Mijares V Ranada GR No.

139325, April 12,2005

Topic: Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement
FACTS:
A complaint was filed with the Unites States District Court, District of Hawaii, against the estate of former President
Ferdinand Marcos by Filipino citizens who allegedly suffered from human rights abuses during the Marcos regime.
They invoked the Alien Tort Act as basis for US District Court jurisdiction. The US District Court rendered Final
Judgement awarding the plaintiff class a total of $1.964 billion, and such judgement was affirmed by US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mijares filed complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of final judgement. The estate of Marcos filed a
motion to dismiss raising the defense of non-payment of correct filing fees. In response, petitioner claimed that an
action for the enforcement of final judgement is not capable of pecuniary estimation, hence the PhP410.00 fee was
proper. Respondent Judge Ranada dismissed the complaint and opined that the subject matter was capable for
pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgement rendered by foreign court ordering the payment of definite sum of
money, allowing easy determination of the value of foreign judgement therefore Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of Civil
Procedure applies. The motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari invoking
that the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgement, and not an action for collection of some
of money therefore, their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Commission on Human Rights was
permitted to intervene, it urged that petition should be granted and that the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the
action for the execution of final judgement as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been
decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again
in another country.
ISSUE: Whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment."?
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations implies that final judgements of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain condition that may vary in
different countries.
The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment has remained
unchanged.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
The law recognizes 2 cases of foreign judgement, and in both cases the foreign judgement is subject to impeachment
in the local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
 Action in rem – the foreign judgement is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing.
 Action in personam – the foreign judgement is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In the case at bar, the complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a final judgement,
the Final Judgement. However, the Final Judgement is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of
the petitioner against the Marcos estate. The Marcos estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employee Org V Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. 51 SCRA 189 June 5, 1973
Topic: Hierarchy of Rights
FACTS:
Peitioner, PBMEO is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent company. They decided
to stage a mass demonstration in Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of Pasig police, to be participated by
the workers in 1st shift and those in regular 2nd and 3rd shifts. Days before the said rally, the company held a meeting
with the representatives of PBMEO. PBMEO clarified that the said demonstration has nothing to do with the
company and that it is an exercise of their rights. The management informed PBMEO that they recognize their
rights, however the activity will prejudice the normal operation of the company. They warned PBMEO that anyone
who belongs to first and regular shifts without previous leave of absence who shall fail to work on that day will be
dismissed and the officers shall be held primarily liable because it is a violation to the provision of CBA “NO
STRIKE, NO LOCKOUT”. After the rally, the company charged and dismissed the officers and employees of first
shift for the violation of CBA. Judge Salvador found PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith. PBMEO’s motion
for reconsideration since it was filed 2 days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not PBMEO validly exercise their constitutional right of freedom of speech?
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central
core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must
be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision
of those who have no patience with general principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On
the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
Enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an accepted principle
that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
Tupas V CA 193 SCRA 597, 1991
Topic: Due Process in General
FACTS:
The petitioner received the copy of the decision of RTC Pasay on April 3, 1989. They file the motion for
reconsideration on April 17, 1989 or 14 days later. The order of May 3, 1989 denying the motion was received by
the petitioner’s counsel on May 3, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review the the Court of Appeals within the
remainder of 15-day reglementary period on May 10, 1989 the petitioner only filed on May 23, 1989 or 14 days
late. The Court of Appeals held that the appeal had been tardily made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been denied due process?
No, the petitioner has not been denied due process.
The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period, which he should have
known was only one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted as a matter of course.
It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that
they have been denied due process.
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are
contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept
is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
Banco Español 37 P 921
Topic: Judicial Proceeding in General
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tangquinyeng mortgaged various parcels of real property as a security of a debt owing by him to
Banco Español. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have
been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for the
plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication. An order for publication was
accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila.
At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the
summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the
Empire of China. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however,
among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an
employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post-office a
registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the
plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the
postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports
to show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment
was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was
said about this notice having been given mail. . Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before
July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, and it
was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage
property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order
was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. About seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca,
as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July
3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion
itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. The court denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law?
As applied to a judicial proceeding, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied
if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant
or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall
thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and
the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the
probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it
is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice
unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all
these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered
absolutely necessary. It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some
way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get
notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must
abide the consequences. Having due regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the
absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident
to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail
carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its
destination and be delivered to him.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice,
if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and
hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by
publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires.
Ang Tibay V CIR 69 P 635
Topic: Administrative Due Process
FACTS:
Ang Tibay filed an opposition for both the motion for reconsideration of CIR and the motion for new trial by the
National Labor Union.
In the National Labor Case:
- They alleged that Toribio Teodoro who dominated the National Worker’s Brotherhood of Ang Tibay made a
false claim the there was a shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay that made it necessary for him to lay off
workers. However, such claim was unsupported by record of the Bureau of Customs and the accounts of Native
Dealers of Leather. That such was a scheme adapted to systematically discharged all the members of NLU Inc.
from work, and unjustly favored the National Workers Brotherhood. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a substantial evidence that the exclusion of laborers was due to their union
affiliation or activity?
Due process in administrative character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) Have something to support the decision
(4) Evidence must be "substantial". .) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
It is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate,
in a national way, a conclusion of law.