CASE DIGEST IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(PA3220-18)

NAME: SITTIE JEAN M. CANA

1. Cotiangco v. Province of Biliran, G.R. No. 157139, October 19, 2011

FACTS

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking a reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 July 2002,1 and its Resolution dated 24 January
2003 which affirmed Resolution No. 000894 dated 30 March 2000 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC Resolution held that petitioners’ removal from their
respective positions in the Biliran Provincial Health Office as a result of the reorganization
of the provincial government was lawful.

Petitioners held permanent appointments as public health workers in the Province of

Biliran.

On 23 October 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Biliran passed SP

Resolution No. 102, Series of 1998, approving the revised structure and staffing pattern
of the provincial government submitted by its then incumbent governor, Danilo Parilla.

Pursuant to said Resolution, Governor Parilla issued Executive Order (EO) No. 98-07,
Series of 1998, dated 4 November 1998, declaring all positions in the provincial
government of Biliran as abolished except those of the Provincial Treasurer and all
elective positions.

EO No. 98-07 was revoked by EO No. 98-08, Series of 1998, which in turn declared "all
positions under the new staffing pattern vacant" and directed "all permanent employees
to submit their application within fifteen (15) days from the date of posting of the approved
new staffing pattern on November 4, 1998."

Petitioners filed a suit for Prohibition 2 to question the validity of EO No. 98-08, Series of
1998.

Meanwhile, pursuant to said EO, a Personnel Placement Committee (Committee) was

created to screen and evaluate all applicants for the vacant positions.
Petitioners failed/refused to apply for any position under the new staffing pattern, claiming
that to do so would be inconsistent with their pending suit for prohibition. At any rate,
petitioners argue that under Rule VI, Section 9 of Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution No. 91-1631,3 as well as Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Government
Reorganization, there should be a screening of the qualifications of all existing
employees, and not merely of those who filed their respective applications under the new
staffing pattern.

As a result of the reorganization, the following positions in the Biliran Provincial Health
Service occupied by petitioners were excluded or abolished:

Dr. Carlos C. Cotiangco --- Provincial Health Officer I

Licio J. Salas ---------------- Administrative Officer II

Edeltha O. Salonoy --------- Senior Bookkeeper I

Ma. Filipina V. Calderon --- Cashier II

Rosalinda A. Abilar --------- Pharmacist III

Medarda S. Lariba ---------- Cook I

Tito G. Gutierrez ------------ Driver II

Benjamin J. Luciano -------- Cook I

Myrna A. Filamor ----------- Nurse II

Monina Najarro -------------- Medical Technologist

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when they were not screened and
evaluated for possible appointment to new positions.

DECISION

We rule to deny the petition.

1. Petitioners failed to show that the reorganization was done in bad faith. They have not
adduced sufficient evidence to establish the existence of bad faith.

"(i)n case of regular employment of public health workers, their services shall not be
terminated except for cause provided by law and after due process."... government officer
or employee's removal from office as a result of a bona fide reorganization is a valid cause
for that employee's removal.
Petitioners claim that the provincial government's reorganization implemented by
Governor Parilla was not caused by a desire to streamline the local bureaucracy to save
on resources.
the provincial government argued, and the CSC found, that the Biliran Province had a
total of 162 personnel in 1990. However, this number swelled to 381 personnel in 1998.
Reorganization was therefore called for to lessen the budget allocation for personnel...
services; and to increase that for development projects, the purchase of medicines and
supplies, and the maintenance of infrastructure.

2. The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development v. Ejercito Lim, G.R. No.
183173, August 24, 2016

FACTS
Respondent was the operator of a domestic air carrier; his business operation was
primarily that of transporting live fish from Palawan to fish traders. Palawan Council for
Sustainable Development (PCSD) issued A.O. No. 00-05 to ordain that transport of fish
from Palawan would only be allowed through carriers who were accredited by PCSD.
Respondent claims his business is of the common carrier therefore exempt from
accreditation requirements. Resolution No. 03-211 amended A.O.

ISSUE
Is the A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03211; and the the Notice of
Violation and Show Cause Order null and void for having been issued in excess of the
PCSD’s authority?

DECISION
No. The issuance of the assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other
issuances by the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasi-legislative powers. R.A.
No. No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan. Towards
this end, the PCSD was established as the administrative machinery for the SEP' s
implementation. The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 of R.A. No.
7611. The PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose penalties and sanctions in
relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As
such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-211 was well within
its statutory authority.

3. Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L46496, February 27, 1940

FACTS
The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a
motion for reconsideration wherein the court has considered the legal conclusions stated
in Spanish language.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of
the judgment of the majority of this court and remanded the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for new trial averring among other issues that Toribio Teodoro claimed that
there was shortage of Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made him necessary to lay off the
members of the National Labor Union, Inc.

That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with
the Philippine Army.

That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’
Brotherhood.

ISSUE
Whether or not a new trial be granted since the documents attached to the petition was
inaccessible to the respondent NLUI.

DECISION
Re-Trial was granted that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given the opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in the motion
and such evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
4. Nasecore v. ERC, G.R. No. 190795, July 6, 2011

FACTS
On June 8, 2001, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9136, known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Among other reforms in the electric power industry,
this law created the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), which superseded the Energy
Regulatory Board. Section 36[1] of the EPIRA directed all distribution utilities to file with
ERC an application for the approval of their unbundled rates.
Respondent Meralco complied with this requirement. The ERC acted on the application
of respondent and, in a Decision dated March 20, 2003, approved the latter’s unbundled
schedule of rates effective in the next billing schedule. In the same Decision, however,
the ERC directed it to do the following, among others:
a) To discontinue charging the PPA [Purchased Power Adjustment] upon effectivity of
the approved unbundled rates; any change in the cost of power purchased shall be
reflected as deferred charges or credits which shall be recovered through the
Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM) approved by the Commission for
implementation per ERC Order effective February 24, 2003;”
In other words, Meralco was directed to recover the costs of power purchased from the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) through the new Generation Rate Adjustment
Mechanism (GRAM). Previously, these costs were recovered through the Purchased
Power Adjustment (PPA) mechanism.
In its February 24, 2003 Order issued in another proceeding, ERC Case No. 2003-44, the
ERC apparently conducted public consultations with the distribution utilities and the
consumer groups, including Petitioner National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms (Nasecore). The ERC adopted the “Implementing Rules for the Recovery of Fuel
and Independent Power Producer Costs [under the] Generation Rate Adjustment
Mechanism (GRAM)” and the “Implementing Rules for the Recovery of the Incremental
Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (ICERA).”
The GRAM and ICERA were formulated by the ERC to replace the Purchased Power
Adjustment (PPA) and the Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (CERA) -- the automatic
adjustment mechanisms then in effect. In its view, neither of these adjustment
mechanisms met the goal of balancing its need to review the reasonableness and
prudence of these costs with the need of the utilities for a timely recovery of costs.[4] The
effectivity clauses of the implementing rules of the GRAM and the ICERA provided that
these should take effect immediately.
Afterwards, in consonance with the above Decision and Order, Meralco filed with the ERC
an amended application entitled “In the Matter of the Application for the Recovery of the
Independent Power Producer Costs under the Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism
(GRAM),” docketed as ERC Case No. 2004-112. Meralco sought to increase its
generation charge of P3.1886 per kWh -- earlier allowed in the ERC Order dated January
21, 2004 -- to P3.4664 per kWh, allegedly computed in conformity with the generation
rate formula in Section 6 of the GRAM implementing rules.
In its June 2, 2004 Order, the ERC approved the increase in Respondent Meralco’s
generation charge, albeit only from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh, to take effect
immediately.
Consequently, Petitioners Nasecore et al. filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari,
seeking to nullify the June 2, 2004 ERC Order. The lack of requisite publication of
Respondent Meralco’s amended application allegedly deprived them of procedural due
process. They also invoked Section 4(e), Rule of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of the EPIRA
Respondent asserted the inapplicability of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA,
requiring the publication of its application in a newspaper of general circulation and the
service of a copy on the concerned local government units. Its amended application for
the increase in its generation charge was supposedly governed by the GRAM
Implementing Rules adopted by the ERC in the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC
Case No. 2003-44.
Like Meralco, the ERC asserted that the procedure prescribed under the GRAM
Implementing Rules, particularly Sections 2 and 5, radically differed from that provided
for in Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. Specifically, the GRAM Implementing
Rules did not require the prior publication of the application of a distribution utility, like
Respondent Meralco, or the solicitation of comments of local government units and the
consumers.
The procedure prescribed by the GRAM Implementing Rules was markedly different from
that of the IRR of the EPIRA. The GRAM was intended to be an adjustment mechanism
and not an independent rate application, which was the scheme that fell within the
contemplation of the IRR of the EPIRA.

ISSUE
The sole issue raised by the parties was whether the ERC had committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the Order dated June 2, 2004, in ERC Case No. 2004- 112. The
Order approved the increase in Respondent Meralco’s generation charge from P3.1886
to P3.3213 per kWh, effective immediately without publication of the amended
application.

DECISION
On February 2, 2006, the Supreme Court en banc, through Mr. Justice Romeo S. Callejo
Sr., promulgated its unanimous Decision. It held that the ERC had committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed June 2, 2004 Order. The Court found that the
amended application of Meralco for an increase in its generation charge had not been
published in a newspaper of general circulation, in violation of Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the
IRR of EPIRA.
The Court explained that, contrary to the stance taken by respondents, the amended
application of Meralco for an increase in its generation charge was covered by Section
4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. This rule could not have been any clearer with
respect to its coverage, as it referred to “any application or petition for rate adjustment or
for any relief affecting the consumers” without making any distinctions. Hence, falling
within the contemplation of the rule was any application or petition that would result in an
adjustment in the total price (retail rate) paid by the end-users, whether this adjustment
was occasioned by a change in the charges for generation, transmission, distribution,
supply, or some other factor.
That the amended application of Meralco was nonetheless covered by the said provision
was mandated by the fact that the relief prayed for would clearly affect the consumers.
The costs of their electricity consumption would increase. The Court recalled its ruling in
Freedom from Debt Coalition v. ERC, which had outlined the requirements of Section
4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA
Moreover, according to the Certification dated January 11, 2006, issued by the Office of
the National Administrative Register (ONAR), neither had the GRAM Implementing Rules
been filed with that office, in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987. Failure to
publish these rules violated the fundamental principle of due process, as enunciated by
the Court in the landmark case Tanada v. Tuvera; hence, they must be declared
ineffective.
5. Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 21, 1963

FACTS
This is an appeal from a decision of Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch X), in its
Civil Case No. 41639, enjoining the Secretary of Public Worlds and Communications from
causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly
Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No.
15905.

The case started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked
the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the
obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After
notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public
nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the
land owners, spouses Lovina to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the
Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent. After receipt of the
decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain
the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearin g, granted a
permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal.
The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno, Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and Benjamin Yonson, investigator, question the jurisdiction of the trial
court, and attribute to it the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional;
2. The trial court erred in receiving evidence de novo at the trial of the case;
3. The trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of defendant Secretary of
Public Works and Communications and in reversing the latter's finding that the stream
in question is a navigable river which was illegally closed by plaintiffs;
4. The trial court erred in holding that the Sapang Bulati is a private stream; and
5. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiffs should first exhaust administrative
remedy before filing the instant petition.

The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056
is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of
whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam en croaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state
of facts, thereby constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUE
Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only
as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for
being unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable.

DECISION

No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachment upon public streams, constructions that no
private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is
public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession

It is true that exercise of the Secretary’s power under the Act necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its
previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are
merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams
of unauthorized obstructions or encroachment, and authorities are clear that they are,
validly conferrable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity
to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great

value can not be done expect through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to
summary abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before
us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the
complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein . It is noteworthy that Republic
Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as ‘public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions” on public navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are
in the latter class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters
within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud,
collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this
case, we agree with appellant that the court below erred in rejecting the finding of fact of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
6. Pantranco South Express, Inc. v Board of Transportation, G.R. No. L-49664,
November 22, 1990

FACTS
On August 5, 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of public
convenience to Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. (BLTB) for the operation of
twenty-eight (28) bus units on the Pasay City — Legaspi City line, Bulan-Sorsogon line,
Sorsogon line. On April 4, 1975, Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PANTRANCO) filed a
complaint against BLTB before the Board of Transportation (BOT) charging it with
abandonment of services on said lines and praying for the cancellation of BLTB’s
certificates of public convenience.
BLTB referred the matter to hearings before the BOT. At said hearings, BLTB admitted
nonoperation of the bus services based on the following supervening factors which are
beyond their control which prevented them from operating the lines at issue:
(1) The gasoline crises starting 1971;
(2) The destructive big floods in 1972 and 1974;
(3) The general troubled conditions of peace and order in 1971 and 1972 leading to the
declaration of martial law;
(4) Starting 1973 and on to 1974,1975 and 1976 the nearly prohibitive cost of units and
spare parts (if available at all), the higher costs of operations and acute tire shortages
particularly in 1974;
(5) All these, which are of general public knowledge and known to the Board, brought the
whole land transportation industry in what might be termed as in extremis condition
causing the bankruptcy of many operators, big and small; and
(6) Complainant Pantranco South Express, Inc. was not spared the ill effects of these
adverse conditions to the extent that up to the present it has not registered all the buses
required for its regular bus operations.

On January 4, 1979, the BOT issued an order, ordering the respondent to operate within
fifteen (15) days and inform the Board within ten (10) days from commencement of
operation, pay the fine of P10,000.00, and declare the consolidated complaints filed
closed and terminated.

The BOT rationalized the non-cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of public convenience,

as follows:

The BOT rationalized that cancellation of a certificate of public convenience is a penalty

of the severest degree. Its consequences are suffered not exclusively by the operator; it
extends to the travelling public whose needs for transportation facilities would further be
aggravated by a diminution of needed services.

Sec. 16 (n) of the Public Service Law empowers the Board ‘to suspend or revoke any
certificate . . . whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully and contumaciously
refused to comply with any order, rule or regulation of the Board or any provision of this
Act.’

A reading of the provisions of Public Service Law would show that failure to comply with
the terms and conditions of any certificate of public convenience is basically punished
with a fine, unless the violation is willful or contumacious, in which case the penalty of
suspension, or cancellation may be imposed.

Judged by the foregoing standards, the evidence of the complainant to be sadly lacking
in elements that would qualify the BLTB’s failure to operate as wilful and contumacious.
True the respondent did not operate on its certificate from the time it was granted but is
had given its justification by writing to the Board, that because of unfinished portions of
the road it could not render the service authorized by the Board to be rendered.

The Board, in its desire to be responsive to public need, has always kept itself informed
of actual and latest transportation conditions in the provinces, including the Bicol region.
Thru reports/ complaints from the general public, from reports of its field men, and from
its own personal observations acquired thru in spection trips, the Board is aware that
buses which are operating are very much less than what has been authorized.

In Bicol region, for instance, PANTRANCO registered and operated less than 50% of its
authorized units. The non-operation by PANTRANCO of th ese more than two hundred
(200) buses clearly requires the entry or operation of an equal number of buses. Any
prohibition against an effort to fill up a public need would be contrary to public interest.

Public interest will better be served if responden t is allowed to operate the service
authorized in its certificate of public convenience. To cancel these certificates at a time
when the clamor and demand for such service have been increasing day to day, prodded
by the people’s desire to avail of the excellent road conditions, which in turn conduces to
fast and convenient travel, would be to negate and turn back the clock of progress which
has been seeping steadily and constantly to the long neglected vast communal area that
is the Bicol Region.
 ISSUE

Whether BOT has the discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of
public convenience based on its own observation and investigation .

DECISION

There can be no dispute that the law (Section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act) gives to
the BOT ample power and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate
of public convenience issued to an operator as long as there is evidence to support its
action, as held by this Court in a long line of cases, wherein it was even intimated that in
matters of this nature so long as the action is justified this Court will not substitute its
discretion for that of the BOT.
The BOT, in refusing to cancel the certificates of public convenience of BLTB, relied on
these pieces of evidence; (1) the letter of BLTB dated September 18, 1972; (2)
reports/complaints from the general public; (3) reports of its field men; and (4) its own
observations acquired thru inspection trips, all of which form part of its records. The BOT
is particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on questions regarding certificates of
public convenience are influenced not only by the facts as disclosed by the evidence in
the case before it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that are
periodically submitted to it. Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration
the result of its own observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision,
in connection with other evidence presented at the hearing of a case.

BLTB acted in good faith when it did not immediately operate on those lines and not
because of a design to prejudice public interest. Certificates of public convenience involve
investment of a big amount of capital, both in securing the certificate and in maintaining
the operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere failure to operate temporarily should
not be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the case at bar, the suspension
of the service was directly caused by circumstances beyond the operator’s control. In the
absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation on the part of the utility
operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked. More importantly,
what cannot be ignored is that the needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by
the BOT in its order. In the exercise of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public
convenience, the BOT is guided by public necessity and convenience as primary
considerations.

Petition DISMISSED.
7. Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990

FACTS

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner.
Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE
AND SEIZURE ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it
was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the
place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes
which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the
confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the
house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought
to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider
the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE

May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code?
 DECISION

PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a
warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

8. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. NTC, G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989

FACTS

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196, petitioner was
placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its
facilities and services and the fixing of rates. NTC required petitioner to apply for the
requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the
services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rate.

Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue operating
and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining
since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it
has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so
that it can continue to operate and maintain the above-mentioned facilities, provide the
services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.

Petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities,
to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging.
This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. When said
provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6)
months. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority
of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it
directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.

ISSUE

Whether or not the order violates procedural due process for having been issued without
prior notice and hearing?

DECISION

Yes, the respondent violated the procedural due process. Respondents admit that the
application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. Respondent contention that notice and hearing
are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section16 (c) of the Public Service Act dictates that
a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and if not subject
to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-
fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the
same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission’s own
motion as in the present case.

9. Orais v. Almirante, G.R. No. 181195, June 10, 2013

FACTS

Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, or in case of conviction , where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman's decision shall be final,
executory, and unappealable. Indeed, in one case, the Court went so far as to declare
that in such cases, the Court of Appeals (CA) had no appellate jurisdiction to review,
rectify or reverse the order or decision of the Ombudsman.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks a review and setting aside of the CA's August
17, 2006 Decision, as well as its December 10, 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
82610, entitled "Frederick James C. Orais, petitioner, versus Dr. Amelia C. Almirante,
respondent."

Factual Antecedents
In 2003, petitioner Frederick James C. Orais, Veterinary Quarantine Inspector-Seaport of
the Veterinary Quarantine Service-Seaport, Region VII Office of the Department of
Agriculture (DA), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for corruption and
grave misconduct against his superior, herein respondent Dr. Amelia C. Almirante,
Veterinary Quarantine Officer-Seaport. Docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0184-D, petitioner
accused respondent of committing the following anomalies:

1. Ordering, directing, persuading and inducing Veterinary Quarantine Inspector Luz

Tabasa to receive money in check or in cash, from importers of meat products and
other imported items for the preparation and issuance of Clearance Certificate[s]
without [issuing any official receipt therefor];
2. Directly or indirectly request[ing] or receiv[ing] money in check or in cash [in the
amount of P600.00] from importers of meat products and other goods allegedly as
inspection fee without issuing official receipts therefor;
3. Knowingly approving [and/or] granting permit[,] authority or privilege to private or
contractual workers of the office to perform some veterinary quarantine functions, like
allowing them to board and inspect domestic vessels carrying quarantine products or
items, conduct quarantine inspections on imported items in ports or inland quarantine
sites, issue quarantine permits, etc.;
4. Knowingly approving and granting monetary considerations to private or contractual
workers whom x x x respondent authorized or permitted to perform some veterinary
quarantine services; and
5. Lack of delicadeza or lack of professionalism, justness and sincerity; knowingly
allowing a situation [where she and her husband Oscar Almirante work in the same
office, with the latter as her subordinate, thus creating doubt or suspicion that she is
granting favors or undue advantage to the latter in the assignment of quarantine
inspections].

In support of his Complaint, petitioner attached the affidavits of Luz Tabasa (Tabasa),
Agriculturist II Veterinary Quarantine Inspector; Dr. Verna Agriam (Agriam), Bohol
Veterinary Quarantine Officer; and Alfredo Barbon (Barbon), Janitor-Utility employed by
Perfect Clean General Services, janitorial and maintenance contractor.

In her March 27, 2003 Affidavit, Tabasa alleged that private contractual employees
including Barbon, who are not DA employees, were assigned by respondent to perform
quarantine functions like inspection of imported cargoes in cold
storages/warehouses/processing plants and the preparation and issuance of clearance
certificates, commodity clearance for export, and shipping permits; that in the preparation
and issuance of clearance certificates, no official receipt is issued but the money paid
therefor is remitted to respondent, who would only issue an acknowledgment receipt
signed by her; and that for every inspection she made, she was given P250.00 by
respondent.

Agriam, on the other hand, alleged in her April 2, 2003 Affidavit that respondent defied
Special Orders of the Regional Director of DA Region 7 which assigned her (Agriam) to
the Veterinary Quarantine Services at Seaport, refusing to honor said orders of
assignment; that instead, she was assigned at DA Region 7 Regulatory Division, Cebu
City; that respondent allowed and authorized janitors and contractual employees
employed by a private manpower agency to perform quarantine functions like i ssuance
of quarantine permits, inspection of domestic vessels, and veterinary inspections, despite
an August 9, 2002 Memorandum issued to her by the Regional Executive Director which
ordered her to desist from the practice.

Barbon's March 27, 2003 Affidavit stated that he was employed by Perfect Clean General
Services, manpower contractor; that apart from his actual duty as janitor, respondent
likewise authorized him to perform quarantine services, namely: to inspect imported
products or items at quarantine sites owned by companies such as Tennessee Feedmill,
Popular Feedmill, and Upland Feedmill; to board and inspect local/domestic vessels for
quarantine services; to disinfect chicken dung of some clients; and to issue quarantine
domestic shipping permits. Barbon added that for every inspection he made, respondent
gave him P100.00, while respondent kept the additional P500.00 as her share; that he
had been performing quarantine services until the latter part of 2002; and that he
performed overtime work but was not given overtime pay therefor.

In her June 16, 2003 Counter-Affidavit, respondent claimed that there was no truth to the
accusations against her; that all payments were received by the DA Regulatory Division
through its duly authorized Collection Officers who issue the proper official receipts
therefor, pursuant to Orders of Payment issued by respondent; that all Clearance
Certificates were issued by the Veterinary Quarantine Office, and not by respondent; that
the payments made for which acknowledgment receipts were issued do not cover
Clearance Certificates, but reimbursements/payments made to quarantine personnel for
their overtime services, transportation, meals, lodging and other expenses incurred in the
examination and inspection of imported animal meat/by-products, which is authorized
under DA Administrative Order No. 22, series of 1993 (DAO 22) issued by then Acting
Secretary of Agriculture Joemari D. Gerochi; that petitioner's accusation that respondent
received money from importers of meat products as "inspection fee" without issuing
official receipts is untrue, and is not supported by specifics as to which importers,
transactions, or dates are covered, and the exact amounts she allegedly received; that if
indeed importers were aggrieved or victimized, said importers would have complained or
come forward, yet none has come out to complain or act as petitioner's witness; that the
amounts given to Tabasa and Barbon as alleged in their affidavits were duly authorized
payments pursuant to DAO 22 for their transportation, meals, lodging, etc., and were not
bribes or donations from respondent; that petitioner and Tabasa were motivated by hatred
and resentment for respondent's refusal to sign their respective Daily Time Records
(DTRs) on account of their multiple absences and irregular reporting to work, which have
become constant sources of disagreement and conflict between them.
In a June 29, 2003 Reply-Affidavit, petitioner submitted the respective Affidavits15 of
Rogelio C. Mainit (Mainit), DA utility driver, and Danilo E. Tidoso (Tidoso), representative
of Gusay Customs Brokerage. Mainit merely alleged that he would serve as
temporary/occasional driver to respondent and other quarantine personnel. Tidoso, on
the other hand, claimed that he acted as customs broker to two importers of feed additives
and supplements, and that for the inspection and clearance of these clients' imports, he
would pay a flat rate of P700.00 per vessel to the Veterinary Quarantine Office, after
which an acknowledgment receipt is issued therefor. To this, respondent explained that
DAO 22 authorized the payment/reimbursement of transportation and other allowable
expenses, including overtime, and the rate is agreed upon by her office and the importers'
representatives or brokers, who find it difficult to liquidate their cash advances if payment
thereof is made on contractual basis, and regardless of distance traveled by the inspector,
volume of imported items, or whether inspection/service was carried out during regular
working day, holiday or after office hours upon the request of the importer concerned.

On July 18, 2003, petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit accusing respondent of refusal
to obey office memoranda and other Special Orders issued by her superiors. To this,
respondent submitted her Supplemental Counter-Affidavit, arguing that the flat rate
payments for overtime work of quarantine personnel and reimbursements of
transportation, meal and lodging expenses were the result of an agreement arrived at
between her office and the representatives/ brokers of the concerned importers who
found it difficult to liquidate their cash advances if payments were instead made on a
contractual basis.

ISSUE
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it simply concurs with the office of
the ombudsman in dismissing the complaints by stating that the dismissal “was done in
the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutor powers granted by law” despite kowing
the ombudsman findings regarding one of the questionable acts Dr. Amelia Almirante i.e
the issuance of “acknowledgement receipt” as a “system susceptible to graft and
corruption”

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it simply dismissed the petition for lack of
merit

DECISION
The Court denies the Petition.

The Court agrees with the CA that the instant Petition presents no opportun ity to depart
from past pronouncements consistent with law and the rules of procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman's
decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. Indeed, in one case, the Court went
so far as to declare that in such cases, "it follows that the [Court of Appeals] has no
appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse” the order or decision of the
Ombudsman.

But of course, the above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial
review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud
or error of law[, or w]hen such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly mis
appreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not
hesitate to reverse the factual findings."

However, there is no reason to apply the above stated exception. The Court notes that
the sole basis of the instant Petition rests on the Office of the Ombudsman's observation
in its Decision that the practice and procedure for payment and reimbursement of
overtime services, transportation, meal, and lodging expenses present an opportunity for
graft and corruption and; that the issuance of mere acknowledgment receipts by
respondent warrants the filing of charges against her. First of all, this argument is flawed;
if petitioner's argument is allowed, then charges should just as well be filed against all
who are covered by the said practice and procedure, including the petitioner. They are
all part of the system covered by DAO 22, which petitioner claims to be a defective
system.

Secondly, the presumption of validity attaches to DAO 22. The work of quarantine
inspection and providing quarantine services in general requires employees of the DA to
be assigned to field work, to perform tasks outside the office where these quarantine
personnel are assigned. It is inconceivable that an importer with tons of meat, vegetable
or fish products should physically proceed to the DA office with the meat, vegetables or
fish in tow just so the quarantine personnel therein could perform a quarantine
inspection. DAO 22, which sets the guidelines on overtime service as well as
transportation, meal and lodging expenses, and the rates to be charged therefor from
importers (or what the administrative order refers to as "parties served") whose imports
require on-site quarantine inspection by the DA, answers to the need for quarantine
personnel to be mobile and dynamic, yet at minimum expense to the government. What
is collected from the parties served goes directly to the quarantine personnel in the form
of overtime pay or reimbursements for travel, meal and lodging expenses. There is very
little room for allegations of corruption in this regard, contrary to what petitioner
believes. All quarantine personnel receive what they deserve, by way of overtime pay
and reimbursements for expenses. If they do not, they will naturally complain; and the
first to complain should be the petitioner and his witnesses. Yet they have not claimed
that they were short-changed for their services.
Thirdly, even if there be truth to petitioner's allegations that the practice could breed
corruption, he certainly has not shown how, nor could he attribute the same to respondent,
just as the Ombudsman could not.

An apparent reason for issuing acknowledgment receipts, rather than official receipts,
with respect to amounts charged under DAO 22 is that these amounts are not accountable
funds which must go to the national coffers; they only cover the cost of the quarantine
personnel's time and expenses, and are ultimately distributed to them in the form of
overtime pay and reimbursements for expenses incurred during the performance of
quarantine services. Besides, DAO 22 does not require the issuance of official receipts;
indeed, in this regard it is silent.

Finally, if petitioner believes that DAO 22 is inherently infirm, or that there are irregularities
or anomalies in its issuance and implementation, he should initiate the proper move to
question the same. A direct challenge in court would settle any doubts as to its
validity. As it stands, he, respondent and all others covered by it are simply acting
pursuant to its mandate. Until it is invalidated, they must follow it to the letter.

10. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 1967

FACTS

Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1962 to require
manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the “established name” (generic name) of the
drug prominently and in type at least half as large as the type used for the “proprietary
name” (brand name) on labels and other printed material. The purpose was to inform
doctors and patients of drugs’ established names so that they could be purchased at
lower prices. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs published proposed regulations (in
addition to the Act) which required all drug labels and drug advertisements to put the
established name next to the proprietary name every time the proprietary name appeared.
A group of 37 drug manufacturers (the Petitioners) challenged the regulations on the
grounds that the Commissioner exceeded his authority under the Act in issuing the
regulations. The District Court granted injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Commissioner. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding (1) that pre-
enforcement review of the regulations was not permitted by the Act, and (2) that no relief
was available under the Administrative Procedure Act because no actual case or
controversy existed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari .

ISSUE

Did Congress, by its Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, intend to forbid pre-
enforcement review of the sort of regulations promulgated by the Commission er? Were
the issues ripe for judicial decision? Would withholding court consideration result in
hardship to the parties?

DECISION

Reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to review the District Court’s decision
that the regulation was beyond the power of the commissioner. No. Nothing in the Act
itself precludes pre-enforcement review. A review of the legislative history of the Act
reveals that the specific review provisions were designed to provide an additional remedy,
and not to cut down more traditional ch annels of review. The Act itself states, “The
remedies provided for in this subsection shall be in addition to and not in substitution for
any other remedies provided by law.” Yes, the issues presented were ripe for judicial
consideration, and withholding judicial consideration would result in hardship to the
parties. The parties agreed that the issue tendered was a purely legal one. The
regulations in issue were reviewable as a “final agency action” under the Administrative
Procedure Act because “when, as here, they are promulgated by order of the Commission
and the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they
are appropriately the subject of attack.” The regulations would have a direct day-to-day
impact on the operation of the companies, who either had to incur huge costs to comply
with the regulations’ requirements or risk prosecution. Dissent. There were two
unpublished dissents by Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice Clark. Concurrence. None.