Republic vs Marcos

GR Nos 130371 & 130855, August 4, 2009

Facts:
RTC acting as a probate court in a Special Proceeding, issued an Order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon filing of bond by the Marcos.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration in so far
as the RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. This motion was denied
by the RTC. Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting
letters testamentary to respondents. But this Court referred the petition to the CA.
Subsequently, CA issued a Decision dismissing the referred petition for having taken
the wrong mode of appeal. CA’s basis was Supreme Court Circular 2-90. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Petitioner then files this
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents Marcos can act and serve as executors?
Ruling:
YES. Sec 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those grounds. Respondent Marcos does
not specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and “conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude” since there is no evidence on record, oral, or documentary, to
substantiate and support the said allegation that respondent Marcos have been
convicted of a number of cases. Also, the cases filed against Imelda Marcos has been
reversed by this Court. Hence, the so-called “conviction” against respondent Imelda
Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
As to the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos, CA acquitted
respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges. He appealed his conviction
relating to four violations on Section 45 of the NIRC hence those cases should not serve
as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More
importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same
is still insufficient to disqualify his as the “failure to file an income tax return” is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R.No. 176831 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:

Facts:
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother
Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that
she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the
demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was
denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from
the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier
ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of
attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with
this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court
denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this
Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy
and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
Ruling:
No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is
clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any
of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the
action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be
used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some
obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies
to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and,
regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is
called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used
for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued
only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless
to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its
nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant
of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature
of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of
the will whether the same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the
Court grants the demurrer.
Abellana vs Paredes
GR No. 232006, July 10, 2019

Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Sec 11 and 12 of RA 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which was denied. Atty Raul Albura filed his
Entry of Appearance as counsel for petitioner.
The RTC issued an Order submitting the case for decision for failure of petitioner
and his counsel to appear during the scheduled hearing on even date for initial
presentation of evidence for the defense and rendered decision finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. After series of filing of motions, Atty Albura filed a
Manifestation of his withdrawal as counsel for petitioner, which was granted. Petitioner’s
third counsel. Atty Reynaldo Acosta, filed a Petition for Relief from judgment on the
ground that petitioner was “deprived of his constitutional right to be heard and to present
evidence in his behalf in view of the excusable negligence of Atty. Albura in not
appearing in the above-mentioned hearing and for failure of his bondsman or Atty
Albura to inform him of the scheduled hearing. The RTC denied the petition for relief of
judgment for lack of factual and legal basis. On appeal with the CA, the latter court
dismissed the petition and agreed with the RTC.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus before
the Supreme Court. He claims that a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus
may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy in such cases when a person is deprived
of his Constitutional Rights during the court proceedings. Specifically, he claims that he
has been deprived of his rights to due process and to competent counsel. Petitioner
avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of notice of
the proceeding in the RTC. He claims that the RTC hastily admitted the criminal cases
for decision even if there was no proof on record that petitioner or his previous lawyers,
Atty Rama and Albura, received any notice or order from the court of the proceedings,
thereby effectively depriving him of his rights to be heard and to present evidence on his
behalf. Moreover, petitioner argues that he has been deprived of his right to competent
counsel for the negligence of Atty Albura.
In compliance with the Court’s directive, respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a comment. The OSG Contends that the petitioner was not
deprive of his constitutional rights; hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued to
him as a post-conviction remedy.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted?

Ruling:
No. The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an
extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.
 Indeed, the rule is that when there is a deprivation of a person's constitutional
rights, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention. The
inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court
within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under
which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The concern is not merely
whether an error has been committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody,
but whether such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process in
question.
Petitioner, however, failed to convince the Court that the proceedings before the
trial court were attended by violations of his rights to due process or competent counsel
as to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. Thus, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is
unwarranted.
Bartolome vs Republic
GR No. 243288, August 28, 2019

Facts:
Ruben C Bartolome filed a petition to change his name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court before the RTC of Paranaque City. The petitioner prays for the correction of his
name from” Feliciano Bartholome” as appearing in his birth certificate to the name that
he allegedly used since his childhood, “Ruben (Cruz) Bartolome”. After the posting and
publication, the petitioner presented different proofs of his identity which all bears the
name “Ruben C Bartolome”.
The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
insufficiency of evidence, and improper venue. It was held that the procedure sought for
the change of the petitioner’s first name is incorrect, and RA 9048 is the proper remedy.
As regards with the prayer to correct last the last name it was denied for improper
venue. It was further held that the RTC of Manila where the civil registrar is located is
the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Lastly, the
evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that he had been habitually called
“Ruben C Bartolome” since childhood.
The CA held that the petitioner should have filed the correction in the entries of
his birth certificate under RA 9048, instead of Rule 103. It was likewise held that
petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the surname of his father
and his siblings is spelled as “Bartolome”.
The OSG argued that the CA correctly denied the petition. A petition pursuant to
RA 9048 before the civil registry should have been filed first in order to change his first
name and to correct the spelling of his surname.
Issue:
Whether or not the change/correction sought in the petitioner’s first name, middle name,
and surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, from Feliciano Bartholome to Ruben
Cruz Bartolome should be filed under RA 9048, Rule 103 or Rule 108?
Ruling:
The changes sought by the petitioner are all covered by RA 9048.
In connection to this, the change sought in the petitioner’s first name from
“Feliciano” to “Ruben” is covered by Section 4(2) of RA 9048, as amended, on the
ground that he had habitually and continuously used “Ruben”, and is publicly known by
that first name. Further, the inclusion of the petitioner’s middle name “Cruz”, and the
correction of his last name from “Bartholome” to “Bartolome”, a mere clerical error, and
is covered by Section 2 of the said law. The latter may be readily corrected by merely
referring to the existing records of the Civil Registrar such as the last name of the
petitioner’s parents and immediate family members. Therefore, the petition should have
been filed in the local civil registry of the city or municipality where the records sought to
be changed or corrected is being kept, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9048, as amended.
The petitioner can only avail the appropriate judicial remedies when the
changes/corrections sought through the administrative’s proceeding are denied. Hence,
if the prayer to administratively correct the middle name and the surname were denied,
the same may be brough under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Bautista Vs Dannug-Salucon
GR NO 221862, January 23, 2018

Facts:
Respondent, Atty Maria Dannug-Salucon was a co-founder of the National Union
of People's Lawyers (NUPL), as well as a partner of her own law firm, and undertook
the defense of several political detainees, including human rights defenders labeled or
suspected to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) or the New
People's Army (NPA) who had been harassed with allegedly trumped-up charges by the
agents of the Government.
On March 24, 2014, respondent was made aware of potential security risks
regarding her work by her paralegal during a lunch meeting with the relatives of a
detained political prisoner client who was accused of murder in the RTC of Lagawe,
Ifugao (lagawe case). Her paralegal was later gunned down that same evening.
Respondent had asked him earlier that day to identify the names, ranks and addresses
of the handler/s of the prosecution witness in the Lagawe case.
That same evening, she was informed by a client who was working as a civilian
asset for the PNP Intelligence Section that the PNP had issued a directive to PNP
Burgos, Isabela (her hometown) to conduct a background investigation on her and to
confirm whether she was a “Red Lawyer”. She was also informed that she was being
secretly followed by agents of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), and that
people that looked like military/police had been asking people in her office about her
and her routine.
On March 31, she received another call from her client-informant which
confirmed that she was the subject of surveillance, and was in fact being tailed by
ISAFP operatives after her client-informant was interrogated by three ISAFP operatives
with regards to w/n she was acquainted with known NPA members and why she was
always the lawyer of several suspected communist terrorists.
Upon further investigation she discovered additional things that supported this
claim: (see notes for full section) but tl;dr, (1) She was tailed by AFP & PNP Operatives
(2) Shady looking PNP/AFP personnel went to her home and office several times, etc.
as reported to her by her driver and co-workers
As a response, she filed with the CA the present petition for the writs of amparo
& habeas data alleging that the above acts, in conjunction with the previous history of
human rights lawyers/defenders/political activists were killed or abducted after being
labeled as “communists” following this pattern of surveillance may be interpreted as
preliminary acts leading to her abduction/killing. She further alleged that while the
purported military/police personnel were still unidentified, they were members of the
ISAFP, AFP & PNP who acted under the orders of their superiors, hence impleading the
respondents.
The CA ruled in her favor, finding that she has proven by substantial evidence
that respondents (petitioners here) are responsible and accountable for the violation of
respondent’s rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of the unjustified surveillance
operations/acts of harassments and intimidation committed against her as well as lack
of fair and effective official investigation with regards to her allegations. Granting her
petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data
Directing respondents, in their capacities as Acting Regional Director of the
Police Regional Office 2, Command General of the Philippine Army; Commanding
Officer of the ISAFP and Chief of Staff of the AFP to protect the life liberty and security
of respondent (Atty. Dannug-Salucon) as well as to conduct further investigation into her
allegations.
After CA denied motion for reconsideration, current petition for certiorari was
filed.

Issues:
1) W/N the evidence adduced by the respondent sufficient to justify the
issuance of the writ of amparo?
2) W/N the CA had sufficient basis to grant the writ of habeas data?

Ruling:

1) Yes.
Following the doctrine of Razon the SC held that a writ of amparo may be issued
if the person who filed it has sufficiently shown based on the totality of evidence in
relation to the information available to them at the time that: (1) There is a real and
probable threat to their right to life, liberty and security (2) the presence of a state or
private action produces the threat Here, her paralegal was gunned down after the
former informed her of potential surveillance.

2) Yes.
Habeas Data is a remedy for “any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is volated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.” It is an independent and summary remedy that seeks to protect a
person’s right to control of information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. Here, factually & procedurally warranted. Civilian asset informed her of
the surveillance, and she personally observed the surveillance.