G.R. No.

208170; August 20, 2014; kidnap for ransom and serious illegall detention

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-Appellants.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the
December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC
found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No.
7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.

The Facts

Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information, 3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion
of which reads:

That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau
a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon
regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes,
Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while
therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally rescued on
February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the kidnapping:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman
from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-
115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA,
and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that
while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold
framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-
up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and
he was handcuffed and chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as "John"
approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for
ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape
recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and
father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day
after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped
for ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from the former informing them that he
was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.

On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation and a meeting with the
representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.

Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions,
to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to
Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and
eventual release.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that
he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e.
beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers.
Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to
proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in
the morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM
Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they
were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll
down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment.
Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his
driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car
registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and
asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest
for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a
QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City
Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.

Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the police car. The rest of the members of
PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair
Onglingswam.

During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant
Petrus Yau.5

Version of the Defense

Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief 6 to substantiate their claim of innocence:

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the
subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He
came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he
was in Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was
kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.

On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her
shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men
bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered
his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.

When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was
wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him
for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone
removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to
make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.

When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license,
Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card,
and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.

After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the
PACER Custodial Center.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in
August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats),
without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot
drive a taxi as an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him
(though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes,
she would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his
house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The
white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.

During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his constitutional rights.

Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and
dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5,
Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor,
Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.

On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at
Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00
o’clock in the morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come
with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.

Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an
office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together
with her children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released
and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.

Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying
cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had
withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding
ring, necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know. 7

The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and
sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive
identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over the
phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator
of the heinous act.

With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus
in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.

The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison
term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to
the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS
MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.

Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two
Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full
payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8

Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.

Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND
AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.10

Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in
not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was
asked if there was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of
Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held
captive and not because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice. 11

On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution 12 notifying the parties that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments
in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his
arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove
the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for
the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v. Maxion 15 that:

(FIRST)The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better
position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These
are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies.Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion,
whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless
some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the
case.16

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even
conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17

In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the
accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the
commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here,
the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he
lost consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his
phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed
that he had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court.
It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19

Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the
twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to
remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of
Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for
three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice
with Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and
their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit. 20

(SECOND)Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led tothe inescapable and reasonable
conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the
circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.22

The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:

1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St.,
Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;

2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills
Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-
appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;

3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of
Petrus Yau;

4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken
chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying
down position and family footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n
Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of
Susana Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No.
2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate
of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit
slips; and PLDT bills;

5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that
the owner ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been
known yet; and

6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken
from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.23

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken
together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the
prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim.24
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First,
Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a
taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth,
Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.

(THIRD)Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that
there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution
had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his
kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence 25 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design;
that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police
authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. 26 As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De
Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather thanthat of a
principal.

Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February
12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the
credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the
investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan
accused, as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit. 30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides,
sworn statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which transpired. 31

Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the
accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with
clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult
to prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. 33 Apart from
their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi
and frame-up and, thus, remain selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any
dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely
testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their
only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.

As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless
arrests. This too must fail.

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned
the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to
the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-
appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons.35Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu, 36 the Court ruled that
the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error.37

With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole
against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds
that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the
information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be
exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to ₱200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and
his family endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and
his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the
basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a
testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00
to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment
of the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal,
Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities
among all the accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should
shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.

In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral
damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into
consideration the degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages
(₱573, 132.00 x 213) or ₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or ₱191,044.00.
Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱133,333.33; and
exemplary damages in the amount or ₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral damages;
and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in
the amount of ₱200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is
maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:

1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and

2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67
and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱33,333.33.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990 – MUDER/TENANT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the
pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now
Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that
the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case
to us for review.6

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta
with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in
Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went
to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio
Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and
started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman
Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been
informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the
scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with
the following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed
upward to the right axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width
and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5
inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular
line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla
left.
 9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.

11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of
the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED,

STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs,
heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat
by the Ajuy police force. 13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder
dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as
follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are
still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with
treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and
wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the
record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of
which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio
Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the
crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt.
(ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the
widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981
after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured
wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility
that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and
the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie
Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related
the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on
other matters.

By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as
30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy,
Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity
of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place
where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd
Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and
carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on
his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that
he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the
extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which,
to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he
travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied
participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis
of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:

. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada.
(TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to
20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who
was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.

As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he
feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of
most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
 It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and
Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could
not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the trial
court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:

Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the
award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People
v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984);
People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his
sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no
indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where
the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as
the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains
inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of
attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is
the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never
mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of
the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed
persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or
more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas'
testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too
impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described
in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada,
at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of
banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused as the
malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on
cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular
weapon was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance by
the herein accused as identified by you?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

 Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was
hacking the victim?

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was
stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?

A Yes, sir.39

(Emphasis supplied)

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing
in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation
under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by
the Court of Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
 Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance,
there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced
his death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what
specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen
inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have
caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the
five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused
could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay
probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her
womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds,
coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long
months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities
the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the
more it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been
satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was
threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer
to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused
were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be
clear and present when he testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In
fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not
existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their
landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness
and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has
confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the
surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a
greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial
distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the
victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging
for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is
contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult
children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime
of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary,
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the
crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant
is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 – DRIVER/ROBBERYAMO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404
thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO
SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990
finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO
GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both
sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
 The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento
the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they
were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said
presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.4

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the
established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are
without any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990,
p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries.
She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop.
He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so
Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with
Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at
the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She
said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her
at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown,
perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a
check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for
P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and,
after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because,
according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn
too (Id., pp. 23-26).

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank,
Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6

As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped
the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police
outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried
to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by
appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held
liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or
qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance,
whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder
would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of
his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official
duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful
acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by
both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know
your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I
had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of
ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and
consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in
the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:

Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit.

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed to
you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at
Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?

A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to her
house at Villa (sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given
you the checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or
some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa
Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention
thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily
gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery
or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293
of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by
Presidential Decree No. 532.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information that the victim was
carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up
to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more
money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion
the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a
modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between
and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that
any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion
thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and
brigands are synonymous. 20

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective,
we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the
then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing
validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in
the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient
to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members
of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other
hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed
by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential
Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from
the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best
and strongest in the law. 24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation
upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
 WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by
imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be
considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in
said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties,
albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts
if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption
in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline,
the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned
precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by
the said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would
be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear,
we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No.
532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew
resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a
highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the
unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential
Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the
natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition
of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse
of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the
intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the
Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging
them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through
intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of the robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by
necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with
intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could
negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants
Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the
Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the
amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.