PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs

PETRUS YAU a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a.
“Susan”, Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 208170 August 20, 2014

PONENTE: Mendoza

TOPIC: Kidnapping for ransom

FACTS:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant

Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United
States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white
Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra
Mall. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM
Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in
Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate,
appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and
gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was
also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone.
He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his
head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a
man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him
and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John
informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to
make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony
equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With
these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father
and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with
instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his
captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as well as to
reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he

was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still
alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other
accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-
down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
 Complainant was rescued when members of the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) intercepted the same taxi with plate
number PVD 115 and subsequently appellant led the team to his house where
complainant was held captive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petrus and Susana Yau were guilty of kidnapping for
ransom

HELD:

YES.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows:

1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
2. Actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and
3. Motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench.

1. Petrus is a private individual.

2. Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the
latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.
3. Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana
Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and
hence, deprived of his liberty.
4. Alastair was taken against his will.
5. Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of
US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.

Petrus is a principal and Susana is an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping

for ransom

It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the
prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he
remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his
kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.

Requisites for a person to be an accomplice

1. That there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way; and
 3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband,
Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities.
Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or
accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only
countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It
has been held that being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana
to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or
feeling of support to her husband.

People v. De Vera: where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of
the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
People v. Gonzales / G.R. No. 80762 / March 19, 1990

FACTS:Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales Sr., Custodio

Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida were all found guilty of murder for
killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. All of them except for Custodio Sr. withdrew their
appeal.The decision of the trial court was based on the testimony of witness Jose
Huntoria. Huntoria said that appellant was also one of the attackers of the deceased.
Appellant maintained that he was asleep at the moment.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s defense of alibi.

ISSUE: Whether appellant was guilty.

RULING: The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria

admitted during cross-examination that he cannot determine the group of people
stabbing the deceased. He failed to point definitely that appellant also did the crime.
As stated in Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable,
an act should be committed. The SC found no sufficient proof that appellant has
acted. Lastly, the SC found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the
tenant of the deceased. His testimony was sought to ingratiate himself with the
deceases family. The SC found appellants guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus
acquitting him.
People vs. Puno

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias

"Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants En Banc
Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific
intent

Facts:

 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in
Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs.
Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place

 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she
got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to
"get money" from her

 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked
Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000

 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000
check

 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed
his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga

 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the
other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van,
her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground
and was injured when she jumped out of the car
  The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except
that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car

o He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw
that his employer had gotten a ride

o He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as

charged

2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under
PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

1. No.

2. No.

Ratio:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,

nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation.

o For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty

o In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an

incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders

o This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of
our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since
the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such
moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin
of the law on highway robbery)

o PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery

perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons
 on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only
a predetermined or particular victim

o The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which
was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532
applicable to the case

o This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2

months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused
to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.

TOMASA DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.

Manuel Torres, for private prosecutor.

Alfredo Chicote, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila, taken by the complaining
witness, Julian Gonzalez, from a judgment of acquittal, upon a complaint for bigamy
under article 471 of the Penal Code.

The defendant was married to the complaining witness in Manila, May 27, 1897.
After living together in Manila for a time they separated, the defendant remaining in
the house where they had been previously living until some time subsequent to July
12, 1900. On that day she was married in Manila by a Protestant clergyman to
Ramon Martinez. Her defense is that she honestly believed her first husband was
dead when she married Martinez.

It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the
separation, in the same house with the defendant. Gonzalez testifies that the
separation took place in March, 1900, and that he also lived for some months in the
lower story of the same house, the defendant living in the upper story. He further
testifies that after he left this house and went to live elsewhere he visited his relatives
there nearly every day down to a few days before the trial, which took place in
September, 1901. He says that he often saw his wife at these times, supplying her
with means for her support through his relatives, but that he never spoke with her. A
short time after her second marriage the defendant moved away from the house and
has since lived elsewhere.

The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and
two months when the separation took place. That would fix the date of the separation
in July, 1898. She testifies that sometime during the year following the separation
she was told by the mother of Gonzalez that she had been informed that her son
was dead, that thereupon prayers were said for his soul for nine nights, and that she
put on mourning and wore it a year. She says that she contracted the second
marriage with the consent of the mother of Gonzalez, and believing that the
information which she had received from her as to the death of Gonzalez was true.
The mother of Gonzalez died before the trial.
There was some further evidence from other witnesses on both sides, but it was of
such a character as to throw but little light upon the facts of the case. On the whole,
we have reached the conclusion, though not without some hesitation, that the story
told by the defendant is in the main more likely to be true than false, and that she
probably did contract the second marriage under a bona fide belief that the first
marriage had been dissolved by the death of Gonzalez

We have recently held, in the United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique
Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902, that there can be no conviction under article
475 of the Penal Code, where by reason of a mistake of fact the intention to commit
the crime does not exist, and we think the same principle must apply to this case.
The defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the
complaint.

We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal
negligence in contracting the second marriage, and should have been convicted
under article 568 of the Penal Code. (See G.O., No. 58, sec. 29.) It does not appear
that she made any attempt to ascertain for herself whether the information received
by her mother-in-law as to the death of Gonzalez was to be relied upon. She never
even saw or communicated directly in any way with the persons who gave her
mother-in-law this information. Moreover, viewing the testimony in the light most
favorable to her, she waited less than two years after hearing the death of her
husband before contracting the second marriage. The diligence with which the law
requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which he is to perform. In a matter so important to the good order of
society as that in question, where the consequences of a mistake are necessarily so
serious, nothing less than the highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard
prescribed by the law. We cannot say that the defendant has acted with that
diligence in the present case.

Applying the provisions of article 568 of the Penal Code, the act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage, the prior marriage not having been lawfully
dissolved, being one which, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, the
offense committed by the defendant is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum
degree to prison correctional in its minimum degree. There being no aggravating
circumstance, and as we think the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the
Penal Code may properly be considered in this case, this penalty should be applied
in its minimum degree.

We therefore sentence the defendant to four months and one day of arresto mayor
and costs. The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance with this
opinion.
US v. Ah Chong GR No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’ quarters
at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was
the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had
been several robberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the
defendant and his roommate to reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of
their room by placing a chair against it. The defendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock on the door and
say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alone in his room,
was awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. The defendant
called out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard no answer. Fearing that
the intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill the
intruder if he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the
defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the
darkness of the room, the defendant thought he was being hit by the intruder and
tried to defend himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the said intruder was actually the
defendant’s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the
military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue:

WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated. In order for mistake of fact to be
held as a valid defense, there has to be several requisites. One, that the act done
would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
Two, that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, and
lastly, that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused. In the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant
believed him to be, then Ah Chong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal
intent, and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that he cannot
be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness.
PEOPLE V. ROBERTO ESTRADA

G.R. NO. 130487

Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to death. Defense interposed
insanity with proof of his history of mental illness filed for suspension of arraignment
and suspension of proceedings. Both were denied without subjecting accused to
mental examination.

HELD:

Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental examination to determine

competency to stand trial. By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial
court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial and the proceedings before the court
are therefore nullified. He who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must
prove it by clear and positive evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does
not entirely discount the probability that accused was not of sound mind at that time.
In passing the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the test is
found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance
which the law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct matters to be determined under
this test (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with
information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he is
able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered

rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court took it
solely upon itself to determine the sanity of the accused. The trial judge however is
not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health. The court should
have at least ordered the examination of the accused, especially in the light of the
latter’s history of mental item.
[G.R. No. 125672. September 27, 1996.]

JESUSA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN IN

MANDALUYONG, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF SECTION 20, ARTICLE

IV OF R.A. NO. 6425, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7659; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — RA 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly modified the
penalties prescribed by RA 6425, that is, inter-alia, where the quantity of prohibited
drugs involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty is reduced to a range of prison
correctional to reclusion perpetua. (Ordonez v. Vinarao, G.R. NO. 121421, March 28,
1996). In People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555, July 29, 1994) and People v. De Lara
(236 SCRA 291, September 5, 1994), this Court ruled that where the marijuana is
less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prison correctional.
Moreover, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable is
further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to the medium
period of prison correctional as the maximum term, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances (Garcia, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. NO.
110983, March 8, 1996). All told, the petitioner should now be deemed to have
served the maximum period imposable for the crime for which she was convicted,
i.e., selling 5.5 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Although her penalty of life
imprisonment had already become final, the beneficial effects of the amendment
provided under R.A. 7659 should be extended to petitioner.

RESOLUTION

After having served five and a half years of her life sentence, may petitioner — who
was convicted of selling 5.5 grams of prohibited drugs, namely, dried marijuana
leaves — be now entitled to the beneficent penalty provisions of R.A. 7659 and be
now released from imprisonment?

The Facts

Petitioner Jesusa Cruz, a.k.a. Jesusa Mediavilla, is at present confined at the

Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City serving the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed upon her as a consequence of her conviction on March 31,
1992 for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Her appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, was dismissed by this Court on
March 1, 1993 in G.R. No. 106389, People v. Jesusa Cruz. Hence, her life sentence
has become final and executory.

On August 6, 1996, the present petition for habeas corpus was filed by Atty. Mylene
T. Marcia-Creencia (of the law firm of Fortun and Narvasa) who was appointed by
this Court on September 13, 1995 as counsel de oficio to assist the accused in the
preparation of the said pleading. Petitioner alleges that, as of the date of filing of her
herein petition, she has already served five and a half years of her life sentence
(February 2, 1991 to August 5, 1996). She argues that the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed by the trial court is "excessive considering that the marijuana
allegedly taken from her was only 5.5 grams or less than 750 grams." The Solicitor
General, in his Comment filed with this Court on August 30, 1996, interposed "no
objection to a favorable application of Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

RA 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly modified the penalties
prescribed by RA 6425; that is, inter-alia, where the quantity of prohibited drugs
involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty is reduced to a range of prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. (Ordoñez v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 121424, March 28,
1996.) In People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555, July 29, 1994) and People v. De Lara
(236 SCRA 291, September 5, 1994), this Court ruled that where the marijuana is
less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional.
Moreover, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable is
further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to the medium
period of prision correccional as the maximum term, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances (Garcia, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No.
110983, March 8, 1996).

All told, the petitioner should now be deemed to have served the maximum period
imposable for the crime for which she was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. Although her penalty of life imprisonment had already become
final, the beneficial effects of the amendment provided under R.A. 7659 should be
extended to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is hereby ORDERED

RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, unless she is being detained on some other legal
charge. No costs.
PEOPLE VS. QUIJADA G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996

FACTS;

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38
cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without
giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation,
the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident
of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on
his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE;

If homicide or murder is committed by the accused with the use of an unlicensed

firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

HELD;

What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is
the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any
firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful
if the necessary permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is
attached the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum, to reclusion perpetua Now, if
"with the use of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed;"
the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession
of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal
possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is aggravated if the
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of
possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in the former.
There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful possession of
a firearm, which may be simple or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by
the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD1866. The other is homicide or
murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a
firearm without legal authority consummates the crime under P.D. 1866, and the
liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearm's use in a killing. The
killing whether homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of possession,
and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis
supplied).
People vs. Oanis G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

Facts: As a group taking the route to Rizal street, Chief of Police Antonio Z. Oanis
and his co-accused Corporal Alberto Galanta were under instructions to arrest
Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to
get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and
on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry
as to his identity. The victim turned out to be a peaceful and innocent citizen, Serapio
Tecson who upon autopsy, multiple gunshot wounds were found on his body which
caused his death. The defendants alleged and appealed that in the honest
performance of their official duties, they acted in innocent mistake of fact.

Issue: Whether or not Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were guilty of
murder.

Ruling: New Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2 paragraph 2 provides, No

unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed by both
was murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. Even if it were true that the
victim was the notorious criminal, the accused would not be justified in killing him
while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the
law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is
determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to capture him that killing
him would be justified.
SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA (G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992)

September 9, 2016 / Russell Jay

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)

Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.

Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to

the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

FACTS: Sometime in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other
armed men, went to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom.
Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by
his son-in-law and his family. RTC convicted Intod of attempted. Petioner raised the
case to CA but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is
only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place
where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present
in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing
intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other
words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act
which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.

Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of

Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together
with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
Campuhan

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks
for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr.,
brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.

• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw
Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand

• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several
times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who
she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting
Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to
chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials
who detained.

• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact

• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.

• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death

• Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated

• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible

• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is
yet as underdeveloped

• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus
showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim

• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about
what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray
ko!

• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and
the victim
G.R. No. L-19069 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968

People of the Philippines

vs Amadeo Peralta

Facts:

February 1958, Peralta among other inmates of New Bilibid Prisons, conspired and
mutually helped one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with
deadly weapons, feloniously killed Jose Carriego, Eugene Barnosa and Santos Cruz,
also convicts of New Bilibid. Aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present
because the crime was committed while the offenders were convicted by final
judgments.

Upon motion of the fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against
one of the accused for lack of evidence. After prosecution of the case, the charge
against 6 accused were dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case against
them. After trial, 5 of the accused were also acquitted, then 1 died.

Issues:

(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the
fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it
overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

Ruling:

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in
concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the time they
killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did
not participate in the actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they
are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act
and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the
execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in
the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals. Hence, all of the
six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz —
each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only
two modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or
successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple
capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-

recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses
were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of
convictions by final judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in a position, that the severe penalty imposed
on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta,

Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio
Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder,
and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
People v. De Vera y GarciaG.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999.Panganiban, J.

Facts: Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo
and ElmerCastro, was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in connection with the killing of one Frederick Capulong. De Vera and
Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other two accused, Florendo and
Castro, were at large. During trial, theprosecution presented as witness one
Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in thecar, where an altercation
later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle anapparently
disabled Capulong and shot him in the head moments later. Aside from Cacao’s
testimony, the prosecution also presented De Vera’s extrajudicial statement which
established thathe knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three
co-accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to watch for
passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convictedDe Vera and his co-accused Garcia of
the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim.In ruling that the crime committed
was murder, the trial court found that the killing wasattended by treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these wasenough to qualify the
crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The
trial court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for
Florendo’s group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the
accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the
attack was planned and performed in such a way asto guarantee the execution of
the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior
strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and
weapons. Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who actually
shot the victim. However, it convicted De Vera as a principal because the scientific
and forensic findings on thecriminal incident directly and substantially confirmed the
existence of conspiracy among the four accused. Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his
conviction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting De Vera as principal?

Held:

Yes. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could
inculpate De Vera. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was
imputed to him. Merepresence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court
based its finding of conspiracy onmere presumptions, and not on solid facts
indubitably indicating a common design to commitmurder. Such suppositions do not
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that De Vera was at the locus
criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime did not make him
aconspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution
evidence has notestablished that De Vera was part of the conspiracy to kill
Capulong. De Vera ’s participation, asculled from his own statement, was made after
the decision to kill was already afait accompli

.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs REGIE LABIAGA (G.R. No. 202867, July 15,
2013)

September 10, 2016 / Russell Jay

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder

Laws Applicable: RPC Art. 6

Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Doctrine: In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound
would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails
to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death
without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.

FACTS: Sometime in December of 2003 in Iloilo, accused Regie Labiaga (Regie)

and three others conspired, confederated and helped one another, with an
unlicensed firegun, willfully and unlawfully shot Judy Conde (Jojo) in different parts of
her breast whiched caused her death thereafter. The same individuals also
conspired to kill Gregorio Condea and later succeeded.

Appellant said that the shooting of Conde was an act of self-defense Conde
challenged him to a gunfight. RTC ruled out his defense.

RTC convicted the appelant of murder adn frustrated murder. CA affirmed the
decision with modifications as to civil indemnities.

ISSUE: WON Regie is guilty of frustrated murder.

RULING: NO. In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound
would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails
to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death
without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde
was mortal. Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant
should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51
of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be
two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248,
that is, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:

Appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an

indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of

David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer
and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap
when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed
the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk
things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant
lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a
legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces
of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of
the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending
and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter
terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.

He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2
months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that

Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by

the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of
the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However,
this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to
property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing
the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still
pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was
the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is

applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these
requisites:

Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have
left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and
putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be
acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor
has the right to be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case,

killing was disproportionate to the attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was
no provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay

the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity.

RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation
of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of
proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA
5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and

extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto
mayor and to indemnify

each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served
more than that, he should be released.
Criminal Case Digest: People vs Gregorio G.R. Nos. 109614-15 March 29, 1996

People vs Gregorio

G.R. Nos. 109614-15

March 29, 1996

Criminal Case Digest

Facts:

On the eve of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his 15-year old son Romeo
Catorse, arrived at the two-storey house of appellant Adronico Gregorio, at Sitio
Bug-as, Brgy. Sta. Cruz in Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the wake of the
latter’s grandson.

When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake.
Downstairs, Adronico Gregorio, et. al. were conversing, while upstairs, “Tunggak”
(son of Adronico), Ricardo Gregorio (brother of Adronico), et. al. were playing
“pusoy” (Russian poker).

Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with
him any weapon in their possession for safekeeping to avoid any trouble. Complying
therewith, Carlos handed over his “samurai” while John Villarosa and Remolito
Calalas, surrendered their knives, to Adronico.

However, around 1:00 a.m. of May 8, 1986, while playing the Russian poker,
appellant Ricardo Gregorio in a very loud voice, reprimanded “Tunggak” from
peeping at the cards of other players, but the son of Adronico, shouted also in a very
loud voice and wanted the game be stopped. When his father overheard it, he
summoned his son and boxed him several times.

In order to pacify the father and son from further aggravation, Carlos Catorse
intervened and begged Adronico to stop hurting his son and not to put him into
shame before the crowd. When suddenly, co-appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed
Carlos from behind using the latter’s own samurai and thereafter hacked and
stabbed him several times more in different parts of his body. Right after the
deceased fell to the ground, Adronico for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim with
bolo.

Romeo Catorse, son of the deceased, terrified of what he saw and ran out of the
house. Later, when Romeo returned to the house of Adronico Gregorio, he was
joined by his sister and younger brothers, together they found their father lying
prostrate and dead. When the police authorities arrived to the scene of the crime, to
investigate, the appellants already fled to another Sitio, but authorities pursued and
succeeded in apprehending them.
Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty for murdering
Carlos Catorse. Hence, another criminal case was instituted against Adronico
Gregorio for the murder of Marcelo Lo.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not appellants can invoke self-defense in their criminal liabilities?

Held:

Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from

criminal liability, however, the trial court skeptic of the said plea, rejected the same.
The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of accused
Ricardo Gregorio and co-appellant brother. Ricardo’s testimony affirmed that it was
Carlos Catorse who aggravated them initially, supported by Adronico’s claim, that
the deceased first attacked his son and brother. The court held that not only are the
foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are innately false and fatuous.

It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was luck of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The trial court agree that such aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may
be appreciated against the appellants. Treachery exist when an offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risks to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Hence, before the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could file its Appellee’s Brief,
appellant Ricardo Gregorio died on December 12, 1993. Consequently, his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon is extinguished. However,
Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000 each, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed in all respects. As aforestated, the death of Ricardo
Gregorio extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising from said crime.
CRIM 2: Sycip VS CA

SYCIP VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR 125059

March 17, 2000

FACTS:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel
Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit. Upon execution of the contract to sell,
Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the
amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.

After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and
incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint.
Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was
suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project
plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of
its townhouse project.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment

Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the
bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the
due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying
bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming
checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank
dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of
Quezon City six Informations charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The trial
court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22. Dissatisfied, Sycip
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but the decision of the RTC was
upheld

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:
The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED
of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), 9 an offense is
committed when the following elements are present:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other
elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at
the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the
bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third
elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not
rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue,
which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the
insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his
checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is
evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented
evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to
prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable
presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means
that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that
the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case were
issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find
from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had
knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them
when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner
that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with
Citibank.
People of the Philippines vs Gerardo Sazon, alias INSIK

GR. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

Facts: Ernesto Romualdez was confronted by Sazon for circulating a rumor that
Sazon and his companions were engaged in stealing, upon confrontation however,
Romualdez boxed Sazon and threatened to kill him. 2 days later, Sazon and his
cousin followed Romualdez after seeing the latter pass by. Sazon again confronted
Romualdez, and Romualdez allegedly provoked Sazon to just shoot. To which
Sazon shot Romualdez dead.

Issue: WON Sazon was justified in killing Romualdez because there was provocation

Held: No. The alleged provocation of Romualdez was insufficient to justify Sazon's
actions. Furthermore, there was evident premeditation when Sazon and his cousin
followed the victim in an attempt to overpower him.
G.R. No. L-28129 October 31, 1969ELIAS VALCORZA,

petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

RULING

The petitioner is acquitted.

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability
Paragraph 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office.

The facts and circumstances constrain us to hold that the act thus performed by
petitioner, which unfortunately resulted in the death of the escaping detainee, was
committed in the performance of his official duty and was more or less necessary to
prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully eluding the officers of the law. To
hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police officers
discharging official functions identical or similar to those in the performance of which
petitioner was engaged at the time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result
that thereafter we would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts on their part to
comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to the great detriment of
public interest.

FACTS: The deceased, Roberto Pimentel was a detention prisoner who escaped.
While in search for the escaped prisoner, Sgt. Daiton saw a person approaching
slowly under the bridge and he ordered him to halt. The latter instead of doing so,
jumped down into the creek spanned by the bridge. Roberto Pimentel emerged
suddenly from the bushes and lunged at the appellant Valcorza, hitting him with a
stone and causing him to fall to the ground. Appellant Valcorza regained his
composure and immediately chased the deceased, as the deceased did not heed his
order to stop, appellant fired four times into the air, and a fifth shot at Pimentel as the
latter was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the creek. The
members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate Pimentel and they
saw him floating, with a wound on his back. Elias Valcorza surrendered himself and
his firearm to the Chief of Police

ISSUE: Whether or not peace officer Valcorza was justified in shooting the deceased
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs

Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue, defendants.

Avelina Jaurigue, appellant.

FACTS: Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was
acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs.
She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment
suffered by her. From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue
appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon.

On September 20, 1942, at around 8o’clock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue went to
the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services. Avelina
Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the
purpose of attending religious services, Upon observing the presence of Avelina
Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by
her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of
her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she
had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand.
Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon
him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Fearing that
Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue
and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors
and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him.
Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and
questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of
what had actually happened

ISSUES:Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had
acted in the legitimate defense of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional
mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense attended by aggravating circumstance.

HELD: In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances
above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, with
no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.

Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric lights and there
were several people inside; under the circumstances, there was and there could be
no possibility of her being raped. The means employed by her in the defense of her
honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case,
she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.

The facts that the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered and admitted having stabbed the deceased, (2) had
acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense committed against her, (3) had
not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand, be
considered as mitigating circumstances.

Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of
her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked ordered confiscated.
People vs. Apolinar

Facts: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant andappellant Anastacio

Apolinar alias Atong was at thattime the occupant of a parcel of land owned by
JoaquinGonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan.Armed with a
shotgun, Atong was looking over said landwhen he observed that there was a man
carrying abundle on his shoulder.Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the
defendantcalled his attention but he ignored him.The defendant fired in the air and
then at the person.The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to getback to
his house and consequently narrated to AngelNatividad, the barrio chief, that he had
been woundedin the back by a shotgun.He then showed the two wounds - one in
each side of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in formand a little bigger
than a quarter of an inch, according tothe medical report of Dr. Mananquil.Petras
died of the wounds he sustained.The defendant surrendered to the
authoritiesimmediately after the incident and gave a swornstatement (Exhibit F)
before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.

Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defenseof property

Held: No; the right to property is not of suchimportance as right to life, and defense
of property canbe invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it iscoupled with an
attack on the person of one entrustedwith said property.
G.R. No. L-33304
December 13, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CONSTANTE SOTELO, ET AL., defendants.

CONSTANTE SOTELO, appellant.

FACTS

The Sotelo brothers, namely, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente, were prosecuted
in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for the crime of homicide under the
following information:

That on or about the night of December 24, 1929, in the municipality of Narvacan,
Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, the said accused Constante, Dominador,
and Vicente Sotelo, armed with a penknife, a stick, and an iron bar, respectively,
acting together and helping one another, did willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and
feloniously with treachery and evident premeditation attack, beat up, and commit
assault upon the person of Ignacio Cambaliza, inflicting a mortal wound upon him on
the level of the left nipple, which penetrated the left lung and the left ventricle of the
heart, another on the outward surface of the right arm, a bruise on the nose and
another on the upper lip: as a result of which said Ignacio Cambaliza died after a few
minutes.

The record shows that at about 8 o'clock in the evening of the 24th of December,
1929, Ignacio Cambaliza started for the barrio of Ravadabia, in the municipality of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, accompanied by Baltazar Capistrano. They took the provincial
road leading to said barrio and as they approached the Sotelo house, they bid the
time of day, asking whether they might pass by, according to the custom of the
place. They were barely 20 meters away from the house, when the defendant
Constante Sotelo, who had just finished his supper, descended from the house
towards the road, and, from the entrance of his yard, turned his flashlight on the
passers-by to see who they were. When Ignacio Cambaliza saw this, he walked
back to where Constante Sotelo stood and inquired why he turned his flashlight on
them, and what it was he wanted, winding up with a vulgar remark. When
Constante's brothers, who were then in the yard on the side of the road, saw
Cambaliza's attitude, they approached their brother to separate or defend him,
whereupon Cambaliza's commenced beating them with his iron crop, once striking
Constante's arm. The brothers, in turn, fell upon Cambaliza, Dominador striking him
across the face with the stick he carried, and Vicente wounding him in the right
shoulder with a penknife. At this juncture, Capistrano attempted to intervene, but he
was warned by Vicente and probably by Dominador also, for which reason he
withdrew from the scene, and the fight then continued between Cambaliza and
Constante. In the course of this fight, Constante thrust a penknife into Cambaliza at
about the level of the left nipple, producing a wound which penetrated the left lung
into the left ventricle of the heart, resulting in his death a few minute later.

ISSUES

Whether the trial judge erred in sustaining the fiscal's objection to having witness
Capistrano explain the contradiction between his statement and his testimony before
the trial court at the hearing.

RULING

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts other
than the facts in issue, which if proved, may tend by inference to establish the fact in
issue. The witness Capistrano affirmed in Exhibit 10 that he saw Constante standing
at the entrance of his yard, alone; that the deceased was the first to make vulgar
remarks to Constante; and that during the fight Constante was under Cambaliza
when he drew his penknife to stab him. On the other hand, testifying before the trial
court, the said witness Capistrano stated that he and the deceased saw the three
brothers, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo in the yard of the house; that
one of these brothers was the first to make insulting remarks to Cambaliza, and that
while the two brothers were attacking Cambaliza, Constante stabbed him in the
chest with a penknife. We believe Capistrano's testimony appearing in Exhibit 10 as
to Constante's position when he wounded Cambaliza, must be accepted, not only
because it was given two days after the incident, but because it has been
corroborated by the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge erred in sustaining
thus; Constante is guilty of the crime homicide.
P Vs Beronilla

Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

Facts: Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico
file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder
for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the
outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor
Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of
the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously
upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which authorized him to
appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and
aiding or abetting the enemy.

Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he
was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on
various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who
replied, saying “…I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way
of handling the whole case.”

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were
indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued
Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts
of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others
were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives
and that the crime was committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty
proclamation.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances

for obedience to lawful order of superior

Held: Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military
subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith without the being
aware of its illegality.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution
and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it
could not be established that Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel
Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the illegality of
Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not
have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show
malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel
given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence
review sent to the superior officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of to be innocent).

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the
Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La
Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory, the court should have found for the
Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable doubt as to whether a given
case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the
accused.”

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

People vs PO3 Fallorina

G.R. No. 137347

March 4, 2004

Facts:

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old
minor and the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar,
Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City, asked permission from his mother
Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon
“Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned
carinderia beside the road.

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness
Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the
familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball
court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine
National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG),
knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one of his friends was
previously been scolded by the appellant before.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3
Fallorina saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed
at them. After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from
the roof while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he
heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as
Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant
pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot.
Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned
carinderia and the basketball court.

The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting
tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was
pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the head.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?

(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of public position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary
surrender?
Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a
criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is
the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the
accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or
with fault or negligence.

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a

lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident;
and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it.

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and
inculpatory facts and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of
the accused. The court also failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of the accused since it was only after three days that the
appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And lastly, the court
considered the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the
accused.

On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant-
accused of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public
position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3
Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by the
Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC).
Hence, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro,
Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid for funeral services);
P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer
the Death Penalty.
People v. Arguta and Cahipe

G.R. No. 213216; April 20, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari challenges the decision of the CA affirming
thedecision of the RTC which convicted accused-appellants, Ricky Arguta and
Wilson Cahipe, of one (1) count of rape, defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Sometime in December 1996, AAA was on her way home when
the accused-appellants threatened her with a bladed weapon and allegedly,
thereafter, raped her on a certain cottage. Arguta was the one who first raped the
victim and afterwards, Cahipe took over and raped her. They left AAA at the cottage.
An hour later, Cahipe dragged the victim to another place and raped her again. AAA
was returned to the cottage after this instance. The next day, AAA’s father found her
at the cottage. Two (2) criminal informations were filed before the RTC charging
Cahipe with two (2) counts of rape, and Arguta of one (1) count of the same crime.
The accused-appellants both denied the accusations and offered their alibis. The
RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.
However, Cahipe was not convicted on the other charge of rape due to insufficiency
of evidence. The CA affirmed their conviction with modification as to the damages.
Aggrieved, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

ISSUE:

In qualified rape, if the circumstances of “use of a deadly weapon” and “two or more
persons” are present, is one of them considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance?

HELD:

No. In the case of People v. Lamberte, the Court held that the presence of either
circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies the
crime of Rape. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not
a generic aggravating circumstance. In this case, the Court deems it appropriate to
modify accused-appellants’ conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape as the
rape occurred during the effectivity of the old rape provision of the RPC which
provides that “xxx Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death”.
Hence, qualifying the crime of rape. Considering that the crime was committed by
two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it
is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.

Furthermore, when the two circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to
consider the remaining circumstance as a generic aggravating circumstance for
either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerating what are aggravating circumstances.

Therefore, if the circumstances of “use of a deadly weapon” and “two or more

persons” are both present, there is no need to appreciate the first as a qualifying
circumstance and the second as a generic circumstance.
People vs Regala

G.R. No. 130508

April 5, 2000

Facts:

On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then
16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were
sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered
the former’s house.

Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the
room of the victims and poked at 8-inch gun on them, one after the other, and
hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother was
hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmother’s aparador being opened
where two rings, two wrist watches, and money were taken from the aparador. After
raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the
aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped
again by the accused.

He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his criminal
case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of
Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness “either” voluntarily submitted to
a sexual act or was forced into one.

Issue:

(a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered as an

aggravating circumstance?

Held:

On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo, separately

testified that they saw the face of Regala, despite of no electricity at the commission
of the crime, because he used a flashlight and took off the mask he was wearing,
and thus, they remembered him wearing an earring of his left ear, which he was still
wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police station.
The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract from
the fact, that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused-appellant.
As correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not
exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulanday’s testimony
does not support the contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily
submitted to sexual advances of Regala.

The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in
force. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides,
under paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for
any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.

In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not
be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
court is proper. The judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the victim is entitled to
an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Subject Matter: Conspiracy

Facts:

On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo
Aquino and Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually
helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a
movie actress by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal
accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal
knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel
in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences
each of them to the death penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the
element of conspiracy.

Held:

No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of
conspiracy was present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is
also liable for the crime committed by each of the other persons who conspired to
commit the crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose,
Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three
(3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise
convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000
in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Cañal was dismissed only in so
far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to
promulgation of judgment.
PEOPLE VS. CASTILLO, G.R. NO. 132895, March 10, 2004

FACTS:

Who:

• Appellant - Elizabeth Castillo (principal),

Evangeline Padayhag (co-principal) and Imelda Castillo Wenceslao (accessory)

• Appellee - Solicitor General

o Kidnapped- "Rocky" or Horacio Cebrero IV (6

years old)

o Parents - Luis Cabrero and Sandra Cabrero

Where: Paranaque, Manila

Appellant – Elizabeth Castillo

Castillo asserts that the victim’s parents did not pay her wages when she worked as
a maid of the victim’s family. She claims that it was this injustice, her educational
level and her ignorance of the law, which impelled her to take Rocky. Castillo insists
that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend time with
him. Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not
harmed, and was even cared for during his detention.

Appellant – Evangeline Padayhag

Padayhag asserts that she doesn’t have knowlege of Castillo’s plans. She met
Castillo only because Castillo told her that her boyfriend is sick. When Castillo asked
her to fetch Rocky, she did so believing that Castillo misses the boy, as the former
told her.

Appellee

March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria (victim's yaya) and Femie(another housemaid),

bathed and prepared Rocky (victim). The parents advised Baria that someone would
fetch Rocky. At 8:00 am, a tricycle arrived and on-board was Evangeline Padayhag
(accused co-principal). They went to a nearby Mcdonald's and joined by Elizabeth
Castillo (principal). At 5:30 PM, Luis Cabrero arrived home from work. DJ (other son)
informed him that Rocky did not attend school. Baria said that Rocky was fetched by
a woman to attend a birthday party. Mr. Cabrero went to police station and report his
missing son.At 7:30 PM, a woman called asking for the ATM in exchange of his son.
March 2, 1995 - A woman called asking for 1 million pesos. Mr. Cabrero said he
doesn't have that money. On March 3, 1995 - No call. Mr. Cabrero as his wife to
raise money and was able to withdrew P800,000. The bank provided the serial nos.
of the money.

March 4, 1995 - 9:30 PM - The woman called again and asked for the ransom. Mr.
Cabrero said he only has half. The woman agreed and instructed them to be in
Paco, Obando, Bulacan at 2AM. A stakeout operations by Major Ronnie Eleazar was
organized. At 11PM, in front of the Sabadista chapel, a car arrived. A man alighted,
left the bag in front of the chapel and immediately left. About 40 mins after, two
woman collected the bag and disappeared. The policie lost the suspects but have
identified Castillo and Padayhag.

March 5, 1995 – at 9PM, tricycle stopped in front of Mr. Cabrero’s house and found
that is was his son who knocked. On March 12, 1995 – Police found Padayhag, who
surrendered herself to clear her name. On March 18, 1995 – Police captured
Castillo in Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga City and found the ransom money, matching
the serial numbers provided by the bank.

ISSUE:

WON Padayahag’s actions is considered conspiracy for the kidnapping and illegal
detention of the victim?

HELD:

RTC: Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing them with
death penalty

Supreme Court:

• On Castillo - Affirmed with Modification.

Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay
the victim P100,000 as moral damages. The award for exemplary damages is
deleted for lack of legal basis.

• On Padayhag – Reversed and Acquitted.

Padayhag’s sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and
bringing him to where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling
with the two, went to the house of Castillo’s sister together with Castillo and Rocky,
and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution would have us
rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that
without Padayhag’s help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky. Padayhag’s acts
before, during and after the crime all point to the conclusion that she was no more
than an unwitting tool of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again
misled her into fetching Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after the day of
Rocky’s abduction. Castillo also testified that she did not bring Padayhag along with
her when she went to Obando on the day that coincided with the “pay-off.” The only
circumstance linking Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of two police
officers who admitted that their quarry inexplicably disappeared before their very
eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, by itself,
cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.Nothing links
Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never received any part of the ransom,
precisely because she did not even know it existed.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with
Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal
by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly
and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for
baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through.

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent;

and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur.
Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act
must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action
is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by
a common design

In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, and not on the weakness of the defense of the accused. The
prosecution should have done more to establish Padayhag’s guilt. Instead, the
prosecution left a lot of room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt.

The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis
except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the
contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty- a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to
act upon it.
Enrile vs Salazar

Enrile vs Salazar

G.R. No. 92163

June 5, 1990

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel
of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition
filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising
from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred
to in the second clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances,
the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in
the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined
and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that
must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the
facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal
case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner
to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have
been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if
appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
Santiago vs Garchitorena

Santiago vs Garchitorena

G.R. No. 109266

December, 2 1993

Facts:

On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified"
aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged
that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides
that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days
after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On
November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that
there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion
for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment.

More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship
because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the
country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to
issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena,
written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated
that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure
permission to leave the country.

The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his
disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution
dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito

continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In
fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in
mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal
Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has
been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145
penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war
veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a
single criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not
qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred
that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended
party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October
17, 1988.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993
in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32
Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information
charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar
as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
PEOPLE v. DELA TORRE [G.R. Nos. 137953-58. April 11, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs. WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.

FACTS: The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision[1] and June 3, 1998
Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales. The assailed
Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and
four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by plaintiff (now appellant). Ruling of the Trial Court: The RTC
ruled that “it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of
lasciviousness against Mary Rose. Further, the trial court added that the moral
ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not give
any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial
and alibi. However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death
on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of
the offenses. Hence, this appeal. In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this
single error for our consideration: “The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with
reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the
supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659.” The Court’s Ruling: The
appeal has no merit. The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by
imposing the supreme penalty of death on the accused. It argues that it has proven
that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18)
years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.[23] Under Section
1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This
provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.

ISSUE: Whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate
the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

RULING:

Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the
prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.

Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous,
these cannot be corrected by this Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Said the
Court:
"Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision.
This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution
no matter how obvious the error may be."

The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper
petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People
v. CA and Maquiling as follows:

"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls
for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right
against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to
converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction
of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy.