Aldovino Vs NLRC
Aldovino Vs NLRC
Aldovino Vs NLRC
FIRST DIVISION
layoff. Both received temporary financial assistance equivalent to two (2) months basic pay in
accordance with the 7 September 1991 agreement.viii[8]
On 7 January 1992, Voluntary Arbitrator Romeo B. Batino upheld the right of respondent
company to temporarily lay off its employees upon his finding that AG & P's claim of severe
financial losses due to adverse business conditions was duly substantiated.ix[9]
On 9 February 1993, after applying anew for work at the AG & P, Pimentel was rehired at a
reduced salary as a project or contractual employee assigned at the company's Flour DanielEnron Project.x[10]
In 1994 Aldovino and Pimentel instituted separate but similar complaints against AG & P for
unfair labor practice, illegal layoff, illegal dismissal and non-payment of CBA increases and
benefits. They prayed for reinstatement with back wages, interests, CBA wage increases,
benefits and attorney's fees. The two (2) cases were thereafter consolidated. xi[11]
On 12 August 1994, finding that the complainants were illegally dismissed, Labor Arbiter Ernesto
S. Dinopol rendered a decisionxii[12] in the two (2) cases ordering AG & P to reinstate Aldovino
and Pimentel as regular employees and to pay back wages and attorney's fees. He explained
that the financial situation of AG & P was not bleak as was pictured in its position paper, which
was why the extended temporary layoff status of Aldovino and Pimentel was unjustified and
"akin to illegal dismissal." The Labor Arbiter however rejected the charge of unfair labor practice
and the claims for damages and other monetary benefits for lack of evidence.
AG & P appealed to the NLRC protesting that the issue of the validity of the temporary layoff had
already been decided in its favor by a voluntary arbitrator, hence, was res judicata.xiii[13]
Aldovino and Pimentel also appealed, although partially, questioning the Labor Arbiter's
computation of their back wages and the denial of their claim for CBA increases and benefits.xiv
[14]
Resolving the appeal on 18 February 1995,xv[15] the NLRC set aside the 12 August 1994
decision of the Labor Arbiter and agreed with AG & P that the principle of res judicata was
applicable in petitioners' case, citing the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator Batino which upheld the
validity of the 17 September 1991 temporary layoffs. It also alluded to its decision in Revidad v.
AG & P of Manila promulgated on 14 July 1993xvi[16] which already established the law of the
case. In its resolution of 30 March 1995, the NLRC denied reconsideration. Hence this recourse.
Petitioners argue that: (a) since the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action is lacking in the instant case, the doctrine of res judicata cannot attach; (b) the NLRC
misapplied Art. 286 of the Labor Code because at the time AG & P asked petitioners if they were
willing to extend their layoff status, there was yet no resumption of operations in the particular
work unit or area to which they were previously assigned; (c) an extension of the six-month
temporary layoff period operates as a constructive dismissal; and, (d) the NLRC should have
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's finding of illegal dismissal and rectified the award of back wages by
computing them as of the time petitioners were illegally laid off and not from the lapse of the 6month layoff period as ruled by the Labor Arbiter.
The petition lacks merit. For res judicata to apply (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and, (d) there must be as between the first and second actions identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.xvii[17] Petitioners insist that the last requisite of
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action in the case before the voluntary arbitrator
and the petition now before us is absent. They argue that they cannot be bound by the 7
January 1992 decision of Voluntary Arbitrator Batino inasmuch as that case involved only their
union URFA on one hand, and AG & P on the other.
The above argument is specious. It cannot be denied that both petitioners were bona fide
members of URFA when the case was under voluntary arbitration. In Davao Free Workers Front
v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court ruledxviii[18] The detail that the number and names of the striking members of petitioner union were not
specified in the decision nor in the complaint is of no consequence x x x It is the function
precisely of a labor union such as petitioner to carry the representation of its members
particularly against the employer's unfair labor practices against it and its members and to file an
action for their benefit and behalf without joining them and to avoid the cumbersome procedure
of joining each and every member as a separate party x x x x
The right of URFA as a legitimate labor union to represent its members is expressly guaranteed
under Art. 242 of the Labor Code.xix[19] This right, however, does not deprive its individual
members of their concomitant right to file a case in their own names, nor of their right to
withdraw from any case filed by the union in their behalf. More importantly, the individual
member may seasonably exercise his option to withdraw from a case filed by his union if he
does not want to be bound thereby. In Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v.
CIR,xx[20] this Court ruled that only those members of the petitioning union who did not signify
their intention to withdraw from the case before its trial and judgment on the merits are bound by
the outcome of the case. Since it has not been shown that Aldovino and Pimentel withdrew from
the case undergoing voluntary arbitration, it stands to reason that both are bound by the
decision rendered thereon. This obtaining, there is no doubting the identity of parties between
the arbitrated case and that brought by petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. Hence we reiterate With respect to the aspect of identity of parties, it has been repeatedly stressed that this
requirement is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties which
means that the parties in both cases need not be physically identical provided that there is privity
between the parties x x x xxxi[21]
As regards identity of subject matter and causes of action, our ruling in Revidad v. NLRCxxii[22]
stands. That case was for illegal dismissal relative to the 17 September 1991 layoff by AG & P of
its employee Revidad and his co-employees Aldovino and Pimentel, contending that the
arbitration proceeding under Voluntary Arbitrator Batino involved only the 13 August 1991 layoff
and did not cover those subsequently effected. There we pronounced We are not, however, in accord with the findings of public respondent that the subject of
voluntary arbitration proceedings was the September 17, 1991 lay-off of herein petitioners, which
allegedly was the one and only lay-off effected by AG & P. Private respondent AG & P does not
deny nor controvert the allegation in the position paper submitted by the AG & P - URFA with the
voluntary arbitrator that the AG & P management started the actual implementation of the
company's Presidential Directive No. 0191 on August 3, 1991 by effecting the temporary lay-off
of more than 705 employees. Thus, the layoff of herein petitioners on September 17, 1991
cannot be validly asserted as the only lay-off subject of the aforementioned voluntary arbitration
proceedings.
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
xxvi