Apex Mining Company, Inc., Petitioner, v. NLRC and Sinclitica Candido1 motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.

thereof was denied. Hence, the herein

22 April 1991; Gancayco petition for review by certiorari (which appropriately should be a
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon special civil action for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice,
I. Facts is hereby treated as such).
1. Candido was employed by Apex on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry II. Issues
services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte.
Whether the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company is a
◦ In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm.2 Regular employee
January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a III. Holding
month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month
The petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution NLRC are
2. On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her
back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate IV. Ratio
supervisor De la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Asirit. 1. Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended,
3. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as
work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa follows:
offered her the amount of P2,000.00 which was eventually increased ▪ "The term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the
to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer term ‘domestic servant' and shall refer to any person,
and preferred to return to work. whether male or female, who renders services in and about
4. Apex did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on the employer's home and which services are usually
February 4, 1988. necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort
5. On March 11, 1988, Candido filed a request for assistance with the
and enjoyment of the employer's family."
DOLE. The LA ordered Apex to pay a total of P55,161.42:
2. The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or
1. Salary Differential 1. — P16,289.20
domestic servant who is employed in the employer's home to
2. Emergency Living Allowance 2. — 12,430.00 minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.
3. 13th Month Pay Differential 3. — 1,322.32
3. The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or
4. Separation Pay laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like Candido
(One-month for every year of who attends to the needs of the company's guests and other persons
service (1973-1988) 4. — 25,119.90 availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered
to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in
the company, the staffhouses and its premises.
6. Not satisfied therewith, APEX appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed 4. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of
the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true

1 Bullet points in a lighter font are included “just in case”. 2 Apex (the employer) wants Candido to be declared a domestic servant.
 that the nature of the work may be similar in nature, the difference
in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually
serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation
or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any
other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the
staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer.
In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in
the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
5. Apex contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic
servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer
that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such
an employee.

◦ The Court disagreed. The mere fact that the househelper or

domestic servant is working within the premises of the business
of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its staffhouses for its guests or even for its officers
and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper
or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee and not as a mere family househelper or domestic
servant.
6. Apex denies having illegally dismissed Candido and maintains that
she abandoned her work.

◦ This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to

show that because of an accident which took place while Candido
was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work
and was ultimately separated from the service.

◦ She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular

employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears
not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons,
the payment of separation pay to her is in order.
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Erlinda Castaneda
November 20, 2006 | J. Puno Substantive Issues
By: Perry WON the respondent was a regular employee. YES.
WON the respondent was illegally dismissed. YES.
SUMMARY:
Respondent-complainant alleged that she was illegally dismissed. The RULING:
petitioners set up the defense that the complainant was not a regular employee Procedural Issue
but was a househelp of the family of the Managing Director. The NLRC, CA and
SC all ruled in favor of the complainant. The SC ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed
to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases.
DOCTRINE: Moreover, the SC ruled that the requirement of verification is formal and not
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render it fatally
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and defective.
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant
is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a As to the issue of late filing, the SC noted that the last day for filing of the motion
mere family househelper or domestic servant for reconsideration of the respondent fell on a Saturday. The SC has consistently
ruled that if the tenth day fell on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the
FACTS: next working day. Moreover, the filing of the petition for certiorari does no
Respondent-complainant alleged that she started working for the petitioner as a interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
company cook in 1983 with a salary of ₱4,000; that she worked for 6 days a or writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
week; that she continuously worked for the petitioner until she was from further proceeding with the case.
unceremoniously prevented from reporting from work when the petitioner
transferred to a new site in EDSA, Caloocan City. She averred that when she Substantive Issues
reported for work in the new site, she was informed that her services were no The SC ruled in Apex Mining v. NLRC, that a househelper in the staff houses of a
longer needed, thus prompting her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. company was a regular employee of the said firm. A househelper shall only be
Petitioner denied the allegations and posited that Erlinda was not a regular considered as such when he/she caters to the personal comfort and
employee but a domestic helper of the Managing Director, Mr. Antonio Tan. The enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of the employer. In
petitioner further posited that it did not have any degree of control and/or such a case, they are actually serving the family. However, as opposed to the
supervision over Erlinda’s work; that Erlinda did not have a time card; and that case at bar, Erlinda’s services was being rendered in the staffhouses or within
she was free to roam around the company premises, hence, she was not a the premises of the business of the employer. Thus, she should properly be
regular employee. considered as an employee of the company entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee. The mere fact that a househelper or domestic servant is working
The LA dismissed the complaint, finding that the respondent was a domestic within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
helper. This was reversed by the NLRC who ruled in favor of the respondent- connection with its business, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
complainant. A Decision was rendered and a petition for certiorari was taken by domestic servant is a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere
the petitioner to the CA. However, before the petition was acted upon, the NLRC family househelper or domestic servant.
issued a Second Decision based on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
respondent, increasing the monetary award from ₱51,747.88 to ₱62,437.50. Since she was found to be a regular employee, the SC further found that there
The CA sustained the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petition for was indeed ground for her illegal dismissal. The petitioner alleges that the
certiorari filed by the petitioner. Hence, this case to the SC. respondent abandoned her work. However, the act of filing a complaint belies
the foregoing contention as the act of filing a complaint is sufficient proof of her
ISSUES / HELD: desire to work.
Procedural Issue
WON the issuance of the Second Decision was proper. YES. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v Ople The Minister of Labor dismissed the notice of strike and ruled that the new
February 8, 1989 | Grino-Aquino, J. scheme did not interfered with the workers’ right to self-organization.
By: Ron San Juan Petitioner's conjecture that the new plan will sow dissatisfaction from its ranks
is already a prejudgment of the plan's viability and effectiveness.
SUMMARY:
SMC introduced a new marketing scheme whereby its beer products were offered ISSUES/HELD:
for sale directly to wholesalers through the company’s sales office. Petitioner Whether or not CDS interferes with the workers’ right to self-organization
union filed a notice of strike on the ground that the new scheme violated the CBA (whether it constitute union busting). (NO)
as it would reduce the take-home pay of the salesmen. SC ruled that the new
scheme is a valid exercise of management prerogatives because an employer is RATIO:
free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of Public respondent was correct in holding that the CDS is a valid exercise of
employment so long as the prerogative is exercised in good faith. management prerogatives.
Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
DOCTRINE: Management Prerogative assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used,
Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, and recall of work.
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer
of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may
and recall of work. adopt or devise means designed towards that goal.

FACTS: Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect
the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.
A collective bargaining agreement was entered into by petitioner PTGWO, and The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its
the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1, of Article IV of the purpose cannot be denied.
CBA.3
San Miguel Corporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force who
In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-
"Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby its beer products were called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might
offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguel's sales offices. lose as a result of the CDS proves the company's good faith and lack of intention
to bust their union.
PTGWO filed a complaint for ULP in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike
on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the existing marketing scheme
whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to
sell their stocks of beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not
from the company. It was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates Section
1, Article IV of the CBA because the introduction of the CDS would reduce the
take-home pay of the salesmen and their truck helpers for the company would be
unfairly competing with them.

3
Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be
entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their
respective sales.
Sime Darby Pilipinas Inc vs NLRC Lunch break will be between:
April 15, 1998 | Bellosillo, J.
By: Sam 12:00 NN 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).

SUMMARY: Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association filed a case with the Labor Arbiter
Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association filed a case against Sime Darby against Sime Darby Pilipinas Inc, alleging that the change of their work schedule
Pilipinas Inc, alleging that the change of their work schedule and the and the discontinuance of the 30-minute paid on-call lunch break constituted
discontinuance of the 30-minute paid on-call lunch break constituted Unfair Unfair Labor Practice and discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the
Labor Practice. resolution of this Court in Sime Darby International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.
DOCTRINE: (Management Prerogative)
Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all Sime Darby Pilipinas maintained that the change was valid management
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, prerogative.
time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of LA: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work
workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory
workers constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the
Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the
so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers time did not exceed eight (8) hours. Moreover that the factory workers would
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the be justly enriched if they continued to be paid during their lunch break even if
employees under special laws or under valid agreements they were no longer on call or required to work during the break. He also ruled
that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case was not applicable to the instant
FACTS: case because the former involved discrimination of certain employees who
Sime Darby Pilipinas issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory
advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except workers were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the discriminated employees
those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a be similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch break.
change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 as follows:
NLRC: Sustained LA ruling and dismissed the appeal.
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE. NLRC MR: Reversed its ruling. NLRC considered the decision of this Court in
the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner was ordered
Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule factory to pay the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch and/or
office will be as follows: working time breaks. The public respondent declared that the new work
schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of time-honored company
practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an
7:45 A.M. 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday) unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor
Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent committed
7:45 A.M. 11:45 P.M. (Saturday). grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a) in ruling
that petitioner committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between: change in the work schedule of its employees

9:30 A.M. 10:30 A.M. and OSG: filed in lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the
petition be granted, alleging that the new work schedule was not discriminatory
2:30 P.M. 3:30 P.M. of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice.
ISSUES/HELD:
W/N the act of management in revising the work schedule and discontinuing
their 30-minute paid lunch break constituted an unfair labor practice? NO.

RATIO:
The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their
employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the
adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved
production.

It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch
break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they
were on call. Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well be
considered as working time because the factory employees were required to
work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work
schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any
interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break,
the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not only for eating but also
for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better
performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer required to work
during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be
compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work
schedule fully complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without
violating the Labor Code. Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in
the factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not.

The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination
of employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule, which
management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor
practice. As shown by the records, the change effected by management with
regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the
same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent
union. Hence, it cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management
prejudices the right of private respondent to self-organization.

Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of
workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.

Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service

so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such
prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements
Interphil Employees Union-FFW v Interphil Laboratories, Inc. duration of the CBA to two years. The inquiry was repeated two more times,
19 December 2001 | Kapunan, J. one in March and one in a meeting set in April 1993. Salazar replied that the
By: Dudday inquiry is premature and that the matter will be best discussed during the
formal negotiations for the new CBA since the previous CBA was about to
SUMMARY: expire.
Petitioner Union committed overtime boycott and slowdown when Respondent 4. The day following the meeting in April 1993, all the RFE refused to follow
Company did not want to accede to the proposal to change the CBA duration to two years
their regular two-shift work schedule from 6AM to 6PM and from 6PM to
(from three years). The justification for Respondent Company’s refusal is that it was premature
6AM. They even stopped working and left their workplace without sealing
to talk about it since the current CBA has not yet expired and that the matter will be better
discussed during the formal negotiations. Respondent Company filed a petition to declare the the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on. Salazar
boycott and slowdown as illegal strike before the LA. asked the employees what caused their refusal to work, to which the
The parties were not able to agree for the terms in the new CBA. Respondent employees replied, “ask the union officers”.
Company filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction with SOLE while Petitioner Union filed 5. A union director (Enrico Gonzales) told Salazar that the employees would
a ULP case against the Company before the NLRC. only return to their normal work schedule if the company agrees to their
SOLE assumed jurisdiction and gave a return-to-work order. He also directed the LAs demands as to the effectivity and duration of the CBA. Salazar again told the
handling the cases to give a report and recommendation on the cases. LA made a report finding union officers that the matter will be best discussed during the formal
Petitioner Union to have committed illegal strike and declared the Union officers as terminated
negotiations. Overtime boycott continued and the employees started to
from employment. This was adopted by the SOLE in its Decision and was affirmed by the CA.
engage in a work slowdown campaign.
In its present petition before the Supreme Court, Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of
the SOLE in taking cognizance of the case, alleges that CA erred in disregarding the Parol 6. 03 September 1993 – Respondent Company filed a petition to declare the
Evidence Rule, and in recognizing that the Respondent had already condoned the illegal acts “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” of the employees as illegal strike
of the Union officers when it gave substantial separation packages. SC denied the petition and before the NLRC, and sought an urgent request for preventive mediation
upheld the CA decision. with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to help the parties in
DOCTRINE: Management Prerogative their new CBA negotiations. Still, Petitioner and Respondent did not agree,
(Guys, di ko sure kung ano ‘yung related sa management prerogative.) prompting the Respondent to file a petition for assumption of jurisdiction
It is within the discretion of the management to provide the work schedule of the order with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE).
employees and to change the same should it be necessary for its operations and such 7. 24 January 1994 – Petitioner Union filed a Notice of Strike citing unfair labor
discretion is stated in the CBA. practice by the Respondent Company. Petitioner staged a strike on 12
February 1994.
FACTS: 8. 14 February 1994 – SOLE Nieves Confessor issued an assumption order
1. Petitioner Interphil Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive directing the Respondent to accept the striking workers back to work and
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees (RFE) of Respondent the Petitioner to strictly comply with the return-to-work order. The order
Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of also stated that “all pending cases which are direct off shoots of the instant
manufacturing and packaging pharmaceutical products. labor dispute are hereby subsumed herewith.”
2. Their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which was effective from 01 9. Petitioner Union moved for the consolidation of the labor case filed by them
August 1990 to 31 July 1993, had the following contents: for ULP and filed by the Respondent Company before LA Caday. This was not
a. Effectivity of the CBA for three years granted; instead, the Las handling the cases were ordered to proceed with
b. Prohibition on the part of the union or the employees during the the hearing and to submit their report and recommendation to the SOLE.
existence of the CBA to stage strike or engage in slowdown or 10. LA Caday submitted his recommendation which was approved and adopted
interruption of work by the SOLE. Said Order declared the “overtime boycott” and “work
c. Regular working hours on a normal work day shall be consisted of 8 slowdown” as illegal strike, terminated the Union Officers from work, and
hours, from 7:30AM to 4:30PM found Petitioner Union guilty of ULP.
3. February 1993 – Union president (Nestor Ocampo) and one union director 11. After the denial of their MR, Petitioner Union went to the CA via petition for
(Hernando Clemente) approached the Respondent Company’s Vice- certiorari (Rule 65). CA dismissed their petition. Hence, the present recourse
President of the Human Resources Department (Allesandro G. Salazar) to to the Supreme Court wherein Petitioner alleges:
inquire about the stand of the company with respect to shortening the
 a. SOLE does not have jurisdiction to rule on the illegal strike 2. Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding the provision in the CBA and
committed by the Union since the same was submitted to the Labor giving credit to mere testimonies with respect to the schedule of work of
Arbiter of the NLRC way before the SOLE’s assumption of the employees.
jurisdiction over the dispute  In labor cases before the NLRC or LA, rules of evidence in courts of law
b. CA disregarded the “parol evidence rule” when it upheld the or equity are not controlling. The LA is not precluded from accepting
allegation of Respondent Company that the work schedule of the and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is
employees was from 6AM-6PM and 6PM-6AM, despite the fact stated in the CBA.
that their CBA stated 7:30AM-4:30PM as the working hours  From the provision4 stated in the CBA, it is clear that the working hours
c. Respondent Company had already condoned the illegal acts they may be changed at the discretion of the company, should such change
committed when it extended substantial separation package to be necessary for its operations, and that employees shall observe such
some officers of Petitioner Union during the pendency of the case. rules as have been laid down by the company. LA Caday found that
ISSUES/HELD: Respondent Company had to adopt a continuous 24-hour work daily
1. Whether the SOLE has jurisdiction to rule on the illegal strike committed by schedule because of the nature of its business and the demands of its
the Union – Yes clients. Since the employees adhered to the said work schedule since
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the “Parol Evidence 1988, the employees are deemed to have waived the 8-hour schedule
Rule” when it accepted the allegation of the Respondent Company as to the since they followed without any question or complaint, the 2-shift
schedule of work when the same was not indicated in the CBA – No schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto.
3. Whether Respondent Union condoned the illegal acts committed by the  The ULP case filed by the Petitioner Union against the Respondent
Petitioner – No Company also alleged that the “company has not been computing
RATIO: correctly the night premium and overtime pay for work rendered
1. SOLE has jurisdiction to rule on the illegal strike committed by the Petitioner between 2AM and 6AM of the 6PM-6AM shift”, which shows the
Union. awareness of the Petitioner Union, its officers and members about the
 Article 263(g) of the Labor Code grants SOLE the authority to assume existence of the regular overtime schedule of 6AM-6PM and 6PM-6AM.
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or 3. Respondent Company did not condone the illegal acts of Petitioner Union,
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This its officers, and members when it gave substantial separation packages to
authority necessarily extends to all questions and controversies arising the officers.
from labor disputes, including cases over which the labor arbiter has  The gesture of Respondent Company in extending substantial
exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the opening proviso of Article 217 of separation packages to some officers of the Union was taken by the
the Labor Code (“except as otherwise provided under this Code xxx”) Court as act of generosity since instead of withholding the benefits until
contemplates that there are exceptions to the original and exclusive the final resolution of the case, Respondent Company considered the
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Taken together, Article 217 and 263(g) financial hardships experienced by its employees and the prevailing
meant to make both the Secretary (and various regional directors) and economic situation. Moreover, at the time the Union officers obtained
the labor arbiters share jurisdiction subject to certain conditions. their separation benefits, they were still considered employees of the
[International Pharmaceutical, Inc. v Hon. Secretary of Labor and company. Hence, the company was merely complying with its legal
Associated Labor Union (ALU)] obligations.
 The participation of Petitioner Union in the continuation of the hearing Petition is denied.
(they asked for consolidation of the cases and attended the hearings)
was also an affirmation of the jurisdiction of the SOLE by the Petitioner
itself.

4Section 1 (of the CBA). Regular Working Hours. – A normal workday shall consist of not more than eight discretion should such change be necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall
(8) hours. The regular working hours for the Company shall be from 7:30AM to 4:30PM. The schedule observe such rules as have been laid down by the company for the purpose of effecting control over
shift work shall be maintained; however the company may change the prevailing work time at its working hours. (emphasis supplied)
ARICA v. NLRC with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to
February 28, 1989 other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require
PARAS, J.: the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective
work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the area
FACTS: where the farm are located, such that after the roll call, which does
not necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to
 A complaint was filed by petitioners on April 9, 1984 against private their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not
respondent Stanfilco for assembly time, moral damages and subject to the absolute control of the company during this period,
attorney's fees, with the aforementioned Regional Arbitration otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would
Branch No. XI, Davao City. justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The CBA
 Petitioners: contend that the preliminary activities as workers of does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare
respondents STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as of any proof on this point. This, therefore, demonstrates the
working time (from 5:30 to 6:00 o'clock in the morning) since these indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not
preliminary activities are necessarily and primarily for private primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but
respondent's benefit. ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-
 These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows: availability for work during every working day.
 LA: Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot but agree with
 (a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their respondent that the pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the
individual work assignments from the foreman. thirty-minute assembly time long practiced cannot be considered
 (b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the waiting time or work time and, therefore, not compensable, has
Laborer's Daily Accomplishment Report during which they are often become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed
made to explain about their reported accomplishment the following without doing violence to the time- honored principle of res-
day. judicata.
 (c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials,  NLRC: affirmed.
tools and equipment.
 (d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, ISSUES: W/N the claim is barred by res judicata (YES)
equipment and materials.
 All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish W/N 30 minute assembly time is considered part of waiting time,
 Respondents: the instant complaint is not new, ALU v Standard Fruit hence compensable (NO)
Corporation when ALU was the bargaining agent of respondent's SC:
rank and file workers. The said case involved a claim for "waiting
time", as the complainants purportedly were required to assemble  It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very
at a designated area at least 30 minutes prior to the start of their same claim which they filed through the ALU and which records
scheduled working hours "to ascertain the work force available for show had already long been considered terminated and closed by
the day by means of a roll call, for the purpose of assignment or this Court in G.R. No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be
reassignment of employees to such areas in the plantation where faulted for ruling that petitioners' claim is already barred by res-
they are most needed judicata.
 Minister of Labor (in ALU v STANDARD): Furthermore, the thirty  Be that as it may, petitioners' claim that there was a change in the
(30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice of the factual scenario which are "substantial changes in the facts" makes
employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected respondent firm now liable for the same claim they earlier filed
 against respondent which was dismissed. It is thus axiomatic that respondent on the other hand insists that these practices were the
the non-compensability of the claim having been earlier established, same practices taken into account in ALU v. STANFILCO. If this were
constitute the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties so, the Ople decision was silent thereon
and remains to be the law of the case making this petition without  It is evident that the Ople decision was predicated on the absence
merit of any insinuation of obligatoriness in the course or after the
 As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is assembly activities on the part of the employees. They are not
"clearly violative of the familiar principle of res judicata.There will subject to the absolute control of the company during this period,
be no end to this controversy if the light of the Minister of Labor's otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would
decision dated May 12, 1979 that had long acquired the character justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. As indicated,
of finality and which already resolved that petitioners' thirty (30)- however, by the petitioners, things had since changed, and
minute assembly time is not compensable, the same issue can be remarkably so, and the latter had since been placed under a
re-litigated again." number of restrictions. My considered opinion is that the thirty-
 Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies minute assembly time had become, in truth and fact, a "waiting
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined time" as contemplated by the Labor Code.
to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence

DISMISSED.

DISSENTING OPINION (J. Sarmiento)

 Precisely, it is the petitioners' contention that the assembly time

in question had since undergone dramatic changes, thus:
(a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their
individual work assignments from the foreman.
(b) Thereafter,they are individually required to accomplish
the Laborer's Daily Accomplishment Report during which
they are often made to explain about their reported
accomplishment the following day.
(c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working
materials, tools and equipment.
(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their
tools, equipment and materials. (Supra, 4-5.)
 The petitioners have vehemently maintained that in view thereof,
the instant case should be distinguished from the first case. And I do
not believe that the respondents have successfully rebutted these
allegations. The Solicitor General relies solely on the decision of
then Minister Ople, the decision the petitioners precisely reject in
view of the changes in the conditions of the parties. The private
Rada v. NLRC and PhilNor Labor Arbiter ruled for Rada, while NLRC ruled for PhilNor.
February 15, 2012 | Mendoza, J.
By: Chad ISSUES:
1. WON the NLRC erred in accepting the appeal of PhilNor despite its
SUMMARY: failure to post a supersedeas bond within ten days of receipt of the
Rada, who worked as a project driver, claims illegal dismissal and overtime pay LA’s decision -NO
from PhilNor despite his signing of quitclaim. Despite being late, what was important was PhilNor did pay. The broader
interests of justice and the desired objective of resolving controversies on the
DOCTRINE: merits demands that the appeal be given due course.
Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular Art 221, Labor Code: "In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the
construction project. Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall
they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
process
connection with such termination.

FACTS: 2. WON the NLRC erred in upholding the termination of Rada -NO
Hilaro Rada was employed by PhilNor in three separate renewals of “Contract of Quiwa v. PhilNor- upheld workers as project employees
Employment for a Definite Period” from 1977 to 1985, the third and last Contract Cartagenas, et al. vs. Romago Electric Company- upheld electrical
having been extended for four years. He worked as a driver for a North Luzon contractors as project employees
Extension construction project, which was repeatedly extended as well due to Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project
lack in budgets (hence the renewals and extensions of his contract). In 1985, the employees, are mentioned in section 281 of the Labor Code as those "where the
phase of the project for which he was hired having been finished, his employment employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion
was terminated. Now he claims illegal dismissal from Philnor and claims or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
separation pay as well as overtime pay. the employee." See doctrine.
The fact that Rada does not belong to a "work pool" from which the company
ARGUMENTS OF RADA: would draw workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion (as
He was a regular employee entitled to security of tenure, not a project employee opposed to in-company groups of carpenters, laborers and masons) means that
since Philnor is not engaged in the construction business as to be covered by he is merely a project worker.
Policy Instructions No. 20. The contract of employment for a definite period
executed between him and Philnor is against public policy and a clear 3. WON Rada was entitled to overtime pay -YES
circumvention of the law designed merely to evade any benefits or liabilities It is usually the project driver who is tasked with picking up or dropping off his
under the statute. His position as driver was essential, necessary and desirable to fellow employees. If driving these employees to and from the project site is not
the conduct of the business of Philnor. He rendered overtime work until 6:00 p.m. really part of petitioner's job, then there would have been no need to find a
daily except Sundays and holidays for a period of three years and therefore, he replacement driver to fetch these employees. But since the assigned task of
was entitled to overtime pay. fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently mandatory,
then he is doing overtime work and should be paid for such
ARGUMENTS OF PHILNOR:
Rada already signed the "Personnel Clearance" form for P3,796.20 representing RULING: NLRC decision upheld, except PhilNor ordered to pay Rada
conversion to cash of unused leave credits and financial assistance and also a overtime pay.
"Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" which also released Philnor from all obligations
and/or claims. He did not render overtime work and neither did he demand for
overtime pay. He was not a regular employee, as he was merely employed during
the duration of the phase of the construction contract PhilNor was finishing.
REMERCO GARMENTS MFTG v. MINISTER OF LABOR
Feb. 28, 1985 HOLDING/RATIO:
Cuevas, J.: NO.
 While it is true that it is the sole prerogative of the management to dismiss
Facts: or lay-off an employee, the exercise of such a prerogative must be made
 Private respondents Zenaida Bustamante, Luz Raymundo and Ruth Corpuz without abuse of discretion for what is at stake is not only private
were employees of petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the respondents’ positions but also their means of livelihood.
business of manufacturing and exporting of men’s, ladies’, and children’s
dresses.  As regards Raymundo who was charged with insubordination, she had a
 Petitioner filed three (3) applications for clearance to terminate valid ground not to work on that particular Sunday as she was able to obtain
employment of private respondents on the following grounds: a clearance slip from her immediate supervisor the day before allowing her
o Against Ruth Corpuz for allegedly defacing company’s property by to be absent. Her failure to report cannot be considered as gross
placing a check mark on a jacket with a chalk. insubordination. Petitioner has not shown that Raymundo’s failure to report
o Against Luz Raymundo for insubordination for refusal to work on for work on that Sunday constitutes one of the just causes for termination
her rest day. under Art. 283 of the LC.
o Against Zenaida Bustamante for abandonment for failing to report
for work after the expiration of her suspension.  In Zenaida’s case, she allegedly abandoned her employment for failing to
 The three opposed the clearance application and filed separate complaints report to work after her suspension. Like Raymundo, her suspension arose
for illegal dismissal. from her failure to report for work on that same Sunday. She explained that
 During the period of their employment, Raymundo and Bustamante were she was sick that day as shown by the medical certificate she submitted. It
given 3 consecutive warnings for allegedly refusing to render overtime work. is a recognized principle that abandonment of work by an employee is
They were penalized with one week’s suspension. inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal,
 Raymundo was required to work on a Sunday despite her request for which is what Raymundo did.
exemption because it was her rest day. Her request was disapproved.
Consequently, she was notified of her dismissal upon expiration of her  Constitution requires the State to assure the workers security of tenure and
suspension. just and humane conditions of work. The Labor Code is clear that it is the
 Corpuz was also given a warning for refusal to render overtime work. She duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or not, to provide each
was subsequently dismissed for having written a chalk mark on a nylon of his employees a rest period of not less than 24 hours after every 6
jacket for export allegedly in violation of Rule 26 of petitioner’s rules and consecutive normal work days. Even if there really existed an urgency to
regulations. require work on a rest day (which is not in the instant case), outright
 The acting director of NCR MOLE issued an order which granted petitioner’s dismissal from employment is so severe a consequence, more so when
application for clearance to terminate the employment of respondents. justifiable grounds exist for failure to report for work.
 Respondents appealed to the NLRC. On the other hand, the acting director
elevated the records to the Office of the Minister of Labor.
 Minister of Labor reversed the appealed order and directed the petitioner
to reinstate private respondents to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights and privileges and with full backwages. Petitioner’s MR
denied. Hence, this petition. At this point, case only concerns Raymundo and
Bustamante due to the withdrawal of Corpuz.

ISSUE:
WON sufficient legal grounds exist to justify the dismissal of private respondents Luz
Raymundo and Zenaida Bustamante.
 (3) WON employer was afforded due process YES
San Miguel Corp. v. Court of Appeals
January 30, 2002 | Kapunan, J. RATIO:
By: Arrow
(1) Muslim holidays are provided under Articles 169 and 170, Title I, Book
SUMMARY: V, of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
SMC did not want to pay holiday pay to its non-Muslim employees. Court held Personal Laws, which states:
that this violated the pertinent laws on holiday pay and that the fact that they Art. 169. Official Muslim holidays. - The following are hereby recognized as legal Muslim holidays:
were non-Muslims was of no matter since they were all similarly situated as (a) Amun Jadīd (New Year), which falls on the first day of the first lunar month of Muharram;
workers in a Muslim area.
(b) Maulid-un-Nabī (Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), which falls on the twelfth day of the third
lunar month of Rabi-ul-Awwal;
DOCTRINE: (Holidays and Service Incentive)
There should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as regards (c) Lailatul Isrā Wal Mirāj (Nocturnal Journey and Ascension of the Prophet Muhammad), which falls
on the twenty-seventh day of the seventh lunar month of Rajab;
payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Both Muslim and Christians working
within the Muslim areas may not report for work on the days designated by law (d) Īd-ul-Fitr (Hari Raya Puasa), which falls on the first day of the tenth lunar month of Shawwal,
commemorating the end of the fasting season; and
as Muslim holidays. Wages and other emoluments granted by law to the working
man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid down by laws and certainly (e) Īd-ūl-Adhā (Hari Raya Haji),which falls on the tenth day of the twelfth lunar month of Dhūl-Hijja.
not on the basis of the workers faith or religion. Art. Provinces and cities where officially observed. - (1) Muslim holidays shall be officially observed in
the Provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Iligan,
FACTS: Marawi, Pagadian, and Zamboanga and in such other Muslim provinces and cities as may hereafter be
created;
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Iligan District Office, conducted a (2) Upon proclamation by the President of the , Muslim holidays may also be officially observed in
routine inspection in the premises of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Sta. other provinces and cities.
Filomena, Iligan CIty In the course of the inspection, it was discovered that there The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article 94 of
was underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. the Labor Code, which provides:

SMC contested the findings so DOLE conducted a series of hearings. Still, SMC Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. -
failed to submit proof that it was paying regular Muslim holiday pay to its (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
employees. DOLE Iligan District Office issued a compliance order directing SMC holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
to consider Muslim holidays as regular holidays and to pay both its Muslim and employing less than ten (10) workers;
non-Muslim employees holiday pay within thirty (30) days from the receipt of (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday
the order. but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice
his regular rate; x x x.
SMC appealed to DOLE Main but the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. SMC Petitioner asserts that Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 provides that
went to the SC via petition for certiorai but SC referred case back to CA pursuant (t)he provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims x x x. However,
to the St. Martin doctrine. there should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. The Court of Appeals did
CA modified the decision stating that the holiday pay must be computed from not err in sustaining Undersecretary Espaol who stated:
200% to 150% of the employees' salary and remanded the case to the Regional
Director for the proper holiday pay computation (SMC still lost). Assuming arguendo that the respondents position is correct, then by the same
token, Muslims throughout the are also not entitled to holiday pays on Christian
ISSUES/HELD: holidays declared by law as regular holidays. We must remind the respondent-
(1) IMPT ISSUE: WON SMC must pay their employees (including non-Muslim appellant that wages and other emoluments granted by law to the working
employees) holiday pay. YES man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid down by laws and
(2) WON Regional Director had the power to issue the compliance order directing certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or religion.
employer to pay holiday pay. YES At any rate, Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 also declares that
x x x nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-
Muslim.
In addition, the 1999 Handbook on Workers Statutory Benefits, approved by then
DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma on categorically stated:
Considering that all private corporations, offices, agencies, and entities or establishments operating
within the designated Muslim provinces and cities are required to observe Muslim holidays, both
Muslim and Christians working within the Muslim areas may not report for work on the days
designated by law as Muslim holidays.

(2) On the question regarding the jurisdiction of the Regional Director Allan M.
Macaraya, Article 128, Section B of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7730, provides:
Article 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. -
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give
effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the
findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of the inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the
employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues
supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

Regional Director Macaraya acted as the duly authorized representative of the

Secretary of Labor and Employment and it was within his power to issue the
compliance order to SMC. In addition, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General
that the petitioner did not deny that it was not paying Muslim holiday pay to its
non-Muslim employees. Indeed, petitioner merely contends that its non-Muslim
employees are not entitled to Muslim holiday pay. Hence, the issue could be
resolved even without documentary proofs. In any case, there was no indication
that Regional Director Macaraya failed to consider any documentary proof
presented by SMC in the course of the inspection.
(3) Anent the allegation that petitioner was not accorded due process, we sustain
the Court of Appeals in finding that SMC was furnished a copy of the inspection
order and it was received by and explained to its Personnel Officer. Further, a
series of summary hearings were conducted by DOLE on , and 4 and . Thus, SMC
could not claim that it was not given an opportunity to defend itself.
JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE v. NLRC and NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS/OFFICE 3. The personnel who are paid per student contract hour are not entitled to
WORKERS underworked holiday pay since these regular holidays have been excluded
December 1, 1987/ Paras, J. in the programming of the student hours
By Cate Alegre  The NLRC modified the decision stating that teaching personnel paid by the hour
are entitled to holiday pay
Summary  JRC – The school is not covered by Book V of the Labor Code considering that it
NATOW claims that teachers paid on an hourly basis are entitled to both regular and is a non- profit institution and that its hourly paid faculty members are paid on a
special holiday pay. SC exempted JRC from paying on regular holidays but ordered "contract" basis
them to pay teachers and faculty on special holidays. o Any legal holidays within the semester will not affect the faculty's salary
because this day is not included in their schedule while the calendar is
Doctrine extended to compensate for special holidays
It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the  NLRC - The purpose of a holiday pay is obvious; that is to prevent diminution of
prevention of diminution of the monthly income of the employees on account of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other
work interruptions is defeated when a regular class day is cancelled on account of a words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should
special public holiday and class hours are held on another working day to make up earn. That is his holiday pay. It is no excuse therefore that the school calendar is
for time lost in the school calendar. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened extended whenever holidays occur, because such happens only in cases of
on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must special holidays
likewise be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.
Issue:
Facts: WON the school faculty who are paid per lecture hour are entitled to unworked
 Jose Rizal College (JRC) is a non-stock, non profit educational institution which holiday pay – Not required for REGULAR Holidays but required for SPECIAL Holidays
has 3 groups of employees categorized as follows: (a) personnel on monthly
basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year, Dispositive:
irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of respondent NLRC is hereby set aside, and a
for holidays; (b) personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and new one is hereby RENDERED
they receive unworked holiday pay and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the (a) exempting petitioner from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for
basis of student contract hour. regular holidays, whether the same be during the regular semesters of the school
 The National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) in behalf of the year or during semestral, Christmas, or Holy Week vacations;
faculty and personnel of JRC, filed with the Ministry of Labor a complaint and (b) but ordering petitioner to pay said faculty members their regular hourly rate on
alleged non-payment of holiday pay from 1975-1977 days declared as special holidays or for some reason classes are called off or
 The parties failed to settle their differences on conciliation and the case was shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions of
certified for compulsory arbitration class days be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise
 The Labor Arbiter ruled in the following manner: be paid their hourly rates should they teach during said extensions.
1. The faculty and personnel who are paid monthly are presumed to be already
paid the 10 paid legal holidays and are no longer entitled to separate Ratio
payment  Under the Labor Code 5, APPARENTLY, JRC (although a non-profit institution) is
2. The personnel who are paid daily are entitled to be paid the 10 unworked under obligation to give pay even on unworked regular holidays to hourly paid
regular holidays faculty members subject to the terms and conditions provided for therein.

5Art. 94. Right to holiday pay — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular SEC. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. — (a) Private school teachers, including faculty members of
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers; colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral vacations. They shall,
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a however, be paid for the regular holidays during Christmas vacations. ...
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; ... "
and in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, Book III, which reads:
 o HOWEVER the Court said that the aforementioned rule is not justified by
the provisions of the law which after all is silent with respect to faculty
members paid by the hour who because of their teaching contracts are
obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work actually done
o For regular holidays, since these are no class days, the faculty members do
not expect payment for said unworked days. The law however is silent as to
payment on Special Public Holidays.
 It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the
prevention of diminution of the monthly income of the employees on account
of work interruptions is defeated when a regular class day is cancelled on
account of a special public holiday and class hours are held on another working
day to make up for time lost in the school calendar. Otherwise stated, the
faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should
earn on that day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the
faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it does
not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours
lost, for their income that could be earned from other sources is lost during the
extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account
of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise
be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.
Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) vs. Vivar, NLRC, & Nestle Philippines, Inc. It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after
(formerly Filipro, Inc.) having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m.
January 20, 1992| Gutierrez. if they are Makati-based.
By: Ian
Issue: WON the sales personnel are field personnel as defined under Art. 82
SUMMARY: ("whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
UFE was claiming holiday pays for Nestle’s sales personnel arguing that these are certainty") hence are not entitled to holiday pay.
not field personnel as defined under Art. 82 of the Labor Code “whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty”. SC Petitioner:
ruled for Nestle ratiocinating that these are field personnel under the law because
the company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel,  The period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales
personnel's working hours which can be determined with reasonable
even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back
certainty.
at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in actual field work. The Court
 The company's sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the
strengthened its position by holding that the definition under Art. 82 was
SOD (Supervisor of the Day) schedule and the company circular dated
interpreted and expounded by Rule IV, Book III of the IRR, defining field March 15, 1984.
personnel as those whose time and performance is unsupervised by the  These sales personnel are given incentive bonus every quarter based on
employer. their performance hence their actual hours of work in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty.
DOCTRINE: Sales personnel are not entitled to holiday pay because they are
considered as field personnel as defined under the Labor Code and its IRR. The Held: Yes. They are field personnel and they are not entitled to holiday pay.
rationale for their exclusion, which is the same reason for their exclusion from Ratio:
payment of overtime pay, rests on how they execute their work: works
individually and has no restrictions as to time of work such that the employer has  The definition under Art. 82 must be read in conjunction with Rule IV,
no way of knowing the number of hours they work per day. Book III of the IRR:
“Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Section 1. Coverage - This rule shall apply to
all employees except:
FACTS: This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the
xxx xxx xxx
holiday pay award.
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is
 Nov. 8, 1985- Filipro, Inc. filed with the NLRC a petition for declaratory unsupervised by the employer xxx
relief to determine its rights and obligations in light of the Court’s
decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople involving Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the
holiday pays. aforementioned rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of
 January 2, 1980- Arbitrator Vivar ruled that it should pay its monthly field personnel. The cause “whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
paid employees holiday pay under Art. 94 subject only to the exclusions employer” did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause
and limitation under Art. 82 and other provisions under the Labor Code. "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
 Filipro filed a Motion for Clarification praying, among others, that its certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82
sales personnel6 be excluded from the payment of holiday pay because
which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's
they should be considered as field personnel as defined by the Code,
actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty,
which group is not entitled to holiday pay 7.

6Salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers, and medical representatives determined with reasonable certainty.”
7 Article 82- field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as
“non­agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of
business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance holiday pay benefits also applies.
is constantly supervised by the employer.

In the case at bar:

 The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales

personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field
work and come back at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in
actual field work.
 The SOD schedule adverted to by the petitioner does not in the least
signify that these sales personnel's time and performance are
supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the
sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00 a.m. and are back
in the office not earlier than 4:00 p.m.
 On incentive bonus:
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or
exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection
performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4)
good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns and (6) proper
truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190)
The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given
incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their
actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result
of their work and not by the actual hours of field work which are hardly
susceptible to determination.

In the case of San Miguel Brewery Inc. vs. Democratic Labor Organization
(citing Jewel Tea Co. vs. Williams), the Court discussed the nature of the
job of a salesman:
"The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly
apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent, works individually. There
are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as
much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates.
In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives commissions as extra
compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is
not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and this
employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day."

While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to
overtime pay, the same rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from
Imbuido v. NLRC  January 11, 1994: The NLRC denied Imbuido’s MR.
March 31, 2000 | Buena, J.  Imbuido goes up to the SC though a Petition for Certiorari.
By: Jadd
Topical issue discussed in Ratio 1 ISSUES/HELD:
1) WON Imbuido is entitled to service incentive leave pay – YES
SUMMARY:
2) WON Imbuido is a project employee – YES
Vivian Imbuido was International Information Services’ data encoder for 3 years, 3) WON Imbuido is a regular employee – YES
entering into 13 3-month employment contracts for specific projects. She was 4) WON Imbuidos’ dismissal was valid – NO
terminated after LAKAS petitioned the BLR for certification elections following
an agreement between Imbuido and 12 others to file a petition for certification RATIO:
election for the company’s rank-and-file employees. Imbuido filed a complaint for 1) Yes, Imbuido is entitled to service incentive leave pay because she had
illegal dismissal, praying for service incentive leave pay and 13 th month worked for the company for 3 years before she was dismissed. It is one
differential pay. The LA ruled in Imbuido’s favor and awarded service incentive of the benefits that accrues were it not for an employee’s illegal
leave pay (among others). The NLRC reversed the LA but remanded the service dismissal, so it should be computed up to the date of reinstatement.
incentive leave claim. The SC upheld the LA’s decision and held that Imbuido was A) (The SC cited the case of Fernandez v. NLRC for the following points)
entitled to service incentive leave pay because she had been employed for 3 B) On the duration of employment needed: SILP is demandable after 1
years, from dismissal up to reinstatement. year of service, whether continuous or broken or its equivalent
period.
DOCTRINE: C) On the accrual of SIL in relation to illegal dismissal: SILP is one of the
Service incentive leave pay is demandable after 1 year of service, whether benefits that would accrue if an employee was not otherwise
continuous or broken or its equivalent period. Where there is illegal dismissal, it illegally dismissed.
is computed up to reinstatement. D) On the computation of SIL where there is illegal dismissal: Up to date
of reinstatement (Citing LC 285, as amended)
FACTS: 2) Yes, Imbuido is a project employee because her employment was fixed
 International Information Services (the company) employed Vivian for a specific project whose completion had been determined at the time
Imbuido as a data encoder. of engagement.
o Duration: August 26, 1988 – October 18, 1991 A) Test to Determine Project Employee Status: Whether the project
o Manner: She would enter into an employment contract lasting employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or
for 3 months. She did this 13 times. undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the
 The contracts were for specific projects only. time the employee was engaged for that project. (Citing Nagusara v.
 She was supposed to abide by company rules and NLRC)
regulations for its employees. B) Definition of Project Employee: One whose employment has been
 September 1991: Imbuido and 12 other employees agreed to file a fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
petition for certification election for the company’s rank-and-file termination of which has been determined at the time of the
employees. engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
 October 8, 1991: LAKAS (Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas) petitioned the performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
BLR for certification elections. duration of the season. (Citing Brahm Industries v. NLRC)
 October 18, 1991: Imbuido received a termination letter from the C) In this case:
company’s admin officer due to low volume of work. 1. Imbuido’s activities are necessary or desirable (data encoding);
 May 25, 1992: Imbuido filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for 2. Her employment was fixed for a specific project, whose
service incentive leave pay and 13th month differential pay with the completion or termination was determined upon engagement.
NLRC. 3) Yes, Imbuido is a regular employee because there was continuous
 August 25, 1992: LA Raul Aquino ruled in Imbuido’s favour, ordering rehiring and her tasks were vital, necessary, and indispensible.
reinstatement with backwages, and service incentive leave pay. A) A project employee or work pool member may become a regular
 September 27, 1993: On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision but employee. (Citing Maraguinot v. NLRC)
remanded the claim for service incentive leave for further arbitration.
 1. Requisites:
(1) Continuous rehiring even after project cessstion; (Citing
Philippine National Construction Corp. v. NLRC) and
(2) Tasks are vital, necessary, and indispensable in employer’s
usual business. (Capitol Industrial Construction Groups v.
NLRC)
2. Rationale:
a) This is merely a recognition of a status based on the
continuous rehiring of those performing vital tasks.
b) This is still in accordance with the principle of no-work no-
pay.
c) A contrary ruling would allow circumvention of labor laws.
B) In this case: (Same reasoning as to why she is a project employee)
4) No, Imbuido’s dismissal was not valid because her security of tenure was
violated: she was not dismissed for just or authorized cause.
A) Regular employees are entitled to security of tenure based on LC 285
(as amended.)
B) In this case:
1. Imbuido is entitled to security of tenure because she is a regular
employee.
2. The causes of dismissal (low volume of work, and belatedly,
completion of the project) are not valid causes based on the
Labor Code.
3. Imbuido is entitled to:
(1) Reinstatement without loss of seniority and privileges, full
backwages including allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent.
(2) Computed from: When her compensation was withheld up
to actual reinstatement.
a) Deduct: Amounts corresponding to what could have
been earned from dismissal until reinstatement when
she was not undertaking any project.
Fernandez v. NLRC - They were not given separation pay.
January 28, 1998 | Panganiban, J. 4. For her part, Lhuiller alleged that:
By: Kiko Case of Lim
- Lim was informed that an investigation will be conducted by Lhuillier because
SUMMARY: Fernandez et al. demanded an increase in their salaries. They were of the report of a co-employee that Lim sold to a company consumer her own
dismissed shortly thereafter. LA found that Fernandez et al. were illegally jewelry, in violation of the company house rules
dismissed. LA awarded, among others, service incentive pay to petitioners in
- Notice of Intended Termination was served upon Lim requiring her to submit a
varying amounts based on the length of their tenure. NLRC reversed the LA. written explanation.
- Lim did not submit a written explanation but actively participated in the
DOCTRINE: An employee who has served for one year is entitled to service investigation where she admitted having committed the violation complained of;
incentive leave/pay. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary in view of her admission of guilt, the company lawyer recommended to the
value. Since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of management her demotion and transfer without reduction of salary
service (whether continuous or broken) or its equivalent period, and it is one of - Lim tendered an irrevocable letter of resignation, hence, she was not
the benefits which would have accrued if an employee was not otherwise illegally terminated; and because of the malicious and false complaint filed by Lim, the
dismissed, it is fair and legal that its computation should be up to the date of company was compelled to file a counter-complaint for Perjury.
reinstatement as provided under Section 279 Case of Tomongha
- Tomongha was found to have stolen rematado jewelries.
FACTS: - instead of attending the investigation scheduled for this offense, he abandoned
1. Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuiller and Margarita Lhuiller was charged for illegal his job although his application for leave of absence was not approved.
dismissal by its employees in the pawnshop business. The case involved two - Lhuillier made it a pre-condition for his return to work that he executes a
sets of complainants: Fernandez et al (Leiden Fernandez, Gloria Adriano, Emilia promissory note for his indebtedness. Tomongha executed the promisory note
Negapatan, Jesus Tomongha, Eleanor Quinanola, Asteria Ocampo, Florida and was allowed to return to work.
VIllaceran, Florida Tallado, and Brenda Gadiano) and Lim and Canonigo (Marilyn - Tomongha and other petitioners abandoned their employment.
Lim and Joseph Canonigo). Case of other petitioners
2. Fernandez et al. alleged that: - Adriano was found by to have over-declared the weights and values of certain
-They demanded from Margueritte Lhuillier an increase in their salaries items of jewelry pawned to the company
since her business was making good and that she was evading payment of - Adriano together with Villaceran, Negapatan, Gadiano, Fernandez, Tomongha,
taxes. Campo and Talledo did not report for work although no requests for leave of
- Lhuillier became angry and threatened Fernandez et al. absence were filed.
- Lhuillier accused the employees of stealing jewelry from the pawnshop. - Lhuiller caused letters to beserved on petitioner requiring them to explain their
- Fernandez et al. were verbally informed by Lhuiller that they were terminated sudden abandonment from work. Instead of giving an explanation, petitioners
from work. claimed that their employments were terminated.
3. Lim and Canonigo alleged that: - Lhuiller claims that petitioners voluntarily abandoned their work in order
- They demanded increases in their salaries since they noted that Lhuillier had a to dramatize their sympathy for Gloria Adriano, and they were not
very lucrative business besides evading tax payments by making false entries. dismissed from their employment.
- They also informed Lhuiller that they intended to join the Associated Labor
Union (ALU), which made Lhuillier angry. 5. LA ruled in favor of petitioners and against respondents. Lhuillier was ordered
- Lhuillier advised them to tender their resignations as they were reportedly to reinstate petitioners and to pay them separation pay, service incentive leave
responsible for some anomalies at the Agencia Cebuana-H Lhuillier. Lhuillier pay with full backwages. The labor arbiter granted varying amounts of service
assured them that they will be given separation pay. incentive leave pay to the petitioners based on the length of their tenure (see
- They asked Lhuillier that they be allowed to confront the persons who reported footnote for the computation of the service incentive pay).8
to her about their supposed involvement in the alleged anomalies but she ignored
it and told them to tender their respective resignations.

8
Lhuillier is ordered to pay to the complainants among others their respective 1. LEIDEN FERNANDEZ:
separation pay, service incentive leave pay computed hereunder as follows: Service Incentive Leave (6 yrs.)= 3,322.50
6. NLRC reversed the LA and remanded the case for further proceedings to the employer must prove a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
Regional Arbitration Branch due to Lhuiller’s failure to present evidence and LA’s resume his employment without any intention of returning.
disregard of his procedural due process rights.
Lhuillier failed to discharge this burden. The claim of abandonment was
ISSUES/HELD: (there were procedural issues but I am not including them for inconsistent with the immediate filing of petitioners’ complaint for illegal
brevity) dismissal and prayer for reinstatement. No inference be made that an
1. WON petitioners were illegally dismissed? (YES, Fernandez et al were employee had no intention of returning to work, when such employee filed a
illegally dismissed but Lim and Canonigo were found to have resigned.) complaint for illegal dismissal praying for reinstatement three days after the
2. Assuming petitioners were illegally dismissed, WON the computation of alleged abandonment. Also considering that petitioners had been with
the backwages, service incentive leave pay and damages were valid and Pawnshop Lhuillier for several years (ranging from six (6) years to thirty
correct? (YES) three (33) years), it is unlikely that they would simply leave their
employment. Clearly, there is no cogent basis for private respondents’ theory
RATIO: that Fernandez et al. abandoned their work. In this light, LA was sustained with
1. Fernandez et al. were illegally dismissed regard to the finding that Fernandez et al. were illegally dismissed, with neither
Lhuiller argues that Fernandez et al. abandoned their employment while just cause nor due process.
Fernandez at el. alleged that they were told not to report for work. Court found
that Fernandez et al. did not abandon their employment; rather, they were Lim and Canonigo Resigned
illegally dismissed. Petitioner Lim’s testimony that she has never been informed of any wrongdoing
until her termination is belied by her assertions in her letter of resignation9. Her
To succeed in pleading abandonment as a valid ground for dismissal, the admission of the offense charged shows that
employer must prove: she was not coerced to resign. Besides, the fact that her complaint for illegal
(1) the intention of an employee to abandon his or her employment and dismissal was filed long after her resignation on February 24, 1990 suggests
(2) an overt act from which such intention may be inferred; i.e., the employee that it was a mere afterthought.
showed no desire to resume his work. Mere absence is not sufficient. The

2. GLORIA ADRIANO: Service Incentive Leave (2 yrs.) = 1,038.50

Service incentive leave (17 yrs.)= 10,986.25
9
3. EMELIA NEGAPATAN: In Lim’s letter of resignation, her lawyer proposed the following to Private
Service incentive leave (24 yrs.)= 13,752.00 Respondent Lhuillier:
4. JESUS P. TOMONGHA: 1. That our client Ms. Marilyn Lim be given immediately a clearance upon
Service Incentive leave = 19,478.25 resignation from your good company and payment of separation pay at the rate of
5. ELEONOR QUIANOLA: one month per year of service; and
Service Incentive Leave = 8,022.00 2. That our client is willing to execute a promissory note on her indebtedness, and
6. ASTERIA CAMPO: will pay upon the same terms prevailing before her resignation. Our clients ability to
Service Incentive Leave (13 yrs.) = 7,400.00 settle her indebtedness should be given kind consideration by your company
7. FLORIDA VILLACERAN: considering that her eventual resignation will render her jobless for a
Service Incentive leave (17 yrs.) = 9,677.25 while. Besides, per Investigation Report No. 2, Series of 1990, conducted by your
8. FLORIDA TALLEDO: Resident Counsel, Atty. Malcolm V. Seno, our client has impressed your Resident
Service Incentive leave (18 yrs.) = 10,557.00 Counsel as a person of much valor and great determination when she immediately
9. BRENDA GADIANO: admitted her guilt.
Service Incentive leave (13 yrs.) 7,536.75 3. That the various checks she endorsed to your company be returned to our client,
10. MARILYN LIM: so that she could file a case against the issuers or drawers of the same, be it
Service Incentive for 7 yrs. = 4,980.50 criminal or civil in nature. (Emphasis supplied).
11. JOSEPH CANONIGO:
Petitioner Canonigo contends that he was forced to sign his letter of resignation. one of the benefits which would have accrued if an employee was not
He also stated that he resigned because he was assured of separation pay. Like otherwise illegally dismissed, it is fair and legal that its computation should
Petitioner Lim, he did not immediately file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Based be up to the date of reinstatement as provided under Section 279 of the LC.
on these, he was found to have voluntarily resigned on the assurance of
separation pay. SC took note however of the fact that the Implementing Rules state that
entitlement to benefit provided under this Rule shall start December 16, 1975,
2. Award of Service Leave Incentive Pay was Proper the date the amendatory provision of the LC took effect. Hence, petitioners,
OSG: The award of service incentive leave should be limited to three years, except Lim and Canonigo, should be entitled to service incentive leave pay from
based on Article 291 of the LC which provides: December 16, 1975 up to their actual reinstatement.
ART. 291. Money Claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.

Fernandez et al: Article 291 speaks clearly on the prescription of filing [an]
action upon monetary claims within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued, but it is not a prescription of a period of time for the
computation of monetary claims.

Court’s Ruling:
The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay to
workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V, Book
III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that every employee who
has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service
incentive leave of five days with pay.

Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served
within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the
employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular
holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or
policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in
which case said period shall be considered as one year. It is also commutable to
its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year.

In other words, an employee who has served for one year is entitled to
service incentive leave/pay. He may use it as leave days or he may collect
its monetary value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor
general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right. The law indeed does
not prohibit its commutation.

In Bustamante et al. vs. NLRC et al., the SC lifted the three-year restriction on the
amount of backwages and other allowances that may be awarded an illegally
dismissed employee.

Since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of

service (whether continuous or broken) or its equivalent period, and it is
 However, on 17 October 1996, private respondents Abesa and Gonzales filed
before the NLRC complaints for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay,
JPL Marketing v. Court of Appeals 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and payment for moral damages.
08 July 2005 | Tinga, J. Aninipot filed a similar case thereafter.
By: Jocs Dilag LA Rivera: Dismissed complaints for lack of merit
SUMMARY: The LA said that Gonzales and Abesa applied with another store before the
JPL stopped direct merchandising in employees assigned location. They were 6-month period given by law to JPL to provide private respondents a new
requested to wait for further notice for new reassignment. There was no illegal assignment. Thus, they may be considered to have unilaterally severed their
dismissal mainly because the employees were the ones who severed ties with JPL relation with JPL, and cannot charge JPL with illegal dismissal.
within the 6-month period allotted to the employers to resume work or reassign LA said that it was their obligatioin to wait until they were reassigned by JPL, and
its employees pursuant to art 286 of the LC. if after six months they were not reassigned, they can file an action for separation
pay but not for illegal dismissal.
DOCTRINE: (Computation of benefits) The claims for 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay was also
When to start: denied since private respondents were paid way above the applicable
13th month pay - From the first day of employment; minimum wage during their employment.
Service incentive leave pay - A year after commencement of service; NLRC: Affirmed LA but ordered Separation pay, based on their last salary rate
Until when: and counted from the first day of their employment with the respondent JPL up
Only up to 15 August 1996, or the last day that private respondents worked for to the finality of this judgment; Service Incentive Leave pay, and 13th month
JPL. pay, computed in the same way as the separation pay.
To extend the period to the date of finality of the NLRC resolution would negate CA: Affirmed NLRC.
the absence of illegal dismissal, or to be more precise, the want of dismissal in
this case. Besides, it would be unfair to require JPL to pay private respondents ISSUES/HELD:
the said benefits beyond 15 August 1996 when they did not render any service to WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay and
JPL beyond that date. service incentive leave pay. YES
These benefits are given by law on the basis of the service actually rendered What should be the reckoning point for computing said awards. From the time
by the employee, and in the particular case of the service incentive leave, is the employees severed their ties with JPL
granted as a motivation for the employee to stay longer with the employer.
There is no cause for granting said incentive to one who has already RATIO:
terminated his relationship with the employer. WRT the grant of separation pay
Under Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, separation pay is authorized only in
FACTS: cases of dismissals due to any of these reasons: (a) installation of labor saving
JPL is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of recruitment and devices; (b) redundancy; (c) retrenchment; (d) cessation of the employer's
placement of workers, while private respondents Noel Gonzales, Ramon Abesa business; and (e) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his
III and Faustino Aninipot were employed by JPL as merchandisers on separate continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health and to
dates and assigned at different establishments in Naga City and Daet, the health of his co-employees.
Camarines Norte as attendants to the display of California Marketing As a measure of social justice in those cases where the employee is validly
Corporation, one of JPL’s clients. dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
13 Aug ‘96: JPL notified private respondents that CMC would stop its direct moral character, but only when he was illegally dismissed
merchandising activity in the Bicol Region, Isabela, and Cagayan Valley effective Under Sec. 4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules to Implement the
15 August 1996. Labor Code that provides for the payment of separation pay to an employee
They were advised to wait for further notice as they would be transferred to entitled to reinstatement but the establishment where he is to be reinstated has
other clients. closed or has ceased operations or his present position no longer exists at the
time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the employer.
The common denominator of the instances where payment of separation pay is other payment amounting to not less than 1/12 of the basic salary but shall
warranted is that the employee was dismissed by the employer. not include cash and stock dividends, cost-of-living-allowances (COLA) and
all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-
As applied: monetary benefits.
In the instant case, there was no dismissal to speak of. Private respondents On the other hand, service incentive leave, as provided in Art. 95 of the Labor
were simply not dismissed at all, whether legally or illegally. What they received Code, is a yearly leave benefit of five (5) days with pay, enjoyed by an
from JPL was not a notice of termination of employment, but a memo informing employee who has rendered at least one year of service. Unless specifically
them of the termination of CMC’s contract with JPL. More importantly, they excepted, all establishments are required to grant service incentive leave to their
were advised that they were to be reassigned. At that time, there was no employees. The term “at least one year of service” shall mean service within
severance of employment to speak of. twelve (12) months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date
the employee started working.
WRT the suspension of operation of the business
Furthermore, Art. 286 of the Labor Code allows the bona fide suspension of the
As applied:
operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six 6 months,
wherein an employee/employees are placed on the so­called “floating status.” Nonetheless, JPL cannot escape the payment of 13 th month pay and service
incentive leave pay to private respondents. Said benefits are mandated by law
When that “floating status” of an employee lasts for more than six months,
and should be given to employees as a matter of right.
he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the service.
Thus, he is entitled to the corresponding benefits for his separation, and this Admittedly, they were not given their 13th month pay and service incentive
would apply to suspension either of the entire business or of a specific leave pay while they were under the employ of JPL. Instead, JPL provided salaries,
component thereof. which were over and above the minimum wage.
The Court ruled that the difference between the minimum wage and the
As applied: actual salary received by private respondents cannot be deemed as their
As clearly borne out by the records of this case, private respondents sought 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay as such difference is not
employment from other establishments even before the expiration of the six equivalent to or of the same import as the said benefits contemplated by law.
(6)-month period provided by law. As they admitted in their comment, all three The computation for both benefits should only be up to 15 August 1996, or
of them applied for and were employed by another establishment after they the last day that private respondents worked for JPL.
received the notice from JPL. To extend the period to the date of finality of the NLRC resolution would negate
JPL did not terminate their employment; they themselves severed their the absence of illegal dismissal, or to be more precise, the want of dismissal in
relations with JPL. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay. this case. Besides, it would be unfair to require JPL to pay private
The Court is not inclined in this case to award separation pay even on the respondents the said benefits beyond 15 August 1996 when they did not
ground of compassionate justice. render any service to JPL beyond that date.
The Court of Appeals relied on the cases wherein the Court awarded separation
pay to legally dismissed employees on the grounds of equity and social
consideration.
Said cases involved employees who were actually dismissed by their
employers, whether for cause or not. Clearly, the principle applies only when
the employee is dismissed by the employer, which is not the

WRT holiday pay and other benefits

PD 851, as amended, requires an employer to pay its rank and file employees a
13th month pay not later than 24 December of every year. However, said law
does not cover employers not paying their employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent. The term “its equivalent” was defined by the law’s implementing
guidelines as including Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, cash bonuses and
  Sugue filed an application for leave for July 14 and 15, but the approval of the
Sugue v. Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. same was conditioned on her submission of the 2001 Marketing Plan.
January 30, 2009| Leonardo-De Castro, J. Sugue also applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was also denied
By: Monica because of the arrival of the company’s regional manager (international
region).
SUMMARY: When Valderrama left (claiming constructive dismissal), Sugue complained
Two employees were absent from work and this absence was charged against that she was asked to report to Temblique, who she claims was her assistant
their vacation leave credits. They also filed applications for leave which were and therefore she is being demoted.
denied to due to non-compliance with imposed conditions. The SC eventually  Valderrama and Sugue were asked to explain their continued absences
ruled that the conditions imposed were valid. without leave. Prior to actual termination, they filed another complaint
for constructive dismissal.
DOCTRINE:  LA ruled in their favor. On appeal to the NLRC, the LA was reversed. On
In the grant of vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the employer is certiorari to the CA, the LA’s decision was reinstated with the modification of
given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to the same as it is not a deletion of the attorney’s fees and reduction of moral damages.
standard of law, but a prerogative of management. It is a mere concession or act  Sugue and Valderamma’s heirs (Valderrama died sometime during the
of grace of the employer and not a matter of right on the part of the employee. pendency of the case) appealed to the SC to question the modification of the
Thus, it is well within the power and authority of an employer to deny an LA decision. Triumph appealed to question the NLRC reversal and
employee’s application for leave and the same cannot be perceived as reinstatement of the LA decision.
discriminatory or harassment.
ISSUES/HELD:
FACTS: 1. WON Sugue and Valderrama were constructively dismissed? No.
 Virgina Sugue was respondent’s Assistant Manager for Marketing and 2. WON Sugue and Valderrama application for leaves were validly denied? Yes.
Renato Valderrama was one of respondent’s Direct Sales Manager. In 1999, 3. WON the crediting of their half-day absence to their leave credits was valid?
respondent’s sales declined. Sales target, which were set by Valderrama Yes.
himself , were not met. The low sales performance was the subject of
correspondence between Valderrama and the top management, RATIO:
 Sugue and Valderrama filed a complaint with the NLRC against Triumph for Constructive Dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when
payment of money claims arising from allegedly unpaid vacation and continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when
sick leave credits, birthday leave and 14th month pay for the period there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
1999-2000. insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
 On 19 June 2000, Sugue and Valderrama attended a preliminary
conference of the case they filed. They did not file a leave and used company Acts which purportedly show discrimination and bad faith on the part of
car and driver. They were asked to explain where they were in the morning Triumph:
of 19 June 2000. Sugue and Valderrama said they went to the preliminary In the case of Valderrama:
conference of the case and thought that they could use company time. 1. The half-day he spent in attending the NLRC hearing on June 19, 2000 was
 Triumph charged Sugue and Valderrama’s one-half day absence to their charged to his vacation leave credit;
vacation leave credits. 2. His application for sick leave for July 3 to 5, 2000 was disapproved; and
 Valderrama was absent from July 3 to July 5. He filed an application for sick 3. His request for executive check-up was denied.
leave, which was denied because Valderrama failed to present a medical
certificate. The company policy requires such a certificate for sick leave for In the case of Sugue:
more than one day. 1. The half-day she spent in attending the NLRC hearing on June 19, 2000 was
Valderrama applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was denied charged to her vacation leave credit;
because of the arrival of the company’s regional manager (international 2. The approval of her application for leave of absence for July 14 and 15,
region). 2000 was made subject to the condition that she should first submit a report
on the 2001 Marketing Plan;
 3. The approval of her request for executive check-up was deferred until after 1, 2000. This undeniably demonstrated that Valderrama intended to leave
the visit of the company’s regional marketing manager; and his employment with Triumph even before the company issued a show cause
4. A memorandum was issued instructing her to report to her former memo (on July 10, 2000) for him to explain, among others, his below target sales
assistant, Mr. Temblique, which was allegedly tantamount to a demotion. performance and before he informed the company that he considered himself
constructively dismissed on July 17, 2000.
1. Sugue and Valderrama were not constructively dismissed. The
circumstances do not warrant a finding of constructive dismissal. Having failed to substantiate their claim of constructive dismissal, Sugue
and Valderrama should be deemed to have abandoned their work, thus,
Explained below are the explanation for Triumph’s actions. Anent Sugue’s their dismissal is warranted. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
claims that she was demoted, this was found to be unfounded by the refusal of an employee to resume his employment, without any intention of
Court. The person to whom she was to report to was not under Sugue, returning. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of
but he was in the same level as Valderrama (Sugue’s boss). employment by the employer. For abandonment to be a valid ground for
dismissal, two elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work
2. Sugue and Valderrama wanted to have their executive check-ups when or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
their regional manager (officer from abroad) was in town. It was fair the employer-employee relationship. The second element is the more
for the company to require them to be present because of their function. determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts.
They had to coordinate and meet with the regional manager. They were not
precluded to have their check-up after the regional manager leaves.

Valderrama’s rejected sick leave application are also valid. It was shown that
he did not comply with the company policy on the application for sick
leave. He failed to present a medical certificate.
Sugue’s rejected application was also valid considering that what was
required of her was actually part of her functions. The preparation and
submission of the marketing plan was a valid condition to be imposed.

In the grant of vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the

employer is given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to the
same as it is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of management. It is a
mere concession or act of grace of the employer and not a matter of right on
the part of the employee. Thus, it is well within the power and authority of
an employer to deny an employee’s application for leave and the same cannot
be perceived as discriminatory or harassment.

3. Sugue and Valderrama’s absence from work to go to the preliminary

conference of their first case was not compensable time. Triumph was
justified in charging the absence to their vacation leave credits.

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or
management and employee is that a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor."
If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay,
unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was
illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended.

Worth noting is that as early as June 21, 2000, Valderrama had accepted
employment with Fila Philippines, Inc. as its Sales Director effective August
PSTMSDWO v. PNCC Skyway Corporation  Petitioners allege that the schedule was a scheme on part of PNCC to
GR No. 171231; Feb 17, 2010; Peralta avoid monetization of the VL based on a memo addressed to department
By: Paola heads stating that the target is zero conversion of VL come December
2004.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner labor union contested the two provisions in the CBA with PNCC. They 2. As to the expenses for in-service training
claim that the prerogative to schedule vacation leaves should be with the  CBA provided that the security guard EE should shoulder expenses
employees (and not PNCC) and that PNCC should bear expenses for renewal for securing/renewing their licenses.
of licenses.  Petitioners are now demanding that the expenses for the required
Supreme Court held that PNCC had the right under the CBA to schedule the in-service training of security guards, as a requirement for
leave. However, it sided with labor union on the second issue stating that renewal of licenses should be shouldered by PNCC.
under the law, it is PNCC who should shoulder the costs for in service  Petitioners and PNCC failed to settle amicably so the issue was
training, which is a prerequisite before security guards may renew their licenses. submitted to the voluntary arbitrator (VA)
DOCTRINE: 3. VA: Sided with petitioners. Scheduling should be under discretion of EEs
In the grant of vacation leave privileges to an employee, the employer is given the entitled thereto –so it ordered PNCC to convert into cash all leaves that PNCC
leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to and commutation of the same, compelled petitioners to use. As to expenses for in-service training, PNCC
as the grant of vacation leave is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of should pay for it.
management. It is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer and not a 4. CA: reversed decision of VA.
matter of right on the part of the employee. Thus, it is well within the power and  Provisions of CBA are clear and VA had no authority to interpret the
authority of an employer to impose certain conditions, as it deems fit, on the grant same beyond what was expressly written.
of vacation leaves, such as having the option to schedule the same. Along that line,
since the grant of vacation leave is a prerogative of the employer, the latter can ISSUES/HELD:
compel its employees to exhaust all their vacation leave credits. 1) WON the management has the sole discretion to schedule the VL of petitioners
– YES. (see doctrine)
2) WON the in-service training should be borne by petitioners – NO. PNCC should
FACTS: shoulder the costs of training.
Petitioner labor union and PNCC entered into a CBA. Included in this CBA are
vacation leave (VL) and expenses for security license provisions. RATIO:
Vacation Leave:
1. As to vacation leave: The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, the
 Employees (EEs) are given certain days for vacation leave over the year contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean. Here
(15-19 days depending on length of stay in service) the terms of the CBA entered into by petitioners and PNCC are clear and leave no
 In the CBA it is explicitly stated in Art VIII that the company shall doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties – it categorically provides
schedule the vacation leave of EEs taking into consideration the that scheduling of VL shall be under the option of PNCC. Preference requested
request of preference of employees. Any unused leave shall be by EEs is not controlling because PNCC retains power and prerogative to
converted into cash. consider or ignore the request.

PNCC then published the scheduled vacation leave of the EEs for the year 2004. As stated by the CA:
 PNCC then published a memo stating that EEs may swap schedule on “the grant to management of the right to schedule vacation leaves is not without
one-on-one basis, or request for rescheduling of their leave, which good reason. Indeed, if [EEs] were given the unilateral discretion to schedule
PNCC shall review taking into consideration operational requirements of their vacation leaves, the same may result in significantly crippling the
the department. number of key EEs of [PNCC] manning the toll ways on holidays and other
peak seasons, where [EEs] may wittingly or unwittingly choose to have a
Petitioners objected to the implementation of the schedule saying that individual vacation. Put another way, the grant to management of the right to schedule
EEs have the right to schedule their VL. vacation leaves ensures that there would always be enough people manning and
servicing the toll ways, which in turn assures the public plying the same orderly
and efficient toll way service.”

The CBA did not give EEs the right to schedule their VL and as such their
preference may only be given priority but they cannot demand, as a matter of
right, that their request be automatically granted.

In the grant of vacation leave privileges to an employee, the employer is given the
leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to and commutation of the same,
as the grant of vacation leave is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of
management. It is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer and not a
matter of right on the part of the employee. Thus, it is well within the power and
authority of an employer to impose certain conditions, as it deems fit, on the grant
of vacation leaves, such as having the option to schedule the same.

Along that line, since the grant of vacation leave is a prerogative of the employer,
the latter can compel its employees to exhaust all their vacation leave credits.

It seems that petitioner’s goal in relentlessly arguing the preference for

scheduling their VL is not to avail of the VL but to convert all their VL credits into
cash. The SC stated that purpose of a vacation leave is to afford a laborer a chance
to get a much-needed rest to replenish his worn-out energy and acquire a new
vitality to enable him to efficiently perform his duties, and not merely to give him
additional salary and bounty. It is a non-monetary benefit. To allow them to
convert their VL into cash would defeat the very purpose of VL.

In-service training
While the CBA may provide that the EE-security guards must shoulder expenses
for the renewal of their licenses, under the Private Security Agency Law and its
IRR, it is the responsibility of operators of private security agency and company
security forces to train and maintain standards of efficiency of their personnel.
They should conduct in-service training for their members. This training may be
centralized but the costs would be pro-rated among participating agencies or
companies. Since the law provides that the duty to maintain standards and
efficiency is with the operators/company, then costs should be on the account of
the company.

Also petitioners alleged that prior to the signing of the CBA, in service training
was provided by PNCC and the latter did not controvert this, therefore it is
deemed admitted and deemed an acknowledgement on part of PNCC of its legal
mandate to shoulder expenses for this training.
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, Pacita O. Po, and/or Josefa Po Lam v. 1. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patet and the
Rolando Adana, Chona Bumalay, Roger Burce, Eduardo Almares, Amado Almaes, employer had the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or
Edgardo Torrefanca, Lourdes Camigla, Tedoro Laurenaria, Wenefredo Loveres, Luis authorized cause, pursuant to Art. 286 of the Labor Code.
Gaudes, Amado Macandog, Paterno Llarena, Gregorio Nicerio, Jose Attractivo,
2. Petitioners initially claimed with the LA that it could not be illegal dismissal
Miguel Torrefranca and Santos Bronola
because the lay-off was merely temporary and due to the expiration of the
16 May 2005; Puno
lease contract over the old premises of the hotel. After the LA ruled that
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon there was already illegal dismissal when the lay-off had exceeded 6 months,
it raised a new argument stating that the failure to reinstate the employees
1. Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant is a single proprietor business
could not be attributed to the petitioners as the fact that the employees
registered in the name of the petitioner Pacita Po, whose mother, petitioner
were out of work was due to circumstances beyond the petitioners’ control.
Josefa Po Lam, manages the establishment. The hotel and restaurant
employed around 16 employees. 3. While the closure of hotel operations in April 1997 may have been
2. March 31, 1997: Hotel operations of the business were suspended due to temporary, the evidence on record belie any claim of the petitioners that
the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the rented space the lay-off was merely temporary. Rather, the SC held that evidence
occupied by said hotel and restaurant at Rizal Street. It continued its showed that petitioners meant for it to be permanent.
operations at a new location on Elizondo Street, Legazpi City. Only 9 of the
16 employees continued working there. ▪ The illegal dismissal complaints were filed immediately after the
3. April to May 1997: The 16 employees filed complaints for underpayment of closure of operations on Rizal Street.
wages and other money claims against petitioners. ▪ Petitioners made no mention in their position paper with the LA
4. July 14, 2000: Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio Rivera rendered a Joint that they had any intent to recall the respondents to work upon the
Decision in favor of the employees who awarded substantially all of the completion of the new premises.
money claims of the respondents and held that respondents Loveres, ▪ Petitioners made allegations in various pleadings that the
Macandog, and Llarena were entitled to separation pay, while resondents respondents were responsible for mismanagement of the
Guades, Nicerio, and Alamares were entitled to retirement pay. establishment and for abuse of trust and confidence. These
5. NLRC reversed the LA. Respondents filed an MR with the NLRC which was accusations are inconsistent with a desire to recall them to work.
denied.
▪ Petitioners’ memorandum on appeal also averred that the case
6. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which rendered the
was filed “not because of the business being operated by them or
now assailed decision.
that they were supposedly not receiving benefits, but because of
7. Petitioners filed an MR with the CA which was denied. Petitioners went up
the fact that the source of their livelihood, whether legal or
to the SC.
immoral, was stopped on March 31, 1997.”
II. Issues
▪ Petitioners, in the same pleading, alleged that there was only
1. Whether respondents Loveres, Guades, Macandog, Atractivo, Llarena, and temporary cessation or suspension of operations but also stated
Nicerio were illegally dismissed? YES. the separation was due to severe financial losses and reverses
2. Whether respondents are entitled to money claims due to underpayment of leading to closure of the business and that petitioner Po had to
wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SLIP, COLA, close shop.
overtime pay, and night shift differential pay? YES. ▪ The LA had the uncontroverted finding that the petitioner
terminated all the oter respondents by not employing them when
III. Holding
the establishment relocated to their new side on Penaranda Street.
Motion to dismiss of USA granted.
4. While the aforementioned factors may be inconclusive individually, when
IV. Ratio taken together, they lead to the conclusion that petitioners really intended
to dismiss all respondents
Respondents were illegally dismissed
5. Even assuming that the closure was due to a reason beyond the control of
 the employer, it still had to accord to its employees some relief in the form interviewed by the DOLE as to the quality and quantity of the food,
of severance pay. nor was it shown that the respondents voluntarily acecepted them.
6. Under these circumstances, the award of damages was proper. As a rule, 6. Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted
moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or certain legal requirements.
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
▪ As stated in Mabeza v NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct
Respondents are entitled to their money claims the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the
1. SC agreed with the CA and LA that the respondents have set out with following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished
particularity in their complaint, position paper, affidavits, and other by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily
documents the labor standard benefits they are entitled to, and which they accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are
alleged the petitioners failed to pay them. Thus, the burden was on the charged at fair and reasonable value.
petitioners to prove that they have paid these money claims.
▪ There was also uncontroverted testimony of respondents on
2. Despite repeated orders from the LA petitioners failed to submit the record that they were required to eat in the hotel and restaurant
pertinent employee files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar so that they will not go home and there is no interruption in the
documents which would show that respondents rendered work entitling services of Mayon Hotel & Restaurant.
them to payment for overtime work, night shift differential, premium pay
7. The SC also did not agree with the petitioners that the 5% gross income of
for work on holidays and rest day, and payment of these as well as the COLA
the establishment can be considered as part of the respondents’ wages.
and the SILP – documents which are not in respondents’ possession but in
the custody and absolute control of petitioners ▪ LA: “While complainants, who were employed in the hotel,
receive[d] various amounts as profit share, the same cannot be
▪ By choosing not to fully and completely disclose information and
considered as part of their wages in determining their claims for
present the necessary documents to prove payment of labor
violation of labor standard benefits. [The] [so-]called profit share
standard benefits due to respondents, petitioners failed to
is in the nature of share from service charges charged by the
discharge the burden of proof
hotel. This is explained by [respondents] when they testified that
3. Petitioners claimed that the cost of food and snacks provided facilities to what they received are not fixed amounts and the same are paid
respondents should have been included in reckoning the payment of not on a monthly basis. Also, [petitioners] failed to submit
respondents’ wages. They claimed that these benefits made up for evidence that the amounts received by [respondents] as profit
whatever inadequacies there may have been in compensation. share are to be considered part of their wages and had been
agreed by them prior to their employment. Further, how can the
▪ They specifically invoked Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule II-A which allowed the amounts receive[d] by [respondents] be considered as profit share
deduction of facilities provided by the employer through an when the same [are] based on the gross receipt of the hotel[?] No
appropriate Facility Evaluation Order issued by the Regional profit can as yet be determined out of the gross receipt of an
Director o the DOLE. enterprise. Profits are realized after expenses are deducted from
4. Petitioners also averred that they give 5% of the gross income each month the gross income.”
as incentives.
5. SC ruled that the cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to
respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents’ minimum wage.

▪ While petitioners submitted Facility Evaluation Orders issued by

the DOLE Regional Office, the cost of meals in the Order cannot be
considered as applicable to the respondents. The latter were never