EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and

KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of
First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T .
David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A . Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P . de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D . Quiason
and Solicitor C . Padua for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY CONTEST

LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR. — It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby (Lewis vs.
U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda
vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs.
U.S., 26 F. 2d. 444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the document, papers, and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporation adverted to, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997;
People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Two
points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in the case at bar do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code", — as alleged in aforementioned applications — without reference
to any determine provision of said laws or coders.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. — To uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the victims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision Sec. 1, par. 3
Art. III, Const.) — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that
the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such is the seriousness of
the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court, by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The grave violation of the Constitution
made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: "Books of
accounts, Financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers, showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
and loss statements." Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions petitioners herein, regardless of whether
the transaction were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records
of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURES. — Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
 competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause and only possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of
crime. But when this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE ILLEGAL
SEARCH WARRANT OR MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS NO
EXCUSE. — The theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect
the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but understandably finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. — The doctrine adopted in
the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants for the search of 3
residences of petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and
void; the searches and seizures therein made are illegal.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C .J : p

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 —

hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondent-Judges — issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
5 directed to any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises

of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers)."

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do
not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case,
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their
agents and or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring
the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of
the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or
confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted
or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object
to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
 ". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal
defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional
rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not
the rights of the other defendants . Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness
of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded .
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes
had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore,
that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer
& Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the
answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers
and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof
are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized, to wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
wer e legal or illegal . The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"
16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully

obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach
and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent
as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of
trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that
is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed ".
18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land." 19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions
of the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation

of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open
to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court.

"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared

enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it
used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be 'a form of words', valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, 'without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
 conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to privacy,
when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible
of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the
right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which
an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.'
...

"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy
the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise . Because it
is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforceable itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoinment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."
(Emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission
of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
 Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect
the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably —
finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that
the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and
Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of
and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has been advanced, not in their petition or amended petition
herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June
29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed
in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof,
contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant
application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do
not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it
is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent, that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
 and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J .B .L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P ., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ .,
concur.

Separate Opinions

CASTRO, J ., concurring and dissenting :

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and
from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following
distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this
case are general warrants and are therefore prescribed by, and in violation of,
Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,
should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are
expressly declared null and void; the searches and seizures therein made are
expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effects seized in the residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily
demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
declaring as null and void the search warrants served at such other places and as illegal
the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination
in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the
immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time,
the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and
the illegality of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my
view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court
from forthrightly laying down the law - not only for this case but as well for future cases
and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were
therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumenti, have no legal
standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places
other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic illegality of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the
searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal
standing, the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings
submitted to this Court, the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the
suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from
places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost
verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many
years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our
courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncements made on the Fourth
Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression
or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers and
effects gives "standing"; (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person"
doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are
"primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person", gives
"standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them,
the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted
named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of
Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and
were actually made, in the "office/house warehouse/premises" owned by or under the
control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion
to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961) (personal
and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president); United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging
to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor
in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12,
1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental

nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his homes, or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or
in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of
the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveillance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court
over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt
the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here or do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable." Hoffa vs. U.S. 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966) See also U.S. vs.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searches gives "standing ."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents
seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of
their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
offices (IBMS, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club);
and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the
corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return
and suppression of the books, papers and effects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature
and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standards of the
then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts.
We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into
 the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law, which, more than almost any other
branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not
be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards." See also Chapman vs. United States,354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return
and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a bookkeeper for
several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized
successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F.
Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for
the return and suppression as to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:

"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, either his

own or the corporation's, was entitled to protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure
were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized articles and
the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted." (emphasis
supplied)

Time was when only a person who had property interest in either the place
searched or the articles seized had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of
the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. United States, 336 U.S. 461 (1948),
Justice Robert Jackson, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that
"even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion". This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was
articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in
Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched, but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of
"person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premises where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of
a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return
and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652
(5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court concluded that the defendant had standing on two
independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and
second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just in the case at
bar ). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation's premises and had
seized most of the corporation's books and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:

"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a
'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that appellant
should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search
and seizure of the corporation's books and records, merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial
possessory interest in the invaded premises . . ." Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651.

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th
Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the
defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he
asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held
that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of
privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure
were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682;
Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage
and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his
standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the
custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing
because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and
because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that.

"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished

personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of
unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them."
Schwimmer vs. United. States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed

against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell,
242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y. ). The defendant had stored with an
attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the
time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of
the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management". The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these
type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was
held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises
where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers
and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631; Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and
Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that.
 "It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were
directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the
papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first "search warrant described
the records as having been used in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . .'
The second search warrant was captioned: 'United States of America vs. Lowell
M. Birrell. (p. 198)

"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives

standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones." (p. 199)

"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the

records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the
premises searched." See also Jeffers vs. United States. 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58,
187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United
States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the
petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the
illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners' connection with the premises raided is
much closer than in Birrell .
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the
warrants regardless of whether these were directed against residences in the narrow
sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or
(to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity
or under their personal control.
Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to
the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where
these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place
or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from
the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which
were the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping
should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices, warehouses and/or premises
owned and/or controlled and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as
shown in all the search warrants and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void
search warrants, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers,
documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers
will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in
ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners
 likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate
papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as
specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my
disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional
proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Footnotes

1. Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as
Acting Director of National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr., and Assistant Fiscal Manases G.
Reyes, City of Manila.

2. Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino,
Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch Hon. Eulogio Mencias. Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of
the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.

3. Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

4. Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5. U. S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far

East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business
Management Corporation General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass
Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing
Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic
Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.

6. Inter alia.

7. Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in the
case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the
papers, documents and things from the following premises: (1) The office of the US
Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg. Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita,
Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts. Port Area, Mla; (4)
527 Rosario St. Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp.,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; 7224 San
Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago and 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at
23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla; (10) Investment
Inc. 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC. Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General
Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp.,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts., Dewey Blvd., Manila;
(15) Warehouse Railroad St., between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm 304,
Army and Navy Club, Manila South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port
 Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Bills, Inc.,
Trinity Bldg. San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. &
Boston, Port Area, Manila (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila (23)
IBMC, 2nd Flr., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Bldg.,
610 San Luis Manila (25) United Housing Corp. Trinity Bldg., San Luis Manila (26)
Republic Real State Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St.,
Malate. Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and
(29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953
and 955 against petitioners before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. the
preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the
other premises namely: in those of the residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra
Road, Forbes Park Makati, Rizal (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati Rizal; and (3) 8
Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati Rizal."

8. Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9. Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10. In re Dooley (1931) 48 F. 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs. U. S. 237 F. 69;
Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. 60; Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11. U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384, 394.

12. On March 22, 1962.

13. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14. Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

15. . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule
126.)

16. People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17. Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18. Pugliese (1945) 153 F. 2d. 497.

19. Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L. ed, 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; underscoring
supplied.

20. Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647. 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs.
United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564; Wolf vs. Colorado, 338
US 25, 93 L. ed, 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d.
1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio L91961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed 2d. 1081, 81
 S. Ct. 1684.

21. Even if remote.

22. Particularly, Jones vs. U.S., 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. Republic, 216 Fed. Supp. 48; U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henze vs. U.S. 296 Fed. 2d
650.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.