ages moins bien); elle s'avere plus q u e jamais indispensable s u r des
glasscockpits oB I'information est kcrite en anglais (de moins en moins d e cadrans.
d e plus en plus d e textes et labels), e t ou les procedures verbales doivenl reprendre
Nous remercions vivemenl les cornpagl~ieset pilotes clients d'Aeroforrnation qui ont accept6 de
partici~rA ceue exp6rimenwrion. La validit6 ecologique du resulrat en est inliniment plus grande que
s'il s'agissait de piloles se deplaqant pour participer a "une expkrirnentation sur la coordination
d'Quipage". En bref. Ie jeu des pilotes observes n'est pas "forcf'. ni "binis6 par I'expt2rime11cation".il est
silnplemeot nature1 el les r12sulratsontkaucoup plus de porree.
sans cesse dcs expressions anglaises (Vnir Amalherti ct Racca, I989 pour des
I-esulratsdtraillds sur- les dil'f'iculi2s cn anglais en fonction de I'agt! des pilotes).
Figure 2
Percentage of pilots failing at FFS7 during A320

transition course as a function of age, N=1148
Figure 3
Comparison between A3 10 trainees t';liling at rhe FFS exam and A320 train-
fiiling at the same exam. A3 I0 resulrs come from Amalbcrti & Racca, 1989.
11 conviznt de noter que I'Cchec au premier contr6lr: dt: FFS7 sancrionne une
progression insut'fisante du svagiaire milis ne doit en lrucun cas Gtre intzrprkt6 comrne
un 6chec difinitif ;i la iocmari~nsur A720. k s stagiaires ay ant 6chouk au premier
con trdle sont g~ndrilzrnentadmis 1 l'occasion d'un second con male effectud a p r b
une au plusizurs skances supplimentaires dt: sirnulaieur.
Le deuxiitme crit21-t:It: ~nieuxcerrelk ii la reussite at It: del'nier type d'avian
pilate et It: nornbre d ' h e u d dr: vol effect& sur ce type (figure 4 ct 5).
De h q o n gC112ralc.It: fail d'avoir d i j i unr: expgrience sur glass-cockpit ou d't~re
jzune (cas dt: la plupait des pilotcs de turbo-prop) est unt: aide tsks eonskquente i la
sur glasscockpit.
~~lrtnsforrnario~l .
figure 4
Percentage of pilou failing at FFS7 during A320

transition come as a function af he Ias~alc tlown
Figure 5
Percentage of pilots failing at FFS7 during A320 transition

course as a function of fligh-time hours on the last a/c fbwn. N=
1148
Le lien tr2s fort avec le nombrt: d'heures sur le dernier avion pilot6 peut s'
expliquer par les exigences plus "intellectuefles"des stages dt: qualifications sur les
machines modcr*nes.C'effort de comprehension est considCrabie compare 5 ce qu'i1
etait sur les machines plus anciznnes oh la p u t dr: I'apprentisiage par I'action irait
dominant. Ce nnuvel &at dl: fiiit esi sans doute plus difficile i szltisfaiie pour les
pjlaies formCs depujs longtemps j. Icur ancienne machine et dCshubi~ucSs.des
qualifica~ionsde type. On pzut aussi penser que dans le cas ou les pilotes sont ~-es&s
longrernps s u r un avion d'ancienne gdnkrarion, leur schema de toordinarion.
different dt: celui qu'il faut appliquer sur glasscockpit. est plus diflicile j; modifier e l
devjent un handicap pour sc qualifier sur les nouvelles machines.
Une deuxiZme serie de risultats analyst: plus parriculi&remenrles elfets de culture

(origines g6ographiques des stagiaires) en fonctions de 6 themes en relation avec la
communication Hornme-Hornme et la communication Wornme-Machine. L'anaiyse
porte sur les themes suivant : la communication WM rnesulV&e par (1) la maitrise du
FMS et (2) des Ecarns, la ~ornmunicatiooHIH rnesurk (3) globalement), (4) lors
des appmches et atterrissages, ( 5 ) en situation de panne, enfin (6) une indication
g6nCralt: sur la vitesse des progr2s du stagiaire pendant le stage de qualification.
Rang relatil par lhemcs lits a Ia HIM des difficuites reaconrrts par
les stngiaires pel~rlarltleur quditicatbl de t y p sur A320 Idu plus mauvais ~ s u l l a cork
t 1
au rneilleur cot&6) N= I 148.
4
Le tableau resume les difiicultes des stagiaires sur ces 6 thkrnes en 1es
prisenrant sous forme d'une statistique de rang (du plus dit'ficile de vateur 1 au plus
facile de valeur 6 ) . On retmuve le FMGS cornme difficultk principale ( voir d'autres
risultats dilns ce sens : Arnalherti, 1992; Sarter et Woods. 1992) mais avec des
nuances importantes :
-pour les iquipagzs dcs pays anglopbones et les equipages ayant peu
d'heures sur Ieur dernier avion pilot& (la figure 6indique ce nombre d'heures), Ia
mai trise du FMGS apparai t effectivernent cornme la premikre difficul tk des
stagiaiies; la coordination d'kquipagt est bien ~naitrisieet les progrks dans la
qualiticatian ne posent pas de probteme particulier par rapporl aux standai-ds dz la
qualification sur le type,
-Ce n'est pas 1e cas des iquipages provenant de pays non anglophones et
dont le temps pas& sur It: dernier avion piloti est de surcroit t5levk (on a vu en figure
5 le lien nCgarif entre le nambre d'heures pass& sur le dernier avion et la isus us sire au
premier conrrcile de FFS7). Pour ces equipages, la premiere difficult6 est bien
d'ordre cornrnunicatoi~.e(poids t r b imponant de I'item crew-coorcfinaiion)avec une
incidence assez forre sur le rythme des progris dzs acquisitions qui a t ralenti. Lt3s
difficul tb avec It: FMS ne viennent alors gtl'en deuxihrne plan.
On norera aussi que de fason g tohale. Iw difficultis sont d'aurant plus fanes qlre
la distance entlr la langue maternellt: et la langue d'apprcntissage est grande, que 1a
cul tur-e dcs siasiaires cst kloignee de la culture des ins1t.u~teurs et plus globalernent
de ccllc du c.ou~.sproprement d i ~ .
Figure 6
Pilots' flighl hours spent on the last a/c llown as a fcrnciion ol' geographical origin
Notons hien ici que I'effet de I'anglais &st double : proctdural dams I'usage des
sysr2mes. lcur compl-Chension et la reprise de leur nom pour Izs designer. mais aussi
langue d'enszignernent, donc vecteur plus ou moins facile de I'appreniissage er de
culture.
A cet tlgard, il est important dt: noter que rous ies instructerrrs A&-ofomationsonr
iu moins bilingues (anglais-kan~ais)er parfois triIingues avec I'aIIemand, ce qui
favorise considt5sablement les stagiaires praiiquant.mieux le franqais et l'allernand
que I'anglais et gornme pour ces stapiaires les effers de distance de langue
d'apprenlimge.
L'ensemble de ces I-ksultals de la base de donnks Cosynus sert gvidemment
Akraforrnarion-Airbus pour mieux ci hlec les difficu l tes des stagiaim et ajuster
I'enseignernens en consequence en gommant autant que possibles Ies er'fers de
cul~uct:qui vimdraient h defavoriset certains de ces stagiairu.
3-1 R6sultats de 1'6tude DGAC sur ies processus de communication

dans !es glasscockpits
L'enregisrrzmenr zt l'analyse fine des processus de communicakions dans les '
kquipages en coui*s de transformation sur A320 se poursuir acruellement. Lcs

resuliats presen tgs ci-dessous son t donc extrememen1 parriels et ne sauraienl
representer des rksulrab dCfinirifs.
Lm equipages enregistris 2 ct: jour en FFS 3 et FFS 6 se rspartissenr cornme suit :
4 &quipagesSud-EuropCens pour lesquels Iknseisnement a etk pratiqui
avec un rn&l;lngr: de fi-anqais et en anglais
4 equipages de I'Amt~iquchispanisante, avec un enseignzment , sauf cas
ponctueI, rialis6 exclusivement en anglais
2 Squipages j. trks bon niveau dlAnglais (languc anglaise quasi-native).
Rappeilons ici qut: le dipouillement des communications verbales et extra-
verbales d'une demi-hew-e de vidto est t1-2s'longet que de ce fait 1'Ctude progresse
lentemenr. L'objectif tinal est une vingtaine dlCquipages rkpartis en trois gtoupes :
anglophone natif ou quasi-natif (deux ikme langue officielle), non anglophone avec
un culture relatiuement proche du constructeur. et non anglophone avec une culture
diffkren te.
' .
Les rksultats pr6sentb ci-aprh sont limit& A Iaanalyse de quelques equipages lors
de l'exercice de take-off avec feu rnoteur i VR.
Les analyses portent sur les dkvia tibns et 6caru entre equipage d'origine differen tes*
en fonctian du type de communication rkglementaire mise en jeu.
Rappellons que I'on distingue trois niveaux de communications reglementaires qui
sont plus ou moins speciIi6s dans les SOPS (Wibaux. 1992):
U n niwau pau spt'cifib qui correspond i dss consipnes gdnerales r[ perkianentes.
On rerrouve par exzrnple dans certr: categorie :les "Aknowledgements "u
l'encoul-agement?I proposer des solutions er i critiquer les solutions choisis" ou
encore le crosscheck des informations utili&es ou insC1'6espar Itautre mernbre
dlQuipage.
Un niveau sp6ciiiC dans ses grands thkmes mais pas dans son contenu psdcis ni dans
sa position temporellr: lors du vol: l'exernple type en est Ie briefing. L1+uipa_re
doir le hire; le cadre est sp6ciii6: le CdB est charge de le construlre et de lire.
le copilote dolt prendre des notes et rgpeter ce qu'il a compris. Mais la faqon dc
Ie ~<di?er.et le moment de le dire sont laiss6. dans une fai-ge mesure. au bon
jugelnent de I'gquipage.
Un niveau &s spCcifiC dans son conunu el dans son cxicution ternporelie
C'est le c j s typique' des annonces et des checklists (enco1.e que I'exkcution
ternporelIt puissc: Ctre quelqur: peu tlexible) et 6galement des procedures
ECAMs (lh encore. proddul-es temporelles pouvans Elre interpi-Mes avec un
degrg dt: li berte elatit).
3- 1- 1 Variation des communications t1.h sp&ifitk

La lecture des annonces et des checklists ne pose pas de pt-ohlhe specilique de
comprehension aux &quipages mais se trouve particulikl-ementsensible h la pression
lempoClIe. Tous les &quipagesont fai t sans gZne apparentt: ces comrn unica lions en
anglais. II s'agit de co~nmunications esszn tiellernen[ verhules. rn6diGes par
I'in terface. sans regard vers l'au t re partenaire.
Les Ccarts ohservb portent sur des annonces oubliks (i.e: les modes FMA, Ie train
sur rentl*) et sur des crosschecks qui ne sont pas effectub par l'autre ppilote quand la
checklist est enbnck. La deviation par rapport aux actes 1.6glementairesde dialogue
s'explique par I'io tetprCtation technique en fonction du contexte; dans ce cas
Itexplication tjent manifestement une interpretation multimodale de la procedure :
si le cokquipier a vu ce que vous rites, que vous le savez, ei que la situation est
risquke. il sernble qu'il soit priferi ne pas occcuper inutilernent le canal verbal avec
une informarion peu inh~mativt:(gestion des ressources de communications).
Extr;lit tlc prntrrcolr:
FO:V 1
FO: rotate, Klzorr clc Innsrcr warniug
FO:psirive climb : Ic FO earn le wain lnais prsonne Ile pmllonce gear up. Ie Captain regafde le
tmia et pox 9 s m;uns sur ks m,menes.
La lecture des Ecams donne lieu 3 des diffkrences plus importantes entre quiptlges.
Les difficult5s son I en efiet de deux ordres, cornprendre mi-mZme et cornrnuniqutr
avec son partznaire. Les erreul-s relevks sont mu1tiples; certaines sont arrivks a des
equipages avec des jeunes copilotes ou des pilotes peu habitues aux nouvclles
technologies z t aux procidures de dialogue:
absence dt: synchronie temporelle : precipitation, avec lectui-e rrop pdcoce ou
trop compltre en ionction de Is sizua~ion,
absence de synchronie cognitive : lecture sans prendre en compte la
disponibilite de son partenaire qui ne peut de se fait integrer la nouvelle situation et
Ies nouveaux sratuts et qui nCcessite une nouvelle lecture.
Dans d'autres cas, il s'agit plus typiquemen t d'une communication rendue difficiie
par la mauvaise maitrise de l'angfais. Le passage h Ia langue rnzilernelle est I'atti tude
la plus fdquente, et la communication devient redondame avec les ~.egardsdes deux
pilotes qui suivent les gestes de celui qui actianne les syszkrnes. Cestains mots-cfCs
de I'ECAM sont traduits dans ce cas dans la langue matemelle des, pilotes
(probablemtnt pour oter toute ambigui't6).
Extrait de nrotoct>lr
CdB : Varnos a la lina
FO:con~il~uc
colt ECAM i l c h ~
C.dB: haisse in~r~lsittde la voix :Continue ECAM
FO :(I& len~et uts doucemen) AirPack 1+2 faults. ...when differential pressure below one prcenl
Insrructoc W I I ~do you have this message
FO : his.* inre~~siik de voix, retour en latlgue matcnlelle
3- 1-2 Variations des briefings

Les briefings on t rep~esentkle type de communications oh les pilotes se regardent le
plus, mais I i encore avec des variations selon Ies pilotes et suivanz leur charge de
travail.
LRs brielings Izs plus couns sont des briefings en anglais realisb par des pilotes
non anglophones;pour les quelques Cqui pages qui ont recornmenck leur briefing en
le realisant en langue matemelle suite 5 une intervention de I' instructeur, le contenu
est devenu ncttement plus condquent montrant que la formulation en' angIais esr
effectivemerit un handicap communicatoire (situations d'instruction).
3- 1-3 Variations &s autres actes de co@inaiian
t e style gidral dt: camrnunication est exlrEmernant variable d'un tiquipage ii I'autrt:
m2me dans Ir: cadre d'une situation de for.matian 5 p~iorit1.2~standdisantz.
Le ~01uml:dt: pill-ole varie de 1 ;i 4 et le nornbre d'interaations visuelles ou
gestuelles writ: dans des proporrions encore plus grandes.
On ~*elkvede nornhreuses actions impropres Cenclenchzment trop t6t de "open
climb") qui correspondenr h des shemas de communications d6ynchonisks (un d a
deux pilores anticipt: sur les d&oulernents du schema de cornmt~,nic;ition, dzs
manques de cantrbks rnutuels ou de protection mucueile (extinction mokur).
On relkvt: C~l_hlcrnent
de nombreux dCbriet1ngs infomels en langue maternelle avec
le regard pol-ti sur son partenaire. Ces communications. qui suivent nu precedent
dzs br.icljngs ou dcs checklisu, i'nnclionncnl cornme dzs alarmm sur des points
r6puds difliciles, Elks augrnenient la conscience du risque encourru,
Enhn, plus glohnlement. I'intetaction simultank avre p ~ geste et
~ vision. du
panenaire esr relaiivcment r a w ile taux dt: signes didiCs i l'aurre pilote pour le
mCmt exercice,est de wsywcrivemenr 12 el 15 pour ies Cquipages sub.-arndricains
analyses. 8 pour les &quipages sud-evro@ens et moins de d pour Ies dtqcripnge
anglophones alms quc l"on retmuve Cgalemen~un volume de parole plus imporunr
chcz les equipages d'Arnkrique hispan isanre e t sud-europ6ens par rapport aux
q u i p a g a anglaphones, Ces cammunications gestuelles onr j. I'ividence une double
fonction. de suppltance quand 5 I'anglais el au canal verbal. et de syncfironisation
cognitive en skcurisant l'autre co-equipier Sur la compr6hension des informations
cles. De msme Ies regards son\ disrrlbuk diff6rernmenc enwe Quipages de cuIrures
diffirentes, plutbt orienr6s vers les &jets du discours verbal (nard europ5en). plut8t
Orienr2s vea l'kquipitr dans les cultures plus m15ridionaIes.
En conditions d'optrations maitrisdes CconformesA la proc.4dur~mCme si ella '
soar dans un cad^ de situations incidenlelles), le canal: verbal est u t i l i d de faqon
dominame put tous les equipages, Les gestes sonr utilisks poor les actions
individuelles (sans intention de communiq~erau partenaire de I'information) ct le
regard sen surtout 3. faire des conk6lks d'ob.iets sans synchonie ternpol-elle avec son
kquipier. En breP. la communication sur glasscockpi1 est rnCdide par I'intedace qui
transformkkaucoup d'bchanges jadis synchrones sur avion classiques en echanges
asynchrones qrhrnds paf lei informadons erl retour de la machine tun agit, el l'autre
ae conrrrile pas I'action, mais 1e retour de I'action sur son interface). A noter gue IRS
dqcripages anglophones semblent plus sensibles 3 ces changements car ils utilisent
moins les communications extra-verbales qur: les equipages non 'anglophones (gestes
mutwls et recards dirig& vers I'auare).
E n cond i h n s d'npira lions non mnilrisies (j.e.:errcurs d'us des mem bres
d'equipage. situarion WOp dvoIutive, ere), laus les Quipages changen t presque
syaimaiiquement \cur mode dt communicafinn; on voit a\on appariitre
-un rerrrur ?t la langue na~ale,en tout Gas un niveau de bngue peu sttucturt5:
avec une augmentation du volume global d~ communications et dc la longuehr des
inserventions {ett'et du stress, mais aussi faciliration de [A comrnunic~tion~
-une r-edondancedu lmgagc p;lr gesre pointant !es o b j e ~ou dorinks fautifs, et
guidanr I\atre optriiteur
-une synchrmie des regards qui se' pottent sur des objets communs abjets des
signs gestuels ou de la conversation verbale (voir I'exemple suivan t) :
Extrait d r nrotocide
FO : f ~ ise nut
FO :we dis~kargcd...Mth agents
FO :cleat it?
r O d m NUNONO!
J j m w d e ~N
C ~ long*
B intervention en langue natale + geste touchant le bras du cdquipier et le pmneau plafond
+ regard ,ufflafottden syncbonie avsc F Q (diahgw: de rcicu@acim{piqueen l n g u e mtmIIel
C ~ B :shut dnww~...fuel crossfeed ir on? (la situarion scrnble rtcu@r&e, retour ? un mode rle
c~mmuniwtirn~ FO regdele fuel bled.
s~;tndard~ revicnla EC.AMS)
FO { s i & ~ l l )is ur}... ?
C ~ reparc
B en [mrgue native* regards d e deux ~ pilatez prtts sur Ewns ct sur fuel bleed et gates
accanpagtlanl I'cxplicatinn et la levee Q daure .
Au hilan. ces premiers r2sulI-a~confirmen[ I'exisrcncr: de difft5ren~est'rrqons de se

caordonner: Aucune de ces E q ~ n sn'esl talalement exempte d e d6fauIS. Les
cnmmunic;ltinns des &quipages a n g l n p h ~ ~ souifrent
es parfois d'un manque de
synohonie ternpoielk p a w qut! Iss pilotcs se reperdent pbu cc priviligisnt la
cornmun~cationuerb.&\eet re consrblt: rnutw.1 F L i'inkrm4di.k
~ du sys'tkmt. k
communications t r h redandantes visuo-verbales et gestuelles des rfquipages sud-
eu~.o@enszt surtout d1Am6riquehispanisante assurent une assez bonne synchi-onie
cognitive mais consomment beaucoup de ressourcls au detriment de la conduite du
vol et parfois de la synchronic temporalle avec la situation. Dans ce cas, Ies I-kglages
s'instatlent plagressivement en se t'amiliatismt avec les textes des ECAMs et le
manizrnent du FMGS, provoquant. parfois un certain retard dans la progression
globde du stage de qualitkation. mais sans pour avtant qu'il y ait un Iien avec le
niveau de eompCtence final du slagi2ire. Dans LOus les cas, le style glpbal de
cornrnunicatinn ne disparait pas mais Cvolul: plut6t vers une adaptqbn. un
cornpromis qui prend en compte les facteurs techniques, les propres comp5tences en
anglais du stagiaire. ses craintes .vis j. vis du systhe et ses habitudes culturelles i
communiquer dans un petit groupe avec des rnarqueurs propres higrarchiques de n5-
asssurance muruelle et d e rkguiation du stress.
Conclusion
La coordination d'kquipage sur les glasscockpits fait appel B des facteurs non
techniques (a~ri~udes, compktence ;i cbrnrnuniquer) et des facteurs techniques
(maitrise de l'anglais. connaissance dis ssystmees, connaissancw des procedures dt:
coordination rCgltrnen~aire).
Les rksuluts pdsent&sdans cet article. bien que partiels, confirment qu'il existe de
nombreuses diffirences dans la m anikl-e de rnetrre en jeu cette coordination. L'f ge
des piloies et le dernier type d'avion pilot4 sonr des t'acteurs t r k influents sur la
tiicilitC ou la difficult6 dr: la qualification sur avion automatisd. La maitrise de
I'anglais, sous-iacentt: ii c a factcun. joue un r6le impartant en ce sens qu'elle facilite
l'appren~issa~i (enseignement en anglais) el une communication homogkne avec les
exigences du syst2mt: (ECAMs, FMGS). Les equipages rnoins anglophones
compenscnt cet handicap en d6veIoppant des stratkgies de communications non-
verbales qui paraissent peut-Etre plus len~es;i slahiliser et h adapter aux exigences
des glassc~kpiu(effet sur l'apprentissage) mais tout zlussi performantes en fin de
qualification. Inversement, les dquipages anglophones, paniculiirement les jeunes.
urilisent peu les communications extra-verbales, et peuvent, malgr6 un apprentissage
rapide, souffrir dans certain& sisuations de ce manque de redondance.
De fait. cerw Ctude contirme apr5s les analyxs de Degani et Wiener ( 1991) sur Ies
checklists. de Johnston sur les effets culturels (1992). qu'il n'existe pas de ref6rence
absolue i la ucmrdinzl~iondXquipagz. Lzs regles prescrites et enseignCes sont bien
sdr nCcess;lires pour une standardisation minimale mais elles reslent reIativement
genkrales. Au deli, leur misz en application dCpend des individus et Iaisse
suffi'fisamment de degrks de likrtt5 pour que chacun les interprkte at?n d' obtenir la
rneilleure prformance possible en fonction de ses pmpres difficult&.
Entin, on notera quz I'Ctude DGAC, en cows d'expioitation devrait permeltre, en
association 2 d'auues 6tudes en cours i Akroformarion sur la direction du regard
dans I e s glass cockpits, de souligner l'irnportzlnce des communications non v e r b a h ,
trop souvenr nQligCes. Ces dernieces servent de ~Ccurisation,dt: redondance, de
prise en cornpct: de I'au~re,d'adaptation 6 I'autn: er au ryrhme de l'aut~~e, autant de
r6les non rechniqlres rn uis particul ikrement sollicit& sur l'apprenrissage d'une
nouvelIe machine qui est une p6riode d' adaptation importance.
Arnalberti R. (1992a) Automatisation et facteur hurnain: Ie meilleur et le pire, Bulletin de Skcwitt? des
VoJs d 'AirFronce, 28, 52-64
Amalberti R. Racca E. (1989) Cosynus: the data base system for trainees, 1st Airbus training
symposium, paper 24, Airbus: Toulouse.
Amalberti R. Pelegrin C. Racca E,(1991) Cosynus : a new data acquisition system fbr aiding pilot
training on modern aircraft, Proceedings WEAAP 91, Dentan MC & Lardennois P. (eds),
AirFrance publisher, Paris, 71-83.
Amalberti R. Falzon P. Figarol S. Pelegrin C.Racca E. Rogdski J. Samurcay R.
Wibaux F. (1992) Communication et coordination dans les cockpits automatis& Rapport scientifique
intermaiaire DGAC-2-92
Degani A. Wiener E. (1990) Human factors of flightdesk checklists : the normal checklist, N A SA
reporb CR 177549, Moffet-Field
Falzon P. (199 1) Cooperative dialogues, in J .Ramussen, B .Brehmer & J .Leplat (&Is) Disrributed
Decision Making :Cognitive Models for Cooperative Work,London : Wiley and sons, 145 192.
Foushee H.Helmreich B. (1988)Group interaction and flight crew performance, in Wiener E. Nagel D.
(eds) Hwnan factors in aviation, San Diego: Academic Pcess.
Foushee C. (1984) Dyads and tryads at 35,000 feet, Factors affecting group process and aircrew
perfombce, American Psycholo~ist,39 (8)
Helmreich R. (1987) Theory underlying CRM training, psychological issues iri flight crew
performance and crew coordination, NASA conference publication 2455, 15-22.
Johnston N. (in press) Cmss mlhlral perpectives, in Wiener E. Kanki B. Helmreich R. (eds) Cockpit
Resource Management, Academic Press Inc, NY
Navarro C. (1987) Communications fonctionnelles et complexit6 des aches dam le pilotage d'un
avion de ligne, Le travail Humain, 50,4, 289-304.
Orlady H. Foushee C.(1987) Cockpit resource management, CRM training proceedings of

NASAlMAC workshop, NASA conference publication 2455, San Francisco, May 6-8.
Rogdski 1. (1989) Cooperative work in emergency management : andysis of verbal communications in

distributed decision making, Second European Meeting on Cognitive Science Approaches to
Process Control, CEC-ICR Ispra-University of Siena, Siena, 183-193.
Ruffel-Smith H. (1979) A simulator study off the interaction of pilot workload with errors, vigilance and
decisions, NASA technical memorandum 78.482, Moffet-Field
Sarter N. Woods D. (1992) Pilot interaction with cockpit automation : operational experiences with the
flight management system, Int, Sourn, Aviat. Psycho1 ., 2(4), 303-32 1
Wibaux F. (1992) L'implicite dans la prescripion : le cas de la formation au pilotage de l'A320, mtSmoire
de DEA d'ergonomie, CNAM, 1992.
Wiener E. Kanki B. Helmreich R. (eds) (1993) Cockpit Resource Mmagemenf, Academic Press Inc,NY
Wiener E,Nagel D. ( 4 s ) (1988) Human Factors in Aviation, Academic Press: NY

Computer-Based Approaches for Enhancing
Human Performance in Aviation Maintenance.
William B. Johnson, Ph.D.

Vice President of Information Division
Galaxy Scientific Corporation
Atlanta, GA USA
(404) 491-1100
ABSTRACT
Advanced technology computer hardware and software provides opportunities to enhance the performan&
of aviation maintenance technicians. Maintenance tasks require that the technician be properly trained and
have access to technical information appropriate for each aircraft. Therefore, improved training and
information access is likely to enhance human maintenance performance.
This paper describes systems that capitalize on expert-system software technology to deliver simulation-
based training and real time job-aiding for troubleshooting. The systems operate on small desktop and
portable computer hardware. In addition, the systems are being designed to use "Pen" computers, that
require no keyboard and use a pen stylus to write on the computer screen. The pen technology permits
easy access to technical documentation as well as a convenient means for the technician andfor inspector
to complete required documentation of maintenance.
Background: Human Factors and Maintenance Performance Enhancement
The U.S. FAA Office of Aviation Medicine has an extensive ongoing research program related to human
factors in aviation maintenance. That research program has been described at all of the ICAO Regional
Seminars (Johnson & Shepherd, 1991, Shepherd & Johnson, 1991, Shepherd, 1992 & 1993). Further, the
research program has conducted seven conferences on human factors in maintenance as shown in Table
1. All of the conference proceedings are published in hard copy and on CD-ROM (Galaxy, 1993). The
CD-ROM is available from the FAA Office of Aviation Medicine or from Galaxy Scientific.
The human factors in aviation maintenance research program uses the model shown in Figure 1. The
aviation maintenance technician (AMT) is at the center of the system. The input to the aviation
maintenance system are aircraft, shown to the left of the human. System outputs are safe and available
aircraft. It is important to note that the safe and available aircraft must be affordable for the passengers
and profitable to the operator. Therefore each activity of the human factors research maintains a
consciousness toward improving human performance to enhance work efficiency and, thus, lower overall
maintenance costs.
Surrounding the human are a variety of factors that are likely to affect human performance. While the
research program is addressing each of the factors in Figure 1, this paper concentrates on two, training
and data sources.
Table 1. Human Factors in Maintenance and Inspection Workshops since 1989
Training
Concerns for effective aml efficient

maintenance training are shared by all
the airlines of the world. ahere is
continuing management attention to
provide rmfncient training for
maintenance personnel to ensure safe
practices. At the same time
management must schedule training
so that it is not an overwhelming cost
burden due to such factors as uavel
or time off the job. Improved
training practices are a potential
solution in that such training may be
able to provide more and better
instruction for less money. Advanced
technologies, Uke computer-based
training (CBT),are one such solution. 0
mrefm, the Office of Aviation Figure 1 The Human in the Maintenance System
M d d n e embark4 on a mearch and
development plan to demonstrate and evaluate state-of- the-art CBT. The m l t a n t software has been
distributed to most of the world's airlines, via the Air Transport Association (ATA) Maintenance Training
Committee. Like the CO-ROM, mentioned above, the CBT is available from the FAA Omce of Aviation
Medicine and Galaxy Scientific.
The cralning system is designed m dmomare the concept of "loteltigent tutoring." The W n g system
has software to mOae1 the performance of a system expert, an insmctional expert, and the student. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to describe intelligent tutoring. However &re are numerous detailed
descdptions elsewhere (Johnson, 1990, Johnson & Norton, 1991, Johnson, Norton, & Utsman, 1992).
The Mning system is for a Boeing 767-300 environmental control system (ECS). Due to the generic
natuxe of the ECS many airIines suggested that it would be a good exemplary system. The training
design capitalizes on simuIatlon of the system to provide diagnostic training and prwce. Training for
troubleshooting has the best potential for training adults to be prepared to perform the maintenance job.
The system permits the learner to access dl appropriate cockpit and maintenance bay controls for the
environmental ccotml system. In addition, the learner can access interactive pages from the Boeing fault
isolation manual (HM) as shown in Figare 2.
The training was designed to

exemplify what can be done with
CBT. The system avoided the use of
non-interactive "page-turning"
computer screens that characterize
early CBT for maintenance training.
The ECS training has demonstrated
that tday's software and hardware
can provide robust simulation in a
rich, advice- and feedback-oriented
environment.
The ECS training system was

evaluated at a large US carrier. At
the suggestion of the ATA and the
participating carrier the training
evaluation study was deSignsd 20
compare stu&n&ontrolled CBT to Figure 2 An Interactive Page from the B e i n g FauIt
imlructor-led CBT. A group of 20 Isolation Manual
students were trained for
approximately six hours using one of
the two m a d . Using a written post-test, it was shown that post-training knowledge was the same for
both groups. Students, however, expresssd a preference for the combination of CBT and a human
instructor. It is reasonable to expect that learners desire an enlightened human as well as the CBT.
However, the student-controlled CBT group had no requirement for scheduled group training, for a human
instructor, for a projection computer, or for a classmrn. Since post-training knowledge was the same for
both groups the mearch favors the cost effectiveness of the student-controlled Iraining. Extensive
reporting of the ECS evaluation Is contained elsewhere (Galaxy Scientific, 1993).
Data Sources
Aviation maintenance has extensive data requirements. Mechdcs have estimated that 40-50% of a day
can be spent on finding technica1 data and completing required "paper work." Therefore the Human
Factors in Maintenance research program explores ways to provide Wer access to technical data and
better ways to record, store, and analyze data collected in the field and shop, or on the hangar floor or
flightline. This section describes two such projects: the CD-ROM and the m m a n c e mancement
System (PENS)
*0 243-AN/I46
Circular/Ca"rculaird~up~yn~~p
CD-ROM
This project has the goal of designing large digital. documents that are easy to develop and use. While
this goal appears to be straight-forward it Is a challenge h today's ever changing hardware and sobare
environment.
Curcent CD-ROM hardware exists on a 5 112" disc media that stor& about 640 Megabytes of data. The
storage W h o t o gy is not wmglex. Conceptudty, it crut be ~ n sas ai large
~ hard d s k with "read-
only" capability, in most cases. The challenge, therefore, is to design interfaces to make it easy for a
novice user to find the information that is desired. Even more signIfScant is the task of developing
software to facilitate easy development of the digital data.
The Interface to the FAA Offiix of

Aviation Medicine CD-ROM is
shown in Figure 3. As shown, the
CD-ROM contains six major
programs as demonstration of the
technology. 'Ihe first program, at the
top left of Figure 3, is the
Hypermdia information System. It
contains about 1800 pages of
proceedings from the conferences
listed in Table 1. The software
permits a variety of ways to search
the information from these meetings.
In addition to the mnferenm

proceedings the CD-ROM contains
two complete CBT programs. One of Figure 3 Main Interface for Aviation Medicine CD-
the CBT programs L the ECS tutor, RUM
described above. The second program
demonsbates a CBT system used by
the FAA for training of Airway Facilities electronic ?eclmicians. That program, named ATCBI4, shows
the combination of intelligent tutoring, electronic simulation, and retrieval of technical documentation for
maintenance.
The CD-ROM contains two multlmdia presentations with audio and video. The first showcases the FAA
Office of Aviation Medicine. The second program shows the Human Factors Laboratory at the FA4
Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ. Both programs were designed to be stand-alone programs for
kiosks at various convention exhibits.
A demonstration of the PENS software is also included on the CD-ROM. This demonmation is useful
to describe the need fw the PENS research and development, Of come, the PENS pmjxt has been
rapidly evolving. Therefore*the PENS version on the CD-ROM is not the very b a t example of current
capability. Current PENS capability is described below.
Circular/Circulair~up~nxp
243-AN146 A-261
Eerformrrnce mhaneement @stem (PENS)
The research program is working with the FAA Flight Standds Service to develop a Performance
ENhancement System (PENS) for Aviation Safety Inspectors. PENS is designed to Provide aviatioi safety
inspectors with portable, easy-to-use, hardware and software to enhance on-the-job performance. PENS
helps inspectors to collect, store and analyze safety data in real-time. PENS uses hand writing recognition,
and smart software to reduce error and ex@@ data collection. Figure 4 shows an example of the on-
line FTRS form and pull-down menus for access to other data sources.
Aviation Safety Inspectors perform a

variety of tasks, including: accident
and incident investigation, certificate
management, avionics inspection, and
aircraft inspection. They document
their activities on a Program Trackjng
and Reporting Subsystem CpTRS)
form. PENS permits the inspectors
to record the F I R S and other data in
a format that can be directly entered
into the National database.
Anorher aspect of the inspector's job

is information retrieval; the inspectors
must not only maintain records of
their activities, they must have access
to the large amounts of information
relevant to their jobs. Such Figure 4 An Example Form on the YENS
information, as shown in Figure 4
includes: Fsderal Aviation Regulations, Airworthiness Directives, Advisory Ciculm, Inspector's
Handbooks, and more. Again, PENS provides ready access to such information. The software techn010gy
from the CD-ROM hypermsdia project perml tted a rapid technology transfer to the PENS project. This
same technology is applicable for a variety of additional aviation maintenance work environments.
Conclusions
Advanced technology is a means to enhance human performance in maintenance. Technology is not an

As research and development on human factors in aviation maintenance and inspection continues,
the team of scientists and engineers will explore technology and match it to appropriate applications.
Experience has shown that hardware capability most often exceeds the design of quality sofhvare and
development of g m d intuitive interfaces. The research program has a scientific responsjbility not only
to develop new advanced technology but also to test it and be sure that it is integrated properly into the
maintenance system.
Development, implementation, and evaluation will remain the highest priority for the research program.
In order to ensure success the research team will continue ta interact with government personnel, airline
management, and aircraft maintenance job incumbents. The research end products and s e w shall be
designed for immediate transfer and useful acceptan= by the aviation maintenance community.
References
Galaxy Scientific Corporation (1993). Human Factors Issues in Aircraft Mai~lterranceand Inspection :CD-
ROM {Compact Disc Read Only Memory}. Atlanta, GA: Galaxy Scientific Corpation (Distributor).
Galaxy Scientific Corporation (1993). Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance Phase 3, Valurne I :
Progress Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Depamnent of 'kansporbdon, Federal Aviation Adminiswation.
Johnson,W.B. (1990). Advanced technology for aviation maintenance training: an industry status report
and development plan. Proceedings oJ the 34th AllmuuJ Meeting ofthe Htdmarp Factors Society. alando,
FL:The Human Factors Society, 1 171- 1175.
Johnson, W.B. & Norton, J.E. (1 99 1j, Using intelligent simulation.to enhance human performance in
aircraft maintenance, Proceedi~gsof the I99 1 International Conference on Aging Aircrafi and Structural
A irworihiness {NASA Conference Publication 31 60). Washington, DC:Federal Aviation Administration
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 303-313.
Johnson,W .B..Norton JE., and Utsman L.G. (1992). New tachnology for the schoolhouse and flightline
maintenance environments. Fmeedings of the 7th FAA Conference on Human Factors in Aircraft
Maintenance and inspection. Washington, DC: FAA Office of Aviation Medicine. NTIS Nu. PB93-
146975.
Johnson, W.B.& Shepherd, W.T.(1991). Human factors in aviation maintenance: research and
development in the USA. Proceedings of the ICAO Flight Safely and Human Factors Seminar. Douala,
Cameroon, B-192 - B-228.
Shephd, W.T. (1 993). Issues in aviation maintenance human factors. Proceedings of the. JCAO Flight
Safely and Human Factors Seminar. Cdm, Egypt.
Shepherd, W.T. (1992). Aircraft maintenance challenges and human factors solutions. Proceedings of
the lCdO Flight Safeiy and Human Faciors Seminar. MeAco City, Mexico, 167 - 183.
Shephm, W.T. & Johnson, W.B.(1 99 1). Aircraft maintenance challenges and human factors solutions.
Proceedings of the ICd 0 Fiighr Safety and Humart Factors Seminar. Bangkok, Thai1and, 204-220.
06YYAK)qHE KArlECTBA TPEHAXEPA KAK MEPA €TO BO3AEfiCJBHfl
HA Y EROBEQECKMA @AKTOP
B ~ a c ~ o f l u apabo~e
fi MsnaramTcH pesynbra~br~ccnenosaHMfi,sblnorrHeHHblx B JI~THO-
~ccne~osarenbc~w
M H C T H T ~ T ~M nwnuemblx aHanH3-y aaam o c a m ~ e m y KpmepnRMH
cosepureHcTea a e ~ a q ~ o ~ Tpetiamepm
~wc cl cHuxetiHeM B pe3ynb~are o ~ ~ ~ H HHa H Hnx
OTplnUTeffbHCir0 B Q ~ Q @ ~ T B MYenOBeWCKOrO
R mKT0pa. PBCCM~T~MW~OTCR,
8 OCHOBHOM, KOMnneKCHMe
TpeHmepbl. IB u l ~ p o ~ccutdcne
o ~ WFI TpeHampoe mar0 rnna MOXHO yKasarb cnenymqne w ~ l
@MC. IJ:
M c I ~ o J I ~ ~ o B B H M ~CaMQReTa B KaYBCTBB OCHDBHOrO CpeACTBa WH O~)NBHMR M

n0pe)WclMHMH nMnOTOE B H8CTORq08 3peMR He MOXeT PBCCMBTPVBBTbCR. TO obyCnOBne~0R ~ I C O K O ~
C T Q M M O C T ~ ~noneToB, 60nblll~ha pacxoaoM Tonnwa M pecypca, a Tame onacHocTbm. R O ~ T O M ~
uempanb~oirnpo6ne~oGRsnFeercR 06acnere~neT.H. Transfer", r.e. nonHon aReKsaaHocrM ~ a 3 e ~ ~ o Q
~O~~OTOBK TeMM p@3yIlbTaTaMj KOTOpble HMenM 6b1 MeCTO IlpM flONOTOBKi3 B nOneTe. f o n b ~ 9 ,3TO
rapaHTMpyeT OQOCHOBB~HH~IR IlepeHOC B DeTHYH, IlpatKTMKy 3 ~ 8 H ~ i H , BBblKQB H YM~HH~,
C@OPMMPOBBHH~IX C HOMBUbK) TPeHZW8POB M flf3rrHX 06yamu~mCPBnCTB.
Ecncl roBopnfi ywynHeHHo, TO 6eaanac~oc~bnoneros onpeaenneTcH TWMR

COCTMRkOuHMH: ~a~ep~aflbtlo YaCTbtO
fi neT~T0nbHBTO aTlffapaTa, BHeUlHclMM )!CnQBHRMM H T&
cosolryn~ocmmnapaMeTpos, K M O ~ ~ D npHHmo 0 6 0 3 ~ a w nKBK ~ ~ ~ O B ~ W Caamop K M ~ @ ~ c .2).
qeno~erec~nh @ a m p e csom orepenb MOXHO ycnosHo pa an en^-rtr Ha perynaptlyro M HeperynApwm
COCTaBnHloIl&4e. n e p ~ a ~ lOnpeflenReTCFl ~ ~ ~ I Q @ ~ C C M O H WM8CTePCTBOM;
I~H~~M BTOPaR HOCUT
~eonpenene~~blEi xapamep: o ~ wnpoRanReTcR s BMp,e Hesepmx, cnamatlwx p e u ~ e ~n~ rpy6brx fi
npQh4aOB. Y ~ ~ O B B W C@aKTOp K M ~ npUFl0flReTCFl He TOJlbKO KaK MHAMBM&!bnbHW XapaKTepMCTMKa, HO
H BO B ~ ~ M M O A ~ ~ ~ C TMB M
e Hw QneHaMbl aWIla>Ka.
f l o ~ e ~ q ~ a f l b ~@OBeHb
blfi 6e3onac~mn m, 0npeAenReMblA f l e m o n TOAHOCTbH),
OUeHMBWTCFI npM C~PTM@MKB~MH. ~ ~ M ~ T MYTO M , JleTHm TOaHOCTb OXBaTblBaeT He TOflbKO
KOHCTP~KL~HKICaMOneTa M 6 f O O ~ Q P Y P . O B ~ H HHO
~ , M BHelLlHMe YCnOBMFl H HeKOTOPYkO YaCTb PBQ/J~RPHO~
cocTaen~we8YenoaevecKoro aalcropa. Ha npamKe ypoeetib Beaonac~ocmc ~ m a e H~acraopmou ~
M & m e 6unbwe ~ 3 - 3 aB n n R H m H ~ ~ ~ T B H H 3ne~en'io~
MX qenaeerecKara @amopa - ULUM~OK nwo-roa.
aKcnnyaray~o~Horo
nepcoHana M RHcnewepoe YBfl.
Y M ~ H ~ U J Mym3aHH08
T~T~ PaCXOmeHMe M e m y nOT0HUMBnbHMM M @KWrlBCMM YPOBHBM
be30nac~oc~nMbXliO C flOMOUbD XOPOUIO OPTaHH30MMHblX TPeHHPOBOK, KOTWblB fl0380nRCaT
WeCTBeHHO CHM3HTb BBPOFITHQCTb O W H ~ O KneTHbtX 3KJrllT@K6fi b4 W e MCKnWHfb MHOrHB M3 HMX.
3 ~ e c bnonmeti paccMaTpMearbcFl UIHPOKMG cnelcrp O ~ ~ ~ H I V ICP I~. ~ ~ B nepeyrlneawe
~ H H O snme-r e
n o n m ~ e p eHa p e r y n w m cocTaBnwyt0. Ha HepevnHpHym cocTasnwtyym o w cwMsaercfl
s
OAHO ~3 ~ a n p a e n e ~ ~ b~il,e f i ~ t ~ u l e enepeblM
c~l McTopvrqecKoM nnacre, CrpeMmcH
yGO~pWeHCTBoRCITb C21M w @ H m 4 P , n9pZluHBaP H pa38blRZ1R OTflWibHbl@ KOMnOHeHTbl. O ~ H B K HeTO
qar~oinwocm, obecndunea8.r nn donee cnoxti~ilTpemaxep n y m peuetlw sanar & p e ~ ~ u ?
BTO~Q ~
HanpasneHHe c-rasw 4enbm ~ O B ~ I L U ~ H M
xapamepMcmK
Q Tpetimepa M ero
KOMlloHeHTOb mR TOTO, WQbhd A Q ~ H T ~ C F60nbwefi
I uBKBa*fHOCTH C hlOfleTOM p3WlbHOrO mMOneTa.
Ha TOM nplrlHyHne nocrpoew ~ c eHauHoHmbHMe emHaapTb1 M TpeHamepb!, a Tatme Henastio
p a s p a h ~ a ~ ~ bMeNcjyapo~rnbl
lfi R CTaHnapT. ~ ~ c x O ~ ~ H ~FI
nOCblnKB 3aKn K148eTCR 6 TOM, qT0 Ha
WeKsaTHOM TpeHMBpa MOXHQ C @ ~ O P M M P O B ~ T ~
apl@KBaTHble HBBMKH. O ~ H ~ BMCOKaR
KO WeKBaTHWb
npmlro ~e o6ycnm~ wsae~sbrcotwe obywrnqwe Kaqeema. KpoMe roro, non~oha e t m T ~ o c T #M e m y
Tpewmepou H cauoneTaM m3clrrbc~HbKorAa He y m c ~ c ~G. r p a ~ l r l u e ~snecb
~ e ~ RmRefcH pe3~uR
POCT M Q M O C T H M CTOHMOCTH. POCT3TUT H M e T H W M H B H H ~
XapaKTep:
I~ B 30He " H ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ HBH H
~oropoRHBXOARTCfl C ~ ~ Y BTPeH#KePbl
C BMCUMQ KnaCCOB, ~ e 6 0 n b ~ ~ tZ
nPMPOCT weKBatHWTb4 ~ipe6ye~
wenb Q o n b ~ xsa~par rr yeenwewq CTOHMOCTH. ~ O ~ T O MB~ YacTnocw,
, nonywno MH-reHcMsHoe
pa3BM-rHe HanpaUetlbW C03ABHMR TPBHmepQB HHSKOR CTOHMUCTM, HO CPaBHMT0JlbHO B ~ I C Q K O ~
~ @ @ ~ D C M .
~ P ~ A ~ o J ~ B F ~ ~qTQ F ICBPTH@HKB~MOHH~IX
S CB , HCnblTaHHFlX OnPBAeneHbl P e X M M b l M mE13bl
nonera, B KOTOPHX npM ' V ~ p m ~ n bMnH ~ o 3~ r a n o ~ ~n~norMpoaaHw"
a~ HaT y r p w ~~ ~ ~ Q ~ ~ C H O C M
Tep~Mti" n p a e ~ n t t ~ onnnoT#posawen
e BmneH nmoMy, rlro HenpaewnbHoe ~MROTMPOBBHMB, ~ Q M ~ T H O
OTRHY BmUeeCFI OT 3TUlOHa, MOXeT npLiBeCTM K llOCJWP,CTBWM, VWeCTBeHHO O T I I H Y W M U C R 07 TeX,
Koropble 6b1nn onpenenem1 npn cepm@wlcaw~;B ~ a ~ 6 o n a~e e 6 n a r o n p ~ ~ m cw o ~a e - 37-0
a s a p ~ h ~ Mmn M ~ a t a m p o @ # q e c ~CaH ~ L S M H .
# ~ I H Tor0 YT&M
KwnneKc rpe6oemnA, nawawblx ~a cnaQne 7 .
nepeym momr rpeBoeatin~ K K O H C T ~ ~TpeHaxepa M
.
AOCMlltr BblCOKHX 0 6 ) W a ~ ) ~KBrlBCTB,
x H ~ O ~ X O W M OBblIlOJlHMTb
T T ~ ~ B ~ H MpFaI s h w Ha n ~ rpynn.
H eso xapamepMcTnKaM. BTOpafl rpynna
o 6 n e ~ ~ w r e rrpeboeatl~~K anemamocm. nHnompoeaHm. f p e n ~ rpynna onpenenmm
cot3epweHmBou nynbTa HwTpylcropa, BO~MOXHOCW ~ B T O Q A ~ W ~ H ~KU BQ~ T H~ M~ ynpamewe ~
~ b 0
A-266 Circular/Circula i r e / U u p ~ ~ ~ l243-ANA
n ~ ~ p 46
K m b l i 4 manon AonxeH OTHOCMT~CRK OnpeAeneHtioMy pemnMy nonem. 3necb BecbMa
nnonofBoptim o ~ a 3 a n cnepetioc
~ e npamKy Tpetiamepocrpoetm npntiuwa "Pacret~b~X cnyaes",
xopouro 3ape~olwe~~losae~ueroo c e 6 ~n p ~ c e p m @ ~ ~ a ucaruloneTos.
m~ Cyrb ero sammae~cfle TOM,
6 0On b l ~ l 0 ~"pas~wroro"
TO BMBCTO H C ~ W M T B ~ ~ H 0 MHmecma K O M ~ U H ~M ~ycM noe~M~C4 H p e x ~ ~ o s ,
B TOM qHCne OTKBSMHX, MCflOflb3088Tb OTHOCHTeJlbHO ~e60Jlbul~ft ~ a 6 0 pTMllOBMX CH3meT08 - OKOnO
150-200. CWX0Tbl nOIIXHM HBJlRTbW CTaMCTHYeCKM SHarlMMMMU U A B C B ~ O ~ ~ ~ COY3, T M
KOTOPW OHM flOnHHbl n0flHWTbHl IIUKpMBaTb.
T ~ Kme, K ~ KpeanbHaH n o n ~ m nporpawa nonera, aranoH nMnomposaHMH He

RsnaeTcR " X ~ ~ T K M M OH M nepeMatiHym cocraennmqne. Daxe WFItuTaTHblx
" . COA~PMT ~OCTORHHYK~
TlpWpaMM 803MOXHbl n0peMeHHble COCTaBnHkO~Me, KQTOPMe MSAIBHRCDTCFI 113-38 BaPblrlPOBElHMR
3KCflJl!/aTaLlblOHHblX ~ c J ~ o B HH~a,n p M M e p M3MeHeHHR MaCCbl M n M UeHJPOBKM. H ~ B ~ I K BBefleHMR
OM 3TMX
COCTBBZIRIOWMX M HX BblnOnHeHMR AOJ17KeHqOBnaAeTb o ~ ~ ~ K ~ u M @ Hac TpeHa>Kepe.
FI
DeTNIbHblh aHmM3 M H O ~MCJle~tIblk

O~ IlOJleTOB, 6011bll10r0 Y MCna R 0 H M X ~ P O H C W B C T B H ~ ~
M Ilpe~llOCblJIOK K HMM lIOKa3MBaeTi 4TO Ol-flOMHOe pa3~006pa3~0 flOnyUeHHble 0 ~ ~ MOXHO 6 0 ~
Q M Y THllUB. ~ ~ o B ~ c T
C0eCTM K CPaBHMT0RbHO H ~ ~ O ~ ~ ~ U IqHCJly T Ma w K R ~ C C M @ ~ K ~ ~ ~nOMOratOT
HK,
BBeflBHHMB HaMH 3TBnOHbf.
- nepeWbI#atlMm nponycy
H ~ M npoueayp, npeAnncaHHMx P13;
IiailJeQ pa60~0OC0bae BHMMaHMe 6b1fl006palqe~0Ha KOpeHHOe yCOB0pLlJeHCTWBaHMe
nynbm HHcrpymopa H ynyYuretlMe sa NOT clrer obyramul~xcsoficm TpeHwepa. 3To noc~~rtlyro
C O ~ A ~ H HHoearo
~M ~ti@op~ayna~~ o r o no cyulemey e nynbT MHcTpymopa saenetia aucneptHaR
nonfl;
CMCTeMB.
Ha qeeTHoM Awnnee r p a w ~ a ~ uunH ~ n nepccmanb~iro KoMnbmTepa s HarnRnHoM

wne fleMoricrpnpymTcF1 @ a m w s c ~ ~napaMetpbl
e AeweHnn M ynpasnetiw, p e a n ~ 3 o ~ a ~
KyPCaHTOM & flpOqeCCe TpeHMPOBKH Ha T p e H a e p e . MHAMUMP~KITCFIHenwpblSHbl4 napaMeTpbl,
TpaeKTOPMFl flOneTa, mCKP@THblB llpO!&flypH. 3~kl AaHHble C0IlOCTBWFIK)TCH C 3TaflOHaMM
IlM~OTHPOB8HHR.
Bce TO n o 3 ~ 0 n ~ e TCIHCT~~KTOPY
~ M C T ~H
O 6 e 3 o ~ l l r 1 6 ~04eHHBa~b
~0 KarleCTBO
nCIjlOTMpOBaHMU, EblRBnflTb ~ O ~ L l J ~ H H OUIH~KU.
MB
R O HaueMy MHBHMkO, HCnblfaHHR Tp8HmBpa BOJMHbl ilpOFPOfWbCFI B . Tpbl 3Tafla. Ha
nBPBOM MCnblTblBaKlrCR OCHOBHMe KOMIlQHeHTbl. Ha HTOpOM MCnMtkJBa~TCR tpWMep B WWMe
amMamrecKoro nunor#posaHm. ~ P M TOM ~ ~ J I ~ K I T C F~ FT M O H H ~ IYnpaBnfirnuMe
~ BOSR~GCTBUR
B ~~ P ~ P M B H HHa
T HH M
( ~ ~ M C K ~ ~H ~ } . TpeWM 3Tall0 T p e H m p I70 CtleqklWibHQG MGTOnMKe OUBHIABBmT
e b s c o ~ o ~ a a n ~ @ ~ u c l p ~o n
~Wa ~M~K~ Me - H ~ ~ ~ I Tffewur~.
~ T B ~ Hpwee
. He p a h ~ a s u w na
i rpetramepe, HO
nmasurw~Ha cauoneTe, nonmeH aa Kaponcoe epelulfl HayyMTbcR npasMnbno nmnampasatb p e ~ a m p .
A-270 Circular/Circulair~upwynslp243-AN/I46
TAXONOMY AND MODELS FOR HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIVE

SYSTEMS: A N APPLICATION TO FLIGHT SAFETY
P.C. CACCIABUE, M. PEDRALI E. HOLLMAGEL

Commission of the European Communities, Computer Resources International,
Joint Research Centre, Space Division,
Institute for Systems Engineering and informatics, P.O. Box 173, DK-3460,Birkergd,
21020 lspra (Va), Itdy Denmark
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses how the problem of analyzing human erroneous behaviour can be
appropriately tackled by a framework that comprises four phases, namely: -1) the consideration for
a paradigm of human behaviour; 2) the development of a taxonomy of human erroneous actions;
3 ) the evaluation of appropriate tables of data and 4) a methodology of analysis at different levels
of complexity. An application of the proposed metbd has been focused on the accident of the
flight AZ404 Milan-Zurich. The study has been performed from two different hypotheses
concerning the human erroneous behavior. The resub, in terns of rmt causes and manifestations,
have been compared.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the vastly improved reliability of mechanical and electronic components has
funher contributed to the increased h n m n hplicatjon, as the "causal factort',up to approximately
70% of the accidents for air carriers (Nagel, 1988). Moreover, the advent of "glass cockpit",
which has enhanced the role of the pilot as "supervisort?ather than actor in the flight conml
process, and the extensive use of Information Technology (IT) for the design of the Cockpit
Resources Management, have induced additional perspectives in human factors analysis (Speyer,
1990). These can be summarized in the need to study in detail the cognitivddecisiond processes
as well as the dynamic interaction within the loop pilot-aircraft-cone01 system. Consequently, the
improvement of human factors methods calls for the consideration of the "interactive system"
represented by the pilot(s), their mental processes and the dynamic, IT governed, environment in
which they operates.
The main objective of this paper is to propose a m e w which couples a classification

(taxonomy) of human erroneous behavior with the dynamics of the working domain in which the
human skill is operating, i.e., the pilot-airplane-con~olsystem interaction. The proposed analysis
of human erroneous behaviour is based on four phases:
1. The availability of a male1 or paradigm of human behaviour.
2. The development of a taxonmy (chssification) for human erroneous behaviour.
3. The existence of tables of data between the actual working domain and the taxonomy.
4. The presence of n method of analysis.
WhiIe the availability of an adequate model of cognition and the systematic
classification of human erroneous behavior are theoretical issues, the drawjng of data from actual
situations and the application of the technique to design an%r evaluation of real airplane c o n ~ d
and management are topics of practical consideration. In this paper, we will descrik the proposed
methodology focusing on the model ofthe pilot and on the taxonomy of erroneous behavior. We
wiIl then apply the methodology to a retrospective study of the accident of the AZ flight 404
Milan-Zurich on November 1990. We wili show how the root causes of the accident, as far as the
human factors ace concerned, can k searched and andysed in a "systematict' way using the
proposed taxonomy framework and the data collected from the flight voice recorder,
D E S C R M O N OF METHODOLOGY
A Model of cognition and a Taxonomy of erroneous behavior
The availability of a paradigm (model) of behavior of cognition is the necessary initial

condition for the construction of a taxonomy of erroneous actions. More specifically, the model
must be able to emulate and control at least the following categories of operator functions:
perceptionlobservation (OBS), memory (recall af information), interpretario~l (1NT)
(identXcation/diagnosis], planninglcbice (PLAN) (decision maldng), and actionlexecution
(ACT) of a plan. These categories can be formalized (Hollnagel, 1993) in terms of a Simple Model
of Cognition (SMoC) (fig. 1).
M em ory
[knowledge
repos Itory)
P lanningt
C holce
P re-d eflne d
~ " s P ~ n = e s
\
D atof
M e a s u r e m snts A ctions
Figure 1 A Simple Model of Cognition

In the context of human factors analysis, the cognitive model needs to l
x included in a taxonomy
framework in order to identify categories of erroneously p ~ o r m e dactions. We wiu refer in our
methodology to a taxonomy, developed since some years, which is being adjusted to fit the SMoC
paradigm and is based on the principle to maintain, at all levels, a clear distinction between
causes, manifestations and consequences of erroneous behavior. The causes of erroneous
behaviour are the reasons which determine the occurrence of a certain "inappropriate" behaviour.
The manifestations are the forms or modes in which the "inappropriate"khavior takes place. The
causes can be further sukiivided in internal or "person related" and external or "system related",
but the latter play a role only as possible triggaing conditions, able to set-off or m d f y a person
related cause or even a random event. It is up to the safety analyst to perform the appropriate
evaluation of the working envknmerrt in order to identify and quantify these external, system
related factors affecting the human behavior.
The incidental sequences due to erroneous behavior can originate at anyone of the four
levels of the SMoC. In order to apply the taxonomy to the working environment, four tables can
be developed for the detailed analysis of causes and manifestations of erroneous behavior
corresponding to the 4 functions of the SMoC. In each table the causes and the &estations
(effects) are funher subdivided in general (causdeffect) and syecifc (causdeffect),according to
whether they represent a generic situation or a more spscific case. In the tables each General
Effect (GE) and its related Specific E f S e c (SE} are liked to a General Case (GC), which i s the
manifestation of an emneous behavior at the level immediately prgcedig; andfor to a Specific
Cawe {SC), depending also on a system related event or on a random occurrence. Tables 1-4
report the taxonomy with reference to the four phases of SMoC, i.e. Action (ACT), Planning
( P m , Obswvation (03s)and Interpretation ( I M J . For brevity, only no detailed comments on
these tables are reported here, while a Mner description can l x found elsewhere (Pedrali, 1993).
This way of malysing the human behavior can be procedur;rlised.
A Framewxlrk of Application
In figure 2 the procedure is depicted fur analysing an existing sequence of events,

starting from the manifestations (effects)and searching, in a retrospective way, for the causes ar
all levels of the SMoC. The starting point is thus the manifestation of the erroneous behavior, i.e.
the inappropriate action (ACT), which is also called ''phena~pe" and it js described as a SE and a
correspondent GE. From this initial condition, the steps to be followed by the analyst are:
1. Semh fur the GCls), using the taxonomy tables (tab. 1). If only Random Events are
identified, rhen the search is finished. Else continue.
2. Identify the GE and SE at the level immediately above (tab. 2), namely PLAN. Note that the
GCs at any level are equal to the GEs of the level immediately above! Search for the GCs
and/or SCs at this level, If SCs are found, one branch of the analysis is terminated .
If GCs exist, then the search for more (other) mot causes at the above level (INTI.
3. At IWT level the same procedure is applied in order to reach the level of OBS. At this level
only SCs are to be recognized from the taxonomy and the search process terminates.
The analysis performed in this way, leads to the identification of the level at which the initiating
human event has occurred, to the system related causes and to any other Specific (root) CCIUS~.
Circul a r / C i m l a i ~ u p ~ r y n243-AN1146
~p A-273
start
analysis
w end of
e
al
Figure 2. The procedure for a rewo-spective application of the taxonomy.

Incorrect choice of
Table 1. Error modes realted to the ActionIExecuriorr part of SMoC
(Chock, Fear, ,.)

Incomplete matching of
P r e - ~ ~ t i not
on
Side-effect not considered

Subgoal nor considered
Satisficing I n m t ididentifimtion
Recognition grimed 0N.n
choice
Wrong criteria used Incorm$ diagnosis (RSr)
i Use of wrong decisionrole
Table 2. E m Causes realled to the PlanninglCbice part of SMoC

Absent from place
At~ntionfailure
Phisiologid needs
Recent failures
Time compression
Woik oveshad
Deduction failure
Inadeguate knowledge
Frequency gambling Induction failure
Similarity matching
Long interval-since
Subjectively ambigom
Incorrect assumptions
Table 3. E m r Causes redted to the Interpretation part of SMoC.
GenertrI functions
Table 4. Error Causes realted to the PerceptionlObservatiunpart of SMoC

A -276 243-AN/146
Cimtlhr/Circulaire/Uup~y~srp
THE ACCIDENT OF ZURICH
The study of a seal accident has been performed applying the taxonomy in a
retrospective way aiming at the identification of the root causes of the human erroneous or
inappropriate behavior. The accident examined is the crash of the DC 9-30, AlitaIia flight 404
Milan-Zurich, against the hill of Stadelberg on November 14th, 1990. On that day, the Alitalia
flight 404 was approaching the Zurich airport and at 20:06:20hours the aircraft was authorized to
descend to 4000 ff, the altitude at which the final approach starts. At this point, a number of flight
control operations were carried out in order to capture the glide slope ("from below"), within few
seconds. At a distance of 11 NM the airplane was flying too low (-1000 ft), with reference to the
glide, however, neither the crew nor the ATC detected this state. T h e aircraft followed the
localim (LOC-14) precisely, but descended constantly below the glide path, as if it was
established on the glide, until the crash on the ground at 20:11:17 hours.
This accidents has been the object of many inquires made primarily by .the Swiss
authorities, under the coordination of the Office of investigation of the aeronautical accidents, and
also by the Accident Investigation Group of the M A C ("Associazione Moti Aviazione
Commerciale") and by the Accident Analysis Committee (AAC) of the FAZPA ("International
Federation of Airline Pilot Association"). The a h of this analysis is to show how the proposed
methodology could serve the purpose to search for the root causes of human behavior* given
certain environmental and cognitive conditions which may have strongly affected the pilots
believes, decisions and actions during the course of the accident evoIution.
The study of the human factor
The analysis of the accident, carried out on the basis of the voice recorder and by
making a number of Iogical and plausible considerations, has clearly shown that the crash was the
result of the combination of several concurrent system (components) rnalfunctions/failures and
human factors as well as environmental. conditions. We will not discuss further the system
malfunctions identified by the oEciaI inquiry, but we will focus on the analysis of the human
factors developed during the accidental evolution from two possible perspectives. Znded, with
reference to the findings of the oficial commission of the inquiry, we will apply the taxonomy in
two different ways:
1. to study the causes related to the human factors identified by the official commission;
2. to evaluate a different hypothesis relative to the initiating human cause.
According to the results of the official commission of the investigation, the safety
measures,which should have prevented the airplane crash, faded at all three levels, namely:
1. Thefight navigation system (the V I E NAV unit No 1) was malfunctioning, giving the false
indication "on glide", whereas the airplane was flying 1000 ft below the glide path.
2, The crew Jig hr management showed inadequate system failure analysis, non-compliance
with basic and poor cooperation between pilots.
3. The air trafic control did not monitor the adherence to the clear altitude of 4000 ft before
the Final Approach Point and the airplane's vertical alignment on the LS.
Focusing on the crew flig ht management, the cornmission of inquires concluded that, despite the
'
VHF NAV malfunction, there was a number of erroneous actions made by the pilots:
1. the crew omitted to report ."established"on the L S ;
2. they omitted to perfom the brief'lng of"CATJ", following the failure of the NAV system;
3. they omitted the regulation ofthe Decision Height @H) at 200 ft.
Moreover, these errors must have been coupled to a mntinuous m i s r e w of the "drum pointer"
altimeter by the Captain, which led to a series of ~ l a t e inappropriate
d actions, namd y:
4. the interrupted "goaround'hnd the subsequent
5. "leveling"prior to the crash.
We idenmed these 5 events as the phenotypes of the human behavior and we have applied h e
taxonomy in a re~ospectiveway, for the evaluation of their root causes.
Thefirst analysis
The application of the taxonoq, according to the procedure described abwe (figure
21, revealed that the phenotypes 1,2 and 3 were Omissions while phenotypes 4 and 5 have shown
a more complex nature. For sake of brevity we will describe here only the analysis of phenotype 1
and we will only sketch the others, making some observation on the findings,
P h e n o t a . The Omission (SE-ACT) to report "established" on the ELS by the crew has k e n
considered as an Incorrect choice of alternative (GC-ACT => GE-PLAV),rnore specifically a Use
ofwrong decision rule (SE-PUN), since they noticed that dl four NAY indications gave an 'an
Glide" indication without a warning flag appearing. This Specific EfSect was due ody to a
-
Spec@% Came - work overload hggered by two System Related Causes, namely conflicting
priorities, since the pilots had to follow the approach to landing procedure at the same time as to
maintain the separation from preceding airplane, and inu&guote functioning, of the Automatic
Flight Control System.
P h e n o m 2 and 3, The Omissions (SE-ACT) relative to phenotypes 2 and 3 can,schematically be
described as follows: No choice made (CC-ACT => G E - P U N ) , Planning horizon roo short (SE-
P U N } , Work overload ( S C - P U N ) and Time compression ( S C - P W J , Conflicting priorities
(System Relared Cause).
Phenotypes 4 and 5. In order to define the root causes of phenotypes 4 and 5, it has k e n
necessary to backtrack through the taxonomy up to the level of PerceptionlObservation. For
example, the interrupted "go around" has been recognized as a Failure to complete (SE-ACT),
due to an Jncorrect choice of alternative (GC-ACT => GE-PLAN], more specifmlly a Wrong
criteria wed (SE-PLAN), caused by h c k of rraining (SC-PUN) of the co-pilot unable to
bvercome the decision ofthe Captain to stop the "go-around",and by an Incorrect recognirion of
state (GC-PLAN => GE-INT). This inappropriate interpretation was due to an Incorrecf
recognition of value (GC-JAT => GE-OBS), provoked by the ambiguous labeling of the indicator
(System Rdated Cause), and more specifically by the Captain Reading the wrong v a l u {SE-OBS)
on the drum pointer a1timeter because of Failure of aitention (SG-OBS}.
A similar type of analysis, performed for the "IeveIing",has led to the same root cause, Failure of
attention (SC-OBS),even if a different path has been followed through the taxonomy.
From the analysis of these 'erroneous behaviors it results that, while emon 1-3 are very clearly
identified and explained, the underlying reasons of phenotypes 4 and 5 are much more complex to
enhance. Indeed, they are both dependent on a common fundamental specific cause, which resides
at the fisst level of the cognitive process, i.e., the erroneous reading (observation) of the altimeter
due to failure of attention, and they are both sustained by a n u r n k r of other causes related to the
socio-technical environment of the crew.The phenotypes 4 and 5 are thus quite different in nature
and causes than the phenotypes 1-3, which are based on much simpler and immediate
representation of the situation.
The second analysis
These particular remarks relative to phenotypes 4 and 5, coupled with a very important
feature of the findings, namely the fact that the altimeter of the Captain was never found, have led
us to attempt the analysis of the accident, with particular focus on these last two emors, from a
different perspective. We have postulated n much simpler error of the Captain: the miscalibration
of the altimeter. We have, then, performed the analysis of the accident from the instant of the
miscalibration onward, applying the taxonomy in a prospective manner. Here are the results,
The instant of the calibration of the Altimeter of the Captain, who was acting as the
Associate-Pilot, from the QNH (1019, in this case) to the QFE value (9701,should have wcurred
at a height of about 5000 ft approximately. The wrong calibration of the instrument could be
classified as a Wrong movement type (SE-ACT), or more in general as a phenotype of Incorrect
direction (GE-ACT). From table 1, this type of error is only linked to a system related random
event, with no connection to the other levels of the taxonomy and only general function of the
working domain can be analysed as the triggering conditions of this error. For example,
interference of communication within the crew or conflicting priority with another request of the
Co-pilot could be seen as the external factors triggering the random error of miscalibration. So
this error could be very simply classified.
From this point onward, if we assume that the altimeter of the Captain was calibrated at
a pressure somewhere in between 1019 and 970, the altitude reported would have resulted figher
than the actual one in a QFE-ATL mode: this miscdibration could have approximately
compensated for the low altitude at which the airplane was flying. With this scenario in mind, the
prospective analysis of the interrupted go-around and the subsequent leveling (phenotypes 4 and 5
above) can be c d e d out assuming that the Captain did not &sread the altimeter but, quite on the
contrary, always read correctly an inadequate functioning instrument. In this case, using the tables
of the taxonomy and following the procedure of application (fig. 2) ii~the direction of the
prospective analysis, there would be: an Incorrecrlincomplete recognition of stare (GE-INT =>
GC-PLAN) ("altitude too lowt'); this would lead to a Recognition primed choice (SE-PLAN)
("no-need to increase level of flight") and more in general to an Incorrect ckoice of alternative
(GE-PLAN=> GC-ACT), represented by the Failure to complete (SE-ACT), ("the intempted go-
around), and by the Unrelated object (SE-ACT), ("the leveling").
This analysis, although based an a speculation concerning a possible error of calibration

of the altimeter, carries to two relevant features in contrast with the previous study:
1. A simpler construction of the sequence of the accident is obtained, as far as the errors of go-
around and leveling are concerned. n i s is more coherent with the reconstruction of the other
events of error of omission made by xhe crew during the ATL phase. In other words, the
inappropriate khavior shown by the crew during the various phases of the accident remains,
as in the previous cases of omissions, at the level of errors of planning or of random errors,
which are very common in everyday life and do not call for a complex cognitive analysis.
2. The repetitive erroneous reading of the altimeter is not identifEd as one of the root causes of
the accident. Indeed, this continuous error can be considered as n rather unlikely event, given
that the Captain was a vesy experienced pilot with more than 1OOOO hours of flight and thus
very well used to capture at once the i n f o m o n from the altimeter reading.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVFS

This paper has described a meihodology for studying the human factor in man-machine
interactive systems. Its potentialities have been shown in an application to a real accident situation
applied to the avionics domain,
The results obtained have demonstrated that it is pssible to use the reports on
accidents to analyse in detail and derive the root causes of human behavior. h most cases, the
lessons learned from such analyses can be used for improving further the design of control
systems and specially the training of persofinel. This could be exactly the case of the accident of
Zurich, in which the work overIoad and the time pressure have been idenmed as the root causes
of a number of crucial errors, while the misreading of the altimeter (case 1) or the miscalibration
of the same instrument (case 2) have played an additional role in the accident evolution. These
two main causes are becorning predominant in accidents of modem technological systems and
they must be handled by appropriate design features as well as by ad-hm mining.
The overafl methodology has not yet been fully formalized in an instrument able to
sustain the safety analyst and the designer of control procedures. However, the results obtained in
the application to the case of the Zurich accident have ken very promising and are encouraging
for the remaining work of development still to be carried out.
REFERENCES
HollnageI E,, ( 1993). Reliabiliry of Cognition: Foundnrions of Human Reliability Analysis.
Academic Press, London
Nagel D.C., (1 988). Human E m r in Aviation Operations. In Wiener E. L.and Nagel D.C. (Eds),
Human Factors in Aviation, Academic Press, San Diego, CA, pp. 263-303
Pedrali M.,(1993). ModeIli e tassonornie di errori urnani per I'analisi di sicureua neUtaviadone
civile. fl caso studio delll'inciderite di Zurigo: ricerca dellt cause e indagine prospettica, Tesi di
Laurea in Ingegneria Aeronautica. Poli tecnico dii Milano. 1993
Speyer JJ., (1990). Towards design-induced error tolIerance, Proceedings of the ICAO Human
Factors Seminar, Leningrad, April 1990,ICAO, MontreaI, Canada, pp.A-393-414
A-2&0 JIP 243-AN/146
CircuIar/Circulair~uprcyn
VERBAL PREBELPTATIOH
Dr. T h o m a s M c C l o y a n d Dr. M a r k Hofmann (USA)
Overcoming Ob~taclesin the Application of Research to Bractice

in t h e Aviation Environment
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be with you to speak about

a topic af great interest to a l l of us--0vercominq Obstacles in
the Application of Research to Practice. I might add that the

movement of research to practice which has been evident
throughout t h i s symposium, reflects that I am speaking to a
knowledgeable group with regard to this topic.
In the final analysis, it is the objective of all research to

get i n t o practice either d i r e c t l y or indirectly by supporting
other research t h a t ends up in practice, Therefore,
understanding and removing obstacles that may impede meeting
t h i s objective is an important t o p i c . Though I w i l l not have
many visual aids today, this particular quote
I believe contains great meaning for the topic at hand.

Introducing anything new, which research to practice inevitably
does, has never been easy, a point that Machiavelli succintly
pointed out.nearly 500 years ago, I humbly submit that things
have changed very little since t h a t t i m e . Some, like John
Gilman in his 1991 article in physics Today,-entitled Research
C i r c u l a r / C i r c u l a i r ~ ~ p ~ y243-Ah!/!&
n~~p A-281
Management Today, may say the problems have become worse

Rbecause of muddled language to describe reseakch, counter-
productive management policies, and unfavorable financial
condition^.^ However, one way to combat t h e resistance to
change which Machiavelli captures in his note is to first and
foremost build a constituency or customer base, For the case
at hand, this means developing a base for human factors
research and the products it produces, If there is n o t a
constituency or customer.base, t h e chance of moving from .
research to practice diminishes greatly and eventually the

support which exists for the research will erode.
There are many strategies to b u i l d t h i s customer base, but one

effective way is to actively involve the p o t e n t i a l customer in
t h e planning and execution of t h e research.
This technique of active involvement of customers or potential

customers in t h e research process h e l p s focus t h e research. It
faciiitates shaping and maturing the research product into a
form that best solves customer problems, enhances the
likelihood the product w i l l have value added and a s s i s t in
making t h e product customer acceptable. It must also be
remembered, that customers should not be narrowly defined. For
example, in the aviation environment, customers can include
pilots, a i r t r a f f i c controllers, maintenance personnel, f l i g h t
attendants, and so forth. They can also include management
personnel, unions, professional groups, engineers, regulators,
A-282 Circular/Circulaird4uprcyn~p243-AN/146
inspectors, etc. Anyone of the above-mentioned customers or

more likely some combination of the above, will be involved if
research is to enter practice.
Customer acceptance or overcoming the obstacle Machiavelli so

eloquently pointed out should not be taken lightly. How many
research products and technologies struggle for introduction
and application because of the significant resistance to change
which must first be overcome. Often this situation is
independent from the overall objective value of the product.
Customer acceptance is so important that technologies may be
derated to minimize the changes which are required for
introduction.
For example, insistence on keeping boiler guages on CRT1s or

advanced display mediums - do not develop better ways to
present information - use the same old presentation or
interface mode that was required by the old technology even if
it is not required by the new. Then maybe you can gradually
improve the presentation mode over time so resistance to
acceptance is minimized. Problems in reducing resistance can
be magnified many times and become increasingly complex when
one moves from this simple example to expanded customer bases
and larger systems with their inherent cultures and procedures.
For example, consider the introduction of collision avoidance
advisory systems on onboard aircraft which can cause pilots to
take evasive actions that otherwise would not occur without air
~p 243-AN/t 46
Circular/Ci~uluira/~up~yn A-283
traffic direction and when they do, occur can have a d i x e c t

impact on a i r t r a f f i c controllerst ability to &nag= traific.
Clearly not a l l resistance will be dissapatsd by customer

involvement or a l l problems solved, but in m o s t cases, if
handled correctly, it will not hurt. This Customer
participation demand oriented model is in no w a y meant to i n f e r
that all research must be focused on solving the here and now
today problems of aviation customers at the expense of
technology push or longer-range research. Ji continuum of
research is needed for research program qtnying power and

staying ahead of t h e power curve.
A second area where obstacles can be found in getting human

factors research products to practice is developmental p o l i c i e s
and processes or lack thereof. It is essential that human
factors research products be considered for applicability and
value in a l l developments, be they hardware, t r a i n i n g ,
organizational, or ather. Further, they must be considered in
a systematic manner with emphasis on the early stages o f the

development. T h i s obstacle, if it exists, is best overcome by
policy that requires and rewards their consideration. These
policies must come from higher-level management who must be
sold on t h e value added of the research products in a lexicon
they understand. It might be added, this marketing can be
immeasurably helped By having customer support,
A-284 243-AN/I46
Circular/Circulaire/4up~y(1~6p
Last but not l e a s t , in overcoming obstacles in going from
research to practice is the trained human factors specialist.
It is these folk who often must take the product forward to
application by working with intermediate as well as end
customers. These persons must have knowledge of human factors
research products as well as developmental processes. To be
effective, they must be able to interact and communicate w i t h
persons of other disciplines. They must be able to operate in
t h e real world in real time w i t h a l l the tradeoffs t h i s
environment imposes. They must also be strategically placed in
the organization in sufficient numbers to do t h e job.
In conclusion, f o r overcoming obstacles in the application of

research to practice in the aviation environment one needs to:
a. Have research products that provide value added.
b. Have processes whereby t h e products can be

introduced,
c, Have skilled persons to introduce t h e products.
To accomplish this:
- 243-AN/146
Circular/Circu Iaire/Uupx~y~~~p A-285
a. Establish a program of research which is balanced in
terms of longer and shorter term research that is
focused by active customer participation and matured
through t h e process of analysis, simulation, and
field validation.
b. Establish via high-level policy the requirement and

. process to consider human factors in all
developments.
c. Establish a cadre of trained human factor specialists

and strategically place them in adequate numbers inin
t h e organization,
I believe from what we have heard at this symposium, the

aviation community is effectively overcoming many of t h e
obstacles found in application of research to practice.
Thank you for your kind attention.

Maior Obstacle
"It must be remembered that there is nothing
more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success,
nor more dangerous to manage, than the creation
of a new system, for the initiator has the enmity
of all who would profit by the preservation of the
old institution and merely luke warm defenders in
II
those who would gain by the new one...
Machiavelli, 1513
Establishing Elements
Balanced programs of research established with
active customer participation.
Policies and rewards to consider Human

Factors products in all developments.
Cadre of trained Human Factors specialists strategically

placed in the organization.
Elements for Successful Transitions
Research products which provide value added.
Processes whereby products can be introduced.
Skilled persons to introduce p.roducts.

Appendii B
EVALUATION OF'THE SYMPOSlUM
The participants, keynote speakers and panel chairpersons were asked to assess the symposium.
The following evaluation reflects their assessment as submjttd to ?he metadat at the end of the
Symposium.
The Second Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium,organized jointly by the United
States Government and ICAO,consti~tedan impadant step in the ICA 0 Flight Safety and HumanFactors
programme.
The Symposium underlined the importance of consolidating the experience and knowledge gained
by States, airlines, and international organizations in the area of Human Factors. The excellent attendance
attests to the need for fume events to update the level of knowledge and most importantly, to share that
knowledge among States and institudons. In this way, the improvement of safety in aviation through
better understanding of Human Factors will become a reality.
Responses through Symposium assessment fonns were received from the majority of the
participants. The assessment questionnaire contained four questions designed to obtain feedback and to
make recommendations for fume Symposia.
In response to the question: What is your overall opinion of the Symposium? 34 percent of
respondents graded it Excellent, 47 percent Very Good, 12 percent Good and 07 percent Appropriate. The
majority of comments received highlighted the need to have similar Symposia at regular intervals. This
can be best sumrnarised through the words of one respondent: '!4s excellent as the papers presenred were,
is the action of bringing the world experts together to shure their eqerience and infownation".
Participation from developing States was felt to be missing. The wish of such representation through
ICAO fellowships in the future was expressed. AH respondents expressed admiration on the top qudity
of the interpretation services.
The second question consisted of three parts. In response to question number 21a): Were there
topics imlevmt to the workprogramme? At1 respondents said that all topics were relevant. In response
to question number 2(b): Were there topics other lhun those presented which should have been included
in the work programme? Respondents included a long list of topics (20 all in all) which they felt should
have been addressed. 65 percent felt that a topic on Human Factors Awareness for Management Personnel
should have been included. In response to quadon number 2(c}: Please rate the relevance of the Leckres
presented to your operatimaWtraining reguirmmts, 70 percent found them to be relevant to their
rquhements while 20 percent Indicated that, though the presentatjons as a whole were relevant, some
presentations seemed to aim at "what we have done"rather than " what we have discovered or achieved.
They said that "additional depth would have bmn appreciated".
The third question asked participants to rate the technical work progrcsmme as a whole. 90pcent
of the respondents agreed that, Overall, the technical work programme was very g a . Quality of
interpretation was rated excellent.
B- 1
? Circular 243-AN//46
Question Number 4 asked the participants: Wkat should be t& tknse of rk next Flight Safety and
Humcua Factors Global Symposium, p h n e d for 19%? In response to this question the majority (75
percent) agreed that the theme of the, next Symposium should address Human Factors and Management.
It was felt that this theme augmented by presentations on "'HumanFactors and International Cooperation"
would go a long way to achieve ICAO Human Factors objectives as declared in all Human Factors
Digests. Other Symposium themes suggested by participants Included: Safety in Complex Systems and
Integration of Human Factors in Airline Operations.
Eighty five percent of respondents recommended that ICAO should continue to organize Regional
Seminars designed to address the partkular requirements of the regions were they are held. Many of the
representatives considered such regional seminars as the preparatory ground for an effective participation
y the developing Slates, in the Global Symposium. Many suggested
by regional experts, ~ i a l l from
that ICAO take steps to assure that the developing States fully participate in fumeregional and global
seminars, to update the knowledge and commiment to Human Factors throughout the industry.
The ICAO initialhe which led to the holding of this Symposium and the four regional seminars
since the first Global Symposium in Leningrad conforms a deep comrmitment to solving the Human
Factors issues which confront the air tranrpott industry. Participants of the Symposium expressed their
appreciation to ICAO for its initiative and conduct of the proceedings and to the United States
Government for its generosity and hospitality in hosting the Symposium.
Appendix C
List OF Participants
Mr, Alejandro L. Camelo

Safety Officer
APLA
360 Palomar .
Buenos Aires
Capt. J, Lerda
Subgerente de instruction
AUSTRAL L.A.
Ambrosetti A29 2/11
1405 Buenos Aires
Dr. Gerarda Canaveris

NATIONAL TNSTITUTE OF AVIATION AND SPACE MEDICINE
Vit-rey Arrendo 2203-3-11
1426 Buenos Aires
Dr, L, Cayetano Gugliotta
Chief of the military and civil office
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF AVIATION AND SPACE MEDTCINE
Dr. Vicente Ciancio

Medical Chief Aviation
SOCLEDAD ARGENTINA DE MEDICINA AEROESPACIAL
Cable Die2 4 1 3
La P l a t a
Capt, Peter Tomkinson

European Technical Representative
AUSTRAUAN FEDERATION OF A I R PILOTS
Altengassweg 2
D614Q Benaheim
Germany
Fax: ( 4 9 ) 6251 3708
C-2 Circular 243-AN/I46
Mr. David Adams

Deputy Director BAS1
BAS1
GPO BOX 967
civic Square
Canhrra ACT 2608
Capt. Tony ~ i l s o n
CREW DYNAMICS
Eerderderg Park Road
Bacchus Marsh 3 3 4 0
Prof. Ross Telfer

Head, Dept. of Aviation
UPJIVERSXTY OF NEWCASTLE
2 0 Macquanee St, Boltan P o i n t
NSW 2283
Dr. Hellfried Aubauer

AUSTRIAN AIRLINES
A-1300 Vienna Airport
Mr. 0 . Kubin
Director ~echnicaland operational Affairs
CAA
Federal Ministry of Public Economy and Transport
Department of Civil Aviation
Vienna, A-1030 Radetzkystrasse 2
T e l : 711-62-00
Fax: 713-03-26
Mr. J. Zahn
Head, Personnel Licsncing
CAA
Mr. W. Kostler
Circular 243-AW46 C-3
BWGLADESH
. Mushtaq
Capt
Chief, Flight Safety
BIMAN BANGLADESH AIRLINES
Biman Flight Operations
Dhaka
BELGIUM
Capt. L. Friob
Captain
AIR BELGIUM
2 6 Rue du Trichon
1457 Walhain
Mr, Guido Wuyts
Inspector Examiner
CAI4
P¶. Serletstreet 7
2610 Antwerp
Mr. Morgan
Director Training
Mr. S . V . Blizzard
chief, civil Av. ~edicalUnit
378 Viewmount Dr.
Nepean, Ont K2E 7P6
. Mr. J. Bertram
Captain
AIR CANADA
23 Thackexay Cr.
- ~arrie,Ontario L4N 6J7
Mr. Norman Dowd
Pilot A i r Canada
CALPA
2872 ~ t e e ~ i e c h a s e
St h z a r e , Quebec JOP 1VO
Capt. Tim Leslie
S t a f f Officer Pilot Training 2
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
Aircommand HQ
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3J OTO
C a p t , Cary Pettinger
Deputy RCA OPS\O
Aircommand HQ
~ i n n i p e g ,~ a n i t o b aR 3 J OTO
Capt, R . C . Chapman
Aircommand HQ
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3J OTO
Mr. Doug ~ e i n
A i r Navigation Colnmissioner
ICAO
1000 Sherbrooke West
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2R2
Canada
V.M. Baile
TRANSPORT CANADA
3813-103 B St
Edmonton, Alberta T63 2x8
Mr. J . A , Pearson
Regional Aviation Safety Officer
TRANSPORT CANADA
13 Sable Cres
St A l b e r t , Alberta T8N OH2
H. Leech
Director, Aviation Safety
TRANSPORT CANADA
Place da Ville, Tower C
O t t a w a , KIA OM8
A, Sherif
Manager Aviation Safety
TRANSPORT CANADA
22 ~ l m b n dLane
Kanata, Ontario K2C 3T3
Circuhr 243-ANA46 C-5
J, Lauzon
TRANSPORT CANADA
D, Malette
Inspector
TRANSPORT CANADA
D. Thornton
Aviation Safety officer
TRANSPORT CANADA
TRANSPORT CANADA
1-65 West Gate
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 2C9
TRANSPOW CANADA
603-120 Donald St
Winnipeg, ~ a n i t o b a
D, Nowzek
Regional Director
TRANSPORT CANADA
6 3 0 5 , 4 5 Ave
Delta, British columbia V4K 4T5
Mr. N. Leblanc
Aviation System Safety Officer
TRANSPORT CANADA
Mr. pierre Senay

TRANSPORT CANADA
Insp. J . H . King
Civil Aviation Inspector
TRANSPORT CANADA
Centennial Towers
260 Kent St.
O t t a w a , Ontario KIA ON8
C-6. Circular 243-AN/146
Insp* Arlo Speer
Inspector
TRANSPORT CANADA
2 0 0 Kent St.
Ottawa, Ontario KIA ON2
Mu, James P. Stewart
Director General, System Safety
TRANSPORT CANADA
360 Laurier A y e . W
O t t a w a , Ontario
Mr, Walter Peters

Director Analysis & Research System Safety
TRANSPORT CANADA
1284 Turner Crescent
Orleans, Ontario KIE 2Y4
Mr, Ray Rohr
T W S P O R T CANADA
lk, Don spxuaton

TRANSPORT CANADA
Dr. S . V , Vernon
Chief Civil Aviation ~ e d i c a lUnit
TRANSPORT CANADA
Mr. H. Wiltzen
Superintendent of Standards
TRANSPORT CANADA
11116-298 Edmonton
Alberta, T6J 3 Y 9
Mr. A . J . Humphrey
Regulatory Compliance Inspector
TRANSPORT W A D A
11 Perperrall Crk
Nepean, Ontario K2J 3W7
Mr, J.H. Scott
Chief Aviation Training
TRANSPORT CANADA
2 0 0 Kent St.
Ottawa, bntario KIA ON8
Circular 243-AN1146 C-7
Mr. G. Takahashi
TRANSPORT CANADA
4 0 Wall Ford Way
Nepean, Ontario K2E 6B6
Mr. Peter Harle
Director, a c c i d e n t prevention
TSB
PO Box 9120
A l t a V i s t a Terminal
O t t a w a , Ontario K1G 3T8
Fax: (819) 997-2239
Mr. J, Maxwell
chief Standards & A u d i t
TSB
81 Spruce St.
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 6N8
-
CEC
Mr, P , C . Cacciabue
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE
CEC -
IRC
21090 Ispra (VA)
Italy
M, Pedrali
JOIPDT RESEBRCH CENTRE

Plazza Trieste 3
20069 Vapria DaAdda, Milano
Italy
CHILE
Mr. Oscar Mella

Chief, department of Flight Safety
DGCA
Miguel Claro 1 3 1 4
Providencia ST60
17-8 Circular 243-AN/I46
Mr. Beyle ~ o j a s
Cantrovador de Transito Aereo
DGCA
Mr. Ezaley Georges

Sous-Directeur de la navigation et des opgrations aQriennes
ANAM
1 5 BP 990
Abidjan
Ms. Gnassou Kachia Irene
C h e f du dgpartement des etudes et des statisques
ANm
Dr. Kacou Xavier Francois

Medecin chef, m6decine aeronautique
rnAM
Flemming Kirkegaard
chairman, Human Factors Committee
C M
Box 7 4 4 , 60 Ellebjergvej
DK-2450 Copenhagen SV
Tel: 4 5 36 44 48 4 8
Fax': 4 5 3 6 44 03 03
Joergen T e m e h l e n
viat ti on Psychologist
CIlA
Anders Jensen
Member Danish HF corm.
CAA
Dan Eriksen
Chief Parsonnel Licensing
CAA
Circular 243-AM46 C-P
Per Hanson
Principal, Danish ATS Academy
CM, ATS ACADEMY
Blok 2 , Kastrup Airport
DK 2 7 7 0 Kastrup
Mr. Flemming Jeppsson
Captain
SAS
5A Vindelbro
DK 4180 Sori
J.A. Gordon
Sub Director
DAC
Quito
Hrs P . D . Campbell
Secretary Trustee
EUROPEAN GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY FOUNDATION
Hatherlow Merrow Common Road
Guildford Surrey
A.V.M. ~ l 0i . Zik?
Chairman of the gypt ti an CAR
CAA
Eng. Nagwa El-Aasar

Representative of Egypt on t h e Council of ICAO
ICAO
Montreal, Quebec W3A 2R2
Canada
C o l A.G. Hanna
Chief, Flight Operatioris Division
CAA
PO Box 978
Add25 Ababa
Tel: 01-61 02 77
Fax: ( 2 5 1 ) 1-612533
FRANCE
Mr. Eddy L. Racca
Senior director general research
AEROFORMATION
6 Rue du chateau d'eau
31700 Blagnac
Mr, P. A l b a
Chef: du bureau di4tudes Oparatians
AEROPOSTALE
6oci&t& dkxpploitatian ABsapostale
15 Rue du Haut de L a V a l
Zone de F r e t 7
BP 10454
95708 Roissy CDG Cedsx
Mr. B. De Halglaive
Siesponsable du service Niveau ~rafessionnel
AIR F W C E
~irectiandaa operations ~ ~ r i a n n e s
BP 10201 F-95703
Charles de Gaulle cedex
Hme M.C. Dentan
Assistante du Directeur des opirations adwiennes
A I R FRANCE
Direction des ~pgrations~ B r i a n n e s
BP 10201 F-95703
Charles de Gaulle Ceaex
Hx, Guy Magnol
officier de s0curit0 des vols
AIR INTER
DEW
1 Rve. Mareha1 lhvaux
91551 Paray V i e i l l e Paste: Cedex
Circular 243-AN/146 C-I1
Mr. 3-I?. Ridet
Chief flight FlOO
AIR SITTOML
Aerodrome ~ontpellisrFrejorguee
34000 Montpellier
Mr. Jean ?arias

Deputy chief
BEA
2 4 6 Rue Lecourbe
7 5 7 3 2 Paris Csdex I5
Mr. 3 , F . Douche
Lawyer
CABINET GARNAULT
26 - 28 Rue du clos dtOrleans
94120 Fontenay sous Bois'
Dr. Ren& Amalber-ki
Deputy-Head of Aerospace Ergonomics Department
C m m
11 Bvd H o t e l de V i l l e
93600 Aulnay
Mr. A l i x Sery
Chef, D i v i s i o n travail Emploi
DGAC
2 4 6 Rue Lecourbe.
75014 Paris
Mr. Didier Dufour

Chef de la Division Circulation Aerienne
DGAC - DNA
Direction de la navigation aerienns
143 Rue Blornet
75015 Paris
Fax: 1 48 5 6 02 9 0
Mrs. Caroline Horicot
Chercheur
IRIS -
CNRS
27 R u e Damesme
75013 Paris
Tel: 1 4 5 8 9 56 19
Mr, Bruno Debiesse
Formation -
Facteurs Humairis
SFACT
Division des Personnels Abronautiques
2 4 6 Rue Lecourbe
75015 Paris
Tel: 1 4 0 4 3 4 6 4 2
C-12 Circular 2.13-ANfi46
Mile Florence Wibaux

Ingdnieur
SFACT
- Facteurs Humains
Division Exploitation
2 4 6 R u e Lecourbe
75015 Paris
Tel: 1 4 0 4 3 45 14
Mr. P. Sainson
Directsur des opgrations aerfennes
TAT EUROPEkU A I R L I N E S
BP 0237
37002 Tours Cedex
Mr. H. Pochat
Adjoint Chef Division, Responsable formation
TAT EXJROPEM-4 AIRLINES
Mr. W, Roth
Head of clinical Psychology Branch
ALRFORCE INSTITUTE OF AVIATfON MEDECINE
Mr. A. Losansky
Deputy Head of Lfcencing Dept.
DER BUNDESMINXSTER FUR VERKEHR
PO Box 2 0 0 100
D-5300 Bonn 2
Capt,. Hans Joachim John

Manager, Dept. Flight Crew Training
LUFTHANSA
Bereichsleitung
Training ~liegendesPersona1,FRA OF
Lufthansa Basis
6 0 0 0 Frankfurt Flughafen
Tel: 0049 696 5739
Fax: 0049 696 5949
Circular 243-AW46 C-13
GHANA
Mr. B. Asare Buotu

.
A g Director
CAA
light‘ Safety
PMB, KIA
Accra
Mr. E.F. Akohene

Flight Operations Manager
CRA
Kotoka f n t . Airport
Accra
Capt. Powis Spencer
Director, Flight Operations
GHANA AIRWAYS
Box 1636
Accra, Ghana
HONG KONG
Mr, K e n Patton
Assistant Flying Training Manager
CATHAY PACIFIC
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd
Concorde Road
Hang Kong International Airport
Kowloon, Hong Kong
Mr. B.G. Crayson
Fliqht Safety Manager
CATHAY PACIFIC
IAOPA
Mr. Ronald D. Campbell
Technical co-ordinator for Europe Region
IAOPA
Hatherlow Merrow Common Rd
Guilford Surrey, England
C-14 Circular 243-AM46
IATA
Capt. T. Gwanaas
IATA
2000 Peel Street
Montreal
Capt. Gunnar K. Fahkgren
Human Factors consultant
IATA
Mr. G. Matthiassom
Representative of Iceland to ICAO Council
ICAO
C a p t H a t t i Sorsa
Member HUPER Committee
FINNAIR
Kertojantie 17B
00730 H e l s i n k i
Finland
Capt, Hans Sypkens
Chairman, HUPER committee
KLM
IFATCA
Mr. Bert Ruitenberg
Executive Board Member
IFATCA
Valkenburgerlaan 3 0
2771 DA Boskoop
Capt. S . H . Datt
Deputy Director of A i r Safety
AIR INDIA
Bombay Airport
Santacruz East
S~mbay400029
Mr. V.R. Chandna
Director A i r Safa t y
DGCA
Mr. P.S. Maity ,

Senior Technical Officer
INDIAN AIRLINES
P-13, Block-E
Lake T a w , Calcutta
T O O 089 India
Capt. Neil Johnston

Captain, Training Development
AER EIHGWS
133 Georgian Village
Castleknock, Dublin 15
JAPAN
Capt. Akira Haene'

Deputy Director Safety Promotion Cam.
ALL NIPPPON AIRWAYS
Capt. Masatosi Kiuchi
ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS
Capt. Rensuke Iwase

Deputy VP ~ n g i n e e r i n g , Research & Project
JAPKN AIR LINES
5-2-13 ~akaishi,Asao-Ku
Kawasaki C i t y , Kanagawa P r e f
C-16 Circular 243-AN/l#6
Capt. Takuroo Tanaka
Director Engineering
JAPAN AIR LINES
6-10-15 Higashi Hatsutomi
Kamagaya-Shi 273-01
Capt, Yasuo Kobayashi
Captain DC9
JAPAN AIR SYSTEM
2-15-1-304 Tamami, Aso-Ku
Kawasaki-Shi , Kanawaga
Mr. Katsumi Suzuki
~ssistantManager light Ops.
JAPAM AIR SYSTEX
2002-15-403 Futoo-cho Kohoku-KU
Yokohama City, 2 2 2 Kanagawa Pre
KOREA
Mr. Hyun-Chul Kang

senior Researcher
CAA
Prof. Soon-kil Hong

Chairman, Department of aviation administration
HANKUK AVIATION IINIVERSITY
Banpo A p t 62-308, Seo Cho-Ku
Seoul
Mr. Peter Shin

Traf E i c Manager
KOREAN A I R
43-40, 171 St
Flushing, NY 11358
USA
Mr. Chun-Yong Son

Flight officer
KOREAN AIR
Circular 243-AN/146 C-17
Mr. Dong-Sool Cho

Assistant General Manager
KOREAN AIR
Flight Crew raining Center
Jung Suk Bldg., Jung Gu
Inchon
LEBANON
Mr. Tony El-Helou
Chief Airworthiness service
DGCA
Fum El Chebback, Street General
Beirut "
Mr. Ali Halawi

Chief Aviation S a f e t y
DGCA
Zantout Bldg
Riad SoLh Street
Saida
Capt. Naji H. Absi

Chief pilot A 3 1 0
MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES
PO Box 341
1280 Versoix {GE)
~witzerland
MEXICO
Capt. E.P. de Leon Sala

COLEGIO DE PILOTOS DE MEXICO
Palomas 110 Mexico
MOROCCO
Capt. 6,Abderrahmane
Charg6 de securitb
ROYAL AIR MAROC
Direction PN
Royal Air Maroc
Casablanca
NETHERLANDS
Mr. T. C . Van Gelder
Director
AEROSPACE MEDICAL CENTRE
Mrl J. Meyer
Mr- A. Mengelberg-Thissen
Lawyer
CAA
Pr. Hendriklaan 54
1862 El Bengen
' Ms. Patricia Antersijn
J.M. Vansliedgrast
Mr. Andre Droog

Psychologist
K M FLIGHT ACADEMY
Mr. Peter Jorna

Head,, Human Factors Group
NATIONAL AEROSPACE LABORATORY
NLR
PO Box 90502
1006 BH Amsterdam
Tel: 32-20-5113638
Fax: 31-20-5113210
Capt. Han ~uchsinger
CRM Project Leader
TRWSAVZA
Bartokhan 3 4
2 2 5 3 Cx Voorsckoten
Mr. A. Bichelaer
Pilot
TRANSAVIA
Larixplants 2 2
1702 XH Heerhujoweerd
Capt. P. Kerr
Technical specialist PL
CAA
161 Knights Rd.
Lower H u t t
Prof. G.J. Hunt
Head of School
MASSEY WfVERSXTY
l 8 C Montgomery Tce
Palmerston North
Mr, Bjarne Hattestad

Director Flight Standards NCAA
Ci4A.
Skogjvingen 5
1324 Lysaker
Mr. Frods Mo
Director, System Planning Division
C M
PO Box 8124 DEP
N-0032 O s l o
Mr. 0 . Mydland
A i r Navigation Commissioner
ICAO
1000 Sherbrooka West
C-20 Circular 243-AN/146
PANAMA
Mr. Ernesto Ponce
Director A i r Safety
DGAC
Apartado 7501/7615
Zona 5 Panama
Dr. 0.1, Bogado Fleitas

Chief, A i r Accident Investi$ation
DGAC
Saturio Rios No 8 5 3 e n t r e Florida y Molinas
Ciudad de Fernando de la ~ o r a
Mr. E . R . Gostomelsky
Gerente de OPS y L i c .
DGAC
Oleary 1292
-
PHILIPPINES
Hr. Joey PII. Anca Jr.
Manager, Human Factors
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
Flight Operations Department
N i c h o l s Field
Pajay City
Mr. Rolando Luna
Flight Operations Safety Officer
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
Capt Dwight Galsim

8 7 4 7 Capt,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
Mr, Jerzy Lacki
CAA
Capt. Waldemar Koziel

Captain
LOT POLISH AIRLINES
Wyrobka 11-17
8 0 - 2 8 8 Gdansk
PORTUGAL
Capt J . C . Pastor
Director Accident Investigation Bureau
DGAC
Rua B, Lisbon Airport
1700 Lisboa
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Dr. N.A. Stolyarov
Director of the Ergonomical Department
Dr. E . L . Kan
Chief of Science Lab
197 3 4 2 , St Pstersburg
Lanskoye shosse, G
Tel: 242-0114
Dr. G.A. Meerovich
Chief, Lab Simulation Device
Uralskaja 3-36
Moscow
Mr. G.N. Zaitsev
Deputy Director, A i r Transport Department
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT
Mr. Y.P. Tarshin
Head, Flight Operations Division, A i r Transport Department
Mr. A.V, Nemchinov

Deputy Executive Secretary
Capt. Fahad Assaid

PCA Inspector
CAA
Jeddah 21231
Capt. A.A. Abuznada
Flight Training Manager- L1011
SAUDIA
Jeddah 21231
Mr. Ong Yew Leng

Head, school of AT5
SINGAPORE AVIATION ACADEMY
1 Aviation Drive
Singapore 1789
SPAIN
Mr. Josd M. Mejia
A i r Traffic Controller and Clinical Psychologist
DGAC
Centro de Control de Transito Aereo
Palma de Mallorca
Fax: 34 71 452367
Capt. Oscar Elizalde
Head, HF and CRM
IBERIA
-
A z a l e a , 290 Soto Moraleja
28109 Alcobendal, Hadrid
Circular 243-AN/l46 C-23
SWEDEN
Kristina Pollack
Chief Psycholagist
BOARD OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PO Box 1 2 5 38
S-102 2 9 Stockholm
T e l : 4 6 8 737 5840
Fax: 4 6 8 7 3 7 5 8 5 2
Ulf Winslow
Deputy Director, Flight Safety Department
CAA
Swedish CAA
Norrkoping
Kaj Skarstrand
Head of viat ti on raining and ~icensingSection
CAA
Same as above
Prof. Krister Germer
senior Lecturer
STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
Morrbackgatan 4 1
11341 Stockholm
SWITZERLAND
Mr. Jean Rodolph Willi
chief, Division of Flight Services
FOCA
OFAC
3003 Berne
Dr* Hans Hafner
Chief Medical Executive
FOCA
Capt. Beat ~alsiger

chief, section of Flight Operations
FOCA
Hofacker 10
8311 Brutten
Dr. Urs Glaus
A v i a t i o n Medica 1 Examiner
FOCA
CH-1041, St Barthelemy '
Mr. F. Frochaux
Air Navigation Commission Member
ICAO
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2112
Capt. T i m Crowch
MD80 Captain
SWISSAIR
Hinderlomstrasse 5
8453 Ahten
Dr. Beat Schar

- Head of Plight Crew Recruiting and Training
SWISSAIR
CH-3286 Muntelier
.
Capt Dieter Schlund
Head of Cockpit Crews, chief p i l o t
SWISSAIR
Swissair QC
CH-8058 Zurich
Martin Wyler
assistant head cockpit crew
SWISSAIR
Mr. Sukit Klinhom

Controller
AERONAUTICAL RADIO OF THAILAND LTD
102 Ngamduplee
Yanaw Dist, Bangkok 10120
Tel: 5315990
Mr. Sanguan Luxaman
Controller
AERONAUTICAL RADIO OF THAILAND LTD
102 Ngamduplee
Yanaw Pist., Bangkok 10120
UKRAINE
Dr. P . V . Nazarenko
Head of Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation ~ n g i n e ' e r s
Dr. M,F. Davidenka

Head of flight safety department, Kiev institute
UNITED KINGDOM
Hr. John G.R. Hindley
Consultant publisher
ASHGATE
A us bridge Copse Farm, ~ y d e s t le
i
~odaltting,Surrey GU8 4DH
Capt. Jeremy Butler
captain, BA Consultant to IATA
BRITISH AIRWAYS
Room B305
TBA (S341)
PO Box 10
Haathrow Airport
Hounslow, ~iddlessexTW6 2JA
Capt. D. Rowlands
Flight Manager, Concorde
BRITISH AIRWAYS
Dr. Rory Barnes

Senior Medical O f f icew
CAA
viat ti on House, Gatwick ~ i r p o r t
W, Sussex RH6 04R
Mr. Dick Whidborne

principal inspector of a i r accidents
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
AAIB DRA Farnberough
Hants, GUl46TD
Mrs. P.D. Campbell
Secretary Trustee
EGASF
Mr. David Lawson

Director
ITL
13 Stephenson Road, St ives, Huntingdor
Cambe PE17 4WJ
-
USA
Kr. Fred F. Crenshaw

viat ti on Consultant
4303 Offut Dr.
suitland, Maryland 20746
Mr. R. Rivera Pamales
captain
8507 Heather Dr. N.
~acksonville,FL 32251
Mr. T. Duke
captain
560 NST SW, #212
Washington DC, 2 0 0 2 4
klr. S. Monroe
Associate Professor
118 Rhode Island Ave.
Payshore, NY 11706
Mr. Rich Adams
V i c e president
ADVANCED AVIATION CONCEPTS
1 0 3 5 6 Sandy Run Rd.
Jupiter, FL 3 3 4 7 8
Russell 3 . Rapan
AEROSPACE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
8710 Linton Lane
Alexandria, VA 22308
Capt. Ron Durie
C h i e f , AIM Facilitator
AIRBUS SERVICE CO.
3 9 4 2 Adpa A v e .
Miami, FL 33178
Capt. John Cox
Captain
ALPA
4463 -
34th Street South
St Petewsburg, FL 33711 - VSA
William W, Edmunds Jr.
ALPA
2 9 5 1 Bfook M i l l CT
Berndon, VA 22071
Tom H a l e
ALPA
1107 Ternfield Rd
Towson, MD 21286
Dr. Beth Lyall
Manager HF Research
AMERICA WEST AIRLINES
5617 C S. Clambake Bay Ct.
Tempe, AZ 8 5 2 8 3
Mr. Tony Hodges
ARINC RESEARCH CO
1011 Shore Dr.
Edgewatter, MD 21037
W i l l i a m W. Russell
Director, Flight Technical
ATA
s u i t e 1100
1301 Pennsylvania Awe NW
Washington DC, 20004-1707
Mr. J i m Baumgarner
Senior Editor
AVIATION DAILY
Suite 2 0 0 , 1200 G St. NW
Washington DC, 20005
C-28 Circular 243-AN1146
Dr. Barry H. ~antowitz

Senior s t a f f research scientist
BATTELLE RESEARCH CENTF;R
4 0 0 0 HE, 4 1 St
Seattle, WA 98105
Mr, John L e e
Research Scientist
BATTELLE RESEARCH CENTER
4 0 0 0 NE, 41st ST
S e a t t l e , WA 98105
Mr. M. Mc Callurn
Research scientist
BATTELLE RESEARCH CENTER
4 0 0 0 NE, 41st ST
S e a t t l e , WA 98105
A l a n D. White
Research scientist
3x0 TECHNOLOGY
4 0 5 N, Washington St.
Suite 203
Falls Church, VA 2 2 0 4 6
Tel: (703) 534-8200
Fax: (703) 5 3 4 - 2 3 5 1
Ms. Diane C h r istensen
810 TECHNOLOGY
Dr. James F. Parker

BIO TECHNOLOGY
Curtis Graeber
Manager, Flight Deck Research
BOEING
6715, 134th CT. NE
Redmond, WA 98052
Capt. william C . Roberson
Senior Instructor Pilot
BOEING
Box 3 7 0 7
Seattle, WA
Capt. C . L . Ekstrand
Director, flight training
BOEING
26059 Marine View D~.s.
Kent, WA 98032
Mr. Mark Busch
Senior System Safety Engineer
BOEING, DEFENSE & SPACE GROUP
11703 30th St NE
Lake Stevens, WA 9 8 2 5 8
Mrs. Sarah Booth
Lawyer
BOOTH, WADE & CAMPBELL
Cumberland Center 11
3100 Cumberland Circle, suite 1500
Atlanta, GA 30339-5939
Dr. M. Mouloua
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON DC
2726 Connecticut Ave UW, # 103
Washington DC
ns. ~ a t r i c i aMay
Student
4121 Postgate Terrace 6 3 0 4
Silver Spring, MD 20906
Dr. Parasuraman
Professor of Psychology
Pept. of Psychology
Catholic University
Hr. Brian Hilburn
Research Assistant
3616 N. Zlst Ave
~ x r l i n g t o n , VA 2 2 2 0 7
Mr. R o b Benson
Senior Director Training & Methods
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
4375 Wright Road
Houston, TX 7 7 0 3 2
Mr. Russell Peck
Director Human Factors
COWINEPSTAL AXRLIHES
17441 SFK Blvd
Mr. P. Wright
President
DEFENSE
238 N Payne St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
Ms Kimberly Bowen
DOT
4 0 0 7th St.SW
Mr. Robert Martin

DOT
PO Box 96090
Washington Dc, 20090
Dr. Robert Simon

Staff s c i e n t i s t
DYNAMICS RESEARCH CORP
60 Concord Street
Wilmington, HA 01887
Mr. Lanny J. Ryan
Exec VP
EXBRY-RIDDLE UNIVERSITY
6 0 0 S, Clyde Morris Blvd.
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900
Tel r (904) 226-7037
Fax: ( 9 0 4 1 226-6459
Dr. Bob Blanchard

Manager, Human Factors Lab
Flm
Oklahoma city, OK 73125
Dr. Eleana Edens
FAA
FAA Address:
8 0 0 Independence Ave, SW
Circular 243-AN/146 C-3J
Brooks Goldman
Glenn Hewitt . -
Scientific and Technical Advisor 'for ~ G a nFactors
FAA
Thomas Hilton
Manager, Training and Org. research Lab
FAA
FAA Civil Aeronautical Institute
Oklahoma city, OK 73120
Peter V. Hwoschinsky .
Vertical Flight Programe Manager
FAA
ARD-30, # 8 3 6 6
8 0 0 fndependance Ave. SW
Washington DC 20591
~hyllisKayten
FAA
J i m C . Savage
International Liaison Officer
FAA
Brussels, Belgium
David Schroeder
FAA
Dr. Douglas C , Taylor

Human Factors Psychologist
FAA
Towe Titlow
Program Analyst
FJM
G32 Circular 243-AN1146
Michael T. Vachon
Program Analyst
FAA
Office of Aviation Medicine
Washington DC
Mr. James Witeck
FAA
Dr. William T. Shepherd

Manager, Biomedical and Behavioural Sciences Branch;
Flm
W-240, 8 0 0 Independence Ave. .SW
Ms Jean Watson
FAA
Dr. Tom M c C l o y
Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors
FAA
Dr. Mark Kofmann

Chief Scientific
FAA
Mr. T.R. Proven

-Safety Inspector
F M *
Mrs. Fredarica Dunn
Mr. John Zalenchack

Research Psychologist
FAA
Circular 243-AN/146 C-33
Mr. R. Jones
Coordinator
Flm
Mr. J, Lynett
FAA
Mr. A. Smith
Psychologist
FAA
813 Spring Kwoll Dr.
Herndarn, VA 2 2 0 7 0
~ r .w,n. Russell
Mr. Tom Koesiaras

Program Analyst
FAR
1101 Fallsraead Way
Rockville, MD 20854
Mr. E r i c Ooten
Vice President ERAY
FAA
Office of Accident ~nvestigation
FAA HQ, Washington DC
Mr. M. Lenz
Program analyst
F M
D.L. Scott
Special Project Officer
FAA
Mrs. Monica Grusche

Program Analyst
FAA
Mr. J . H . Enders
Vice chairman
FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION
2 2 0 0 Wilson Blvd, # 5 0 0
Arlington, VA 22201
Mr. Douglas Schwartz
Director of Flight Standards
FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL
7 5 2 5 Fauna St,
Mr. P, Mc Sweeney
Manager Regional A i r l i n e s
FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL
130 S Mourning Pawe Dr.
Fayetteville, GA 30214
Charles Layton
GALAXY SCIENTIFIC CORP.
2310 Parklake Drive
Suite 300
Atlanta, Georgia 3 0 3 4 5
Fax: ( 4 0 4 ) 2 7 0 2 8 5 6
Ms, Suzanne Morgan
GAWLXY SCIEMTIFIC CORP.
Mr. James Yoh

President
Dr, William Johnson

Vice-President, information division
GALAXY SCIENTIFIC C O W .
Mr. Kent Zones

Mr. J i m Mateski
H U M FACTORS SOLUTIONS
4 6 1 7 Gemstone Terrace
Rackville, MP 2 0 8 5 2
Circular 243-Arlr/146 C-35
Mr. D.M. Newman

Representative on Council
ICAO
Canada
Mr, R.D- Cook
A i r ~avigationCommission Member
ICAO
Capt. James McIntyre

Chairman HF Working Group
ISASI
4 9 South Road
Deer Field, NH 03037-1713
Tel t Fax: ( 6 0 3 ) 463-8804 in N e w Jersey
Tel: (703) 430-9668 in Washington, ISASI HQ
(703) 450-0265
Mr. H . S . Monroe
ASS, Prof. college of Aeronautics
ISASI
Mr. Rudy Ruana

Director Washington Office
JEPPESEN
1725 K St NW, S u i t e 1107
Mr. J. Jenkins
Program Manager
NASA
7729 Harlen St, .
Annandale, VA
Ms S. Chappell
principal scientist
NASA AMES
NASA 262-1
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
Dr. Barbara Kanki
Research scientist
NASA AMES
Mr. W . O t t l e y
Consultant
NATIONAL AESONAUTIC RSSN,
2627 Woodley Place
Mr. B i l l Stine
Liaison
NBAA
1200, 18th St NW
Washington DC, 20036-2598
Dr. H. Clay Foushee
NORTHWEST AIRLINES
Northwest Airlines (N7200)
5201 Northwest Dr.
St Paul, MM 55111
Mr. John 2%; Brown

Manager CRIY program
NORTHWEST AIRLXNES
3101 Country Wocd Dr
~urnsville,MN 5 5 3 3 7
Mr. James W. Danaher
Chief, O p s Factors & Human Perf.
NTSB
490 L'Enfant Plazza East, SW
Barry Strauch
Chief, Human Performance Division
PPTSB
490 LaEnfant Plazza East, SW
Dr. Malcolm Brenner
human performance investigator
NTSB
4 9 0 LtEnfant Plazza E a s t , SW
Mr, Benjamin Berman
Transportation Safety Specialist
NTSB
4 9 0 Lqenfant Plazza East SW
Washington DC 20594
Circular 243-AM1146 C-37
Dr. Sehchang Hah
NTSB
4 9 0 L'enfant Plazza East, SW
David L. Hayer
NTSB
4 9 0 Laenfant P l a z z a E a s t , SW
Steven Predmore
NTSB
4 9 0 L'enfant P l a z a East, SW
Mr. Fred Hyman
Accident Investigator
NTSB
4 9 0 LIEnfant Plazza East, SW
Mr. Richard Jensen
Professor
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Aviation
Box 3022
Columbus, OH 43210-0022
C a p t , H. Orlady
Human Factors consultant
O R W Y ASSOCIATES
16188 Escobar Ave.
LOS Gatos, California
Mrs. Margaret Shaffer
President
PARADIGM 3NC
8815 Quiet Stream CT
Potomac, MD 20854
Mr. R . T * Heinzer
Director.training standards
SfEIUFLITE
2812 S u m i t Ridge
s rape vine, TX 76051
C-38 Circular 243-AM45
Mr. D . J . Sullivan
Vice President
GUMAVIA
PO Box 2 8 7 7
Evergreen, Colorado 80430
Tel: ( 3 0 3 ) 792-5238
Fax: ( 3 0 3 ) 649-9558
Mr. Gary Simpson
Senior system engineer
SYSTEMS CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
1611 N. Kent St. Suite 910
Arlington, VA 22209
Ms. Linda La Belle
System Engineer
SYSTEMS CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
1611 N. Kent St. Suite 910
Arlington, VA 2 2 2 0 9
Burton P. Chesterfield
Manager, Aviation Safety Division
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INSTITUTE
6 5 0 0 S Macarthur Blvd,
PO Box 2 5 0 8 2
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5050
Fax: (405) 954-3521
Lisa A. Eagleson
Engineer in Training
John V. Bures
A i r Safety Investigator / Instructor
TRAITSPORTATION SAFETY INSTXTUTE
Eleanor B. Gavesky
Aviation Training Specialist
Marilyn 3;. Ingram

Program assistant
Circular 243-AN/Id6 C-39
Mr. Cal Hutchings
Manager CLR P r o g r a m
UNITED AIRLINES
United Airlines Fli.ght Center
Stapletan Airport
Denver, CO 8 0 2 0 7
Linda Orlady
C J Z / R Manager
UNITED AIRLINES
7974 W. 108th Ave.
roomf field, CO 80021
L . P . Piaher
Pilot
UNITED AIRLINES
182 Cypress Place
~ausalita,CA 94965
UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO
3 4 2 Bell Hall
University of Buffalo
Buffalo, NY 14260
Dr. T. Bennett
Program Manager
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
1231 shoreline Dr.
San Mateo, CA 9 4 4 0 0
Prof, E a r l Wiener
Professor of Management science
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMZ
1736 oak Creek Dr, $407
Palo A l t o , CA 9 4 3 6 4
Mr. Peter Hancack

Director HFRL
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Dr. Najim Heshkati

Associate Executive Director
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
ISSM, University of Southern California
Loa Angeles, CA 90084-0021
C-40 Circular 243-AW146
, .
Mr. J . R . ~apia-Videla
Senior Evaluator
US GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Richard Yeatter
Director
USAIR
Greater Pittsburgh Int. Airport
Pittsburgh, PA 15231
Tel: (412) 747-3598
Fax: (412) 747-3479
Mr. J , N . Komich
CRM program developer
USAIR
5 5 MiddleburyLane
Beverley, MA 01915-1359 .
Mr. D. Love
USAIR
Greater Pittsburgh Airport
Pittsburgh, PA 15231
Tel: (412) 747-3598
Fax: (412) 747-3479
Mr. R.B. Barnes
Director
WORLD AUXILIARY POWER COMPANY
8711 E. Pinnacle Peak Road 8337
Scottsdale, AZ 8 5 2 5 5
- END -
ZCAO TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS
The fuiiowirrg summory gives the sfotus, and also regarded as not yet having attained a sufficient degree
describes in general terms the contents of the various of maturity for adoption as International Standards and
series of technical publications issued by fhe Infer- Recommended Practices, as well as material of a more
national Civil A viation Organizufion, It does not permanent character which is considered too detailed
include specioiized pubIicutions that do not full specifi- for incorporation in an Annex, or is susceptible to
cally within one of the series, such us the Aeronautical frequent amendment, for which the processes of the
Chart Catalogue or the Meteorological Tables for Convention would be too cumbersome.
International Air Navigation.
Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS) have a
Internatbnpl Standards and Recommended Prrc- status sirnilat to that of PANS in that-they are approved
tices are adopted bj, the Council in accordance with by the Council, but only for application in the respective
Articles 54, 37 and 90 o f the Convention on Inter- regions. They are prepared in consolidated form, since
national Civil Aviation , and are designated, for certain of the procedures apply to overlapptng regions
convenience, as Annexes to the Convention. The or are common to two or more regions.
uniform application by Contracting States of the speci-
fications contained in the International Standards is
recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of
international air navigation-while the uniform appli- Thefollowing publications are prepared by authority
cation o f the specifications in the Recommended of the Secretary General in occurdanee wifk the
Practices is regarded as desirable in the interest of principles and poIici@supproved by the Council.
safety, regularity or efficiency of international air
navigation. Knowkdge of any differences between the Technical Mammals provide guidance and infor-
national regulations or practices OF a State and those mation in amplification of the International Standards,
established by an tnternational Standard is essential to Recommended Practices and PANS, the implemen-
the safety or regularity of international air navigation. tation OF which they are designed to facilitate.
In the event of non-compliance with an International
Standard, a State has, in fact, an obligation, under Air Navigation Plans detail requirements for facili-
ArticIe 38 of the Convention, to notify the Council of ties and services for international air navigation in the
any differences. Knowledge of differences from respective ICAO Air Navigation Regions. They are
Recommended Practices may also be important for the prepared on the authority oC the Secretary General on
safety of air navigation and, although the Convention the basis of recommendations of regional air navigation
does not impose any obligation with regard thereto, the meetings and of the Council action thereon. The plans
bb
Council has invited Contracting States to notify such are amended periodically to reflect changes in require-
differences in addition to those relating to International ments and in the status of implementation of the
Standards. recommended facilities and services.
Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) are ICAO Circul~rsmake available specialized infor-
approved by the Council for world-wide application. mation of interest to Contracting Stares. This includes
They contain, for the most part, operating procedures studies on technical subjects.
Order Nu. CIR243
Printed in ICAO

243 en PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

243 en PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

243 en PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ICAO

HUMAN FACTORS DIGEST

Approved by the Secretary General

Documeni Sales Unit

The Catalogue of ICAO Publications

. Monthly supplemenfs announce new publicationsand audio visual

Available free from the Document Sales Unit, ICAO

Address by Dr. Pldlippe Rochat, Secretary General bf ICAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE HUMAN FACTORS REVOLU7TON: hfEANlNCFUL C W G E OR TEMPORARY TNFA~WA~UN?

LES DEFIS DES M S PROCHAUVES M N E E S

I. Developing Human Factors Knowledge

11. Developing Human Factors Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :. . . . . . . . . . . . 45

III. Human Factors Training for ~utorn&ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

I. Developing Human Factors Knowledge

Human Factors Training for Operational Personnel

Human Factors in Learning and Instruction

Human Perfomumce Limitations Requirements - The United Kingdom

Human Factors Knowledge Requirements for Flight Crews

Implementation of Human Factors Knowledge Requirements

Human Factors in General Aviation

New Aviation Professionalism: Knowledge Systems that

Some Aspects on Our Human Factors Concept

Training Humans for an Automated ATC Environment

Transavia's Integrated Approach to Human Factors Training

Training of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Training the Investigator

H m Factors Topics in Canadian Private Pilot Training

H m n Aspects Development (HAD) - me Swissair Trainirig Syllabus

CRM: Feedback and Appraisal System

AIM, Aircre w Integrated Management: A Manufacturer's

Humcan Fuctors and Training lssues in CFlT

Enhancing the impact of Human Factors Training

111. Human Factors Training for Automatiofi

Lre in the Second Deccmde of tlie Glass Cockpit

Fundamental Engineering Training of Flight Personnel as a

The Other Side of Automation - A Challenge for Pilot Training

Training for Computer Assisted Flying (CAF)

Improving the Process of the Selection and Training of

Pilot's Strategies of Crew Communication in Advanced

Computer-based Approaches for Enhancing Human Pe@ormance

Instructional Qualities of a Simulator and Human Factors

Taxonomy and Models for Human Factors Analysis of

Overcoming Obstacles in the Application of Research 'to

Appendix B: Evaluation of the Symposium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-1

Washington D.C., 12 to 15 April 1993

ORGANIZATION OF THE SYMPOSIUM

1: DEVELOPING HUMAN FACTORS KNOWLEDGE

2: DEVELOPING HUMAN FACTORS SKILLS

3: HUMAN FACTORS TRAINING FOR AUTOMATION

The officers of the Symposium were:

Dr. William R.Fromme Director, Air Navigation Bureau

Mr. Garland P. Castleberry Associate Administrator for

OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM

Second Flight Safety and Human Factors Global Symposium

Washington, D.C., United States,

Economic, legal and/or financial, which include comercia1 developments and

Human and/or M a l , including unlawful interference, environmental protection,

Sp~cifjmlly,flabwe must recognize the challenge of jncreased mhn01ogy and

Finally, as it relates to aviaon safety, we must think in collective rather than in