Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez

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[No. 18913.

April 15, 1922]

RAFAEL A. DIMAYUGA and TEOFILO FAJARDO,


plaintiffs, vs. RAMON FERNANDEZ, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Luis P. TORRES, city fiscal, JOHN W. GREEN,
chief of police, defendants.

1. INJUNCTION.—Under the early decisions, it was the


general rule that a court of equity would not restrain the
authorities from the enforcement of a criminal law, but,
under the modern authorities, the writ is sometimes
granted where it 'is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or to avoid a multiplicity of action.

2. LEGAL DISCRETION.—The writ of prohibition is


somewhat sui generis, and is one of more or less legal
discretion, and is intended to prevent the oppressive
exercise of legal authority.

3. GENERAL RULE.—As a general rule, this court will not


interfere where it appears that the legal questions upon
which the petitioners rely can be raised and decided in a
case pending in a lower court which has jurisdiction of the
subject-matter.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.


The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
     Romualdez Bros. for plaintiffs.
     City Fiscal Torres for defendants.
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VOL. 43, APRIL 15, 1922 305


Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez

STATEMENT
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, in which the
plaintiff s allege that they are citizens and inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands, residing in the city of Manila. The
defendant Ramon Fernandez is the Mayor, the defendant
Torres, the fiscal, and the defendant Green, the chief of`/
police of the city of Manila.
It is alleged that the plaintiffs are Chiropractic Doctors,
practicing their profession in the city of Manila, and that
they are graduates of reputable American universities, and
have complied with all of the rules and regulations of such
universities, which are required for the issuance of the
degree of Doctor of Chiropractics, and that a chiropractor is
a mechanic whose duty it is to see that human anatomy is
in working order, without the use of any kind of drugs or
medicines internally or externally. That such treatment is
practical and economical, and is not dangerous, and that it
is officially recognized in a large number of States in the
United States, and that as a science it has earned a place
among the learned professions and in the Philippine
Islands. "That the plaintiffs are exercising the profession of
chiropractics after having duly paid the license fee required
by Internal Revenue Law." That the plaintiff, Dimayuga,
appeared before the Honorable Secretary of the Interior,
the Honorable Director of Health and the Board of Medical
Examiners, for the purpose of submitting to, and taking, an
examination, if any was required. That he was advised that
he could practice his profession so long as there is no
express provision against it. That the Board of Medical
Examiners informed plaintiff that it could not give him any
examination, because no one of its members had any
knowledge of chiropractics. That the Director of Health
held that he did not have any objection to the plaintiff s
practicing chiropractics in the Philippine Islands so long as
there is no complaint against his treatment. "That there is
no law prohibiting directly or indirectly or regulating in
any manner the practice of chiropractics in the Phil-
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306 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez

ippine Islands." That the defendants, with full knowledge


of such facts, and in flagrant violation of the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs, are, with the use of force, about to
arrest and persecute them in the exercise of their prof
ession in the city of Manila, and to illegally prohibit their
practice, as evidenced by a written opinion of Mr. Torres, as
fiscal of the city of Manila, and that their arrest would be
without any legal right or authority. That, on account of
such illegal acts, the plaintiffs have been damaged in the
sum of 3P10,000, and they have no speedy or adequate
remedy at law.
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the
ground:
First. That the acts alleged do not constitute a cause of
action;
Secpnd. That this court has no jurisdiction; and,
Third. That the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at
law.
It also appears that in September, 1921, a complaint
was filed against the plaintiff, Dimayuga, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, charging him with the illegal
practice of medicine, and that the charge is still pending in
that court.
At the time the petition was presented here, upon the
showing then made and upon the filing of an approved
bond, a temporary restraining order was granted against
the defendants.

JOHNS, J.:

At the argument on the demurrer, many legal questions


were discussed, including the constitutionality of the
medical act, the decision of which, under our view of this
case, is unnecessary to this opinion. It is true, as
respondents contend, that, as a general rule, a court of
equity will not restrain the authorities of either a state or
municipality from the enforcement of a criminal law, and
among the earlier decisions, there was no exception to that
rule. By the modern authorities, an exception is sometimes
made, and

307

VOL. 43, APRIL 15, 1922 307


Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez

the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly


administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions.
In legal effect, that was the decision of this court in
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila (41 Phil., 103).
The writ of prohibition is somewhat sui generis, and is
more or less in the sound legal discretion of the court and is
intended to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
legal authority, and to bring about the orderly
administration of justice.
It appeared at the argument, and was not denied, that
last September, one of the plaintiffs was arrested for the
illegal practice of his profession in Manila, and that the
case is now pending in the criminal court.
The legal questions upon which the petitioners now rely
can be raised and decided in the trial of that case, and, if
they are sound, should be sustained by the court which has
jurisdiction of the case.
It appears that the defendants are acting upon the
written advice of the city attorney as to the construction of
the law. The Mayor had a right to ask that official for his
legal opinion and rely upon it, and he had a right to give it.
The record simply shows that the defendants are seeking to
discharge their official duties as they understand them,
and.there is no evidence that either of them are acting from
malicious or dishonest motives. Neither is there any
evidence that the def endants are threatening plaintiffs
with daily arrest or a number of oppressive prosecutions, or
that they are disposed to involve them in expensive
litigation.
The Court of First Instance first acquired jurisdiction of
the criminal prosecution against one of the plaintiffs, and
the defense there would involve the legal questions
presented here, and could be raised in the trial of that case.
It does not appear that the defendants are threatening
to, or will, make numerous arrests of the plaintiffs at least

308

308 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Ingersoll vs. National Bank

until such time as the law of the case is finally settled.


There is no allegation that Fiscal Torres was not acting in
good faith in the giving of his advice, or that he is not
honest in his opinion. The very most that is charged
against him is that he is mistaken in the construction of a
law, which has never been judicially construed and which
can be construed in the case now pending, to which one of
the plaintiffs is a party.
The fact that the criminal charge was filed in
September, 1921, and that up to date only one complaint
has been filed, and that from one cause or another the case
has not yet been decided, is strong evidence that there has
not been, and is not, any disposition on the part of the
defendants to make numerous arrests and involve the
plaintiffs in oppressive litigation.
For such reasons, and upon the record now before us, we
decline to pass upon the constitutional questions presented
and hold that the temporary injunction should be dissolved
and the demurrer sustained, with leave to plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint within ten days from the
promulgation of this decision. So ordered.

          Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and


Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Injunction dissolved, and demurrer sustained.

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