Olivia D.

Diwa Persons & Family Law - 1JD-A

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-63915 Date: December 29, 1986

Facts: The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al, invoked the process by demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential decrees to which they claimed were not published as required by the law. The
respondent, Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, et. al, had argued that even if publication was a rule that was
necessary, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided”, as when the decrees declared themselves
that they were to be effective and immediately upon their approval.

In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, it was affirmed by the court that the necessity for
publication of the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

In the petitioner’s move for a motion of reconsideration of the aforementioned case, they suggested
that there should not be any distinction between the laws of general applicability and those which are
not. Publication should mean complete publication and that the publication must be made forthwith
the Official Gazette.

Issues:

Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability, such as presidential
decrees, and laws which are not as to their publication for its effectivity as covered by the provisions of
Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

Ruling:

No. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The term “laws” should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in
general despite the fact that there are some that do not apply to them directly.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Olivia D. Diwa Persons & Family Relations 1JD-A

GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,

vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA,
SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP-
P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.

G.R. No.: 159747 Date: April 13, 2004

Facts:

The petitioner, Senator Gringo Honasan, was charged with the crime of coup d’etat before the
respondents, Department of Justice, et. al. The charge against him was for and on behalf of the rebels
in the military occupying Oakwood who had made a public statement that was aired on national
television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFp and the
Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Adding on to their statement, they stated that
they are willing to risk their lives so as to achieve the National Recovery Agenda authored by Sen.
Honasan, which they firmly believe is the only course of action that should be taken to get rid of the
ills of the society. Thus, a subpoena was issued for preliminary investigation.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification in questioning the jurisdiction the DOJ has over the
case. The petitioner further added that the said imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office, thus reasoning that the Office of the Ombudsman has the proper jurisdiction to conduct the
corresponding preliminary investigation and not the DOJ. The charge should be filed in court under the
Sandiganbayan and not the regular courts, that can legally take knowledge of the case considering that
he is a part of a group of public officials.

Issues:

Whether or not the DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation over the charge of
coup d’etat against the petitioner.

Ruling:

The jurisdiction of the DOJ is not derived from the Joint Circular, OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but
on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code found under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV governing
 the DOJ. Sec. 1. As a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in
the investigation of the crimes, prosecuting offenders and administration of the correctional system;
and investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system. Thus, in Section 13(1), it does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law
to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, under the Ombudsman Act of 1987, was
enacted empowering ombudsman with primary jurisdiction over perceptible cases by Sandiganbayan
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government. Moreover, the
Ombudsman recognizes its concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative bodies of government.

WHEREFORE, the petition for ceritorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, June 28, 2001

FACTS:

 The petitioners are the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. and Perfecto V.
Fernandez.

 Respondents include Honorable Benjamin Vega (Presiding Judge, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court
of Manila), the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Liquidator of the Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB).

 In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines sought assistance for the liquidation of PVB, leading
to Case No. SP-32311.

 The Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. filed claims for unpaid wages and
benefits in the same case.

 Partial payments were made, but many claims remained unpaid due to piecemeal hearings.

 On January 2, 1992, Republic Act No. 7169, providing for PVB's rehabilitation, was enacted and
published on February 24, 1992.

 Despite this, the respondent judge continued the liquidation proceedings.

 On August 3, 1992, PVB resumed regular banking operations.

 Petitioners contended that R.A. No. 7169 rendered the liquidation court functus officio, stripping
it of authority to continue liquidation proceedings.

 The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on June 8, 1992, halting the trial
court's proceedings.
  Various motions for intervention and exclusion from the TRO were filed.

 The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the petitioners.

ISSUE:

1. May a liquidation court continue with the liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

RULING:

 The Supreme Court ruled that the liquidation court could not continue with the liquidation
proceedings of PVB after Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening.

 The respondent judge was permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP-
32311.

 Liquidation and rehabilitation are diametrically opposed processes that cannot be undertaken
simultaneously.

 Liquidation involves winding up a corporation, settling with creditors and debtors, reducing
assets to cash, discharging liabilities, and dividing surplus or loss.

 Rehabilitation involves reopening or reorganizing a corporation to restore it to successful

operation and solvency.

 The enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, which provided for the rehabilitation and reopening of
PVB, rendered the liquidation court functus officio, stripping it of the authority to issue orders
involving acts of liquidation.

 R.A. No. 7169 became effective immediately upon its approval by President Corazon C. Aquino
on January 2, 1992, as specified in Section 10 of the Act.

Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It
is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

 The respondent judge acted in excess of or without jurisdiction by continuing the liquidation
proceedings after the law's enactment.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_105364_2001.html

Cui v. Arellano University

FACTS: Emeterio Cui is a law student at Arellano University from 1948-1949 until the first semester of his
fourth year, received scholarship grants for his scholastic merit covering his tuition fees. Francisco R.
Capistrano who happens to be his uncle, was also the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel at
Arellano University. At the last semester of Cui, he transferred to Abad Santos University. When Cui
finally applying to take the bar examination, he was required to submit his transcript of records from
Arellano University. However, Arellano University refused to release his transcript of records unless he
refunded the scholarship with the amount of P1,033.87. Cui paid the amount under protest then filed a
lawsuit to recover the amount, seeking moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses. The CFI of Manila ruled in favor of Arellano University. Hence, this appeal.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the
following contract covenant and agreement:

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer
to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and
the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to
the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court ruled that the provision requiring Cui to refund his scholarship if he
transferred to another school is null and void as it is contrary to public policy.

 The decision of the lower court was reversed, and Arellano University was ordered to pay Cui the
sum of P1,033.87 with interest from the date of the institution of the case, along with the costs.

 Arellano University's counterclaim was dismissed.

 The Supreme Court held that the stipulation in the contract was contrary to public policy.

 Scholarships are awarded to recognize merit and assist gifted students, not to bind them to a
particular institution for its prestige or business potential.

 Such stipulations undermine the principle of merit and the public interest in supporting talented
students.

 The court referenced Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, from the Director of Private Schools,
which stated that scholarships should not be conditioned on the student remaining at the same
school.

 Although the memorandum was not a law, it reflected a sound principle of public policy.

 The contractual provision was found inconsistent with sound policy, good morals, and the public
interest in supporting gifted students.

Under Article 6 of the Civil Code, as a general rule, a person may waive any matter which affects his
property, alienable right or privilege of which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by constitution; provided that such right are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe rights of others, not forbidden by law, and not against public
policy.