LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE G.R. No.

170351
EMPLOYEES UNIONALU TUCP,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ENERGY MENDOZA, JJ.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 30, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Under review is the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65760, which dismissed
the petition for certiorarifiled by petitioner Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union ALU―TUCP (petitioner Union) to annul
and set aside the decision[2] dated December 10, 1999 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Certified Case No.
V-02-99.

The facts, fairly summarized by the CA, follow.

[Respondent Philippine National Oil Corporation]-Energy Development Corporation [PNOC-EDC] is a government-

Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Regional Office No. VIII, Tacloban City.

Among [respondents] geothermal projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan
Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. The said Project is composed of the Tongonan 1 Geothermal Project (T1GP) and
the Leyte Geothermal Production Field Project (LGPF) which provide the power and electricity needed not only in the
provinces and cities of Central and Eastern Visayas (Region VII and VIII), but also in the island of Luzon as well. Thus,
the [respondent] hired and employed hundreds of employees on a contractual basis, whereby, their employment was
only good up to the completion or termination of the project and would automatically expire upon the completion of such
project.

Majority of the employees hired by [respondent] in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects had become members of
petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner demands from the [respondent] for recognition of it as the
collective bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, the [respondent] did not heed
such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to be completed, the [respondent]
proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of Employment upon the employees who are members of the petitioner.

On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against the [respondent] on the ground of
purported commission by the latter of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass
termination. On the same day, the petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike.

To avert any work stoppage, then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma intervened and issued the Order, dated
January 4, 1999, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all the striking workers
were directed to return to work within twelve (12) hours from receipt of the Order and for the [respondent] to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike. Further, the parties were directed to
cease and desist from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation.
 However, despite earnest efforts on the part of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to settle the dispute amicably,
the petitioner remained adamant and unreasonable in its position, causing the failure of the negotiation towards a
peaceful compromise. In effect, the petitioner did not abide by [the] assumption order issued by the Secretary of Labor.

Consequently, on January 15, 1999, the [respondent] filed a Complaint for Strike Illegality, Declaration of Loss of
Employment and Damages at the NLRC-RAB VIII in Tacloban City and at the same time, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Petitioners Certificate of Registration with DOLE, Regional Office No. VIII. The two cases were later on
consolidated pursuant to the New NLRC Rules of Procedure. The consolidated case was docketed as NLRC Certified
Case No. V-02-99 (NCMB-RAB VIII-NS-12-0190-98; RAB Case No. VIII-1-0019-99). The said certified case was
indorsed to the NLRC 4th Division in Cebu City on June 21, 1999 for the proper disposition thereof.[3]

In due course, the NLRC 4th Division rendered a decision in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the officers and members of [petitioner] Union as project employees;

2. Declaring the termination of their employment by reason of the completion of the project, or a phase or
portion thereof, to which they were assigned, as valid and legal;

3. Declaring the strike staged and conducted by [petitioner] Union through its officers and members on
December 28, 1998 to January 6, 1999 as illegal for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
of the law on strike[;]

4. Declaring all the officers and members of the board of [petitioner] Union who instigated and spearheaded
the illegal strike to have lost their employment[;]

5. Dismissing the claim of [petitioner] Union against PNOC-EDC for unfair labor practice for lack of merit[;]

6. Dismissing both parties claims against each other for violation of the Assumption Order dated January 4,
1999 for lack of factual basis[;]

7. Dismissing all other claims for lack of merit.[4]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the Petition. The
assailed Decision dated December 10, 1999 of the NLRC 4th Division in NLRC Certified Case No. V-02-99 (NCMB-
RAB VIII-NS-12-0190-98; RAB Case No. VIII-1-0019-99) and its Order dated March 30, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the Petitioner.[5]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Union, positing the following questions of law:
1. MAY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAIN THE PROJECT CONTRACTS THAT ARE
DESIGNED TO DENY AND DEPRIVE THE EMPLOYEES THEIR RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE BY MAKING
IT APPEAR THAT THEY ARE MERE PROJECT EMPLOYEES?

2. WHEN THERE ARE NO INTERVALS IN THE EMPLOYEES CONTRACT, SUCH THAT THE SO-CALLED
UNDERTAKING WAS CONTINUOUS, ARE THE EMPLOYEES PROPERLY TREATED AS PROJECT EMPLOYEES?

3. MAY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORE THE FIRMS OWN ESTIMATE OF JOB
COMPLETION, PROVING THAT THERE IS STILL 56.25% CIVIL/STRUCTURAL WORK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED,
AND RULE THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE DISMISSED FOR COMPLETION [OF] THE PROJECT?

4. MAY A FIRM HIDE UNDER THE SPURIOUS CLOAK OF PROJECT COMPLETION TO DISMISS EN
MASSE THE EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE ORGANIZED AMONG THEMSELVES A LEGITIMATE LABOR
ORGANIZATION TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS?

5. WHEN THERE IS NO STOPPAGE OF WORK, MAY A PROTEST ACTIVITY BE CONSIDERED AS

6. WHEN THE DISMISSAL IS AIMED AT RIDDING THE COMPANY OF MEMBERS OF THE UNION, IS
THIS UNION BUSTING?[6]
Stripped of rhetoric, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether the officers and members of petitioner Union are project employees of respondent; and
2. Whether the officers and members of petitioner Union engaged in an illegal strike.

On the first issue, petitioner Union contends that its officers and members performed activities that were usually necessary and desirable
to respondents usual business. In fact, petitioner Union reiterates that its officers and members were assigned to the Construction
Department of respondent as carpenters and masons, and to other jobs pursuant to civil works, which are usually necessary and desirable
to the department. Petitioner Union likewise points out that there was no interval in the employment contract of its officers and members,
who were all employees of respondent, which lack of interval, for petitioner Union, manifests that the undertaking is usually necessary
and desirable to the usual trade or business of the employer.
We cannot subscribe to the view taken by petitioner Union.

The distinction between a regular and a project employment is provided in Article 280, paragraph 1, of the Labor Code:

ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists.[7]

The foregoing contemplates four (4) kinds of employees: (a) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (b) project employees or those whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking[,] the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee; (c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in nature, and
the employment is for the duration of the season; [8] and (d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal
employees. Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind a fixed-term employee.[9]

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as worded, establishes that the nature of the employment is determined by law, regardless of any
contract expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract and the stipulations contained therein is
to bring to life the policy enshrined in the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.[10] Thus, labor contracts are placed on a higher
plane than ordinary contracts; these are imbued with public interest and therefore subject to the police power of the State. [11]

However, notwithstanding the foregoing iterations, project employment contracts which fix the employment for a specific project
or undertaking remain valid under the law:

x x x By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his employment is coterminous with
the project. He may not expect to be employed continuously beyond the completion of the project. It is of judicial notice
that project employees engaged for manual services or those for special skills like those of carpenters or masons, are,
as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a valid reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for
invalidating a contract of employment. Project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only one
party thereto. The employers interest is equally important as that of the employee[s] for theirs is the interest that propels
economic activity. While it may be true that it is the employer who drafts project employment contracts with its business
interest as overriding consideration, such contracts do not, of necessity, prejudice the employee. Neither is the
employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment contract. After all, under the law, the interest of the worker is
paramount.[12]
In the case at bar, the records reveal that the officers and the members of petitioner Union signed employment contracts
indicating the specific project or phase of work for which they were hired, with a fixed period of employment. The NLRC correctly disposed
of this issue:

A deeper examination also shows that [the individual members of petitioner Union] indeed signed and accepted the
[employment contracts] freely and voluntarily. No evidence was presented by [petitioner] Union to prove improper
pressure or undue influence when they entered, perfected and consummated [the employment] contracts. In fact, it
was clearly established in the course of the trial of this case, as explained by no less than the President of
[petitioner] Union, that the contracts of employment were read, comprehended, and voluntarily accepted by them. x x
x.

xxxx
 As clearly shown by [petitioner] Unions own admission, both parties had executed the contracts freely and voluntarily
without force, duress or acts tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no reason not to honor and give
effect to the terms and conditions stipulated therein. x x x. [13]

Thus, we are hard pressed to find cause to disturb the findings of the NLRC which are supported by substantial evidence.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when
supported by substantial evidence.[14] Rule 133, Section 5 defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor cases.[15] We may
take cognizance of and resolve factual issues, only when the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC are
inconsistent with those of the CA.[16]

In the case at bar, both the NLRC and the CA were one in the conclusion that the officers and the members of petitioner Union were
project employees. Nonetheless, petitioner Union insists that they were regular employees since they performed work which was usually
necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of the Construction Department of respondent.

The landmark case of ALU-TUCP v. NLRC[17] instructs on the two (2) categories of project employees:

It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and scope of the term project in the present context. The
project for the carrying out of which project employees are hired would ordinarily have some relationship to the usual
business of the employer. Exceptionally, the project undertaking might not have an ordinary or normal relationship to
the usual business of the employer. In this latter case, the determination of the scope and parameters of the project
becomes fairly easy. x x x. From the viewpoint, however, of the legal characterization problem here presented to the
Court, there should be no difficulty in designating the employees who are retained or hired for the purpose of
undertaking fish culture or the production of vegetables as project employees, as distinguished from ordinary or regular
employees, so long as the duration and scope of the project were determined or specified at the time of engagement
of the project employees. For, as is evident from the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier,
the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project
employees as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the project employees were assigned
to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the
employees were engaged for that project.

In the realm of business and industry, we note that project could refer to one or the other of at least two (2)
distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular
or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other
undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The
typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a construction company. A
construction company ordinarily carries out two or more [distinct] identifiable construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-
storey hotel in Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City.
Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and duration of which has
been determined and made known to the employees at the time of employment, are properly treated as project
employees, and their services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.

The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular
business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary
or regular business operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.[18]

Plainly, the litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a fixed period of employment involving a
specific undertaking which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the particular employees engagement.

In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members of petitioner Union were specifically hired as project employees for
respondents Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon
the completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, the officers and the members of petitioner Union could be validly terminated.

Petitioner Union is adamant, however, that the lack of interval in the employment contracts of its officer and members negates the latters
status
as mere project employees. For petitioner Union, the lack of interval further drives home its point that its officers and members are regular
employees who performed work which was usually necessary or desirable to the usual business or trade of respondent.

We are not persuaded.

Petitioner Unions members employment for more than a year does equate to their regular employment with respondent. In this
regard, Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC[19] illuminates:
 The first paragraph [of Article 280 of the Labor Code] answers the question of who are regular employees. It states
that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged
in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.

A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking,
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where
the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season, as in
the present case.

The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall under the
definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those
casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken.

Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case and that
the Labor Arbiter should have considered them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is without merit.

The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain
or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be construed
with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or
to other sections thereof. The only exception to this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not
only the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself
as a whole.

Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of regular and casual
employees was designed to put an end to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many
employers to prevent so called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from
joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to
stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether
agricultural or industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their employees and not, as
petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to realize
profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed casuals but not to the project employees
nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their
employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the [end of the] season. The termination of their employment
cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
Considering our holding that the officers and the members of petitioner Union were project employees, its claim of union busting
is likewise dismissed.

On the second issue, petitioner Union contends that there was no stoppage of work; hence, they did not strike. Euphemistically,
petitioner Union avers that it only engaged in picketing,[20] and maintains that without any work stoppage, [its officers and members] only
engaged in xxx protest activity.

We are not convinced. Petitioner Union splits hairs.

To begin with, quite evident from the records is the undisputed fact that petitioner Union filed a Notice of Strike on December
28, 1998 with the Department of Labor and Employment, grounded on respondents purported

unfair labor practices, i.e., refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination. On even date, petitioner Union declared
and staged a strike.

Second, then Secretary of Labor, Bienvenido E. Laguesma, intervened and issued a Return-to-Work Order[21] dated January 4,
1999, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The Order narrates the facts leading to the labor dispute, to wit:

On 28 December 1998, [petitioner Union] filed a Notice of Strike against [respondent] citing unfair labor practices,
specifically: refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination as the grounds [therefor]. On the same
day, [petitioner] Union went on strike and took control over [respondents] facilities of its Leyte Geothermal Project.

Attempts by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board RBVIII to forge a mutually acceptable solution
proved futile.

In the meantime, the strike continues with no settlement in sight placing in jeopardy the supply of much needed power
supply in the Luzon and Visayas grids.

xxxx
 The on-going strike threatens the availability of continuous electricity to these areas which is critical to day-to-day life,
industry, commerce and trade. Without doubt, [respondents] operations [are] indispensable to the national interest and
falls (sic) within the purview of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, which warrants (sic) the intervention of
this Office.

Third, petitioner Union itself, in its pleadings, used the word strike.

Ultimately, petitioner Unions asseverations are belied by the factual findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA:

The failure to comply with the mandatory requisites for the conduct of strike is both admitted and clearly shown on
record. Hence, it is undisputed that no strike vote was conducted; likewise, the cooling-off period was not observed and
that the 7-day strike ban after the submission of the strike vote was not complied with since there was no strike vote
taken.

xxxx

The factual issue of whether a notice of strike was timely filed by [petitioner] Union was resolved by the evidence on
record. The evidence revealed that [petitioner] Unionstruck even before it could file the required notice of strike. Once
again, this relied on [petitioner] Unions proof. [Petitioner] Union[s] witness said:

Atty. Sinsuat : You stated that you struck on 28 December 1998 is that correct?
Witness : Early in the morning of December 1998.
xxxx

Atty. Sinsuat : And you went there to conduct the strike did you not?

Witness : Our plan then was to strike at noon of December 28 and the strikers will be positioned at their
respective areas.[22]

Article 263 of the Labor Code enumerates the requisites for holding a strike:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. (a) x x x.

x x x x.

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of
strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Department at least 30 days before the intended date thereof.
In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified bargaining
agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case
of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall
not apply and the union may take action immediately.
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Department of
Labor and Employment may promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Department to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number
of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to
declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for
the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was
taken. The Department may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the
secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

In fine, petitioner Unions bare contention that it did not hold a strike cannot trump the factual findings of the NLRC that
petitioner Union indeed struck against respondent. In fact, and more importantly, petitioner Union failed to comply with the requirements
set by law prior to holding a strike.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65760 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner Union.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158703 June 26, 2009

TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES TEACHERS and EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION (TIPTEO) and its member
MAGDALENA T. SALON, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the Amended Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in the case Technological Institute of the Philippines v. Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees
Organization, CA G.R. SP No. 66896.2

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, set out in the original CA decision promulgated on November 20, 2002,3 are summarized below.

Petitioner Magdalena T. Salon (Salon) was a College Instructor 3 of the Humanities and Social Science Department (HSSD) of
respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) and a member of the Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and
Employees Organization (TIPTEO). She commenced employment with the TIP on June 13, 1989.

On October 24, 2000, the TIP received complaints from students claiming that Salon was collecting ₱1.50 per page for the test paper
used in the subject she was teaching at the time. She reportedly asked her students not to write on the test papers; these test papers
were not returned to the students after the test. An allegation was made, too, that Salon committed an anomaly in the grading of her
students.

Acting on the written complaints, the TIP – through Ms. Josephine Royer (Ms. Royer), the school's Assistant Faculty Coordinator – sent
Salon a memorandum dated October 30, 2000 asking her to explain within 72 hours why she should not be disciplined on the basis of
the complaints.4

Salon answered the charges on October 31, 2000. 5 She explained that she collected only ₱0.50 for each page of the test papers, which
sum she spent in photocopying the papers; the amount collected was within the limits the school had set. She admitted that she asked
her students not to write on the test papers because there was no space on these papers where they could write their answers; it would
be preferable to use the test booklets also provided to the students.

On the alleged grade manipulation, Salon explained that the incident involved the son of a fellow faculty member who actually failed her
subject. Her fellow faculty member and mother of the student, upon learning of her son's failing grade, tried to persuade Salon to give
her son a passing grade for fear that the father, if he learned of the failing mark, would harm his son. Salon claimed that she did not
accede to the request; she gave the student a grade of 6.0 or "dropped" instead of giving him a grade of 5.0 or "failed."

The TIP created a three-man committee to conduct a formal investigation of the charges. 6 The committee called a hearing on
November 16, 2000 and issued the following findings: 7

Recommendation:

1. Evidences (sic) show that Ms. M.T. Salon has changed the grade of Mr. Joseph Florante Manalo. She disregarded the TIP
grading system when she gave a grade of 6.0 (officially dropped) inspite of the class performance records. She admitted that
the grade is 5.0 (failed) but made it 6.0 (officially dropped) which according to her is 'lesser degree of failure' because Mr.
Joseph Florante Manalo, is the son of a co-faculty, Mrs. Elma Manalo in HSSD. She also changed the entry in the class
record. The class record was already submitted to TIP so that this is already a TIP document.

2. With regards to the printed test questionnaires, Mrs. M.T. Salon has violated Memorandum No. P-66 SY 1992-1993 by not
getting the approval of the department officer. It is unauthorized selling which the General Disciplinary Sanctions
(Memorandum No. P-2 s. 1999-2000) classifies as a GRAVE offense.

3. The committee recommends the application of the corresponding sanction as contained in the General Disciplinary
Sanctions (Memo No. P-3 s. 1999-2000) which is dismissal.

4. The recommendation shall take effect only after the approval of the President.
On December 4, 2000, the office of TIP President Dr. Teresita U. Quirino notified Salon of the termination of her service as member of
the faculty of HSSD effective thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice.8 The dismissal was based on the investigation committee's
recommendations.

Salon sought assistance from TIPTEO which then requested the TIP that a joint grievance investigation be conducted to take up her
dismissal. The TIP denied the request arguing that Salon's dismissal was not proper for the grievance machinery because the ground
for dismissal was a violation of the school's rules and regulations.

Faced with this denial, TIPTEO opted to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
in the National Capital Region. At the NCMB, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to Voluntary Arbitrator Alfonso C. Atienza for
voluntary arbitration.

On July 14, 2001, the voluntary arbitrator rendered an award in Salon’s favor. 9 The arbitrator ruled that Salon was dismissed without a
valid cause and without due process. He found that the school was unable to prove by substantial evidence that Salon committed the
acts charged. At the most, the arbitrator concluded that the TIP only proved that there was no permission, written or verbal, before
Salon prepared and sold the test papers to her students. On the due process issue, the arbitrator found that Salon was not afforded an
opportunity for a real investigation because she was denied the right to counsel; neither was she afforded the right to a hearing under
the grievance procedure of the CBA and under the Labor Code.

The voluntary arbitrator ordered the TIP to reinstate Salon as College Instructor 3 with full backwages, but suspended her for one
month "for not getting a written permission from responsible officials of the school in charging students with the cost of examination
papers."

The TIP sought the reconsideration of the award, but the voluntary arbitrator denied the motion on September 16, 2001. The TIP
thereupon elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. In a decision promulgated on November 20, 2002, the appellate
court affirmed the voluntary arbitration award resulting in the dismissal of the petition. 10 The appellate court agreed with the voluntary
arbitrator that nothing in the TIP rules warrants the dismissal of a faculty member for selling examination papers without the school's
written permission. It was not convinced that the infraction committed by Salon is a grave offense referred to in Memorandum No. P-25
s. 2000-2001 that the TIP cited as justification for the dismissal of Salon. 11 The relevant portion of this memorandum reads:

1. In line with the school's thrust to provide quality education and service to its students, a photocopy center is created with the
major task of servicing students on their handout requirements.

xxx

4. Please discuss these to your respective faculty members on one of your department meetings.

xxx

4.1 Explain to them the objectives for the creation of said photocopy center. Emphasize to them that they are not authorized to
sell instructional materials, and to do so is a grave offense. Explain further that this is one of the reasons why the center is
being formed.

xxx

4.2 Make clear to them that services of the photocopy center shall be limited to required handouts and instructional materials
assigned by faculty members and will not include other photocopy needs of the student.

The CA ruled that examination papers do not fall within the term "instructional materials" that the memorandum covers; the
memorandum only covers handouts and instructional materials needed by students and assigned by their teachers. The CA explained
that from their nature and use, handouts and instructional materials are entirely different from examination papers; instructional
materials are used to present and convey lessons to the students; whereas, examination papers measure the students’ degree of
comprehension of their lessons.

On a related matter, the CA held that if Salon committed an infraction, it should be limited to the fact that she did not ask the Faculty
Coordinator and the Department Head to determine the cost of the papers which she disseminated among her students, as required
under paragraph 4 of Memorandum No. P-22 s. 1988-1989.12 Additionally, the CA held that Salon could be cited for tampering with the
grade of her student Joseph Florante Manalo (Manalo) – a violation of the TIP grading policy.

Undeterred, the TIP moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA granted the motion and handed down the now assailed
amended decision on May 22, 2003.13 It examined the facts for the second time and concluded that it erred in excluding examination
papers from the ambit of the term "instructional materials." It reasoned out that "examination papers play as much, maybe even more
importance in the determination of a student's aptitude than any kind of instructional material x x x to exclude examination papers from
the perimeters of the term 'instructional materials' would amount to an incongruity." The CA also faulted Salon for changing the grade of
Manalo from 5.0 (failed) to 6.0 (officially dropped) after the grades had been submitted.

For the reason that the infractions committed by Salon "were unrefuted and proven," the CA found basis for the TIP's decision to
dismiss her for the commission of a grave offense. This notwithstanding, the appellate court deemed it "in accord with justice and equity
to award her separation pay," in consideration of Salon's more than ten (10) years of service to TIP and because she had not previously
been involved in any similar act or one that warrants a heavier penalty.

Accordingly, the CA annulled its decision dated November 20, 200214 as well as that of the Voluntary Arbitrator dated July 14, 2001.15 It
declared that Salon was dismissed for a valid cause, but awarded her separation pay at one month's basic salary for every year of
service. From this decision, Salon and TIPTEO (now represented by the present counsel upon the demise of Mr. Antonio Diaz who had
assisted her [Salon] from the beginning) now come before this Court to challenge the amended CA decision.

THE PETITION

The petition submits that the CA erred:

1. In ruling that Salon was dismissed for a valid cause.

2. In not finding that Salon was denied procedural due process.

3. In not dismissing the petition outright despite its failure to attach a certified statement of material dates in violation of Section
3, Rule 46 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and Revised Circular No. 1-88.

On the first ground, Salon and her union bewail the CA's shifting appreciation of the nature of test/examination papers, from "non-
instructional" material to "instructional" material relying on the same policy document of the school, Memorandum No. P-25 s. 2000-
2001.16 They contend that the appellate court's change of mind was not supported by any authority. Citing the dictionary definition17 of
"instructional" and "test," they argue that "instructional material" and "test papers" are two different things; "test" is "a series of
questions, problems, etc., intended to measure the extent of knowledge, aptitudes, intelligence, and other mental traits"; "instructional"
is an adjective which means "pertaining or relating to instruction; educational; containing information."

Further, petitioners posit that it is incorrect to conclude that Salon is guilty of selling photocopied test questionnaires to her students;
she was not selling but merely securing reimbursement for the personal expenses she incurred in the preparation of the test papers.
Salon cited as authority Memorandum No. P-22 s. 1988-1989,18 which expressly set guidelines for the cost of stenciled examination
papers, ₱0.40 for newsprint, and ₱0.60 for whitewove paper.

Charging the students for the examination papers could have been avoided according to Salon had TIP performed its obligation of
providing test and examination papers to the students; faculty members, who are not allowed to use school computers and typewriters
in the preparation of the materials, had to type and photocopy the examination papers at their own expense and for which they had to
seek reimbursement.1avvphi1

On the violation of the school's grading system, Salon submits that she did it for a noble intention; she changed the grade of Manalo –
the son of a fellow faculty member – from a failing mark of 5.0 to a grade of 6.0 (dropped) to lessen the impact of the student’s mother’s
guilt and to keep the student from being punished by his father, as she explained in her letter dated November 14, 2000 to TIP
President Dr. Teresita Quirino.19

Salon claims that when she realized that she violated the TIP's grading system, she consciously tried to rectify her error; on October 20,
2000, during the submission and re-checking of her grading sheets, she asked the permission of Ms. Royer to use the Arlegui computer
room to correct the grade of Manalo, but Ms. Royer directed her to defer the correction until the date set by the Registrar's Office for the
final audit of grades; the scheduled date, however, was overtaken by her dismissal from her teaching post. She submits that there was
no malice in what she did or an intent to violate the school's grading system; at the very least, she committed an error in judgment that
does not warrant the harsh penalty of dismissal; her dismissal would violate the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.

On the due process issue, Salon points out that the investigation of the charges against her was a "hoax"; no genuine investigation took
place as she stated in her affidavit dated June 27, 2001;20 the investigation was merely a gripe session where the complaining students
hurled a barrage of malicious allegations against her; she was not afforded an opportunity to defend herself and to be represented by
counsel of her own choice or a representative from the union. Salon further submits that the TIP failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement before she was terminated from employment – (1) a first notice apprising her of the particular acts or omission for which
she was being dismissed, and (2) a second notice informing her of the school's decision to dismiss her. She contends that the first
notice issued by the TIP merely directed her to submit her explanation regarding the "selling of photocopied examination," and did not
inform her that this was a ground for dismissal.

In her third assignment of error, Salon faults the CA for not dismissing the TIP's petition outright for its failure to attach a certified
statement of material dates in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 in relation with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Revised Circular No. 1-
88. She submits that a perusal of the TIP's petition for review, dated October 1, 2001, 21 reveals that there was no verified statement of
material dates accompanying the petition – a defect which cannot be cured by the incorporation of material dates in the body of the
petition.

Petitioners pray that the CA's amended petition be set aside; that Salon's dismissal be declared illegal; and that she be reinstated with
full backwages.

THE CASE FOR TIP

The TIP’s Comment dated September 5, 200322 and Memorandum dated March 25, 200223 commonly justify Salon's dismissal on
grounds of: (1) tampering or falsifying the grade of a student, which is a serious misconduct and an act of dishonesty and, (2) selling of
test papers without the approval of the school, which is a grave offense under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and TIP's
general disciplinary sanctions.24

On the first infraction, the TIP laments that the Voluntary Arbitrator ignored Salon's involvement in the incident on the excuse that the
complaint was not notarized. The TIP brushes aside the technical deficiency and focuses on the substance of the offense charged –
that Salon admitted that she changed the grade of her student Manalo from a failing grade of 5.0 to a mark of 6.0, which means that the
student did not fail, but "officially dropped" the subject; the act constituted tampering, a violation not only of the school's explicit rules
and regulations, but also of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; the alteration of the grade of her student constituted serious
misconduct in relation with the performance of Salon's duties that rendered her unfit to continue working for the school; it was also an
act of dishonesty, a clear disregard of her duty to serve as an example to her students and to others. While Salon claimed that she did it
with the noble intention of giving the student a lesser degree of failure, it was a clear falsification of student records, which is a valid
ground for termination of employment under the Manual.

Regarding the charge of selling test questionnaires without approval, TIP again relies on the results of the investigation undertaken by a
committee created for the purpose. The committee found Salon to have violated Memorandum No. P-66 s. 1992-1993,25 which provides
among others:

1.0 All faculty members are reminded that

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1.3 Faculty members who intend to use mimeographed or photocopied test questionnaires should first refer these to their respective
department officers. If approved, they should not sell these more than the cost of the prevailing price of photocopies which are between
0.25 to .035 centavos per page.

xxx

2.0 Any faculty member violating the school's policies will be subject to disciplinary action, either suspension or dismissal depending on
the gravity of the offense.

TIP contends that Salon did not ask for the approval of the school on her selling and costing of the test questionnaires, an offense
classified as grave under the general disciplinary sanctions of the school, or Memorandum No. P-3 s. 1999-2000, the penalty for which
is dismissal. It further contends that in an attempt to justify her acts, Salon cited Memorandum No. P-22, s. 1988-1989 regulating the
selling of mimeographed examinations, which it argues cannot prevail over a subsequent issuance, Memorandum No. P-66 s. 1992-
1993 and Memorandum No. P-25 s. 2000-2001, which set guidelines for the use of the photocopy center, not acts of teachers. It
explains that under the two memoranda, the selling of test papers without authorization from school authorities is a prohibited act.

Also, the school takes exception to Salon's reliance on Memorandum No. P-25 s. 2000-200126 on the use of the photocopy center,
especially on her claim that the test questionnaire is not an instructional material and, therefore, can be sold to students. It faults the
voluntary arbitrator for his shortsighted appreciation of the case; the recommendation of the investigating committee clearly reflected
that the rule violated was Memorandum No. P-66 s. 1992-1993.27 This notwithstanding, the TIP argues that Memorandum No. P-25 s.
2000-2001 and Memorandum No. P-22 s. 1988-1989 must be viewed in relation with the prohibition under Section 94 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools against any form of collections from students. 28 It thus posits that the question of whether "test
questionnaires" are instructional materials becomes irrelevant since the prohibited act is the selling or collecting of contributions without
the approval of the school. It is quick to add, however, that the CA is correct in classifying examination papers as "instructional
materials."

On the issue of due process, the TIP claims that it duly notified Salon of the charges against her consisting of (1) her having collected
money from her students for test papers without the approval of the school, and (2) the complaint of the father of the tampering of the
grade of his son (Manalo). The school asked Salon to submit her written answer to the charges against her. She was also given the
opportunity to explain her side at the investigation hearing. Thereafter, she was given the required notice of termination.
On Salon's third assignment of error, the TIP submits that the petition for review it filed with the CA complied with the requirement on
statement of material dates under the Rules of Court.29 It disputes Salon's argument that it is not sufficient to state the material dates in
the body of the petition and that a separate verified statement must be attached. It maintains that a perusal of the specific applicable
rule shows that the statement of material dates in a petition for review under Rule 43 need not be in a separate attachment under
oath.30

The TIP then points out that the petition filed with the CA states that the school received the decision of the voluntary arbitrator dated
July 14, 2001 on August 10, 2001; on August 16, 2001, it moved for reconsideration of the voluntary arbitration award, and received on
September 17, 2001 the order dated September 6, 2001, denying the motion for reconsideration. It explains that with the
verification/certification under oath that "all allegations in the petition for review are true and correct," the statements of material dates
made on pages 1 and 4 of the petition are therefore verified or certified under oath. The CA thus held that since a review of the material
dates revealed that the petition was filed within the fifteen-day period from petitioner TIPTEO's receipt of the voluntary arbitrators' denial
of its motion for reconsideration, the petition could be given due course. 31

The TIP lastly contends that under the Court's Revised Circular No. 1-8832 that Salon cited, the dismissal of a case where there is no
verified statement of material dates is at the discretion of the court. It then concludes with the statement that it has been held in a
number of cases that rules on technicalities are adopted to serve justice and equity, and not to hamper them.

THE COURT'S DECISION

We resolve to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

The Procedural Issue

We first resolve the procedural question raised – the alleged failure of TIP to attach a verified statement of the material dates to its
petition with the CA, as required by the Rules of Court33 and Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 1-88.34

We clarify in this regard that the review the TIP filed with the appellate court was not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court; it was an appeal to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43. This is consistent with our ruling in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees 35 that decisions of voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary
arbitrators should be appealable to the CA. The CA correctly treated the petition of TIP as an appeal filed under Rule 43 which,
parenthetically, also requires a statement of material dates in the petition. 36 The rationale for the requirement is to enable the appellate
court to determine whether the petition was filed within the period fixed in the rules. 37

The CA reviewed the material dates contained in the petition and concluded that the petition "was filed within the fifteen (15)-day period
from receipt of the voluntary arbitrator's denial of its motion for reconsideration x x x ." Proceeding from this premise and in the exercise
of the discretion granted it by the Rules in considering technical deficiencies, the CA concluded that the petition "could be given due
course."38 We respect the CA’s exercise of its discretion as it was exercised within the limits allowed by the Rules; the material data on
the filing of the petition are reflected in the petition. The CA was therefore properly guided in considering whether the petition had been
timely filed. Consequently, we declare that the CA committed no reversible error when it gave due course to the petition.

The Substantive Issues

a. The Sale of Papers

The first substantive issue is on the sale of test papers to students. We find it unfortunate that the tribunals below failed to recognize the
appropriate TIP rule that should govern the situation. Thus, Memorandums Nos. P-22, P-25, and P-66 have all been invoked. To clear
the air, Memorandum No. P-22 is an issuance on August 4, 1988 on the subject: Mimeographed Examinations whose relevant terms
provide:39

There have been complaints received by this office that a number of teachers have been abusing the use of printed test materials to the
detriment of the students:

1. A certain teacher uses the same printed matter in all of his classes and charges each student P1.00. This printed test
material is only one page.

2. Some teachers are having printed examinations for which they charge the students exhorbitantly.

xxx

To correct these practices we have several suggestions:

xxx
 3. Faculty members who have no other recourse but to print their examinations should ask for the permission of their Faculty
Coordinator, Department Head or Dean before they sell such examination papers to students.

4. The cost of the stenciled examination paper should be determined by the Faculty Coordinator, Department Head and Dean
by presenting the official receipts or the cost of printing. More or less, the cost per page should be for Newsprint paper – P0.40
and Whitewove paper – P0.60.

For your guidance and strict compliance effective this semester SY 1988-89.

We quote this Memorandum in full because it indicates the concern that the school sought to address in coming out with a regulation,
which concern is exactly the cause for the students’ complaints. The Memorandum stresses, too, that an approval process had been in
place as early as 1989.

Memorandum No. P-25 issued in 2000-2001 is on the subject of PHOTOCOPY CENTER, "created with the major task of servicing
students on their handout requirements" and "shall be limited to required handout instructional materials assigned by faculty members
and will not include other photocopy needs of the students."40 Apparently, this Memorandum addresses its own objectionable practice
and is very specific on the concern it addresses – handout instructional materials.

Memorandum No. P-66 issued on April 23, 1993 is on the subject of "UNAUTHORIZED BOOKBINDING OF REPORTS AND
PROJECTS, MIMEOGRAPHING OR PHOTOCOPYING OF TEST QUESTIONNAIRES, HANDOUTS, OR ANY PRINTED MATERIAL."
Significantly, this Memorandum specifically provides that "Faculty members who intend to use mimeographed or photocopied test
questionnaires should first refer these to their respective department officers. If approved, they should not sell these more than the cost
of the prevailing price of photocopies which are between ₱0.25 to ₱0.35 centavos per page. x x x 2. Any faculty member found violating
the school’s policies shall be subject to disciplinary action, either suspension or dismissal, depending on the gravity of the offense."

Under these regulatory measures, it appears clearly that Memorandum No. P-22, while specifically on the subject of Mimeographed
Examinations, is not the current TIP issuance on the matter. Memorandum No. P-66 is the latest issuance and the one that specifies
the requirements and penalizes violations. On the other hand, Memorandum No. P-25 appears to be an issuance with little relevance
on the present dispute because it deals with instructional materials and by its own terms does not cover "other photocopy needs of the
students." An additional reason for its irrelevance, of course, is the existence of at least two issuances that deal specifically with
examination papers.

Salon never denied that she had charged her students the cost of their examination papers without the approval of the proper school
authorities pursuant to Memorandums Nos. P-22 and P-66. The rationale behind the school policy of closely regulating the cost and
sale of examination papers is to free the students from avoidable financial burdens, and to prevent the abuse of the use of printed
examination papers by the teachers, as expressly stated in Memorandum No. P-22. It is of no moment that Salon kept within the price
range set by the school for the cost per page of the examination paper. Her transgressions spring from her failure to secure prior
approval of her use of photocopied exam papers, and of the attendant cost. These transgressions link up directly with the students’
allegations that they had to return and could not write on the exam papers they paid for – a possible indicator of the intent to abuse.41

Salon's guilt is not erased or mitigated by her excuse that she had no choice but to secure reimbursement from the students for the cost
of the examination papers that the school should provide but does not. The school does not deny that the teachers have to be
reimbursed, but at the same time it imposes measures to avoid abuses. Unless there is a showing of patent unreasonableness (and we
find none in this case), these measures have to be complied with. In saying this, we do not thereby indicate our approval of the school
practice of not providing test papers as part of services to students covered by their matriculation fees. Tests are the traditional and the
accepted mode of measuring students’ performance and should be part and parcel of the basic services that a school should offer.
Charging their costs to students at the time of the examination renders the students’ capacity to take the examinations dependent on
their finances at examination time. However, these are policy questions outside the scope of our present inquiry, as the substantive
reasonableness of the school’s policies and issuances is not a question directly before us, nor are these issuances patently
unreasonable. Thus, they do not enter the picture at all in the determination of Salon’s guilt and penalty.

b. Grade Tampering

Salon admitted that she changed the grade of Manalo from one of "failure" (5.0) to "dropped" (6.0) at the behest of a colleague, the
mother of Manalo, to save the son from being harmed by his father for his failing grade. Salon thought she was doing the family of
Manalo a favor, but her act produced the opposite result because the father himself lodged a complaint against her for grade
tampering;42 as suspected all along, the father was not satisfied with a grade of 6.0 for his son.

As in the case of unauthorized selling of examination papers, Salon's guilt is not erased or mitigated by the fact that she meant well, or
that she tried to rectify her indiscretion after realizing that she violated the grading system of the school.43 Two differences exist
between the examination paper selling violation and the present one. First, her examination paper violation is largely a
transgression against a school regulation. The present one goes beyond a school violation; it is a violation against the Manual of
Regulation for Private Schools whose Section 79 provides: 44
Sec. 79. Basis for Grading. The final grade or rating given to a pupil or student in a subject should be based on his scholastic record.
Any addition or diminution to the grade x x x shall not be allowed.

Second, the present violation involves elements of falsification and dishonesty. Knowing fully what Manalo deserved, Salon gave him a
grade of 6.0 instead of a failing grade. In the process, she changed – in short, falsified – her own records by changing the submitted
record and the supporting documents. Viewed in any light, this is Serious Misconduct under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code, and a just
cause for termination of employment.

Be that as it may, the mother of Manalo, being a teacher herself, should have been questioned or investigated for urging Salon to give
her son a passing grade. What Mrs. Manalo did was in itself highly irregular and should have been subjected to disciplinary action, in
the interest of fairness.

The Due Process Issue

Salon claims that her right to due process was violated because her investigation was a "hoax," 45 a gripe session where the
complaining students were allowed to engage in a spontaneous barrage of malicious allegations against her, and where she was not
afforded an opportunity to defend herself and to be represented by a counsel of her own choice or by a union representation. She adds
that she was not given any notice before her termination.

The records of the case belie these claims.

Salon was given the opportunity to show cause why she should not be dismissed. First, in a Memorandum dated October 30,
200346 issued by Ms. Royer, Assistant Faculty Coordinator of the HSSD, Salon was asked to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against her for "selling photocopied examination papers." She was also furnished a copy of the complaint of the father of
Manalo regarding her "tampering" the grade of Manalo.47 Salon submitted her explanations to the two documents consisting of (a) her
letter dated October 31, 2004 addressed to Ms. Royer, where she admitted photocopying the examination papers and charging her
students ₱0.50 a page;48and (b) her letter dated November 14, 2000 addressed to TIP President Dr. Teresita U. Quirino, where she
admitted changing the grade of Manalo. 49

Second. An investigation was conducted by a committee created by the TIP, which submitted a report/recommendation dated
November 20, 2000, confirming the unauthorized selling of examination papers and the tampering of the grade of Manalo. The
committee recommended Salon's dismissal.50

Third. In a memorandum dated December 4, 2000,51 Dr. Quirino advised Salon that her position as Faculty Member is terminated
effective 30 days from receipt of the memorandum. 52 This was her notice of termination – the 2nd notice that statutory due process
requires in a dismissal situation.

Thus, not only was Salon notified in writing about the charges against her, she was given a reasonable opportunity to explain her side;
she was also called to an investigation where, again, she had the opportunity to explain why she should not be dismissed. She was
only dismissed after the conclusion of the investigation and after she had been given a second notice in writing that she was being
terminated as a faculty member of the school. In short, she has nothing to complain about in terms of the process she underwent that
led to her dismissal.

The Penalty

In the same breath that she justifies her actions, Salon entreats this Court to impose on her a penalty less harsh than dismissal if she
will be held accountable for her misdeeds.53 She points out in this regard that it was the first time that she was charged of an offense,
and that she had been with the school for more than ten (10) years already, and there was no bad faith or malicious intention on her
part.54

We do not find these entreaties sufficiently compelling or convincing as Salon is no ordinary employee. She is a teacher from whom a
lot is expected; she is expected to be an exemplar of uprightness, integrity and decency, not only in the school, but also in the larger
community. She is a role model for her students; in fact, as she claims, she stands in loco parenti to them. She is looked up to and is
accorded genuine respect by almost everyone as a person tasked with the heavy responsibility of molding and guiding the young into
what they should be – productive and law-abiding citizens.

What Salon committed is a corrupt act, no less, that we cannot allow to pass without giving a wrong signal to all who look up to
teachers, and to this Court, as the models who should lead the way and set the example in fostering a culture of uprightness among the
young and in the larger community. From the personal perspective, Salon demonstrated, through her infractions, that she is not fit to
continue undertaking the serious task and the heavy responsibility of a teacher. She failed in a teacher’s most basic task – in honestly
rating the performance of students. Her failings lost her the trust and confidence of her employer, and even of her students.
Under the circumstances, our conclusion can only be for Salon’s dismissal for two counts of valid causes – i.e., for serious violation of
TIP’s Memorandum No. P-66, for unauthorized selling of examination papers, and for serious misconduct, for falsifying Manalo’s grade
and violating the grading rules under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

The affirmation of the penalties the CA imposed brings into focus the appellate court’s award of separation pay in consideration of her
more than 10 years of service with TIP.55 Given the finding of guilt and the penalty imposed, no basis exists to support and justify this
award. No court, not even this Court, can make an award that is not based on law. 56 Neither can this award be justified even if viewed
as a discretionary financial assistance, since this kind of award can be imposed only where the cause for dismissal is not serious
misconduct or a cause reflecting on the employee’s moral character. 57 The dismissal we affirm is precisely for serious misconduct. The
causes cited reflect as well on Salon’s moral character. Hence, we delete any award of separation pay/financial assistance that the
appellate court decreed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. We hereby AFFIRM the amended decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on May 22, 2003, but DELETE the award of separation pay. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.